Oral Answers to Questions
John Baron Excerpts(11 years, 9 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
No. The right hon. Gentleman is simply wrong. The figure of £12.5 billion is from CAAS—the internal cost assessment and assurance service. It was quoted by the National Audit Office and has subsequently been reassessed at £4.4 billion. [Interruption.] No, it was by CAAS and has been reassessed at £4.4 billion. The right hon. Gentleman is simply wrong.
Labour has to decide whether it is going to engage seriously in this debate or not. At last year’s Labour conference, the right hon. Gentleman told his party that it
“must deal with the issues we would if we were in power…No smoke and mirrors, no delay in tough decisions”.
Just two weeks ago, however, he told The Daily Telegraph:
“I’m not going to say we will guarantee to overturn this cut or the other.”
Which is it to be: tough decisions or more ducking and weaving?
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
The 2011 independent commission acknowledged the increased cost of collectively training Territorial Army units over their regular brethren when force generation factors were taken into account. Given that the Green Paper makes clear that TA units will be more frequently used, will the Government justify their claim that replacing regular troops with reservists is cost-effective?
Mr Hammond
As my hon. Friend knows, we have allocated £1.8 billion over 10 years for additional training, infrastructure and equipment for the reserves to try to rebuild the broken trust that resulted from the previous Government’s slashing of funding for reserve training and equipment. On the economics of using reserves instead of regular forces, it is true that, when deployed on operations, reserves are more expensive than regulars, but, held as a contingency, reserves are significantly lower cost than regular forces. We are simply trying, within the budget envelope available, to create the greatest amount of military capacity it is possible to generate.
Deployment to Mali
John Baron Excerpts(11 years, 10 months ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on deployment to Mali.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)
On 14 January the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Mark Simmonds), made a statement to the House outlining the UK’s deployment of two C-I7 transport aircraft to provide logistical support to France, as well as a small detachment of technical personnel deployed to Bamako airport to assist with the reception of the C-I7 aircraft. Since that announcement, we have decided to extend our support to the continued provision of one C-I7 in support of the French for a further three months. There are currently about 20 people deployed in Bamako supporting liaison with French forces and, following a French request for additional surveillance support, we have deployed a Sentinel R1 aircraft to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support staff of about 70 people.
EU Foreign Ministers agreed on 17 January to establish an EU military training mission to Mali—EUTM—and work is ongoing to scope that mission. Today in Brussels, representatives from EU member states, including the UK, will meet to discuss the individual member state contributions to the mission. The UK is prepared to contribute up to 40 personnel to the EUTM, either in an HQ or training team role. We do not envisage UK personnel fulfilling a force protection role, and it is quite possible that all 40 personnel will not be required, dependent on the contributions from other member states. I can assure the House that we will not allow UK personnel to deploy on any mission until we are satisfied that adequate force protection arrangements are in place.
Today in Addis Ababa the African Union is hosting a donor conference to discuss how the international community can support the African-led intervention force, AFISMA, in delivering the role that the United Nations Security Council has mandated it to fulfil. The UK will today offer £5 million for two new UN funds to support the strengthening of security in Mali, with £3 million directed to AFISMA and £2 million to activity in Mali that facilitates and supports political processes for building stability. The UK is also prepared to offer up to 200 personnel to provide training to troops from Anglophone west African countries contributing to AFISMA, although the numbers required will be dependent upon the requirements of the AFISMA contributing nations. To establish those requirements, we have deployed a small number of advisers to Anglophone west African countries that are likely to contribute to the AFISMA mission, to assess their needs and to gain situational awareness.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers will provide an update to the House on the outcome of the discussions in Brussels and Addis Ababa at the appropriate moment.
Mr Baron
I thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question, and thank the Secretary of State for his answer.
British involvement in Mali and the wider region is deepening, and it is clearly in everyone’s interests that we do not allow legitimate Governments to fail, particularly when faced with extremists. It is no secret that I opposed our recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, because I fear that one can be drawn into ever-deepening conflicts. Afghanistan illustrated the dangers of being sucked into larger deployments. That mission morphed into something much larger: it changed from a mission to defeat al-Qaeda or deny it the use of Afghanistan to one of nation-building.
Drawing on our lessons in Afghanistan—and, perhaps, on other interventions—will the Government clarify the following points? We need greater clarity on the role of British troops. The Government have said they will not be placed in a combat role, but there are a host of grey areas between combat roles and support roles. What exactly will these advisers do? Will they be involved in logistics or training, or will they advise on strategy? Equally importantly, how will they be protected? Are we deploying troops on the ground to protect these advisers, or are we relying on our French colleagues to provide that protection?
May I also ask the Secretary of State what exactly is the exit strategy? It is very easy to get drawn into these situations, but it is not always clear what the endgame and exit strategy are, and even what the endgame looks like. What are the contingency plans if military progress does not go to plan? Is there talk on the table that we should perhaps be deploying or committing, or be prepared to commit, more troops if the fighting goes badly? At the moment, that is all going well, but the situation can change very quickly.
Finally, what lessons should we learn from United Nations Security Council resolution 2085, which was passed last year and called on local African nations to lead the combat role in defeating these extremists in northern Mali? There was tremendous delay in the implementation of that resolution. What lessons have we learned from that, because we seem to be playing catch-up? On a related but slightly separate issue, what is the international community’s broader strategy on encouraging local forces to play a more proactive role, not only in Mali, but in the wider region, in combating these extremists? These are legitimate questions and the British public and we as a House need to ask them, because there is a real danger of getting drawn into a much larger deployment, particularly if things do not go to plan on the ground.
Mr Hammond
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. First, the UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and in ensuring that its territory does not become an ungoverned space available to al-Qaeda and its associates to organise for attacks on the west. Secondly, we have established military co-operation with France, which is an important part of Britain’s strategy for the future, and this situation, along with the Libya campaign, is an opportunity for us to demonstrate the validity of that working relationship with France. The role of British troops, as I set out in my response to the urgent question, is clearly not a combat role, and it will also not extend, as we envisage it at the moment, to a force protection role. We are looking for force protection arrangements to be put in place, probably by the French, but certainly by the European Union in relation to the EU training mission.
My hon. Friend asked me about the exit strategy. France has made it clear that it envisages a short intervention to stabilise the situation on the ground while the African forces from neighbouring countries and the Malian army deploy to sustain the situation in the longer term. We concur with that strategy. I should say, again, that it is not our intention to deploy combat troops; we are very clear about the risks of mission creep and we have defined very carefully the support that we are willing and able to provide to the French and the Malian authorities.
My hon. Friend referred to UN Security Council resolution 2085 and the time delay in deploying African forces. I think it is well known that the intention was to deploy African forces in support of the Malian authorities later this year, but the situation on the ground has become more urgent, hence the decision by the French to intervene. Some of these forces require equipment and some require additional training, and the response time to the mobilisation envisaged by resolution 2085 has perhaps been longer than we would have liked. The lesson we can learn from that is that if we want local forces to be able to deploy and respond to resolutions of this nature, we may have to take a more proactive role in resourcing them to do so.
On the broader strategy for encouraging local forces to tackle extremism, part of our defence posture, set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010, is to devote an increasing proportion of our defence resources to upstream engagement, building capacity in fragile nation states to allow them to deal with early threats to their security, rather than waiting for the situation to degenerate to the point at which it requires outside intervention.
Armed Forces Redundancies
John Baron Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr Francois
For the purposes of this process, Scottish personnel will be treated in much the same way as personnel throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. I believe the House thinks that is right; so do I.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
Some of us who have served question the wisdom of cutting regular battalions before knowing for sure that the reservists can fill the large gap that will be left behind. We live in an uncertain world. What objective measures exist for Parliament to gauge progress on this issue?
Mr Francois
As my hon. Friend may recall, he raised this matter with me at Defence questions last week. At the risk of being repetitious, I pointed out to him that we are delighted that recent tri-service and Army recruiting campaigns have already produced a 25% increase in TA inquiries, while regular Army engagements are up 3% against a three-year rolling average. I have taken a close personal interest in the plan to increase the size of the reserves. I understand what lies behind his question, but I genuinely believe that we can do it.
Nuclear Deterrent
John Baron Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
Most Members will be aware of this, but for the record I should like to state that I firmly believe in our nuclear deterrent. In this uncertain world where countries that are not necessarily friendly to the west have nuclear weapons, it is an unfortunate fact of life that we need them as well to guarantee Britain’s safety. However, that does not stop us also working towards arms reduction. When President Obama launched his global zero initiative, I very much welcomed it. We also owe a debt of thanks to the Royal Navy and our Vanguard submariners, who are always on patrol, for safeguarding the country and providing the essential British contribution to NATO.
I want to suggest that our commitment to our nuclear deterrent should not just be about the current capability and future plans. There is a legacy from the dawn of our deterrent that we have still not yet fully recognised. We have to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to another group of people, who also deserve our recognition and thanks, without whom Britain would never have joined the top tier of nuclear powers. They are, of course, our nuclear test veterans.
In the 1950s and 1960s, in the largest tri-service operation since the D-day landings, 20,000 service personnel participated in British nuclear weapon tests in the south Pacific and Australia. These men’s service was unique. When they took part, the science was largely unknown. Pre-test precautions were primitive and inadequate and failed to protect individuals fully from the effects of heat, blast shock and ionising radiation. Many veterans believe that their health was adversely affected by those tests, a view substantiated by scientific research undertaken in New Zealand by Professor Rowland that was peer-reviewed and accepted by the then New Zealand Government.
Some years ago, following an inquiry from a constituent, I became involved with the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association and I am now its patron. After a long campaign, the BNTVA and I succeeded in persuading the Ministry of Defence to undertake a health needs analysis of all surviving veterans. It showed that 84% of them believed that their main health condition was caused by radiation. If anybody thinks that that was an easy task and analysis to accomplish, they have not dealt with the MOD, but I thank it for taking that on.
Mr Baron
To a certain extent, yes.
Many helpful, practical measures are now being introduced as a result—for example, small but important things such as markers denoting veteran status on NHS records.
Following the success of the health needs analysis, the BNTVA and I recently started a new campaign with three objectives. The first is to secure a lasting legacy for these men and their descendants. There is still much to learn about the effects of exposure to radiation and how we can continue to make nuclear energy safe. The second is to secure public recognition from the Prime Minister of our debt to these veterans. That could include recognition through the medal system by adding a clasp to the general service medal. The third is to establish a benevolent fund courtesy of Government, the suggested figure being £25 million. This would support atomic veterans and, more importantly, their descendants, who have also suffered medical setbacks that can be attributed to their fathers’ exposure.
Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)
I am very pleased to hear the hon. Gentlemen’s speech and endorse every word he has spoken. I am a member of the group that he has set up and I, too, have been horrified to hear from my constituents about the effects on grandchildren as a result of the tests in which the veterans took part. He is absolutely right: we must not forget the part that those veterans and their families continue to play.
Mr Jones
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I was pleased to put in place the health study, against the opposition of a lot of the civil service, when I was a Defence Minister. A generous settlement proposal was put to the lawyers—I got the Treasury to agree to it—but it was rejected. That was an opportunity missed for veterans to get some compensation.
Mr Baron
I recognise the part that the hon. Gentleman played in the health needs analysis. However, let us be absolutely clear about a confusion that is all too readily accepted by the MOD: the BNTVA has never participated in the legal cases that some individual veterans have brought. That is a vital distinction to make and I ask the House to take it on board.
Although £25 million sounds like a lot of money, we should set it in the context of how other nuclear countries have treated their veterans. The US gives each veteran £47,000 plus a further £47,000 for any secondary attributable illness. No causal link is required between the cancer suffered by the veteran and the fact that they were there. If they were at the tests and they have cancer, they automatically get the compensation. Canada pays more than £15,000 in addition to money, from pensions and compensation legislation. The Isle of Man makes an ex gratia payment of £8,000 to any resident test veteran.
In all three cases, the service personnel in question have access to free health care provision. The MOD argument that veterans in this country have access to the NHS therefore does not stack up. The fact remains that this country’s nuclear test veterans are almost at the bottom of the scale in the international comparisons going by how they are treated by this country. I hope that the House will accept that that needs to be put right. Against those comparisons, the campaign for £25 million, which works out at about £6,000 per veteran, is modest.
I should at this stage repeat what I said to the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and make it clear that the BNTVA has never participated in the legal challenges brought by some veterans.
We have had several meetings at the MOD with successive Ministers for veterans. I wrote to the Government in November to set out the details of our campaign. Despite chase-ups, I still await a response. No doubt the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), will carry that message back to the MOD. Meanwhile, I have written to all Back Benchers requesting their support for our campaign for recognition. As the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) mentioned, many have been kind enough to write back positively. I will be taking the matter further in due course.
In conclusion, as the Government are on the verge of commissioning the next iteration of our nuclear deterrent, it is right that we remember those who first created it and finally, after so long, repay the debt that we owe them.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Baron Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Mr Robathan
Switching variant does not make any difference to whether or not the aircraft could land on the Charles de Gaulle. We are co-operating with the Charles de Gaulle and we do not see the two aircraft carriers as being interoperable; we see them as separate but linked assets, and we certainly support the French. Indeed, during Exercise Corsican Lion, the Secretary of State, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne) and I had lunch on the Charles de Gaulle, and very good it was too. I assure hon. Members that we discussed equipment, interoperability and other matters.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
6. What support he has received from major employers for the proposals set out in his Reserves Green Paper.
Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)
13. What support he has received from major employers for the proposals set out in his Reserves Green Paper.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr Mark Francois)
As I informed the House on 26 November a number of large companies have shown their support for our reservists and the Green Paper consultation process. Some have held their own reserves awareness events. We have received over 2,400 responses to the consultation to date—not all from my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier)—and we held a workshop on 11 January with major employers and the Secretary of State. We continue to engage with major employers, but also with medium-sized and small businesses, the CBI, the Federation of Small Businesses and other employer organisations to ensure that we capture the views of as broad a range of employers as possible.
Mr Baron
I thank the Minister for that response, but the Government will know that I think it unwise to disband regular infantry battalions, such as 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, before first being certain that the reservists can plug the gap. What objective measures exist for Parliament to gauge the progress of Government plans in this regard?
Mr Francois
I acknowledge the strong interest that my hon. Friend has taken in the fate of his old regiment. I think that the whole House can understand his motivation for doing that. Our plan is for the Army to achieve its full strength of 30,000 trained volunteer reservists in 2018 from its current trained and in-training volunteer reservist strength of 25,000. These are early days, but I am delighted that the recent tri-service recruiting campaigns have produced a 25% increase in Territorial Army inquiries and that regular Army enlistment is up by 3% against a three-year rolling average. We regard both those statistics as good news.
Afghanistan
John Baron Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Mr Hammond
The responsibility for protecting Afghan local health services will be primarily for the Afghan police and military, but I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman that we were all shocked by the reminder of the primitiveness of some of the Taliban doctrine, and that they would attack people for providing vaccination against life-threatening diseases. That is the scale of the challenge we are dealing with.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
I welcome the statement, but as the Secretary of State knows, some Members of the House have long held the view that we were fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country, as we strayed from the original mission. Will he confirm that ISAF is now conducting non-conditional talks with the Taliban? Until fairly recently, the American position was that they would only talk to the Taliban if the Taliban laid down their arms and accepted the constitution. The Americans were living in never-never land. Has the position on those talks changed?
Mr Hammond
I think it would be wrong to characterise the discussions as ISAF discussions. There are discussions that the Afghan Government have indicated a willingness to enter into, which are conditional on an acceptance of the Afghan constitution. That is the position of the Afghan Government. There are also discussions, which have been widely reported, between US officials and Taliban representatives, which do not have the same preconditions attached to them.
2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers
John Baron Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
I beg to move,
That this House opposes the disbandment of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (2RRF); notes that 2RRF is the only infantry battalion being cut that was not initially due for disbandment on military grounds; further notes that 2RRF was instead caught by the Government’s additional criteria of only one battalion loss per regiment and no deletion of cap-badges, which has resulted in more poorly-recruited Scottish battalions being saved; further notes the social and economic costs of disbandment; and urges the Government to reverse its decision.
I shall start by thanking a few people. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting the debate, and I wholeheartedly thank all Members from both sides of the House who have supported our campaign, especially those who have signed the motion. I also thank the many hundreds of ex-Fusiliers who have participated in the march and lobby today outside Parliament in support of the motion, most of whom have been up since the very early hours of the morning and travelled long distances. Our thanks go to them, and most of them are in the Gallery. We wish them well and thank them for their support. I also thank the many other regiments that volunteered to march with the Fusiliers today. Their kind offer was declined, but their support was very much welcome.
I should perhaps single out one person. It is always unfair to do so, of course, but I would single out Colonel Brian Gorski and his team—they know who they are—for everything that they have done and for their support and tireless efforts. Finally, I thank the Serjeant at Arms and his office; Samantha Howlett, the ticket lady; and everybody else on the parliamentary estate who has engineered an administrative miracle by getting 400-plus Fusiliers into the House today and accommodating them so well.
Why this debate? Needless to say, I am very proud to have served as a Fusilier. As a regiment, we trace our ancestry to the 17th century, and we have won more battle honours than any other regiment in the British Army, including the Guards. We won more Victoria Crosses in the great war than any other regiment, and we completed more operational tours of Northern Ireland than any other regiment.
Looking forward, we perhaps need to remind everyone that the Fusiliers is one of the few regiments to have served in all the recent military campaigns, including both Iraq wars, Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan. Operationally, it is one of the most experienced regiments in the British Army. Our fighting record is second to none—that is undisputed, but it is not the subject of this debate. The subject of the debate is our contention that 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is the only infantry battalion to be cut for non-military reasons as part of the Army 2020 proposals.
We are told that the cuts were based on military logic, notably capability and demographic sustainability, yet answers to written questions, a letter from the Secretary of State and discussions confirm that 2RRF has a better recruitment record than other battalions that have been spared. In fact, in recent years 2RRF has one of the best recruiting records of any battalion, and indeed it was the best recruited battalion when the announcement was made.
Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)
There was one person missing from the list of thank-yous at the beginning of the debate—the hon. Gentleman himself. I thank him for securing the debate and for the campaign that he has led.
This morning, the hon. Gentleman and I presented several petitions to Downing street, including one containing 10,000 signatures of people in Lancashire and Greater Manchester, collated by the Manchester Evening News. Does that not indicate not just the scale of support for the Fusiliers but the unhappiness at the way in which the decision has been made and the unfairness behind it?
Mr Baron
I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. The strength of feeling has been illustrated not just by today’s march but by the number of people who have signed the petitions. There can be no dispute but that feelings run high on the issue, and I thank him and all other Members who have supported the campaign.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware that Coventry and Warwickshire have been great recruiting grounds for the Fusiliers over the centuries. Does he agree that although we often praise our soldiers in the House, for a change we now have an opportunity to stand by our soldiers’ regiments?
Mr Baron
I completely agree. This is a clear opportunity to say that we stand side by side with the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. At the end of the day, soldiers take orders, which is absolutely right. However, we are having this debate because we contend that 2RRF has been felled by political considerations, to save more poorly recruited Scottish battalions ahead of the 2014 Scottish referendum.
Let me be clear that I, for one, think that the cuts to the Army, and certainly their scale, are a big mistake. In this increasingly uncertain world, when many countries that are not necessarily friendly to the west are increasing their defence spending, I am really concerned about the scale of our cuts and about the ability of the Territorial Army, much as I respect it, to plug the loss of those regular battalions. I believe that no battalions should be cut, Scottish or otherwise, but if there are to be cuts, they must be based on military logic and not political calculation born out of the misguided view that it will somehow help to save the Union if we save more poorly recruited Scottish battalions.
Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)
I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his leadership of this campaign. Can we not find further evidence that the decision was not made on military grounds in the fact that it was not part of the Government’s initial proposals but was added later to take political considerations into account? Does the hon. Gentleman agree?
Jim McGovern (Dundee West) (Lab)
I have heard the hon. Gentleman say on a number of occasions that some of the Scottish battalions or regiments should have been disbanded. Is this not a time for mutual support rather than picking on Scottish regiments?
Mr Baron
Let us be absolutely clear about this. I do not believe that any battalion should be cut at all, and that is a fact, but if there have to be cuts, they must be based on military logic, not political calculation. The bottom line is that the figures provided in answers to written parliamentary questions about recruitment and retention and in the Secretary of State’s response to me clearly show that two Scottish battalions are undermanned—far more so than the equivalent in the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. That is what we are discussing. Decisions should be based on military logic, not political calculation.
Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and congratulate him on securing the debate. Does he agree that, given the amount of money we are spending on foreign aid and our contribution to the EU budget, it is lunacy for the Government to put themselves in the position of having to make these difficult decisions? Is it not about time the Government reassessed their priorities and put defence of the realm at the top of that list?
Mr Baron
I completely agree with my hon. Friend, who is spot on. I shall come on to that point later. I for one, to answer the question from the hon. Member for Dundee West (Jim McGovern), am not pointing the finger at any other regiment. I am not asking for further cuts in the Ministry of Defence, but if the Government cannot make the right decision here and now about 2RRF, there is money outside the MOD budget, as my hon. Friend has highlighted, that could be used to reverse this bad decision.
If hon. Members will forgive me, I want to make a little progress before I take further inventions, as time is pushing on and I know that a number of Members want to speak.
The Government have been reluctant to justify their reasoning. In fact, getting information from the MOD has been like extracting teeth, and one can see why from the damning evidence that was eventually obtained. The House will remember that on 5 July the Secretary of State for Defence announced the Government’s Army 2020 proposals. As part of the proposals, five infantry battalions were earmarked for disbandment, one of which was 2RRF. The impression created in this Chamber—I and other Members were present—was that the decision was based in large part on military calculations of capability and sustainability, or, in other words, that military logic had prevailed.
Many of us know that 2RRF has not only a good recruitment record but sound demographics in its core recruiting areas. On 6 July, I tabled named day written parliamentary questions asking for the recruitment and manning figures for all battalions involved. Given that we had been told that the decision on which battalions were to be cut was in large part based on those figures, one would have thought that they would have been ready to hand. I did not get the answers until 3 August, a month later, when Parliament was in recess. While I was waiting, I pressed the Prime Minister and the MOD by way of e-mail and letter.
In my view, the initial response from the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), who was then Minister for the Armed Forces, skated over the logic and continued to suggest that the MOD had “used a methodical approach with objective criteria to select those battalions which had to be lost”, but did not tell us what those objective criteria were, despite the fact that I had specifically asked for that in my letter and questions.
I then finally received answers to my named day questions, comparing 10-year records of establishment and strength for each of the battalions being cut and the five battalions of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. The figures were revealing; they clearly showed that two battalions from the Royal Regiment of Scotland had worse recruiting records by far. On 14 August, I met the Secretary of State and the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall. On that very morning, after a number of phone calls from the MOD, I finally received a letter by e-mail from the Secretary of State. That letter finally admitted that on purely military grounds two Scottish battalions would have been axed. The letter clearly stated that 2RRF was the only one of the battalions being axed that was not initially earmarked for disbandment. In fact, the letter was quite specific. It made it very clear that the five least sustainable battalions are two battalions from the Royal Regiment of Scotland, one from the Yorkshire Regiment, one from the Mercian Regiment and one from the Royal Welsh Regiment.
The letter went on to explain that what did for 2RRF was the Government’s decision to limit regimental losses to one battalion each and to ensure that no cap badges were lost. The Government’s insistence that no cap badges are lost makes no sense when we think that, as Members will remember, only six years ago in 2006 four cap badges and six battalions were amalgamated to form the five battalions of The Rifles. That was held up as an example of best practice by many senior Army officers. The Government’s justification for capping regimental losses to one battalion also does not make sense or withstand scrutiny. Five-battalion regiments can more easily withstand the loss of two battalions, particularly if they are struggling to sustain them, than two-battalion regiments can withstand the loss of one. Single battalion regiments also find it harder to meet the operational flexibility required and to offer their officers and soldiers a varied and demanding career profile.
It is perhaps also worth nothing that contrary to Government assertions, no Scottish battalion is being cut. The letter made it clear that on military logic two should have gone, and we know that if the regimental losses had been limited to one battalion, one should have gone. However, the one that should have gone has not gone. All that has happened is that it has been reduced in size for ceremonial duties. No cap badges or colours will be lost north of the border.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead) (Lab)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and securing this debate. I am proud to say that the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, one of the bedrock regiments that form the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, was my dad’s regiment. He served in Palestine and north Africa before the war as a regular soldier and was captured in north Africa in 1940.
Some of my constituents are in the Public Gallery today. Messrs Spalding, Gannon and Allen are welcome to London for this debate—
Ian Mearns
I apologise, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I am afraid that the damage is done.
I have talked to colleagues in the regiment and note that the creed of the battalion includes the words:
“I will never accept defeat nor let down my mates or my regiment.”
We should take that on board as regards 2RRF.
Mr Baron
I completely agree. Once a fusilier, always a fusilier and despite the odds we will carry this campaign to the end.
I shall wind up shortly, as I am conscious that a number of Members wish to speak, but I must add that the letter from the Secretary of State was revealing in another sense. I have talked about history and recruitment, and some might say, “Well, that is history. What about the future?” The letter, however, cast doubt on the demographic sustainability of the regiment, which I suggest is utter and complete nonsense. The regiment recruits from the three largest cities in the United Kingdom: London, Birmingham and Manchester.
Mr Baron
Yes, and Newcastle. I could go around the country—Rochdale, Bury—but I am sure the regiment will forgive me for not listing every city, town and village. However, it certainly recruits from the three largest cities, and I will not forget Newcastle, of which I have many happy memories.
The letter from the Secretary of State was revealing because it omitted to mention London as one of the regiment’s recruiting grounds. How can the MOD talk about demographic sustainability if, in its list of what it considers to be the regiment’s regional recruiting grounds, it fails to include London, probably one of the key recruiting grounds? We should not forget that the headquarters of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is based at the Tower of London, yet London was conveniently forgotten.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
Perhaps the Ministry of Defence had indeed forgotten that the regimental headquarters of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is distinctly in the Tower of London, which I think is in London.
Mr Baron
It is; my hon. Friend is quite right. [Interruption.] I am pleased that the Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Claire Perry), agrees. It is strange: we go through the recruiting regions of the whole country for the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, yet somebody forgot to mention London. That is absolute nonsense.
I love Scotland; I am married to a Scot and I believe in the Union. However, this is not the way to go about cementing that Union, and it is impossible to believe that the demographics of Scotland are healthier than for the three largest cities in the country, and the four largest counties—let me mention Newcastle again. Figures also confirm that for battalions exclusively recruited from a country, England has a population of 3 million per infantry battalion, against fewer than one million for Scotland.
Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)
May I add my voice to those of other hon. Members who have congratulated my hon. Friend on initiating this debate? I assure him that when I became Defence Minister in 2010, I and my colleagues found it extremely painful to make these difficult decisions. One of the reasons we did so was that we inherited a budget deficit of £156 billion, and to retain the confidence of the international capital markets, something had to be done. We also inherited a £38 billion black hole in the finances of the Ministry of Defence, which has now been put right.
I share with my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) a belief that there is an alternative. When in government I never said that there was no alternative—there is, and it is to reprioritise Government spending. In my view, we cannot justify spending ever more taxpayers’ money on overseas aid and cutting our armed forces. I recognise that my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, carries responsibility for those matters, as did I. We had a real problem to face.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. This is a very important debate and a lot of Members wish to speak. It is going to be time limited, and interventions from both sides of the House must be shorter. I want to hear everybody’s contribution, not just certain ones.
Mr Baron
Briefly, if there have to be military cuts, I suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) that they should be based on military logic, not political calculation. As he knows, he and I are at one when it comes to priorities and Government spending.
We should not be blind to the social costs of axing 2RRF. Not only will 600 soldiers find themselves out of work—many of whom are recruited from areas that do not have healthy employment opportunities—but there will be a knock-on effect on their families, on veterans and on local affiliated cadet organisations. Furthermore, if 2RRF goes, I suggest that Warwickshire will be the only county in England without a direct battalion link. We should perhaps remember that Field Marshal Montgomery was a Warwickshire fusilier, and his regiment became 2RRF.
Mr Baron
We will argue about that later; we are all claiming Field Marshal Montgomery. [Interruption.]
Looking at the bigger picture, and to follow the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), I have severe doubts about the extent of the cuts to the Army and our armed forces generally. We must never forget that the first duty of Government is to national security. As the Foreign Secretary reminded us:
“The range of threats and dangers is, if anything, increasing.”
Many countries, not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their defence spending. Much as I respect the Territorial Army, having been on operations with it, I question the extent to which we are asking it to step up to the plate and plug the gap left by the loss of regular battalions. I am sad to say that the coalition Government continue to cut. Defence spending has halved over the past 20 years, and it continues to decrease.
I suggest that our relationship with the United States is a process of give and take and is not free. It is based on shared values and a close working relationship on nuclear and security issues, and it is underpinned by our military capability. These are austere times, but given that the first duty of Government is to national security, I suggest that money could be saved in other areas.
I am not suggesting that the Government do the right thing within the MOD budget; I have made it clear that I am not pointing the finger at other regiments. I am saying that we need to reprioritise our spending. I, for one, have trouble with all the extra billions of pounds that we are sending in our contribution to the EU budget. I also have a problem—I know this is unfashionable but I will say it anyway—with sending £1 billion in aid to India, a country with its own space, nuclear and rearmament programmes, an aircraft carrier, and its own aid programme. We are, in effect, subsidising those programmes, which I think is wrong.
In conclusion, the Government are wrong. Military logic and not political calculations should determine Army cuts. I am a firm believer in the Union, but this is not the way to achieve it. In my view, the Government’s culpability is illustrated by their reluctance to justify their decision, and the evidence has been damning. That was illustrated by a freedom of information request that I submitted on 6 September, asking for the first draft of the Chief of the General Staff’s recommendations as to which battalions should be cut. I received the answer late last night, saying that that they will not release that information. I ask the Government to think again and reverse the decision to axe 2RRF. I am not calling for any other battalions to be cut, just for this very bad decision to be reversed.
Mr Robathan
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. As it happens, I have a great regard for him, and I do not wish this to be a party political debate. I wish to talk about the future of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, which has a very proud history.
We are now living within our means, and we have a fully funded equipment programme and affordable armed forces. Reaching that position has required us to make hard, painful choices, which have included reducing the size of the regular Army. I have always said—I have heard it repeated two or three times in this debate—that the first duty of Government is the defence of the realm. Our mission endures, and it is to protect our country and its values and interests abroad and at home. To do this, we must meet the complex range of threats and challenges in a rapidly changing world. We must adapt to stay ahead and ensure that our people have what they need in order to do what we ask of them.
Mr Baron
I am pleased that the debate is returning to the substance of the motion about the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The Minister said that detailed analysis was undertaken to come to the basic decision to axe 2RRF. Will he explain the basis of that analysis, as the Secretary of State’s answers to written parliamentary questions make it very clear that other battalions had far worse recruitment and retention figures than the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers? On what basis, then, was this analysis undertaken?
Mr Robathan
If I may, I will cover my hon. Friend’s points as they were made in his speech. My responses are written down here, and it is better that I give him a detailed analysis rather than provide one off the top of my head.
While our armed forces might be smaller than before, they will still be able to reach across the world and operate across the full range of capabilities. We are reducing the size of the regular armed forces, but we are increasing the reserves, including an integrated element of the total land force of 120,000, with an extra £1.8 billion of investment in reserves, training and equipment.
The Army has been both pragmatic and imaginative in responding to this very real challenge. The blueprint was decided upon by the Army and announced by the Defence Secretary on 5 July. This project we call Army 2020. For the first time, this provides a pathway to a fully integrated Army of regular and reserve forces that will be configured for high-end conflict, rapid reaction, UK engagement and upstream conflict prevention.
Mr Robathan
I have to confess to my hon. Friend that I do not deal with procurement measures. We have a defence reform project going on, which I think he will find addresses his point. I will ensure that he receives a letter from the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, setting out a proper response.
I think it would be better if we stuck with the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, because that is what people have come to speak about. Today, we have heard arguments about the withdrawal of 2RRF from the Army’s order of battle. Neither my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State nor I take any pleasure in the removal of any unit from the Army. I can assure hon. Members that we did not come into politics to reduce our armed forces. There is not a battalion or regiment in the current order of battle that does not have a proud history and significant battle honours. If, however, we are to create an affordable and balanced Army offering serious military capability into the future, a small number of those proud units and battalions will have to be withdrawn from the line.
My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has been made aware of the reasons behind the Army Board’s decisions—and they were Army Board decisions, endorsed by Ministers. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate these reasons for the benefit of the House.
Mr Robathan
I am about to answer my hon. Friend’s questions; he might like to intervene again later.
In redesigning the future Army, it was decided that five fewer regular infantry battalions were required than are currently in the order of battle. In deciding which of the current 36 battalions to withdraw, the Army—I repeat, the Army—applied a number of criteria. The first was to maintain a regimental system that was largely regionally aligned. The second was to ensure the sustainability of regiments according to the projected regional supply of recruits in the 2020 time frame. The third was to ensure proportionality of outcome across the infantry, with no cap badge deletions and with no regiment losing more than one battalion.
Another key criterion, which Members who have served in the Army will understand, was to balance the whole infantry structure to maintain a variety of roles and parity of opportunity of experience for officers and soldiers. It was also important to take account of previous decisions on mergers and deletions, as well as historical manning performance. Finally, the Army wanted those who are currently serving to see this as fair and equitable. After all, it is those who are serving now, and those who are seeking to join the Army, who will make the change happen.
Those criteria were determined by the Chief of the General Staff and by General Carter, who has led the Army 2020 review. After a period of consultation with Ministers, they constructed an objective, fair and transparent process that included the criteria, applying the military logic to which my hon. Friend referred.
Mr Baron
I appreciate the Minister’s generosity in giving way. Let me make it clear for the record that I know him well enough to be aware that he takes no pleasure in announcing these cuts. I do not doubt that at all: it is not what we are questioning. However, if there have to be cuts—and I personally think that the Government’s priorities are wrong; I think that such cuts should be made outside the MOD budget—they should be based on military logic, not on political calculation that is designed to save more poorly recruited Scottish battalions north of the border.
In answers given to me by the Secretary of State and in answers to written parliamentary questions, it has been confirmed—confirmed in writing by the Secretary of State—that the five least sustainable battalions will be two from the Royal Regiment of Scotland, one from the Yorkshire Regiment, one from the Mercian Regiment and one from the Royal Welsh Regiment. That is military logic, as applied in a letter to me from the Secretary of State.
Mr Robathan
As I have said, one of the criteria was that no regiment should lose more than one battalion. I shall explain shortly why the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers came into the frame.
Mr Robathan
I do not think that I made that point, because I was not the person involved at the time. Since my hon. Friend’s time in the armed forces, and mine, people have moved a great deal more between divisions and between larger regiments. Where we are talking about a one-battalion regiment in a division, people cross over between the regiments in the division. That is certainly happening much more than it used to.
Determining the fifth battalion to be withdrawn required the application of criteria that went wider than demographics. Remembering the imperative of having no regiment losing more than one battalion, the Army discounted those regiments that were already losing a battalion, such as the Royal Scots, and those which were single-battalion regiments. That meant that the choice came down to a battalion from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the Royal Anglian Regiment or The Rifles—the Parachute Regiment was excluded on the grounds of its specific role. Taking account of the need to maintain equity of opportunity across the infantry divisions, the Army decided—I stress that it was the Army that decided this—that it should be the Queen’s Division that lost a battalion. That was because it had six battalions whereas other divisions would be left with only four or five. Taking account of historical manning performance—since the previous reorganisation of the infantry, in 2007, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has had average undermanning of 13.3%—and the fact that the Fusiliers is a regiment with two battalions, it was considered the most appropriate from within the Queen’s Division from which to withdraw a battalion.
I would like to pay tribute to the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. It has a proud history and it will continue as a regiment with a proud history. It has served in every major campaign since 1674, up to and including Afghanistan. I have visited the regimental museum and the headquarters in the Tower of London with my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay—in fact, I went back only last month. I know the history of this proud regiment.
As some in this Chamber may know, in Northern Ireland Second Lieutenant Winthrop devised a clever way of finding hidden caches. I remember being taught this in Northern Ireland, and it allowed us to find hidden IRA weapons. He was a Fusilier, and that is someone more recently who influenced military thinking. I served with the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in the first Gulf war, and my mother’s uncle was killed in 1916 while serving in the Fusiliers. I mention that because we all hugely respect the past and present members of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. I fully understand that this decision came as a great disappointment to those serving with the regiment and those, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, with connections to it.
Mr Baron
I welcome the Minister’s warm words, but I suggest to him that we do not just want warm words—we want action. Clearly he is basing his whole argument on the idea that regimental losses should be limited to one battalion. That is exceptionally questionable, and it is a complete about-turn on the thinking of the reorganisation that took place only six years ago, when four cap badges and six battalions were amalgamated into larger regiments. Can he not understand that it is far more disruptive for a two-battalion regiment—a well-recruited one—to lose one battalion than it is for a five-battalion regiment that has trouble sustaining two battalions, as has been admitted by the MOD, to maintain those two battalions? Can he not see the logic here? Can he not see why the MOD’s limitation of one battalion loss per regiment is so illogical?
Mr Robathan
My hon. Friend is an intelligent person, but I have made the point several times that the Army decided that it wanted to withdraw only one battalion from each regiment, and that is why this decision was reached.
I know that the decision is a great disappointment to many people, but it was simply not possible to save every unit, given the financial situation in which we found ourselves. I hope that what I have explained is a fair, transparent and equitable process, which produced the right outcome, in difficult circumstances, for the Army. The MOD has now placed in the Library of the House the detailed data the Army used in reaching its decision on which battalions to remove from the order of battle.
I think I have dealt with the question of Scotland. We did not take another battalion out of the Royal Scots, because that would have been to the detriment of the criterion that only one battalion should be taken from each regiment. My hon. Friend and others have suggested that the decisions were not taken on wholly military grounds and that a degree of political influence was brought to bear that has resulted in English regiments “losing out”—their words—to the Royal Regiment of Scotland, but the advice from the Chief of the General Staff and his Army 2020 team was clear: the effect on the regimental structure and the wider community of losing more than one battalion would magnify the impact of any change and thus impact on the subsequent healing process. I hope that that advice and the rest of the objective criteria the Army applied to the review will put minds at rest. As the Government have made clear on a number of occasions, we are making no plans on the basis of an independent Scotland, as we firmly believe—a belief that I know is shared on both sides of the House—that the majority of Scottish people will continue to support the Union in any referendum.
Cap badges and uniforms are important, but hon. Members should realise that they evolve and change over the years, and indeed have done so during our lifetimes. I have worn many different cap badges and I believe that people adapt very quickly and are proud of the regiments and the units in which they serve. I assure all hon. Members here today that we are aware of the justifiably fierce pride and loyalty felt by local communities to their locally recruited battalions, wherever that might be across the UK.
I come back to the real reason behind the reductions, which is the fiscal mess we inherited in 2010. The process has been painful for the Government. I reiterate: no Defence Minister came into government to reduce our armed forces. However, balancing the black hole inherited from the previous Government required difficult decisions to reach our current more balanced and affordable position. The Army—and it is the Army—has played an intelligent and constructive part in the exercise and has had to make some very tough decisions, but it is never possible to make such significant changes without causing some pain somewhere. The plan that has been announced, while difficult for some to accept, offers a balanced and fair way to maintain a robust regimental system into the future.
I reiterate that the Fusiliers—the proud Royal Regiment of Fusiliers—will go on as a regiment. We are not abolishing the Fusiliers, as some seem to have implied. I know that the Army as a whole understands that and is now getting on with implementing the new structures in the positive and pragmatic way that anybody who knows the Army would expect. My sincere hope is that hon. Members, and in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, who instigated this debate, can now allow the Army to do so.
Mr Baron
Perhaps we should make it absolutely clear that no one really wants to make cuts to the armed forces, particularly in these increasingly dangerous times. However, if cuts have to be made, our contention is that military logic should prevail rather than political calculation about saving more poorly recruited Scottish battalions ahead of the Scottish referendum. I have made it clear that I do not believe that any battalion should be cut, Scottish or otherwise, but the Government’s decision is a bad one.
The decision is a bad one, not because we say so but because it is clear from responses to letters and inquiries to the MOD and from written parliamentary answers—the evidence is there for all to see—that 2RRF should not be in this position because its recruitment and retention record is excellent. The original five battalions, which were the least sustainable ones, did not include 2RRF. I cannot help but conclude that this rather silly rule that regimental losses should be limited to one battalion is a political fix ahead of the Scottish referendum, because only six years ago four cap badges and six battalions were amalgamated into one regiment. All the talk then was about how larger regiments were the way forward because they provided a varied career structure and sustainability. That is the right way to go about it.
The sudden introduction, out of the blue, of the rule about limiting regimental losses to one battalion is utter nonsense, and it is just by coincidence that it has happened to save both Scottish battalions that there were earmarked for closure. The MOD admits that the Royal Regiment of Scotland should be two battalions short. It is two battalions down. It is illogical for the Government to say that they will maintain them when they cannot help themselves. As for the Government’s claim that only one battalion, the Scottish battalion, will be lost, that is also untrue, as the Minister very well knows, because it will only be downsized. No Scottish battalions will be lost.
I repeat that I do not want any battalions to be lost in these cuts. I think that we should be prioritising our spending outside the MOD budget better. I have questioned aid to India, unfashionable though that may be, and the billions we are pouring into the European Union. This is a bad decision. It is based not on military logic but on political calculation. It is my intention, with your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, to do what I can to divide the House on the issue.
Question put.
Afghanistan (NATO Strategy)
John Baron Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the change in NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)
There has been no change of policy in Afghanistan. As I told the House yesterday, the security of our deployed forces in Afghanistan or anywhere in the world remains a defence priority. The safety of our service personnel is an issue that all in government and in the military chain of command take extremely seriously.
In respect of the international security assistance force fragmentary order issued on Sunday, not for the first time the media have become a little overexcited. It might help the House if I quote a press release issued by the commander of ISAF forces in Kabul this morning. He stated that
“recent media coverage regarding a change in ISAF’s model of Security Force Assistance is not accurate. ISAF remains absolutely committed to partnering with, training, advising and assisting our ANSF”—
Afghan national security forces—
“counterparts. The ISAF SFA model is focused at the battalion level and above, with exceptions approved by senior commanders. Partnering occurs at all levels, from Platoon to Corps. This has not changed.
In response to elevated threat levels resulting from the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video, ISAF has taken some prudent, but temporary, measures to reduce our profile and vulnerability to civil disturbances or insider attacks…The SFA model is integral to the success of the ANSF, and ISAF will return to normal operations as soon as conditions warrant.”
The commander of ISAF Joint Command has effectively directed a change to the level at which partnering and advising are scrutinised and authorised. Most partnering and advising was already at the kandak, or battalion, level and above. The change does not mean that there will be no partnering below that level. The need for that will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and approved by the regional commanders in theatre.
The regional commander in Regional Command Southwest, where British forces are based, is Major General Mark Gurganus, a US Marine Corps general. He has endorsed the approach currently being taken by the UK-led Taskforce Helmand, including mentoring and partnering at below kandak level. That means that the UK partnering and mentoring operations will continue substantially unchanged by this order. It is normal practice that all elements of our operations are subject to oversight by the chain of command, and operations will continue to evolve and risk assessments will continue to be updated. The ANSF capability for independent operations is, in any case, steadily increasing, and our level of partnering activity on the ground has therefore been steadily decreasing.
The personal safety of our deployed personnel remains a defence priority, and we will take every step necessary to minimise the risk to them. We have always kept the level at which we mentor the ANSF under review and will continue to do so through the process of security transition. British commanders on the ground retain the flexibility to mentor at the appropriate level in consultation with the regional commander. We have a strategic plan that takes us to the end of combat operations in 2014 while strengthening the ANSF to take over security responsibility from us. I have every confidence in the way Com ISAF is executing that plan.
Mr Baron
May I thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting the urgent question?
At the very least there is confusion with regard to this issue. A NATO statement has made it clear that joint on-the-ground operations have been suspended until further notice. The decision announced in Afghanistan by General Allen has appeared to take the UK Government by surprise. Only yesterday, in Parliament, the Defence Secretary was rightly defending NATO’s continued work with Afghan troops on the ground. When did the Government know of this decision, and were they consulted on the matter?
This announcement threatens to blow a hole in our stated exit strategy, which is heavily reliant on these joint operations continuing until Afghan forces are able to operate independently and provide their own security following ISAF’s withdrawal. As a soldier myself, I know the real value of mentoring—coaching and training—at ground level, and there is no substitute for that. Anything else above battalion level is very much theory. If these operations are not going to take place at ground level, where does that leave our exit strategy? Will our soldiers be coming home early? The announcement adds to the uncertainty as to whether Afghan forces will have the ability to keep an undefeated Taliban at bay once NATO forces have left.
This, in a way, goes to the very heart of what our mission is in Afghanistan. For those of us who opposed our involvement in Afghanistan, there appears to have been confusion from the start. Al-Qaeda was driven from the country in the early stages. The mission has now morphed into one of nation building, human rights and democracy. Laudable though those aims are, they are very different from our original mission. I suggest that we need to be clear about this. Last week, the International Development Secretary talked of nation building. At the same time, the Defence Secretary, when visiting troops in Afghanistan, talked, rightly in my view, about it being wrong to risk the lives of our troops for nation building when they should only protect our vital national security interests. The importance of that distinction is that nation building requires defeat of the Taliban, whereas protecting our national security interests in preventing al-Qaeda from returning does not necessarily require their defeat, given their differences with al-Qaeda.
What is our mission in Afghanistan? Clarity is required. If we are remaining true to our original mission of eliminating al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, should we not now be doing more to encourage the Americans to conduct non-conditional talks with the Taliban in order to explore possible common ground?
Mr Hammond
There were a lot of questions there. First, my hon. Friend talks about consultation with Governments. This is not a strategic initiative; it is a tactical initiative, taken by commanders in theatre, operating within their delegated responsibility. We would not seek to interfere with the military judgment of commanders on the ground.
On information, I can tell my hon. Friend that this FRAGO was issued on Sunday evening. I was told about that during a meeting on Monday, along with information about several other measures that ISAF has taken. No particular significance was attached to it.
My hon. Friend talks about partnering at below kandak level. I should stress to him that US forces have not routinely partnered below kandak level. It has been the practice of the British-led Taskforce Helmand to partner and mentor Afghan units at tolay—company—and even platoon level. That is not a practice used by the Americans, so the impact of the announcement will be far less significant than he suggests. As I made clear in my opening remarks, General Gurganus, Regional Commander of RC Southwest, has this morning confirmed that he is happy for Taskforce Helmand to continue in its current mode of operations. In other words, he has endorsed the risk assessment and management approach that we have been using. We will continue our operations as we were carrying them out last week in Helmand.
My hon. Friend asks, at the more strategic level, about our mission in Afghanistan. I touched on that yesterday, and he knows my position very well: we can ask British forces to place themselves at risk for the defence of Britain’s national interest, and legitimately for no other reason. I am clear that the mission we are carrying out in Afghanistan is to protect Britain’s national security by denying Afghan space to international terrorists. That is our mission, and that is the mission we will complete.
Afghanistan (Force Protection)
John Baron Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr Hammond
I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis. When we end our combat role in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it is likely that it will not be an entirely peaceable country. The point, however, is that ISAF and Afghan national security forces are containing the insurgency and, critically, denying the use of Afghan territory to international terrorists. That is the bottom line for the UK’s national security. If we turn the clock back 10 years, Afghanistan was the principal base for international terrorists who sought ungoverned space from which to plan their attacks on the west.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
Last Thursday, in a statement on Afghanistan by the Secretary of State for International Development, the importance of nation building was stressed. When visiting troops in Afghanistan, the Secretary of State for Defence rightly made the point that our troops’ lives should be put in danger not for the sake of nation building, but only to protect British security interests. Which is the Government view? The importance of the distinction is that the first requires defeat of the Taliban, whereas the second does not.
Mr Hammond
I am not sure I agree with the last part of my hon. Friend’s analysis. Building the capacity of the Afghan state is and has been an important part of winning the overall battle. Afghans in Helmand in particular are now enjoying substantially better health, education and transport services, and access to justice, than they enjoyed a couple of years ago. There is lots of evidence to show that that reinforces their tendency to support the Government and diminishes their tendency to support the insurgency. It is clear to me that building the capacity of the Afghan Government is an important part of the overall equation, but our forces are there to protect our national security. That is their principal task and the basis on which we should judge the wisdom of their engagement.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Baron Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Peter Luff
I remember a good friend of mine, a general, who retired recently from the British armed services, who said he would know that he had retired when he started believing what he read in newspapers. I would strongly recommend to the hon. Gentleman not to believe what he reads in newspapers. The United States remains strongly committed to the programme. The F-35B is an outstanding aircraft, it is flying extensively, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will receive our first two aircraft on Thursday. The hon. Gentleman should be a little sceptical.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
12. What account he took of recruitment capability in determining regimental disbandment.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)
In selecting infantry battalions for withdrawal, the Army has focused on the major long-term recruiting challenges that it faces in this area. It has looked carefully at historic recruiting performance over a decade, and at demographic projections for the age cohort from which infantry recruits are drawn in the recruiting catchment areas of different regiments. It has also considered regional and national affiliations, the merger and disbandment history of individual battalions, and existing commitments of battalions to future operations. The overriding objective has been to arrive at a solution that delivers a balanced and effective military force and is seen as fair and equitable by those currently serving in the Army.
Mr Baron
Although the MOD has not been able to supply the five and 10-year recruitment figures, despite a named-day written parliamentary question tabled the week before last, the three-year figures clearly show that better recruited English battalions, including the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed in order to save the more poorly recruited Scottish ones. Will the Secretary of State deny that petty politics in relation to the Scottish referendum has influenced decisions?
Mr Hammond
My hon. Friend is repeating an assertion that he made when I made the statement. I sat down afterwards with the Chief of the General Staff and went through his process again to reassure myself that I could say with confidence to my hon. Friend that the assertion he is making is simply not correct. Looked at over a decade, the recruitment figures for the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers speak for themselves. I am happy to have a meeting with him and go through the numbers, if he would like to do so.