2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers

Lord Robathan Excerpts

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Glindon]

Both those points strengthen the case for maintaining the 2RRF.

I have been proud to support the local campaign, which has received the kind support of the Newcastle Journal and the Evening Chronicle, which has been fantastic in helping to publicise the fight across our region. The veterans and the Fusiliers have played a massive role in promoting the campaign, and have organised two public events in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, which I have been honoured to attend.

It was at one of these events that the real impact of the Government’s decision hit home. I noticed among the honoured veterans and members of the public a young man standing particularly proud during the minute’s silence, in a way that no other civilian around him did. After the ceremony, as the crowds chattered and photographs were taken, I managed to speak to this young man. He told me that he had been a Fusilier, but that more than a year ago had had an accident and had to leave.

Fortunately, the young man has fully recovered, but he has not been able to find any work since leaving the Army. Shamefully, employers do not always seem keen to employ ex-soldiers. He told me that he would be eligible to re-apply to rejoin the Army in November, and that it was his greatest wish to resume his Army career in the 2nd Battalion. My heart went out to the young man and to all the other young people who, like generations before them, have wanted to serve their country in the military but who now have little prospect of ever being able to serve as full-time soldiers.

Former members of the Territorial Army are sceptical about the Secretary of State’s plans to replace full-time soldiers with an expanded reserve force. They gave me the example of the 6th Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, which had been a well-recruited and fully equipped, operational, NATO-role battalion, and which was recognised as one of the best in the country. The battalion was disbanded and became the Tyne-Tees Regiment in 1999, but it lost all its support weapons, which meant that associated skills were lost too. It now exists as the 5th Rifle Battalion, with only three companies and no support weapons. There is a severe shortage of officers and senior non-commissioned officers, and a lack of funding has meant no training and led to the deskilling of the battalion.

The fear is that disbanding regular units that are not immediately replaced by a reserve capacity creates a wide capacity gap—indeed, a gap in our entire national security. The campaign is clear in its aims. The 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has no trouble recruiting in London, Manchester, Birmingham or the north-east, as has been said. It is currently at full strength. The regiments that the Government are choosing to save have to recruit largely from foreign and Commonwealth troops. Our Government have said they are committed to British jobs for British people. Clearly in this instance they are not. The campaigners and supporters of the motion know that this is not a fair decision.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

I should point out that the recruitment of foreign and Commonwealth troops took off under the last Government. There was a deliberate policy to recruit up to, I think, 10%. I should say that those troops do a very good job, most of them, and I pay tribute to them, but I do not think the hon. Lady should accuse us of in some way being illogical in this regard.

[Mrs Glindon]

I do not think I mentioned the Minister being “illogical”. The point is that those battalions are poorly recruited and have to go abroad, when in 2RRF we have the strength of the Army being made up from people who are local, as is the regimental tradition.Moreover, I would point out to the Minister that there has been criticism of the decision from top-ranking figures, who state that the abolition of the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers will not stand up to public scrutiny.

I stated at the beginning of my speech that the motion is not against the brave Scottish soldiers, which is true. However, in the north-east there is a fear that the referendum on Scottish independence will see the Government favouring Scotland over the north-east, in order to keep Scotland in the Union. I do not want to see Scotland leave the UK, nor do I want to see my region pay any economic or social price to ensure that we maintain the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom must be fair and honest to all its people, in all its regions. However, if Scotland becomes independent, it is possible that such a small country will not be able to sustain five battalions, nor will the remaining UK be able to be properly served by the 25 remaining battalions.

In summary, the feelings of everyone who supports the motion are expressed in the words of Major Chester Potts:

“‘Quo Fata Vocant’ (Whither the Fates call) is the regimental motto of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. Wherever the fates have called we have been there and shed our blood in the defence of the country. We have fought the nation’s enemies for nearly 350 years now. We never expected our greatest enemy, and architect of our demise would be our own Government.”

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[Mr Jones]

I will not, because of the time limit.

The conclusions of any review should also take into account the long-term strategic objectives that will be in the interests of this country, but neither Army 2020 nor the strategic defence and security review did so. The SDSR was rendered out of date within weeks of being written by events in Libya, with equipment that had been scrapped weeks before being brought back into service. Army 2020 has got rid not only of some of the British Army’s best battalions, but of some of the bravest and most dedicated members of the armed forces. The Minister must explain what his criteria are, and how he is going to maintain the necessary skills, even though many have already been lost.

We are told that the numbers have to be cut, but I want to concentrate on the way in which that is being done. There was confusion this summer as the Government let the process linger on, allowing rumours and uncertainty to continue, mainly to save the Prime Minister the embarrassment of making this announcement before Armed Forces day. There have also been substantial cuts in the numbers of our armed forces personnel. Let us remember that, when in opposition in the last few years before the general election, the Conservatives were calling for a larger Army and a larger Navy with more personnel. They have achieved exactly the opposite since they have been in power. They are saying one thing and doing another. [Interruption.] I will come to the question of budgets in a minute, if the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) will just hold his water.

These decisions are resulting in the Government having a credibility deficit on defence matters, not only with the public but with our armed forces. It is no wonder that there is confusion. The planning assumptions in the SDSR were based on an Army whose manpower was 95,000. Will the Minister tell us whether those assumptions are still being achieved, now that the number has been reduced to 82,000? Will he also be precise about the time scale for the build-up of the reserves? It has already been pointed out that there could be a capability gap in that area. I pay tribute to the members of our reserve forces. It is not surprising to discover from the continuous attitude survey of the armed forces that morale is at an all-time low.

The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay talked about the criteria that had been applied when making the decisions. Serious questions need to be asked about how and why they were made.

[Mr Robathan]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jones]

No, I will not. I would if I could get extra time—[Interruption.] No, I could not. I have already taken two interventions; those are the rules.

We are told that the units that were having the greatest recruitment difficulties would be abolished. The 3rd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment was only six short of its full establishment, and the 2nd Battalion the Royal Fusiliers was only eight short. However, other battalions with much less favourable recruitment records were maintained. It is no wonder that the honorary colonel of the 2nd Battalion the Royal Fusiliers said that the decision to axe his battalion would not “best serve” the armed forces and

“cannot be presented as the best or most sensible military option.”

It has been pleasing to see the turn-out today outside Parliament, and I know the strength of feeling that exists in the north-east of England. My hon. Friend the Member for North Tyneside (Mrs Glindon) has already mentioned the tremendous campaign being run by the Newcastle Journal and the Evening Chronicle. We are seeing the ad hoc nature of decision making in whole areas of defence. The fact that Ministers have announced further reductions, over and above the numbers proposed in the SDSR, shows the short-sightedness of their proposals. We said when the SDSR was produced that it was not a blueprint for our strategic future so much as a Treasury-led defence review.

I have already paid tribute to our reservists. The Secretary of State has said that the proposal to back-fill the Army with reservists presents a risk. The fact that the only announcement he has made so far is that he is going to change the name of the Territorial Army leaves questions unanswered. There has been no clarification on training, or on whether employment law needs to be changed, as is quite likely if people are to be released from their employment to serve in the armed forces. So there are still a lot of loose ends, and there will be a capability gap if we are not careful. It is quite clear that Government policy is about deficit reduction and not about what is in the best interest of this country’s defence.

I will touch on the thorny issue of budgets, because we are told that the cuts are justified because of the big, bad Labour Government who left the Ministry of Defence with a £38 billion black hole. From this Dispatch Box, I have repeatedly asked the Government to explain this. The Public Accounts Committee has asked them to explain it, too, but to date nothing is forthcoming. I will be happy to hear, when the Minister replies to the debate—

[Mr Robathan]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jones]

No, I will not.

[Mr Robathan]

Why not?

[Mr Jones]

Because I do not have the time. I shall wait with anticipation for the first ever breakdown of this figure. As I was saying, this has been the justification for the cuts that we have seen. It is quite clear what has to be done: if we are to take these cuts, the Government must set the record straight and be honest not only with the British public but with our brave servicemen and women.

Historic battalions are being axed for short-term savings without any coherent strategy for our armed forces. We have no confidence that the abolition of battalions, such as the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is either in the best interests of the country or is being done on a fair basis. Until Ministers fully explain the criteria behind Army 2020 that justify the abolition of these regiments; until they clarify the reforms to the reserves and the rebasing of forces in Germany on which we still await explanation; and until they are more honest about the state of MOD budget—simply coming here to say that the budget is unbalanced is not good enough—it will be difficult for the Government to have any credibility on defence. More importantly, the people who are quite rightly campaigning against this decision will think that decisions have been taken in an ad hoc way, without taking into consideration the interests of either the 2nd Battalion or of this country’s defence.

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[Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I had the privilege to serve, albeit briefly, with 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. As a Lancastrian I am well aware of the high regard in which the regiment is held by the local community, which is reflected in its successful levels of recruitment. I fully support the campaign of my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and I will not detain the House by repeating the points that he skilfully made in highlighting the many flaws in the Government’s case. I want to address not the criteria, which my hon. Friend tackled, but the wider decision-making rationale that underpins the Government’s measure and that was at the heart of the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), who is a distinguished former Ministry of Defence Minister, when he sought to justify why this cut is being made.

First, if a measure such as this is to be positioned on the grounds of cost savings, the first thing one might expect is clarity on how much is being saved. However, when I asked the House of Commons Library that question this morning, answer came there none—it could not tell me. A rough estimate might put the figure at £25 million a year, but the least we might expect from the Minister’s closing remarks is some certainty, if the measure is being justified on cost grounds, as to how much is being saved.

Secondly, the MOD suggests that this cut, which is out of step with the criteria applied to other battalions, is needed to address the defence overspend; but the saving is puny in the context of overall MOD spending, when one considers the reputational impact, the history and the esteem of the front-line service that is being cut.

Let me put this in context and draw the House’s attention to some recent National Audit Office reports. Last year the MOD increased its defence inventory at the same time as it was cutting the size of its armed forces, so we are buying more kit for fewer troops, even though we already had, for example, 10 years’ supply of overalls. We have 54 years’ worth of equipment for Nimrod, even though the plane has already been scrapped. The sums of money being wasted are not insignificant. The MOD spent £2.4 billion on non-explosive inventory, even though it already had five years’ worth of such items in stock—we spent £2.4 billion buying things when we already had five years’ worth of supplies. We are now trying to get rid of some—£1.4 billion-worth—of the stock that we bought by mistake. It is costing £277 million a year just to store the stock that we do not want, and which we should never have bought. That puts the saving that is being made by the decision on 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in context.

My second question to the Minister is therefore why, when the National Audit Office report in June—the very time when this cut was being proposed—could identify savings of that order, officials in the Department could not do more to avoid the necessity of cutting this battalion.

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend is making a good point about overstocking. We are bearing down on that enormously. He will understand that, not having been in government between 1997 and 2010, we did not order most of this kit. We are selling off the kit so that we have to spend less money on storage, and we are spending less money on unnecessary kit; but he will also understand that the armed forces need good equipment, especially given the ongoing situation in Afghanistan.

[Stephen Barclay]

I am willing to recognise the big strides that the Government have taken in making those savings. However, we are spending vast sums of money on kit of which we have five years of supplies. The Minister says that this is about equipping our troops better, but we are not addressing that point by buying a higher specification of kit if we are buying things that we do not need. That was one of the key findings of the National Audit Office report.

If Ministers are not convinced that more could be done on logistics and supplies, perhaps I could put this saving of about £25 million in the wider context of our defence procurement. Again, I am willing to acknowledge the huge strides that have been taken by Ministers to get to grips with procurement. However, the 15 largest defence projects have overspent their initial budgets by £6 billion. The saving from this cut is a fraction of 1% of that, although we cannot know exactly how much it is because we have not had the figure. It is a tiny amount, and yet it is hitting the front line—our fighting units.

The case that I put to colleagues today is that surely more could be done, notwithstanding the efforts that are being made, to increase the scale, intensity and speed of implementation of the savings in logistics, supply and procurement. This decision does not provide value for money. It is too modest, it uses flawed criteria and the scope of delivering savings elsewhere means that it would be a mistake for the Government to go ahead with it. That is reflected in the comments from Members from all parts of the House today.

I have never voted against my Government, but I support my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and will do so if the motion is put to a vote. I hope that Ministers will listen to the strength of the arguments, look at the findings of the National Audit Office and deliver the required savings from other areas of the defence budget.

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[Mr Ellwood]

We did not call for a larger armed forces at the election itself. It was our intention. It is where we would like to go. When we made these announcements, we were not expecting Labour to have ruined the Treasury numbers, as it did.

As has been repeated again and again, Labour made a mess of something else. I refer to the madness of its procurement strategy, which wasted billions of pounds in overruns. The worst of it was delaying the carrier build by one year, which cost £1 billion alone. Given that the capitation cost of a brigade is £100 million, let us think how many battalions we could have saved. To take an operational perspective, for years our troops in Afghanistan were forced to use Snatch Land Rovers, but suddenly the last Government woke up to the fact that they were not adequate and there was a flurry of buying off the shelf. The Cougar, the Mastiff, the Ridgback—all these vehicles were purchased off the shelf, wasting huge sums of money, while our armed forces suffered on the front line. All those funding issues had a knock-on effect on the decisions we are debating today and the decisions for the future, not only on battalion and brigades, but on the order of battle.

I am an infanteer—I served in the Royal Green Jackets, another regiment that disappeared under the last Government—but I am also a national politician. We are all national politicians, and we must consider the capability of our entire armed forces—the demand to save ships; the demand to save planes, such as the Harrier, which has been debated by this House many times; the demand to save intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capability; and, of course, the demand to save regiments, not least my own. As we have heard, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has an amazingly proud history, dating back to James II —I am sorry that the Father of the House is not here to confirm that—and it has had an impact not just in its own area, but right across Britain as a whole. When the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers was formed, it was given the most up-to-date weapon of the day, the fusil, which gave it its name, and in the first world war it had a total of 196 battalions in operation. How different the picture is today.

We have heard some powerful arguments, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister says in response to the support we have heard for the Fusiliers. However, I would also say to him—I hope he listens carefully to this proposal—that if it is the Government’s intention to reconfigure the balance of our armed forces between regular forces and the Territorial Army more towards the Australian and American models and to increase the size of Territorial Army units, and if it is also the Minister’s intention to decide to disband the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, then why not allow this fine battalion to configure immediately into a Territorial Army unit? I absolutely accept that that is not an ideal solution, but it would prevent that footprint in history and the contribution made by this amazing battalion from disappearing in their entirety.

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend will know that the Territorial review is continuing. We have had the review and we are now looking at the details, but I assure him that we will look carefully at that proposal as we expand the Territorial Army, or the reserve.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful to the Minister. I appreciate that that is not the solution that many hon. Members, on both sides of the House, are looking for, but if it is the Government’s intention to reduce the size of our battalions, my proposal would seem to be one way of maintaining the future prosperity and history of this wonderful regiment.

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[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

We have heard some very heartfelt, passionate and emotional contributions today. I do not criticise hon. Members for that emotion in any way; indeed, I have a great deal of sympathy for many of the points that have been raised.

I would like first to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing this debate, which has allowed so many people to contribute and make their points, which is very important in this House of Commons. I welcome this opportunity to explain the situation. We have come to these decisions, as has the Army, after a great deal of consideration and analysis. The British Army and the regiments concerned are now looking to get on with the difficult task of implementing the decisions, which, frankly, have not been palatable.

In May 2010, when we entered government, we faced a dire financial situation. A £38 billion black hole, possibly a great deal more—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Robathan]

Of course I will give way, although I must point out that the hon. Gentleman had the opportunity to give way to me and would not do so, even though he had been told, on a piece of paper that I saw being slipped to him, that he could take as many interventions as he wanted.

[Mr Jones]

That is not what I said at all. It is interesting to hear what the Minister is saying. He talks about the £38 billion, which he has never explained before at the Dispatch Box, and he is now telling the House that the figure could be bigger. How much bigger?

[Mr Robathan]

The hon. Gentleman did not explain at all; he just said that he would not take any interventions. I can see the piece of paper there. Perhaps he would like to read what it says—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. I can probably help the Minister on this. The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) was under the impression that he was time-limited, which of course was not the case. That was not down to any information that he had at the time; it was while he was speaking that he believed he was time-limited. The Minister will have a slightly longer time. Perhaps we can sort this out across the Dispatch Box.

[Mr Robathan]

Of course, Madam Deputy Speaker.

The hon. Gentleman knows that the previous Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr Byrne), left a note saying that there was no money, and there is no money. We are working on producing a detailed analysis of the money, which will be made available to the Defence Committee at some stage. I am not quite sure where we have got to on that.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Robathan]

Not for a third time. He would not give way even once. Can we crack on?

We have to deal with that hole in the budget, and the hole in the defence budget, if we want to put the defence of this nation on a sound and sustainable footing—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) chunters away, but we cannot spend money that we do not have.

[Mr Jones]

You don’t even know how much money you’ve got.

[Mr Robathan]

As hon. Members will know from statements made by the Secretary of State for Defence—

[Mr Jones]

You’re making it up.

[Mr Robathan]

Have you finished?

As hon. Members will know from statements made by the Secretary of State for Defence, the Ministry of Defence is now—for the first time I can remember—living within its means, and we can plan for the future with a much greater degree of certainty than was previously the case.

[Mr Jones]

I find what the Minister is saying completely remarkable. He has just told us that he cannot explain the £38 billion. He has also told us that the figure could be bigger, and he is now saying that the defence budget is in balance. If he did not know how big the hole was in the first place, how the hell can he now claim that the budget is in balance? That is complete, incoherent nonsense.

[Mr Robathan]

I do not think that this debate should be argued on party political grounds—

[Mr Jones]

You started it.

[Mr Robathan]

I regret very much the attitude of the hon. Gentleman. Others will look at the debate and decide whether he started it, or whether we did. Frankly, it is pathetic and childish to argue in such a way.

[Graham Stringer]

I sympathise with the Minister; as an ex-military person, he must be in an uncomfortable and lonely position. However, rather than having a debate about the nation’s finances, which would be more appropriate at another time, will he respond to the points that have been made on both sides of the House? What is his argument against the fact that the decision to get rid of the battalion was made on political grounds, and not on military grounds? That is the substantial point of the debate.

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[Mr Robathan]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. As it happens, I have a great regard for him, and I do not wish this to be a party political debate. I wish to talk about the future of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, which has a very proud history.

We are now living within our means, and we have a fully funded equipment programme and affordable armed forces. Reaching that position has required us to make hard, painful choices, which have included reducing the size of the regular Army. I have always said—I have heard it repeated two or three times in this debate—that the first duty of Government is the defence of the realm. Our mission endures, and it is to protect our country and its values and interests abroad and at home. To do this, we must meet the complex range of threats and challenges in a rapidly changing world. We must adapt to stay ahead and ensure that our people have what they need in order to do what we ask of them.

[Mr Baron]

I am pleased that the debate is returning to the substance of the motion about the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The Minister said that detailed analysis was undertaken to come to the basic decision to axe 2RRF. Will he explain the basis of that analysis, as the Secretary of State’s answers to written parliamentary questions make it very clear that other battalions had far worse recruitment and retention figures than the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers? On what basis, then, was this analysis undertaken?

[Mr Robathan]

If I may, I will cover my hon. Friend’s points as they were made in his speech. My responses are written down here, and it is better that I give him a detailed analysis rather than provide one off the top of my head.

While our armed forces might be smaller than before, they will still be able to reach across the world and operate across the full range of capabilities. We are reducing the size of the regular armed forces, but we are increasing the reserves, including an integrated element of the total land force of 120,000, with an extra £1.8 billion of investment in reserves, training and equipment.

The Army has been both pragmatic and imaginative in responding to this very real challenge. The blueprint was decided upon by the Army and announced by the Defence Secretary on 5 July. This project we call Army 2020. For the first time, this provides a pathway to a fully integrated Army of regular and reserve forces that will be configured for high-end conflict, rapid reaction, UK engagement and upstream conflict prevention.

[Stephen Barclay]

Will my right hon. Friend address the point that the value of the defence inventory is currently £40.3 billion? Just this June, the National Audit Office said:

“the Department is spending money on unnecessary levels of stock, which could be spent elsewhere in government.”

We are talking about such a modest sum of money; can it not be found elsewhere?

[Mr Robathan]

I have to confess to my hon. Friend that I do not deal with procurement measures. We have a defence reform project going on, which I think he will find addresses his point. I will ensure that he receives a letter from the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, setting out a proper response.

I think it would be better if we stuck with the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, because that is what people have come to speak about. Today, we have heard arguments about the withdrawal of 2RRF from the Army’s order of battle. Neither my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State nor I take any pleasure in the removal of any unit from the Army. I can assure hon. Members that we did not come into politics to reduce our armed forces. There is not a battalion or regiment in the current order of battle that does not have a proud history and significant battle honours. If, however, we are to create an affordable and balanced Army offering serious military capability into the future, a small number of those proud units and battalions will have to be withdrawn from the line.

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has been made aware of the reasons behind the Army Board’s decisions—and they were Army Board decisions, endorsed by Ministers. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate these reasons for the benefit of the House.

[Mr Baron]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Robathan]

I am about to answer my hon. Friend’s questions; he might like to intervene again later.

In redesigning the future Army, it was decided that five fewer regular infantry battalions were required than are currently in the order of battle. In deciding which of the current 36 battalions to withdraw, the Army—I repeat, the Army—applied a number of criteria. The first was to maintain a regimental system that was largely regionally aligned. The second was to ensure the sustainability of regiments according to the projected regional supply of recruits in the 2020 time frame. The third was to ensure proportionality of outcome across the infantry, with no cap badge deletions and with no regiment losing more than one battalion.

Another key criterion, which Members who have served in the Army will understand, was to balance the whole infantry structure to maintain a variety of roles and parity of opportunity of experience for officers and soldiers. It was also important to take account of previous decisions on mergers and deletions, as well as historical manning performance. Finally, the Army wanted those who are currently serving to see this as fair and equitable. After all, it is those who are serving now, and those who are seeking to join the Army, who will make the change happen.

Those criteria were determined by the Chief of the General Staff and by General Carter, who has led the Army 2020 review. After a period of consultation with Ministers, they constructed an objective, fair and transparent process that included the criteria, applying the military logic to which my hon. Friend referred.

[Mr Baron]

I appreciate the Minister’s generosity in giving way. Let me make it clear for the record that I know him well enough to be aware that he takes no pleasure in announcing these cuts. I do not doubt that at all: it is not what we are questioning. However, if there have to be cuts—and I personally think that the Government’s priorities are wrong; I think that such cuts should be made outside the MOD budget—they should be based on military logic, not on political calculation that is designed to save more poorly recruited Scottish battalions north of the border.

In answers given to me by the Secretary of State and in answers to written parliamentary questions, it has been confirmed—confirmed in writing by the Secretary of State—that the five least sustainable battalions will be two from the Royal Regiment of Scotland, one from the Yorkshire Regiment, one from the Mercian Regiment and one from the Royal Welsh Regiment. That is military logic, as applied in a letter to me from the Secretary of State.

[Mr Robathan]

As I have said, one of the criteria was that no regiment should lose more than one battalion. I shall explain shortly why the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers came into the frame.

[Dan Byles]

The Minister is an old military hand himself, so he will know the phrase “situating the estimate”. Let me explain for the benefit of those who are not military that it means setting the parameters deliberately in order to achieve the desired outcome. Does the Minister not recognise that there is a great deal of concern among Members in all parts of the House who believe that that is what has happened in this instance?

[Mr Robathan]

I do recall the phrase, and that is not what has happened.

Let me now explain in some detail how the application of the criteria that I listed earlier led us to the outcome announced on 5 July. Some of this may sound a little dry, but it is important for the House to understand the care that was taken in reaching these decisions.

Drawing on demographic data for the age cohort across the United Kingdom from which infantry recruits are drawn—the 15-to-29 age group, according to the way in which the Office for National Statistics segments the population—and taking account of historical trends in terms of the percentage of that cohort who were likely to join the Army, an assessment was made of which regiments were likely to be the least sustainable in the future in their current configuration. That work also included a comparison of each regiment’s historical outflow so that the likely recruiting requirement could be determined. On that basis, the Army’s analysis showed that the regiments likely to be the least sustainable in future were the Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Yorkshire Regiment, the Mercian Regiment, and the Royal Welsh Regiment. It was therefore decided to move one battalion from each of those regiments.

After the removal of the four battalions, and given the criterion that there should be no cap badge deletions and no regiment should lose more than one battalion, the method of predicting future sustainability, and therefore which battalion should be added to the four whose future had already been decided, became less statistically discerning. To put it another way, it was impossible to distinguish between a number of regiments on the basis of the future sustainability criterion alone.

[Sir Alan Beith]

In his letter to me, the Minister used those figures and there was a prediction that the Royal Regiment of Scotland would be one and three quarter battalions short on sustainability in the future. When we compare the risk to operability of that level of difficulty with the predictions for the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, do we not find that the military logic is overpowering?

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[Mr Robathan]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. However, in these difficult decisions, certain criteria were applied, one of which was that there should be only one battalion taken away from each regiment. That is what, I fear, trumped the good point that he makes.

[Patrick Mercer]

I am conscious that the Minister finds this an exceedingly painful process, but can he explain something? We were told a few years ago that it was deeply undesirable for regiments to continue as one-battalion organisations, for reasons relating to the career structures and all sorts of military logic, which I did not necessarily agree with. How was it that just a few years ago new regiments were invented and curious names were developed, yet now, a short time later, all of that is being stood on its head?

[Mr Robathan]

I do not think that I made that point, because I was not the person involved at the time. Since my hon. Friend’s time in the armed forces, and mine, people have moved a great deal more between divisions and between larger regiments. Where we are talking about a one-battalion regiment in a division, people cross over between the regiments in the division. That is certainly happening much more than it used to.

Determining the fifth battalion to be withdrawn required the application of criteria that went wider than demographics. Remembering the imperative of having no regiment losing more than one battalion, the Army discounted those regiments that were already losing a battalion, such as the Royal Scots, and those which were single-battalion regiments. That meant that the choice came down to a battalion from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the Royal Anglian Regiment or The Rifles—the Parachute Regiment was excluded on the grounds of its specific role. Taking account of the need to maintain equity of opportunity across the infantry divisions, the Army decided—I stress that it was the Army that decided this—that it should be the Queen’s Division that lost a battalion. That was because it had six battalions whereas other divisions would be left with only four or five. Taking account of historical manning performance—since the previous reorganisation of the infantry, in 2007, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has had average undermanning of 13.3%—and the fact that the Fusiliers is a regiment with two battalions, it was considered the most appropriate from within the Queen’s Division from which to withdraw a battalion.

I would like to pay tribute to the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. It has a proud history and it will continue as a regiment with a proud history. It has served in every major campaign since 1674, up to and including Afghanistan. I have visited the regimental museum and the headquarters in the Tower of London with my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay—in fact, I went back only last month. I know the history of this proud regiment.

As some in this Chamber may know, in Northern Ireland Second Lieutenant Winthrop devised a clever way of finding hidden caches. I remember being taught this in Northern Ireland, and it allowed us to find hidden IRA weapons. He was a Fusilier, and that is someone more recently who influenced military thinking. I served with the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in the first Gulf war, and my mother’s uncle was killed in 1916 while serving in the Fusiliers. I mention that because we all hugely respect the past and present members of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. I fully understand that this decision came as a great disappointment to those serving with the regiment and those, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, with connections to it.

[Mr Baron]

I welcome the Minister’s warm words, but I suggest to him that we do not just want warm words—we want action. Clearly he is basing his whole argument on the idea that regimental losses should be limited to one battalion. That is exceptionally questionable, and it is a complete about-turn on the thinking of the reorganisation that took place only six years ago, when four cap badges and six battalions were amalgamated into larger regiments. Can he not understand that it is far more disruptive for a two-battalion regiment—a well-recruited one—to lose one battalion than it is for a five-battalion regiment that has trouble sustaining two battalions, as has been admitted by the MOD, to maintain those two battalions? Can he not see the logic here? Can he not see why the MOD’s limitation of one battalion loss per regiment is so illogical?

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend is an intelligent person, but I have made the point several times that the Army decided that it wanted to withdraw only one battalion from each regiment, and that is why this decision was reached.

I know that the decision is a great disappointment to many people, but it was simply not possible to save every unit, given the financial situation in which we found ourselves. I hope that what I have explained is a fair, transparent and equitable process, which produced the right outcome, in difficult circumstances, for the Army. The MOD has now placed in the Library of the House the detailed data the Army used in reaching its decision on which battalions to remove from the order of battle.

I think I have dealt with the question of Scotland. We did not take another battalion out of the Royal Scots, because that would have been to the detriment of the criterion that only one battalion should be taken from each regiment. My hon. Friend and others have suggested that the decisions were not taken on wholly military grounds and that a degree of political influence was brought to bear that has resulted in English regiments “losing out”—their words—to the Royal Regiment of Scotland, but the advice from the Chief of the General Staff and his Army 2020 team was clear: the effect on the regimental structure and the wider community of losing more than one battalion would magnify the impact of any change and thus impact on the subsequent healing process. I hope that that advice and the rest of the objective criteria the Army applied to the review will put minds at rest. As the Government have made clear on a number of occasions, we are making no plans on the basis of an independent Scotland, as we firmly believe—a belief that I know is shared on both sides of the House—that the majority of Scottish people will continue to support the Union in any referendum.

Cap badges and uniforms are important, but hon. Members should realise that they evolve and change over the years, and indeed have done so during our lifetimes. I have worn many different cap badges and I believe that people adapt very quickly and are proud of the regiments and the units in which they serve. I assure all hon. Members here today that we are aware of the justifiably fierce pride and loyalty felt by local communities to their locally recruited battalions, wherever that might be across the UK.

I come back to the real reason behind the reductions, which is the fiscal mess we inherited in 2010. The process has been painful for the Government. I reiterate: no Defence Minister came into government to reduce our armed forces. However, balancing the black hole inherited from the previous Government required difficult decisions to reach our current more balanced and affordable position. The Army—and it is the Army—has played an intelligent and constructive part in the exercise and has had to make some very tough decisions, but it is never possible to make such significant changes without causing some pain somewhere. The plan that has been announced, while difficult for some to accept, offers a balanced and fair way to maintain a robust regimental system into the future.

I reiterate that the Fusiliers—the proud Royal Regiment of Fusiliers—will go on as a regiment. We are not abolishing the Fusiliers, as some seem to have implied. I know that the Army as a whole understands that and is now getting on with implementing the new structures in the positive and pragmatic way that anybody who knows the Army would expect. My sincere hope is that hon. Members, and in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, who instigated this debate, can now allow the Army to do so.