Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

No, I do not. If the hon. Lady wants to know one of the reasons that we have taken a slightly different position, it is Operation Spring Shield, which relates to the Turkish incursion into north-west Syria. As she is a member of the ISC, perhaps she should look at the impact of that type of change in tactics and use of technology on a conventional armoured force. It became blatantly clear that unless we modernised and updated our land forces in a proper way, they would be deeply vulnerable to those types of attacks. That is the responsibility I have to protect the men and women operating that equipment so that I can deploy them, and I will not take it lightly. If I have to have a few less people to make sure they are better protected, better equipped and better deployable, but also more lethal, that is a decision I would take, and I am sure that most Members in this House would.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con) [V]]

There is much to welcome in this statement. My only concern relates to some of the cuts in our conventional forces, because quantity still has a quality all of its own. For example, no matter how potent a naval vessel might be, it cannot be in two places at once. May I turn my right hon. Friend’s attention to the importance of soft power in helping to avoid conflict in the first place? I know that this is something he agrees with. What plans are there in the integrated review and the Command Paper to increase resource investment in defence diplomacy as a means of increasing our soft power capabilities?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend and I completely agree on this matter. We are going to invest in and increase the number of defence attachés around the world. We are going to invest in better comms for them, and we have already started the process of improving their curriculum, so that they are better trained and more knowledgeable. I have also instructed the director of defence people to make a separate career stream for those people, so that they can start at junior level and follow it all the way through to become a professional in a certain part of the world, speaking the language, understanding the importance of inter-regional actions and therefore really adding value and being able to complement the UK’s diplomatic effort and potentially other efforts around the world to provide stability. In that way, we can hopefully get in early and not end up in a place where we have to go and fight a conflict when things have failed.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

We are focused on the Government’s world-leading commitment to net zero 2050, and defence will, without doubt, play its part. A lot of work is ongoing regarding how we can increase our activity in that sphere, but we have discussions with commercial entities and throughout the MOD about how we can tackle carbon emissions throughout the armed forces. That includes, recently, clearing MOD planes to use up to 50% sustainable aviation fuel. That is a good step in the right direction, and others will undoubtedly follow.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

What plans he has for the contribution of soft power to the UK’s international defence engagement.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Our armed forces are a force for good, providing security, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and defence engagement across the globe. They have a proud track record on the frontline of our national response to humanitarian disasters the world over, from Ebola in west Africa to hurricane seasons in the Caribbean.

[Mr Baron [V]]

As chair of the British Council all-party group, I suggest that soft power can pay for itself many times over by building links and improving trust and understanding, all of which makes conflict less likely. As the Government assess our international engagement, does my right hon. Friend agree that soft power must be a consideration alongside traditional hard power? Will he assure me that he will make the case for soft power when it comes to the Government’s integrated review?

[Mr Wallace]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his work on the British Council all-party group. The British Council is an outstanding institution around the world—indeed, in my opinion there is not enough of it around the world. The integrated review will enhance defence engagement, ensuring that our armed forces are more forward, present, and active around the world, and involve changes to operational development structures, defence diplomacy and allowances. I completely agree that alongside hard power must come soft power. It can be delivered by the military, as well as by those excellent non-governmental organisations, and organisations such as the British Council. The best way to not get into a conflict is to avoid one in the first place by understanding each other’s issues, and by helping nations and people’s economies to build. That is the first way to go.

Middle East: Security

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I certainly press on the United States, which has also said that it is not in its interests, or its wish, to increase tensions. It does not want this event to lead to war. It has been very, very clear about that, as have, indeed, the Iranian leadership. If we accept that both the Iranians and the United States have been adamant that they do want a war, we should then work on that as a way to get both sides to seek a resolution.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Very few countries’ hands are completely clean in the region. A key part of the problem is that there has been a lack of a co-ordinated, overarching peace process, particularly now that the Iranian nuclear deal is dead. Does my right hon. Friend agree that from our point of view the elephant in the room is that we need to spend more on our defence and diplomacy—raise that expenditure— not just to send a very clear signal to the world that we are going to better defend our interests, if we need to, but to hold greater sway with our key allies, particularly the US, in this particular region?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend makes the really important point that both diplomacy and defence do not come cheap and we need to invest in that. Sometimes we need to invest in helping others to defend themselves as well. I think it is one of the most noble things to defend those who cannot defend themselves.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

Let us be clear: the House is absolutely right to scrutinise this Government over recruiting into our armed forces. I welcome that, because it enables me to put pressure on our service chiefs. While there were, without doubt, challenges with that Capita contract, I have explained today how we have already reached 70% of our target within the first six months of this year. That contract is now performing in a way that it was not before. My right hon. Friend is right about medical standards, which is why there is a series of reviews at the moment of how we can prevent those injuries from happening in the first place.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

2. What steps his Department is taking to protect UK shipping in the strait of Hormuz.

[Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)]

22. What steps his Department is taking to protect UK shipping in the strait of Hormuz.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Happy Trafalgar day, Mr Speaker. Ships transiting the strait of Hormuz are currently exposed to the threat of being harried by units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and, in some cases, illegal seizure. While the international community is working to de-escalate tensions, up to four ships of the Royal Navy have been active in the strait since July.

[Mr Baron]

No matter how capable, a Royal Navy ship cannot be in two places at once. On this anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar, given that 95% of our trade is seaborne, is it not obvious that we need a much larger surface fleet, including a larger number of cheaper ships, if we are to play our full part in keeping world sea lanes open?

[Mr Wallace]

I agree strongly with my hon. Friend’s point, which is why this Government have invested in not only the new Type 26 frigate but the Type 31, which will be designed to be more affordable and will increase the overall number of frigates and destroyers that we are able to deploy. In this example, we very quickly managed to have four ships in the region to tackle the problem. We have now gone back down to supplying two ships there, but it was not the case that we could not get ships in the right place at the right time.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

I think it is fair to say that the whole House values the role of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Indeed, last summer I spent the most fascinating week on board RFA Mounts Bay in the Caribbean to see the work being done in preparation for the hurricane season. I have explained the conditions under which the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s pay is reviewed, as civil servants, but I reassure the House that of course we would like to see a constructive end to this dispute, and I am confident that that will be the case.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T1. If she will make a statement on her departmental responsibilities.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Penny Mordaunt)]

I welcome The Sun’s campaign. We will shortly bring forward the first stage to legislate on closing down litigation against our armed forces for historical allegations. Although we hold our armed forces to the highest standards, we have seen that so much litigation against them has not been in the pursuit of justice. Although I note and pay tribute to the work of the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), on the veterans strategy and the veterans gateway, the MOD is not constitutionally responsible for veterans. The MOD, as a consequence, has not directly commissioned services and support for veterans, which has meant that some services we provide for serving members of the armed forces that could benefit veterans have not been available to them. I believe that needs to change, so we are consulting partners on changing the MOD’s constitutional role with regard to veterans.

[Mr Baron]

The all-party parliamentary group on the British Council, which I chair, has been overseeing an inquiry into aspects of the UK’s soft power capabilities. How does defence diplomacy fit into the Government’s overall soft power strategy?

[Penny Mordaunt]

Defence engagement, in all its forms, is vital to promoting the UK’s influence, values and intentions around the world, whether it is promoting stability and prosperity, tackling environmental challenges or responding to natural disasters and humanitarian need. Our strongest relationships with some nations are military to military, and we need to make sure that the contribution of defence to the objectives of One HMG is really understood.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 18th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)]

5. What recent assessment he has made of trends in the number of armed forces personnel.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

9. What steps his Department is taking to increase recruitment into the armed forces.

[Stephen Kerr (Stirling) (Con)]

11. What steps his Department is taking to improve recruitment and retention in the armed forces.

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[Mark Lancaster]

I could not disagree more. I think we have a clear vision as to what we want our Army to do in 2019. Equally, the hon. Gentleman should be encouraged by the fact that as of January we have had the highest number of applications to the Army in five years.

[Mr Baron]

I suggest that the Government should not take any lessons from Labour about manpower shortages, given today’s news about desertions.

The National Audit Office has recently confirmed that Capita has not recruited the required numbers of regulars and reservists in any year since the contract began in 2012. Clearly, extra resources are needed. May I also suggest that the Government consider reinstating 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, which was the best recruited unit in the Army when it was disbanded?

[Mark Lancaster]

I have been here long enough to be able to pay tribute to my hon. Friend for his consistent defence of the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The same National Audit Office report states that the Army has already conducted a full review of the current recruitment strategy. As a result, the contract with Capita was realigned and a comprehensive improvement plan introduced. That will take time to bear fruit, but as I said in answer to the previous question we are now beginning to see early signs of the improvement plan bearing fruit.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 5th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

Defence has been working closely with Capita on a recruitment improvement plan, which is now being implemented. Initial signs are promising. We now expect Capita to deliver on improvements in converting applicants to enlistees. We will monitor progress closely in the coming months, including ensuring that the new defence recruiting system reaches full operating capability as quickly as possible.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

23. Although many of us believe that the Regular Army should be closer to 100,000 in strength, it appears that we are struggling to reach even the reduced figure of 82,000. What more can our Government do to ensure that we increase recruitment, and maintain at those levels, to get closer to 82,000?

[Mark Lancaster]

There is an awful lot going on at the moment. We are working closely with Capita. It would be wrong to say that there have not been challenges in implementing the defence recruiting system. There is also a change in demographics in the UK. That is why we are working so hard to widen our recruiting base and have set targets to recruit from both the BAME—black, Asian and minority ethnic—and female populations. There has been an increase of some 2.6% over the year, but we must do all we can to continue to ensure that joining the armed forces is an attractive occupation. I am particularly proud that the Army is now the largest employer of apprentices in the UK, which is something that we intend to continue.

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[Mr Ellwood]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. We want to make sure we provide the necessary support to all those affected, although I would question whether the incidence is higher than among the general population. The new process we are putting forward, including the helpline launched last week by the Defence Secretary, will make sure that we can meet our covenant promise.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Reports suggest that of the near 100,000 who wanted to join the Army last year, only 7,500 actually made it, in part because of time delays. What can be done to streamline the recruitment process?

[Mark Lancaster]

My hon. Friend makes a valuable point. We have identified as a key problem the time of flight between application and enlisting in the Army. Shortening this period and making sure we get the maximum number of people through the system is the main focus of our work at the moment.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 10th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I am staggered that the hon. Lady thinks her manifesto was fully costed or, indeed, fully funded. There were billions in that manifesto that were due to be borrowed and paid for by future generations. We have implemented the pay review body’s recommendation in full for this financial year and, for next year, evidence is already being acquired by the pay review body. I will give my evidence to the pay review body later in the year, and we will see what it recommends.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

8. What assessment he has made of whether the Royal Navy has sufficient personnel to operate (a) all vessels and (b) the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mark Lancaster)]

The Royal Navy is growing, with 400 more personnel, more ships and new submarines. The Royal Navy remains on track to achieve its manning levels for 2020 and will have sufficient manpower to continue to meet all its operational requirements. That includes ensuring that the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers can always operate safely and effectively.

[Mr Baron]

Given concerns that we are hollowing out our armed forces’ manpower in favour of big-ticket items, what is the Minister, and indeed the Government, doing to ensure that we not only have the manpower to operate those big-ticket items but the ships to protect them when at sea? Global uncertainties abound, and over 90% of our trade is maritime borne.

[Mark Lancaster]

My hon. Friend highlights the challenges we face in recruiting in our growing economy, and I am pleased that the Navy’s efforts to address shortages of engineers are beginning to show dividends, through the personnel recovery programme. He will also be aware of our investment in offshore patrol vessels, five of which are currently under construction, and in the new Type 26s—we will cut steel later this month.

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I agree with a great deal of what the right hon. Gentleman has just said. Although it is not a matter of primary concern to us now, the fact is that Saddam Hussein was the author of his own misfortune. We must remember that, apart from being a brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein had invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990. He chose to try to convince his own people that he had not given up these weapons, when either he had given them up or, as the right hon. Gentleman said and as rumours persist to this day, he had spirited them away, possibly to Syria. However, although I see a degree of agreement with me from those on the Labour Benches over this issue, they may find it a little harder to accept the next point that I wish to make.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I have great respect for my right hon. Friend, as he will know. However, I suggest that, on this issue, it was not just about intelligence sourcing from here. The United Nations inspectors at the time were pleading for more time because they could not find the WMDs upon which premise we were going to war. We should have listened to them as well. Ultimately, the reason they could not find the WMDs is that they did not exist.

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, but the problem that the inspectors and we would always have faced was summed up by something that was said at the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. I was going to quote this later, but I shall do so now. On 21 August 2003, I attended the Hutton inquiry. In the course of giving evidence, Nicolas Rufford, a journalist, made a statement about a telephone conversation that he had had with Dr David Kelly in June 2003. Dr Kelly was, of course, a weapons expert, and knew all about the difficulties of detecting weapons stockpiles if they were hidden. In the course of that telephone conversation, Dr Kelly said to Mr Rufford that

“it was very easy to hide weapons of mass destruction because you simply had to dig a hole in the desert, put them inside, cover them with a tarpaulin, cover them with sand and then they would be almost impossible to discover”.

So the question that we come back to once again is: if Tony Blair had come to this House and more honestly highlighted the question marks against the reliability of the intelligence, would he be as excoriated today as he has been? Let me be counterfactual for a moment. Let us suppose that some stocks of anthrax had been discovered and there had been a secret cache. Would we still be saying that the people who took the decision in 2003, on the basis of what clearly was an honest belief that Saddam Hussein might have deadly stocks of anthrax, were wrong? I have no hesitation in saying that although the Government may have exaggerated—and probably did exaggerate—the strength of the evidence they had, I believe that they genuinely expected to find stocks of these weapons.

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[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I suggest that Iraq 2003 ranks with Suez in a catalogue of British foreign policy disasters. It cost the lives of more than 200 British nationals and many tens of thousands of Iraqi nationals and citizens, and set in train a terrible sequence of events, including a vicious civil war and a fundamental alteration in the balance of power in the region. Thirteen years later, we are still living with many of those consequences.

Given that I resigned from the shadow Front Bench in 2003 to vote against the war, I suppose it could be said that it marked a pivotal point in defining my political career, such as it has been, so for me it has been of rather more than passing interest to observe the progress of the Chilcot report. I defended the time that Sir John Chilcot took, and I want to take this opportunity to thank him and his team for the thoroughness of the report.

As a former soldier, I believe that, whatever has been said previously, war should always be the measure of last resort, to be taken when all other possibilities have been exhausted. We should never lose sight of that simple fact. Of course there is such a thing as a just war, but at the same time we owe it to our citizens, to our Parliament and, above all, to the soldiers whom we are committing to battle to recognise that it must be the measure of last resort. In my view, the overriding, the most important and the most damning conclusion of Sir John’s report was that Iraq was not, in fact, that last resort and that other possibilities had not been exhausted.

The report made other points. It said that the premise on which we went to war—the existence of weapons of mass destruction—was oversold and that there was a discarding of caveats attached to the intelligence. It referred to a lack of preparedness in respect of our armed forces, to deficiencies in equipment and to an absence of post-war planning, all which have been touched on before. That litany of errors was compounded by an overestimation of our influence over the United States. We could not, at the time, believe that it could be in our interests not to be on the frontline. I think that one of the proudest and best moments for Prime Minister Wilson was when he said no to the Americans over Vietnam. That did not fracture the so-called special relationship, which, within 15 or 20 years, was on a very firm footing indeed.

I do not intend to look back at all the errors in that litany, but I suggest that there are two key lessons from this episode on which we would do well to reflect. First, Parliament should have done more to question the evidence put before it. That was a failure at almost every level. If the legislature does not examine the evidence and question the Executive at times like that, when is it going to do so? There was also the failure of those in the know—at all levels, in my view, but particularly in the Cabinet—to challenge what was being presented to the public. I think that the one figure who stands proud among that select group of people in the Cabinet is Robin Cook. Everything that he said during that eventful debate in 2003 has been proved right. I contributed to that debate as well, but his was one of the best speeches that I had heard for a very long time.

We should have questioned more. We should have examined the detail. I was told to stop asking awkward questions, but we, the official Opposition, were asking so few awkward questions that it was suggested to me from the other side that we were trying to play political games with the issue, perhaps hoping that, if it blew up in the Government’s face, we could take advantage of the fact. That is how bad it got during that debate in 2003. We were simply not asking enough questions, and we should have done so.

[Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab)]

I was here in 2003, and I was one of those who rebelled against the leader of my party and voted against action in the Iraq war. I think that the hon. Gentleman is being disingenuous, because it was one of the biggest rebellions that there had been against a Government from that Government’s side.

I remember how difficult it was to make that judgment against the leader. When someone is being led by a party leader whose judgment they respect, it is a tough call to say, “I am going to disagree, and vote against action of that kind.” I had a difference of opinion, and I have had no cause to change my mind about the decision that I made, but can the hon. Gentleman not accept, as I do, that the people who made those decisions did so believing that they were doing the right thing?

[Mr Baron]

I do not think that we are saying different things. I am not suggesting that there was intentional deceit. What I am suggesting is that many of us in this place did not question sufficiently the evidence that was before us. The report from the Joint Intelligence Committee was full of caveats and holes, yet we relied on the Prime Minister’s interpretation, which was given in his foreword to the report.

I fully respect Members’ views as expressed on that fateful evening itself. If one cannot trust the Prime Minister, standing at the Dispatch Box making the case for war and, perhaps, privy to intelligence that we have not seen, it is a sad turn of events. However, I must return to the fundamental point that we should have questioned more, because there was a firm lack of evidence of weapons of mass destruction, and such evidence was the premise for war. We must not forget that central consideration.

The reason the United Nations inspectors were pleading for more time, by the way, was that they could not find any weapons of mass destruction, and they could not find them because they did not exist. We should remember that it was the UN that was asking us to give it more time. The problem was that, at that point, we were marching to a military timetable.

[Hannah Bardell (Livingston) (SNP)]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman and you, Mr Speaker, will indulge me for a second. My speaking time was reduced to four minutes yesterday, so I did not have an opportunity to pay tribute to my predecessor, Robin Cook. Had it not been for his untimely death, I would not be in this place, and he was my Member of Parliament when I was growing up. I wanted to say that we might have disagreed on many things, but on Iraq we did agree. I know that he is missed very much by his family, his friends and his party.

[Mr Baron]

I thank the hon. Lady for what she has said. I am sure that it will be taken on board by all concerned.

I am conscious that time is pressing on, Mr Speaker, so I shall try to wrap up my speech in the next few minutes; I know that many other Members want to speak.

The second important lesson that I think we should learn from Iraq is that we need a properly functioning, properly funded and well-sited foreign policy apparatus. There is no doubt that Iraq revealed clear deficiencies in that apparatus, and subsequent interventions suggest that, in large part, we have still not put them right. Helmand is one example. While most of us supported the initial invasion, or rather intervention, in Afghanistan to get rid of al-Qaeda, we made a massive mistake in allowing that mission—a mission that was wholly under-resourced—to morph into one of nation building. In Libya, we did not understand events on the ground: we could not believe that once we had knocked the door down, which was the easy part, we would lay open all the tribal rivalries.

As for Syria in 2013, there was a suggestion we would be arming the rebels, not realising that lurking in the shadows was ISIL-Daesh and how that would eventually play out. There was a clear deficit of strategic analysis, with a loss of expertise at all levels of the machinery of foreign policy. That is a problem particularly felt within the FCO. In this country, we have quite a narrow pyramid in foreign policy making. In the States, it is much more open and diverse; there are lobbyists and political analysts, and the politicians and experts can buy into and influence the system. In this country, it is much more narrowly defined; it is the preserve of the select few, and the FCO is part of the few, which is why it must be firing on all cylinders, but it has not been doing so.

That is why we need proper funding of the FCO. Its budget has been continually eroded, with a hollowing out of expertise and staff. Traditional skills like languages and knowledge of events on the ground and of peoples and places have all been downgraded, as illustrated by the closure of the in-house language school and the gutting of the venerable library.

How did we get to the point that when Russia intervened in Ukraine we did not have one Crimean expert in the FCO? How is it that when the Arab uprising took place we had so few Arabists that we were calling them out of retirement? How is it that we have a DFID budget 10 times the budget of the FCO? This does not serve us well. We need to increase the budget and have long-term investment to make sure we are as well-sighted as we can be, which is not the case at the moment. There is a continual pressure on the FCO budget, and we need to put that right.

It is no surprise that Parliament—the legislature—has raised the bar with regard to interventions. It expects to be consulted. That is one of the positive developments from the Iraq intervention. The rationale is straightforward: if we believe there is a loss of expertise at the heart of our foreign policy apparatus and if there is a lack of trust not just because of Iraq, but because of Helmand, Libya and Syria, the bar needs to be raised, but this is not a healthy position in the longer term. In this increasingly challenging international environment, we need a knowledgeable Executive to be firing on all cylinders. A well-informed and resourced FCO is essential to that, both to act as a better counterweight to the impulses of No. 10 and possibly to help us avoid costly errors and conflicts in the future. There must be within the system a readiness to speak truth to power, and I am not sure we are quite there yet, but that is one of the key lessons from Iraq.

The UK and the west face enormous geopolitical challenges. The world’s population will rise to 9 billion by 2050, with changing distribution—which is particularly of relevance to Africa—and urbanisation and the consequent strain on natural resources. Today, 1 billion people lack access to sufficient potable water, and by 2050 three-quarters of the world’s population could face water scarcity. A whole array of security and environmental challenges is caused by economic and political uncertainty. In today’s global information world, success will depend not only on who prevails by force but on who wins the story.

One of the lessons from the Iraq failure is that it is symptomatic of a wider malaise: the deficiency of strategic analysis at the core of our foreign policy apparatus. The greatest challenge for policy makers is to ensure we embrace flexibility and foresight. This is perhaps diplomacy’s greatest challenge. We must restore our foreign policy and defence capabilities, otherwise the country risks being left behind. This is happening at a time when the international community is failing to produce co-ordinated responses to many of the challenges facing mankind, including poverty, organised crime, conflict, disease, hunger and inequalities.

We must have a properly resourced and respected foreign policy apparatus and investment in soft power and old friendships and strong defence, because diplomacy and soft power cannot succeed by themselves. We must have this proper funding in place for our FCO, because if we are not well-sighted, the next intervention challenge— there will be more—might not be as local in its ramifications as these past errors have been. The costs of getting it wrong might be much greater next time.

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[Michael Fallon]

I shall talk about the lesson on the importance of planning for reconstruction in a moment. I just want to finish this important point about the machinery of government.

The Ministry of Defence has revamped its strategy and policy making with the institution of an annual defence plan that reflects the outcomes of the strategic defence and security reviews, with senior leaders in the Ministry being individually held to account for their role in delivering it, and a defence strategy group, chaired by the permanent secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff, to address how Defence can best contribute to delivering defence and security policy objectives.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening carefully to what my right hon. Friend is saying, but this is not just an issue of how best to encourage communication and expertise within the system; Chilcot was also saying that there was a lack of investment and proper sighting of events on the ground. That can be put right only through long-term investment to ensure that we are better sighted, so that we have a better idea of what is actually happening on the ground and the consequences of our actions. Does he agree that that is another important lesson to take from the Chilcot report?

Counter-Daesh Quarterly Update

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

We have made progress in reducing the dependence of Daesh on illegally traded oil across its borders and also internally in Syria. We have made progress in cutting down the sale of antiques and artefacts in international markets. We have had the strike that I referred to on the cash stockpiles that Daesh has been using to finance itself. Of course, it draws other revenues from the areas it controls, but one illustration of the progress has been consecutive reports that Daesh has begun to cut the pay rates to its own troops.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Nevertheless, Daesh remains the best funded terrorist group in history, despite the fall in the oil price. How confident, therefore, is the Secretary of State that Daesh can no longer access the financial infrastructure and resources of the Iraqi state, given that the Foreign Affairs Committee is still waiting for answers from the Iraqi banking authorities as to Daesh’s ability to make a turn on the state’s currency markets?

[Michael Fallon]

That is one of the areas that we are working on. When Daesh originally established its caliphate so rapidly, it was able to access finance from the central bank in Mosul and other areas in Iraq, and it levies taxes on the towns and cities that it controls, but I want to assure my hon. Friend that the work is in hand and we are making progress in restricting Daesh’s financial support.