Strategic Defence and Security Review

Alun Cairns Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leigh]

Exactly. I know that parliamentary questions have been asked, but the House must tease out more information on maintaining early-warning capability. I know that this is not an exact historical comparison, but if someone had said in 1938, “Oh, this radar programme that we are deploying on the south coast is terribly expensive. We’ve wasted enormous sums of money on it and there are all sorts of pressures on our budget, so we should get rid of it,” we simply would have lost the second world war. I know that that is not an exact comparison, but we should always be aware of the lessons of history. In defence, whether we are talking about Northern Ireland or piracy, we simply cannot rely on the same situation existing in eight or nine years as exists now.

I am also extremely worried about the decision on Trident. The decision not to push through the main gate on Trident before the next general election is very dangerous indeed, because I believe that it was taken for fundamental political, not military, reasons, and because of the possible result of the next general election. What happens if the Labour and Conservative parties are level pegging, and there is a bargaining situation, as we had this year? I am confident that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister would not be prepared to enter into a coalition with the Liberals if the price was getting rid of Trident, but can we be so confident about the Labour party? The former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), whom we all greatly admire for his time in office, made a significant intervention when he said, “Well, now that Trident’s been put on the backburner, perhaps we should reconsider; perhaps there are cheaper options. It will be five years in advance.” So the political decision to delay Trident is worrying and dangerous.

I do not say that as someone who is fanatically in favour of Trident. I managed to blot my copy book with the Conservative parliamentary party as soon as I arrived in the House—I have succeeded in doing it again and again ever since—when I and my hon. Friend the then Member for Wells tabled an early-day motion questioning whether there were not cheaper alternatives to a ballistic missile system, and suggesting that we could consider cruise missiles off nuclear-powered submarines. My right hon. Friend the then Prime Minister was none too pleased with both of us. So I have always been sceptical about maintaining ballistic missile systems in a post-cold war age, and more and more people like that will be coming out of the woodwork the longer we delay main gate.

Some have said, “If a future Labour Government wanted to cancel Trident, they would cancel it anyway, whether it had been through main gate or not”, but why have we not cancelled the carriers? It is because the admirals were determined to force them through main gate before the election, knowing that after it, there would be enormous political and financial pressure to cancel them. If, therefore, Trident has not gone through main gate before the next general election, it will be thrown immediately into the political mix and it will be much easier to cancel it. I have noticed that the president of the Liberal Democrats, who has been quoted in the Evening Standard, has been crowing that they have achieved a major political victory in delaying Trident. So as much as I love my coalition partners, we should be aware of what could happen in the future.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) has done a wonderful job as Chair of the Defence Committee—he is shaping up to be a superb Chair—in questioning the decision on the future shape of the carrier fleet. I am not a Francosceptic; I am a huge Francophile. Both my parents were brought up in France, I went to a French school, and I speak French, so I am all in favour of every kind of co-operation with the French—

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

But?

[Mr Leigh]

But, indeed. Hon. Members and the public are right to be wary about such co-operation. The public do not really understand—and why should they?—a lot of these details about joint strike fighters, Typhoons and Tornadoes. However, they can visualise aircraft carriers without aircraft, and they can visualise sharing an aircraft carrier with the French, and they do not like it—and they are wise not to like it. We all know what would have happened had we been sharing an aircraft carrier with the French during the Falklands war or the Iraq war. We simply cannot foresee—

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[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for calling me in this extremely important debate.

I thank the Secretary of State and his colleagues for the work they have done on the strategic defence and security review in extremely difficult circumstances. It has been said on many occasions that the state of the public finances, together with under-investment in defence over a considerable period, has put this Administration in a near-impossible position, yet the outcomes of the SDSR are tough and realistic but forward-looking. The SDSR and the national security strategy have, by and large, been well received. I think that their common theme is flexibility and adaptability.

My hon. Friends the Members for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) and for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) said that, after this debate and its due consideration, it ultimately comes down to the individuals who are on the front line. That being the case, I want to talk about defence training.

Naturally, I was disappointed that the Metrix consortium plan for a single tri-service defence training establishment in St Athan in my constituency was not viable. I am pleased, however, that the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister have said that St Athan remains the preferred location for the defence training solution. Decisions such as this cannot be taken in isolation, and the communities surrounding St Athan recognise that fact.

I have had the opportunity to question in private and in more detail the Secretary of State and some of his colleagues, and I am grateful for their responses, some of which it would be inappropriate to share here. I have gained a better understanding of the reasons for the failure of the Metrix consortium. I look forward to further meetings with the Secretary of State and his colleagues to try to establish what St Athan can do to put itself in a strong position as we go forward with the defence review. As a strong supporter of the plan, I am disappointed that Metrix could not deliver a commercially robust proposal within the desired time scale. Clearly, I would have welcomed a £14 billion investment in my constituency, but it must also be right for the nation and for the nation’s security needs.

Questions have been raised by constituents about the appropriateness of providing training through a private finance initiative scheme under a 30-year contract. This raises and highlights two key points, the first of which is whether defence training should be conducted by a private firm. I am a fan of PFI in general. The transfer of risk is a key benefit of PFI, but in defence terms the public purse will always have to carry the risk and bail out any failure. That raises questions about whether PFI is appropriate for defence.

The second issue is the term of the contract. The public purse will be hit hard unless all details are specified and agreed at the signing of the agreement. It is difficult to know what will be all the requirements over a 30-year contract; our technical training requirements 30 years ago were very different from what we need now. That demonstrates the difficulty of planning over a 30-year period in a PFI contract, especially as the nature of the risks we face these days changes at a much quicker pace. It would be useful to have the Secretary of State’s and the Minister’s views on the timing and particularly on the use of PFI for defence projects and, most specifically, for defence training.

The training needs of the forces still need to be addressed. The reasons for the previous Government’s defence training review remain. We need to offer our forces the best training possible to protect themselves and our nation when fighting in the line of duty and to equip them with transferable skills when they leave the services. To my mind, that is an essential element of the military covenant. The principle and benefits behind the tri-service training model are still true, and the run-down state of training establishments, as inherited from the previous Administration, is still a matter of concern and needs to be addressed.

The social and economic demands of today’s trainees are far greater than they were in the past, and we need to match their expectations. The positive influence over the different cultures of each individual service that a tri-service facility would bring can only be beneficial. It was interesting to note from the UK-French security co-operation data that there is a plan to develop a joint expeditionary force involving all three services. When I refer to a joint force, I mean that it would involve all three services; it would not necessarily involve the French. Training will be provided. The proposal underlines the importance of co-operation between the services. We also need to offer transferable skills that members of the forces can use when they leave Her Majesty’s service.

It was alarming to read that even in 1999, when the previous Government launched the defence training review—incidentally, the fact that the process began 11 years ago highlights the delays created by that Government—site running costs represented between 40% and 50% of the total costs of the training establishment. That is clearly not efficient spending. Training is currently delivered at nine key locations. A considerable amount of technical training is common to all services, and it obviously does not make sense for identical functions to be delivered over several locations.

[Mr Havard]

I was going to ask the hon. Gentleman earlier what he had been told by Ministers, in secret or otherwise, about why the St Athan plan would not go ahead, but as his speech has unfolded it has become clear what the excuses are. Given that he agrees that St Athan should still be the preferred site and given that PFI is not the right way of financing it, has he received any undertaking that it will be financed by general spend from the Ministry of Defence?

[Alun Cairns]

The Secretary of State made clear in his written statement that there would be a statement about defence training by the spring, and that written statement specified St Athan as the preferred location for the defence training solution. We could not ask for a clearer statement than that. However, I also benefited from meetings with Ministers, including the Secretary of State. One of those meetings, incidentally, was offered on an all-party basis, but unfortunately Labour Members chose not to turn up. Obviously, information would have been shared with the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues if he was unable to attend himself.

[Mr Havard]

The hon. Gentleman may be satisfied with that, but I think that the position is still very unclear. It is also unclear where St Athan will fit in with the training that is required elsewhere in the country. It seems that the hon. Gentleman has been handed a Confederate dollar. A better explanation is needed.

[Alun Cairns]

If the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) had not left after a bit of a spat because there was a mix-up over the room changes, that information would have been shared with him. It is not necessarily appropriate to share such information in public, although I have been reassured that more information will be given in public as time goes on.

There are also significant opportunities to introduce modern training methods involving the latest technologies, thus enhancing the capabilities of our forces. I would, however, caution against centralising technical training on a single site, as Metrix proposed. I believe that that would pose a security risk that could be managed better on a small number of sites than in a single location. We need a defence capacity that involves not only appropriate equipment, but the training flexibility that makes it possible to respond to an ever-changing environment.

Let me return to the subject of St Athan. As the Secretary of State has pointed out on several occasions, its infrastructure, facilities and location won through during the last consideration. Preliminary site works have been conducted, and planning permissions are in place. Those factors remain, as do the needs of the forces. I look forward to the spring, when the Secretary of State will outline the next steps—within the financial envelope, of course.

There was no problem with the site. It was Metrix, the developer, that failed. However, I hope that the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Defence will recognise the support that the communities in and around St Athan were prepared to give, and the compromises that they were prepared to make. That good will remains, on the basis that the St Athan facility will be used to its full potential.