UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Following on from the previous intervention, does my hon. Friend agree that although our troops do not want Members of Parliament to doubt ultimate victory or how to control the Taliban, we should question whether the tactics are always right, because there might be other ways of doing things? President Reagan bombed Libya, for instance, which shows that we do not necessarily have to have troops on the ground. Do the troops accept that point?

[Bob Stewart]

Most certainly they do, and I accept that it is our job to question everything. The problem is that we have made some fundamental mistakes. I am not blaming anyone, but we made mistakes in 2006 when we dissipated our forces so they were in platoon houses and were not within the envelope. That meant that they could not have protection from artillery, and we had to use air power instead. The air power protecting them knocked out houses around them and killed local people, turning the people against our forces. In 2007 and 2008 we had gone back to counter-insurgency tactics—taking, holding, building—and our gallant troops went in to take, but they could not hold. They had to withdraw. Perhaps Members remember those pictures of helicopters flying with men strapped aboard to try to bring troops back. We could not hold the ground. Also, of course, our enemy came in and put devices on the ground that caused real problems, and they continue to do so to this day.

We now have a situation in which there is an increase in the number of soldiers on the ground, principally from the United States, and the principles of counter-insurgency are, in fact, beginning to work. They are protecting the people, and the key is whether the Afghan people feel protected and safe and can live a decent life.

Afghanistan

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

“Victory” is a word I do not use; I talk instead about success in Afghanistan. On the national security mission we have set ourselves, I would describe success as a stable enough Afghanistan that is able to manage its own internal and external security without the need for external intervention. There is of course the Pakistani problem to be dealt with as well, which will require us to give considerable help in a number of different areas to the Government of Pakistan. There is not going to be a moment when we can hoist up a flag say, “This is a victory.” There will be ways in which we measure success in terms of national security, but the regional problems are likely to continue for some time, and if we are serious about the national security of the United Kingdom we cannot simply turn a blind eye and wish them away.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State agree, however, that we went into Afghanistan on the wrong premise? We were told we were going there to protect Londoners going to work. We now know that al-Qaeda has moved most of its operations to Pakistan, and that most of the Taliban whom we kill die within 20 miles of where they were born, so why are we there? Is it to hold territory, which nobody has ever succeeded in doing in Afghanistan—not even the Soviets with 240,000 people? If it is to fight a dirty war and keep heads down, why do we not place more reliance on special forces, rather than let the British Army carry on bleeding to death?

[Dr Fox]

My hon. Friend knows that we never comment whatsoever on special forces and what they do, but we are in Afghanistan to give the Afghan Government space to develop the skills in governance and security, so that when we do leave we do not leave behind an ungoverned space into which, as a security vacuum, elements of transnational terrorism are once again drawn.

I sometimes wonder whether the general public remember the chronology correctly. I was in the United States last week, where a woman said to me, “If we hadn’t been in Afghanistan, we would never have had 9/11.” We need to remember that we did not seek this confrontation; it was brought to our streets and cities against our will. We did not seek this conflict, but we will see it through to its conclusion.