Reserve Forces

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Hollobone]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who has identified a real issue, and hope that the Minister will respond to those figures. We want to ensure that ex-regulars join the reserves. We also need to retain the reservists who are recruited. Retention is a key issue. All too often we focus on how well recruitment is going, and do not spend enough time on retaining reservists.

I am pleased that the Government have an employer recognition scheme. It was launched by the Prime Minister in July 2014 and is intended to recognise employers through a scheme with bronze, silver and gold tiers. I understand that 10 employers received gold awards last year.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that part of the problem is that the original plan was to hold the regular forces and not let sizeable numbers go until there was clear evidence that the plans for the reserves were working? That original plan changed because of financial considerations, which is the reason for the present large capability gaps. Perhaps it is also the reason for the problem with recruitment.

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[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) for securing the debate. When he was serving in his trench in Germany in the 1980s, I was even further east during the cold war, in Berlin, surrounded by the enemy. We were always told that quality would see us through, but some of us also knew that quantity has a quality all of its own, and that we stood very little chance. Our job was just to slow the progress of the advancing forces in time for when they met my hon. Friend, who would obviously put a stop to them.

I start by making the obvious point: the plan to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists was born out of financial pressures, not strategic logic—let us be absolutely clear about that. As was described to me and others by the then Secretary of State for Defence, the financial logic was very simple. In peacetime, reservists cost a fraction of regular forces; they are easier to maintain on the Ministry of Defence budget, but when the balloon goes up and they need to be deployed, the cost of deployment, which is far higher for reservists than it is for regulars, gets transferred to the Treasury. It was an accounting exercise designed to save money. There were no strategic grand designs with this plan. That is not to say that there are not advantages from having a more flexible reservist force available to hand, or that one does not have a deep regard for the Territorial, now reservist, forces—I served with them myself in Berlin, Germany, Cyprus and Northern Ireland back in the 1980s—but the bottom line is that the plan was born out of financial pressure, not strategic design.

The plan was criticised by some of us at the time. The criticism manifested itself most starkly when we tabled amendments to the Defence Reform Bill, later the 2014 Act, in the last Parliament. I managed to secure the support of the official Opposition and the Scottish National party for an amendment, but unfortunately I could not carry quite enough Members from my side, although I am very thankful to those who did support me in that amendment, including my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering.

For us, the problem was that replacing 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists would create capability gaps and false economies in the longer term. The original plan was to hold those 20,000 regulars in situ until we had clear evidence that the reservist plan would work—in other words, until we had geared up on the reservists’ recruitment. There were clear indications that we could plug that gap—that, by the way, was confirmed by the previous Defence Secretary, who stood up during the debate on the amendment to the Defence Reform Bill and said that that was the case and that was the original plan. However, in addition to the cack-handed plan of replacing 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reserves, simply on the grounds of financial pressure, we then compounded the problem by saying, “We’ll let the regulars walk out the door, and no doubt we won’t have any problem with reserve recruitment.” What madness that turned out to be. We let the regulars out the door and the Army is now, I think—no doubt the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—below 82,000 on our regular strength, and meanwhile we are struggling to recruit the reservists, as my hon. Friend has clearly outlined.

The problem is not just numbers. My hon. Friend rightly pointed out that we are perhaps 9,000 or 10,000 reservists short, but, as has been alluded to in this debate, it is not just the numbers that are the problem; it is the age profile of the existing reservists. Answers to written questions more than a year ago highlighted that the average age of an infantryman in the reserve forces was in the mid-30s, and that going up the ranks, whether senior NCOs or officers, it was heading into the 40s.

We all loved “Dad’s Army”—great series—and there is a place for a home reserve, but Dad’s Army was not on the Normandy beaches. In addition to the numbers being recruited into the reserve, we need to look at the age profile of the existing reservists. The figures I quoted are for infantrymen, not the other arms of the reserve. Infantrymen have to be of a certain age to be at their peak capability on deployment.

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. and gallant Friend is generous in giving way. Dad’s Army was not on the Normandy beaches as it was a home defence force, but the Territorial Army most certainly was there. A division helped to hold the line at Dunkirk and, indeed, a national guard division on its own took Omaha beach.

[Mr Baron]

I do not deny all that, and the Minister will not be able to deny that the Government have made it clear that they intend to deploy reservists much more frequently in overseas operations. He gives us only half the truth. If the plan is to deploy reservists much more regularly, not only will that be more costly than deploying regular forces, but we will have to address the demographic issue within existing reservists and the TA.

In the time remaining, let me return to false economies. No one can deny that capability gaps have occurred as a result of the change in plan, but the Minister must address the false economies resulting from that. Letting regulars go prematurely and the problems with reservist recruitment highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering have resulted in extra spending. It is not just the IT fiasco, which cost £10 million, but the extra spending on incentives for both employers and employees —£500—pension equalisation and advertising.

I have asked parliamentary questions about whether the Government can quantify those extra expenses, which were not foreseen when the original plans were put in place. We have not had answers. We keep being told that there is £1.8 billion, which should cover those expenses, but that £1.8 billion is over 10 years. We need detailed answers from the Government on what those unforeseen extra costs have been. When will we have those answers? Either the Government do not know the answers, which would be worrying, or they do know and will not disclose them. That would be equally worrying and may suggest to some that they are trying to hide something.

I look forward to answers from the Minister, and if he does not have time to provide them today, perhaps he will write to me and others who have raised the issue and say what the extra costs are. Our two central concerns are capability gaps in the short term and false economies in the longer term. At the moment, the reservist plans seem to have both problems.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

What a pleasure it is to respond to the debate under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) on securing the debate and on his remarkable, predictably thoroughly researched and self-effacing speech. The debate takes place as we remember the first world war, in which the then Territorial Force won 71 Victoria Crosses, and the Battle of Britain, in which two of the three highest-scoring squadrons were from the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

I will try to pick up as many points as I can in the short time available. My hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon), who had to leave to attend the Defence Committee, know that I am not allowed to respond to the points they made about special forces, beyond saying that my heart goes out, as I know theirs do, to the families of the three young men. I share my hon. Friend’s pride in the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross he referred to, which is the latest in a series of decorations won by the unit we both served in.

The expansion of the reserve forces is critical to our ability to deliver defence on a sustainable financial basis and to maintain the Clausewitzian trinity of the armed forces, the Government and the people. It will enable us to ensure that the armed forces are structured and resourced to meet the challenges of the 21st century. After many years of neglect, the Government are restructuring and revitalising our reserve forces and investing in new equipment and support.

The programme is not—my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and I have debated this many times—about swapping regular personnel for reserves. In 2010 we did, indeed, make some very painful decisions right across Government. After that, the commission on which I served looked at the issue of the balance and recommended changing the way that we delivered defence to make the best use of our resources, better to harness the talents of the wider UK society and, above all, to help to restore links and understanding between the armed forces and the communities that they serve. The sombre events in Paris remind us of the importance of those close links. We should be in no doubt at all that, whatever the size of our armed forces, we must always have reserves.

Now, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) knows that he is not going to tempt me into anticipating the strategic defence and security review, but I can say that I am pleased to be part of a Government who are genuinely committed to 2% for defence spending, although I know I will not satisfy my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering on the legal point. Nevertheless, we are committed to it.

Our programme to grow the reserves is making good progress but, as my hon. Friend said, there is no room for complacency. In the year to 1 October, more than 8,500 people joined the volunteer reserves, an increase of more than 65% on the previous 12 months, taking their strength to more than 33,000. Most notably, 6,500 people joined the Army Reserve, an increase of 73% on the previous period. All three services are ahead of their trained strength targets, but that certainly does not mean that we can relax. We must continue to make further progress to meet our commitment of creating a force of around 35,000 trained volunteer reserves by April 2019, and to deliver the usable, motivated and capable reserve forces that the country needs. My hon. Friend is right that that means another 9,000 trained personnel in three and a half years’ time. Given that we have grown by 1,300 trained personnel in just the past six months, that seems challenging but not unattainable.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right—a number of other Members referred to this—that the biggest challenge is building the officer base. The internal study set up by the Chief of the General Staff and headed by a reserve brigadier has recommended considerable restructuring, including a marketing post manned by a volunteer reserve officer with huge marketing experience, who is now installed in Sandhurst. The numbers are going up. For example, just outside the constituency of the hon. Member for Stirling (Steven Paterson) is 71 Engineer Regiment, which I visited recently. It now has six young officers under 30—a transformation from even a couple of years ago. The same thing has happened with my local reserve unit.

A number of Members made a point about the need to get the age structure down. In fact, the largest concentration in the age structure of the Army Reserve is in the 25 to 29 category. We are working hard on it, but the averages are pulled up by the fact that we want older people—those in their 40s and even 50s—in areas such as intelligence and for some of the medical skills. A number of Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering, mentioned transfers from the regulars. Those are running above our target. In fact, that is the one part of reserve recruiting that has been consistently above target, and we are offering substantial financial incentives to those who transfer.

We are offering reservists today more challenging opportunities than before. New call-out powers enshrined in the Defence Reform Act 2014 have allowed us to use reservists in the same way as regulars, and reservists have taken up the challenge. We would only have compulsory call-out only in an emergency, but people join the reserves because they want to be used. In the past 12 months, they have been deployed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering said, in formed groups to Afghanistan and Cyprus. They have provided specialist help to deal with the Ebola crisis in west Africa, and maritime reserves have taken part in counter-terrorist and counter-piracy operations alongside their regular counterparts. As my hon. Friend said, next summer a company from 4 Para will provide the framework company for the Falkland Islands.

We are offering reserves more and better training opportunities. In the current training year, the services have planned more than 50 overseas exercises involving reserves, including a series of Army exercises in Kenya with integrated companies of regulars and reserves. A number of Members referred to the crucial importance of the specialist courses in what we call phase 2 and 3 training and to the difficulties of tailoring those to reservists in civilian employment. The fact that Chatham has managed that for an area such as bomb disposal shows that this is possible more widely across the Army.

Several people, including the hon. Member for Bridgend and my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering, referred to the importance of cyber. For quite a long time, the only cyber-unit in the armed forces was a reservist one in the then Territorial Army. Today, reserves play an important role in cyber in all three services.

We have invested in new equipment. We have given reservists access to the regular pension scheme and a paid annual leave entitlement. We are giving them full access to Defence-provided medical care and physiotherapy, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering will remember, was an issue when he and I served. We have improved civilian accreditation for training. Employers are vital and we are immensely grateful for the commitment some of them make.

[Mr Baron]

No one in this Chamber doubts the dedication, hard work and enthusiasm that the Minister is putting into the task of increasing the reserve forces, but he must also accept that key questions remain unresolved, including the age profile of the infantry. We all accept the age profile when it comes to reservists and specialisms such as cyber, but the age profile of the infantry is still far too high—mid-30s and early 40s. May I return the Minister to the central issue of extra costs? There have been extra unforeseen costs with these plans, which, despite frequent requests to the Government, he and the Government are unable or unwilling to disclose. Does he intend—if not here today, then perhaps in the immediate future—to put that right?

[Mr Brazier]

I have written to my hon. Friend and I will write to him again. The ongoing costs of the recruiting process have shown some significant savings, but it is difficult to separate regulars and reserves because they are in the same contract. If he is referring to the contingency costs of deploying reserves on operations, there is a cost associated, but it is a cost that is paid for only when there are large-scale operations. The point about reservists—as the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) said, if I heard her correctly—is that it is very much cheaper most of the time to have part of the forces in reserves.

We have established the defence relationship management service, to which 42 of the 100 FTSE companies are now signed up. I have already mentioned the extra benefits for small and medium-sized enterprises. Crucially, we have set up an annual employer notification process, so that employers know a long way in advance when reservists are being called. That is crucial for retention, which so many Members referred to.

My hon. Friend the Member for Kettering set out the progress we have already made on the employer recognition scheme, which includes many NHS trusts. We are not in a position to dictate this, although I pay tribute to the Scottish Government, who run a more unified system and are able to dictate. Many hospital trusts have won employer awards. The Cabinet Secretary has the 1% challenge; we now have 1,250 civil servants serving in the reserves. These are at the heart of the retention issues. I cannot give the exact figures for medical reserve recruiting at the moment, but I can say that over the past 12 months the Army medical services, which are the bulk, have seen a considerable surge in numbers. I will write to my hon. Friend and to the other Members who raised that issue with some more detailed figures.

We have overcome a number of challenges that were affecting Army Reserve recruitment. We are making more imaginative use of advertising media, and we have hugely reduced the delays in the pipeline under the new system and provided better mentoring and support in units for those enlisting.

I thank all Members who took part in the debate and the many other Members who support their local units. Our reserves are stronger and better equipped than they have been for years. Despite the neglect, over the past 10 years, 70 reservists won decorations for gallantry in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 31 gave their lives. There is a great deal that we can be proud of in our reserve forces. We are making the reserves proposition that we set out in the 2013 White Paper a reality.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 13th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I can give the hon. Gentleman that assurance, and I welcome the approach that the Opposition are adopting. We do not currently intend to present proposals to the House, but we have a strategy to help the Government of Iraq defeat ISIL, which we are pursuing in Iraq. We are also flying reconnaissance flights over Syria, and helping to train members of the Syrian opposition. As I think the hon. Gentleman implied, the situation in Syria is very different from and more complex than the situation in Iraq, and any strategy in Syria must properly reflect that.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

11. What assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the decision by the Major Projects Authority to give the Future Reserves 2020 programme a red rating.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

My hon. Friend will have heard my earlier answer.

Since the MPA report, governance has been shaken up, with each service delivering its own programme alongside a defence-level enabling structure. My hon. Friend will know from many earlier answers that our improvements in recruitment, selection and training processes are bearing fruit. We remain committed to delivering the FR20 requirement.

[Mr Baron]

The Minister will nevertheless know that the MPA declares as red projects that it believes risk being unachievable. Given the delays, cost increases and capability gaps, and given reports that superannuated reservists and those who do not regularly attend parades are remaining on strength, at what point will the Government consider scrapping their plans and increasing the size of the regular Army?

[Mr Brazier]

We recruited nearly 7,000 reservists across the three services last year. That was a rise of 65%, and the rise was even greater within the Army Reserve. As for my hon. Friend’s reference to superannuated reservists, I visited 3 Royal Welsh last weekend, and the average age of that battalion has dropped from 41 to 31 over the past three years.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I would not want to suggest that the hon. Gentleman was reading his horoscope. I do not think he was doing anything of the kind—that is a calumny!

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Defence diplomacy is a major component of Britain’s soft power. What steps are the Government taking to foster and encourage this aspect of our international relations?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Julian Brazier)]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: defence engagement is of pivotal importance. We are in the process of “upgunning” the role of defence attachés worldwide, with more language training and a proper career structure to make it more attractive. That is part of a wider attempt to raise the importance of defence diplomacy. Soldiers, sailors and airmen can so often reach parts of our allies that others cannot.

Defence Spending

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House believes that defence spending should be set to a minimum of two per cent of GDP in accordance with the UK’s NATO commitment.

Thank you for those kind words, Mr Speaker. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for allowing this debate and those MPs who supported the application. We live in times of heightened international tensions. We would do well to remember that the adage about defence being the first duty of Government has been forged by events, and we ignore the lessons of history at our peril. The world remains a dangerous and unstable place, and a growing number of countries that are not necessarily friendly to the west are not only rearming at an alarming rate, but becoming more assertive. We need to spend more on defence not only to better protect our interests and support key alliances, but to deter potential aggressors and ensure that we try to avoid conflict in future.

The motion calls on the Government to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence, in line with our NATO commitment. Defence spending as a share of GDP has been falling in recent years, and it is widely believed that Britain will shortly fall below the 2% figure. We all know that 2% is an arbitrary figure; spending should reflect desired capability. I believe that defence spending should be much more than 2%—I suggest 3% to 4%. But the 2% figure does have symbolic value. Having lectured other NATO members about its importance, we should lead by example.

In short, we need to rediscover the political will for strong defence, and that political will transcends the political divide here. Some demons may need to be vanquished first, most notably our recent misguided military interventions, which have probably distracted us from greater dangers, but banished those demons must be. That we have the political will to ring-fence the international aid budget at 0.7% of GDP suggests that such will can be found; it is simply a question of priorities.

We have in this country, I believe, a political disconnect that needs to be put right. None of the main parties seems to question that Britain has global interests and needs to remain a global power, both to protect them and to uphold our international obligations as a member of NATO and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Yet the political establishment, across the political divide, appears unwilling properly to resource these commitments.

So why the disconnect? I can only put it down, in large part, to our misguided military interventions of the past decade, which have led some to question the value of spending on defence. These interventions have been very costly in terms of blood and treasure, and have rarely achieved their original aims, with the extent of civilian casualties and the persecution of minorities being two such examples.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

While I disagree with my hon. Friend about misguided previous military engagements—I do not think that either was misguided—we did see what happens when we try to deploy troops abroad on the cheap without their being properly equipped. We lost a lot of good people because of that, and there were a lot of injuries. We should never put our people in that position again.

[Mr Baron]

My hon. Friend and I may disagree about whether our interventions were misguided, but he makes a very valid point, which is that we have been intervening with increasingly marginal effect. Helmand in Afghanistan was a classic case of that. It took the Americans putting in another 20,000 troops before we pulled that situation round.

Let me return to the point about disconnect. The military interventions over the past decade have distracted us from the greater danger. Too often in these military interventions, we have failed to take the long view in favour of short-term foreign policy fixes that give rise to as many problems as they solve. A key reason is a deficit of strategic analysis at the heart of our foreign policy making, in large part because of continual underfunding—but perhaps that is a debate for another day.

There is little doubt that we went to war in Iraq on a false premise, and that we foolishly allowed the mission in Afghanistan to morph into one of nation building after we had achieved our original objective of ridding the country of al-Qaeda. Our Libyan intervention has not ended well courtesy of a vicious civil war. Speaking as someone who opposed them all, we must dispel these demons when thinking about defence more generally, because, in addition to being mistakes in themselves, these interventions have distracted us from, and blinded us to, the greater danger of traditional state-on-state threats.

For example, recent events in Ukraine reveal a resurgent Russia that is once again making its presence felt around NATO’s borders. Russian bomber aircraft and submarines have resumed their aggressive patrols, some near UK waters and airspace. The Defence Secretary correctly observed last month that Russia posed a real and current danger to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—all NATO members covered by article 5. Only by dispelling these previous intervention demons and recognising the bigger danger can we mend the political disconnect between commitments, on the one hand, and funding, on the other. It is absolutely essential that we do that.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that two of the most chilling interventions in recent weeks have been, first, from the chief of staff of the American army, who said that he thought that a diminished UK defence capability would serve not alongside, but as part of, an American division; and secondly, from the Europeans, who indicated that the best deterrent against Mr Putin was a European army? Are not both those interventions extremely telling?

[Mr Baron]

I can only agree with my hon. Friend. The idea that British brigades would serve within American divisions would probably have been unthinkable only 10 years ago. That is testament to the alarm in Washington, expressed—this is highly unusual—as we head into a general election. The extent of that alarm is clear for all to see.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Like my hon. Friend, I am suffering from flu.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the intervention in Iraq has allowed Iran to get away with its own nuclear programme, which is what our emphasis should have been on?

[Mr Baron]

I agree with my hon. Friend. One of the intended consequences of our misguided intervention in Iraq was that we fundamentally altered the balance of power in the region, and we have been playing catch-up ever since.

There are significant benefits to strong defence. As no one can predict with any certainty from where the next substantial threat will emerge, we require armed forces of sufficient capability and capacity to respond to any challenge. The straits of Hormuz or the South China sea may seem a long way away, but we would soon realise their importance should sea lanes become closed, given the fact that the majority of our goods and trade arrive by sea. Argentina is looking to buy sophisticated fighter jets, and that reminds us that our capacity must include the ability to act independently, if necessary.

The heft of a strong military underpins a successful foreign policy. By contrast, a shrinking defence budget threatens our ability to lead global opinion, reduces our foreign policy options and, crucially, sends the wrong message both to our allies and to potential adversaries. It is doubtful that President Putin would operate as he is now if he thought that NATO, especially the European NATO members, would robustly stand up to him. [Interruption.] That is very kind.

[Mr Speaker]

In deference to the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), I think that that is called coalition co-operation.

[Mr Baron]

Whatever it is called, the glass of water is gratefully received.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Test it first.

[Mr Baron]

If I go down, hon. Members will know why.

Falling defence budgets across NATO have emboldened the Russian President, who has concluded that the heart has gone out of the alliance. This is dangerous, and it underlines the point that well-resourced and capable armed forces can, by deterring potential aggressors, make future conflict less likely. How many times have we foolishly discounted or underestimated that fact?

As we heard in the statement, the benefits of strong defence are not confined just to deterring potential aggressors. Strong armed forces can help us and others to face many of the emerging global challenges for which we need to be better prepared. Armed forces training has a wide skill base—everything from medicine and catering to construction and telecoms—and is a key component of our disaster relief capabilities, as shown by our response to the hurricane in the Philippines and the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone.

That skill base will be in increasing demand because the emerging global challenges include those posed by the fact that Africa’s population will be two and a half times that of Europe’s by 2050, the reverse of the proportions in only 1950; by resource scarcity, including water scarcity, which now affects one in three people; by temperature anomalies, which increasingly affect north Africa and the middle east; by fast-emerging middle classes who question political systems that struggle to deliver the goods; and by a growing tendency, aided by social media, for social unrest. Yet it could be argued that this is happening at a time when, in large measure, the international community is failing to produce co-ordinated responses on the scale needed to meet many of the most pressing challenges facing mankind, including poverty, organised crime, conflict, disease, hunger and inequalities. All that points to the need for investment in our foreign policy making and defence capabilities not only so that we are better sighted, but so that we can retain the maximum possible number of policy options by way of response.

How are we faring? Following a strategic defence and security review driven largely by financial pressures, rather than strategic design, the current Government have markedly reduced our armed forces. Plans to replace 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists have created unacceptable capability gaps in the short term and false economies in the long term. Particularly given the fact that the original idea was to hold on to the 20,000 regulars until we knew that the plan to replace them with 30,000 reservists was going to work, I suggest that it was incompetent to let 20,000 regulars march out of the door while only adding 500 to the trained strength of the Army Reserve in the two years that the plan has been in operation.

[Zac Goldsmith (Richmond Park) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech and I agree with every word he has said so far. If trends continue, all the problems that he has just identified will get worse, not better. In that context, he will surely agree that any move to cut expenditure on defence would be sheer lunacy. Clearly, we need to move in the opposite direction.

[Mr Baron]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. That point is best encapsulated in the recent statistic from the Library, which suggests that if the international aid budget continues to grow as it is, it will be as big as the defence budget by 2030—in only 15 years’ time. That is nonsense.

[Julian Smith (Skipton and Ripon) (Con)]

I am sympathetic to many of my hon. Friend’s arguments, but does he not need to make it clear that the Government had a £38 billion black hole to deal with, and many major challenges had to be addressed in 2010?

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[Mr Baron]

I agree that we inherited a financial shambles, as I have said many times before, but if we are prepared to ring-fence the international aid budget, it becomes a question of priorities. My point is that we need to spend more on defence and we need to reflect what is happening on the international stage: we are failing to do that.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

It may be worth reflecting on the fact that in 2010 we spent 2.5% of GDP on defence, so considerable cuts have already been made. The 2% is a marker.

[Mr Baron]

I made the point earlier that defence spending as a percentage of GDP has been falling under this Government, but my message is not just to my own Government. There is a political disconnect between the extent of our commitments and the lack of funding that is not being recognised across the political divide. I do not hear either of the main political parties saying that we should scale back our ambitions in the world, but nor has either party made it clear that it is committed to at least 2% in the future. I personally would like to see much more than that, but everyone can see the terms of the motion.

The reservist plan has been a disaster, in my opinion, resulting in unacceptable capability gaps in the short term and false economies in the long term, as we throw yet more money at it to try to make it work. Matters are not much better in the Royal Navy, which has been reduced to a mere 19 surface ships, although a recent SDSR suggested that 30 would be more appropriate. In addition to problems with the new aircraft carrier, the lack of a replacement for Nimrod means that we are in the ridiculous situation of having no maritime patrol aircraft. We have to go cap in hand to the Americans and the French to police our waters against potentially hostile submarines. That is a ridiculous state of affairs for a country of our standing.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I agree with the point that my hon. Friend makes about maritime patrol aircraft. It is urgent if we intend to deploy aircraft carriers, which are currently being constructed and fitted out in order to come into service in a couple of years.

[Mr Baron]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a valid point.

With these major shortcomings in our defence, it was alarming that a report by the Royal United Services Institute published this week suggests that the defence budget might be cut by 10% after the next election. Talk that Britain has the fifth largest defence budget—and the second largest in NATO—rings hollow when MOD reforms are cutting manpower, capabilities and the armed forces’ capacity to deploy force. Some estimates suggest that we rank 30th in the world in our ability to deploy force overseas, and my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) told us of the extent of the American concern about this issue.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. If we see defence cuts of another 10% after the election, another major concern will be the impact on our special forces. If we have an Army of 50,000 or 60,000, we will reduce the ability to recruit men into our special forces—currently probably the most respected in the world—and that will have a significant effect on our ability to project force.

[Mr Baron]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. He makes a very valid point, but time is pressing and this is a popular debate, so I will bring my remarks to a conclusion.

At the very least, the British Government should fulfil their NATO commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence. Having implored fellow NATO members to reach this level at last year’s NATO summit, which we hosted, falling below this level ourselves would be a grave mistake as well as a national embarrassment. Given current levels, it would be a dangerous message to send to the Kremlin.

The past decade of questionable military interventions may have bred a reticence among the political establishment on defence. This must end. We must banish these demons and recognise the greater danger of state-on-state threats, which never really went away. It is essential that we have the capability to protect ourselves, our interests and our allies. Reassessing our defence spending should go hand in hand with a wider reappraisal of how we approach foreign policy generally. Budgets have fallen at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Our key soft power institutions, such as the BBC World Service and the British Council, have suffered accordingly. This has resulted in a dilution of skills that has hindered policy making and reduced our options.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s speech with great admiration. He talks about banishing demons. There are 632 demons that we cannot banish: those who will be commemorated tomorrow; those who died as a result of terrible mistakes made in this Chamber that sent them to Helmand and Iraq. Should we not acknowledge the dreadful delusions, under which we have been operating for the past 12 years, which created those disasters, before we repeat them?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. In fairness, Mr Flynn, you have just asked to be put on the speaking list. I want to hear your speech later rather than now.

[Mr Baron]

All I will say is that we can have our own opinions about those misguided interventions, or interventions generally. I do not think any of us would say that it has been the fault of the troops on the ground. They did a sterling job in their operations. If the fault lies anywhere, it is with the politicians and the generals who perhaps promised too much and delivered too little.

In closing, I call on both main parties—I do mean both main parties—to recognise their reluctance to commit to spending at least 2% of GDP on defence. As an ex-solider and an MP now of 14 years, I find it difficult to believe that I am still, with others, having to try to make this case. I make no apologies for repeating that the adage about defence of the realm being the first duty of Government has been forged by events. We ignore the lessons of history at our peril. Whereas previous generations have perhaps had time to recover from such adverse situations, time may be a luxury we can no longer afford. We must learn those lessons.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

I want to thank all hon. Members for their contributions. There have been many good speeches here today, and I am pleased to say that we have all benefited from them. There has been almost universal acceptance that we live in times of heightened tensions. A growing number of countries not necessarily friendly to the west are not only increasing their defence spending and rearming but becoming more assertive. We need to spend more on defence not only better to support alliances and better protect our interests, but in deterring potential aggressors, to help to avoid conflict in the future.

We all know that 2% is an arbitrary figure. Money must be well spent and should reflect desired capability. I personally believe that we should spend 3% to 4%, but 2% has a symbolic value in that, having lectured other NATO members on the importance of 2%, it is important that we lead by example. We need to rediscover the political will for strong defence across the political divide. There is presently a disconnect in that the main political parties accept that we have global interests and responsibilities but seem reluctant to fund them, and perhaps our misguided military interventions have contributed to that. If so, these demons must be vanquished, because they have distracted us from the greater danger of potentially hostile nation states.

In short, as for the line that there are no votes in defence, we are shirking our duty to lead on this issue, and votes are lost through bad defence. We have acknowledged the adage that the first duty of Government is the defence of the realm. That has been forged by events, and we forget the lessons of history at our peril. Therefore, given that those on neither Front Bench have clearly committed to 2% of GDP—[Interruption.] If they have, they will have no trouble in supporting the motion. On that basis, I wish to test the will of the House if it will allow me.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

We cannot say what proportion of recruits resulted from it, but we can say that there has been a surge in recruiting, and that it was up 147% on the quarter last year, as the figures I have just given the House show. Additionally, although we are not going to publish the figures on cyber-recruiting, I can say that they are running ahead of the reserves average as a percentage.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

19. Government answers show that the average age of an existing reservist infantryman is in the mid-30s. Given that we have added only 500 reservists in the two years that this plan has been in place, and that that has led to capability gaps and false economies, has not the time come to rethink the plan and to stop trying to get our defence on the cheap?

[Mr Brazier]

Over the past 12 months, we have added more than 800 to the reserves. That followed a long period—a whole generation—of decline. We make no apologies for revising the age requirements for ex-regular soldiers to join the reserves in order to share their knowledge and expertise. We are looking for people with key skills and it is a waste to lose people with specialist skills in areas such as intelligence and medicine. Dare I say that my hon. Friend, with his years of experience, might have something to offer to the reserves?

Afghanistan

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Simpson]

The problem with our participation in the Iraq campaign and our military commitment in Afghanistan, which then expanded, was that the policy aims changed, and widened out. There is an argument—I do not actually stand by it but there are many who believe it, including perhaps some hon. Members present—that, through our participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, we made our streets less secure. But that comes back to the issue that we and the Government should be considering: the lessons learned.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. My point in a way reinforces his key earlier message. Is not the key error that we made in Afghanistan that, on succeeding in our initial objective of ridding the country of al-Qaeda, we allowed the mission to morph into one of nation building—a mission that we have struggled to resource properly?

[Mr Simpson]

I agree with my hon. Friend. That was the problem.

The material in the public domain—official records and the memoirs of civil servants and senior military officers—shows that it is difficult to establish how, for example, our commitment to Helmand came about. Helmand province was irrelevant in terms of the overall security picture in Afghanistan, and we did not want to go there. The logic stated that we should go to Kandahar, but unfortunately the Canadians were already there.

Loose political-military thinking bedevilled our military mission, coupled with the fact that, as my hon. Friend rightly said, we then glued on to our original policy things such as poppy eradication. At the time, many experts said that all we would do with that was drive impoverished farmers into the hands of the Taliban—we now know that was the case. That was a problem not just for the British but for the United States of America and many of our partners as well.

Coming back to the business of willing the means, I should say that there is no doubt in my mind that a crucial element in all this was what was perceived by the Iraqi Government and the Americans as our failure in Basra. It appeared that we had abandoned Basra. I am simplifying—there was a big argument at the time made by successive military commanders on the ground—but there was a sense that we were unable to cope with the situation in southern Iraq. At the same time, there was the feeling—and I have heard contradictory views about this, which is why, in terms of lessons learned, it would be nice to hear the truth—that there were elements in the Ministry of Defence who wanted to get out of Iraq because it was costly and not going anywhere, we had achieved our original objective and it seemed that Afghanistan was going to be an easier policy to explain to the British public. I am open to persuasion on that.

The interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan were predicated on the idea that they were part of the war against terror, but, as I have said, the objectives kept changing. Many of us who participated in debates on the interventions at the time were horrified by the inability not just of the British and American Governments but of our allies to show any understanding of the history and culture of both those countries—and, indeed, previous military operations in them. There were many voices attempting to explain that the interventions would be more difficult than people thought. Naturally, given a mission, the military were prepared to get stuck in and to think about the consequences later.

There is a real need to look at the policy-making machinery of the Government in Whitehall. To use the words of Lord Reid when he was at the Home Office, I am beginning to wonder whether that machinery is partly dysfunctional when it comes to complex operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. There was no lead Minister or Department for either Iraq or Afghanistan. Ultimately, decisions were made by the Prime Minister. There was no National Security Council then to at least try to co-ordinate policy. Individual Ministers attempted to take a lead, but I can remember going to briefings with officials in the Foreign Office, laid on in 2004 and 2005 by the Labour Government; after the second one, several of us said, “Perhaps it would be a good idea to have officials from the MOD and DFID along.” It took some time to get them to appear.

Trident Renewal

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Angus Robertson]

Forgive me, but I want to make some progress. The right hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity to make a speech later, and I look forward to hearing it.

The time has come to put down a marker about scrapping Trident and not replacing these weapons of mass destruction. At present, a UK Trident submarine remains on patrol at all times, and each submarine carries an estimated eight missiles, each of which can carry up to five warheads. In total, that makes 40 warheads, each with an explosive power of up to 100 kilotons of conventional high explosive—eight times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, killing an estimated 240,000 people from blast and radiation.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman and I have agreed on a number of foreign policy and defence issues, but can he not see that recent events, even on NATO’s border, again remind us of the importance of retaining the ultimate insurance policy in order to help keep Britain and its allies safe?

[Angus Robertson]

The difficulty with that position, of course, is that, were it true, it would mean that Germany, Italy and Spain were not safe and required nuclear weapons. In fact, it is the same argument made by the North Korean regime, which believes it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself. It is a dangerous argument to pursue.

I have yet to hear a supporter of Trident convincingly explain in what circumstances they would be prepared to justify the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children and the causing of massive environmental damage to the world for generations to come. Those are the consequences of using nuclear weapons, and surely if one has them, one has to be prepared to use them. I have yet to hear anybody give an example of circumstances where they would be prepared to kill millions of people.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s admiration of those people, and I was privileged to see them off just before Christmas. I note that the senior nursing officer in the rotation—effectively the commander in the red zone on the current operation—is herself a reservist.

To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question directly, those people are entitled to a number of other allowances, and we are looking at the moment at the issue that he mentions. My right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces will write to him when it has been determined.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The latest MOD figures show that the trained strength of the Army Reserve has actually fallen over the past 18 months. Can the Minister inform the House of the extra cost that has been incurred, over and above the original estimates, to encourage recruitment? The MOD’s continued silence on that suggests either embarrassment or ignorance.

[Mr Brazier]

On my hon. and gallant Friend’s first question, by looking back 18 months he is looking back past the bottom of the trough. The past six to nine months have been much more encouraging, and the next quarter is expected to be even better.

My hon. and gallant Friend has asked his second question again and again, and we have explained that, although we acknowledge that there are some extra costs, there is no way that we can separate them from the whole picture. Some of them are one-off costs, and some of them are connected with regular recruiting as well—we have to remind people, post-Afghanistan and so on, that we are recruiting.

Defence

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Ministerial Corrections

The following is an extract from Questions to the Secretary of State for Defence on 24 November 2014.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

25. However these figures are dressed up, the Ministry of Defence’s own figures show that the trained strength of the Army reserve has actually fallen over the last 18 months. Given that the Government have had to throw more money at the reforms, including added incentives to join up, will the Minister answer the one question that the Government have so far ducked: how much extra are these reforms costing, over and above original estimates?

[Mr Brazier]

Over the past six months, the trained strength of the volunteer reserves has increased by 400, and it is only in the last three months that most of the reforms we have introduced have bitten. The answer to my hon. Friend’s question is that we are confident that the figure that we originally offered—1.8, over the 10-year period—will be adequate for the purpose. We are still aiming to reach our targets. Numbers are growing and recruiting is increasing rapidly.

[Official Report, 24 November 2014, Vol. 588, c. 624.]

Letter of correction from Mr Brazier:

An error has been identified in the answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) during Questions to the Secretary of State for Defence.

The correct response should have been:

Afghanistan

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 27th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who of course served in the armed forces. He makes a good point about keeping those who lost loved ones in the campaign and those who suffered injuries up to date with the progress on the memorial, and I certainly undertake to do that.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Most of us agreed at the time with the initial deployment to rid the country of al-Qaeda, but what we tend to forget in this House is that that mission was accomplished within a couple of years. The mistake we made was then to allow the mission to morph into the much bigger one of nation building, something we did not properly resource. Given that—to use the Defence Secretary’s own words—the Taliban “remain a potent force”, may I draw him out a little and ask him what he thinks the key lessons are from this intervention?

[Michael Fallon]

I think I drew attention to the military lessons we can learn: these campaigns are best fought by local armies that have the support of the local population and have that inclusive support across tribal and political divides; these campaigns are waged best in conjunction with international partnerships, so that we learn and can operate each other’s equipment; and military action has to be supplemented with effective economic and political support alongside it. I certainly acknowledge that there is a great deal more to do in all three of those respects.