The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
That my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) is an ornament to all we do is well established. That he is a guardian of our liberties and freedoms is well known. But what is not so well known outside his locale is that he is a doughty champion of his constituents and their interests—as doughty as any in this House, matched by few, but matched by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Charlotte Leslie) who, like him, leaves no stone unturned when it comes to highlighting the interests of her constituents and dealing with what they perceive to be unfairness and unreasonableness, and that is precisely what my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset in his view and mind has drawn to the attention of the House tonight. I make no comment on that and he would not expect me to comment on the particular details of the case, although I have much to say in the short time available to us.
As I am acting as a proxy for the Police Minister, it is a particular delight to see him sitting beside me. I know that he will watch over me with the gaze that he uses in dealing with all such important matters.
The leadership of our police forces is of central importance to the effective maintenance of law and order, and it is important that the people of England and Wales understand how decisions affecting the leadership are made and are scrutinised. We have heard from both my hon. Friends who have spoken and from those who have intervened. I note my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) in his place, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater and West Somerset (Mr Liddell-Grainger). The relationship between public and police depends on that absolute certainty—that trust—that things are done properly.
As I said, it would not be appropriate for me, and I do not intend, to address the specific case. Instead, I will respond to my hon. Friends’ remarks by setting out the principles underpinning the complaints and disciplinary system, and how that system works. It is well known that policing in England and Wales is built on the principles set down by Sir Robert Peel. For the convenience of the House, I wondered whether I might put those principles in the Library of the House following this short debate. Central to these principles is that
“the ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police . . . actions”.
Although I may disagree with Peel on many things, particularly the corn laws, he had sagacious advice about the importance of trust and confidence in the force he established. He stated that
“the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence”.
Such is the community of trust between the public and the police. The moment that trust is lost, the public approval of police actions is in jeopardy, and policing as we know it is threatened. I say this not to be melodramatic, but to reinforce the fact that the police hold a very significant range of powers, and if they are to use those powers effectively, and maintain the Queen’s peace, the public must have the utmost trust in the police, and how they are led.
The election of police and crime commissioners marked the biggest change in police governance in living memory. PCCs give the public a direct say in how their forces are run, reinforcing the link between the public and police, and providing the public with a democratically elected voice in their local police force. This link between the public and the police is of central importance to the matters being considered here today, drawn to our attention by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset. The chief constable of any force leads their force on behalf of the communities they serve. The PCC holds them to account on behalf of the public, and it is right that decisions relating to who leads that force are made by PCCs. It is vital that this central point is not lost in the debate we have here today.
Let me turn specifically to allegations of misconduct, and the regulations that govern how these are handled. The Government have been clear that the role of the Independent Police Complaints Commission is crucial in a system of police scrutiny and complaints that functions well and commands public confidence. The majority of misconduct allegations about chief constables are usually referred by PCCs as the “appropriate authority” to the IPCC for independent investigation. As an independent body, it is for the IPCC to decide whether to investigate an allegation about a chief constable following referral from the PCC. Ministers are, as I said, unable to comment on individual cases.
Last year, an independent review of the police disciplinary system led by Major-General Chip Chapman recommended that the IPCC should investigate all chief officer cases. The Government will shortly introduce legislation to implement that recommendation.
Dr Fox
Will my right hon. Friend give us an assurance that when the Government look at this legislation they will take on board this point: why should a good and decent public servant want to take on the role of chief constable when they can be dragged into the mud by smear and innuendo that turn out to have no basis in fact?
Mr Hayes
Smear and innuendo are never acceptable in any aspect of public service, and my right hon. Friend is right that the system must be robust in guarding against vexatious and unhappy claims. As I have said, I will not comment on the specifics of the case, but as a matter of principle he is, of course, right that the system needs to be sufficiently well designed to ensure that complaints that have merit are dealt with properly.
We have heard today, particularly from my right hon. Friend, about what might be described as “double jeopardy”—the time-honoured principle that people are not tried twice for the same thing—and it has been suggested that it should not be open to a PCC to call upon their chief constable to resign or retire when they have been subject to misconduct proceedings.
I think that it is important to note that the process of misconduct hearings, and the sanctions that may result, are rightly different and separate from the process set down in section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which enables the PCC to call upon a chief constable to retire or resign. The PCC holds the chief constable to account on behalf of the public. They are best placed to make decisions on both the appointment and dismissal of a chief constable. We have set out a clear process that must be followed, and I shall come to it momentarily.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that clarification, but in this case the section 38 process followed immediately from the report into the misconduct allegations, so the two were intimately and intricately linked.
Mr Hayes
With the precision and eloquence for which he is renowned, my hon. Friend has put that on the record.
The Government recognise that the decision to call upon a chief constable to resign or retire is significant and should not be taken lightly, and in that regard I take the point made by my right hon. Friend a moment ago. That is why we have established detailed procedures that must be followed whenever a PCC might wish to invoke their section 38 powers, and we remain satisfied that sufficient safeguards are in place with regard to the power of PCCs to dismiss chief constables.
These issues have, of course, been debated in this House previously, most notably during the passage of the 2011 Act. It is worth noting that the IPCC has no role within the section 38 process, although it is equally important to note that the PCC is obliged to have regard to the views of Her Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary and to seek the views of the relevant police and crime panel, as well as providing the chief constable with the opportunity to make representations. The process is detailed and requires the PCC to take into account independent views. The final decision will remain that of the PCC, but I remain confident that the process offers sufficient checks and balances and that the interests of the people and communities who elect PCCs are properly served in this way.
Mr Liddell-Grainger
The Minister knows me well enough to know that I will speak very bluntly about this case. The PCC has promoted a senior officer who released a letter as a superintendent. He basically stabbed his boss in the back and then turned up as a senior commander in Somerset. What confidence can we have when we have a badger cull, Hinkley Point, serious flooding two years ago and a man who quite honestly is there because he is—this is a horrible term—a poodle of the PCC? That is not the way to police in this country. I am sorry to be blunt with the Minister, but I hope that he takes it in the spirit with which it was meant.
Mr Speaker
There is never a deficit of passion, or indeed of oratory, from the Minister of State.
Mr Hayes
Ah, Mr Speaker, I may be a player, but the stage is yours.
The truth is that, in particular circumstances, with the sensitivities that surround particular cases, there will be strong views held on all sides of the debate, and it is by the nature of this Chamber that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset has been able to bring some of those strong views to our attention. I know that the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice, who is sitting beside me, takes these matters very seriously indeed, and I may have some news at the end of my speech that may give some satisfaction to those who have contributed to this short discussion.
The process that I have described includes the PCC obtaining the views of Her Majesty's chief inspector of constabulary in writing and having regard to those views; providing a copy of those written views to the chief constable and the PCP; providing a written explanation to the chief constable and the PCP of the reasons why he or she is proposing to remove a chief constable; notifying the chief executive; and giving the chief constable the opportunity to make written representations. If the PCC still proposes to call upon the chief constable to retire or resign, he or she must give the chief constable and the PCP a written explanation of their reasons, which must also be given to the chief inspector of constabulary. A scrutiny hearing of the PCP will then be held in private, at which the PCC and chief constable are both entitled to attend to make representations, regardless of whether the PCP wishes to call them.
The PCP may consult the chief inspector of constabulary before making a recommendation to the PCC as to whether or not the commissioner should call for the retirement or resignation of the chief constable. Fundamentally —this goes to the heart of the debate—the PCC is missioned to act reasonably and fairly.
It was Disraeli, Peel’s adversary in the corn law debates, who said
“circumstances are beyond human control, but our conduct is in our own power.”
The question of how we conduct ourselves is vital to any relationship, not least that between the police and the public. I thank my hon. Friend for raising these issues and for giving me the opportunity to speak about this relationship today.
The news I want to bring to my hon. Friend and other concerned Members of this House is that, given the representations made by right hon. and hon. Members, well articulated in this debate, and typical of my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice, he is indeed happy to meet Members of this House to discuss their concerns. He is also prepared to meet the former chief constable as part of that process. It seems to me important that that further check on reasonableness and fairness, personified by this excellent Minister, is vital both as a matter of principle and as a matter of practice in this case. I know that all who have contributed to the debate will recognise the significance of the step that my right hon. Friend has decided to take and I have imperfectly and humbly been able to draw to their attention.
Question put and agreed to.