Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Gareth Davies]

Clause 319 implements changes announced at the spring Budget 2023 concerning tobacco duty rates. The duty charge on all tobacco products will rise in line with the tobacco duty escalator, with additional increases being made for hand-rolling tobacco and to the minimum excise tax on cigarettes. Smoking rates in the UK are falling, but they are still too high. Around 13% of adults are smokers. Smoking remains the biggest cause of preventable illness and premature deaths in the UK, killing around 100,000 people a year, and about half of all long-term users.

We have plans to reduce smoking rates further, towards our Smokefree 2030 ambition. To realise that ambition, the Minister for Primary Care and Public Health recently announced the next steps to help people quit smoking. Our policy of maintaining high duty rates for tobacco products will support the Government’s plan to reduce smoking to improve public health. According to the charity Action on Smoking and Health, smoking costs society £21 billion a year in England, as a result of sickness, disability and premature death, including £2.2 billion in costs to the NHS for treating disease caused by smoking.

At the spring Budget, the Chancellor announced that the Government will increase tobacco duty in line with the escalator. Clause 319 thus specifies that the duty charged on all tobacco products will rise by 2% above the retail prices index level of inflation. In addition, duty on hand-rolling tobacco increases by a further 6% above RPI inflation. The clause also increases the minimum excise tax—the minimum amount of duty to be paid on a pack of cigarettes—by an additional 1% to 3% above RPI inflation. The new tobacco rates will be treated as having taken effect from 6 pm on the day they were announced, which was 5 March 2023.

Recognising the potential interactions between tobacco duty rates and the illicit market, the Government intend to introduce tougher sanctions later this year to punish those involved in the illegal tobacco market. The Government also recently announced that HMRC and Border Force will publish an updated strategy to tackle illicit tobacco later this year.

This clause will continue our tried and tested policy of using high duty rates on tobacco products to make tobacco less affordable, and will continue the reduction in smoking prevalence towards a smoke-free 2030, as well as reducing the burden of smoking on our public services.

[Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con)]

On the Government’s ambition to reduce smoking, I briefly want to mention heating tobacco, in preference, I might say, to vaping.

The only problem with vaping, of course, is that there is absolutely no evidence of any health benefits or health risks. However, with heating tobacco, there is a huge amount of evidence, particularly from Japan, about its health benefits, in helping people to reduce and stop smoking. I just wondered whether the Minister has had any indication that heating tobacco has been looked at as an alternative to vaping. Of course, adding extra duties to it is an inhibitor to people reducing or stopping smoking.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are obviously dealing with a product that kills and, as the Minister said, cost the public purse £21 billion a year. That is why there is cross-party support for the tobacco duty escalator, which the Minister just outlined, explaining how it applies to current costs. It will increase the average price of a packet of cigarettes by 95p and the average price of a 30-gram packet of hand-rolling tobacco by £1.75. I have to say that hand-rolling tobacco is the tobacco product that is smuggled most, so we have to be particularly aware of that. The Minister will know that, if he has been to see Border Force. A 10-gram packet of cigars will go up by 48p, a 30-gram packet of pipe tobacco—again, that is a tobacco product that is often smuggled—by 63p and a typical 6-gram pack of tobacco for heating by 24p.

The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that these increases will raise the amount of revenue taken by tobacco from £10 billion last year to £10.4 billion next year, which will actually return it to where it was the year before. Clearly, that is just an OBR estimate, but I presume that it is based on the work of and information given by Border Force and HMRC. If we are trying to get to a tobacco-free place by 2030, surely we need more progress than this kind of stasis on receipts. I wonder whether the Minister might wish to comment on that.

Clearly, the innovation of vaping is helping many people to give up smoking, but there are unknown health risks to vaping. In particular, would he comment on the way that vapes are being marketed at the moment in our society, with sweer flavours like bubble gum and melon, in a way that is clearly aimed at children. I do not think we should tolerate that. Will he give us a view rather than just saying that vaping is better than smoking cigarettes, which is clearly true?

What that does not include is the alarming rise in vaping among children, which is addicting them to nicotine in a way that might have difficult implications for public expenditure, health and their wellbeing if we allow it to continue. Will the Minister give us at least an early indication of his Department’s thinking on this juxtaposition?

Some organisations that do not think we are going far enough fast enough to eliminate tobacco as a habit to get to a smoke-free 2030 are proposing capping net profit margins on UK tobacco sales to no more than 10%—currently it is 50%—in line with the average for UK manufacturing. That could directly raise £700 million, which could fund the Khan review proposals, which contained a more radical way of trying to get us to the smoke-free target. Is the Department considering something more radical on revenue raising from tobacco products, given that progress has stalled?

As the Minister mentioned, and it is no surprise that he did, as soon as the tax goes up on tobacco products, the financial incentives to smuggle get greater. He mentioned there would be another smuggling strategy, which presumably will try to prevent the complete loss of revenue and lack of any capacity to prove whether the products being smuggled are even vaguely acceptable, because they are adulterated by all sorts, including brick dust. Will the Minister give us more information about what effect that will have on smuggling, because it is a constant problem?

Finance (No. 2) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Will the Minister tell us how clause 322(4), which devolves these issues to the Northern Ireland Assembly, will work, given that the Assembly is not sitting at the moment? Does it mean that this will be decided centrally at Westminster? What arrangements are made for that, since, if there was no change in these areas, in the absence of the Assembly sitting, there would be a divergence between air passenger duty in one place and the other? How has the Treasury modelled that divergence, given that air passenger duty is a devolved issue, even though the devolution settlement is not working at the moment because the Assembly is not sitting?

Will the Minister update the Committee on where we are with the aviation treaties that zero-rate aviation fuel? It is an ongoing issue, given the nature of the environmental damage that is done—particularly by aviation fuel—in the higher atmosphere when airplanes fly at higher levels, which they normally do on long-haul flights. How will private jets be treated and affected, if at all, by the reduction in domestic air passenger duty, since we have a Prime Minister who seems to think that public transport is chartering a private jet for short-haul flights?

[Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con)]

May I declare a loose interest?

I have an elderly mother who lives in Australia. As she is elderly, I am spending more and more time going down there. That aside, has the Minister done any evaluation of air passenger duty and the economic competitiveness of the UK versus our European partners?

I ask that because I know from previous years travelling down to Australia that it has been much more viable for me to catch a flight to Amsterdam, Oslo or wherever and pick up a flight from there, because the cost of flights from the UK has been phenomenally more expensive than those from our European partners. From speaking to people, I know that more and more people are doing that. APD has the adverse effect of making us uneconomical and perhaps at some future point even taking a reduced rate because more and more people will be doing that. Has the Minister or anybody in the Treasury done any evaluation of our air passenger duty versus those of our European counterparts?

[Gareth Davies]

Let me try to answer those questions in order. Just to clarify for the Committee, there is no APD other than on fixed-wing aircraft. Private jets pay a higher rate than any other flight domestically, and they are not, to answer the hon. Member for Wallasey, subject to the 50% cut that we are talking about here. Any ultra-long-haul flights will face a new band, as I described in my opening remarks.

To answer the excellent and reasonable question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Craig Whittaker), I understand there was a review in 2021 of the economic impact of APD. As I said in my opening remarks, all factors are considered as part of that process, but I am happy to provide more detail in due course if that is warranted.

The point on Northern Ireland that the hon. Member for Wallasey raised is a good one. It is a devolved matter, as she points out, and Northern Ireland has the ability to set the rate for ultra-long-haul flights. Let me look into the matter of the arrangements we are putting in place, given the specific circumstances that we find ourselves in with the Executive. It is a fair question, and it deserves a fair answer, so I will come back to her.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

There is an ongoing issue in this country, and in our economy, with investment and with the ability to ensure that we can remake our prosperity as a country and make our way in the 21st century as we did in previous centuries, thereby maintaining our position in the G7, perhaps, as the rise of other economic powers in other parts of the globe puts that under pressure. [Interruption.] Everybody cheers for that, Mr Stringer. Everybody on this Committee wants to see positive progress in this area.

This Bill is enacting some of the Budget—that is why we are in Committee, considering this legislation—but the OBR report on it had a pretty grim picture to show us of how investment has stalled in our country. On page 48, at chart E, it states that

“business investment stalled…after the EU referendum”.

By the time this document was published, investment was at fully 16.2% below the OBR’s pre-referendum expectations. Those who have sat in the main hot seat in No. 10, and those who have been progressing all too rapidly through the Chancellor’s hot seat, have been aware of that and have tried to do something about it. Most notably, there was the current Prime Minister’s super deduction, which paid people to invest in plant and machinery. It not only deducted the entire cost, but gave even greater tax incentives for them to invest. Effectively, it failed: it made no difference whatever to the stalling levels of investment in plant and machinery in our economy. That has now been replaced.

[Craig Whittaker]

It is interesting to hear what the hon. Lady says about levels of investment in plant and machinery. From the point of view of my patch, Calder Valley, where we have 19.2% of people working in manufacturing, the super deduction has been a huge boost to manufacturing. Will the hon. Lady acknowledge the huge investment of £17.7 billion that has been achieved only this week by the Prime Minister’s trip to Japan? That is an amazing boost to our economy.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am glad that there are positive examples of investment, but what I am talking about is the macroeconomic levels, which demonstrate that we are not where we should be. Essentially, investment has “stalled”—that is the OBR’s word, not mine. That stalling is not disproved by individual examples of investment in particular places. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman and all the people who have been involved in doing whatever has happened in Calder Valley—no problem—but I am talking about the macroeconomic effects. The investment zone policy that we are discussing is presumably designed to kick-start investment in particular areas where the zones are marked out, which hopefully will create local prosperity. That is my understanding of what the Minister said.

Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con)]

The points that the hon. Lady makes are valid. Another valid point is this: while it is true that more people are paying tax, is it not also true that more people are earning a lot more money than they used to?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am all in favour of people earning more money, but it is important that they are doing so in in real terms. Someone can earn more money in terms that do not take account of inflation, but they can actually be earning less. If the right hon. Gentleman talked to people and asked them whether they were any better off than they had been when this series of Governments came into office in 2010, he would find that people’s nominal salaries and wages might be higher in some cases, but a lot of them are worse off in reality because those earnings have not kept up with inflation. The point about the tax burden and fiscal drag makes that much worse.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

If I may, I will answer the hon. Lady’s questions first. For the two schemes to work, we must help employers and employees to administer them and take advantage of them respectively. This is why we have made the changes that I set out.

We are mindful of the changes in the employment market that the hon. Lady described, and we looked very carefully at the gig economy. The issue is that many workers in the gig economy are not employed for tax purposes, so they fall outside the scope of EMI. Extending eligibility to the self-employed would go beyond the aims and objectives of EMI, because it is about employees having not just an earned income interest, but a full share investment in the business for which they work. There are complexities here, but we are mindful of how the modern economy is taking shape. That is why we will be launching a call for evidence shortly on non-discretionary share schemes, which are open to all employees of companies that opt in. I encourage her and others to participate in that call for evidence when it is launched.

The hon. Member for Ealing North asked about compliance, and he will know that HMRC takes compliance very seriously. Indeed, we have increased funding for compliance activities across the board. We want to ensure not only that officers can deal with particular forms of tax evasion or criminal activity, but that they can offer results across the board. I know that the answer will come to me shortly, but I commit to writing to the hon. Gentleman if it does not fall upon my shoulders before I sit down. I am very willing to take questions or interventions from any colleague on this matter, particularly from colleagues on this side of the House, because we fundamentally believe in entrepreneurship and capitalisation. We believe in spreading prosperity and wealth across the workforce, so it is not just the business owners but the employees that must profit.

[Craig Whittaker]

Before my time in this place, I worked for the Dixons stores group in retail. I remember how valuable the share options were to us—they were available to all employees. In fact, Dixons stores group was such a great company to work for that it often gave us free shares. On one occasion, it helped to pay for a very luxurious family holiday. Does the Minister agree that all the Government can do is to facilitate legislation to enable good employers to keep such things going? Skin in the game, as we used to say, is of as much value as money. Feeling part of the company is just as important.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend, who had a very successful business career before he was rightly elected to this place. He makes a really interesting point about spreading the benefits and how they do not just need to be financial, as he says. They can also be about career development. I recently visited John Lewis on Oxford Street. Although it has a different model of—

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Great. Unless there are any further questions from Members or our witnesses have anything particular to say that they have not said—I see no indication that that is the case—I thank our three witnesses very much indeed for their time before the Committee. Their evidence will be useful in our deliberations over the next couple of weeks, when we will consider the detail of the Bill. I call the Whip to move the motion to adjourn.

[The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury (Craig Whittaker)]

I beg to move—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Q I am sorry to interrupt—it is a very dangerous thing to interrupt a Whip—but Ms Childs has one more comment to make.

Charlotte Childs: Apologies, but while I have this audience I want to touch quickly on the industrial relations model that we have in place at Hinkley Point. The benefit that it is creating for the workforce there could be transferred to Sizewell C, and amendments could be made to the Bill to entrench that within the process. We have a joint project board set up at Hinkley Point B, and the unions have an influential voice within it. A committee was also set up on site to deliver results for our members in industrial relations and health and safety, and we are putting agreements in place for the terms and conditions of those building the plant, and agreements are under discussion for those who will be operating the plant once it is finished.

It would be prudent for those who make the decisions to make amendments that require the nuclear company, as it were, to recognise established sector trade unions, and to embed union access—or the requirement for union access—into the Bill, not just for the client and the tier 1 contractors, but for second and third-tier contractors, as we have on the HS2 project. The nuclear company should have regard to the security of its supply chain, and figures on UK content should be published.

The access that we have on Hinkley Point has created an environment where the GMB in particular is able to have really in-depth discussions with the client and tier 1 contractors on things such as equality and diversity and inclusion. We are currently working on projects to encourage women into the construction sector at Hinkley Point and to create an environment that will be welcoming and encouraging to women who want to come into the sector. Given the skills gap the construction sector currently faces and is heading towards, it is important that that work is done with both employer and trade unions to ensure that we get that right for the workforce. While I had the floor, I wanted to suggest that union access was put into the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 185, in clause 48, page 43, line 3, leave out from “determination” to end of subsection (4) and insert

“determinations mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) are to be reviewed by the Multi-Agency Assurance Panels, who will have the power to overturn the determinations made by the competent authority.”

This amendment seeks to introduce Multi-Agency Assurance Panels at the reasonable grounds stage and will enable them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I both congratulate and commiserate with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his rapid promotion this morning to take forward an incredibly important piece of legislation. I wish him all the very best with the rest of the week.

Amendment 185 seeks to build upon the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and introduce multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, as well as enabling them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority. That would ensure that multi-agency scrutiny is applied at the first stage, offering an important safeguard. Multi-agency assurance panels were part of a range of reforms to the national referral mechanism that were announced in 2017, following the NRM review commissioned by the Home Secretary in 2014. A recent review provided key recommendations, such as establishing new multidisciplinary panels headed by an independent chair, with a view to replacing the decision-making roles of UK Visas and Immigration and the UK Human Trafficking Centre with a single competent authority.

At present, there is multi-agency scrutiny only of negative conclusive grounds decisions, which, even then, is limited, with panels having the power only to ask the single competent authority to review a decision, as opposed to overturning it. A recent review of the national referral mechanism multi-agency assurance panels conducted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group found that

“at present, MAAPs do not adequately assure NRM decision-making”,

the reasons for which include that there is

“no multi-agency involvement in the reasonable grounds stage of the NRM, undermining confidence that there are any checks on bad decision-making at this first stage”.

The report also pointed to

“MAAPs lack of decision-making powers”

and times at which

“the evidence reaching the panels is minimal and of poor quality”.

The amendment applies those recommendations and highlights that, as the reasonable grounds stage is effectively the gateway to all anti-trafficking support, an extra level of safeguarding should be available to ensure good decision making. Both the amendments tabled to clause 48 are necessary to ensure that we are not turning our back on victims and restricting opportunities for individuals to refer into the NRM and receive the support they need. The measures have been widely endorsed across the sector and seek to introduce examples of best practice. I therefore strongly hope that the Minister will join us in endorsing these changes.

The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)

-

It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Roger, but not particularly in this role. However, as always, it is a pleasure to be sitting on a Committee that you are chairing.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her valuable contribution on this point. Decision making is of course central to our ability to support possible and confirmed victims of modern slavery. That is why, throughout the Bill, as she will know, we have discussed ways for that to be done as quickly and fairly as possible. It is in that vein that we have sought to clarify the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds thresholds in primary legislation, to support that effective decision making. It is also why we are committed to reviewing the guidance that under- pins the reasonable grounds test to ensure that it best supports that.

Central to that work is the premise that the reasonable grounds decision should be made quickly. Currently, where possible, that is within five working days of referral to the national referral mechanism. That timeline enables us to quickly identify possible victims and ensure that they receive the appropriate support that they need. All decision makers receive robust training to support that process, and any negative reasonable grounds decisions will be reviewed by a second caseworker or a manager/technical specialist to ensure that all decisions taken are in line with the policy. An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may also request reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority where there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with the policy, or if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case.

At the conclusive grounds stage, we already have a process whereby negative decisions are considered by those multi-agency assurance panels. That process is set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We believe that that is the right place for the process, enabling us to adapt it in future to changing needs. To put in place the duty for multi-agency assurance panels to review all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions would cut across that approach. It is not appropriate for that to be set out in primary legislation, as amendment 185 seeks to do, as that would remove the ability to change such a process to appropriate bodies and needs in the future.

Moreover, the amendment would add a new power whereby multi-agency assurance panels can overturn competent authority decisions, rather than the current approach of asking the competent authority to review a decision in specific circumstances. It is right that only designated competent authorities have a decision-making role. The current approach supports a culture of continuous improvement.

As I have set out, we do not believe that primary legislation is needed here. The current multi-agency assurance panels have been subject to an evaluation, and we will consider the conclusions and lessons learned in due course. If in the future we wished to consider multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, or to change their remit, it would follow that that, too, would be a question for guidance.

Although I presume not intentionally, the amendment would also remove the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery. That is the current test that is applied, in line with our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.

Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)

- - Excerpts

Does the Minister agree that decision making in such circumstances is made very difficult by the fact that many people who are victims of modern slavery will not declare that because it is part of the deal with the people traffickers, and many people who claim to be victims of modern slavery are not victims but are using it as a way of getting their asylum claim accepted?

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He is right that one of the key points in the process is that decision makers have the ability and the training to know what they are looking for to identify whether people are victims of modern slavery.

Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is stepping in as Minister, but he just said that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby was right in his assertion that many of those who claim to be asylum seekers are not. Could he remind us of the Home Office statistics on that issue?

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.

It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. Last week, I was speculating about how long the Immigration Minister might be in post, but I was still shocked. Seriously, we all pass on our best wishes to him for a speedy recovery. I congratulate the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his temporary promotion.

On the whole, we have stayed out of debates on the clause, despite having lots of sympathy for what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, has been saying. The clause largely applies only to England and Wales—distinct legislation is in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, one part of the clause amends the “Interpretation” section of the 2015 Act and that does extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. With the amendment, we are just posing some questions for the Minister. I appreciate that it is not easy for him to answer in these circumstances, so anything in writing afterwards would be more than acceptable.

Under the 2015 Act “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as applying to people who are victims of those respective crimes in the first couple of sections of that part of the legislation. That seemed a logical, straightforward and consistent way of doing things—define the criminal offences and then set out support regimes for victims of those offences. I have heard no complaint that that definition causes problems, but clauses 48 and 57 of the Bill—to which my amendments relate—will use a different definition of modern slavery.

The new definitions do not totally supplant the existing definitions of victims of modern slavery or trafficking in the 2015 Act, but they add a new and potentially different definition for the purposes of identification and support of the victims. The question therefore arises as to why we should have one definition of a victim for some purposes, but another for the purposes of identifying those to be supported? If there is to be a different definition, why is it not on the face of the Bill? Why is it, somewhat bizarrely, left to the Secretary of State to define in regulations what must be two of the most fundamental concepts for the purposes of this part of the Bill?

We do not know how the Secretary of State will use the powers, so that is another question for the Minister: what is the intention? It could be that she wants to be generous and to adopt a wider definition for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims and survivors. In line with other provisions of the Bill, however, it could be that she wants to be more restrictive and to confine the category of people who can get support to a much narrower group. If Parliament really wants to be back in control, it should not be allowing the Government to pass legislation such as this. I simply ask the Minister for an explanation as to why it has been done in this way.

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his questions. Basically, he asked whether we are amending the definition of modern slavery, and the straightforward answer is no.

To underpin the measures in the Bill, we are creating a power to make regulations to define the meaning of “victim” in accordance with our ECAT obligations. The definition of a victim of slavery or trafficking for the purposes of the Bill will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why we are raising thresholds as such. As I said before, the proposed measure in this Bill will amend the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act so that it mirrors some of our ECAT obligations. Alongside this, we are reviewing the reasonable grounds test and the corresponding guidance for decision makers to ensure they are best able to identify genuine victims and reduce the potential for non-genuine victims to misuse the system.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his answer. I have made the point I need to make, which is that it is not appropriate to leave it to regulations to define these two fundamental concepts. I am sure this is something that will be pursued in the House of Lords. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I will be brief, because I fully endorse what the shadow Minister has said. I absolutely welcome the fact that the measure will be in statute, but I share her concern and astonishment that the Government have decided, for no apparent reason, to reduce the prescribed recovery period to 30 days. Yes, that is consistent with the trafficking convention, but equally so is 45 days. There is nothing in the convention to say that it cannot be done and, for all the reasons she outlined, that was a welcome additional safeguard in the UK’s approach.

What is the Home Office driving at here? What signal does it send by making this change? As the shadow Minister pointed out, it is completely artificial, given where we are with average decision times. In one sense, this is just about sending signals. What a signal it sends—that we want to reduce the support given to folk who are suspected of being victims and survivors of trafficking. I support the amendment and endorse everything that the shadow Minister said.

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. Let me see if I can answer some of their questions. Basically, there is no need to amend clause 49 to provide a 45-day recovery period as that is already provided for in guidance. The guidance is the statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where victims will still receive a 45-day recovery period unless disqualifications apply.

The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until

“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”

In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.

With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.

On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his response. We have seen this approach at previous stages of the Bill. The Minister cites the realities of processing times, but the fact that it is 45 days in the statutory guidance shows why the Bill is an absolute nonsense and does not make the first bit of sense. We should ignore it and trust the guidance. There is a commitment to driving down the processing times anyway. I hope that the Minister can therefore see why the amendment was tabled. On that basis, I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I support the amendment and join the calls for the clause not to stand part of the Bill. I very much echo the comments of the shadow Minister. Like her, and as on previous occasions, I find myself not at all clear why the clause is necessary, and what problem it is driving at. Again, I find myself asking for evidence. I have not seen or heard about an issue with abusive additional trafficking claims sparking extra NRM recovery periods. I recognise that that could absolutely happen in theory, but we need much more by way of evidence before we enact such a clause.

Even though someone might be describing earlier events of trafficking, disclosure of that additional information and trafficking or slavery histories could have all sorts of significant implications for that survivor. It could, for example, mean a break from a controlling partner. It could give rise to other dangers for them or to new trauma. Furthermore, as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has noted, survivors can feel more able to disclose their trafficking experiences relating to one particular form of exploitation than another, so forced labour can sometimes be disclosed earlier than sexual exploitation, due to feelings of shame or mistrust.

The fact that if the competent authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case another recovery period can be granted is better than nothing, and it is good that that provision is in the clause, but that protection needs to be considerably strengthened to ensure that those who need it will have it. As matters stand, we have no idea how that analysis is going to be undertaken. What if the disclosure of this new information leads to new dangers or new trauma? Surely we would all agree that that should require a new decision and a new recovery period, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that that would definitely happen.

Perhaps the clause should be reversed—the Home Office might want to consider turning the presumption around, so that we assume instead that a new recovery period would be needed unless we are satisfied with a very restricted route for a very restricted range of reasons, and the reasonable grounds decision should not occur. The Home Office needs to explain its thinking here.

Finally, on the issue of trafficking, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham are conducting research on that subject at this very moment in time. I urge the Home Office to wait to see the evidence, rather than jumping in with two feet.

Craig Whittaker

-

I would first like to clarify that the clause does not prevent individuals who have been re-trafficked from receiving a further recovery period. Rather, the clause introduces a presumption against multiple recovery periods where an individual has already benefitted from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism and period of support. This is not a blanket disqualification from multiple recovery periods; it is focused on removing the presumption for multiple recovery periods where the period of exploitation happened before the original recovery period was provided.

The clause will provide further recovery periods where required—for example, where an individual has a second referral for an incident that happened before the first incident for which they were referred and have already received a recovery period. It may not be appropriate or necessary to provide the further recovery period. A discretionary element is included, underpinned by guidance, so that cases are considered on an individual basis.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I put to the hon. Gentleman the suggestion I made towards the end of my contribution: that he reverses the situation so that the presumption is that somebody does need an additional recovery period unless there are specific circumstances that mean it is not appropriate. Is that something he could pass on to his ministerial colleague, for when he takes the Bill forward?

Craig Whittaker

-

As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.

Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for that contribution. I have been consistently concerned by the lack of provision for children and young people within the clauses before us. With that in mind, I will not be withdrawing amendment 180.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I rise to support the amendment and to make the case for the removal of the clause. The amendment is absolutely right, and excluding any survivors, especially children, from the scope of the clause will alleviate its worst impacts. The whole clause is bad.

Unlike with previous measures, it is absolutely apparent what the Government are driving at this time, but there is already a perfectly good procedure for dealing with this issue. Guidance implementing the European convention on action against trafficking says that where there is an improper claim of victim status, or there are public order grounds for doing so, the state can make a negative conclusive grounds decision and decide not to observe the reflection and recovery period. That remedy is available right now. How many times has that remedy been used in the United Kingdom? I hope the Minister can answer that, now or later.

The Home Office wants to go much further and help itself to a different remedy. Despite Home Office claims, nothing in the convention justifies simply failing altogether to make a conclusive grounds decision. On the contrary, article 10 of the convention requires states to identify victims, and that position is recognised in the Home Office’s guidance. That is why the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has expressed, as we have heard, serious concern about the compatibility of the clause with ECAT—they just are not compatible. The measures will not only breach international obligations, but they will be counterproductive in the fight against trafficking and slavery.

We have already heard one or two of the case studies provided by the commissioner. I will add one more, from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It relates to the case of Z, who was trafficked to the UK after being used for prostitution in Europe for a number of years. Her child had been removed from her by the traffickers. She managed to escape from the traffickers in the UK, and used a false document that she grabbed during her escape, as she wanted to go back to Europe to find her child. She was arrested and prosecuted for a document offence and given a sentence of more than 12 months after being advised to plead guilty. Trafficking was never explored as part of the criminal process. Later, Z was referred to the NRM and claimed asylum. The Home Office agreed that she was a victim of trafficking, and she was then given leave to remain on that basis. It also agreed not to pursue deportation because of her trafficked status.

After Z was referred to the NRM, a decision still had to be made about whether she was a victim of trafficking. The Home Office ultimately decided to grant her leave to remain and halt deportation, having been required to make that decision. Had the clause been in force, Z would never have been identified as a victim of trafficking; she would have been deported. That would have been absolutely dreadful for Z, who would have lost out on support and help that she clearly needs for her recovery, but it is also dreadful for many others, because it will clearly make it infinitely more difficult to track down Z’s traffickers. They will not be apprehended, and other people will fall victim to the very same crime, as is shown by the other case studies provided by the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, and by the commissioner in her letter to the Home Secretary.

In short, people who need support will be denied it, and the perpetrators of the crimes against them will not be caught and punished. As we have heard, the clause will simply encourage traffickers to target those who have criminal convictions and who are sentenced to more than two at once, and even compel them into criminal activity precisely so that the exclusions will apply to them if the trafficker threatens to disclose their crimes. We have heard from the commissioner that that is already the traffickers’ modus operandi—excuse me; my Latin is terrible. The reason is that traffickers know that the absence of support and removal from the country will make it easier for the trafficker and their colleagues to avoid justice. The clause is, in essence, a gift for people traffickers, and it totally undermines the work of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

I will briefly mention some other problems. The commissioner has rightly expressed concern about the huge breadth of offences that would be caught by the provision, particularly as it includes sentences imposed outside the UK that might not reflect sentencing guidelines in the UK; that could mean that minor offences are brought within scope. Will the Minister confirm that trafficking victims who enter the UK in breach of clause 37 of the Bill would end up in prison, possibly for even three or four years, and would therefore be excluded from support? A huge proportion of survivors will be left with the threat of exclusion from support hanging over them, putting them in even more vulnerable position.

Why is the expression “bad faith” used in the clause, rather than the convention’s wording or the wording of the guidance that the Home Office has put in place, which relate to “improper purpose”? The use of a different form of words needs to be explained. Why is it that in some cases, suspicion of certain offences, rather than an actual conviction, is enough for exclusion? The key point is that if we do not identify victims, neither do we identify traffickers. In breach of the convention, the clause expressly provides for that, so it should be amended.

Craig Whittaker

-

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked whether the clause is incompatible with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. The answer to that question is no, it is not incompatible at all with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is a criminal offence, but clause 51 of the Bill is a very separate system. Section 45 is separate from the public order disqualification. A section 45 defence is not applicable to the serious crimes set out in schedule 4 of the Bill. The Government will of course continue to work with local authorities to safeguard children and take their particular vulnerabilities into account on a case-by-case basis.

I will just highlight one or two points that piggyback on the back of what the Government are doing in this field. The hon. Member for Halifax mentioned county lines, and we have invested in specialist support for the under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. We also fund a missing persons safe call service—a national, confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation—and the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. There is also a public awareness campaign that started in September, which is called Look Closer. What I would say to the hon. Member for Halifax is that the public order grounds for disqualification are set out in ECAT, in which it is envisaged that the recovery and reflection periods will be withheld—

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

That wording is absolutely right. It is possible for the recovery period to be withheld, but the convention absolutely does not allow for a decision to be made on public order grounds. It is absolutely contrary to article 10 of the convention. Does the Minister have anything that can help him with that point?

Craig Whittaker

-

As I have already explained, such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Regardless of whether they are children or vulnerable people, it is important that all aspects of the individual’s case are taken into account, such as whether they have been exploited and to what extent.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I do not want to make life difficult for the Minister, because I know he is in a very difficult situation, but the point is that it will not happen on a case-by-case basis, because decisions will not be made at all. As a result of the clause, people will just be excluded altogether from having a decision made about them. The point is that there is no case-by-case basis. It is an absolute blanket, and huge swathes of people will just not have a decision made about them, with no assessment made of whether they might be a victim of trafficking.

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank the hon. Member for his further intervention. I will take some advice on the technicalities in what he says, but that is not my understanding of what the clause says. I have already said that the decision to withhold recovery periods on public order grounds will be made on a case-by-case basis. That will balance the need to safeguard exploited individuals against public protection concerns and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the protections of the national referral mechanism, where the particular circumstances of an individual mean it is appropriate to do so.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

In light of the fact that the Minister is asking for the amendment to be withdrawn and given his understanding that decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, can the Minister tell us if the guidance that goes with the legislation will set out the exemptions and the process by which cases will be decided on an individual basis, and if there will not be the blanket exemption that is the Opposition’s understanding?

Craig Whittaker

-

Of course we will fully assess the issues in policy guidance. The hon. Member is exactly right that it will be set out in policy guidance, to ensure that due account is taken of the circumstances, so that any permitted actions, including prosecutions, are proportionate and in the public interest. It is right that the Bill seeks to target ruthless criminal gangs who put lives at risk by smuggling people across the channel.

The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. As we have heard from the interventions made by hon. Members, the case studies before us mean that we have grave concerns about clause 51. The assurances that the Minister has sought to make do not overcome some of the barriers that clause 51 will put in place.

I look forward to hearing more detail about the Children’s Society projects that the Government are funding and the Look Closer campaign, which I very much welcome, but, as things currently stand, this is much more of a blanket exemption than the Minister has tried to suggest. The very broad public order definitions in the Bill go beyond the intention that he has tried to explain, so once again I am concerned that children will be particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of clause 51 if unamended, so I am minded to press amendment 164 to a division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

The amendments seek to incorporate our international legal obligations under ECAT within the provisions of support available to victims during the recovery period, as well as extending statutory support for those who have received a positive conclusive grounds decision.

Having already discussed the changes to the recovery period in our discussion of clause 50, I will not repeat myself, but it is important to consider these amendments alongside the provisions in clause 50. We share the concerns of Christian Action, Research, and Education, or CARE, which has worked with us on amendment 4, that clauses 52 and 53 have the potential, if they remain unamended, to

“make matters worse for victims”.

Amendment 2 would update the definition of the reasons for providing a recovery period as solely to harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question,”

and replace it with the requirement to assist a person

“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their retrafficking.”

Therefore, amendment 2 would put into the Bill the wording of article 13 of ECAT, which provides support

“necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”.

The British Red Cross has highlighted that

“making support dependent on specific ‘harm’ caused by the ‘conduct’ that led someone to be identified as a victim, fails to recognise the reality of human trafficking”.

The Home Office’s own research from 2017 says that

“unlike most crimes, which are time-limited single events, modern slavery is a hidden crime of indeterminate duration”—

in that it involves multiple locations and individuals. Therefore, amendment 2 better reflects the Home Office’s own assessment of the nature of human trafficking.

Amendment 4 seeks to set out the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery. Colleagues will be aware that presently neither the Modern Slavery Act 2015 nor the Bill includes such a provision, and therefore amendment 4 would fill a significant void in the legislation. The types of assistance and support include a range of provisions, such as safe accommodation, medical advice, a support worker, access to translation services, counselling, and assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation.

Amendment 4 is a practical and reasonable measure, and one that we hope will provide a sense of certainty and security to support survivors as they move towards recovery and towards justice, as confidence in the process grows, which will foster trust between agencies and victims, and enable more perpetrators to be brought before the courts. The types of assistance defined are basic provisions that victims should be entitled to if they are to rebuild their lives.

Building upon this idea of defining assistance, amendment 3 would offer long-term support to survivors with a positive conclusive grounds decision, stipulating that the Secretary of State must also secure assistance for at least 12 months, beginning on the day that the recovery period ends.

Given that there is no mention of statutory support after a conclusive grounds decision, amendment 3 seeks to correct another considerable omission from the Bill. In 2020, the Centre for Social Justice said:

“Long-term support is a further significant gap in the support system. In recent years a number of reports have concluded that the lack of long-term support puts victims of modern slavery at risk of homelessness, destitution and even re-trafficking after they exit the NRM support provision. It also has a significant negative impact on their engagement with the criminal justice system”.

This approach has broad support, as these amendments would build upon the recommendations made by the Work and Pensions Committee in 2017, which stated that

“There is very little structured support for confirmed victims once they have been given a ‘Conclusive Grounds’ decision...We recommend that all victims of modern slavery be given a personal plan which details their road to recovery, and acts as a passport to support, for at least the 12 month period of discretionary leave.”

Similar measures were also incorporated in the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by Lord McColl of Dulwich, which awaits its Second Reading in the House of Lords. That Bill was greatly welcomed across the human trafficking sector and by all parties.

To summarise the case for amendments 2, 4 and 3, they are vital in expanding support for victims, and can boast wide support. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on their merits.

On clause 52 more broadly, we welcome the fact that support for victims in England and Wales is being placed on a statutory basis during the recovery period, but this change is undermined by the limitations on support, and the decision to reduce the minimum recovery period from 45 to 30 days under earlier clauses. The clause introduces provisions for assistance and support only

“if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary”

for recovery, mental health and wellbeing purposes, and crucially only if the recovery is from harm caused directly by the trafficking.

In the explanatory notes, the Government state that the intention behind the clause is to implement the UK’s ECAT obligations under article 13 to provide a recovery period to potential victims of modern slavery, but that is not really what has been included in the Bill. The explanatory report on ECAT says that articles 12 and 13 are

“an important guarantee for victims and serve…a number of purposes.”

This wording emphasises the “guarantee” of support, and its serving different purposes. By contrast, the clause narrows the scope of the recovery support received solely to support needed as a result of harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit claims that as a result, the clause will

“create a huge evidential burden on survivors, in demonstrating that their recovery needs are linked to their experiences of having been trafficked”.

It adds that the clause will also

“necessitate an increase in the number of medico-legal reports that the Competent Authority will be required to consider.”

To summarise, the clause has the potential to further disqualify victims from support entirely. It has nothing at all to offer a person who had physical and mental needs before being trafficked—needs that may have been a factor in them having been targeted by criminal gangs. It risks trapping victims in an endless cycle of exploitation, which will undermine our ability to identify victims and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. For these reasons, the clause should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank the hon. Lady for raising important issues around the support and assistance offered to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Support for potential victims is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by this horrendous crime and reducing the risk of their being re-trafficked. We are agreed on the importance of placing the entitlement to support in legislation, which is what the clause will do. Our intention in our drafting was to provide victims with certainty about the circumstances in which support is provided through the NRM; we know that is imperative in aiding their recovery. To this end, we have sought to put in clause 52 that support will be provided where

“it is necessary for the purpose of assisting the person receiving it in their recovery from any harm to their physical and mental health and their social well-being arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

Amendment 2 would restrict this support to where it was needed for a victim’s

“physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”

This provides less clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision makers, reducing the clause’s effectiveness in supporting victims. Our approach is not to do as amendment 4 suggests and go into detail in the clause on the types of support provided, but to instead do that in guidance. The reason is twofold: it provides us with the flexibility to tailor support to victims, and to ensure that we are able to amend the guidance and support as our understanding of victims’ needs changes.

After entering the NRM, potential victims are entitled to access a wide range of specialist support services to help them rebuild their lives. This includes safe house accommodation, financial support, and a social worker to assist with access to services including, but not limited to, health care, legal advice and translation services. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims’ ongoing recovery needs are assessed, and a clear plan is tailored to their specific recovery needs to help them transition out of support and back into a community, where this is possible. Confirmed victims’ recovery needs are assessed to ensure that the overall support package provided through the modern slavery victim care contract is specific to the individual. This needs-based approach ensures that the Government provide targeted and personalised support to victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives.

As I have outlined, the details of the types of assistance and support that can be provided already exist in the modern slavery statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Bringing this detail into primary legislation, as amendment 4 seeks, is not appropriate and would create a fixed, blanket approach to support, making it harder to adjust our approach in the future and tailor to victims’ individual needs as our understanding of trauma develops. Amendment would also necessitate that assistance and support may be provided only with the consent of that person. As children are not necessarily able to offer their consent in an informed way, the amendment may—unintentionally, I am sure—exclude children from the provision.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister said earlier that the tailored plan would support someone until they move back into the community. Can he confirm that that support will be provided whatever setting the person is living in, not only to those who happen to be in a detention centre or accommodation centre, for example?

Craig Whittaker

-

I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for his response. He paints a picture of the NRM that I do not think would be recognised by those working with it on the frontline. We heard testimony from those within the NRM that it was not clear that they were even in it, because it was not clear what provisions or support they were receiving. I wish it was the case that the description and the offer of support that he outlines were there in reality.

The Minister says the discretion within the Bill is necessary in order to facilitate going further and doing more, but we know that discretion is also used to offer less than we think is appropriate for victims who require that support. We will continue to argue and make the case for amendments 2, 3 and 4, but in the interests of time, we will simply vote against clause 52 in its entirety. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I want to say a few words in support of the amendments, which have the SNP’s full support. Currently, while someone might be in limbo for a long time, they are more secure the day after their referral into the NRM than they are the day after they receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, and that is not right. If they have been accepted as a survivor of trafficking, it makes them less secure. We should move towards a period of automatic leave to remain. The provision of leave is often an absolute prerequisite for meaningful recovery. With some security of status, the ability to seek employment or education and participate in the community builds confidence and stability, and the amendments broaden the number who will achieve that stability.

We also absolutely agree that there are problems regarding consistency between article 14 of the trafficking convention and current Home Office guidance. That is what amendment 5 would fix, so we support it. The convention speaks of allowing leave where necessary, given a survivor’s personal situation, and the explanatory report to the convention refers to issues around safety, their state of health, and the family situation or similar. The Home Office guidance calls for a much broader, individualised human rights and children’s safeguarding legislation-based approach, which seeks to protect and assist a victim and safeguard their human rights. Decision makers are to assess whether a grant of leave is necessary to meet the UK’s objectives under the trafficking convention and to provide protection and assistance to that victim owing to their personal situation. The current guidance is therefore closer to the convention than what is in this Bill.

The clause considerably reduces the scope of article 14 and the idea of a personal situation by adopting wording from the totally different article 12 and not offering any justification for that. The purpose and aim of leave to remain is recovery first in the host state if a survivor seeks that before any further upheaval is forced on them. That helps a survivor, and it helps us with law enforcement. It is also the only realistic way that they will be able to seek redress through compensation from those who exploited them. Pursuing such compensation from abroad just does not happen in practice.

Putting emphasis on the possibility that protection might be offered in the survivor’s home state, as the clause does, risks undermining a proper analysis of the personal circumstances as a whole and risks putting survivors back to square one and at risk of re-trafficking. Crucially, watering down the current position will mean fewer survivors remaining here or being in the best position to work with law enforcement authorities to bring the perpetrators of these awful crimes to justice. Again, that is dreadful news for survivors, but dreadful news for all of us as the perpetrators will escape punishment and other people will become the next victims. We support these amendments and call on the Government to explain why they do not just adopt the wording of article 14 of the European convention.

Craig Whittaker

-

The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.

In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister is right: a huge number of organisations welcome the specific leave to remain on these grounds. Perhaps he could tell us the average length of time that it takes to prosecute gangs on these specific circumstances and whether it is the Government’s intention to protect anyone who has been trafficked for the entire period of the case in order to prevent them from being intimidated if they are outside the UK and in their country of origin, for want of a better term.

Craig Whittaker

-

The hon. Gentleman will know from his own experience that that is done through the criminal justice system in this country. If any victim or any person needs to be taken into any form of witness protection, that will be done via the courts. You may want to come back in.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

But I am asking very specifically about the circumstances in clause 53(2)(c), where the Government are offering leave to remain on these specific grounds. Is it the Government’s intention that that leave to remain is extended for the period of any case involving the individual who is believed to have been trafficked?

Craig Whittaker

-

As I have said, each individual case will be considered on an individual, case-by-case basis. That is why the measure is written the way it is—so that decision makers can make individual decisions, based on individuals’ needs and support.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

Shall I try it the other way round?

Craig Whittaker

-

You can try it whichever way you like.

The Chair

Order. I have been trying not to interrupt the Minister, but “you” is me.

Craig Whittaker

-

Sorry, Sir Roger.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

Let us try it the other way round. Can the Minister confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to end leave to remain during criminal proceedings if that could mean that someone is forced to leave the UK and could be at risk of intimidation in another country?

Craig Whittaker

-

As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.

Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.

With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual

“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

But the point is that “personal situation” is the wording in the convention and it is also the wording in the Home Office’s own guidance, and I do not understand it to have created problems for the Home Office up to this point. The problem is that this Bill is narrowing the scope of the circumstances that will be taken into account when considering this.

Craig Whittaker

-

The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

Could the Minister provide some statistics to help us—I do not expect him to have this to hand, but perhaps he can respond in writing—on the average length of these cases, the number of people granted leave to remain who were believed to be victims of traffickers and the average length of the leave to remain they granted? Those would be useful statistics for the Committee and for the House ahead of Report.

Craig Whittaker

-

I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.

The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.

Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as

“the person’s wishes and feelings”,

which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.

We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.

I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.

I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.

For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister, once again, for his contribution. In the interests of time, I will seek to move amendment 189 formally as, once again, I am not satisfied that the appropriate provisions for children have been recognised. I will gently make the point that statutory guidance has been referred to so often as the place where we would look for further detail on how the Bill would actually affect people’s lives that it would have been diligent to produce the statutory guidance at the same time as the Bill. That would have given Members the ability to really scrutinise it in full.

With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Craig Whittaker

-

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 53, page 48, line 10, leave out “reasonable” and insert “conclusive”.

This amendment corrects a drafting error.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

Craig Whittaker

-

The Government have tabled a minor amendment to subsection (9) of the clause to reflect that a grant of leave comes after the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the reasonable grounds decision. Subsection (9) has therefore been amended to provide that the relevant exploitation for the purpose of granting leave under subsection (2) of the clause means the conduct resulting in the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the positive reasonable grounds decision. This corrects a minor drafting error.

I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I have heard the Minister’s opening remarks on clause 53 stand part. Only 11% of confirmed victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2020 received discretionary leave. I therefore ask the Minister to make it clear how an individual’s need for leave will be judged under the criteria in the Bill, and to provide us with clear evidence on how he believes that clause 53 is in keeping with the ECAT obligations.

As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,

“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 53, as it stands, shows that the Government are only cherry-picking at parts of ECAT to satisfy their agenda, rather than adopting article 14 in its entirety. On that basis we cannot support the clause.

Craig Whittaker

-

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked how the clause is compatible with ECAT, and where is the certainty. This measure will clarify in primary legislation the obligations set out in article 14 of the European convention on human rights, and clarify the policy that is currently set out in guidance. This confirms that victims of all ages, including children, who do not have immigration status will automatically be considered for temporary leave. A grant of temporary leave to remain for victims of modern slavery does not prohibit them from being granted another, more advantageous, form of leave, should they qualify for it. It continues to be the core principle of the approach to modern slavery—

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

The Minister refers to a piecemeal approach to extending leave—and extending leave—and extending leave. That is preventing victims from moving on with their recovery, from trusting the agencies and from establishing relationships that will lead to the prosecutions that we all hope for. Since he says that further extensions are likely, could we not reflect on more significant periods of leave being given in a single grant?

Craig Whittaker

-

I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

I think the Minister is suggesting that there would be variation in the lengths of leave provided. Can he set out that it is the Government’s expectation that there would not be a minimum, bog standard six months that everyone is given, and that there will be quite considerable variation in the periods provided?

Craig Whittaker

-

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention asking for clarity. He is absolutely right; decisions will be made on the basis of individual needs. I can understand where the word “piecemeal” comes from, but the reality is that if an individual’s mental and physical health and wellbeing support needs mean that those periods need to be extended, the individual highly trained decision maker will have the ability to extend the period.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister is again saying extend, rather than grant for the necessary period. Coming back to the criminal prosecution case, it is very unlikely that the case will be heard within six months. It will not even get to court within six months, let alone be heard. Is it the Government’s expectation that someone will be protected with a period of leave that covers a court case? Will the individual decision maker have access to the average statistics on the time it takes to hear a case of this nature?

Craig Whittaker

-

I do not think that the decision maker will need the statistics on the average timescale for a decision. What they will need to make a decision is the individual person’s history and needs, which is what they will use throughout the process. If they need six months, they will get six months. If they need longer than that—whether for a court case or other circumstances —that is intended to be allowed for the individual.

There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 55 stand part, as announced by Sir Roger at the end of the morning sitting.

The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)

-

Identifying and supporting victims at an early stage is a key part of the Bill, and the new one-stop process. To underpin that process, clause 54 provides for legally aided advice on the national referral mechanism to be provided to individuals who are already receiving legally aided advice on an immigration or asylum matter. The additional advice will be free to the individual.

The provision of legally aided advice under the clause will help the individual’s lawyer to provide holistic advice on the individual’s situation as a whole, looking at the range of protection-related issues, including modern slavery. Advice under the clause will additionally help to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery at an earlier stage. Potential victims of modern slavery will be able to understand what the NRM does and able to make an informed decision as to whether to enter it and obtain the assistance and support provided under it.

The Government are firm in our commitment to identifying and supporting all victims of modern slavery. The clause seeks to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the NRM at the same time as they are receiving advice on an asylum and immigration matter, which will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and supported.

Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)

- - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. Clause 54 amends the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to enable advice on referral into the NRM to be provided as add-on advice where individuals are in receipt of civil legal services for certain immigration and asylum matters. Although I and many other colleagues welcome the fact that the Government have recognised the importance of legal aid as part of the process, we argue that legislating for it only as an add-on misses the opportunity to extend access to all those who would benefit from it—I include the Home Office as one of the main beneficiaries of people having access to proper advocacy and advice from an early stage.

In England and Wales, 63% of the population do not have access to an immigration and asylum legal aid provider, due simply to a lack of provision—what is known as a legal desert. Where there are providers, many are operating beyond capacity. Sadly, it is therefore commonplace for support workers to be unable to find lawyers for clients who are victims of trafficking.

It is not reasonable to expect vulnerable victims to be able to navigate the system without legal representation. It is vital that this is provided at the earliest stage possible. As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out:

“The provision of legal aid to individuals who seek redress is not simply a matter of compassion, but a key component in ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice, itself inherent in the rule of law and an essential precondition of a fair and democratic society. Failure to provide it can amount to a breach of fundamental rights under the common law and/or the European Convention on Human Rights.”

We believe victims deserve better than what is set out before us in the Bill. The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has highlighted how the single competent authority is currently sending out template witness statements as a guide for how they should be prepared. They warn of the legal implications of the document even in the absence of a lawyer. That is unacceptable. I am sure the Minister agrees that it would make for an improved system with more integrity and fewer errors—the very sort of system he proposes—if a broader approach to legal aid was adopted.

It is also fair to argue that access to legal aid remains somewhat of a postcode lottery, with many outside London and the south-east experiencing difficulties in accessing legal assistance. I take this opportunity to highlight the great work of the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit in attempting to widen access, having developed an online referral system for support workers to simplify the process for sourcing legal aid representation. However, it should not fall to organisations such as ATLEU to plug the gaps in the system. We wish to see improved access through this clause.

Similarly, the Government state in the explanatory notes to the Bill that clause 55 is designed to provide an add-on to legal aid on referral to the NRM if the victim has been granted exceptional case funding and is being advised in relation to the claim that their removal from or requirement to leave the UK would breach the Human Rights Act 1998. That means that clause 55 does not provide a route to pre-NRM advice for those who are not already in receipt of legal aid via the scope of another matter, and therefore does not provide free legal aid pre-NRM for all trafficking cases.

In scrutinising these measures, we have worked closely with the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which I thank for having been so generous with its expertise, as I know it is for MPs right across the House, and for providing real-life examples that demonstrate the scale of the issue. It said:

“We assisted the pro bono department of a non-legal aid law firm when they helped a potential survivor apply for exceptional case funding—ECF—in August 2020. The funding was requested in order to provide advice on an NRM referral and associated immigration advice. This application was refused. A request to review the decision was refused. A decision on a second review is pending a final decision from the Legal Aid Agency. One ground of refusal at first review stage was that no decision had yet been made to remove the individual as they had not come forward to the authorities, and if a decision to deport or remove a client from the United Kingdom is made, an application for ECF could be made at that stage. The application remains undecided 13 months after the original submission.”

The system is a mess, Minister. It is the Opposition’s view that free legal aid and advice for potential victims of slavery and trafficking in the UK pre-NRM should not be limited to cases with existing immigration and asylum aspects. Only then will the Government’s offer of legal advice on referral to the NRM work in practice. In summary, the proposals contained within clauses 54 and 55 do not fully address the existing shortcomings in the system—another missed opportunity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56

Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Craig Whittaker

-

The trafficking directive—the directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims—was adopted by the UK on 5 April 2011. The Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—is the principal international measure designed to combat human trafficking. The trafficking directive is intended, in part, to give effect to ECAT. ECAT’s objective is to prevent and combat trafficking by imposing obligations on member states to investigate and prosecute trafficking as a serious organised crime and a gross violation of fundamental rights.

Following the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but ECAT remains unaffected. Therefore this Government intend, by means of clause 56, to disapply the trafficking directive in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in the Bill. That will bring legislative certainty to the Bill and how its clauses will apply. It will also provide further clarity to victims about their rights and entitlements.

The Government maintain their commitment to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, as part of the world-leading NRM. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and ECAT, which sets out our international obligations to victims, remain unaffected, as do the UK’s obligations under article 4 of the European convention on human rights.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on clause 56. The explanatory notes on the clause state that, as the Minister has just outlined,

“the Trafficking Directive should be disapplied in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in this Bill.”

There are some substantial and quite technical inconsistencies here that need to be worked through, and to do so we have had to enlist legal expertise from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit and others, so I thank them all for their service.

The trafficking directive is part of a suite of measures designed to combat the crime of trafficking. The EU has introduced several legislative measures to strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking, including the 2011 EU directives on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims of trafficking.

I turn first to the heading of clause 56—“Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive”. Subsection (1) refers to

“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”,

which saved the trafficking directive in domestic law, so that it continued to have effect on or after the UK left the EU at the end of December 2020. However, it has the opposite effect, by stipulating that any

“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from the Trafficking Directive”

that were saved cease to apply,

“so far as their continued existence would otherwise be incompatible with provision made by or under this Act.”

Therefore, our primary concern about clause 56 is that the power to disapply the rights derived from the trafficking directive will cease the rights and remedies available to victims generally as a matter of domestic or EU law that continues in force in the UK.

The world’s largest group of modern slavery researchers, Rights Lab, has argued:

“After eight years of the government’s general position being that the rights under the Trafficking Directive were already in domestic law, the choice to legislate now in the Nationality and Borders Bill—to reduce and restrict rights and entitlements through Part 4 of the Bill—and the presence of the express power to disapply them in the event of an incompatibility with the Bill in Clause 56 is concerning. The government should instead ensure that rights under the Trafficking Directive continue to apply in UK law, by incorporating it, and further, it should incorporate ECAT in domestic law and end the fragmented approach to victim identification, protection, and support.”

The clause will also threaten the Government’s ability to combat the perpetrators of human trafficking, as it will further undermine the response to criminal justice and the rights of victims of trafficking as victims of crime in the victims of crime directive and relevant codes of practice. Additional concerns have been voiced in relation to the rights under the NRM of victim identification and support and non-penalisation. For example, article 8 of the directive provides for the non-prosecution or non-allocation of penalties to victims, and requires the UK to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to any of the acts referred to in article 2.

Therefore, that directive is clearly threatened by clause 56 and other provisions of part 1 of the Bill, including clause 51, which I appreciate is precisely why this Government want to disapply it. However, I am afraid that that is just the wrong judgment call.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible—

Craig Whittaker

-

I am not sure whether the hon. Member is aware that the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his intervention. We are into the thick of the legal technicalities. These points are from some of the leading legal experts on the subject. They are not entirely satisfied that clause 56 is compatible, and that we are not missing some of the protections that have been hard fought for, with good reason.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible with the UK’s legal international obligations and will have far-reaching consequences. For that reason, it should not stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Jonathan Gullis

- - Excerpts

Of course—absolutely. Young people should not be placed in a situation like that, for safety reasons. As a former teacher, I would not want a 14 or 15-year-old to be somewhere they felt unsafe. The problem is that we have a broken asylum system that needs fixing. Age assessments can be avoided if people do not try to enter the country illegally, but come by safe and legal routes, where we can have documentation.

There are other ways to prove someone’s identity, age and application, as we have done in Afghanistan and Syria, which will ultimately be a much better system than having illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel from Calais and entering this country illegally. They are putting a huge strain on the public services of our country and on the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, whose area is the fifth largest contributor to the asylum dispersal scheme.

Age assessment is absolutely essential. It is another way of reminding people that if they make an illegal entry into this country they will face a number of procedures to verify the credibility of their asylum claim, their identity and their age, in order to ensure we protect our country’s young and vulnerable people. It is the right and proper thing to, and I fully applaud the Minister on pushing this essential clause.

Craig Whittaker

-

Let me start with amendment 150. I would say to the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that his amendment applies to all aspects of age assessments, not only the use of scientific measures. As such, it is extremely broad, although I do not know if that remains his intention.

The Home Office takes its statutory duties towards the welfare of children very seriously. The current age assessment system is desperately in need of reform. We have heard many reports from local authorities about the prevalence of adults posing as children and claiming services designed for children, including accommodation, education and social care. This poses significant risks to the welfare of genuine children in our care system and undermines the integrity of the immigration system. Equally, we need to safeguard vulnerable children from being placed in adult services, although I am not sure I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield Central when he said that this is headline grabbing.

We must do everything in our power—whatever that is—to safeguard children, including vulnerable and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

Holly Lynch

- - Excerpts

The Government were less enthusiastic about protecting children under part 4 of the Bill.

Craig Whittaker

-

I do not think that deserves a response because I do not believe any Member of the House, wherever he or she sits, would advocate that we leave children vulnerable in the system.

One measure we look to pursue is the use of scientific methods, as has been said. Assessing someone’s age is an incredibly difficult task. It is only right that in this complex and sensitive area we seek to improve and expand the evidence base on which decisions can be made. We are aware there are ethical concerns around the use of certain scientific methods for age assessment, which is why new clause 32 includes a number of changes to the Bill to ensure proper safeguards are in place for those who are asked to undergo a scientific age assessment.

First, the Secretary of State may only specify a scientific method of age assessment in regulations once she has sought scientific advice and determined that the method in question is appropriate for assessing a person’s age. I expect that scientific advice to also cover related ethical considerations. Secondly, a scientific method of age assessment will not be performed unless the appropriate consent is given by or on behalf of the individual on whom the method is to be performed. We will be as transparent as possible about the nature and consequences of the specified method where consent is required once an appropriate method has been identified. Thirdly, where a person has reasonable grounds for refusing to undergo a scientific age assessment, they will not be required to undertake one. That decision will not then count against them.

Existing regulatory frameworks already govern the safe and ethical application of various technologies and they could be employed to assess age. The use of ionising radiation, for instance, is highly regulated by the Justification of Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Regulations 2004, which require a demonstration that the individual or societal benefits of their use outweigh any health detriments. I can assure hon. Members that the Government will comply with all relevant regulatory frameworks in relation to the scientific methods chosen.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

The Minister is outlining what he sees as safeguards. I am unconvinced. New clause 32(9) seems to say that nothing prevents the use of a scientific method, even if it is not specified in regulations and so on, if the decision maker considers it appropriate and, where necessary, consent is given. Given that there are implications if consent is not provided, that surely rides roughshod over all the other protections that the Minister just outlined.

Craig Whittaker

-

I will come on to that when I discuss further measures in new clause 32, but our opinion is that the amendment is not necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw it. On the new clauses, clause 58 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses of introduction, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provision on age assessment. New clauses 29 and 35 are intended to replace clause 58 entirely.

Before I touch on the other clauses, regarding new clause 32, we have already said that determining a young person’s age is an inherently difficult task. One of the questions posed earlier was how we do that as a comparator between other young people growing up in less well-developed countries. Under current arrangements where an individual’s age is disputed, local authorities must already undertake an age assessment. That typically involves two appropriately qualified social workers undertaking a series of interviews with the young person and taking into account any other information that is relevant to their age. However, even where those assessments are conducted thoroughly and reach reasoned conclusions, they are fraught with difficulty, as one would imagine. Such assessments can have a wide margin of error. We are aware of cases where a Merton-compliant age assessment, as they are called, has been conducted on the same individual by different social workers and has come to very different conclusions about the person’s age. Given that context, the use of scientific age assessments represents an additional and important source of evidence to help decision makers in a difficult task, allowing them to better come to accurate judgments. At the end of the day, that is our aim.

Various scientific methods of age assessment are already in use across most European countries, and have been for several years. In Finland and Norway, which I mentioned earlier, radiographs are taken to examine development of the teeth and the fusion of bones in the wrist. Two certified experts perform the age assessment and must jointly agree on the person’s age. In France, X-rays are taken to examine the fusion of the collarbone, alongside dental and wrist X-rays. In Greece, dental X-rays are used alongside social worker assessments.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

What are the experts comparing with? My question is, will they be comparing the bone density or whatever with that of children of the same age in the UK, knowing that the development of children from other parts of the world is very different, or will they have a database of comparable images of the skeletal system—whichever part they are using—from each of the other countries? Is that something that is happening at the moment, or will they just be compared with UK-based children?

Craig Whittaker

-

I suspect that the answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that how that is assessed will be down to the individual scientific advice given on the individual case at the time. I cannot see a like-for-like comparator for a child from Ethiopia or Sudan, which was mentioned earlier, being a child in this country. That is why the scientific evidence is a much more accurate way of assessing. It can be a great tool in the arsenal of assessing a child when compared with our existing system, which is the Merton assessment by two individual social workers. Given the challenges of assessing an individual’s age, we see no good reason why such technologies should not also be used. In all good faith, this is one of several tools in the arsenal. To further enhance my answer to the question asked by the hon. Lady, the precise scientific method of assessment will be specified in regulation, following scientific advice.

We are also making it clear within new clause 32 that a decision maker will be able to draw a negative credibility inference if an individual refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without reasonable grounds. The introduction of any scientific method would be entirely undermined if someone who was asked to undergo such an assessment could simply refuse to co-operate. By legislating to develop our own scientific age assessment capability, we hope to emulate best practice across Europe and to ensure that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are provided with the care they are entitled to in a safe environment.

Let me turn to the rest of the amendments in the group before I answer some of the questions. Amendment 168 is consequential on new clauses 32 and 33. It provides that the regulation-making powers in the clauses are commenced automatically two months after Royal Assent.

The purpose of new clause 29 is to define an “age-disputed person” and to set the parameters to whom the age-assessment clauses apply. It clarifies the meaning of a number of terms, including “age-disputed person”, “immigration functions”, “immigration officer” and the respective definitions of “local authority” in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause also defines the meaning of “relevant children’s legislation” across the four nations of the United Kingdom.

New clause 30 relates to the establishment of a decision-making function in the Home Office, referred to as the national age assessment board, or the NAAB, as I think the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate referred to it. The NAAB will have responsibility for conducting age assessments of age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority or another public authority specified in regulation. Where an age-disputed person is referred to the NAAB by a local authority, the NAAB assessment will be binding on both the Home Office, in relation to immigration functions, and the local authority when determining access to children’s services. Alongside new clause 30, new clause 31 relates to the establishment of the NAAB. While most NAAB age assessments will be conducted on referral from a local authority, the new clause stipulates that the NAAB may, in certain situations, conduct age assessments on age-disputed persons for the sole purpose of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State should exercise any immigration functions.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

Will the Minister say a little bit more about the NAAB? Who will be appointed to it, how will it generally undertake assessments and how will its independence from the Home Office be ensured?

Craig Whittaker

-

I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will answer him before I finish answering the other questions, if indeed I can find the answer in my book.

I have covered new clause 32 quite extensively. New clause 33 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations about the way in which age assessments are to be conducted under the provisions in new clauses 30 and 31. It will provide the Secretary of State with the power to provide more clarity on what a comprehensive age assessment should entail, including, where appropriate, existing elements of age assessment case law. It will be mandatory for local authorities and the Secretary of State to follow these requirements when conducting age assessments. New clause 34 provides for a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal for an age-disputed person who has been subject to age assessment. In considering an appeal, the tribunal will be able to consider any evidence it deems relevant. It will determine the age of the age-disputed individual and assign them a date of birth.

New clause 35 provides clarity in a number of areas related to the appeal of an age assessment decision. First, a person who brings such an appeal must do so while they are here in the United Kingdom. If they leave the United Kingdom before the appeal is finally determined, the appeal is discontinued. Secondly, the clause provides for the appellant to apply to the tribunal for an order. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the local authority must exercise its function under children’s legislation as if the person is the age they claim to be. Where an age assessment has been made and the individual has not brought an appeal, or has concluded the appeal process, new clause 36 provides a mechanism for them to make further representations to a decision maker where they have new evidence to submit in support of their claimed age. That covers all the specific parts of the new clauses.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate asked me about hotel accommodation. In cases involving a child, local authorities obviously will have obligations to look after them. For adults, hotels are not detention centres, and adults are not held their against their will. There is a duty of care on the local authority when someone is placed there; it is required to give wraparound care for that individual, particularly for children. I cannot really see children being placed there by themselves, but I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about where there is an issue around age. Somebody could slip through the net, but the local authority would be required to give wraparound care.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked about the devolved Administrations. As part of the consultation earlier this year, we engaged with the devolved Administrations and have had conversations about some of the detail of the new clauses, and we intend to continue to do so in the coming weeks. I hope that helps to answer his question.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

The Minister may be about to pre-empt me, but I do not think he has answered the questions raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in relation to the national age assessment board, so will he at least undertake to write to us on that issue?

Craig Whittaker

-

No, I have not finished yet. I am not quite ready to sit down, but I will answer that question. Basically, the board will predominantly consist of qualified social workers who, through being dedicated to the task of conducting age assessments and through training and the sharing of expertise, will achieve a more consistent and accurate approach to the task of age assessment. As Members have probably seen, such professionals are referred to as a “designated person” in the new clauses, and the board will have responsibility for conducting age assessments on age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority, as I said. Local authorities will retain the ability to conduct age assessments if they prefer to do so. If they believe that a person is actually the age they claim to be, they must inform the Home Office accordingly.

The hon. Member for Sheffield Central asked whether binding local authorities’ hands is just a power grab from central Government. The answer to that question is no. If local authorities wish to carry out their own assessments, they will be able to do so—without question, that will be the case. On that basis, I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s observations. To be fair, he made a good fist of defending the indefensible, but he failed to answer the concerns expressed by me and the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in relation to the way that subsection (9) of new clause 32 drives a coach and horses through all the reassurances that we have been given. His criticism of the amendment as being a bit broad and involving quite a lot of work fails to acknowledge how narrow it is. It would simply require the Secretary of State to take advice before making regulations, and I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

We welcome the reviews included under new clause 10, but they are not sufficient, and the powers under new clause 9 are too wide. Again, they give far too much power to the Secretary of State. It seems that nothing is off limits. The new clause encompasses three themes recurring in the Bill: first, too much power to the Secretary of State; secondly, not enough regard to international relations; and thirdly, closing down one of the few safe and legal routes, unless the Minister can reassure me that refugee family reunion is not affected by the provision—I hope he can.

Craig Whittaker

-

Starting with amendment 151, I reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the penalties are there to encourage countries to co-operate. There is international precedent for countries to have the power to impose penalties on countries that do not co-operate on the matter of returns.

Both the United States and the EU have similar powers to those we are seeking. Recently, the Council of the EU decided to suspend temporarily the application of certain provisions in the visa code to nationals of The Gambia, owing to the country’s lack of co-operation on readmission of third-country nationals illegally staying in the EU. The new powers in the Bill will bring the UK into line with our international partners and ensure that we are no longer lagging behind other countries.

I assure hon. Members that, given talk of penalties and exemption, family reunion will be an exemption to the penalties, as discussed.

Turning to amendment 151, I can assure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the power to impose visa penalties will be exercised only after consideration of the potential economic impact on the UK, and with full agreement across Government. Contrary to the hon. Member’s assertion that there is another Government leak, there is no current list: this will be done on a case-by-case basis, based on the impact across areas such as the economy, but also taking each Department into account. I also draw the hon. Member’s attention to new clauses 9 and 10, which—as we have already touched on—set out those visa provisions in more detail. I feel that this is a fairly straightforward part of the Bill, with no need for the hon. Member’s amendment.

Turning to new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80, a key function of the Home Office is the removal of individuals who have no legal right to be here, either by deportation or administrative removal, usually to the country of which they are nationals. We expect our international partners to work with us, as they expect us to work with them, to remove such individuals, as the UK does where our own nationals in other countries should not be in those countries. This is a critical component of a functioning migration relationship, and the vast majority of countries co-operate with us in this area. However, a small number do not.

As has been said, new clause 9 is designed to give the Government the power to impose visa penalties. Countries should no longer expect to benefit from a normal UK visa service if they are unwilling to co-operate with us on the matter of returning nationals. We will be able to slow down or suspend visa services for that country, and require applicants to pay a surcharge of £190 when they apply for a UK visa. Specifically, new clause 9 sets out when a country may be specified as unco-operative and the factors that will be taken into account when imposing visa penalties. Additionally, the new clause provides detail on the types of penalties that may be applied. It is a critical step in taking back control of our borders.

Briefly turning to new clause 10, visa penalties are intended to be a matter of last resort, and must not be in place longer than necessary. The new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the application of visa penalties every two months and revoke those penalties if the relevant country is no longer unco-operative. This provision is a safeguard to ensure that any visa penalties applied do not remain in place by default. Government amendment 80 is consequential on new clauses 9 and 10, providing that they will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

I commend new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80 to the Committee, and by your leave, Ms McDonagh, I request that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central withdraw his amendments.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

I was reassured by the commitments on family reunion, and I look forward to the Government’s bringing forward an amendment on that topic, perhaps in the House of Lords. I have taken the Minister’s other comments on board, so I will not press this amendment to a vote at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 59 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 60 disagreed to.

Clause 61

Special Immigration Appeals Commission

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to consider Government new clause 11—Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

Craig Whittaker

-

Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.

Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.

The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.

That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.

The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.

The sector has long expressed concerns about the powers and procedures of SIAC, but the Government are seeking to extend the powers even further. It follows that the wider escalation of the Home Office power in the Bill, which will have a devastating consequence for vulnerable people, will also provide the lead for others to promote and encourage similar draconian measures in their immigration and asylum systems. We are opposed to new clause 11, because it will significantly expand the powers of SIAC and put British citizens—and other people who have or seek an entitlement to enter, reside or remain in the UK—at risk of being excluded from the UK or of being treated as having no right to be here.

Craig Whittaker

-

Let me address a couple of points. Basically, the hon. Gentleman is asking whether SIAC involves a further erosion of civil liberties. The direct answer to that is no—if anything, it is quite the opposite. New clause 11 allows the specialist court the ability to consider all evidence relied on to ensure that cases may be both brought and properly defended. In addition, the special advocate system, the disclosure procedure used in such hearings and other safeguards are designed to provide individuals with substantial measures of procedural justice in their difficult circumstances when, in the public interest, material cannot be disclosed to them directly.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 62

Tribunal charging power in respect of wasted resources

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.

We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for

“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.

This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.

The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.

Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.

All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.

In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.

In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.

Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.

Craig Whittaker

-

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I echo what the shadow Minister said. This is all really political theatre—a move to get immigration lawyers. As a former immigration lawyer, I cannot let these clauses pass without comment. In my experience, immigration lawyers are a group of people who do an invaluable job, and not one that there is a queue of folk desperate to do. It is a difficult job. Most clients have no resources; legal aid budgets are far from easy; many clients can be communicated with only through interpreters, who are often hard to find; and these lawyers are dealing with facts, circumstances, documents and other evidence from jurisdictions thousands of miles away. The pressures can be enormous. These lawyers are acutely aware that in some cases, if they get things wrong, the client’s life, liberty or human rights are at serious risk.

This group have been egregiously maligned by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. Here, they are singled out again. It is wrong, reckless and counter- productive. It is wrong because, not for the first time, we are being asked to make law on the basis of anecdote, rather than detailed evidence. As has been said, the immigration tribunals have all the powers that they need in their case management, cost and referral powers. They do not need these new, distinct and very controversial powers. Given the difficult job that we recognise these lawyers do, and the significant pressures that they face, the very last thing we should do is create a threat of their having to pay money for taking on a case. As the shadow Minister said, the measures create the risk of a conflict of interest, because solicitors could find that doing the right thing for their client, or following their client’s instructions, puts them at risk of having to pay a financial penalty.

The measures are also wrong because immigration lawyers have been singled out. I would have thought alarm bells would be ringing in the Home Office at the idea of putting in place a procedure that will apply only to lawyers operating on behalf of non-nationals. I suspect this would see the Home Office in court again. I could go along to the immigration tribunal and do something that I might do without facing consequences in the social security tribunal, employment tribunal, tax tribunal or any other tribunal; but I would find that in the immigration tribunal, there were special provisions in place for me to pay some sort of financial penalty. That seems odd.

Speaking of the tax tribunal, the provisions are essentially a tax. We do not know how much the tax will be, because we are not given any indication at all of the nature of the penalties involved, but it is a tax, because it is not compensation to the other party for wasted costs—we already have provision for that. The money goes straight to the Exchequer. On the other side of the coin, if the Government representative is guilty of this misconduct, the Government pay themselves. They hand over money to the Exchequer. There is not equality of arms, by any stretch of the imagination.

As the shadow Minister said, the measure is also counterproductive, because when the conduct described in the new procedure rules occurs, we will end up with endless hearings, and solicitors will be repeatedly made to come to hearings, just to explain why the situation happened. That is a waste of time, and in absolutely nobody’s interests. I have no idea what the Home Office is playing at here, other than performing political theatre and again having a go at immigration lawyers. If hon. Members want an example of vexatious, unreasonable conduct, they should read these two clauses, because that is exactly what they are.

Craig Whittaker

-

I have already spoken on clause 62; let me comment on clause 63. I apologise, Ms McDonagh, but I did not realise we were taking them together.

Representatives and relevant participants in the legal process on both sides have a role in ensuring that appeals run smoothly so that justice can be served. However, there has been clear judicial concern about the behaviours of some legal representatives in immigration and asylum cases, and we are seeking to strengthen the tribunal’s ability to tackle such conduct. As has been mentioned, judges can already issue a wasted costs order when a legal representative acts in a negligent, improper or unreasonable way that causes legal costs to be wasted. The tribunal can also award costs if a party to the appeal has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings, which is called an unreasonable costs order.

Costs orders are rarely made and are generally considered only at the request of the other party. To encourage more use of those existing powers, clause 63 provides a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the immigration and asylum chamber, which will lead judges to more regularly consider making a wasted costs order or an unreasonable costs order, or the new tribunal costs order introduced by clause 62. That will ensure that circumstances and behaviours that have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours that have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. Those have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules, for example through abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 81.

Craig Whittaker

-

Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

Am I right that the Government will vote against the clause?

Bambos Charalambous

- - Excerpts

This might seem innocuous but my concern is that it may be a power grab by the Secretary of State because the clause contains some quite strong measures on what the Secretary of State can do in relation to other parts of legislation. Can the Minister reassure me that my fears are not borne out by the consolidation measures in clause 65?

Craig Whittaker

-

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

What is taken from that review is perhaps the need for consolidation of immigration legislation, nationality legislation and so on, which I would absolutely support. The challenge with the clause as drafted is that it proposes pretty huge and wide-ranging powers. The Secretary of State can amend pretty much any old Act of Parliament if, in her opinion, it facilitates what is otherwise desirable in connection with the consolidation. It could rewrite citizenship laws, for example, or the entire immigration system. There is a check on it in the sense that the regulations will not come into force until a consolidation Act is passed. There is a broader question about how often Governments tend to help themselves to massive Henry VIII powers when they rewrite all sorts of stuff. I have made that point a million times and nobody listens, so I will leave it at that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Extent

Amendment made: 120, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) A power under any provision listed in subsection (5) may be exercised so as to extend, with or without modifications, to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by any of the following provisions to legislation to which the power relates—

(a) section 37 (illegal entry and similar offences), insofar as it relates to the insertion of subsection (C1A) into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section(Electronic travel authorisations)(electronic travel authorisations);

(c) section(Liability of carriers)(liability of carriers).

(5) Those provisions are—

(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

(c) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment amends clause 69 (extent) to provide that the amendments made by the provisions listed in new subsection (4) may be extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the Order in Council provisions listed in new subsection (5).

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 186, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Scotland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Scottish Parliament, bringing it into force in Scotland.

(5) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Northern Ireland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Northern Ireland Assembly, bringing it into force in Northern Ireland.”

Under this amendment, Part 4 of the Bill would not enter into force in Scotland or Northern Ireland until the relevant devolved legislatures had given their consent.

I am sorry to have to take the Committee back to part 4 and modern slavery and trafficking. The amendment relates to a similar issue that I raised in connection with age assessments, because I tend to believe that certain provisions in part 4 encroach on devolved competences in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Given the way that the part 4 is drafted, the Government have recognised that modern slavery and trafficking is a matter that is devolved to both those jurisdictions. That is why certain clauses do not impact on them. However, in this amendment, we are suggesting simply that the Government should go further. For example, in my view, the recovery period is clearly within the competency of the Scottish Government and I think, also, the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, clause 49 interferes with the start and end points of that period. Clauses 46 and 47 trample all over the idea that identification of victims of slavery and trafficking are devolved matters. So too does clause 51. For those reasons, I am prompting the Minister on what engagement there has been and is ongoing and whether a legislative consent motion should be requested from the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly before the Bill is passed.

Craig Whittaker

-

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been engaging with the devolved Administrations, including at ministerial level, over the course of the Bill. I want to reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the devolved Administrations as we look to operationalise the measures to ensure the policies work for the whole of the UK. Contrary to the spirit of working together across the UK, amendment 186 could lead to the scenario where decisions in reserved areas would operate differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill seeks to provide for victims and decision makers. In line with the devolved memorandum of understanding, the UK Government will continue to engage with the devolved Administrations both at ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications and adhere to our priority to safeguard victims. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

On clause 69, I begin by setting out the devolution position. Almost all of the Bill is about nationality, immigration and asylum, which are reserved matters to the UK Parliament. Almost all of the Bill, therefore, extends UK wide.

Neil Coyle

- - Excerpts

The Minister says “almost all” the provisions. Can he outline which are not?

Craig Whittaker

-

It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.

Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for his assurances that engagement has been taking place and is ongoing. I accept that the amendment is not practicable, because it impinges on reserved matters. The other side of the coin is also true and this was about provoking a discussion about which parts of the Bill the Home Office has identified as relating to devolved matters. The Minister has listed some, which is helpful, but I do not think he has completely listed all that would apply and should be described as devolved. For example, age assessments quite clearly relate in some circumstances to devolved functions regarding children. More relevant to this amendment debate is modern slavery, as I said—for example, the length of the recovery and reflection period and various other matters in relation to identification of victims are, absolutely and definitely, devolved. That is why we have separate modern slavery and trafficking legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

I have done what I needed to do, which is to suggest that the Home Office has a look at whether a legislative consent memorandum is required, but I will leave it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Commencement

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

God loves a tryer, and I do try. The amendments are another attempt to encourage the Government to set out their legal thinking on the compatibility of the clauses cited in amendment 109 with the refugee convention. How do the Government think that the provisions in clauses 27 to 35 can be consistent with the refugee convention?

There is significant concern among some Members from all parties on this issue. So far, we have been told repeatedly by a Minister that the Government are committed to living up to their international obligations, and we have had a lot of assertions that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. However, as I have said, I am not aware of any lawyer with expertise in the area who supports that conclusion.

On the contrary, we have a detailed published opinion from Matrix Chambers that the Bill is absolutely not compliant with the refugee convention. Alongside that, organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and various others have come to the same conclusion. Crucially, the ultimate authority on the convention, the UNHCR, published detailed reasoning for its view that certain clauses do not comply with the convention.

In the circumstances, I might be asking a little too much to expect a detailed legal treatise from the Minister today. However, he must at least accept that this state of affairs is not good enough. On the one side, we have extensive published arguments that the Bill breaches the refugee convention and, on the other side, we just have assurances that everything is in accordance with our international obligations. If MPs are to make a properly informed judgment on this on Report and Third Reading, it is incumbent on the Government to provide their legal arguments in more detail.

Craig Whittaker

-

We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of amendments 107 to 109, which I will speak to collectively. I thank hon. Members for moving and tabling them, and I agree that it is important that the United Kingdom continues to meet its obligations under the refugee convention and other international conventions and treaties.

I am taking amendments 107 to 109 together because they all seek to achieve the same goal. We do not support them. They seek to delay the commencement of clauses 27 to 35 until their compatibility with the refugee convention has been consulted on and reported to Parliament. As the Committee knows, the UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations under the convention. I assure hon. Members that every clause in the Bill, including clauses 27 to 35, adheres to our obligations under the refugee convention.

There is no uniform international interpretation of many of the key concepts in the refugee convention. That is an inevitable result of the very nature of international conventions. They are designed to be applied to a range of systems and scenarios across the globe, and to achieve consensus between many signatory states. Each signatory therefore needs to interpret the convention based on a range of sources and information to determine its meaning in good faith. That is not a black-and-white exercise, but one that the Government considered carefully before bringing the Bill to the House and one that we have now entrusted to Parliament in its consideration and considerable scrutiny of the Bill.

The legislative process, in which we are all so engaged today, is in itself a transparent and fully consultative process, as demonstrated by the several reports that the Committee has received on the compatibility of several clauses of the Bill with the refugee convention and other international obligations—including from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Clauses 27 to 35 are drafted to create clarity on what the key concepts of the refugee convention mean, driving improved consistency among Home Office decision makers and the courts, with the ultimate aim of making accurate, well-reasoned decisions quicker. That can only be beneficial for all who are involved with asylum seekers.

In the light of the points that I have made, I hope that hon. Members will agree not to press these amendments going forward.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I have not succeeded in what I wanted to do, which was to move beyond assertion that there is compliance with the refugee convention and to hear a little more about why the Government think that that is the case. I accept the point that different countries have slightly different interpretations of certain provisions; that is legitimate. But there are clear arguments that what the Government are doing in relation to the evidential threshold, their definition of “particular social group” and, in particular, their total rewriting of article 31 on immunity from penalties is inexcusable and way beyond any margin of appreciation that Governments enjoy. I tried. I failed. I will accept that. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Craig Whittaker

-

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, after “Part” insert “and the following provisions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 77, 123, 191, 78 and 167.

Clause stand part.

Craig Whittaker

-

Amendments 76 to 78, which relate to clause 57—interpretation of part 4—will ensure that the regulation-making power in this clause will come into effect at Royal Assent to the Bill rather than two months after Royal Assent. This is to ensure that the regulations that will define “victim of slavery” and “victim of trafficking” have time to progress through Parliament and themselves come into force by the time the remaining clauses relating to modern slavery commence. As currently drafted, clauses 16, 17 and 23 come into force two months after Royal Assent. Amendment 123 ensures that these clauses, which relate to priority removal notices, come into force by commencement regulations aligning with other provisions relating to priority removal notices. This is to ensure that all provisions relating to priority removal notices can commence simultaneously.

Amendment 191 removes the commencement provision regarding clause 42, as the clause is intended to be replaced entirely by new clause 20. Amendment 167 removes the commencement provisions regarding marker clauses 58 to 61—about age assessments, processing of visa applications from nationals of certain countries, electronic travel authorisations and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—as these clauses have been removed and replaced by substantive clauses.

Clause 70 sets out the commencement of the clauses in the Bill. As currently drafted, the majority of the provisions in the Bill will be brought into force by regulations on a day appointed by the Secretary of State, with the exception of those in part 6, which commence on Royal Assent, as is usual, and those that come into force two months after Royal Assent.

Amendment 76 agreed to.

Amendment made: 77, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(a) section 57 (interpretation of Part 4), for the purposes of making regulations under that section;” —(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment brings the power to make regulations defining “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” into force on the day on which the Act receives Royal Assent.

Craig Whittaker

-

I beg to move Government amendment 121, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(b) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(1) and (5) to (7) (effect of failure to give notice of pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”

This amendment brings subsections (1) and (5) to (7) of NC19 (concerning the effect of a failure to give notice of a pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force on the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 122.

Government new clause 19—Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship—

Craig Whittaker

-

New clause 19 allows the Secretary of State to amend section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 to permit that in certain limited circumstances a notice of deprivation does not have to be given to the person concerned, either where there is no way of communicating with them or where to make contact would disclose sensitive intelligence sources. To deprive someone of British citizenship is very serious and is rightly reserved for those whose conduct involves very high harm or who obtained their citizenship by fraudulent means. However, it cannot be right that the proper functioning of the immigration and nationality system grinds to a halt because an individual has removed themselves from contact with the Home Office, there is otherwise no other method of communication, or because our knowledge of a person’s whereabouts comes from sensitive intelligence sources which we do not wish to disclose.

New clause 19 is therefore necessary to avoid the situation where we could never deprive a person of British citizenship just because it is not practicable, or not possible, to communicate with them. Preserving the ability to make decisions in this way is vital to preserve the integrity of the UK immigration system and protect the security of the UK from those who would wish to do us harm. However, we do not wish to deny a person their statutory right of appeal where we have made a decision to deprive, so the amendment also preserves that right. In cases where we have already made a decision to deprive but for one reason or another have not notified the person, the clause also ensures that such decisions, as well as the subsequent deprivation order, are still lawful.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I will not say too much, because I need to give new clause 19 further consideration and to speak with stakeholders about it. Circumstances in which service is difficult because a person is out of contact happen pretty regularly in legal disputes that go through the courts. Rather than just shortcutting by having no procedure at all, what happens is that an alternative method is proposed, such as displaying a notice in newspapers. That was back in the old days; I assume that things have moved online since the dim and distant past when I was a practising solicitor. I wonder if there is a better way that does not result in someone being deprived of citizenship—which, as the Minister said, is a very serious matter—without any procedure having been followed at all.

It is controversial to retrospectively decide that decisions to deprive people of nationality are fine, even though they may not have complied with the laws that were in force at that time. Although provisions of this sort are necessary, I still have concerns that the circumstances in which no service would be required are drawn too broadly and that there may be other ways of doing this that do not undermine the clauses, without depriving people of having notice altogether. I leave it at that just now.

Amendment 121 agreed to.

Amendments made: 122, in clause 70, page 58, line 36, at end insert—

“(za) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(2) to (4) (modifications of duty to give notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”.

This amendment brings subsections (2) to (4) of NC19 (modifying the duty to give notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Amendment 123, in clause 70, page 58, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment will secure that clauses 16, 17 and 23 of the Bill (evidence in asylum or human rights claims) will be brought into force by regulations rather than coming into force automatically two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 124, in clause 70, page 59, line 2, at end insert—

“(fa) section (Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry), for the purposes of making regulations;”.

This amendment brings NC20 into force, for the purposes of making regulations (under the new section 11B for the Immigration Act 1971), two months after Royal Assent to the Bill. The rest of the clause will be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 191, in clause 70, page 59, line 4, leave out paragraph (h).

This amendment is consequential on the amendment removing clause 42 from the Bill.

Amendment 78, in clause 70, page 59, line 5, leave out paragraph (i).—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

Craig Whittaker

-

I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 70, page 59, line 6, at end insert—

“(ia) section (Counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival) (counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival);”.

This amendment provides for NC12 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

The Chair

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 12.

Craig Whittaker

-

Under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through UK port and border areas for the purposes of determining whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism. Currently, officers may exercise schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area and their presence in such an area is as a result of them entering or leaving the UK.

The rise in numbers of those attempting to cross the channel illegally, particularly via small boats, means it is impractical to keep large numbers of people, some of whom are minors or in need of medical assistance, at a port or piece of coastline without adequate facilities. Transporting these individuals to locations once they have been detained or arrested under the immigration Acts often means that examining them under schedule 7 is not possible as they are no longer within a port.

New clause 12 seeks to extend the scope of schedule 7 so that individuals who are in detention under immigration provisions are eligible for examination at the location they are taken to following their initial apprehension under immigration powers. Individuals at these locations will be eligible for examination, provided the officer believes they arrived by sea, were apprehended under the immigration Acts within 24 hours of their arrival and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. The full suite of powers and safeguards under schedule 7 will apply, including access to legal advice for those detained over an hour. In line with amendment 79, the new clause will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The new clause will add a further layer to protect our national security by ensuring those who arrive in the UK illegally by sea can be examined for the purpose of determining their involvement in terrorist activity under the same power as if they had passed through conventional border controls.

Amendment 79 agreed to.

Amendments made: 167, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, leave out paragraph (j)

This amendment is consequential on the amendments removing Clauses 58 to 61 of the Bill.

Amendment 168, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) section (Interpretation of Part etc) (1) to (4) (interpretation of Part 3A);

(jb) section (Use of scientific methods in age assessments)(1) to (3) and (8) (regulations about use of scientific methods in age assessments);

(jc) section (Regulations about age assessments) (regulations about age assessments);”

This amendment means that amendment NC33 (regulations about age assessments), and the regulation-making power in amendment NC32, will be commenced automatically, two months after Royal Assent, as will the clause that defines certain terms used in the regulation-making power.

Amendment 80, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) sections (Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries) and (Visa penalties: review and revocation) (visa penalties);”

This amendment provides for NC9 and NC10 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 81, in clause 70, page 59, line 8, leave out paragraph (k) .—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 75.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 179, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

‘(5) Sections [Time limit on immigration detention], [Initial detention: criteria and duration] and [Bail hearings] come into force six months after the day on which this Act is passed.“

This amendment would bring NC38, NC39 and NC40 into force six months after the day on which the Bill is passed.

--- Later in debate ---

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and the other hon. Members involved for their work on that report, which was incredibly thorough. We then had a Backbench Business debate and the Government did not oppose it, because there was clearly a majority in the House of Commons at that time for such a time limit.

Finally, I want to say why 28 days should be the limit. There is a body of evidence that the effect of indefinite detention on mental health in general is very negative, but that after a month the deterioration is particularly significant. We recognise that there will be a minority of cases where people will try to play the system and use the time limit to frustrate lawful removal, but the amendment allows for re-detention if there is a material change in status or circumstances. Other sanctions are also open to the Government in such circumstances.

If none of that appeals to the Government, I will briefly mention the argument that consistently over half those detained are then released into the community, so it is a completely inefficient system that costs an absolute fortune. There are alternatives that are not only better for the individuals concerned, but easier on the taxpayer. I hope the Government will give serious thought to the amendments. The issue has been championed by Members of all parties for a considerable period. It is now time to see a step change in the Government’s approach to the use of immigration detention.

Craig Whittaker

-

I want to be clear from the outset that this Government’s position is that a time limit on detention simply will not work and will not be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be here in the UK leave.

Paul Blomfield

- - Excerpts

One of the issues highlighted by the report referred to by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, which had genuine cross-party engagement, was that the UK is an outlier in having no limits on detention. Every other country in Europe has a limit. Why does the Minister think it will not work here?

Craig Whittaker

-

Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Those who have no right to be in the UK should leave voluntarily, but where the opportunities to do so are not taken, we have to operate a system to enable us to enforce removal and deport foreign national offenders who would otherwise remain in the UK.

I also want to be clear that we do not and cannot detain people indefinitely. It is not lawfully possible to do so.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

The Home Office repeatedly asserts that it is not indefinite detention, but can the Minister tell me what is the definite time limit on a person’s detention?

Craig Whittaker

-

I think what the hon. Member has asked me to do is put a time limit on this, and I have already said clearly that just does not work. We have a duty to those in the immigration system, but we have a duty to protect the public too. The introduction of a 28-day detention time limit would severely limit our ability to remove those who refuse to leave voluntarily, and would encourage and reward abuse, to answer the question raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, in some cases from individuals who present a genuine threat to the public, which is not the effect I consider the hon. Members intend with new clause 38.

Anne McLaughlin

- - Excerpts

Does the Minister not think that if someone represents a threat to the public, they would be in jail? If they are not in jail, there is no evidence that they represent a threat to the public.

Craig Whittaker

-

The hon. Lady is absolutely right, but we are talking about those who are a threat to the public. We have to have a duty of care. In fact, the first role of the Government is to protect their own citizens.

New clause 38 would allow those who wish to frustrate the removal process to run down the clock, in answer to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, until the time limit is reached and release is guaranteed. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made simply to push them over the 28-day limit.

New clauses 38 to 40 are at total odds with the main objectives of the Bill, which will streamline the asylum process, ensuring that outstanding claims and appeals are dealt with much more effectively, with access to legal advice, while enabling us to remove more easily those with no lawful right to remain in the UK. In summary, it is the firm view of this Government that the introduction of a time limit would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a significant danger to the public. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

Stuart C. McDonald

- - Excerpts

I do not know where to start with that response, although it is very similar to those we have had in previous debates. The bogey card is always that foreign national offenders are a serious risk, yet the Government have the power to deport folk straight from prison. That is the power they should use in those situations.

What we are talking about, very often, is people who have committed no crime, or represent absolutely no risk to the public. They are detained for extraordinary periods of time, and face extraordinary hardship. Anyone reading the report by Stephen Shaw, commissioned by the former Home Secretary and former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), will see what it does to people. There is also the APPG report, which has already been referred to.

The idea that these amendments somehow undermine the Government’s ability to enforce immigration rules is completely at odds with the evidence from around Europe. Other countries have at least as much success—and often far greater success—in enforcing immigration rules and getting people to leave the country if they have no leave, without having to resort to endless and routine immigration detention. For all those reasons, I very much regret what we have heard from the Minister. However, I will not put the amendment to a vote today; we shall keep that for another time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Holmes.)

Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 185, in clause 48, page 43, line 3, leave out from “determination” to end of subsection (4) and insert

“determinations mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) are to be reviewed by the Multi-Agency Assurance Panels, who will have the power to overturn the determinations made by the competent authority.”

This amendment seeks to introduce Multi-Agency Assurance Panels at the reasonable grounds stage and will enable them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I both congratulate and commiserate with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his rapid promotion this morning to take forward an incredibly important piece of legislation. I wish him all the very best with the rest of the week.

Amendment 185 seeks to build upon the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and introduce multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, as well as enabling them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority. That would ensure that multi-agency scrutiny is applied at the first stage, offering an important safeguard. Multi-agency assurance panels were part of a range of reforms to the national referral mechanism that were announced in 2017, following the NRM review commissioned by the Home Secretary in 2014. A recent review provided key recommendations, such as establishing new multidisciplinary panels headed by an independent chair, with a view to replacing the decision-making roles of UK Visas and Immigration and the UK Human Trafficking Centre with a single competent authority.

At present, there is multi-agency scrutiny only of negative conclusive grounds decisions, which, even then, is limited, with panels having the power only to ask the single competent authority to review a decision, as opposed to overturning it. A recent review of the national referral mechanism multi-agency assurance panels conducted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group found that

“at present, MAAPs do not adequately assure NRM decision-making”,

the reasons for which include that there is

“no multi-agency involvement in the reasonable grounds stage of the NRM, undermining confidence that there are any checks on bad decision-making at this first stage”.

The report also pointed to

“MAAPs lack of decision-making powers”

and times at which

“the evidence reaching the panels is minimal and of poor quality”.

The amendment applies those recommendations and highlights that, as the reasonable grounds stage is effectively the gateway to all anti-trafficking support, an extra level of safeguarding should be available to ensure good decision making. Both the amendments tabled to clause 48 are necessary to ensure that we are not turning our back on victims and restricting opportunities for individuals to refer into the NRM and receive the support they need. The measures have been widely endorsed across the sector and seek to introduce examples of best practice. I therefore strongly hope that the Minister will join us in endorsing these changes.

[The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Roger, but not particularly in this role. However, as always, it is a pleasure to be sitting on a Committee that you are chairing.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her valuable contribution on this point. Decision making is of course central to our ability to support possible and confirmed victims of modern slavery. That is why, throughout the Bill, as she will know, we have discussed ways for that to be done as quickly and fairly as possible. It is in that vein that we have sought to clarify the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds thresholds in primary legislation, to support that effective decision making. It is also why we are committed to reviewing the guidance that under- pins the reasonable grounds test to ensure that it best supports that.

Central to that work is the premise that the reasonable grounds decision should be made quickly. Currently, where possible, that is within five working days of referral to the national referral mechanism. That timeline enables us to quickly identify possible victims and ensure that they receive the appropriate support that they need. All decision makers receive robust training to support that process, and any negative reasonable grounds decisions will be reviewed by a second caseworker or a manager/technical specialist to ensure that all decisions taken are in line with the policy. An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may also request reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority where there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with the policy, or if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case.

At the conclusive grounds stage, we already have a process whereby negative decisions are considered by those multi-agency assurance panels. That process is set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We believe that that is the right place for the process, enabling us to adapt it in future to changing needs. To put in place the duty for multi-agency assurance panels to review all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions would cut across that approach. It is not appropriate for that to be set out in primary legislation, as amendment 185 seeks to do, as that would remove the ability to change such a process to appropriate bodies and needs in the future.

Moreover, the amendment would add a new power whereby multi-agency assurance panels can overturn competent authority decisions, rather than the current approach of asking the competent authority to review a decision in specific circumstances. It is right that only designated competent authorities have a decision-making role. The current approach supports a culture of continuous improvement.

As I have set out, we do not believe that primary legislation is needed here. The current multi-agency assurance panels have been subject to an evaluation, and we will consider the conclusions and lessons learned in due course. If in the future we wished to consider multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, or to change their remit, it would follow that that, too, would be a question for guidance.

Although I presume not intentionally, the amendment would also remove the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery. That is the current test that is applied, in line with our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that decision making in such circumstances is made very difficult by the fact that many people who are victims of modern slavery will not declare that because it is part of the deal with the people traffickers, and many people who claim to be victims of modern slavery are not victims but are using it as a way of getting their asylum claim accepted?

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He is right that one of the key points in the process is that decision makers have the ability and the training to know what they are looking for to identify whether people are victims of modern slavery.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is stepping in as Minister, but he just said that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby was right in his assertion that many of those who claim to be asylum seekers are not. Could he remind us of the Home Office statistics on that issue?

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.

It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

[Holly Lynch]

I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. Last week, I was speculating about how long the Immigration Minister might be in post, but I was still shocked. Seriously, we all pass on our best wishes to him for a speedy recovery. I congratulate the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his temporary promotion.

On the whole, we have stayed out of debates on the clause, despite having lots of sympathy for what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, has been saying. The clause largely applies only to England and Wales—distinct legislation is in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, one part of the clause amends the “Interpretation” section of the 2015 Act and that does extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. With the amendment, we are just posing some questions for the Minister. I appreciate that it is not easy for him to answer in these circumstances, so anything in writing afterwards would be more than acceptable.

Under the 2015 Act “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as applying to people who are victims of those respective crimes in the first couple of sections of that part of the legislation. That seemed a logical, straightforward and consistent way of doing things—define the criminal offences and then set out support regimes for victims of those offences. I have heard no complaint that that definition causes problems, but clauses 48 and 57 of the Bill—to which my amendments relate—will use a different definition of modern slavery.

The new definitions do not totally supplant the existing definitions of victims of modern slavery or trafficking in the 2015 Act, but they add a new and potentially different definition for the purposes of identification and support of the victims. The question therefore arises as to why we should have one definition of a victim for some purposes, but another for the purposes of identifying those to be supported? If there is to be a different definition, why is it not on the face of the Bill? Why is it, somewhat bizarrely, left to the Secretary of State to define in regulations what must be two of the most fundamental concepts for the purposes of this part of the Bill?

We do not know how the Secretary of State will use the powers, so that is another question for the Minister: what is the intention? It could be that she wants to be generous and to adopt a wider definition for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims and survivors. In line with other provisions of the Bill, however, it could be that she wants to be more restrictive and to confine the category of people who can get support to a much narrower group. If Parliament really wants to be back in control, it should not be allowing the Government to pass legislation such as this. I simply ask the Minister for an explanation as to why it has been done in this way.

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his questions. Basically, he asked whether we are amending the definition of modern slavery, and the straightforward answer is no.

To underpin the measures in the Bill, we are creating a power to make regulations to define the meaning of “victim” in accordance with our ECAT obligations. The definition of a victim of slavery or trafficking for the purposes of the Bill will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why we are raising thresholds as such. As I said before, the proposed measure in this Bill will amend the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act so that it mirrors some of our ECAT obligations. Alongside this, we are reviewing the reasonable grounds test and the corresponding guidance for decision makers to ensure they are best able to identify genuine victims and reduce the potential for non-genuine victims to misuse the system.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thank the Minister for his answer. I have made the point I need to make, which is that it is not appropriate to leave it to regulations to define these two fundamental concepts. I am sure this is something that will be pursued in the House of Lords. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. Let me see if I can answer some of their questions. Basically, there is no need to amend clause 49 to provide a 45-day recovery period as that is already provided for in guidance. The guidance is the statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where victims will still receive a 45-day recovery period unless disqualifications apply.

The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until

“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”

In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.

With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.

On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister for his response. We have seen this approach at previous stages of the Bill. The Minister cites the realities of processing times, but the fact that it is 45 days in the statutory guidance shows why the Bill is an absolute nonsense and does not make the first bit of sense. We should ignore it and trust the guidance. There is a commitment to driving down the processing times anyway. I hope that the Minister can therefore see why the amendment was tabled. On that basis, I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I support the amendment and join the calls for the clause not to stand part of the Bill. I very much echo the comments of the shadow Minister. Like her, and as on previous occasions, I find myself not at all clear why the clause is necessary, and what problem it is driving at. Again, I find myself asking for evidence. I have not seen or heard about an issue with abusive additional trafficking claims sparking extra NRM recovery periods. I recognise that that could absolutely happen in theory, but we need much more by way of evidence before we enact such a clause.

Even though someone might be describing earlier events of trafficking, disclosure of that additional information and trafficking or slavery histories could have all sorts of significant implications for that survivor. It could, for example, mean a break from a controlling partner. It could give rise to other dangers for them or to new trauma. Furthermore, as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has noted, survivors can feel more able to disclose their trafficking experiences relating to one particular form of exploitation than another, so forced labour can sometimes be disclosed earlier than sexual exploitation, due to feelings of shame or mistrust.

The fact that if the competent authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case another recovery period can be granted is better than nothing, and it is good that that provision is in the clause, but that protection needs to be considerably strengthened to ensure that those who need it will have it. As matters stand, we have no idea how that analysis is going to be undertaken. What if the disclosure of this new information leads to new dangers or new trauma? Surely we would all agree that that should require a new decision and a new recovery period, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that that would definitely happen.

Perhaps the clause should be reversed—the Home Office might want to consider turning the presumption around, so that we assume instead that a new recovery period would be needed unless we are satisfied with a very restricted route for a very restricted range of reasons, and the reasonable grounds decision should not occur. The Home Office needs to explain its thinking here.

Finally, on the issue of trafficking, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham are conducting research on that subject at this very moment in time. I urge the Home Office to wait to see the evidence, rather than jumping in with two feet.

[Craig Whittaker]

I would first like to clarify that the clause does not prevent individuals who have been re-trafficked from receiving a further recovery period. Rather, the clause introduces a presumption against multiple recovery periods where an individual has already benefitted from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism and period of support. This is not a blanket disqualification from multiple recovery periods; it is focused on removing the presumption for multiple recovery periods where the period of exploitation happened before the original recovery period was provided.

The clause will provide further recovery periods where required—for example, where an individual has a second referral for an incident that happened before the first incident for which they were referred and have already received a recovery period. It may not be appropriate or necessary to provide the further recovery period. A discretionary element is included, underpinned by guidance, so that cases are considered on an individual basis.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I put to the hon. Gentleman the suggestion I made towards the end of my contribution: that he reverses the situation so that the presumption is that somebody does need an additional recovery period unless there are specific circumstances that mean it is not appropriate. Is that something he could pass on to his ministerial colleague, for when he takes the Bill forward?

[Craig Whittaker]

As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.

Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister for that contribution. I have been consistently concerned by the lack of provision for children and young people within the clauses before us. With that in mind, I will not be withdrawing amendment 180.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I rise to support the amendment and to make the case for the removal of the clause. The amendment is absolutely right, and excluding any survivors, especially children, from the scope of the clause will alleviate its worst impacts. The whole clause is bad.

Unlike with previous measures, it is absolutely apparent what the Government are driving at this time, but there is already a perfectly good procedure for dealing with this issue. Guidance implementing the European convention on action against trafficking says that where there is an improper claim of victim status, or there are public order grounds for doing so, the state can make a negative conclusive grounds decision and decide not to observe the reflection and recovery period. That remedy is available right now. How many times has that remedy been used in the United Kingdom? I hope the Minister can answer that, now or later.

The Home Office wants to go much further and help itself to a different remedy. Despite Home Office claims, nothing in the convention justifies simply failing altogether to make a conclusive grounds decision. On the contrary, article 10 of the convention requires states to identify victims, and that position is recognised in the Home Office’s guidance. That is why the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has expressed, as we have heard, serious concern about the compatibility of the clause with ECAT—they just are not compatible. The measures will not only breach international obligations, but they will be counterproductive in the fight against trafficking and slavery.

We have already heard one or two of the case studies provided by the commissioner. I will add one more, from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It relates to the case of Z, who was trafficked to the UK after being used for prostitution in Europe for a number of years. Her child had been removed from her by the traffickers. She managed to escape from the traffickers in the UK, and used a false document that she grabbed during her escape, as she wanted to go back to Europe to find her child. She was arrested and prosecuted for a document offence and given a sentence of more than 12 months after being advised to plead guilty. Trafficking was never explored as part of the criminal process. Later, Z was referred to the NRM and claimed asylum. The Home Office agreed that she was a victim of trafficking, and she was then given leave to remain on that basis. It also agreed not to pursue deportation because of her trafficked status.

After Z was referred to the NRM, a decision still had to be made about whether she was a victim of trafficking. The Home Office ultimately decided to grant her leave to remain and halt deportation, having been required to make that decision. Had the clause been in force, Z would never have been identified as a victim of trafficking; she would have been deported. That would have been absolutely dreadful for Z, who would have lost out on support and help that she clearly needs for her recovery, but it is also dreadful for many others, because it will clearly make it infinitely more difficult to track down Z’s traffickers. They will not be apprehended, and other people will fall victim to the very same crime, as is shown by the other case studies provided by the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, and by the commissioner in her letter to the Home Secretary.

In short, people who need support will be denied it, and the perpetrators of the crimes against them will not be caught and punished. As we have heard, the clause will simply encourage traffickers to target those who have criminal convictions and who are sentenced to more than two at once, and even compel them into criminal activity precisely so that the exclusions will apply to them if the trafficker threatens to disclose their crimes. We have heard from the commissioner that that is already the traffickers’ modus operandi—excuse me; my Latin is terrible. The reason is that traffickers know that the absence of support and removal from the country will make it easier for the trafficker and their colleagues to avoid justice. The clause is, in essence, a gift for people traffickers, and it totally undermines the work of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

I will briefly mention some other problems. The commissioner has rightly expressed concern about the huge breadth of offences that would be caught by the provision, particularly as it includes sentences imposed outside the UK that might not reflect sentencing guidelines in the UK; that could mean that minor offences are brought within scope. Will the Minister confirm that trafficking victims who enter the UK in breach of clause 37 of the Bill would end up in prison, possibly for even three or four years, and would therefore be excluded from support? A huge proportion of survivors will be left with the threat of exclusion from support hanging over them, putting them in even more vulnerable position.

Why is the expression “bad faith” used in the clause, rather than the convention’s wording or the wording of the guidance that the Home Office has put in place, which relate to “improper purpose”? The use of a different form of words needs to be explained. Why is it that in some cases, suspicion of certain offences, rather than an actual conviction, is enough for exclusion? The key point is that if we do not identify victims, neither do we identify traffickers. In breach of the convention, the clause expressly provides for that, so it should be amended.

[Craig Whittaker]

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked whether the clause is incompatible with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. The answer to that question is no, it is not incompatible at all with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is a criminal defence, but clause 51 of the Bill is a very separate system. Section 45 is separate from the public order disqualification. A section 45 defence is not applicable to the serious crimes set out in schedule 4 of the Bill. The Government will of course continue to work with local authorities to safeguard children and take their particular vulnerabilities into account on a case-by-case basis.

I will just highlight one or two points that piggyback on the back of what the Government are doing in this field. The hon. Member for Halifax mentioned county lines, and we have invested in specialist support for the under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. We also fund a missing persons safe call service—a national, confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation—and the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. There is also a public awareness campaign that started in September, which is called Look Closer. What I would say to the hon. Member for Halifax is that the public order grounds for disqualification are set out in ECAT, in which it is envisaged that the recovery and reflection periods will be withheld—

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That wording is absolutely right. It is possible for the recovery period to be withheld, but the convention absolutely does not allow for a decision to be made on public order grounds. It is absolutely contrary to article 10 of the convention. Does the Minister have anything that can help him with that point?

[Craig Whittaker]

As I have already explained, such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Regardless of whether they are children or vulnerable people, it is important that all aspects of the individual’s case are taken into account, such as whether they have been exploited and to what extent.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not want to make life difficult for the Minister, because I know he is in a very difficult situation, but the point is that it will not happen on a case-by-case basis, because decisions will not be made at all. As a result of the clause, people will just be excluded altogether from having a decision made about them. The point is that there is no case-by-case basis. It is an absolute blanket, and huge swathes of people will just not have a decision made about them, with no assessment made of whether they might be a victim of trafficking.

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Member for his further intervention. I will take some advice on the technicalities in what he says, but that is not my understanding of what the clause says. I have already said that the decision to withhold recovery periods on public order grounds will be made on a case-by-case basis. That will balance the need to safeguard exploited individuals against public protection concerns and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the protections of the national referral mechanism, where the particular circumstances of an individual mean it is appropriate to do so.

[Neil Coyle]

In light of the fact that the Minister is asking for the amendment to be withdrawn and given his understanding that decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, can the Minister tell us if the guidance that goes with the legislation will set out the exemptions and the process by which cases will be decided on an individual basis, and if there will not be the blanket exemption that is the Opposition’s understanding?

[Craig Whittaker]

Of course we will fully assess the issues in policy guidance. The hon. Member is exactly right that it will be set out in policy guidance, to ensure that due account is taken of the circumstances, so that any permitted actions, including prosecutions, are proportionate and in the public interest. It is right that the Bill seeks to target ruthless criminal gangs who put lives at risk by smuggling people across the channel.

The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

The amendments seek to incorporate our international legal obligations under ECAT within the provisions of support available to victims during the recovery period, as well as extending statutory support for those who have received a positive conclusive grounds decision.

Having already discussed the changes to the recovery period in our discussion of clause 50, I will not repeat myself, but it is important to consider these amendments alongside the provisions in clause 50. We share the concerns of Christian Action, Research, and Education, or CARE, which has worked with us on amendment 4, that clauses 52 and 53 have the potential, if they remain unamended, to

“make matters worse for victims”.

Amendment 2 would update the definition of the reasons for providing a recovery period as solely to harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question,”

and replace it with the requirement to assist a person

“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their retrafficking.”

Therefore, amendment 2 would put into the Bill the wording of article 13 of ECAT, which provides support

“necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”.

The British Red Cross has highlighted that

“making support dependent on specific ‘harm’ caused by the ‘conduct’ that led someone to be identified as a victim, fails to recognise the reality of human trafficking”.

The Home Office’s own research from 2017 says that

“unlike most crimes, which are time-limited single events, modern slavery is a hidden crime of indeterminate duration”—

in that it involves multiple locations and individuals. Therefore, amendment 2 better reflects the Home Office’s own assessment of the nature of human trafficking.

Amendment 4 seeks to set out the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery. Colleagues will be aware that presently neither the Modern Slavery Act 2015 nor the Bill includes such a provision, and therefore amendment 4 would fill a significant void in the legislation. The types of assistance and support include a range of provisions, such as safe accommodation, medical advice, a support worker, access to translation services, counselling, and assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation.

Amendment 4 is a practical and reasonable measure, and one that we hope will provide a sense of certainty and security to support survivors as they move towards recovery and towards justice, as confidence in the process grows, which will foster trust between agencies and victims, and enable more perpetrators to be brought before the courts. The types of assistance defined are basic provisions that victims should be entitled to if they are to rebuild their lives.

Building upon this idea of defining assistance, amendment 3 would offer long-term support to survivors with a positive conclusive grounds decision, stipulating that the Secretary of State must also secure assistance for at least 12 months, beginning on the day that the recovery period ends.

Given that there is no mention of statutory support after a conclusive grounds decision, amendment 3 seeks to correct another considerable omission from the Bill. In 2020, the Centre for Social Justice said:

“Long-term support is a further significant gap in the support system. In recent years a number of reports have concluded that the lack of long-term support puts victims of modern slavery at risk of homelessness, destitution and even re-trafficking after they exit the NRM support provision. It also has a significant negative impact on their engagement with the criminal justice system”.

This approach has broad support, as these amendments would build upon the recommendations made by the Work and Pensions Committee in 2017, which stated that

“There is very little structured support for confirmed victims once they have been given a ‘Conclusive Grounds’ decision...We recommend that all victims of modern slavery be given a personal plan which details their road to recovery, and acts as a passport to support, for at least the 12 month period of discretionary leave.”

Similar measures were also incorporated in the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by Lord McColl of Dulwich, which awaits its Second Reading in the House of Lords. That Bill was greatly welcomed across the human trafficking sector and by all parties.

To summarise the case for amendments 2, 4 and 3, they are vital in expanding support for victims, and can boast wide support. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on their merits.

On clause 52 more broadly, we welcome the fact that support for victims in England and Wales is being placed on a statutory basis during the recovery period, but this change is undermined by the limitations on support, and the decision to reduce the minimum recovery period from 45 to 30 days under earlier clauses. The clause introduces provisions for assistance and support only

“if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary”

for recovery, mental health and wellbeing purposes, and crucially only if the recovery is from harm caused directly by the trafficking.

In the explanatory notes, the Government state that the intention behind the clause is to implement the UK’s ECAT obligations under article 13 to provide a recovery period to potential victims of modern slavery, but that is not really what has been included in the Bill. The explanatory report on ECAT says that articles 12 and 13 are

“an important guarantee for victims and serve…a number of purposes.”

This wording emphasises the “guarantee” of support, and its serving different purposes. By contrast, the clause narrows the scope of the recovery support received solely to support needed as a result of harm

“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit claims that as a result, the clause will

“create a huge evidential burden on survivors, in demonstrating that their recovery needs are linked to their experiences of having been trafficked”.

It adds that the clause will also

“necessitate an increase in the number of medico-legal reports that the Competent Authority will be required to consider.”

To summarise, the clause has the potential to further disqualify victims from support entirely. It has nothing at all to offer a person who had physical and mental needs before being trafficked—needs that may have been a factor in them having been targeted by criminal gangs. It risks trapping victims in an endless cycle of exploitation, which will undermine our ability to identify victims and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. For these reasons, the clause should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising important issues around the support and assistance offered to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Support for potential victims is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by this horrendous crime and reducing the risk of their being re-trafficked. We are agreed on the importance of placing the entitlement to support in legislation, which is what the clause will do. Our intention in our drafting was to provide victims with certainty about the circumstances in which support is provided through the NRM; we know that is imperative in aiding their recovery. To this end, we have sought to put in clause 52 that support will be provided where

“it is necessary for the purpose of assisting the person receiving it in their recovery from any harm to their physical and mental health and their social well-being arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”

Amendment 2 would restrict this support to where it was needed for a victim’s

“physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”

This provides less clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision makers, reducing the clause’s effectiveness in supporting victims. Our approach is not to do as amendment 4 suggests and go into detail in the clause on the types of support provided, but to instead do that in guidance. The reason is twofold: it provides us with the flexibility to tailor support to victims, and to ensure that we are able to amend the guidance and support as our understanding of victims’ needs changes.

After entering the NRM, potential victims are entitled to access a wide range of specialist support services to help them rebuild their lives. This includes safe house accommodation, financial support, and a social worker to assist with access to services including, but not limited to, health care, legal advice and translation services. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims’ ongoing recovery needs are assessed, and a clear plan is tailored to their specific recovery needs to help them transition out of support and back into a community, where this is possible. Confirmed victims’ recovery needs are assessed to ensure that the overall support package provided through the modern slavery victim care contract is specific to the individual. This needs-based approach ensures that the Government provide targeted and personalised support to victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister said earlier that the tailored plan would support someone until they move back into the community. Can he confirm that that support will be provided whatever setting the person is living in, not only to those who happen to be in a detention centre or accommodation centre, for example?

[Craig Whittaker]

I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for his response. He paints a picture of the NRM that I do not think would be recognised by those working with it on the frontline. We heard testimony from those within the NRM that it was not clear that they were even in it, because it was not clear what provisions or support they were receiving. I wish it was the case that the description and the offer of support that he outlines were there in reality.

The Minister says the discretion within the Bill is necessary in order to facilitate going further and doing more, but we know that discretion is also used to offer less than we think is appropriate for victims who require that support. We will continue to argue and make the case for amendments 2, 3 and 4, but in the interests of time, we will simply vote against clause 52 in its entirety. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.

In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister is right: a huge number of organisations welcome the specific leave to remain on these grounds. Perhaps he could tell us the average length of time that it takes to prosecute gangs on these specific circumstances and whether it is the Government’s intention to protect anyone who has been trafficked for the entire period of the case in order to prevent them from being intimidated if they are outside the UK and in their country of origin, for want of a better term.

[Craig Whittaker]

The hon. Gentleman will know from his own experience that that is done through the criminal justice system in this country. If any victim or any person needs to be taken into any form of witness protection, that will be done via the courts. You may want to come back in.

[Neil Coyle]

But I am asking very specifically about the circumstances in clause 53(2)(c), where the Government are offering leave to remain on these specific grounds. Is it the Government’s intention that that leave to remain is extended for the period of any case involving the individual who is believed to have been trafficked?

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

As I have said, each individual case will be considered on an individual, case-by-case basis. That is why the measure is written the way it is—so that decision makers can make individual decisions, based on individuals’ needs and support.

[Neil Coyle]

Shall I try it the other way round?

[Craig Whittaker]

You can try it whichever way you like.

[The Chair]

Order. I have been trying not to interrupt the Minister, but “you” is me.

[Craig Whittaker]

Sorry, Sir Roger.

[Neil Coyle]

Let us try it the other way round. Can the Minister confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to end leave to remain during criminal proceedings if that could mean that someone is forced to leave the UK and could be at risk of intimidation in another country?

[Craig Whittaker]

As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.

Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.

With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual

“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

But the point is that “personal situation” is the wording in the convention and it is also the wording in the Home Office’s own guidance, and I do not understand it to have created problems for the Home Office up to this point. The problem is that this Bill is narrowing the scope of the circumstances that will be taken into account when considering this.

[Craig Whittaker]

The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.

[Neil Coyle]

Could the Minister provide some statistics to help us—I do not expect him to have this to hand, but perhaps he can respond in writing—on the average length of these cases, the number of people granted leave to remain who were believed to be victims of traffickers and the average length of the leave to remain they granted? Those would be useful statistics for the Committee and for the House ahead of Report.

[Craig Whittaker]

I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.

The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.

Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as

“the person’s wishes and feelings”,

which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.

We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.

I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.

I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.

For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister, once again, for his contribution. In the interests of time, I will seek to move amendment 189 formally as, once again, I am not satisfied that the appropriate provisions for children have been recognised. I will gently make the point that statutory guidance has been referred to so often as the place where we would look for further detail on how the Bill would actually affect people’s lives that it would have been diligent to produce the statutory guidance at the same time as the Bill. That would have given Members the ability to really scrutinise it in full.

With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 53

Ayes: 7

---

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

---

Conservative: 9

[Craig Whittaker]

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 53, page 48, line 10, leave out “reasonable” and insert “conclusive”.

This amendment corrects a drafting error.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

[Craig Whittaker]

The Government have tabled a minor amendment to subsection (9) of the clause to reflect that a grant of leave comes after the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the reasonable grounds decision. Subsection (9) has therefore been amended to provide that the relevant exploitation for the purpose of granting leave under subsection (2) of the clause means the conduct resulting in the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the positive reasonable grounds decision. This corrects a minor drafting error.

I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.

[Holly Lynch]

I have heard the Minister’s opening remarks on clause 53 stand part. Only 11% of confirmed victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2020 received discretionary leave. I therefore ask the Minister to make it clear how an individual’s need for leave will be judged under the criteria in the Bill, and to provide us with clear evidence on how he believes that clause 53 is in keeping with the ECAT obligations.

As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,

“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 53, as it stands, shows that the Government are only cherry-picking at parts of ECAT to satisfy their agenda, rather than adopting article 14 in its entirety. On that basis we cannot support the clause.

[Craig Whittaker]

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked how the clause is compatible with ECAT, and where is the certainty. This measure will clarify in primary legislation the obligations set out in article 14 of the European convention on human rights, and clarify the policy that is currently set out in guidance. This confirms that victims of all ages, including children, who do not have immigration status will automatically be considered for temporary leave. A grant of temporary leave to remain for victims of modern slavery does not prohibit them from being granted another, more advantageous, form of leave, should they qualify for it. It continues to be the core principle of the approach to modern slavery—

[Holly Lynch]

The Minister refers to a piecemeal approach to extending leave—and extending leave—and extending leave. That is preventing victims from moving on with their recovery, from trusting the agencies and from establishing relationships that will lead to the prosecutions that we all hope for. Since he says that further extensions are likely, could we not reflect on more significant periods of leave being given in a single grant?

[Craig Whittaker]

I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.

[Neil Coyle]

I think the Minister is suggesting that there would be variation in the lengths of leave provided. Can he set out that it is the Government’s expectation that there would not be a minimum, bog standard six months that everyone is given, and that there will be quite considerable variation in the periods provided?

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention asking for clarity. He is absolutely right; decisions will be made on the basis of individual needs. I can understand where the word “piecemeal” comes from, but the reality is that if an individual’s mental and physical health and wellbeing support needs mean that those periods need to be extended, the individual highly trained decision maker will have the ability to extend the period.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister is again saying extend, rather than grant for the necessary period. Coming back to the criminal prosecution case, it is very unlikely that the case will be heard within six months. It will not even get to court within six months, let alone be heard. Is it the Government’s expectation that someone will be protected with a period of leave that covers a court case? Will the individual decision maker have access to the average statistics on the time it takes to hear a case of this nature?

[Craig Whittaker]

I do not think that the decision maker will need the statistics on the average timescale for a decision. What they will need to make a decision is the individual person’s history and needs, which is what they will use throughout the process. If they need six months, they will get six months. If they need longer than that—whether for a court case or other circumstances —that is intended to be allowed for the individual.

There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 55 stand part, as announced by Sir Roger at the end of the morning sitting.

[The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)]

Identifying and supporting victims at an early stage is a key part of the Bill, and the new one-stop process. To underpin that process, clause 54 provides for legally aided advice on the national referral mechanism to be provided to individuals who are already receiving legally aided advice on an immigration or asylum matter. The additional advice will be free to the individual.

The provision of legally aided advice under the clause will help the individual’s lawyer to provide holistic advice on the individual’s situation as a whole, looking at the range of protection-related issues, including modern slavery. Advice under the clause will additionally help to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery at an earlier stage. Potential victims of modern slavery will be able to understand what the NRM does and able to make an informed decision as to whether to enter it and obtain the assistance and support provided under it.

The Government are firm in our commitment to identifying and supporting all victims of modern slavery. The clause seeks to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the NRM at the same time as they are receiving advice on an asylum and immigration matter, which will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and supported.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. Clause 54 amends the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to enable advice on referral into the NRM to be provided as add-on advice where individuals are in receipt of civil legal services for certain immigration and asylum matters. Although I and many other colleagues welcome the fact that the Government have recognised the importance of legal aid as part of the process, we argue that legislating for it only as an add-on misses the opportunity to extend access to all those who would benefit from it—I include the Home Office as one of the main beneficiaries of people having access to proper advocacy and advice from an early stage.

In England and Wales, 63% of the population do not have access to an immigration and asylum legal aid provider, due simply to a lack of provision—what is known as a legal desert. Where there are providers, many are operating beyond capacity. Sadly, it is therefore commonplace for support workers to be unable to find lawyers for clients who are victims of trafficking.

It is not reasonable to expect vulnerable victims to be able to navigate the system without legal representation. It is vital that this is provided at the earliest stage possible. As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out:

“The provision of legal aid to individuals who seek redress is not simply a matter of compassion, but a key component in ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice, itself inherent in the rule of law and an essential precondition of a fair and democratic society. Failure to provide it can amount to a breach of fundamental rights under the common law and/or the European Convention on Human Rights.”

We believe victims deserve better than what is set out before us in the Bill. The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has highlighted how the single competent authority is currently sending out template witness statements as a guide for how they should be prepared. They warn of the legal implications of the document even in the absence of a lawyer. That is unacceptable. I am sure the Minister agrees that it would make for an improved system with more integrity and fewer errors—the very sort of system he proposes—if a broader approach to legal aid was adopted.

It is also fair to argue that access to legal aid remains somewhat of a postcode lottery, with many outside London and the south-east experiencing difficulties in accessing legal assistance. I take this opportunity to highlight the great work of the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit in attempting to widen access, having developed an online referral system for support workers to simplify the process for sourcing legal aid representation. However, it should not fall to organisations such as ATLEU to plug the gaps in the system. We wish to see improved access through this clause.

Similarly, the Government state in the explanatory notes to the Bill that clause 55 is designed to provide an add-on to legal aid on referral to the NRM if the victim has been granted exceptional case funding and is being advised in relation to the claim that their removal from or requirement to leave the UK would breach the Human Rights Act 1998. That means that clause 55 does not provide a route to pre-NRM advice for those who are not already in receipt of legal aid via the scope of another matter, and therefore does not provide free legal aid pre-NRM for all trafficking cases.

In scrutinising these measures, we have worked closely with the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which I thank for having been so generous with its expertise, as I know it is for MPs right across the House, and for providing real-life examples that demonstrate the scale of the issue. It said:

“We assisted the pro bono department of a non-legal aid law firm when they helped a potential survivor apply for exceptional case funding—ECF—in August 2020. The funding was requested in order to provide advice on an NRM referral and associated immigration advice. This application was refused. A request to review the decision was refused. A decision on a second review is pending a final decision from the Legal Aid Agency. One ground of refusal at first review stage was that no decision had yet been made to remove the individual as they had not come forward to the authorities, and if a decision to deport or remove a client from the United Kingdom is made, an application for ECF could be made at that stage. The application remains undecided 13 months after the original submission.”

The system is a mess, Minister. It is the Opposition’s view that free legal aid and advice for potential victims of slavery and trafficking in the UK pre-NRM should not be limited to cases with existing immigration and asylum aspects. Only then will the Government’s offer of legal advice on referral to the NRM work in practice. In summary, the proposals contained within clauses 54 and 55 do not fully address the existing shortcomings in the system—another missed opportunity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56

Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Craig Whittaker]

The trafficking directive—the directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims—was adopted by the UK on 5 April 2011. The Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—is the principal international measure designed to combat human trafficking. The trafficking directive is intended, in part, to give effect to ECAT. ECAT’s objective is to prevent and combat trafficking by imposing obligations on member states to investigate and prosecute trafficking as a serious organised crime and a gross violation of fundamental rights.

Following the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but ECAT remains unaffected. Therefore this Government intend, by means of clause 56, to disapply the trafficking directive in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in the Bill. That will bring legislative certainty to the Bill and how its clauses will apply. It will also provide further clarity to victims about their rights and entitlements.

The Government maintain their commitment to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, as part of the world-leading NRM. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and ECAT, which sets out our international obligations to victims, remain unaffected, as do the UK’s obligations under article 4 of the European convention on human rights.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on clause 56. The explanatory notes on the clause state that, as the Minister has just outlined,

“the Trafficking Directive should be disapplied in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in this Bill.”

There are some substantial and quite technical inconsistencies here that need to be worked through, and to do so we have had to enlist legal expertise from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit and others, so I thank them all for their service.

The trafficking directive is part of a suite of measures designed to combat the crime of trafficking. The EU has introduced several legislative measures to strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking, including the 2011 EU directives on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims of trafficking.

I turn first to the heading of clause 56—“Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive”. Subsection (1) refers to

“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”,

which saved the trafficking directive in domestic law, so that it continued to have effect on or after the UK left the EU at the end of December 2020. However, it has the opposite effect, by stipulating that any

“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from the Trafficking Directive”

that were saved cease to apply,

“so far as their continued existence would otherwise be incompatible with provision made by or under this Act.”

Therefore, our primary concern about clause 56 is that the power to disapply the rights derived from the trafficking directive will cease the rights and remedies available to victims generally as a matter of domestic or EU law that continues in force in the UK.

The world’s largest group of modern slavery researchers, Rights Lab, has argued:

“After eight years of the government’s general position being that the rights under the Trafficking Directive were already in domestic law, the choice to legislate now in the Nationality and Borders Bill—to reduce and restrict rights and entitlements through Part 4 of the Bill—and the presence of the express power to disapply them in the event of an incompatibility with the Bill in Clause 56 is concerning. The government should instead ensure that rights under the Trafficking Directive continue to apply in UK law, by incorporating it, and further, it should incorporate ECAT in domestic law and end the fragmented approach to victim identification, protection, and support.”

The clause will also threaten the Government’s ability to combat the perpetrators of human trafficking, as it will further undermine the response to criminal justice and the rights of victims of trafficking as victims of crime in the victims of crime directive and relevant codes of practice. Additional concerns have been voiced in relation to the rights under the NRM of victim identification and support and non-penalisation. For example, article 8 of the directive provides for the non-prosecution or non-allocation of penalties to victims, and requires the UK to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to any of the acts referred to in article 2.

Therefore, that directive is clearly threatened by clause 56 and other provisions of part 1 of the Bill, including clause 51, which I appreciate is precisely why this Government want to disapply it. However, I am afraid that that is just the wrong judgment call.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible—

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

I am not sure whether the hon. Member is aware that the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.

[Holly Lynch]

I thank the Minister for his intervention. We are into the thick of the legal technicalities. These points are from some of the leading legal experts on the subject. They are not entirely satisfied that clause 56 is compatible, and that we are not missing some of the protections that have been hard fought for, with good reason.

In conclusion, the clause is incompatible with the UK’s legal international obligations and will have far-reaching consequences. For that reason, it should not stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Gullis]

Of course—absolutely. Young people should not be placed in a situation like that, for safety reasons. As a former teacher, I would not want a 14 or 15-year-old to be somewhere they felt unsafe. The problem is that we have a broken asylum system that needs fixing. Age assessments can be avoided if people do not try to enter the country illegally, but come by safe and legal routes, where we can have documentation.

There are other ways to prove someone’s identity, age and application, as we have done in Afghanistan and Syria, which will ultimately be a much better system than having illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel from Calais and entering this country illegally. They are putting a huge strain on the public services of our country and on the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, whose area is the fifth largest contributor to the asylum dispersal scheme.

Age assessment is absolutely essential. It is another way of reminding people that if they make an illegal entry into this country they will face a number of procedures to verify the credibility of their asylum claim, their identity and their age, in order to ensure we protect our country’s young and vulnerable people. It is the right and proper thing to, and I fully applaud the Minister on pushing this essential clause.

[Craig Whittaker]

Let me start with amendment 150. I would say to the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that his amendment applies to all aspects of age assessments, not only the use of scientific measures. As such, it is extremely broad, although I do not know if that remains his intention.

The Home Office takes its statutory duties towards the welfare of children very seriously. The current age assessment system is desperately in need of reform. We have heard many reports from local authorities about the prevalence of adults posing as children and claiming services designed for children, including accommodation, education and social care. This poses significant risks to the welfare of genuine children in our care system and undermines the integrity of the immigration system. Equally, we need to safeguard vulnerable children from being placed in adult services, although I am not sure I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield Central when he said that this is headline grabbing.

We must do everything in our power—whatever that is—to safeguard children, including vulnerable and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

[Holly Lynch]

The Government were less enthusiastic about protecting children under part 4 of the Bill.

[Craig Whittaker]

I do not think that deserves a response because I do not believe any Member of the House, wherever he or she sits, would advocate that we leave children vulnerable in the system.

One measure we look to pursue is the use of scientific methods, as has been said. Assessing someone’s age is an incredibly difficult task. It is only right that in this complex and sensitive area we seek to improve and expand the evidence base on which decisions can be made. We are aware there are ethical concerns around the use of certain scientific methods for age assessment, which is why new clause 32 includes a number of changes to the Bill to ensure proper safeguards are in place for those who are asked to undergo a scientific age assessment.

First, the Secretary of State may only specify a scientific method of age assessment in regulations once she has sought scientific advice and determined that the method in question is appropriate for assessing a person’s age. I expect that scientific advice to also cover related ethical considerations. Secondly, a scientific method of age assessment will not be performed unless the appropriate consent is given by or on behalf of the individual on whom the method is to be performed. We will be as transparent as possible about the nature and consequences of the specified method where consent is required once an appropriate method has been identified. Thirdly, where a person has reasonable grounds for refusing to undergo a scientific age assessment, they will not be required to undertake one. That decision will not then count against them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is outlining what he sees as safeguards. I am unconvinced. New clause 32(9) seems to say that nothing prevents the use of a scientific method, even if it is not specified in regulations and so on, if the decision maker considers it appropriate and, where necessary, consent is given. Given that there are implications if consent is not provided, that surely rides roughshod over all the other protections that the Minister just outlined.

[Craig Whittaker]

I will come on to that when I discuss further measures in new clause 32, but our opinion is that the amendment is not necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw it. On the new clauses, clause 58 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses of introduction, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provision on age assessment. New clauses 29 to 37 are intended to replace clause 58 entirely.

Before I touch on the other clauses, regarding new clause 32, we have already said that determining a young person’s age is an inherently difficult task. One of the questions posed earlier was how we do that as a comparator between other young people growing up in less well-developed countries. Under current arrangements where an individual’s age is disputed, local authorities must already undertake an age assessment. That typically involves two appropriately qualified social workers undertaking a series of interviews with the young person and taking into account any other information that is relevant to their age. However, even where those assessments are conducted thoroughly and reach reasoned conclusions, they are fraught with difficulty, as one would imagine. Such assessments can have a wide margin of error. We are aware of cases where a Merton-compliant age assessment, as they are called, has been conducted on the same individual by different social workers and has come to very different conclusions about the person’s age. Given that context, the use of scientific age assessments represents an additional and important source of evidence to help decision makers in a difficult task, allowing them to better come to accurate judgments. At the end of the day, that is our aim.

Various scientific methods of age assessment are already in use across most European countries, and have been for several years. In Finland and Norway, which I mentioned earlier, radiographs are taken to examine development of the teeth and the fusion of bones in the wrist. Two certified experts perform the age assessment and must jointly agree on the person’s age. In France, X-rays are taken to examine the fusion of the collarbone, alongside dental and wrist X-rays. In Greece, dental X-rays are used alongside social worker assessments.

[Anne McLaughlin]

What are the experts comparing with? My question is, will they be comparing the bone density or whatever with that of children of the same age in the UK, knowing that the development of children from other parts of the world is very different, or will they have a database of comparable images of the skeletal system—whichever part they are using—from each of the other countries? Is that something that is happening at the moment, or will they just be compared with UK-based children?

[Craig Whittaker]

I suspect that the answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that how that is assessed will be down to the individual scientific advice given on the individual case at the time. I cannot see a like-for-like comparator for a child from Ethiopia or Sudan, which was mentioned earlier, being a child in this country. That is why the scientific evidence is a much more accurate way of assessing. It can be a great tool in the arsenal of assessing a child when compared with our existing system, which is the Merton assessment by two individual social workers. Given the challenges of assessing an individual’s age, we see no good reason why such technologies should not also be used. In all good faith, this is one of several tools in the arsenal. To further enhance my answer to the question asked by the hon. Lady, the precise scientific method of assessment will be specified in regulation, following scientific advice.

We are also making it clear within new clause 32 that a decision maker will be able to draw a negative credibility inference if an individual refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without reasonable grounds. The introduction of any scientific method would be entirely undermined if someone who was asked to undergo such an assessment could simply refuse to co-operate. By legislating to develop our own scientific age assessment capability, we hope to emulate best practice across Europe and to ensure that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are provided with the care they are entitled to in a safe environment.

Let me turn to the rest of the amendments in the group before I answer some of the questions. Amendment 168 is consequential on new clauses 32 and 33. It provides that the regulation-making powers in the clauses are commenced automatically two months after Royal Assent.

The purpose of new clause 29 is to define an “age-disputed person” and to set the parameters to whom the age-assessment clauses apply. It clarifies the meaning of a number of terms, including “age-disputed person”, “immigration functions”, “immigration officer” and the respective definitions of “local authority” in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause also defines the meaning of “relevant children’s legislation” across the four nations of the United Kingdom.

New clause 30 relates to the establishment of a decision-making function in the Home Office, referred to as the national age assessment board, or the NAAB, as I think the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate referred to it. The NAAB will have responsibility for conducting age assessments of age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority or another public authority specified in regulation. Where an age-disputed person is referred to the NAAB by a local authority, the NAAB assessment will be binding on both the Home Office, in relation to immigration functions, and the local authority when determining access to children’s services. Alongside new clause 30, new clause 31 relates to the establishment of the NAAB. While most NAAB age assessments will be conducted on referral from a local authority, the new clause stipulates that the NAAB may, in certain situations, conduct age assessments on age-disputed persons for the sole purpose of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State should exercise any immigration functions.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Minister say a little bit more about the NAAB? Who will be appointed to it, how will it generally undertake assessments and how will its independence from the Home Office be ensured?

[Craig Whittaker]

I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will answer him before I finish answering the other questions, if indeed I can find the answer in my book.

I have covered new clause 32 quite extensively. New clause 33 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations about the way in which age assessments are to be conducted under the provisions in new clauses 30 and 31. It will provide the Secretary of State with the power to provide more clarity on what a comprehensive age assessment should entail, including, where appropriate, existing elements of age assessment case law. It will be mandatory for local authorities and the Secretary of State to follow these requirements when conducting age assessments. New clause 34 provides for a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal for an age-disputed person who has been subject to age assessment. In considering an appeal, the tribunal will be able to consider any evidence it deems relevant. It will determine the age of the age-disputed individual and assign them a date of birth.

New clause 35 provides clarity in a number of areas related to the appeal of an age assessment decision. First, a person who brings such an appeal must do so while they are here in the United Kingdom. If they leave the United Kingdom before the appeal is finally determined, the appeal is discontinued. Secondly, the clause provides for the appellant to apply to the tribunal for an order. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the local authority must exercise its function under children’s legislation as if the person is the age they claim to be. Where an age assessment has been made and the individual has not brought an appeal, or has concluded the appeal process, new clause 36 provides a mechanism for them to make further representations to a decision maker where they have new evidence to submit in support of their claimed age. That covers all the specific parts of the new clauses.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate asked me about hotel accommodation. In cases involving a child, local authorities obviously will have obligations to look after them. For adults, hotels are not detention centres, and adults are not held their against their will. There is a duty of care on the local authority when someone is placed there; it is required to give wraparound care for that individual, particularly for children. I cannot really see children being placed there by themselves, but I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about where there is an issue around age. Somebody could slip through the net, but the local authority would be required to give wraparound care.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

The Minister may be about to pre-empt me, but I do not think he has answered the questions raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in relation to the national age assessment board, so will he at least undertake to write to us on that issue?

[Craig Whittaker]

No, I have not finished yet. I am not quite ready to sit down, but I will answer that question. Basically, the board will predominantly consist of qualified social workers who, through being dedicated to the task of conducting age assessments and through training and the sharing of expertise, will achieve a more consistent and accurate approach to the task of age assessment. As Members have probably seen, such professionals are referred to as a “designated person” in the new clauses, and the board will have responsibility for conducting age assessments on age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority, as I said. Local authorities will retain the ability to conduct age assessments if they prefer to do so. If they believe that a person is actually the age they claim to be, they must inform the Home Office accordingly.

The hon. Member for Sheffield Central asked whether binding local authorities’ hands is just a power grab from central Government. The answer to that question is no. If local authorities wish to carry out their own assessments, they will be able to do so—without question, that will be the case. On that basis, I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Paul Blomfield]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s observations. To be fair, he made a good fist of defending the indefensible, but he failed to answer the concerns expressed by me and the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in relation to the way that subsection (9) of new clause 32 drives a coach and horses through all the reassurances that we have been given. His criticism of the amendment as being a bit broad and involving quite a lot of work fails to acknowledge how narrow it is. It would simply require the Secretary of State to take advice before making regulations, and I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

We welcome the reviews included under new clause 10, but they are not sufficient, and the powers under new clause 9 are too wide. Again, they give far too much power to the Secretary of State. It seems that nothing is off limits. The new clause encompasses three themes recurring in the Bill: first, too much power to the Secretary of State; secondly, not enough regard to international relations; and thirdly, closing down one of the few safe and legal routes, unless the Minister can reassure me that refugee family reunion is not affected by the provision—I hope he can.

[Craig Whittaker]

Starting with amendment 151, I reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the penalties are there to encourage countries to co-operate. There is international precedent for countries to have the power to impose penalties on countries that do not co-operate on the matter of returns.

Both the United States and the EU have similar powers to those we are seeking. Recently, the Council of the EU decided to suspend temporarily the application of certain provisions in the visa code to nationals of The Gambia, owing to the country’s lack of co-operation on readmission of third-country nationals illegally staying in the EU. The new powers in the Bill will bring the UK into line with our international partners and ensure that we are no longer lagging behind other countries.

I assure hon. Members that, given talk of penalties and exemption, family reunion will be an exemption to the penalties, as discussed.

Turning to amendment 151, I can assure the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that the power to impose visa penalties will be exercised only after consideration of the potential economic impact on the UK, and with full agreement across Government. Contrary to the hon. Member’s assertion that there is another Government leak, there is no current list: this will be done on a case-by-case basis, based on the impact across areas such as the economy, but also taking each Department into account. I also draw the hon. Member’s attention to new clauses 9 and 10, which—as we have already touched on—set out those visa provisions in more detail. I feel that this is a fairly straightforward part of the Bill, with no need for the hon. Member’s amendment.

Turning to new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80, a key function of the Home Office is the removal of individuals who have no legal right to be here, either by deportation or administrative removal, usually to the country of which they are nationals. We expect our international partners to work with us, as they expect us to work with them, to remove such individuals, as the UK does where our own nationals in other countries should not be in those countries. This is a critical component of a functioning migration relationship, and the vast majority of countries co-operate with us in this area. However, a small number do not.

As has been said, new clause 9 is designed to give the Government the power to impose visa penalties. Countries should no longer expect to benefit from a normal UK visa service if they are unwilling to co-operate with us on the matter of returning nationals. We will be able to slow down or suspend visa services for that country, and require applicants to pay a surcharge of £190 when they apply for a UK visa. Specifically, new clause 9 sets out when a country may be specified as unco-operative and the factors that will be taken into account when imposing visa penalties. Additionally, the new clause provides detail on the types of penalties that may be applied. It is a critical step in taking back control of our borders.

Briefly turning to new clause 10, visa penalties are intended to be a matter of last resort, and must not be in place longer than necessary. The new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the application of visa penalties every two months and revoke those penalties if the relevant country is no longer unco-operative. This provision is a safeguard to ensure that any visa penalties applied do not remain in place by default. Government amendment 80 is consequential on new clauses 9 and 10, providing that they will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

I commend new clauses 9 and 10 and Government amendment 80 to the Committee, and by your leave, Ms McDonagh, I request that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central withdraw his amendments.

[Paul Blomfield]

I was reassured by the commitments on family reunion, and I look forward to the Government’s bringing forward an amendment on that topic, perhaps in the House of Lords. I have taken the Minister’s other comments on board, so I will not press this amendment to a vote at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 59 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 60 disagreed to.

Clause 61

Special Immigration Appeals Commission

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider Government new clause 11—Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

[Craig Whittaker]

Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.

Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.

The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.

[Bambos Charalambous]

New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.

That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.

The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.

The sector has long expressed concerns about the powers and procedures of SIAC, but the Government are seeking to extend the powers even further. It follows that the wider escalation of the Home Office power in the Bill, which will have a devastating consequence for vulnerable people, will also provide the lead for others to promote and encourage similar draconian measures in their immigration and asylum systems. We are opposed to new clause 11, because it will significantly expand the powers of SIAC and put British citizens—and other people who have or seek an entitlement to enter, reside or remain in the UK—at risk of being excluded from the UK or of being treated as having no right to be here.

[Craig Whittaker]

Let me address a couple of points. Basically, the hon. Gentleman is asking whether SIAC involves a further erosion of civil liberties. The direct answer to that is no—if anything, it is quite the opposite. New clause 11 allows the specialist court the ability to consider all evidence relied on to ensure that cases may be both brought and properly defended. In addition, the special advocate system, the disclosure procedure used in such hearings and other safeguards are designed to provide individuals with substantial measures of procedural justice in their difficult circumstances when, in the public interest, material cannot be disclosed to them directly.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 62

Tribunal charging power in respect of wasted resources

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.

We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for

“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.

This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.

The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.

Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.

All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.

In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.

In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.

Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.

[Craig Whittaker]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I echo what the shadow Minister said. This is all really political theatre—a move to get immigration lawyers. As a former immigration lawyer, I cannot let these clauses pass without comment. In my experience, immigration lawyers are a group of people who do an invaluable job, and not one that there is a queue of folk desperate to do. It is a difficult job. Most clients have no resources; legal aid budgets are far from easy; many clients can be communicated with only through interpreters, who are often hard to find; and these lawyers are dealing with facts, circumstances, documents and other evidence from jurisdictions thousands of miles away. The pressures can be enormous. These lawyers are acutely aware that in some cases, if they get things wrong, the client’s life, liberty or human rights are at serious risk.

This group have been egregiously maligned by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. Here, they are singled out again. It is wrong, reckless and counter- productive. It is wrong because, not for the first time, we are being asked to make law on the basis of anecdote, rather than detailed evidence. As has been said, the immigration tribunals have all the powers that they need in their case management, cost and referral powers. They do not need these new, distinct and very controversial powers. Given the difficult job that we recognise these lawyers do, and the significant pressures that they face, the very last thing we should do is create a threat of their having to pay money for taking on a case. As the shadow Minister said, the measures create the risk of a conflict of interest, because solicitors could find that doing the right thing for their client, or following their client’s instructions, puts them at risk of having to pay a financial penalty.

The measures are also wrong because immigration lawyers have been singled out. I would have thought alarm bells would be ringing in the Home Office at the idea of putting in place a procedure that will apply only to lawyers operating on behalf of non-nationals. I suspect this would see the Home Office in court again. I could go along to the immigration tribunal and do something that I might do without facing consequences in the social security tribunal, employment tribunal, tax tribunal or any other tribunal; but I would find that in the immigration tribunal, there were special provisions in place for me to pay some sort of financial penalty. That seems odd.

Speaking of the tax tribunal, the provisions are essentially a tax. We do not know how much the tax will be, because we are not given any indication at all of the nature of the penalties involved, but it is a tax, because it is not compensation to the other party for wasted costs—we already have provision for that. The money goes straight to the Exchequer. On the other side of the coin, if the Government representative is guilty of this misconduct, the Government pay themselves. They hand over money to the Exchequer. There is not equality of arms, by any stretch of the imagination.

As the shadow Minister said, the measure is also counterproductive, because when the conduct described in the new procedure rules occurs, we will end up with endless hearings, and solicitors will be repeatedly made to come to hearings, just to explain why the situation happened. That is a waste of time, and in absolutely nobody’s interests. I have no idea what the Home Office is playing at here, other than performing political theatre and again having a go at immigration lawyers. If hon. Members want an example of vexatious, unreasonable conduct, they should read these two clauses, because that is exactly what they are.

[Craig Whittaker]

I have already spoken on clause 62; let me comment on clause 63. I apologise, Ms McDonagh, but I did not realise we were taking them together.

Representatives and relevant participants in the legal process on both sides have a role in ensuring that appeals run smoothly so that justice can be served. However, there has been clear judicial concern about the behaviours of some legal representatives in immigration and asylum cases, and we are seeking to strengthen the tribunal’s ability to tackle such conduct. As has been mentioned, judges can already issue a wasted costs order when a legal representative acts in a negligent, improper or unreasonable way that causes legal costs to be wasted. The tribunal can also award costs if a party to the appeal has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings, which is called an unreasonable costs order.

Costs orders are rarely made and are generally considered only at the request of the other party. To encourage more use of those existing powers, clause 63 provides a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the immigration and asylum chamber, which will lead judges to more regularly consider making a wasted costs order or an unreasonable costs order, or the new tribunal costs order introduced by clause 62. That will ensure that circumstances and behaviours that have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours that have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. Those have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules, for example through abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 81.

[Craig Whittaker]

Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Am I right that the Government will vote against the clause?

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

What is taken from that review is perhaps the need for consolidation of immigration legislation, nationality legislation and so on, which I would absolutely support. The challenge with the clause as drafted is that it proposes pretty huge and wide-ranging powers. The Secretary of State can amend pretty much any old Act of Parliament if, in her opinion, it facilitates what is otherwise desirable in connection with the consolidation. It could rewrite citizenship laws, for example, or the entire immigration system. There is a check on it in the sense that the regulations will not come into force until a consolidation Act is passed. There is a broader question about how often Governments tend to help themselves to massive Henry VIII powers when they rewrite all sorts of stuff. I have made that point a million times and nobody listens, so I will leave it at that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Extent

Amendment made: 120, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) A power under any provision listed in subsection (5) may be exercised so as to extend, with or without modifications, to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by any of the following provisions to legislation to which the power relates—

(a) section 37 (illegal entry and similar offences), insofar as it relates to the insertion of subsection (C1A) into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section(Electronic travel authorisations)(electronic travel authorisations);

(c) section(Liability of carriers)(liability of carriers).

(5) Those provisions are—

(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

(c) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment amends clause 69 (extent) to provide that the amendments made by the provisions listed in new subsection (4) may be extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the Order in Council provisions listed in new subsection (5).

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been engaging with the devolved Administrations, including at ministerial level, over the course of the Bill. I want to reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the devolved Administrations as we look to operationalise the measures to ensure the policies work for the whole of the UK. Contrary to the spirit of working together across the UK, amendment 186 could lead to the scenario where decisions in reserved areas would operate differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill seeks to provide for victims and decision makers. In line with the devolved memorandum of understanding, the UK Government will continue to engage with the devolved Administrations both at ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications and adhere to our priority to safeguard victims. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

On clause 69, I begin by setting out the devolution position. Almost all of the Bill is about nationality, immigration and asylum, which are reserved matters to the UK Parliament. Almost all of the Bill, therefore, extends UK wide.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister says “almost all” the provisions. Can he outline which are not?

[Craig Whittaker]

It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.

Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for his assurances that engagement has been taking place and is ongoing. I accept that the amendment is not practicable, because it impinges on reserved matters. The other side of the coin is also true and this was about provoking a discussion about which parts of the Bill the Home Office has identified as relating to devolved matters. The Minister has listed some, which is helpful, but I do not think he has completely listed all that would apply and should be described as devolved. For example, age assessments quite clearly relate in some circumstances to devolved functions regarding children. More relevant to this amendment debate is modern slavery, as I said—for example, the length of the recovery and reflection period and various other matters in relation to identification of victims are, absolutely and definitely, devolved. That is why we have separate modern slavery and trafficking legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

I have done what I needed to do, which is to suggest that the Home Office has a look at whether a legislative consent memorandum is required, but I will leave it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Commencement

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

God loves a tryer, and I do try. The amendments are another attempt to encourage the Government to set out their legal thinking on the compatibility of the clauses cited in amendment 109 with the refugee convention. How do the Government think that the provisions in clauses 27 to 35 can be consistent with the refugee convention?

There is significant concern among some Members from all parties on this issue. So far, we have been told repeatedly by a Minister that the Government are committed to living up to their international obligations, and we have had a lot of assertions that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. However, as I have said, I am not aware of any lawyer with expertise in the area who supports that conclusion.

On the contrary, we have a detailed published opinion from Matrix Chambers that the Bill is absolutely not compliant with the refugee convention. Alongside that, organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and various others have come to the same conclusion. Crucially, the ultimate authority on the convention, the UNHCR, published detailed reasoning for its view that certain clauses do not comply with the convention.

In the circumstances, I might be asking a little too much to expect a detailed legal treatise from the Minister today. However, he must at least accept that this state of affairs is not good enough. On the one side, we have extensive published arguments that the Bill breaches the refugee convention and, on the other side, we just have assurances that everything is in accordance with our international obligations. If MPs are to make a properly informed judgment on this on Report and Third Reading, it is incumbent on the Government to provide their legal arguments in more detail.

[Craig Whittaker]

We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of amendments 107 to 109, which I will speak to collectively. I thank hon. Members for moving and tabling them, and I agree that it is important that the United Kingdom continues to meet its obligations under the refugee convention and other international conventions and treaties.

I am taking amendments 107 to 109 together because they all seek to achieve the same goal. We do not support them. They seek to delay the commencement of clauses 27 to 35 until their compatibility with the refugee convention has been consulted on and reported to Parliament. As the Committee knows, the UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations under the convention. I assure hon. Members that every clause in the Bill, including clauses 27 to 35, adheres to our obligations under the refugee convention.

There is no uniform international interpretation of many of the key concepts in the refugee convention. That is an inevitable result of the very nature of international conventions. They are designed to be applied to a range of systems and scenarios across the globe, and to achieve consensus between many signatory states. Each signatory therefore needs to interpret the convention based on a range of sources and information to determine its meaning in good faith. That is not a black-and-white exercise, but one that the Government considered carefully before bringing the Bill to the House and one that we have now entrusted to Parliament in its consideration and considerable scrutiny of the Bill.

The legislative process, in which we are all so engaged today, is in itself a transparent and fully consultative process, as demonstrated by the several reports that the Committee has received on the compatibility of several clauses of the Bill with the refugee convention and other international obligations—including from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Clauses 27 to 35 are drafted to create clarity on what the key concepts of the refugee convention mean, driving improved consistency among Home Office decision makers and the courts, with the ultimate aim of making accurate, well-reasoned decisions quicker. That can only be beneficial for all who are involved with asylum seekers.

In the light of the points that I have made, I hope that hon. Members will agree not to press these amendments going forward.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have not succeeded in what I wanted to do, which was to move beyond assertion that there is compliance with the refugee convention and to hear a little more about why the Government think that that is the case. I accept the point that different countries have slightly different interpretations of certain provisions; that is legitimate. But there are clear arguments that what the Government are doing in relation to the evidential threshold, their definition of “particular social group” and, in particular, their total rewriting of article 31 on immunity from penalties is inexcusable and way beyond any margin of appreciation that Governments enjoy. I tried. I failed. I will accept that. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Craig Whittaker]

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, after “Part” insert “and the following provisions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 77, 123, 191, 78 and 167.

Clause stand part.

[Craig Whittaker]

Amendments 76 to 78, which relate to clause 57—interpretation of part 4—will ensure that the regulation-making power in this clause will come into effect at Royal Assent to the Bill rather than two months after Royal Assent. This is to ensure that the regulations that will define “victim of slavery” and “victim of trafficking” have time to progress through Parliament and themselves come into force by the time the remaining clauses relating to modern slavery commence. As currently drafted, clauses 16, 17 and 23 come into force two months after Royal Assent. Amendment 123 ensures that these clauses, which relate to priority removal notices, come into force by commencement regulations aligning with other provisions relating to priority removal notices. This is to ensure that all provisions relating to priority removal notices can commence simultaneously.

Amendment 191 removes the commencement provision regarding clause 42, as the clause is intended to be replaced entirely by new clause 20. Amendment 167 removes the commencement provisions regarding marker clauses 58 to 61—about age assessments, processing of visa applications from nationals of certain countries, electronic travel authorisations and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—as these clauses have been removed and replaced by substantive clauses.

Clause 70 sets out the commencement of the clauses in the Bill. As currently drafted, the majority of the provisions in the Bill will be brought into force by regulations on a day appointed by the Secretary of State, with the exception of those in part 6, which commence on Royal Assent, as is usual, and those that come into force two months after Royal Assent.

Amendment 76 agreed to.

Amendment made: 77, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(a) section 57 (interpretation of Part 4), for the purposes of making regulations under that section;” —(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment brings the power to make regulations defining “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” into force on the day on which the Act receives Royal Assent.

[Craig Whittaker]

I beg to move Government amendment 121, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, at end insert—

“(b) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(1) and (5) to (7) (effect of failure to give notice of pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”

This amendment brings subsections (1) and (5) to (7) of NC19 (concerning the effect of a failure to give notice of a pre-commencement decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force on the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 122.

Government new clause 19—Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship—

[Craig Whittaker]

New clause 19 allows the Secretary of State to amend section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 to permit that in certain limited circumstances a notice of deprivation does not have to be given to the person concerned, either where there is no way of communicating with them or where to make contact would disclose sensitive intelligence sources. To deprive someone of British citizenship is very serious and is rightly reserved for those whose conduct involves very high harm or who obtained their citizenship by fraudulent means. However, it cannot be right that the proper functioning of the immigration and nationality system grinds to a halt because an individual has removed themselves from contact with the Home Office, there is otherwise no other method of communication, or because our knowledge of a person’s whereabouts comes from sensitive intelligence sources which we do not wish to disclose.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will not say too much, because I need to give new clause 19 further consideration and to speak with stakeholders about it. Circumstances in which service is difficult because a person is out of contact happen pretty regularly in legal disputes that go through the courts. Rather than just shortcutting by having no procedure at all, what happens is that an alternative method is proposed, such as displaying a notice in newspapers. That was back in the old days; I assume that things have moved online since the dim and distant past when I was a practising solicitor. I wonder if there is a better way that does not result in someone being deprived of citizenship—which, as the Minister said, is a very serious matter—without any procedure having been followed at all.

It is controversial to retrospectively decide that decisions to deprive people of nationality are fine, even though they may not have complied with the laws that were in force at that time. Although provisions of this sort are necessary, I still have concerns that the circumstances in which no service would be required are drawn too broadly and that there may be other ways of doing this that do not undermine the clauses, without depriving people of having notice altogether. I leave it at that just now.

Amendment 121 agreed to.

Amendments made: 122, in clause 70, page 58, line 36, at end insert—

“(za) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(2) to (4) (modifications of duty to give notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”.

This amendment brings subsections (2) to (4) of NC19 (modifying the duty to give notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Amendment 123, in clause 70, page 58, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment will secure that clauses 16, 17 and 23 of the Bill (evidence in asylum or human rights claims) will be brought into force by regulations rather than coming into force automatically two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 124, in clause 70, page 59, line 2, at end insert—

“(fa) section (Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry), for the purposes of making regulations;”.

This amendment brings NC20 into force, for the purposes of making regulations (under the new section 11B for the Immigration Act 1971), two months after Royal Assent to the Bill. The rest of the clause will be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 191, in clause 70, page 59, line 4, leave out paragraph (h).

This amendment is consequential on the amendment removing clause 42 from the Bill.

Amendment 78, in clause 70, page 59, line 5, leave out paragraph (i).—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

[Craig Whittaker]

I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 70, page 59, line 6, at end insert—

“(ia) section (Counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival) (counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival);”.

This amendment provides for NC12 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 12.

[Craig Whittaker]

Under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through UK port and border areas for the purposes of determining whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism. Currently, officers may exercise schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area and their presence in such an area is as a result of them entering or leaving the UK.

The rise in numbers of those attempting to cross the channel illegally, particularly via small boats, means it is impractical to keep large numbers of people, some of whom are minors or in need of medical assistance, at a port or piece of coastline without adequate facilities. Transporting these individuals to locations once they have been detained or arrested under the immigration Acts often means that examining them under schedule 7 is not possible as they are no longer within a port.

New clause 12 seeks to extend the scope of schedule 7 so that individuals who are in detention under immigration provisions are eligible for examination at the location they are taken to following their initial apprehension under immigration powers. Individuals at these locations will be eligible for examination, provided the officer believes they arrived by sea, were apprehended under the immigration Acts within 24 hours of their arrival and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. The full suite of powers and safeguards under schedule 7 will apply, including access to legal advice for those detained over an hour. In line with amendment 79, the new clause will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The new clause will add a further layer to protect our national security by ensuring those who arrive in the UK illegally by sea can be examined for the purpose of determining their involvement in terrorist activity under the same power as if they had passed through conventional border controls.

Amendment 79 agreed to.

Amendments made: 167, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, leave out paragraph (j)

This amendment is consequential on the amendments removing Clauses 58 to 61 of the Bill.

Amendment 168, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) section (Interpretation of Part etc) (1) to (4) (interpretation of Part 3A);

(jb) section (Use of scientific methods in age assessments)(1) to (3) and (8) (regulations about use of scientific methods in age assessments);

(jc) section (Regulations about age assessments) (regulations about age assessments);”

This amendment means that amendment NC33 (regulations about age assessments), and the regulation-making power in amendment NC32, will be commenced automatically, two months after Royal Assent, as will the clause that defines certain terms used in the regulation-making power.

Amendment 80, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) sections (Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries) and (Visa penalties: review and revocation) (visa penalties);”

This amendment provides for NC9 and NC10 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 81, in clause 70, page 59, line 8, leave out paragraph (k) .—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 75.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 179, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

‘(5) Sections [Time limit on immigration detention], [Initial detention: criteria and duration] and [Bail hearings] come into force six months after the day on which this Act is passed.“

This amendment would bring NC38, NC39 and NC40 into force six months after the day on which the Bill is passed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and the other hon. Members involved for their work on that report, which was incredibly thorough. We then had a Backbench Business debate and the Government did not oppose it, because there was clearly a majority in the House of Commons at that time for such a time limit.

Finally, I want to say why 28 days should be the limit. There is a body of evidence that the effect of indefinite detention on mental health in general is very negative, but that after a month the deterioration is particularly significant. We recognise that there will be a minority of cases where people will try to play the system and use the time limit to frustrate lawful removal, but the amendment allows for re-detention if there is a material change in status or circumstances. Other sanctions are also open to the Government in such circumstances.

If none of that appeals to the Government, I will briefly mention the argument that consistently over half those detained are then released into the community, so it is a completely inefficient system that costs an absolute fortune. There are alternatives that are not only better for the individuals concerned, but easier on the taxpayer. I hope the Government will give serious thought to the amendments. The issue has been championed by Members of all parties for a considerable period. It is now time to see a step change in the Government’s approach to the use of immigration detention.

[Craig Whittaker]

I want to be clear from the outset that this Government’s position is that a time limit on detention simply will not work and will not be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be here in the UK leave.

[Paul Blomfield]

One of the issues highlighted by the report referred to by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, which had genuine cross-party engagement, was that the UK is an outlier in having no limits on detention. Every other country in Europe has a limit. Why does the Minister think it will not work here?

[Craig Whittaker]

Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Those who have no right to be in the UK should leave voluntarily, but where the opportunities to do so are not taken, we have to operate a system to enable us to enforce removal and deport foreign national offenders who would otherwise remain in the UK.

I also want to be clear that we do not and cannot detain people indefinitely. It is not lawfully possible to do so.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Home Office repeatedly asserts that it is not indefinite detention, but can the Minister tell me what is the definite time limit on a person’s detention?

[Craig Whittaker]

I think what the hon. Member has asked me to do is put a time limit on this, and I have already said clearly that just does not work. We have a duty to those in the immigration system, but we have a duty to protect the public too. The introduction of a 28-day detention time limit would severely limit our ability to remove those who refuse to leave voluntarily, and would encourage and reward abuse, to answer the question raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, in some cases from individuals who present a genuine threat to the public, which is not the effect I consider the hon. Members intend with new clause 38.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Does the Minister not think that if someone represents a threat to the public, they would be in jail? If they are not in jail, there is no evidence that they represent a threat to the public.

[Craig Whittaker]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right, but we are talking about those who are a threat to the public. We have to have a duty of care. In fact, the first role of the Government is to protect their own citizens.

New clause 38 would allow those who wish to frustrate the removal process to run down the clock, in answer to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, until the time limit is reached and release is guaranteed. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made simply to push them over the 28-day limit.

New clauses 38 to 40 are at total odds with the main objectives of the Bill, which will streamline the asylum process, ensuring that outstanding claims and appeals are dealt with much more effectively, with access to legal advice, while enabling us to remove more easily those with no lawful right to remain in the UK. In summary, it is the firm view of this Government that the introduction of a time limit would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a significant danger to the public. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not know where to start with that response, although it is very similar to those we have had in previous debates. The bogey card is always that foreign national offenders are a serious risk, yet the Government have the power to deport folk straight from prison. That is the power they should use in those situations.

What we are talking about, very often, is people who have committed no crime, or represent absolutely no risk to the public. They are detained for extraordinary periods of time, and face extraordinary hardship. Anyone reading the report by Stephen Shaw, commissioned by the former Home Secretary and former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), will see what it does to people. There is also the APPG report, which has already been referred to.

The idea that these amendments somehow undermine the Government’s ability to enforce immigration rules is completely at odds with the evidence from around Europe. Other countries have at least as much success—and often far greater success—in enforcing immigration rules and getting people to leave the country if they have no leave, without having to resort to endless and routine immigration detention. For all those reasons, I very much regret what we have heard from the Minister. However, I will not put the amendment to a vote today; we shall keep that for another time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Holmes.)

Oral Answers to Questions

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Tuesday 9th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Steve Barclay]

I do not think the hon. Gentleman has actually read the Budget announcement made last week, because the discretionary element of the Test and Trace support payments applies even if people are not in receipt of means-tested benefits. So it does recognise the point raised by Members that it is important that there is an incentive for people to be tested; that is what the £500 payment through the Test and Trace system addresses. But in addition Members raised cases which were just outside the means-tested element of Test and Trace; that is the issue that the discretionary fund addresses, and it was dealt with in the Budget last week.

[Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con)]

What fiscal steps he is taking to support the charity sector in response to the covid-19 outbreak.

[The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Steve Barclay)]

The Government have provided an unprecedented multibillion- pound package of support for Britain’s charities, including £750 million of dedicated funding that has helped more than 15,000 organisations across the country respond to the impacts of covid-19 and relieve the pressure on our NHS.

[Craig Whittaker [V]]

As we all know, yesterday marked International Women’s Day, a day when we celebrate and recognise the social, economic, cultural and political achievements of women. However, this pandemic has also shone a light on domestic abuse and the struggles of many women across the country, so will my right hon. Friend set out what steps he is taking to support charities in this field so we can ensure that victims and their children can access the support they need?

[Steve Barclay]

I join my hon. Friend in marking International Women’s Day yesterday, and he raises a very important issue. That is why my right hon. Friend the Chancellor at the Budget last week committed a further £90 million of funding; that, of course, builds on the £125 million announced at the spending review and indeed the earlier £25 million that had also been provided, recognising the 65% increase in calls to the national domestic abuse hotline and the renewed focus within Government on this important issue.

Future of Financial Services

Craig Whittaker Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Rishi Sunak]

I point the hon. Gentleman to our Budget in March, where we set out a sense of the capital plans for the next few years. What he will see there are plans to spend more than £600 billion in capital investment in this country over the next five years, raising capital investment to the highest sustained level it has seen in almost half a century.

[Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con) [V]]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement. Many of the three quarters of a million jobs outside London in the financial services sector are located in places such as West Yorkshire, and in particular in Calderdale. Does he agree that keeping the UK at the forefront of financial services regulations and supporting an open and dynamic economy is the surest way to ensure we remain a competitive economy as we emerge from the coronavirus pandemic?