Strategic Defence and Security Review

Dai Havard Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Murphy]

The right hon. Gentleman is correct, and we can compete in our admiration of the BBC’s World Service and all that it does, including the launch of the Arabic service relatively recently, the broadcasting in Pashtun, and the fact that President Obama used the medium of the World Service to broadcast. We are occasionally frustrated with some things that the BBC does, but in principle, as an institution, the World Service is something that everyone in this country who feels a sense of pride and patriotism should be remarkably proud of.

[Mr Dai Havard]

(Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney): As someone who lives in Wales, I regularly listen to the World Service, for reasons similar to those that my right hon. Friend gave for listening to it in South Africa: we have a colonial Government these days. I echo the point made by the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, that in Helmand province particularly, and other parts of Afghanistan, the really important medium of information is the radio. It is not the television, or Fox News, as it is in America. The power of what the right hon. Gentleman said is palpable to anyone who visits the place.

[Mr Murphy]

We seem to be entering an Adjournment debate on the importance of the BBC World Service.

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[Mr Dai Havard (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)]

The word “strategic” is in the title of the document, but we have heard several examples of how it is not a clearly formed strategy at the moment. At the end of his thoughtful speech, the Chairman of the Select Committee, the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), explained where we are now and said we needed to form a clear, strategic view of where we will be in future, and that is a job that we must all do.

The debate has been a little deficient—this is understandable because we are considering the matter from the point of view of defence—for the reason that the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr Donaldson) gave. The review is supposed to be about defence and security—that is what the annunciator screens say—but the security part is clearly deficient. The document on the national strategy from the National Security Council is all very well as far as it goes, but it is not clear to me where our foreign policy is in this debate; nor do I think it is clear where the home services stand in terms of the Home Office, policing and so on.

Some of the points made by the hon. Gentleman are telling. The only way to deal with the problems is not with large toys and pieces of kit, but with good old-fashioned police work and intelligence. There must be correct mixture of capability, including people as well as machinery. The cross-governmental aspect of the review was encouraging. In the Defence Committee during the last Parliament, I said that we were in effect already having a defence review, but in an ad hoc and unguided way that was not very helpful or useful. It should have been put into a proper structure much earlier. That is the missed opportunity because the review does not cover the whole of the subject in the title—strategic defence, including security.

There are many parts to the review. I echo some of the points that have been made about Trident. As I said back in July, we cannot take Trident out; well, we could formally, descriptively and all of that, but in reality we cannot, so it was all nonsense. Whether that was said for political reasons to do with the coalition partners is for history to show. There is probably a lot of power in those arguments, but the reality is that it was nonsense to try to proceed in that way.

The other thing that disturbs me is that some parts of the review have not been mentioned today. The lack of clarity about a defence industrial strategy is hugely important. I know that there will be a Green Paper, apparently by the end of this year. It is now November the something-or-other, so I do not know what is meant by the end of this year. I must tell the Minister that I hope we see the Green Paper before the recess comes; otherwise we will have no opportunity to consider it. Apparently there will be a White Paper some time next year, and then something beyond that. What key capabilities are we going to focus on? What direction are we giving to industry? Where is the strategy? Where is the plan? It is not there. We have to form it, and it is to the benefit of us all that we do so.

There is also the reform group—or whatever it is called—that has been set up to transform the Ministry of Defence. We had the reform acquisition strategy before the election. I wrote all this down so that I would not get it wrong, but at that time the Ministry of Defence said, “Well, don’t worry about it, because we’re transforming ourselves. We have the PACE programme”—performance, agility, confidence and efficiency—“the defence acquisition ‘Terms of business agreement’ process, the equipment and support plan, the acquisition operating framework, and the capability delivery practitioners guide.” We were told that the MOD had lots of other things, doubtless all recommended by a legion of consultants of various sorts—not medical consultants, but business consultants—about internal process. That methodology will clearly be part of the MOD’s review.

A number of reviews have been mentioned in other respects. The points that have been made today about force generation are important. I attended part of the presentation by the Marines about how they do things. They give clear costings, and they were not shy about saying what things cost them or how much time they took. The hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) made an excellent contribution to the debate about what needs to happen with MOD processes. However, as all that unfolds and we do the work, my concern is where we are in that process. Who even is this “we”? What I have seen so far is a process that went forward over the summer, but which did not really involve the public or Parliament, as the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire said. In fact, there was a very narrow discussion among a narrow group of people, and it was therefore not as well informed as it should have been.

Scrutiny and involvement in the process are important, as is transparency. There was a review of Trident. Apparently something came out of the end of that review, but I have no real idea what process was used or what the results were. We need to understand better what is going to happen in that process if we are to end up with a better strategic review, which can serve as the overarching architecture, as the hon. Member for Mid Sussex put it. The review may well be the framework for that debate, but it is not the debate itself, nor is it the end product, and to that degree it is deficient.

I shall finish now, because I know that the hon. Member for Colchester (Bob Russell), who is carrying the entire weight of the Liberal party today, needs to speak.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

He makes the same speech every time.

[Mr Havard]

Yes, but he is the only one here to make it.

There are issues to do with particular aspects of the review. I have concerns, partly because my local economy is affected, but the decision on St Athan and the training there is worrying. It is particularly worrying because, as the Chancellor and others have said, one way or another we have to find different ways of paying. We are talking about a private finance initiative. I have to say that I am not the greatest supporter of private finance initiatives in general, but what has happened prompts the question: why, having gone through a due diligence process pretty recently, was the facility not thought to be good enough? We now have a decision that that is not going to happen, but what is going to happen? All we have now is a vague declaration that something else will happen. The big question is about the training. It is about the people, and it is important that this aspect should not be lost in the review, with all the discussions about large pieces of equipment.

I could say a few words about the carriers, which we discussed on a number of occasions in the Defence Committee during the last Parliament. At one point, there was talk about having three carriers—my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson) would like to hear this, but he is not in his place—but that was on the basis of having two British carriers, with the French perhaps buying one off us and our making it for them with their Slingshot deck on it. All these discussions were going on, so this is not an entirely new argument, although it is new in some respects.

I thought a remark in yesterday’s edition of the Financial Times was prescient. It pointed out that if the Ministry of Defence gains the savings it declares it is going to get, it would be a good thing if they went back to the MOD, and did not just get lost in the coffers. If there is a dividend, the MOD should have it, not the Treasury.

[Mr Jones]

One issue raised by the treaty is whether markets, including the French defence market, would be opened up to British companies. Given my hon. Friend’s long membership of the Defence Committee and his close interest in defence matters, does he recollect whether the French have ever bought anything that does not have a main French component to it?

[Mr Havard]

I may be old, but no—that is the short answer, and it might go back longer than me. The French have a particular view about their sovereign capability, so my hon. Friend raises an interesting issue. The Defence Committee was asked to consider the trade treaty with the United States, and did some pre-work before it was agreed. The Americans have only just agreed to the treaty—it took them three years to ratify it. Included in it was important stuff related to technology transfer and the joint strike fighter. Yes, some other nations take a very parochial view: they claim to be free traders, but they often behave in a very—how can I put this? —protectionist fashion. That balance is always there. What comes out of it, I do not know. It will be interesting to find out what lies behind some of the declarations and whether it will change that form of acquisition.

I have a few small questions for the Minister. One is about helicopters and search and rescue. This may be a small aspect of defence, but it is very important, particularly in Wales, because we have to spend a lot of time calling people from Culdrose to come and rescue mostly English people off Welsh hills. In that sense, people in England have an interest in what happens in Wales as much as Welsh people do. It gives rise to a question about particular capabilities within the review. This service is under review and there are lots of individual programmes on which we need more clarity.

Some of the decisions are about timing. It is all very well saying we will have a defence review every five years. Let me tell Government Members that they will have an iteration in 2012 and another in 2014—whether they like it or not. That is because there will be political change in Afghanistan, and there is already political change going on in America. They should not try to pretend that this will work on some prescribed artificial timetable that might seem desirable today, because it will not. Events, dear boy, events—and some of those events are largely predictable because of watersheds in the political timetable set for us elsewhere as well as here. I hope that whatever the review going forward will be—in all its different component parts—it will be open. I hope that Parliament will be directly involved in the process.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Let me first declare my interest, which is set out in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), and I am really pleased that he has rejoined the Defence Select Committee, which, under the chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), has an extremely impressive membership. I know that the Committee will do a great job in holding the Government to account, which is indeed its function.

The first duty of the state is to defend national security and the national interest. Even in today’s defence debate, we have to admit that the chief threat to this country is not military at all, but economic. It is, of course, against that backdrop that we have had the strategic defence and security review.

I might be accused of being sycophantic, but I will say this nevertheless. I think that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has done a first-rate job in marrying our need to ensure that the country returns to an even keel economically with the ongoing need to ensure that we prepare for all foreseeable threats to the country, particularly in a world that is ever-changing.

Much has been said about aircraft carriers, which are close to my heart. I spent 18 years in the Navy, and developed a healthy respect for them during that time. During most of my career, the Harrier jump jet took off and landed on aircraft carriers. It must be said that they were rather short. I think we should bear in mind that, while STOVL—short take-off and vertical landing—has many virtues, its chief virtue is as an expedient for countries that have short aircraft carriers. I listened with interest to the remarks of the former Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), and noted his concern that we should be able to land on small plots of land. Nevertheless, the chief virtue of the aircraft carriers is connected with the fact that for several years—indeed, for decades—we had to make do with carriers that were smaller and more economical than we might have liked.

We are now to have two impressive aircraft carriers, which will be larger than the Charles de Gaulle. Their size will approach that of some of the largest ships in the American fleet that we admire so much. It is absolutely right for us to have craft that are fitted out to accommodate the naval forces of our two greatest allies, the United States and France, and I welcome the fitting of the “cats and traps”, which will provide us with that interoperability.

It strikes me as bizarre that the previous Government should have ignored the obvious desire and need for aircraft from those two nations to use our aircraft carriers, whether or not there is a formal arrangement with France to share one of them, and I am exceptionally pleased that we will now be able to do that. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary on the important work he has done, both in opposition and in government, to strengthen the links with France. It is quite wrong to say that that has happened since May. As one who was on the Defence Front Bench until recently, I know that it was a recurring theme throughout my three years there. We have a great deal in common with our neighbour, and it is not just about our willingness to pay for a defence umbrella under which others in Europe are content to shelter. Both countries, while slipping down the league table of global significance as others rise, have residual interests overseas, although France, of course, has rather more than the United Kingdom.

I congratulate the Government on resisting the temptation to close some of our remaining overseas assets. In particular, our removal from the sovereign base areas in Cyprus would have been most unwise, given the strategic situation. Akrotiri and Dhekelia offer a combination of barracks, training areas, an airfield and a seaport that is peerless, not to mention other assets in the Troodos mountains that are beyond the scope of the debate. Those of us who have had the pleasure of serving in Cyprus will attest to its importance, and to the totemic significance of any east-of-Nicosia moment that the Defence Secretary may have been forced at least to contemplate.

Inevitably, much has been said today about bombs and bullets, but I must confess that my interest is now, and has always been, in our military software, by which I mean the men and women of our armed forces. Tempting though it is for policy makers to become obsessed with equipment, not least when there are jobs and constituency interests to be considered, we must always bear in mind the greatest single factor: the bloke with the gun or, increasingly, the metal detector on the front line. I think that the SDSR has done that.

Importantly, the White Paper makes it clear that an armed forces covenant will be formalised, and I imagine that that codification will feature prominently in the Armed Forces Bill. The military covenant made its debut in April 2000 in a rather dusty Army publication, “Army Doctrine Publication Volume 5”—a snappy title! We can, however, find examples of such a covenant going back to ancient Greece. It was certainly considered in Roman Britain too, with the distribution of bits of land to those who had served in the Roman army, and it continued to the reign of Elizabeth I, who formally codified a system of pensions for those who had been disabled in action. Ironically, it rather fell apart during Cromwell’s military Protectorate, but it has been an unspoken theme of service throughout our history.

Whether or not the author of the military covenant knew it, it was at the extreme end of the spectrum of psychological contracts identified by Harry Levinson in 1962, following his study of the Midlands Utilities Company in the American midwest. The point about such contracts is that they are unspoken and unwritten. In an age of lawyers, that has a certain appeal. We are now considering codifying the military covenant and putting it in writing so that people will be able to rely on it as of right, and potentially, of course, in a court of law.

If we are rather reluctant to go down that route, we must consider the developments of the early 1990s. Many of us will recall NMS—the new management strategy—and the new managerialism introduced into the Ministry of Defence, and the impact that had on the relationship between leaders and led. Commanding officers morphed into budget holders and military units into cost centres. The relationship between commanding officers and those they commanded was subtly changed. In that context, it is right and proper that we should look at articulating the psychological contract of the military covenant in statute. I look forward to seeing the form in which it is introduced in the forthcoming armed forces Bill.

The insurgents in Afghanistan have proved capable of being flexible in their tactics. The Taliban lost, as they were bound to, in the head-to-head early conflict in Helmand and Kandahar. They then shifted to the use of IEDs, and that proved very successful, as all of us will know who have spent time in Birmingham and at Headley Court and who represent constituencies with a military element. The Taliban’s tactics are now changing once again. They are developing their own brand of Sharpe’s Rifles, chosen men who are rather less appealing even than the men of the South Essex.

It is worth bearing in mind the threat that still exists, and is likely to continue to exist, from IEDs. They are a mortal threat to our men and women and a bitter fact of life for the civilian population. I know that the Government have taken a real interest in this and that the Prime Minister has taken the trouble to familiarise himself with the workings of the Vallon metal detector that is currently used by our troops.

I am pleased to note that a contract has now been let to improve the collective counter-IED training of our troops, especially as it has been let to a firm in my constituency. We have a digital record of aptitude and performance in training, and it has been shown to be extremely variable. Will the Minister ensure that the value of that highly granular information is exploited further so as to allow us to assess post-deployment how effective the new training has been, and perhaps refine it further? Will the Minister also say what further personal protective equipment our troops are to have to reduce the toll taken by IEDs?

For servicemen with children there are few issues of greater concern than education, and that is rightly cited in the White Paper. The Department for Education has been consulting on a pupil premium for service children. There is no doubt that schools with substantial numbers of service children are at a distinct disadvantage because of the extra costs involved in their education. I would cite the New Close primary school and the Avenue school in Warminster as prime examples of that. If we are serious about the concept of “no disadvantage” from military service, we must ensure that the extra costs relating to service children are properly reflected in the funding formula.

I have an abiding interest in military health care, so I am very pleased to see a substantial reflection in the White Paper of the importance of doing more. I am particularly keen to see improvements in military mental health care, and I very much welcome the fact that that is cited specifically in the White Paper. However, it is important that we bear in mind that it is not just about combat stress and post-traumatic stress disorder, and that we need to look more widely at mental health issues, including those relating to service families and issues such as alcoholism and the overuse of alcohol, depression and so on.

It is important that we are far more proactive in dealing with combat stress, because most people, including the general public, would accept that of all those conditions the ones that the military has a direct hand in causing need to be addressed as a priority. Although, numerically, the incidence of PTSD—combat stress—might not be vast in the great scheme of things, men and women experience it by virtue of their exposure on the front line, so if we are serious about the military covenant, we must do our utmost to reduce the chances of it occurring in the first place and to manage it when it does. The key to that is being proactive and ensuring that we look for people with problems before they wait, often for many years, before seeking out medical attention. It is important to go where young men and women are if we want to find out whether they are having problems and to signpost services where they are available—and that means going online.

I very much welcome the extra mental health professionals whom the Government have announced they will recruit to improve mental health care for this community. I also welcome the prospect of a veterans’ information service, by which we will inform veterans, after they have left, of the services available to them, and not simply cut them free and let them go, as we have done in the past.

[Mr Havard]

I know of the hon. Gentleman’s particular interest in medical services and mental health. He will be aware that the British Medical Association has made suggestions on improving general practitioners’ understanding about the medical treatment of those who have served. Does he have a view about that?

[Dr Murrison]

Yes, I do. I commend the BMA for its efforts, as I do the Royal College of General Practitioners, which has recently put out a leaflet trying to apprise GPs of the problems that may be faced by patients who have served in the military. That is not an easy task. Most GPs are faced daily with a whole pile of stuff and will jettison most of it, so getting the message across to them is extremely difficult, given that a relatively small number of their patients will have served and may have a problem as a result of their service. That is not to say that we must not do what we can to raise the prominence of this issue.

In conclusion, may I say how much I welcome the emphasis in the White Paper on the military covenant? It is essential that we try to codify it in some way, and I look forward to it becoming a far more prominent part of the way in which we think about the service community and veterans in the future.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

As we approach the defence and security review and discuss how we are going to ensure our future defence and security, one thing that we must be very conscious of is the fact that this is not just the responsibility of our military. My father was in the merchant navy in the last war and was on a merchant vessel going to Russia. His ship was sunk by German submarines and he then spent considerable time in Russia, suffering extreme privations as a result of that sinking. That might be one reason why I am interested in maritime security.

Another reason might be my coastal constituency, and the fact that my friends and neighbours are involved in search and rescue operations on a daily basis. Seeing how the mood of the sea changes is part of our daily life. I do not have any military bases in my constituency, but there are hopes that it will play a key part in the future development of RAF St Athan and the joint training college that was to be established there. My local authority spent a considerable amount of money preparing for that, and still hopes that something positive will come of it. As a member of the Defence Committee, I am aware of the central strategic role of the Royal Air Force in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capability. My colleague on the Committee, the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), has mentioned the importance of intelligence in any future war, and the RAF and ISTAR are certainly critical to that.

I want to focus on the unbelievable, short-sighted and downright dangerous decision to cut the Nimrod aircraft. I cannot believe that the decision came from the Ministry of Defence: it must have been a Treasury-led decision, because only a bean counter could have made it. I honestly cannot see why else it would have been made.

Last Sunday I was at Rest bay in my constituency, where people had come from across south Wales, as well as from north Somerset and north Devon, because of the proposed loss of the search and rescue capability at Chivenor, which rescues people across those areas. We do not know what is happening in that regard and I urge that we should consider seriously our search and rescue capability, particularly on our coasts and for our mountains. That Sunday gathering was attended by experts in the field. I spoke to Phil Missen from the Royal National Lifeboat Institution and Ian Coles from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, both of whom expressed concern about Nimrod being cut.

Back in my office, when I was preparing this speech, I had my own little personal cyber-attack. As I was typing away, I received an e-mail in my inbox from Michael Hiscocks in my constituency. It said:

“With the cancellation of the Nimrod, how does the RAF intend to conduct long range surveillance of the sea, not only against the submarine and surface threat, but also long range search and rescue that the Nimrods and her crews so ably carried out over the years?”

That one paragraph written by a member of the public in an e-mail to a member of the Defence Committee, who happens to be their constituency MP, asks the major question that must be dealt with in today’s debate.

In his leaked letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence made it clear that the primary objective of the strategic defence and security review is to set direction, and that decisions should be based on the risks and threats to the security of our country now and in future. He made it clear that the review should not merely be a cost-cutting exercise, and said that the primary duty of the Government and the SDSR was not to undermine the UK’s ability to defend itself. He also said—I am sorry that he is not here now—that the Government’s words would be “thrown back” at them. Well, I am going to throw some words back at him today for getting things wrong. I do so despite the huge respect I have for him, as he has done an excellent job so far. However, we in the House must support him in getting the decision about the Nimrod MRA4 changed.

The Nimrod MRA4 has several key functions. It forms part of military operations, is an advanced reconnaissance tool, helps to ensure the safety of civil national infrastructure, assists in maritime search and rescue operations, and assists in the defence of our dependent territories. The Secretary of State also said:

“Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.”

So, we all agree: the cancellation of the Nimrod has left the UK with a grave gap in its maritime patrol capability.

As a maritime nation—and we do remain a maritime nation—monitoring and defending our sea is a critical element in the maintenance of our security. The Nimrod’s maritime reconnaissance capability was to have protected our nuclear deterrent, our nation’s ultimate defence, and supported royal naval vessels and submarines in our waters and way beyond. The Nimrods were to have fulfilled a hugely important civil role, providing 24/7 search and rescue services for seafarers, as well as defending vital national infrastructure. Our nuclear power stations and our North sea oil rigs would have all been defended thanks to the Nimrod.

We have talked about working closely with our allies to ensure that we have access to the equipment, training and personnel that we need as a necessary part of our defence, but we cannot rely on our allies to pick up on the capabilities that we will lose by not bringing the Nimrod aircraft into service. The Nimrod MRA4 has far greater capabilities than the aircraft that our allies either use now or have planned for the near future. It has world-leading anti-submarine warfare technology—a particular strength in the UK. We have that strength because of our history, and because submarines carry a vital part of our national security. So there we are: submarines carry the most vital part of our national security, and we are going to scrap the means of protecting them.

[Mr Havard]

Is my hon. Friend aware of the press reports that Ministers are trying to sell on the Nimrod’s capability to someone else? Does she have any comments to make about that prospect?

[Mrs Moon]

It worries me that our defence capability is up for sale. We are selling off some of our defence industry’s crown jewels, and selling on to potential enemies—we do not know where they will be—those capabilities at a time when we are in desperate need. I totally object to that, because anti-submarine warfare is not a relic of the cold war. If we are to protect our aircraft carriers when they are deployed in high-risk areas, who will provide the air cover? We recently lost track of a Russian submarine in the Atlantic for three weeks. We cannot rely on allies who are comparatively poorly resourced, or hope that they will buy the Nimrods, save us the money and provide us with the security.

The Nimrod’s civil use must be emphasised, too. Let us look at the history of its search and rescue capability. When the Fastnet yacht race was hit by storms in 1979, and when the Alexander Kielland oil rig overturned in the North sea, Nimrods provided vital cover. They also did so during the Piper Alpha disaster and, just recently, for the Athena fishing vessel, which needed the Nimrod’s capability because Sea King helicopters could spend only 20 minutes hovering above the vessel. We must remember that we have an international obligation to provide long-range search and rescue missions. We will not be able to adhere to the international convention on maritime search and rescue, which we signed in 1979, if we cancel the new Nimrod.

Let us also remember the use of maritime surveillance capabilities against drug smuggling, human trafficking and piracy. The new maritime patrol aircraft, of which the Nimrod was the mainstay, had the capacity to counter drug-running operations in the Caribbean, fight pirate activity in the gulf of Arabia and form a crucial part of maritime counter-terrorism operations.

It has been a long time since the Conservative Government needed to reinforce the Falkland Islands. I pay particular tribute to the speech made by the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh), who recognised the vulnerability of the Falkland Islands, particularly given the growing demand for energy. The UK’s claim to energy resources in the south Atlantic, which are being explored as we speak, must be safeguarded. The Nimrod provides the only capability that could deploy to the Falklands within 48 hours. It can provide early indicators and warnings for forces that follow. The Royal Navy would take three weeks to deploy there. That is 48 hours for a Nimrod, but three weeks for the Royal Navy.

The Nimrod MRA4 has not been cleared for overland operations, but it does have a tremendously sophisticated suite of new sensors that would make a good surveillance and support asset for land operations. I fail to see why our security and defence capability has been reduced by the removal of this asset. It has the capacity to provide maritime eyes and ears at long range—up to 4,000 miles. Where else do we have a 4,000-mile capability for intelligence? It can move very rapidly—within two hours—and with persistence it can fly for 12 hours without refuelling. No other asset has that capability.

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[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for calling me in this extremely important debate.

I thank the Secretary of State and his colleagues for the work they have done on the strategic defence and security review in extremely difficult circumstances. It has been said on many occasions that the state of the public finances, together with under-investment in defence over a considerable period, has put this Administration in a near-impossible position, yet the outcomes of the SDSR are tough and realistic but forward-looking. The SDSR and the national security strategy have, by and large, been well received. I think that their common theme is flexibility and adaptability.

My hon. Friends the Members for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) and for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) said that, after this debate and its due consideration, it ultimately comes down to the individuals who are on the front line. That being the case, I want to talk about defence training.

Naturally, I was disappointed that the Metrix consortium plan for a single tri-service defence training establishment in St Athan in my constituency was not viable. I am pleased, however, that the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister have said that St Athan remains the preferred location for the defence training solution. Decisions such as this cannot be taken in isolation, and the communities surrounding St Athan recognise that fact.

I have had the opportunity to question in private and in more detail the Secretary of State and some of his colleagues, and I am grateful for their responses, some of which it would be inappropriate to share here. I have gained a better understanding of the reasons for the failure of the Metrix consortium. I look forward to further meetings with the Secretary of State and his colleagues to try to establish what St Athan can do to put itself in a strong position as we go forward with the defence review. As a strong supporter of the plan, I am disappointed that Metrix could not deliver a commercially robust proposal within the desired time scale. Clearly, I would have welcomed a £14 billion investment in my constituency, but it must also be right for the nation and for the nation’s security needs.

Questions have been raised by constituents about the appropriateness of providing training through a private finance initiative scheme under a 30-year contract. This raises and highlights two key points, the first of which is whether defence training should be conducted by a private firm. I am a fan of PFI in general. The transfer of risk is a key benefit of PFI, but in defence terms the public purse will always have to carry the risk and bail out any failure. That raises questions about whether PFI is appropriate for defence.

The second issue is the term of the contract. The public purse will be hit hard unless all details are specified and agreed at the signing of the agreement. It is difficult to know what will be all the requirements over a 30-year contract; our technical training requirements 30 years ago were very different from what we need now. That demonstrates the difficulty of planning over a 30-year period in a PFI contract, especially as the nature of the risks we face these days changes at a much quicker pace. It would be useful to have the Secretary of State’s and the Minister’s views on the timing and particularly on the use of PFI for defence projects and, most specifically, for defence training.

The training needs of the forces still need to be addressed. The reasons for the previous Government’s defence training review remain. We need to offer our forces the best training possible to protect themselves and our nation when fighting in the line of duty and to equip them with transferable skills when they leave the services. To my mind, that is an essential element of the military covenant. The principle and benefits behind the tri-service training model are still true, and the run-down state of training establishments, as inherited from the previous Administration, is still a matter of concern and needs to be addressed.

The social and economic demands of today’s trainees are far greater than they were in the past, and we need to match their expectations. The positive influence over the different cultures of each individual service that a tri-service facility would bring can only be beneficial. It was interesting to note from the UK-French security co-operation data that there is a plan to develop a joint expeditionary force involving all three services. When I refer to a joint force, I mean that it would involve all three services; it would not necessarily involve the French. Training will be provided. The proposal underlines the importance of co-operation between the services. We also need to offer transferable skills that members of the forces can use when they leave Her Majesty’s service.

It was alarming to read that even in 1999, when the previous Government launched the defence training review—incidentally, the fact that the process began 11 years ago highlights the delays created by that Government—site running costs represented between 40% and 50% of the total costs of the training establishment. That is clearly not efficient spending. Training is currently delivered at nine key locations. A considerable amount of technical training is common to all services, and it obviously does not make sense for identical functions to be delivered over several locations.

[Mr Havard]

I was going to ask the hon. Gentleman earlier what he had been told by Ministers, in secret or otherwise, about why the St Athan plan would not go ahead, but as his speech has unfolded it has become clear what the excuses are. Given that he agrees that St Athan should still be the preferred site and given that PFI is not the right way of financing it, has he received any undertaking that it will be financed by general spend from the Ministry of Defence?

[Alun Cairns]

The Secretary of State made clear in his written statement that there would be a statement about defence training by the spring, and that written statement specified St Athan as the preferred location for the defence training solution. We could not ask for a clearer statement than that. However, I also benefited from meetings with Ministers, including the Secretary of State. One of those meetings, incidentally, was offered on an all-party basis, but unfortunately Labour Members chose not to turn up. Obviously, information would have been shared with the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues if he was unable to attend himself.

[Mr Havard]

The hon. Gentleman may be satisfied with that, but I think that the position is still very unclear. It is also unclear where St Athan will fit in with the training that is required elsewhere in the country. It seems that the hon. Gentleman has been handed a Confederate dollar. A better explanation is needed.

[Alun Cairns]

If the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) had not left after a bit of a spat because there was a mix-up over the room changes, that information would have been shared with him. It is not necessarily appropriate to share such information in public, although I have been reassured that more information will be given in public as time goes on.

There are also significant opportunities to introduce modern training methods involving the latest technologies, thus enhancing the capabilities of our forces. I would, however, caution against centralising technical training on a single site, as Metrix proposed. I believe that that would pose a security risk that could be managed better on a small number of sites than in a single location. We need a defence capacity that involves not only appropriate equipment, but the training flexibility that makes it possible to respond to an ever-changing environment.

Let me return to the subject of St Athan. As the Secretary of State has pointed out on several occasions, its infrastructure, facilities and location won through during the last consideration. Preliminary site works have been conducted, and planning permissions are in place. Those factors remain, as do the needs of the forces. I look forward to the spring, when the Secretary of State will outline the next steps—within the financial envelope, of course.

There was no problem with the site. It was Metrix, the developer, that failed. However, I hope that the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Defence will recognise the support that the communities in and around St Athan were prepared to give, and the compromises that they were prepared to make. That good will remains, on the basis that the St Athan facility will be used to its full potential.