Strategic Defence and Security Review

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I believe that the world is a more dangerous place than it has ever been during my time in Parliament. I believe that it is a more dangerous place than it was during the cold war. That was a more stable situation. We have heard about the resurgent and more authoritarian Russia. China is increasingly muscling its way into various parts of the world. Iran will soon be a nuclear power. The Arab spring might throw up more problems than solutions.

As a maritime nation, the Royal Navy always has played and always will play an essential part in defending our freedoms. I do not believe that the Royal Navy is a leftover from the cold war or a replay of second world war convoy systems. It is an essential part of our defence. I am extremely worried about what is happening to the Royal Navy. It will soon be the weakest it has been since the mid-19th century. In 1982, the Royal Navy was only just capable of retaking the Falklands. I have a list of the appalling casualties that we suffered and the number of our ships that were sunk. We just managed it.

Since 1997, our armed forces have been cut by 12% and 24,000 people have been made unemployed. Since 1975, the number of cruisers, destroyers and frigates has been cut by a staggering two thirds. The fleet of minesweepers, which, along with the Americans, will be vital in keeping oil flowing through the strait of Hormuz if Iran makes any moves there, has been cut from 40 vessels in 1975 to 15 today. Those are worrying figures.

We are constantly told that we need larger ships and that we do not need so many. I am not suggesting that we can make direct comparisons with the past or that we should look back to the Royal Navy of 1809, which had a fighting strength of 773 vessels. I remember standing on the deck of a vast American aircraft carrier when I was a member of the Defence Committee and the captain saying, “The ocean is a very large place and I can hide my aircraft carrier.” However, we are faced with enormous problems of piracy and one cannot solve the problems of maritime protection by having just 19 major vessels in the Royal Navy.

Let us consider the threats that we face. I am not saying that they will necessarily come to anything, but they are there and they are real. Let us compare our strength with that of Argentina. We have seven destroyers and it has five. That is not an overwhelming predominance for the Royal Navy. We have a similar number of aircraft carriers, namely none.

[Mr Jenkin]

The importance of aircraft carriers, with their carrier-borne air defence for the fleet and carrier-borne strike capacity, is that one is able to operate away from the home nation. If we fought another Falklands war, it would be all too close to Argentina’s home bases and thousands of miles from ours.

[Mr Leigh]

That is precisely the point that I was going to make next. If there were a war with Iran or Argentina, we would not be fighting it in the channel. In the case of Argentina, we would be fighting it thousands of miles from any shore-based defence systems. I therefore do not believe that the figures alone give an accurate basis from which we can draw comfort.

[Dr Murrison]

It is important to get this matter right in the context of the Falklands, given the activity in Buenos Aires. I accept entirely my hon. Friend’s point about the number of platforms. However, does he accept that the capability of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force is immense compared with that of Argentina? In many respects, our potential ability to project force is much greater than it was in 1982 for that reason.

[Mr Leigh]

I accept some of what my hon. Friend says. However, I pray in aid the recent United Kingdom National Defence Association report, “Inconvenient Truths”, which was written by former defence chiefs. It said:

“Our assessment is that current force levels are inadequate to hold off even a small-size invasion”.

Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward wrote in the Daily Mail:

“The truth is we couldn't defend anything further than the other side of the Channel”.

Air Commodore Andrew Lambert was quoted in The Guardian as saying that the

“British public is not aware how thin the ice is…or how bad things could get”

and that the Falkland Islands are

“ripe for the picking.”

I am not saying that I want this to happen or that it will happen, but I am afraid that we in this House must occasionally sound warnings—that is our duty.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Gerald Howarth)]

My hon. Friend raises concerns that are widespread around the country, particularly in the light of the sabre-rattling by Argentina. However, all the advice that we have received says that the Argentines have neither the capability nor the intention to repeat the folly of 1982 and that the military deterrent we have in place is fully up to the task. I assure my hon. Friend and the House that, in this 30th anniversary year, all of us, as Ministers, are much seized of the matter.

[Mr Leigh]

I am grateful to the Minister. We pay tribute to him and to his colleagues in the Ministry of Defence for the sterling work that they do and the way in which they have defended the defence budget.

The Secretary of State said that part of our strategic defence is to have a balanced budget. We all understand that. However, he is using precisely the arguments that were used time and again in the 1930s when people warned of our military weakness and successive Chancellors of the Exchequer argued that we were well defended, rubbished the figures that were being given to them about our military weakness, and said that the most important thing was that the country had a balanced budget.

We do not blame our right hon. and hon. Friends the Ministers and the Department of State for this. We know that they are fighting their corner; the previous Secretary of State put up a tremendous fight. However, there must be some rebalancing. As my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) said, we are now spending more on winter fuel allowance than on the entire Foreign Office budget. We must have a reordering of strategic defence capabilities, because there is nothing more important than defence. In 1980, the Army had 160,000 soldiers. That number is set to fall to 100,000, and the Government have announced that they want the total strength of the Army to go down to 84,000 by 2020. The Army will have been cut by 12% since 1997. Air Force personnel are being cut from 90,000 to 40,000. Those figures are deeply worrying.

The previous Government said that 25,000 soldiers, 8,000 sailors and 17,000 airmen were surplus to requirements precisely at the moment when we were fighting two major wars. Sir Richard Dannatt, the former head of the Army, has said that we are facing a situation whereby the Army is massively overstretched and many soldiers are having only one year between operations, with much of that time spent away from home. We must appreciate that we live in an increasingly dangerous world. We must, as a House, be prepared to make tough and difficult decisions and be determined to reorder our priorities and say that our defence forces are essential for all our futures.

I was recently struck by a passage in Martin Gilbert’s book, “Winston Churchill: The Wilderness Years”, that quotes Churchill on the night that Eden resigned:

“From midnight to dawn, I lay on my bed, consumed by emotions of sorrow and fear. There seemed one strong young figure standing up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender, of wrong measurements and feeble impulses. Now he was gone. I watched the daylight slowly creep in through the windows and saw before me in mental gaze the vision of Death.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

I start by declaring my interest as a member of the reserve forces.

Are we sufficiently well defended? For an answer, we might do worse than refer to the Prime Minister’s remarks to the Liaison Committee last year. He said that if the question was whether the UK was

“a full spectrum defence power, I would answer that literally by saying yes, because I think if you look…across the piece, you take a Navy that has got hunter-killer submarines, that has a nuclear deterrent that we are renewing, that has two of the most modern and up-to-date aircraft carriers coming down the track; if you look at our Air Force, that has got the Typhoon, one of the most capable and successful aircraft that anyone has anywhere in the world”.

At that point my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, interrupted:

“Prime Minister, everyone knows what we’ve got.”

Indeed we do, and we know what we have not got, too. “Coming down the track” means “not here yet”. I am reassured by the excellent work on the Type 26 of the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), who is responsible for procurement, and by the fact that the Prime Minister speaks enthusiastically about the carriers, but by his own definition of full spectrum capability Britain currently, although unavoidably and understandably, comes up short.

We inherited a catastrophic mess at the MOD when we came into government—I am sorry that we do not have many Opposition Members still in the Chamber to hear me say that. Tough decisions had to be made to clean up that mess, leading to the capability gap and the challenging task of regenerating that capability. We must succeed in doing that, but I am increasingly concerned that we risk failure.

If Britain wants to live up to her billing as a leading nation, we must perform like one. The world still looks to Britain for leadership—as in the recent action in Libya—and it is incumbent on us to be ready to meet those calls in our own national interest. The Royal Navy gives us global reach. It allows us to be present anywhere in the world within 12 miles off any coast with impunity. It keeps food in our supermarkets and the fuel flowing so we can distribute and cook it. Our island nation depends on the Navy for its very survival, an obvious point not often recognised by Departments of State or parliamentarians—present company excepted.

Recognition of that fact does not require one to hark back to the days when Britain’s carrier fleet numbered 55 ships, but it means we need to increase the size of the current surface fleet with the carrier strike and the Type 26 combat ship. It requires us also to ensure that those platforms are properly supplied, so that they can be at their most flexible.

We must stop hollowing out capability. I told the MOD permanent secretary at the Defence Committee that some ships were sent to Operation Ellamy and elsewhere with dangerously hollowed-out capacity. HMS Westminster had only 10% of her ordnance, or, to put it another way, only two shots in the barrel. In response, the permanent secretary spoke of “layered defence” and

“other capabilities that we had in terms of submarines…and …aircraft”.

She also said that it was

“absolutely an operational decision on whether it is safe”

to send Westminster.

“Layered defence” is all very well, but I wonder whether the Westminster’s 190 crew would not have felt more secure if they had the means to defend themselves rather than relying on others. It might have been an “operational decision”, but would we not put the people making such decisions in a far more comfortable position if they knew that ships had a more appropriate complement of missiles? I anticipate that the MOD would answer that missile numbers are secret, but they are not. Anyone— friend or foe—with a moderately priced pair of binoculars and the inclination to look could have discovered how many Harpoon missiles were on Westminster.

The MOD must develop a mechanism properly to plan, acquire and monitor ordnance stocks. No such mechanism exists. As I have raised that point in the Committee, with Ministers and on the Floor of the House, I would like to see evidence that it is being addressed.

I would also like greater recognition of our dependence on carrier strike. As the Foreign Secretary mentioned earlier this week with regard to HMS Argyll’s passage through the strait of Hormuz, we currently rely on our allies—in that instance in the form of the USS Abraham Lincoln. It is apparent, therefore, that when we say we do not need carrier strike for the next decade, we mean we need it but hope to use someone else’s.

That might be all very well when our interests align with those of our allies, but what about when they do not? The Prime Minister has rightly taken a robust line on Argentine pretensions over the sovereignty of the Falklands. The US Administration take quite a different view, regarding the UK administration of the islands as “de facto” and taking “no position regarding sovereignty”. We are encouraged to work things out with Argentina “through normal diplomatic channels”. If it came to it, one suspects that requests for carrier cover would fall on deaf ears.

Equally, although one must recognise that while flying sorties from Norfolk for a time was the only way to halt Gaddafi’s murderous advances in Libya, it was expensive. Had the Ark Royal not been decommissioned, it is unthinkable that she would not have been sent on Ellamy. Had we flown sorties from a carrier in the Mediterranean rather than from an airfield in East Anglia, they would have been more frequent and more responsive, and the need to return to base without dropping a bomb would have been less of a waste of time and money.

I raise those issues not to chastise the Government for the SDSR—they had to close the gap in the defence budget—but to show our dependence on carrier strike force. The Prime Minister has said that carriers are necessary for a nation to have full military capability, which means every day of every week, all year round. Accepting the need for carriers is to accept that we must have both Queen Elizabeth class ships in operation—at minimum, one on, one off.

[Mr Leigh]

Does my hon. Friend recall that the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, referred recently to the Falkland Islands as “the Malvinas”, therefore implicitly giving a nod in the direction of Argentina? My hon. Friend is right that we could in no shape or form depend on the Americans if there were any threat against the Falklands. Were they taken, without a carrier, we could never take them back.

[Penny Mordaunt]

If someone had an argument about the sovereignty of an eastern state, I am quite sure we would have a much more robust response from our nearest ally.

The cost and specification of the new carriers has been much derided. One estimate is that they could be as much as £3.1 billion more expensive than planned. I have heard many an “amusing” conversation in this place about the decks being too short for aircraft to take-off and the possibility of sailors being burnt to a crisp by aircraft engines, along with other such Bird and Fortune material. We laugh, while blindly heading for a greater folly: spending such a sum, only to deny ourselves the capability that it should have brought. If we end up with just one operational carrier, we will have wasted £5 billion over the initial estimates, yet for months of every year we will be without cover. If our enemies strike during an off-period, the British people will ask what that hefty final bill has actually achieved. Thanks to the last Government, £3 billion has been needlessly spent on carrier strike force. Under this Government, let us not have £7 billion pointlessly spent.

Oral Answers to Questions

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

I understand that the story to which the hon. Lady refers is, in fact, a rehash of a previous story. We very much regret making trainee RAF pilots redundant—but by reducing the number of aircraft we have reduced the number of pilots that we need. We have no plans for further redundancies from the RAF’s flying training pipeline.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

There are widespread reports in today’s press that the Government are planning a large cull of senior officers. I know it is a bit of a joke that there are now more admirals in the Royal Navy than major warships—but can the Government not solve this problem by increasing the number of warships instead of cutting the number of admirals?

[Mr Robathan]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his pre-Christmas question. Unfortunately, we have a slight problem with paying for the number of warships. I am sure we will bear it mind, but I have to say that the reduction in the number of senior officers has been spoken about at great length, including in the recent report by Lord Levene.

Armed Forces Personnel

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Thursday 10th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

It is a pleasure to see my hon. Friend in his place today, and I should like to thank him for his work in his previous role as a Parliamentary Private Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. I entirely agree with what he says. It is a tiny minority who behave in that completely deplorable manner. I am sure that all like-minded people would have no hesitation whatever in condemning them and in applauding the work not only of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, but of local authorities and others up and down the country who work assiduously to maintain war memorials.

The 1991 Gulf war was not the end of the loss of British lives in Iraq. One hundred and seventy-nine were killed on Operation Telic between 2003 and 2009. Last month, we marked 10 years since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, where 385 servicemen and women have been killed. The House will have heard about the death of a soldier from 4th Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment on patrol in Helmand yesterday. Our thoughts are with his family at this difficult time as they come to terms with their loss.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence is in theatre as we speak, preparing to observe Remembrance day with our troops there. That is because while we honour the memory of those who have died, those who fought and those who returned bearing the wounds of war, we keep in mind all those currently serving in our defence. I am sure the whole House will join me in paying tribute to them. Those serving do a very dangerous job not only on operations, but in their many other duties, as the sad death of Flight Lieutenant Sean Cunningham of the Red Arrows reminds us.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I do not want to repeat what I said yesterday to the Prime Minister—there is no need—but on the wider issue of personnel, my hon. Friend will want to take this opportunity to emphasise that the Ministry of Defence will leave no stone unturned to ensure the safety of the Red Arrows and their personnel. We want to keep RAF Scampton open because the skies are safe there. However, personnel directly suffer iniquities from the RAF closing bases and not thinking about the future. There is further reportage in today’s papers on the return of all personnel from Germany by 2020. Will the Minister bear it in mind that we have a wonderful base in RAF Scampton, which could remain open to welcome back those who are returning?

[Nick Harvey]

I note what my hon. Friend says and I shall draw his remarks to the attention of the RAF, but in respect of this week’s fatal accident, I must stress that the Military Aviation Authority is beginning a full and proper investigation of what happened and what led to the tragedy. It would be quite improper for me, as a Minister of the Crown, to say anything at this stage that would pre-empt that process. In the fullness of time, I have no doubt whatever that he and others will have the opportunity to raise questions about that.

The armed forces of today are different in many ways from those who fought on the Somme or at El Alamein. The conscription that created the massed forces of the world wars was a reflection of the existential threat facing the country at that time. When world war two ended in 1945, there were around 5 million men and women in uniform. Almost every family in the country was connected in some way to the sacrifice that had been made, and service in the armed forces was woven deeply into the fabric of the nation, but for many years now, our armed forces have been a smaller, professional, all-volunteer force, including reserve forces, which have been used widely in recent conflicts.

As the older generations who fought in the world wars or undertook national service dwindle, and as the services have reduced in size since the end of the cold war, public understanding of our armed forces has declined as a result. I am suggesting not that the respect and esteem in which our armed forces are held by the nation has in any way diminished—the way the people of Royal Wootton Bassett chose to mark the return of the fallen is surely testament to that—but that people understand less how members of the armed forces view risk and reward, and what motivates them to do the dangerous job they do.

What a life in today’s armed forces is like and the impact that service life has on modern families is also less widely understood. That is why, as we seek to reinvigorate the armed forces covenant, we must raise people’s understanding of the impact of service life. Fulfilling the armed forces covenant has to be a whole-of-society enterprise: it is not just for the Ministry of Defence but for all Departments; it is not just for legislators here in Westminster but for legislators at all levels; and it is not just for the Government, but for charities, the private sector and private citizens.

Oral Answers to Questions

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support. In recent days, we have made it very clear through NATO that we intend to continue to degrade Colonel Gaddafi’s command and control capability, including his intelligence network. The regime needs to understand loud and clear that the international community is very resolute: it will continue its military activity as long as this absolutely unacceptable slaughter of the civilian population continues. I hope that the whole House will also be resolute in sending out a very clear message on that front.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that, notwithstanding what the Chief of Defence Staff said over the weekend, our mission in Libya is humanitarian, and is about seeking a ceasefire and not about regime change?

[Dr Fox]

Security Council resolution 1973 authorised the use of force for three different purposes: enforcement of the arms embargo, enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya, and the protection of civilians. Those are the clear delineations of our mission, and all the activities in which we have engaged, including our target sets, have fallen within the requirements of resolution 1973.

Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Monday 6th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[John McDonnell]

I can only refer the hon. Gentleman to the memorandum from Commodore Bill Walworth, who is responsible for the RFA, which specifically names those ships. I think that it is now in the public domain as a result of reports in Lloyd’s List. We will know the situation more clearly by April 2011, but those ships have been identified. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is worrying that a relatively new craft is concerned.

Further reviews are taking place, in particular the value for money review. The value for money review undertaken by the previous Government came to conclusions about the future of the RFA and its retention in the public sector. A further value for money review is linked to the SDSR and the comprehensive spending review. It looks as though the proposals, again according to a memorandum from Commodore Walworth, identify a target figure of 10% savings, which includes a significant number of personnel. If 10% is translated across, 220-odd seafarers could be faced with redundancy.

Anxieties have been raised in the various memorandums and documents that have entered the public domain about the potential privatisation of the service. A letter from Commodore Bill Walworth that I believe went to all personnel, including the unions, refers to a benchmarking exercise that has taken place with the shipping industry that was

“intended to demonstrate the value for money of the operational outputs that we all deliver.”

Benchmarking is perfectly appropriate if we are trying to ensure that there is value for money, but I have anxieties because of a further e-mail that is quoted in Lloyd’s List—I am not sure whether it has leaked or is in the public domain. It is from the RFA’s value for money review group:

“To date there has been work carried out to establish baseline costings of the RFA to inform the review and establish a set of requirements for the RFA that is understandable to”

the shipping industry. It continues:

“Two members of the Review Group will approach”

the shipping industry

“shortly to gauge their appetite to conduct the range of operations carried out by the RFA…This will probably start next week and we can anticipate some press interest.

RFA management has been involved in this work, to ensure that the private sector understands what is required to replicate current activity.

We will continue to work to ensure that when commercial offers are considered by the Review Group they take into account all that the RFA offers alongside that of the commercial options.”

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman should be congratulated on securing the debate, which gives us an opportunity to say that the Government must be aware that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, with its unique place in our maritime history, is held in very warm regard on the Conservative Benches. Any attempt to privatise it, or to deal with it through death by a thousand cuts, will be fiercely resisted.

[John McDonnell]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s comments. My reason for seeking the debate was to get some clarity from the Government about what their intentions are, because at the moment we rely on e-mails circulated within the service itself appearing in Lloyd’s List.

The information that has been put into the public domain has left the RFA in an extremely worrying climate of uncertainty, which is not good for the service, certainly not good for the RFA personnel and their families, and not good, I believe, for the defence of the country.

It is worth reminding ourselves of the long and proud history of the RFA, which the hon. Gentleman has just touched upon. It celebrated its centenary in 2005, having started life in 1905 to give the Royal Navy capability and support at sea, food, fuel, ammunition and supplies. Its motto is “Ready for Anything”. It has always been crewed by civilians, who act as reservists, and has played a major role in every engagement of the past century. RFA officers and ratings delivered distinguished and professional support in every naval theatre of operations in the second world war, from the Arctic to the Pacific. Since then, the RFA has served to support the Royal Navy and Army in Korea, Suez, Cyprus, Kuwait, Borneo, Belize, Aden and even the Icelandic cod wars.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

The right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr Donaldson) made an important point about the potential threat in Northern Ireland. He underlined much of what I will say, in that we simply cannot rely on events panning out in a certain way. In Northern Ireland in the mid-1960s, for instance, we could never have foreseen that events would start deteriorating very quickly in the late 1960s.

In a way, I feel that I am going full circle. Forty years ago, when I first got involved in politics, one of the things that propelled me into politics and away from the Royal Navy university cadetship that I had at the time was the debate about the Royal Navy, the then Labour Government cutting the number of aircraft carriers and the resignation of the Navy Minister. In the early 1980s, I started working with my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who, by the way, would have liked to have taken part in the debate but for attending a funeral. He is one of our foremost thinkers on defence, and we set up the Coalition for Peace through Security.

At the time, a fierce debate was raging about the Royal Navy. Keith Speed resigned as Navy Minister because he felt that the Navy was under threat. At the time, it had 66 destroyers and frigates. Within a year of his resigning, the utterly unexpected happened—the Falklands were invaded and we needed no fewer than 23 frigates and destroyers to retake them. By the way, this very day, Cristina Kirchner, the President of Argentina, has pledged an “eternal fight” for the Malvinas. It is extremely dangerous, therefore, to assume that we will see a particular scenario over the next 10 years.

I very much admire my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Sir Peter Tapsell), who is the Father of the House. He gave an important speech to the 1922 committee last week. Such speeches are supposed to be private, and I will not, of course repeat it. However, I want to repeat just one interesting point that he made—it is so good, I cannot resist the temptation. He said that when he left the employment of Anthony Eden many years ago, Eden gave him a framed copy of the Locarno treaty. The treaty represented the high point of the belief between the wars that peace was assured. Of course, we all know that it was not.

There was a disastrous tendency between the two world wars to believe in what was called the 10-year rule, which assumed that there would be no war for another 10 years. In the 1930s, Lord Hankey criticised the 10-year rule, to which we are apparently returning. He asked who could have foreseen in the spring of 1914 that the world would be convulsed by a world war within a couple of months. If we look back at history, it is clear that any 10-year rule or academic scenario that suggests that we do not need the aircraft carriers for 10 years is extremely dangerous. I am therefore very dubious of any confident statements on how the world will look in five, seven, eight or 10 years’ time.

We are, after all, a maritime nation. I agree that for many periods in our history, the Army has been neglected, but never the Royal Navy. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and in the early part of the 20th century, it was considered essential as a maritime nation dependent entirely on trade—as we still are—to maintain a significant Royal Navy. I echo some of the comments that have been made on Royal Navy planning. We will be left with just 19 serious major ships, and we are hugely dependent on them. We will need to deploy large numbers of them to protect the aircraft carrier—or carriers—and we should be extremely concerned about that situation.

[Mr Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the great worries in Asia? Japan has 4,000 islands, many of which are vulnerable, especially to China. There are concerns elsewhere about the fact that China, which has said it is interested only in territorial self-defence, is now building three aircraft carriers, and fourth and fifth generation aircraft-based attack vehicles, and looking for naval bases in the Indian ocean. Britain and Europe disarming themselves and leaving everything to the United States sends a very worrying message in relation to possible future nationalist adventurism in that part of the world.

[Mr Leigh]

I entirely agree with that.

Again, we should look to history. Had Spain declared war on us in 1940, we probably would have lost Gibraltar and the second world war. It did not declare war because it was deterred by the existence of the Royal Navy—Franco knew that it would immediately take the Canary Islands. Of course, Spain is now a friend and a member of the European Union, and there is no likelihood that the Spanish will ever declare war on us or seek to take Gibraltar by force.

Incidentally, following directly on from that, Spain now has two carriers with Harriers, as does Italy; the USA has 11 carriers; and India, Thailand and Brazil each have one carrier with Harriers. With this review, we have unilaterally destroyed our carrier capability for 10 years. That is unilateral disarmament, and I am extremely concerned about it.

I am also concerned about the decision on Nimrod. There has been a lot of talk about the cost, but very little about how we will maintain that capability, although the Secretary of State referred to that today. I was under the impression that we needed Nimrod as an early-warning surveillance system, particularly to protect our nuclear submarines, and particularly as they are returning to base. Some assurances were given to us today. I know that the Secretary of State cannot go into any great details because such matters are sensitive, but the House is entitled to ask why Nimrod was developed for all those years. Why is it suddenly considered necessary to cancel it just because of its cost?

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I accept the sensitivities regarding what we use Nimrod for, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that if we take any capability out, we must either bin it altogether and not task it, or replace it?

[Mr Leigh]

Exactly. I know that parliamentary questions have been asked, but the House must tease out more information on maintaining early-warning capability. I know that this is not an exact historical comparison, but if someone had said in 1938, “Oh, this radar programme that we are deploying on the south coast is terribly expensive. We’ve wasted enormous sums of money on it and there are all sorts of pressures on our budget, so we should get rid of it,” we simply would have lost the second world war. I know that that is not an exact comparison, but we should always be aware of the lessons of history. In defence, whether we are talking about Northern Ireland or piracy, we simply cannot rely on the same situation existing in eight or nine years as exists now.

I am also extremely worried about the decision on Trident. The decision not to push through the main gate on Trident before the next general election is very dangerous indeed, because I believe that it was taken for fundamental political, not military, reasons, and because of the possible result of the next general election. What happens if the Labour and Conservative parties are level pegging, and there is a bargaining situation, as we had this year? I am confident that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister would not be prepared to enter into a coalition with the Liberals if the price was getting rid of Trident, but can we be so confident about the Labour party? The former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), whom we all greatly admire for his time in office, made a significant intervention when he said, “Well, now that Trident’s been put on the backburner, perhaps we should reconsider; perhaps there are cheaper options. It will be five years in advance.” So the political decision to delay Trident is worrying and dangerous.

I do not say that as someone who is fanatically in favour of Trident. I managed to blot my copy book with the Conservative parliamentary party as soon as I arrived in the House—I have succeeded in doing it again and again ever since—when I and my hon. Friend the then Member for Wells tabled an early-day motion questioning whether there were not cheaper alternatives to a ballistic missile system, and suggesting that we could consider cruise missiles off nuclear-powered submarines. My right hon. Friend the then Prime Minister was none too pleased with both of us. So I have always been sceptical about maintaining ballistic missile systems in a post-cold war age, and more and more people like that will be coming out of the woodwork the longer we delay main gate.

Some have said, “If a future Labour Government wanted to cancel Trident, they would cancel it anyway, whether it had been through main gate or not”, but why have we not cancelled the carriers? It is because the admirals were determined to force them through main gate before the election, knowing that after it, there would be enormous political and financial pressure to cancel them. If, therefore, Trident has not gone through main gate before the next general election, it will be thrown immediately into the political mix and it will be much easier to cancel it. I have noticed that the president of the Liberal Democrats, who has been quoted in the Evening Standard, has been crowing that they have achieved a major political victory in delaying Trident. So as much as I love my coalition partners, we should be aware of what could happen in the future.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) has done a wonderful job as Chair of the Defence Committee—he is shaping up to be a superb Chair—in questioning the decision on the future shape of the carrier fleet. I am not a Francosceptic; I am a huge Francophile. Both my parents were brought up in France, I went to a French school, and I speak French, so I am all in favour of every kind of co-operation with the French—

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

But?

[Mr Leigh]

But, indeed. Hon. Members and the public are right to be wary about such co-operation. The public do not really understand—and why should they?—a lot of these details about joint strike fighters, Typhoons and Tornadoes. However, they can visualise aircraft carriers without aircraft, and they can visualise sharing an aircraft carrier with the French, and they do not like it—and they are wise not to like it. We all know what would have happened had we been sharing an aircraft carrier with the French during the Falklands war or the Iraq war. We simply cannot foresee—

[Mr MacShane]

rose—

[Mr Leigh]

Oh dear! I am sorry. Perhaps I should not have been saying this, because I have forced the right hon. Gentleman to his feet.

[Mr MacShane]

I want only to make the point that when the Falklands were invaded, the then US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, supported Argentina to begin with, but the first call that Mrs Thatcher got that Saturday morning was from Francois Mitterand, pledging support and revealing all the secrets of the Exocet and the Super Etendard. There are many differences between us and the French, but on the Falkland Islands, they were with us, and to begin with the United States was not. That should be put on the record.

[Mr Leigh]

Fine, but we must remember, I am afraid, that it was a French Exocet that sank HMS Sheffield. I do not doubt for a moment that it is a wonderful idea to have increased co-operation with the French on procurement and to work together more closely, but on this basis it is an extremely dangerous decision. My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire was right. There is no way in this debate that we can change the decision on the Ark Royal, the Harriers or Nimrod, and I do not think that I will still be in this Chamber when the two aircraft carriers retire, because I will be about 120. However, for the next 10 years, we can together mount a campaign. Its nature must be clear: that we would make ourselves ridiculous, as one of the world’s greatest maritime nations, if we built the greatest and most powerful ships we have ever constructed and then sold one of them to India, Brazil or elsewhere.

As my right hon. Friend said, extended readiness is not good enough. Our commitment, as with Trident, must be that at all times an aircraft carrier will be available. That means that we must keep our two aircraft carriers and ensure that when one goes in for a refit, the other is available. We remember how long the refit of Ark Royal took and its cost. The refits of the new class of aircraft carriers will take even longer and be even more costly.

[Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

The Deputy Speaker said that many Members want to speak, and the hon. Gentleman has been rabbiting on for about 15 minutes. Can he please wrap it up so that others may get in?

[Mr Leigh]

That intervention was extremely discourteous, especially as Liberal Democrat Members have not attended most of the debate, and I was coming to the end of my remarks.

[Mr MacShane]

Keep going.

[Mr Leigh]

No, I will not keep going, because others want to speak, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt), who no doubt has an important speech to make.

We are entitled to speak up about our concerns for the future of the Royal Navy, bearing in mind that we are a maritime and trading nation, and we must continue the campaign for the future to ensure that we have a strong and viable Royal Navy that can protect this nation, as it has done for centuries.

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Following on from the previous intervention, does my hon. Friend agree that although our troops do not want Members of Parliament to doubt ultimate victory or how to control the Taliban, we should question whether the tactics are always right, because there might be other ways of doing things? President Reagan bombed Libya, for instance, which shows that we do not necessarily have to have troops on the ground. Do the troops accept that point?

[Bob Stewart]

Most certainly they do, and I accept that it is our job to question everything. The problem is that we have made some fundamental mistakes. I am not blaming anyone, but we made mistakes in 2006 when we dissipated our forces so they were in platoon houses and were not within the envelope. That meant that they could not have protection from artillery, and we had to use air power instead. The air power protecting them knocked out houses around them and killed local people, turning the people against our forces. In 2007 and 2008 we had gone back to counter-insurgency tactics—taking, holding, building—and our gallant troops went in to take, but they could not hold. They had to withdraw. Perhaps Members remember those pictures of helicopters flying with men strapped aboard to try to bring troops back. We could not hold the ground. Also, of course, our enemy came in and put devices on the ground that caused real problems, and they continue to do so to this day.

We now have a situation in which there is an increase in the number of soldiers on the ground, principally from the United States, and the principles of counter-insurgency are, in fact, beginning to work. They are protecting the people, and the key is whether the Afghan people feel protected and safe and can live a decent life.

Afghanistan

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

“Victory” is a word I do not use; I talk instead about success in Afghanistan. On the national security mission we have set ourselves, I would describe success as a stable enough Afghanistan that is able to manage its own internal and external security without the need for external intervention. There is of course the Pakistani problem to be dealt with as well, which will require us to give considerable help in a number of different areas to the Government of Pakistan. There is not going to be a moment when we can hoist up a flag say, “This is a victory.” There will be ways in which we measure success in terms of national security, but the regional problems are likely to continue for some time, and if we are serious about the national security of the United Kingdom we cannot simply turn a blind eye and wish them away.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State agree, however, that we went into Afghanistan on the wrong premise? We were told we were going there to protect Londoners going to work. We now know that al-Qaeda has moved most of its operations to Pakistan, and that most of the Taliban whom we kill die within 20 miles of where they were born, so why are we there? Is it to hold territory, which nobody has ever succeeded in doing in Afghanistan—not even the Soviets with 240,000 people? If it is to fight a dirty war and keep heads down, why do we not place more reliance on special forces, rather than let the British Army carry on bleeding to death?

[Dr Fox]

My hon. Friend knows that we never comment whatsoever on special forces and what they do, but we are in Afghanistan to give the Afghan Government space to develop the skills in governance and security, so that when we do leave we do not leave behind an ungoverned space into which, as a security vacuum, elements of transnational terrorism are once again drawn.

I sometimes wonder whether the general public remember the chronology correctly. I was in the United States last week, where a woman said to me, “If we hadn’t been in Afghanistan, we would never have had 9/11.” We need to remember that we did not seek this confrontation; it was brought to our streets and cities against our will. We did not seek this conflict, but we will see it through to its conclusion.