Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 5th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the hallmarks of this Bill are illegality and inhumanity; the imposition of still greater inefficiency and expense on our asylum system; and prejudice to the interests of society in having well-integrated refugees.

The Bill delivers neither dignity for asylum seekers nor a fair deal for taxpayers. My colleague in the other place, Alistair Carmichael, said:

“If cruelty and bureaucracy were the answer, the Home Office would have solved the problem long ago.”


The Bill represents, in the words of distinguished lawyers led by Raza Husain QC,

“the biggest legal assault on international refugee law ever seen in the UK.”

We have a system that is already working badly. Nearly two-thirds of initial decisions are found by the courts to be wrong, there is a backlog of 60,000 people whose cases await initial assessment, and it takes an average of a year to decide a case. The numbers the UK receives ought to be manageable: most European countries, including France, receive far more refugees per head of population than we do.

The obvious solution is to frontload the system, including investing in retention of caseworkers; improving the quality and accuracy of first-instance decision-making; restoring legal aid; and properly funding the courts and tribunals. But the Government, ignoring the first rule of holes, which is to stop digging, have chosen to worsen these problems by making what they call a broken system even more complex and unfair, which only entails yet more delay and expense. They will then double down on blaming asylum seekers rather than looking at the mote in their own eye—I am not the first to observe that it is the Home Office which is broken—and the whole sorry cycle will continue.

There is little in the Bill which helps to put the people-smuggling gangs out of business. The only real way is to create sufficient safe and legal routes, whether through resettlement, humanitarian visas, allowing claims to be lodged at a UK embassy or from, for instance, France, or family reunion. Can the Minister tell us what assessment her department has made of the impact the Bill will have on the number of family reunion visas granted each year?

The UNHCR makes the entirely valid point that the Government’s aim of forcing people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach is by necessity absent from the refugee convention. The front-line states, which already accommodate nearly 75% of the world’s refugees, would never have signed a convention committing them to host 100%.

I second what the Conservative MP Caroline Nokes said on Report about penalising so-called group 2 refugees:

“It causes me real concern that we will create a two-tier system in which people with identical claims to safety—at identical risk from the Taliban—are treated very differently.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 311.]


The further marginalisation of asylum seekers is not only cruel but thoroughly misguided. Skills are lost and health harmed; they are left open to exploitation, with integration and naturalisation impeded and postponed. This is contrary to every interest of our society, which is to see refugees become contributing, productive and taxpaying citizens as soon as possible. Instead of keeping them in depressed limbo for years while they are demonised as scroungers for getting a princely £5.66 a day, the Government should allow all who are able to work. What is the Minister’s response to the recent warning by the Migration Advisory Committee of the “clear evidence of harm” being caused by the current ban on employment?

All I can say now about the proposals on channel pushback, which my noble friend Lady Jolly has fully covered, and offshoring is that they are utterly misconceived. I also have time only to flag my concerns about the proposals on age assessments.

Although the provisions of Clauses 1 to 8 on citizenship are largely welcome, there are two specific groups whose problems in acquiring British citizenship I want to flag: Chagos Islanders and some EU citizens. I signal my intention to join the noble Baroness. Lady Lister, if she so acts, in an amendment on the lines of that tabled in the other place by Henry Smith to restore the citizenship rights of the Chagossians and their descendants, who lost both their homeland and nationality rights when cruelly evicted 65 years ago. It is encouraging that the Minister, Tom Pursglove, indicated that he was “sympathetic” to its aims.

I will again be vigorously pursuing the obscure and obsolete legacy of comprehensive sickness insurance, this time because it is unjustly tripping up EU citizens as regards their own or their children’s British citizenship or family reunion rights.

Lastly, as well as Clause 10 on stateless children, Clause 9 is understandably causing great alarm among our compatriots who because of descent or marriage could be at risk of statelessness. Can the Minister—here I only echo the superb analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich—explain how a right of appeal against a no-notice decision works if the person does not know about that decision?

I look forward to extremely robust discussion in Committee.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I cannot read the mind of the Home Secretary, but the noble Lord is absolutely correct that that was a quote from her. On the point that she was making, I think the article he referred to was in relation to the Liverpool bomber. I think the Home Secretary gave that as an example of someone whose asylum claim had been refused. That person then went on to do potential harm to the people of this country. In fact, through the actions of the very brave taxi driver, he blew only himself up, but she was reflecting on the harm that a broken asylum system can do to the people of this country. That is why we need to give refuge to those who need our refuge and to make sure that we deter illegal migration and come down hard on those people who would wish this country harm. I hope that encapsulates my right honourable friend’s estimation of the situation and satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett.

In terms of the impact of provisions on women, which I touched on earlier, I was very interested to hear the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Coussins, Lady Lister and Lady Neuberger, about the experiences of women and girls including those fleeing sexual violence, and from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, about the experience of vulnerable people who may be experiencing physical or mental ill health. These must be quite traumatic experiences, particularly if you are in a war-torn country.

We recognise that people who have experienced those traumas may feel unable to provide evidence relating to their protection or human rights claim. That is why the Bill makes very clear that, where late evidence is provided and there are good reasons for that, the credibility penalties relating to late evidence will not apply. We will set out in guidance what can constitute good reasons to allow decision-makers the flexibility to take a case-by-case approach depending on a person’s specific situation and vulnerabilities. Looking at the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and his potential case study, it might apply in that case.

We have heard many views expressed on our proposals to make it possible to remove protection claimants to a safe country while their claims are processed. I note in particular the speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Desai, Lord German and Lord Dubs, and my noble friends Lord Horam and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate. While people are placing their lives at risk making perilous journeys, every possible option must be considered to reduce the draw of the UK. The Government have made their position clear throughout the debate: people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. We are also clear that this Bill is fully compliant with all our international obligations and we will not act in such a way which means that a person’s life is at risk or which places a person at risk of persecution, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment.

I move on to the British Hong Kong service personnel. I hope noble Lords will indulge me for an additional minute or two because I was intervened upon. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, raised concerns about the former British Hong Kong service personnel, and I think, to be fair to him, has been doing so since I have been a Home Office Minister, so I must give him credit for that. We remain extremely grateful to those former British Hong Kong service personnel. Under the British nationality selection scheme, a limited number were settled in Hong Kong and could apply to register as British citizens, as he knows. I can confirm, as he requested, that the Government have identified a potential solution to this issue and are currently investigating proposals that could see this cohort treated in a similar way to other non-UK service personnel. That would be in addition to other pathways that they may already be eligible for. There is considerable work to be done to fully scope the ramifications and impact of the policy; however, we aim to provide further details as soon as we can with a view to a solution being provided before the end of this calendar year. Given that he has waited nearly six years—under my tenure anyway—I know he has got an awful lot of patience.

More broadly in terms of international co-operation, my noble friend Lord Balfe, the noble Lords, Lord Reid, Lord German, Lord Davies, Lord Liddle and Lord Dubs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, have spoken eloquently about the need for us to work with our international partners to tackle what really are shared global challenges. I totally agree; all countries have a moral responsibility to tackle the issue of illegal migration. Most countries have got the challenge of illegal migration.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise for creating a slight extra delay, but I have listened in the last 21 minutes to the noble Baroness several times referring to “illegal migrants” or “illegal migration”. This Bill is about asylum seekers and refugees. We may differ on the legal issue of people arriving or entering irregularly, and our interpretation of the refugee convention, but under the Government’s own terms this Bill is not about illegal migrants; it is about asylum seekers.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

It is also about illegal migrants.

Going back to international partners, we expect them to engage with us and we have tried to work with them to build on our good current co-operation and continue to highlight the importance of having effective returns agreements to stop people making perilous crossings. This is an established principle of any functioning migration relationship, and it enables us to maintain public confidence in our immigration system.

We have already signed agreements with India and Albania. There are more people here illegally from India than from any other country, and there are more foreign criminals from Albania than from anywhere else. It is now easier to return criminals and people with no right to be here to both countries. Beyond this, we will seek to negotiate readmissions arrangements with key EU member states which have a mutual interest in preventing asylum seekers moving between safe countries. Where we do not have broad returns agreements, we will seek returns on a case-by-case basis. We will continue to work with our international partners to meet this joint challenge.

We have heard a range of views on international conventions. I note the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Neuberger, and the noble Lords, Lord Green of Deddington, Lord Dubs, Lord Coaker, Lord German, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, Lord Oates and Lord Griffiths of Burry Port. This Government remain committed to our international obligations, including the 1951 refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. Those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has comprehensively explained the reasons for these amendments, which we support. On the issue of good character, if someone has the right to become a British citizen—they already have that right; they just want to register it—what has good character got to do with it, particularly if they are children? Even if the applicant is guilty of a criminal offence, surely denial of citizenship is a disproportionate punishment.

What are we to say about people who acquire British citizenship at birth? We do not say to British citizens, “You’ve been found guilty of a criminal offence, so we are going to take away your citizenship.” What is the difference if people have to apply to register their British citizenship? We fully support these amendments.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I just second what everyone else has said, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, whose Amendment 9 I have had the honour to co-sign. As he pointed out, the key element to stress here is that the imposition of a good character requirement for citizenship now would perpetuate discrimination against those who have been discriminated against in the past, when the whole—laudable—point of Part 1, which, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out, is the only good bit of the Bill, is to rectify historical injustice.

Indeed, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights believes, it could well amount to

“unlawful discrimination, contrary to Article 14 as read with Article 8 ECHR, to require a person to prove good character when remedying previous unlawful discrimination against that person.”

When applied to children, it is even more unfair and obviously against their best interests. Hence the need to delete Clause 3(4), which is the focus of Amendment 9. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to the quotation that this is “divisive, alienating” and unjust, compared to the treatment of other British citizens.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords, and I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Rosser..

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling Amendments 1 and 2. Both refer to Clause 1, which I am pleased to introduce, as it corrects a long-standing anomaly in British nationality law. I appreciate my noble friend’s attention to detail in seeking to make sure that this new provision is clear and in line with the parallel provision in the British Nationality Act 1981 for children of British citizen mothers. However, we do not think that an amendment is needed, as the proposed wording here achieves what is intended. In saying that this provision applies to someone who would have been a citizen had their parents been treated equally, we are talking about a situation where the law applied equally to mothers or fathers, women or men. We are satisfied that the current wording does what is required.

I turn now to Amendment 8 and consequential Amendments 10, 12, 17 and 21, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. British citizenship is a privilege, reserved for those who meet the requirements of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who respect the law and values of the UK. This is reflected by the statutory requirement for an individual to be of good character when they apply for British citizenship. Published guidance sets out the basis for how we assess whether a person is of good character and the types of conduct that must be taken into account as part of this assessment.

Decision-makers are required to give careful consideration to each application on a case-by-case basis, and must decide on the balance of probabilities whether an applicant is of good character. Grounds for refusal of citizenship on the basis of not meeting the good character test include criminality that meets the threshold laid out in guidance, immigration offending such as illegal entry or unlawful residence, and serious adverse behaviour such as war crimes, terrorism or genocide. Such behaviour is fundamentally in opposition to core British values of decency and adherence to the law. Removing the good character requirement from all registration routes for British citizenship would mean that we could no longer refuse citizenship to those opposed to these values.

I turn, finally, to Amendment 9, for which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dubs; I know he has taken a great interest in a number of the provisions of the Bill. I start by reassuring the Committee that the Government are committed to removing discrimination from nationality legislation. That is the aim of Clauses 1 and 2. The Government also recognise the difficulties that current British nationality law has presented for some British Overseas Territories citizen parents who wish to pass on their citizenship. However, the Government do not agree that the application of the good character requirement as set out in Clause 3(4) results in unlawful discrimination. Removing the good character requirement for those applying to register as a British citizen having acquired British Overseas Territories citizenship through the new routes established by Clauses 1 and 2, as this amendment proposes, would be unfair and inconsistent with the approach for British Overseas Territories citizens who can apply to become British citizens by virtue of Section 3 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 and who are subject to the good character requirement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned the word “misdemeanour” in connection with such matters. We need to be clear that the guidance is clear that a criminal record does not necessarily mean that an application for citizenship will be refused. Those with a non-custodial sentence or who have received an out-of-court disposal will normally be refused citizenship unless three years have passed. Caseworkers have discretion to make an exceptional grant of citizenship in certain circumstances. On the subject of children, we ought to remind ourselves that 10 years old is the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales.

I want to clarify that the good character test applies only to new provisions introduced in the Bill to resolve historical discrimination where it already applies to the current route that the person would have been entitled to register under had the discrimination not existed. So the only people who will have to meet a good character requirement under Clause 3 are those who would have had an entitlement to registration as a British Overseas Territories citizen under Sections 15(3), 17(2) and 17(5) if their parents had been married, because registration under those routes carries a good character requirement.

To try to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, where people would have become British automatically had women and unmarried fathers been able to pass on citizenship at the time of their birth, the good character requirement does not apply.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how many children this issue has affected. I am afraid that I do not know the answer and will have to write to him. I should say that if the person would have become British automatically had the discrimination not existed, they will not now have to meet the good character requirement. That deserves reiteration.

I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments for the reasons that I have outlined.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Can the noble Lord address the point that I made, which I think was in the JCHR report? The courts have said that there should be an overall assessment—a holistic approach—that looks at good character as well as bad. However, the noble Lord appeared to concentrate only on a bad record being a triggering factor. He used the phrase “balance of probabilities”, but did not say that something bad could be outweighed by an otherwise wholly good record. He did not appear to suggest or confirm that overall holistic approach. He concentrated only on the negative triggers, which is precisely a fear expressed in the JCHR report. It goes against what the courts have said should be the approach.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her request for clarification. Guidance is clear that a criminal record does not necessarily mean that an application for citizenship will be refused. As I said earlier, those with a non-custodial sentence or who have received an out-of-court disposal will normally be refused citizenship unless three years have passed. But—and this is the key point—caseworkers have discretion to make an exceptional grant of citizenship in certain circumstances, which, I should imagine, would very much cover the circumstances that the noble Baroness has just described.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord Woolley of Woodford, for their support for the amendment. The amendment would extend the right to register as citizens to the descendants of Chagossians exiled from their homeland, subject to a time limit. I am grateful to Rosy Leveque of BIOT Citizens for her help with it, and to Chagossian Voices for its briefing.

To understand the case for this amendment, a bit of history is necessary. Back in the 1960s and early 1970s, the inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago—a British Overseas Territory which became part of the British Indian Ocean Territory—were evicted by the then British Government to make way for a US airbase on Diego Garcia, the largest of the islands. They have never been allowed to return. Not only did they lose their homeland, but their grandchildren and other descendants have no right to British Overseas Territory citizenship and, therefore, to British citizenship. Only those born on the islands and the first generation born in exile have such a right. I should perhaps make it clear that the right to citizenship should not be confused with the quite separate right of return, which is not affected by this amendment, important as it is.

The Chagossians were deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles and now around 4,000 live in the UK, but because of the unjust citizenship rules many are undocumented and children have been and continue to be deported. Families have been broken up and communities are divided, as some members have access to citizenship rights while others do not. This has caused hardship for many and has aggravated the trauma associated with exile. The lack of citizenship rights has created insecurity and made it harder to integrate into local communities.

In the Commons, in Committee, the Minister, Tom Pursglove, expressed some sympathy for the case made for the extension of citizenship rights and acknowledged that

“the Chagossians present a unique case.”—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 4/11/21; col. 644.]

He said he would “reflect further”. It all looked rather hopeful but when the Conservative MP, Henry Smith, raised the issue on Report, what looked like a half-open door was slammed shut by the Immigration Minister, Kevin Foster, which was very disappointing. Mr Smith emphasised the anomalies created, the injustices caused and that we are talking about no more than a few hundred to the low thousands of people who would benefit. So far, BIOT Citizens has identified 500 descendants. What is at stake is a small concession but one that would make a huge difference to the lives of those affected. It would also have symbolic importance for a people who have lost their homeland through no fault of their own.

Mr Smith’s amendment was rejected in a single paragraph. There appear to be two strings to the Government’s case. The first is that the amendment

“would undermine a long-standing principle of British nationality law … under which nationality or entitlement to nationality is not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and its territories, creating quite a major precedent.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 258.]

I am sure noble Lords can spot what a specious argument this is in this context. The only reason the Chagossians in question do not meet this condition is because they are descended from people who were evicted against their will from a British Oversees Territory. Forced and continued exile prevents them from meeting these long-standing conditions. It is not clear that the Government really understand this, but as the Junior Minister acknowledged in Committee, it is “a unique case” so no precedent would be set, unless the Government have plans to evict others from their British Overseas Territory homelands. I hope and trust that, if the noble Baroness—I think it is the noble Baroness—the Minister has been briefed to use this argument, she will scrap it now.

The second government concern is more credible. They do not want to create an open-ended right in the way that the Commons amendment did, and I think that is reasonable. This amendment therefore creates a five-year time limit for applications, following the Windrush precedent in the British Nationality Act 1981. Those aged under 18 at the time of enactment will have up until the age of 23. I am offering the Minister an opportunity to add something positive, that would be widely welcomed, to a Bill that—with very few exceptions to be found in this part of it—has been widely condemned. If this particular way of capping entitlement is not to the Government’s liking I am, of course, open to discussions about alternative means, such as a generational cap. I very much hope that the Minister will accept the amendment or a revised version of it for Report. Is she willing to meet virtually with me and other signatories to the amendment and those advising me to discuss how we might proceed? I plan to return to the issue on Report to try to put right what Henry Smith MP correctly described as an “appalling injustice”. I beg to move.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thoroughly endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has said, and I am very pleased to co-sign this amendment. In the first two groups that we discussed this morning, we talked a lot about righting injustices. This is an opportunity to right a gross historic wrong—a forced eviction and exile that was, indeed, ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice in 2019.

I was one of those who raised this issue very briefly at Second Reading. I do not think the Minister referred to it in her response, although I know she had a lot of issues to cover. It should be noted, though, that the amendment in the other place from Henry Smith MP at Report stage, which the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to, had the sizeable support of 245 Members, displaying the strength of feeling about the trauma and hardship of the Chagossian community that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to.

The all-party group on Chagos is a strong and active group that has long campaigned to right, in so far as is possible, the wrongs of the 1960s when, having resisted independence from Mauritius, of which Chagos was part, Britain secretly acceded to an American request to make one of the islands, Diego Garcia, available on a long lease as a “communications hub”. Of course, it later became notorious as a site for rendition flights. Anyway, the then British Government of, I am afraid, Harold Wilson, detached Chagos from Mauritius and then emptied Chagos, chucking out its inhabitants. This appeared, apparently, to be compensation for the Americans for the UK declining to get involved in the Vietnam War.

The saga is littered with lies and about-face. The UK told the UN that the Chagos Islands had no permanent population and the Chagossians were merely contract labourers. The British Indian Ocean Territory—BIOT—comprising all the Chagos Islands was detached from Mauritius and, between 1968 and 1973, the entire population of Chagos was removed. Some 2,000 people were deported to Mauritius, some went to the Seychelles and some arrived in the UK, particularly in Crawley, perhaps because it is near Gatwick, in Sussex.

As was discussed this morning, the purpose of Part 1 of this Bill is to address long-standing discrimination in British nationality law. I put to the Committee that Amendment 11 fits perfectly in this context. The original appalling injustice of the late 1960s and early 1970s perpetrated against the Chagossians has been compounded ever since, not only by their continuing enforced exile from their homeland but by the deprivation of their descendants of their citizenship rights. Had they not been evicted but had stayed in BIOT, they would have passed British Overseas Territory citizenship from generation to generation and some would have had the entitlement to be registered as British citizens or at least benefited from the Home Secretary’s discretion to so register them.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, Ministers in the other place have provided no justification for resisting the rectification of this injustice suffered by the Chagossians. The Government simply rely, in a sense, on the injustice of eviction to perpetuate the injustice. Because we had chucked them out, they were not BIOT citizens and so they cannot benefit from any subsequent citizenship rights. The Government now have an opportunity with this new clause to make substantial amends—hardly complete amends—for the wrongs done half a century ago. I suggest that it is wrong to seek to assert that correcting the nationality law consequences of this wrong would create any wider precedent, as the noble Baroness said.

By the way, if anyone wants to read the history of the UK’s perfidious treatment of the Chagossians, I recommend this booklet of a lecture by Professor Philippe Sands QC entitled Chagos: The Last British Colony in Africa – A Short History of Colonialism, a Modern Crime Against Humanity? and I will give this to Hansard so it can correctly identify it. I urge the Minister to give a positive response.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading. I strongly support Amendment 11, which has cross-party support. I speak as a vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Chagos Islands.

My noble friend Lady Lister explained powerfully and clearly the position of this small number of people, whose ancestors were wrongly deported from their island homes and who have been caught up in big-power politics, denying them the basic human rights that we in your Lordships’ House enjoy. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, gave the whole context.

The fact is that, although all UK Governments agree that the exile of the Chagossians from their island homes 50 years ago was wrong and unjust, the present Government continue not to allow resettlement. They cite a range of reasons for continuing this injustice, including conservation, finance, feasibility, security and defence. This is irrespective of the fact that it is well known that the American base on Diego Garcia would not be threatened or impeded by resettlement on the 54 outer islands. Indeed, the UK Government committed in their 1965 Lancaster House agreement to returning the territory

“to Mauritius when no longer needed for defence purposes.”

The outer islands are not part of the defence framework. Conservation could be maintained by the Chagossians, as happens in other marine conservation areas, and there are various avenues for assistance with resettlement costs.

It is political will and respect for human rights that are lacking. This Government are acting in defiance of the UN charter on decolonisation and United Nations General Assembly resolutions, and contrary to the opinion of the International Court of Justice and the decision of the tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in their obdurate refusal to countenance resettlement for this, I repeat, small number of people.

The all-party group strongly supports the international rule of law and the right of return. In respect of this amendment, which follows from all the events we have set out, we firmly believe that, until resettlement is permitted, Chagossians should not have to endure having loaded on them the further injustices that this amendment would remove: the separation of families, deportation and the unreasonable costs of excessive fees. The Government adopting this modest amendment, Amendment 11, would at least go some way to ameliorating the acknowledged injustice that Chagossians have endured by their exile.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Dubs and the proposal that Clause 10 should not stand part of the Bill. I put on record my thanks to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for the very helpful work that it has done on the Bill, with a whole raft of very useful reports. According to ILPA and the Bar Council, this clause contravenes the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and that should give us pause for thought. Research by the European Network on Statelessness shows how some children in very vulnerable circumstances will be affected, as my noble friend said, and found that there can be good reasons for delays in registering a child’s nationality.

To my mind, the justification that the clause is needed because there has been a significant increase in the number of registrations of stateless children smacks of the culture of disbelief and suspicion criticised by Wendy Williams in the Windrush report. Surely it is to be celebrated that more children are exercising their rights—no thanks to the Home Office, which has been dilatory in making children and their parents aware of these rights and in removing the barriers to registering them. It is thanks to the hard work of organisations such as the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens that more children and parents have become aware of the right to registration. As I say, this is to be commended, not cracked down on as if it were some kind of crime.

As the JCHR observes, and Amendment 31 addresses —a point made also by my noble friend Lord Dubs—it is difficult to see how this clause is compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. While the Home Hoffice human rights memorandum states that it has considered the best interests of the children affected, it is not clear from it how such a clause is in their best interests, so can the Minister spell out exactly how this clause meets the best interests of children affected?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I agree with the noble Baroness that we have done good work on the Bill. On a more serious note, perhaps I may say how much we appreciate the chairmanship of the right honourable Harriet Harman MP, whose recent bereavement has saddened us so much.

I will speak to both Amendments 30 and 31. As has been said by other noble Lords, Clause 10 amends the British Nationality Act to introduce new requirements for the registration of a stateless child—a child born in the UK—and could make it even more difficult for them to acquire British nationality, to which there are already significant hurdles. I could not agree more with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. Why should it be a problem that children are becoming stateless and ceasing to have the security of nationality?

Under Clause 10, the Home Secretary has to be satisfied that the child is unable to acquire another nationality. That puts that child in the position of having to prove that they could not reasonably have acquired another nationality. The policy rationale seems to be a suspicion that parents are wilfully causing their child’s statelessness—the culture of disbelief that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to. As colleagues and the JCHR say, it is difficult to see how the best interests of the child, as required by the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, are served by the new test in this provision. How is it in that child’s interests to be left stateless?

Indeed, asserts the JCHR, Clause 10

“risks punishing the child for a perceived failure”

on the part of their parent or carer, which is obviously through no fault of their own. However, the UN convention does not impose a requirement on the parent to exhaust all avenues to seek the citizenship of another state. So Clause 10 could move the UK away from the convention. I was interested that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, quoted ILFA and the Bar Council as saying that they do indeed think that this is a contravention of the convention, and I can see why. Amendment 30 is an attempt to move the UK back towards the intention of the convention by saying that British citizenship could only be withheld

“where the nationality of a parent is available to the child immediately, without any legal or administrative hurdles.”

Amendment 31 aims to make the best interests of the child central to the decision-making.

Finally, in addition to the risk of alienation from our society of individual children, it cannot be in the interests of British society as a whole for young people born here to be excluded from sharing citizenship and thus rootedness in their community.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I support the amendments and the proposal that Clause 10 should not stand part, and my noble friend Lady Bennett of Manor Castle has also signed them. We should be making it as easy as possible for children to obtain a nationality if they are already stateless. Quite honestly, who dreams up these cruel clauses at the Home Office? Do they not have a heart when they are writing these things? Do they not understand the impact that they can have on children through no fault of the child? The decision should be made purely in the best interests of the child, as provided by Amendment 31. I hope that the Government change course and make this as easy and straightforward as possible. People outside are looking in and are judging this to be cruel, unpleasant and perfectly horrendous.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I assume that it is the latter, but I will write to the noble Lord with the details of the figures I have here. In particular, I will give him more detail about the countries from which these cases derive.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I want to follow up, because the Minister has answered the question I was going to ask. She mentioned that the 1,700 figure—I cannot remember what year it was for—was evidence of abuse, and as she just replied to my noble friend, she is assuming that the parents in those cases could not apply. It seems to me that there is no evidence of abuse. I am thinking of the strengthened safeguards in Amendments 30 and 31, especially Amendment 31. The Home Secretary must be satisfied that “in all the circumstances” it is reasonable, et cetera. The Minister referred to circumstances where parents cannot access the authorities of the relevant state. One can think of dozens of countries around the world in conflict, civil war or whatever chaos. Adding the words

“without any legal or administrative barriers”

would go with the flow of the Home Secretary having to be satisfied that it is reasonable to refuse, and I really cannot see why the Home Office cannot accept Amendment 30, even if it is claiming that Amendment 31 is unnecessary because it already cares about the best interests of the child.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I shall write to noble Lords about this in more detail, because it is quite detailed, and explain where the figures have derived from. I was actually quoting the judge in his conclusion that an “obvious route to abuse” would be opened. I shall send the figures to the noble Baroness. On case sampling, many of the cases have a poor immigration history, with 79% of the parents having no leave at the time of the birth and only 16% having such leave, but I will outline it to noble Lords in greater detail and they can draw their own conclusion.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

34: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Acquisition of British citizenship by birth or adoption: comprehensive sickness insurance
(1) The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 is amended as follows.(2) After section 15, insert—15A Comprehensive sickness insurance(1) For the purposes of any decision taken by a public authority under this Part after commencement of this section, a person is to be treated as having met a requirement to have held comprehensive sickness insurance, whenever they—(a) had access to the NHS in practice, or(b) held a comprehensive sickness insurance policy.(2) This section applies in particular to any decisions taken under residence scheme immigration rules.”(3) The British Nationality Act 1981 is amended as follows.(4) After section 1(3A) insert—“(3B) A person born in the United Kingdom after commencement who is not a British citizen is entitled, on application, to register as a British citizen if the person’s father or mother would have been settled in the United Kingdom at the time of the person’s birth, if Assumption A had applied.(3C) Assumption A is that, in assessing whether the person’s father or mother met a requirement to have held comprehensive sickness insurance, this is to be regarded as having been satisfied whenever they—(a) had access to the NHS in practice, or(b) held a comprehensive sickness insurance policy.(3D) Registration under subsection (3B) is free of charge.”(5) After section 50A insert—50B ExceptionsNotwithstanding any provision of section 50A, for the purposes of an application for naturalisation or registration made under this Act, a person—(a) is not to be treated as having been in the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws during a period of time that has been counted as part of a continuous qualifying period in a grant of leave to that person under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules, and(b) is not to be treated as not being of good character on account of a failure to hold comprehensive sickness insurance during some period of residence in the UK.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause provides that a person seeking to naturalise as a British citizen, seeking to exercise family reunion rights as a naturalised British citizen, or seeking to have their UK-born children recognised as British at birth, need not have had comprehensive sickness insurance prior to naturalising or prior to the birth of their child.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I hope not to have to detain the Committee for too long on this admittedly complicated subject of the anomalous historical legacy of comprehensive sickness insurance—hereafter CSI—because I am hoping that the Minister will spring up, interrupt me and pledge that the Home Office will resolve all the left-over problems faced by some EU citizens today. She was kind enough to meet me virtually last week, and I detected a degree of thoughtfulness in her department on the subject. I cannot yet put it higher than that, but I am hopeful.

Attentive listeners might recall that some of us— especially, perhaps, I—banged on about the obscure issue of CSI at various points in the debates on EU withdrawal and, in particular, on the UK’s EU settlement scheme. It is a long and, in my view, sorry history. I will recap as briefly as I can: in the EU citizens’ rights directive of nearly 20 years ago—which I worked on as a Member of the European Parliament, hence my long-standing interest—so-called free movers were required to have comprehensive sickness insurance; that was the term used. On the continent, health systems are often covered by state insurance systems. In the UK, we have the NHS or private health insurance. Although of course we have national insurance, people do not think of the NHS as an insured scheme. So there has been a long-running problem of EU citizens in Britain who are not employed, such as students, the self-employed and homemakers, being expected—although, crucially, not usually told—to have private insurance. This was a matter of legal dispute in Brussels, which rumbled on, and I do not think it ever got resolved.

Fast forward to Brexit and the acute issue of whether those lacking private health insurance were legally resident in the UK and could seek settled status under the withdrawal agreement. Fortunately, the UK Government wisely cut through that residual red tape and said, in an admirably pragmatic decision, that they would let everyone get settled status. However, often unbeknownst to individuals, they fell into one of two groups: the true cohort and the extra cohort. The significance of this distinction arises only—indeed only becomes known —when a settled person seeks to register a child’s birth, to naturalise themselves as British or to bring a family member to join them in this country. Then they face a veritable series of snakes and ladders, because any historical gap in CSI—private insurance—may make them slide down into a pit of reptilian problems. Only when they seek to register a child, bring in a spouse or become a British citizen might they be told: “Aha! Your historic lack of CSI is a bar.” Noble Lords will recall that it was not a bar to them getting settled status, but it raises its ugly head at this later stage. At the risk of mixing my metaphors, it is Kafkaesque.

Certainly, in the case of bids for naturalisation, caseworkers have—but only through guidance—been given discretion to waive this historic need for CSI to meet the lawful residence requirement. On Report in the other place, the Minister, Kevin Foster, said that

“no one has been refused British citizenship purely on the basis of the CSI requirement in free movement regulations.”

The trouble is that if an applicant has to stump up around £1,300, without the certainty of the outcome because of the discretion for the caseworker, that is a gamble—potentially an expensive one.

I am asking the Government to carry through the pragmatic logic whereby they decided to ignore the past lack of CSI for settled status and now to wipe the slate entirely clean for subsequent immigration applications and statuses. On 7 December, Minister Foster told the other place

“we are considering how the issues could be picked up as part of our work on simplification”.

He hoped that MPs would

“be pleased to hear that we are looking closely at that work.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 260.]

That was a bit encouraging.

Perhaps the Minister could give us a more solid basis of hope, in relation not just to naturalisation but to the other applications, such as the registration of a baby’s birth and family reunion. I am sure that millions of EU citizens, resident in and contributing to this country, would be immensely grateful for the peace of mind they would thereby secure. Who knows? Their gratitude might rebound on this Government. I hope for good news. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I hesitate to follow my noble friend, who is an expert on this issue. I declare an interest as a British citizen seeking a residence permit in Norway, where I have lived with my husband for the last 14 years. I have always had access to the Norwegian national health system. My application for a residence permit—the equivalent of settled status—has been outstanding for over 12 months because of issues with comprehensive health insurance.

I start by thanking the Government for their generous approach to EU and EEA citizens seeking settled status in the UK. The Government have taken the general approach that, if someone has been living here for years and was legally accessing the NHS when the UK was part of the EU, they do not need to have, to have had or acquire comprehensive health insurance, even if—as with me in Norway—they are not working or studying. This goes beyond the Brexit agreement, but is entirely consistent with the principle that EU and EEA citizens living in the UK prior to Brexit should be able to continue to live here on the same terms after Brexit. It is the right thing to do. I am grateful to the Government for taking such an approach. I wish Norway would do the same.

My understanding of this amendment is that it goes a step beyond settled status—where EU and EEA citizens who have qualified for settled status seek to be naturalised as British citizens, to exercise family reunion rights as a naturalised British citizen, or to have their UK-born children recognised as British at birth. Even though they do not have to have comprehensive sickness insurance for settled status, it currently appears that they may have to have it for citizenship purposes. This amendment seeks to rectify that anomaly between settled status and citizenship. I am getting a nod, so that is okay.

What this amendment seeks to achieve follows on logically from the generous and welcome stance of the British Government on settled status in relation to comprehensive sickness insurance. We support the amendment.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I certainly welcome a great deal of what the Minister had to say, and I thank her for it. I will have to read Hansard just to make sure that I have mastered every detail of her response. This is an incredibly complicated subject; I think I have forgotten almost everything I thought I knew about settled status. It is one of those things that has become a bit of a blur over the last six years. Certainly, she said some very positive things, and was very clear, in particular, about family reunion rights. I was not entirely sure about the registration of a birth. The Minister maintained the need for discretion and the caseworker guidance for naturalisation. I was not really sure why that was necessary.

With the slight caveat that I will want to read in detail what she said on this complex subject, there is, indeed, room for considerable congratulations and gratitude that the Minister has grasped this issue by the horns. I had better stop the metaphor there. She has made progress, and there is cause for considerable rejoicing. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 34 withdrawn.

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[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I rise first of all, briefly, to support Amendment 129, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. It is clear, necessary and relatively simple, at least in principle, so I trust that the Government will consider it very carefully.

Our asylum system is already overwhelmed, with a backlog of cases approaching 125,000, which is, I think, rather more than the British Army. So we have to do everything we can to reduce the inflow of those entering by illegal means. In brackets, I say to the Minister that I hope he will take this opportunity to deny that the Government now intend to bury the statistics and emerge only every three months to tell us what is happening.

That said, I would like to speak briefly about the points that have just been made by other noble Lords about the need for safe routes for asylum seekers wishing to come here. I think we need to be a lot more careful about how we address this. My noble friend has just referred to the 80 million refugees in the world. The numbers are huge, even if these are only a third of those who are actually going to move from one country to another. Is it really being suggested that we have a system whereby any who would like to leave his own country has only to purchase a ticket to London and will then be accommodated, et cetera, and his case will be heard? Is that really what is proposed? What about those who fail? Some 70% of the people now arriving across the Channel are young males. I suspect that they are not, in most cases, the ones who are most in need. If this is not to fly completely out of control and reach a level at which the public will react rather strongly against the sheer size of the inflow, we have to be a lot more careful.

It has been suggested that one way to tackle this would be to have missions overseas to take the applications. I am sure that is being considered very carefully, but I am sure that the outcome of that consideration will be that it just will not work. Those posts—whether embassies or some special posts set up in the third world—would be overwhelmed in a matter of weeks. Then you have to ask the Governments of the countries concerned what will happen to those who turned up, quite often from neighbouring countries, did not get the permission that they were hoping for, and are hanging around the embassy or wherever it is in ever-growing numbers. The host Governments would not care for that at all, and it would not achieve anything as far as we are concerned; it would simply mean that the inflow would become, in principle, pretty unmanageable. I really think we have to be careful about this talk of “safe routes”. We keep hearing it all the time; we never hear what is actually meant. I would like to hear from colleagues in this Committee how they propose to organise 30 million people who would like to come here. It cannot be done; there is no public support for it on that scale, and we really need some clear and logical thought.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Can I just ask the noble Lord about his assumption—it seemed to be a stereotype—that young single men are not at risk? I do not claim to be an expert on the profile of asylum seekers, but one can imagine that, because a young man might be seen to be less vulnerable than a young woman in a dangerous journey towards safety and, perhaps, also vulnerable to recruitment into ISIS, for instance, actually it is not that surprising that it may be young single men who are arriving on our shores in greater numbers than young single women. I just think that it is probably important to avoid prejudicial stereotypes that, somehow, young men are not at any risk and therefore can be locked up—I just looked at the Times article that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned. It sometimes seems to me that we are at risk of demonising young men.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, it is not demonising; it is common sense. The routes that now exist are dangerous and difficult, and the people who are capable of getting through them are the young. But they are by no means the only people, nor necessarily the most deserving of our help. This is why I ask that we have a little more logic and thinking before we simply rattle off about safe routes for asylum seekers.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

But that is why we need family reunion routes.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Can I just point out that the Refugee Council, for example, has made the point that cutting back and restricting family reunion rights, which the Bill will do—this is one of the key safe and legal routes—will particularly affect women and children? Plenty has been written about what safe and legal routes might look like—it is family reunion; it is humanitarian visas. Is the noble Lord really suggesting that we have no responsibility to the kind of people that my noble friend talked about? No one is suggesting that everyone comes over here, but much poorer countries than this country are taking responsibility for asylum seekers, and we will not take any responsibility.

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[Lord Lea of Crondall (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I think the House would be grateful if somebody, in one sentence, expressed appreciation for the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham. No one doubts that, over the past 50 years or so, he has been a beacon of liberalism within his party. The point he made in this connection is that there is a great dilemma facing us all. Apart from climate change, the dilemma is that, for governance systems in parts of the world—Africa is the continent that springs to mind—we will have to have a new arrangement for crossing the Mediterranean whereby we do not get into all these problems, which are getting worse. That speech is not easy to make, but I just want to say that the honesty and the examination of the dilemmas we all face has been a credit to this House.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I remind everyone that Clause 11 is not only not about immigration, let alone illegal immigration; it is not even about asylum seekers. It is titled “Differential treatment of refugees”—people who have been recognised and accepted as entitled to asylum in this country. What Clause 11 means is that the Government want to penalise a certain category of people who have been accepted as refugees. On the one hand, we accept them as refugees, but then we are going to turn round and penalise them in various ways for how they arrived. I have agreed with all the critics of Clause 11, and I agree that Clause 11 as a whole needs to get the chop.

Clause 11 wants to penalise people with a much-reduced permission to stay; by requiring several frequent applications for further permission to stay; by keeping them in uncertainty for many years; by excluding them from public funds; and by delaying or denying altogether a visa for family reunion. I suggest that this is not only pernicious, as everyone has said, but costly. It is costly to that individual and it is costly to society, because it is not good for society when you have people who are unable to integrate and living with instability, isolation, possible destitution, homelessness and separation from family. They have been recognised as refugees, which means that we expect these people to be part of our society. I cannot see that it is good for society.

I had the opportunity, when the Minister was kind enough to meet me, to receive the great news on CSI. I come at this with an approach of both principle and practicality. As I say, I cannot see that it is in the interests of either society or the Home Office to have people living in this constant fear of what their futures are going to hold. We are told that the asylum system is broken. We know about the 125,000 unresolved applications. We know about the time and delays; on average, it now takes a year to decide a case. When I was an MEP, I had people who had been waiting three and a half years for an initial application, with the harm it did to them physically and mentally and to their status within their family as well. How is it going to help the Home Office to have more administration in constantly having to review these applications to decide whether it is going to deny public funds or renew the permission to stay?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

If I understand the noble Baroness aright, there is nothing to stop this sovereign Parliament setting out how it interprets the refugee convention in future. She enumerated four Members of the Committee who had spoken supportively. I think it is the case that none of them argued that the Bill was not a breach of the convention. We had some powerful legal advice that it was a clear breach of the convention. I ask her to remember that the last time this House was asked to pass a Bill that broke an international commitment was on the internal market Bill, and it took the very clear view that pacta sunt servanda mattered and that we should stick to our word.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I was not clear about the noble Baroness’s reference to me. The fact that I did not actually say that I believed Clause 11 breaks the refugee convention does not mean that I do not think that it does, because everybody else had said it. I was not quite clear what she meant.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think what I was trying to say, maybe clumsily, was that the noble Baroness was trying to get back to the amendments.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The clause breaches the refugee convention, in my opinion. I agree with many people who said that.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I was not making that point, but I accept the noble Baroness’s point.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, just said that the four Members did not argue that the clause is not a breach of the convention. The four Members I singled out for mention were trying to explain public opinion in the round and the need to take note and do something about their concerns, notwithstanding the fact that the British public are warm and welcoming. We are a nation of immigrants. I think my noble and learned friend wants to intervene.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I was at pains to say that this is under national resettlement schemes. I have not tried to mask the figures. I have been very clear about how many people we have taken under national resettlement schemes.

I was about to hold up a prop, although I know that is not done in your Lordships’ House. I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who had to go, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Fox; she apologised for that. I wrote to noble Lords about the safe and legal routes, and I think the reason that some noble Lords do not want to acknowledge it is that they do not accept what we have done. I have looked at how many different family reunion schemes we have. We have four, including refugee family reunion. I will spend a moment to really spell this out, because some noble Lords just seem to not want to hear it. We have granted over 39,000 refugee family reunion visas since 2015, of which more than half were granted to children. Comparing that to the Dublin scheme, under the Dublin regulation, we transferred 714 people to the UK in 2019. In the same year, we issued 7,456 visas under our family reunion rules. It does not take a genius to work out that is 10 times the amount. Part 8 of the Immigration Rules—paragraph 319X—allows relatives to sponsor. We also have paragraph 297 and Appendix FM. Under Appendix FM, in 2020 there were 40,255 family-related visas granted. Please do not keep talking about us undermining family reunion, because we just have not. It is not true. I ask noble Lords to refer back to the letter that I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—I think that was last week.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I hope the Minister would acknowledge that—speaking only for myself—what I was doing was objecting to the restriction. I did not criticise the existing record, although my proposed Private Member’s Bill would expand the scope. The objection is to the poor proposed treatment of group 2 refugees under family reunion. I was not talking about the numbers to date.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I would because I am getting thoroughly confused, which is something I perhaps do quite frequently, I accept. I will read out again from the JCHR report. It says:

“The policy paper that preceded the Bill, the Government’s ‘New Plan for Immigration’, gave a more detailed indication of what different treatment may look like, as it proposed that instead of fully fledged refugee status, Group 2 refugees would be granted ‘temporary protection’ for a period of no longer than 30 months ‘after which individuals [would] be reassessed for return to their country of origin or removal to a safe third country.’ Temporary protection status ‘will not include an automatic right to settle in the UK, family reunion rights will be restricted and there will be no recourse to public funds except in cases of destitution.’”


Those are quotations from the Government’s New Plan for Immigration policy statement. In relation to group 2 refugees, who are being created by Clause 11 —that is the new bit and what the Bill is doing—it quite clearly states:

“family reunion rights will be restricted”.

I ask again: is that correct or incorrect? If it is not, why is it written in the JCHR report? If the Minister is going to tell me that the JCHR has got it wrong, please say so clearly now.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness responds, I add that I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is confused: I fear that the Minister is being mildly disingenuous with us. Can she confirm that there is a difference in the intended treatment of group 1 and group 2 refugees as concerns family reunion? Otherwise, what is the point of Clause 11(6):

“The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may … treat the family members of Group 1 and Group 2 refugees differently, for example in respect of … whether to give the person leave to enter or remain”


et cetera? What is the point of this being in the Bill if there is no intention to treat group 2 refugees differently? The Minister told us about how this will not breach the refugee convention and so on. I asked specifically about the comments on Article 8, and I look forward to her replying specifically on that. But can she confirm whether their intention is to treat group 1 and group 2 refugees differently in terms of rights to family reunion?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

May I just add to that? Clause 11(5) says:

“The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may treat Group 1 and Group 2 refugees differently, for example in respect of … whether leave to enter or remain is given to members of the refugee’s family.”

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this will not be the last time we talk about the need for a trauma-informed approach. I think the expression “necessary delay”, used by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, is very useful and applies much better to this situation than “without delay”, which is what we are faced with.

Even without the background and experiences referred to in this amendment, I cannot imagine undertaking the sort of journey that most people fleeing from the situations they are in will have undertaken. Any asylum seeker will be in a pretty awful state. Many will be anxious about authority figures. It is incumbent on us to ensure that they are not retraumatised. We should not require them to present a coherent explanation and make a claim so quickly.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, talked about the possible survival of Clause 11. I would add Clause 36 to that. I do not think this provision can be read without looking at Clause 36, which deals with Article 31 of the convention. Clause 36(2) says:

“A refugee is not to be taken to have presented themselves without delay”—


“presented themselves” is the phrase used in Clause 11—

“unless … they made a claim for asylum as soon as reasonably practicable after their arrival in the United Kingdom.”

I do not think it is necessary to read the whole clause.

I hope the Minister can explain how, in practical terms, given the life experiences that we are suggesting, “present” and “make a claim” relate to one another. Does making a claim

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

mean presenting the substance of a claim? If I read these two clauses correctly, we now have “presenting oneself” and “making a claim”. Failure, under Clause 11, to present not just oneself but one’s claim takes one straight into the territory of late evidence and all the horrors of criminality and second-class status.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly. The remarks by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, made me reflect. She was talking about how it takes a year, 18 months or two years for the people whom she has met in the course of her admirable-sounding charity, to be able to fully open up and explain themselves. This makes me think how similar this is to grief. For asylum seekers who have been forced to flee everything that is familiar to them—their home, country, family and links—and arrive in a strange place, this is a form of grief and bereavement.

I am not the only person in this Chamber who has suffered a relatively recent bereavement. I would not say that I have fully recovered after a year, 18 months, two years—even two and a half years. Indeed, I never will be. Given the disorientation and the inability to fully function, a year, 18 months or two years is not wide of the mark for how long you need to get your act together to handle an asylum claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

It is the principle that I am seeking to deal with. The noble Lord is quite right to ask the question, and perhaps my noble friend the Minister can do some comparisons, but there is no doubt that our colleagues in France feel that one of the key perceived pull factors causing people to get involved in these very dangerous crossings is this subject of no recourse to public funds. That is the only question I am raising. We are being heavily criticised by our French colleagues for allowing ourselves to encourage pull factors to grow and escalate, and that is causing the problem to be much more serious than it was.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My recollection of the French criticism is that they were criticising the ability of asylum seekers to work in the black economy—not the ability to be idle and live off the taxpayer. I imagine that any welfare possibilities in the UK would be less than in France. What they are criticising is the relative unregulated state of our employment market. Some of that criticism is valid; some is not, but we are all sometimes worried by illegal employment. That is what the French were talking about.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

When I look into the detail of the criticism, it is much wider than the noble Baroness is suggesting. Part of it must be NRPF—I am not saying it is the whole problem—and I just wish that we would address—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for giving way. I would like to clarify one point. I think she is saying that the removal or application of, or access to, public funds is discretionary. If that is the case, who has the discretion to apply or withdraw them? It is unusual for the welfare state to be quite so discretionary and, in effect, subject to subjective judgment. It would help to have clarity as to who can say this person will have access to public funds and that person will not.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the Minister answers—I am sorry to prolong the debate; I was going to leave this point until group 8 on the right to work—she talked about pull factors being an absolute fact, but the Migration Advisory Committee said in its annual report in December:

“To the extent that the Home Office has robust evidence to support a link between the employment ban and a pull factor, they should of course make this evidence publicly available for scrutiny and review. That is how good policy is made.”

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, but I disagree.

To answer my noble friend’s intervention about who decides, it is caseworkers.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to these amendments and congratulate my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett on so eloquently moving the amendment. I also congratulate the other speakers who have spoken in favour.

I particularly welcome Amendment 61 of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, because, as he said, he introduces into it elements—human rights and the regard to the special provisions within the Equality Act —of which we should be proud and on which we should lead internationally. I give my wholehearted support to that because, as noble Lords have heard me say before—I make no apologies for saying it again and again—in each of these situations, I imagine what I would want as an asylum seeker or refugee. I must imagine myself in that situation. Some who read our newspapers would believe that it is a picnic and a party; it is certainly not at the moment in the United Kingdom. I believe that the signal that we are sending out with the Bill and with these amendments is that asylum seekers and those seeking refuge are not welcome.

To reiterate the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I remember that, when I was a Member of the European Parliament many years ago, I was approached by a person whose partner was a gay man from Belarus who was seeking asylum here. His asylum process was going through and, suddenly, in the very early hours of the morning, he was arrested and detained at a detention centre. Let us make no bones about it: Clause 12(9) introduces detention centres—they are called “accommodation” centres, but asylum seekers are detained and cannot leave them at will. This is why the minimum conditions that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham outlined are a basic and bare necessity to which we should adhere. This young gay man was placed in a detention centre for a number of weeks and had to sleep in shared accommodation; we managed to get him out because his partner could afford a rather brilliant lawyer to plead the case. While he was there, he contemplated suicide on an hourly basis. This young man is now in a senior job in the United Kingdom, paying his taxes, his dues and his national insurance and abiding by the same rules and laws as everyone else. But he still lives with that scar every single day, and I do not want any other person to experience that.

Placing vulnerable people back into these situations, as outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, only increases stress and the damage to mental health. If LGBTQI people are put back into the communities from which they have fled, they face further oppression within places that should be safe, and it makes it much more difficult for them to prove their LGBTQI status to others.

Someone once said to me, “Oh, being trans is just a feeling, isn’t it?” Well, I cannot prove to anyone that I am a gay man; it is a feeling and one that I have when I look at another human being—although not every single man, interestingly enough. Therefore, we have to deal with these particular issues, not only of LGBTQI people but all of these vulnerable asylum seekers.

I will finish with this. In roughly 1600, Shakespeare co-wrote a play; it was the only play that he co-wrote and it is “Sir Thomas More”. Sir Thomas More is called to London because the citizens of London are rebelling—they had probably read the tabloids of the day—because “the strangers” had made their way from Calais via Dover to London. In a parenthesis to a speech, Thomas More comes out, and with one hand silences the crowd. In that silence, a voice shouts, “Remove them!” Thomas More replies: “You bid that they be removed, the stranger, with their children upon their back, their families at their side, their belongings at their feet. Imagine you are the stranger, with your children upon your back, your family at your side, your belongings at your feet. Imagine you are the stranger and bid that they be removed and show your mountanish inhumanity.” It is a great privilege and pleasure to support these amendments.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group and I ask the Minister to address in her response a couple of issues, particularly in relation to Amendments 57 and 61, about restricting the placing of vulnerable people in accommodation centres—military barracks. When a similar amendment to Amendment 57 was tabled in Committee in the other place, the Home Office Minister, Tom Pursglove, said it was

“unnecessary because there are no plans to place those with children in accommodation centres”.—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 21/10/21; col. 295.]

If the Home Office has no such plans, which is a welcome commitment, why will it not accept a statutory shield against placing at least children in those centres?

Wider than that, I am grateful to the British Red Cross, which has reminded us that there is a Home Office policy document, of which the latest update was in May 2021, called Allocation of Accommodation Policy. It has a section on “Asylum seekers considered unsuitable for Napier”, which starts with the statement:

“Women and dependent children are not suitable to be accommodated at Napier”,


before listing further cases, including potential survivors of modern slavery, people with a disability and those with complex health needs. The tablers of Amendment 57, which I support, say the list should be longer and should include those under Amendment 61. If the Home Office has these policy commitments, it is my contention that it ought to accept the amendments restricting the types of people who would be sent to these accommodation centres. I would be very pleased to hear the Minister agree and therefore accept at least Amendments 57 and 61.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, noble Lords will not be surprised if I strike a somewhat different note; none the less, it is a note that needs to be heard. I think we need to stand back before addressing this group of amendments. We cannot and should not assume that everyone who claims asylum in this country has a case and is a genuine asylum seeker. The Home Secretary said recently that of those crossing the channel, 70% were more likely to be, and were in fact, economic migrants rather than genuine refugees. A historical view, I think, gives a figure of something like 50% of asylum seekers whose cases were rejected after very careful legal procedure. So, I think we have to stand back and not simply assume that all applicants have two wings and a halo.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, except that she dropped me into a group that I have never considered myself to be part of: that of post retirement. As to whether or not it is a pleasure to be working here, obviously it is an honour, and clearly it is better to be able to shout across the Chamber than at the television or radio. Is it good for my blood pressure? Probably not.

However, it is a pleasure to have signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and other eminent noble Lords in this Chamber. For me, banning people from working is just one of the many ways that the Government dehumanise and punish asylum seekers. I honestly cannot see the logic behind it. Why would we not want them to work? Why would we not want them to play a role in society? Why would we not want to engage them and get them out of the probably dreadful accommodation that they are living in? Where is the logic in not letting them work? It will leave them destitute, which is not healthy for them or for us—though I suppose it is slightly better than sending them back to face persecution in their home country.

This Government are not brave enough. They pander to the right-wing parts of their own party and the country, and constantly use nationalist rhetoric to divide and rule. The Conservative Members of the House of Lords are better than that—and some of them do argue against what the Government say. On this occasion, this side of the Chamber is absolutely right: asylum seekers should be allowed to work.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the case for asylum seekers being able to work after a few months is compelling. I am sorry that we have not heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, but I perfectly understand why she is not able to be here. Amendment 65 was admirably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.

In the debate on Clause 11, several noble Lords invoked public opinion, saying that it was wary of immigration. I suggest that obliging asylum seekers to be idle, existing in some cases on taxpayer support, is a surefire way to prejudice public opinion against them, especially those apparently fit young men who have been demonised recently. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, reminded us that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has a provision of the right to work, and I thank him for reminding us of that.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

The noble Baroness made a very important point about public opinion. I draw her attention to a study by British Future which found that 71% of the public support the right to work after six months.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The noble Lord has taken the wind out of my sails; I was going to quote that statistic, though I must admit I did not know it came from there. I got it from the splendid Lift the Ban organisation.

If the majority of people who seek asylum are ultimately found to be entitled to stay here as refugees, after either an initial decision or an appeal, how demoralising and frustrating for them to then be excluded from employment, and be unable to help support their families or to deploy and develop their skills, possibly for several years, or even a decade, as we have heard, while knowing that the host society may regard them as freeloading layabouts. It is of course a waste of a resource.

This is not just a leftie, Liberal cause. Not only was Amendment 65 led by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, from the Benches opposite, but everyone has already spoken about the Migration Advisory Committee report, and I assume it is not going to be accused of being some leftie, Liberal outfit. As has been said, the MAC has told the Home Secretary that there is clear evidence of harm being caused by the job ban, particularly in the context of a rising number of claimants waiting for more than six months for determination of their claim. The Government argue that the ability to work would be a pull factor, but the MAC says that Ministers have failed to provide clear evidence to support this contention, and that it would instead be good policy to assist asylum seekers to “integrate well into society” by letting them work while their cases are decided. I will not delay: I was going to give the same quote that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, did—I jumped the gun and cited it the other day—about the Home Office needing to provide robust evidence because that is how good policy is made.

Amendment 65 has the advantage of requiring permission to work to be granted after a wait of six months. That is stronger than the drafting of Amendment 64, which empowers someone to apply. Ideally, I would like an Amendment 64.5, allowing someone to work after three months but with the drafting of Amendment 65 on requiring permission to be given. The second element in Amendment 65 is that it would not limit the type of work that asylum seekers could undertake, unlike the current policy of restricting them and then, after 12 months—which is too long—using the shortage occupation list. That list is narrow, and many asylum seekers would not have relevant experience or qualifications.

As other noble Lords have said, it is extremely odd—indeed illogical—that the Government want to keep asylum seekers in enforced welfare dependency while, as shown by this morning’s Answer from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, to the Oral Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, defending imposing benefits sanctions after four weeks on unemployed jobseekers who failed to take a job. Why then not allow asylum seekers to work? Most of us would support people trying to get a job, although there can be argument about the policy of the Government.

On Tuesday, the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and others impressed on us the need to take account of public opinion. To repeat, the ban on work makes asylum seekers the potential butt of ignorant jibes that they are lazy scroungers. Some 71% of the public support the right to work after six months. The right to work is a win-win policy. It would save the taxpayer £200 million a year. It would help remedy a labour shortage. I had in my notes that it is a no-brainer, so I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I very much hope that the Government will respond positively.

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[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

I am a bit puzzled. Although the precise numbers vary from year to year, it is quite clear that substantial numbers—30%, 40% or 50%, depending on which year you take—turn out not to have a case for asylum in this country. Surely that should be a factor. Surely the way forward is, as the noble Lord proposed when he first spoke, to speed this situation up so that we can get the answers within the six months, which would be much better for everybody. Surely that should be the centre of their policy.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Can I intervene on an intervention? What is wrong if those people are allowed to work? If it is then determined that they have no right to stay, they would then have to leave—but, in the meantime, they are supporting themselves, perhaps using their skills and contributing tax. If they are then found not to have a legal claim to stay, so be it. I cannot see what the harm is in the meantime.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Green, that, at the end of the day, of course you want to speed the system up. No one does not want to speed up the asylum application process—to say that would be ridiculous, because of course everyone does. What I am saying is that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has just said, at the same time, for the purposes of community cohesion and all the other things that we have heard, allowing asylum seekers to work while their application is being processed is actually a sensible thing to do. But the Government will not publish the evidence for why that is a pull factor, when the policy has been in place since 2001 or 2002 or whatever and has not made any significant difference at all. So all sorts of people and organisations support the right to work, which seems a sensible and reasonable thing to do.

I will finish by saying one simple policy to the Minister. I like to see people off benefits; I do not want to see people languishing on benefits. I thought that was a Conservative Government policy. One of the ways of doing that is allowing people to work: it aids community cohesion and is good for the individuals concerned. I simply do not understand why the Government are turning their face against what is a sensible policy initiative that would do a lot for community cohesion.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that there has to be some shared responsibility in Europe. In particular, his point about Greece, Italy and Spain was well made. They have had to bear the brunt of the inflow of asylum seekers to a very difficult extent, and I understand their problems. The noble Lord was also right that, whatever other solutions may be forthcoming on this very difficult issue, we will eventually have to have some agreement with the French. I am rather hopeful that, with the departure of the noble Lord, Lord Frost, we may have a better chance of reaching agreement—I say that with no malice to the noble Lord, Lord Frost, who I am sure did a very difficult job his way, but none the less, the fact that he has gone seems to me to be rather good news from the point of view of having a rather more diplomatic approach to France. I am glad that the Foreign Office in particular may now be in charge of that. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, will agree that it is probably better for the Foreign Office to have more say in this matter than under the previous arrangements.

What I am concerned about reflects what the Chief Whip said earlier on. Clauses 14 and 15 seem to do no more than bring into British law what we already had when we were in the European Union—that is all they do—using the Dublin regulations and the Spanish protocol. This is nothing more than a transfer. We have all the rights that we enjoyed when we were members of the European Union to take account of particular circumstances and difficulties which people may have in getting evidence and so forth. All these fairly extensive amendments are already taken account of by our existing rights, so I do not see how we can spend very long on these clauses, given that they really do no more than a transfer job.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord is right about EU arrangements. I remember as an MEP fighting hard on the inadmissibility provisions in EU directives. On the Dublin arrangements, my understanding is that the UNHCR is satisfied that those arrangements were compliant with the refugee convention. I contend that Clause 15 is not, hence I have put my name to some of the amendments in this group. My noble friend will propose that Clause 15 be removed altogether, as it fails to recognise the need to share asylum responsibilities with other countries in order for the international system to work effectively, but at least some changes to the clause are necessary, and so I have co-signed the amendments suggested by the JCHR, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.

Amendments 69, 70, 71 and 75 all seek to restrict and improve the operation of the scheme proposed in Clause 15. I also support Amendment 68, and convey the apologies of my noble friend Lord Oates, who has a conflict with other business. Clause 15 is about proposals whereby the UK would attempt to persuade some other country to take responsibility for the asylum applicant if it considered that there was a connection to that state, broadly defined, or even if there was no connection at all.

Amendment 69 seeks to ensure that the definition of “safe third State” means it affords the protection and rights to which the person is entitled, so there is no real risk of them experiencing persecution, a violation of their human rights or refoulement, and that there is access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and refugee convention rights. Amendment 70 seeks to ensure that any removal should be only to a state with which the person has a connection. Amendment 71 requires that, unless formal and legal binding return arrangements are in place with the state in question—such as was the case with Dublin, which is why the UNHCR gave it its blessing—and removal takes place within a reasonable period. Absent those conditions, there must be no declaration of inadmissibility and the claim must be considered in the UK. Amendment 75 removes and rejects the suggestion that the UK can remove a claimant to a country in which the UK Government think it would have been reasonable for them to have made a claim, even if they had never visited that country.

As I said, even if these four amendments were adopted, Clause 15 would still be flawed. It would create yet greater delays, backlogs and costs in the asylum system. As we keep saying, the Home Office says the system is broken yet it wants to shoot itself in the foot by having ever-more complicated and long-winded procedures. It would also create greater anxieties for claimants and disruption to the international system. Therefore, Clause 15 must be at least amended, if not removed.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, unsurprisingly, I agree with everyone who has spoken so far except, I am afraid, for the noble Lord, Lord Horam. This is why: we are out of the EU now and have taken back control of our borders and laws. This is the Government’s policy. We are no longer in this family of nations, this bloc called the EU. Therefore, on what logical basis should we be saying that, by definition, we will never consider a claim made by an asylum seeker from that group?

It is one thing when you are in the EU to say that we do not need to be taking refugees from the EU because there is free movement in the EU and we are part of that bloc. You might well say that it will be inadmissible and that we do not consider refugee claims from within that family of nations of which we are a part, but we are not in it anymore. We have taken back control. Therefore, we are no longer able to assert pressure on others in that group to buck up their ideas about human rights or to threaten the Hungarians with being ejected from the EU if they do not sort out their human rights record. We do not have that leverage anymore. Therefore, it is our obligation as global Britain, as great believers in human rights and a signatory to the refugee convention, that if Hungarians are being persecuted we will consider their claims for asylum because we are better than them and we have taken back control in a lovely global Britain sort of way. It is totally illogical for Clause 14 to be part of the Bill.

More generally, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made an important point about complexity and efficiency. In an earlier group, everyone in the Committee agreed that decision-making needs to be faster and better. That is in everybody’s interest, whichever side of the argument we are on. Creating lots of convoluted provisions about what is inadmissible, before you even consider whether someone is being persecuted, will only make life harder for caseworkers in the home department. I have seen Governments of both persuasions do this over the years. They think they are making it easier, but they actually make it harder by creating more convoluted hoops for people to jump through before their claim is even considered. It is better to have a clean slate and to consider somebody’s circumstances: do they qualify for asylum or not? It would be much easier without all these hoops, so Clauses 14 and 15 should go.

Just consider the claims: if countries are safe, they are safe. If people are not telling the truth, test their credibility and make that decision. Of course, I agree with everything my noble friend Lord Dubs said about safe countries, who has or does not have an association with one and the Government making the decision for them on a spurious basis.

Finally, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, it is a well-established principle of refugee convention jurisprudence the world over that you do not have to be persecuted just by agents of the state. States have a duty to protect all the people in their state. If they do not do it, there can be behaviour and persecution by non-state agents within that territory. If the state is not offering protection, if there is no effective rule of law, it is not enforcing the criminal law and is allowing Roma or gay people or whoever to be persecuted by fascist skinheads in Hungary or whatever it is, that is persecution for the purposes of the refugee convention.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

No other country is in this position because other countries believe that the refugee convention means what it says. I am uneasy, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, must be right, but what makes this particularly peculiar is that we are considering inadmissibility here. Suppose there were an agreement in place. Suppose we were handling a case—the Minister says that it is best done case by case—but we have not done anything except say, “This is inadmissible.” We do not know anything about this chap. He has not had an appeal turned down and has not been categorised in group 1 or group 2; he has simply been declared inadmissible. What does the diplomatic post in the intended recipient country have to go on?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Surely the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right: there is no realistic possibility. The Minister keeps “not confirming” that there are no return arrangements in place yet; she lives in hope, but the reality is that there are none and it seems unlikely that there will be any in the near future. I know there are hopes for one with France after the presidential election; well, good luck with that.

The Government wanted Brexit, they got Brexit done and Brexit meant that we no longer enjoy the Dublin regulation. Realistically, the countries that she is talking about sending people back to are mainly EU countries. Frankly, the chances of having a readmission agreement with the EU are for the birds, so we are going to be seeking bilateral agreements—and none is in prospect. So Clause 15 is indeed basically window-dressing.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned that apparently 6,500 cases have been declared inadmissible. All we do by kicking the can down the road is create more people waiting, more people demoralised and more work for the Home Office. It is all completely unrealistic.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the five amendments in this group—Amendments 83, 88, 90B, 95A and 137, and the question of whether Clause 25 should stand part—all of which I have co-signed or are in my name. The four I have co-signed are inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He has had to leave and has asked me to give his apologies.

The provisions whereby the presentation of evidence, after a date specified by the Home Office or in a priority removal notice, is required to be treated as damaging to credibility or to be given minimal weight are unfair, unjustifiable and should be removed. I agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said.

I have also tabled Amendments 90B and 95A in the alternative, as it were. Under Clauses 21 and 25, the decision maker on priority removal notices or in an asylum or human rights claim would at least be obliged to consider whether the presumption of damage to credibility was fair, rather than looking solely at whether there were good reasons for the delay. Taking lateness into account should be rejected if it would be unfair.

The motivation for all these amendments is fair access to justice—both to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and, as set out in Amendment 137 about removal notices, to uphold a common-law right to access justice. Yesterday, I had the pleasure of being at the Joint Committee on Human Rights session at which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, gave evidence. We discussed having the common law as an inspiration, as well as the ECHR, in the application of human rights. I am sure the noble Lord will be able to tell me that the Government at least accept Amendment 137.

I do not need to say more because the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, put it very well. To say that evidence is not convincing is one thing; to say that, because it has not been submitted by date X it is incredible or has no weight, is putting process over substance.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak against Clause 25 standing part. I agree with so much of what has already been said. This is a particularly tawdry little clause in an outrageous Bill, which, as we have heard, has been slammed by UNHCR, the custodian of the refugee convention, by the JHCR, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and everybody, it seems, except noble Lords opposite.

My noble friend Lord Coaker need not apologise for not being a lawyer. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to see how tawdry Clause 25 is and how it absolutely puts process over substance.

This area of the law is not about parking regulations, or the tax owed to the Revenue or even major civil or commercial litigation between powerful opposing forces. This is the David and Goliath situation referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. When an asylum seeker presents themselves to whoever—the Border Force or the Home Office—they are putting themselves in the trust of Her Majesty’s Government in the hope that this is the right place to be.

Noble Lords have been making arguments in Committee, and those opposite have been making arguments about forum shopping, wanting better lives and all those things as if they are terrible but, in essence, the refugee convention is about desperate people escaping and having a fair crack at being believed. They may not all be telling the truth. Whether they are or not, they may not all qualify for convention protection, but there should at least be a kind and fair reception and a fair crack of the whip. That means not taking tawdry little process points such as this.

I have been a refugee lawyer, in and outside the Home Office. When I worked as a lawyer in the Home Office—I am going back now to before the new Labour Government, when my first boss was the noble Lord, Lord Howard—we did not take tawdry process points like this. That was in 1996.

In a moment, the ever-avuncular and brilliant advocate, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, will get up and tell us not to worry, because this will come into play only when there are no good reasons. So, fear not, Women for Refugee Women, UNHCR, Amnesty International, ILPA and every other bleeding heart. The Home Secretary would call them activist human rights lawyers and they are perhaps almost as contemptible as refugees in her eyes. The noble Lord will say not to worry because, where there are good reasons, this does not come into play and there will not be an issue about evidence.

But why put this in the statute book? Immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and SIAC—these bodies are well capable of looking at evidence and credibility. It is an insult to their intelligence for them to look at whether there were or were not good reasons for late evidence. Sometimes late evidence is incredible and sometimes it is perfectly valid, because there are very good reasons—a host of good reasons, more good reasons than not—in relation to trauma.

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Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

93: Clause 24, page 28, line 40, after “notice” insert “or a slavery or trafficking information notice”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to amend the Bill to provide those receiving a slavery or human trafficking information notice with an equivalent amount of civil legal services support as for those receiving a priority removal notice.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, as I said in an earlier group, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who is the lead signatory of these amendments, could not stay so I am moving our amendments in this and the last group.

Clauses 65 and 66 amend LASPO—the Legal Aid, Sentencing and something Act—to allow for people already in receipt of legal aid for an immigration, asylum or human rights claim, under the exceptional case determination procedure, to receive legal aid advice in relation to a referral into the national referral mechanism, whereby they seek a positive reasonable grounds decision as a potential victim of slavery or human trafficking.

However, these provisions help only victims who already receive legal aid and know how to ask for it. It does not cover all victims. Exceptional case funding for legal aid is very difficult to secure in practice, so Clauses 65 and 66 will help only a small number of people, not least, as the Anti-slavery Commissioner has noted, because it requires a lot of time-consuming work up front to get that exceptional case funding and the solicitor is paid only if the application is successful.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights supports the request of the Anti-slavery Commissioner that legal aid advice of seven hours—or preferably more, as my noble friend’s Amendment 94A probes—should also be available to those in receipt of a slavery or trafficking notice in the same way as for those in receipt of a priority removal notice, to avoid victims of severe trauma remaining unidentified and unassisted. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, like others in Parliament, as I know from these Benches, has also repeatedly expressed its concern about legal aid deserts, but that is a wider debate. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 94A in this group. I am sorry that I could not respond to the Minister on the previous group, but I am sure we will come back to that. I was going to observe that the Chamber seemed largely to have cleared, possibly because other noble Lords could not bear this Bill any longer today, but some noble Lords have rejoined us.

It is clearly better that legal aid is available than not, but I am aware, as my noble friend is, of the shortage of provision and some of the problems here. I would say that it is not a matter for today, but actually it probably is. It is very significant, because the words in the Bill will not provide the advice. The Minister has referred two or three times very confidently to the legal aid offer; we are concerned to ensure that that offer has substance.

I have heard over the years of the difficulties of solicitors—if you can find one—advising and taking instructions in immigration removal centres, with the restrictions there on time, of 30 minutes eaten into by the client having to be fetched and then returned. I do not need to say again, but I will in one sentence, that the client often needs a lot of time over a period to tell his or her story.

My amendment seeks to understand how the Government have landed on seven hours. The Minister gently chided me for the use of the term “arbitrary” before. I will acknowledge that my proposal of 20 hours is arbitrary, but it is my way of probing why the Bill provides for seven hours. I asked ILPA whether that would be sufficient, and the reply was:

“I do not think seven hours of legal aid is sufficient to advise on the notice, the person’s immigration status, the lawfulness of removal, and immigration detention. The immigration system is complex, and the Bill makes it more complex through the expedited processes, priority notices, and new definitions/standards … It is also of concern”


that the Bill

“would allow a power to alter that 7 hour time limit.”

There must have been evidence for coming to the seven hours. If that is so, what evidence would the Minister apply to reduce that figure—or indeed extend it? ILPA says it does not

“have a sense as to the specific number of hours needed for this advice, as it would be so case-specific,”

which is entirely understandable,

“including the immigration and procedural history of the case, novelty of any legal arguments, number of bases on which to raise a claim, the legality of detention”

and so on. So I hope that the Minister can flesh out this provision in the Bill so we can understand what the Government think can be achieved with the seven hours of scarce legal aid.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed. These amendments obviously deal with matters of legal aid, and I remind the Committee that LASPO is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, just to put everybody out of their misery—otherwise they will not be able to sleep when they get home. I will be quick, but I will just make one point: with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, this is not a matter of generosity. This is not about the Government being generous. I do not want to sound high-falutin’, but this is about the rule of law. Abiding by the rule of law is not a matter of generosity; it is simply non-negotiable, and this provision is in the Bill because it is a proper and necessary thing to do.

Amendment 93 and 94 seek to provide up to seven hours of free legal aid to individuals with a slavery or trafficking notice. They are unnecessary because existing legal aid rules will already ensure that individuals can receive more than seven hours of advice if they receive a slavery or trafficking notice. The key point to bear in mind—and I accept that this is complex—is that a slavery or trafficking notice can be issued only to individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim. That is relevant because it means that they are already within the immigration system and legal aid is already available in order to make that protection or human rights claim. So, in a case where an individual is in receipt of legal aid for their protection or human rights claim and they then receive a slavery or trafficking notice, they are already entitled to advice on that notice as part of their protection or human rights claim. Importantly, there is no limit on the number of hours that can be provided on someone’s protection or human rights claim. Legal advice is available until the matter is resolved, and it may well be for considerably more than the seven hours—or, indeed, 20 hours.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am really sorry, I know we are looking at the clock, but if I have understood it, and I am sure the Minister is briefed to the hilt, the problem is that he who has, gets more, as it were. If you are already in the asylum system and then you get the notice, you will get even more legal aid—but what if you have not already made a protection claim? What about those people?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Baroness must have had access to my notes, because that was just the point I was going to make. I have written down here that I know the Committee will ask about individuals who are not receiving legal aid for their protection or human rights claim—and sure enough, the Committee did. My answer is that there could be multiple reasons for an individual not receiving legal aid in those circumstances. The individual might not have passed the means or merits test, and those two tests, as the Committee will know, are there to ensure that legal aid is targeted at those most in need who cannot afford advice themselves. That is one possibility, and I will come back to that in a moment. Another possibility—and this does happen—is that the individual has just made an application to the Home Office by themselves and has not sorted out a lawyer. If so, I would strongly encourage them to seek out a legal aid lawyer, who would be able to provide more than the seven hours of advice that could be provided.

Turning to Amendment 94A, the short answer to why we have specified up to seven hours in Clause 24 is that a balance must be struck between giving free legal advice and using taxpayers’ money responsibly. Seven hours is intended to reflect that this is an opportunity for initial legal advice to help individuals understand what the notice is and what it is requiring them to. It is available on a non-means-tested and non-merits-tested basis. That means that anyone with a PRN is guaranteed access to legal aid for up to seven hours, but it does not mean that, after seven hours, there is no further access to legal aid. Some individuals will need further advice; it is not intended that seven hours will resolve every immigration issue. At the end of the seven hours, any individual who has an issue within the scope of the legal aid scheme and who passes the means and merits test will be eligible for ongoing legal advice funded by legal aid until the matter is resolved.

I am conscious that that gets us into the territory of means and merits tests. I answered an Oral Question in this area on Tuesday, when I said that there was a review of the means test under way at the moment, on which I have personally spent a lot of time. I hope very much that we will soon be able to go out for consultation on that. We are conducting a really thorough review of the means test.

Finally, I will address the noble Baroness’s concerns that the exceptional case funding scheme might not be up to standard. Respectfully, I disagree. That scheme is specifically designed to act as a safety net and to provide legal-aid funding to individuals who can demonstrate that, without it, their human rights might be breached. In 2019-20, of the immigration cases that applied for exceptional case funding, 80% were granted legal aid, so that shows that the system works. We are continuing to work with legal aid practitioners and the Legal Aid Agency to improve the scheme if we can.

For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, speaking also for the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, will be content to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Baroness’s question is quite broad. She knows that we have had a number of discussions about legal aid, which will continue. I did not do much legal aid in my practice. I do not want to advertise from the Dispatch Box, but my brother-in-law is one of the finest criminal legal aid solicitors in London—I am sure that no one here will ever need his services, but he is absolutely brilliant, none the less.

More seriously, I am very conscious of the need to make sure that people have access to a lawyer with the relevant skill set, because a general right to legal aid is not much use if you cannot find a legal aid lawyer—I absolutely appreciate that. On Tuesday, I explained some of the efforts that we are making in this area. To say any more now might trespass on the Committee’s patience, but I am obviously well aware of this point.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I appreciate the care with which the Minister has responded to these amendments. Although he started by saying that they were unnecessary, he conceded that there is a group of people who do not get legal aid. We might differ in our views on how meritorious they are in any claim for legal aid, but he said that they could find a solicitor and get legal aid that way—but that might not be the easiest thing in the world, for reasons that include what was just discussed. I am afraid that I am not really persuaded.

I will read the Minister’s remarks in Hansard, but I do not think that he denied that there are people who do not get legal aid. The fact that the anti-slavery commissioner was on the case with the JCHR shows that it is not just these Benches over here that think that this is an issue. For the time being, I have to accept that the Minister has given his response and I cannot get any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 93 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

97: Clause 26, page 31, line 38, leave out from “State” to end of line 39 and insert “is satisfied that—
(a) any relevant appeal brought in relation to the decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously; and(b) any relevant appeal brought in relation to the decision could be resolved within the time limits set out in subsection (3) without giving rise to unfairness or injustice.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to limit the cases that are brought within the accelerated detained appeals process, to prevent unfairness or injustice arising.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

This clause is about accelerated detained appeals. In moving Amendment 97 I will also cover Amendment 99, both of which I have signed. As I have said, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, is leading on these amendments, but he has had to leave.

I support the deletion from the Bill of Clauses 26 and 27 in order that claimants should retain a meaningful right of appeal. The Government are trying to revive, though with an even wider scope, the detained fast-track system, despite the fact that their arguments were rejected by the Court of Appeal in 2015 and later by the Tribunal Procedure Committee. These provisions would deny access to justice, including for the reason that five days is far too short for a claimant to prepare an appeal, particularly if they are detained—it is even worse if they are in prison or a detention centre. Clause 26 would apply to a greater number of people even than the detained fast track, including those facing deportation.

The Home Office has been struck down and rebuffed twice but is coming back for more. Its decision-making is frequently flawed and unlawful. As we have heard this afternoon, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year to June 2019, so people must have access to effective means of appeal.

After the Court of Appeal declared the detained fast track unlawful in 2015, the Government tried to revive it in tribunal rules. However, the Tribunal Procedure Committee said that if the rules were to operate fairly, which is vital given the high stakes for the claimant, they needed procedural safeguards—an additional case management hearing, for example—such that there was no guarantee of a fast conclusion of the appeal. By trying short cuts, the Government are yet again creating more potential delays. Justice cannot be achieved with the kind of short cuts the Government are trying in this Bill.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

My Lords, I think we are at cross-purposes. I was not saying that the language had not changed; I was saying that the test in Clause 26(5) is the same test as in Clause 23(7). On the question of whether the language has changed, I think the noble Lord is right. I will write to confirm the position—I do not want to get it wrong at the Dispatch Box—but I think there was a change in this clause. The test as set out is entirely proper. Is the only way that justice can be done to take the case out of this tribunal? If that is the only way justice can be done, it ought to be done. If this tribunal therefore, by obvious logic, can deal with the case justly, it should do so.

On the first question, I am not sure how much more I can say. The Secretary of State must consider, in order to certify a case as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, that any appeal to that decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously and that the other conditions are met. In coming to that conclusion, the Secretary of State would obviously have to look at all relevant factors. I am not sure that I can take it much further than that, but let me look again at the noble Lord’s question in Hansard. If I can add anything more, I will do so, so he is in possession of everything I can say before we look at it again—no doubt on Report.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord again for his detailed responses. On the first point, on Amendment 97, I just hope that we do not find ourselves back in litigation. He asserts that the Bill avoids the pitfalls that the Court of Appeal found in 2015 and that the Tribunal Procedure Committee found later. Let us hope so, because obviously, resorts to litigation will also be something that gums up the system, which the Home Office already says is broken. Time will tell if this is going to stay as it is.

On Amendment 99, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right. If my memory serves, the wording has changed since the Bill was in the other place. Certainly, the JCHR would suggest that wording that says that the tribunal “must”—not just “may”—if the interests of justice and fairness require it, take an appeal out of the accelerated detained system is stronger than the wording that is there at the moment. It says that the tribunal “must” if—and it is a broader test—it is in the interests of fairness and justice. It is a better test, and a fairer and more just test, so I am disappointed that the Minister does not like that amendment—although I guess I am not terribly surprised. On that note, I can only withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 97 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was going to come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Let me just say a sentence about it now: the UNHCR is not the interpretive body of the refugee convention. Each state under the convention is there to interpret its obligations, in accordance with the Vienna convention. That is the system which the state parties have set up. When we have a phrase—we will get to one a little later—such as “serious non-political crime”, the state parties have to interpret it. We will get to an example in the next group—this is a little cliffhanger—of where different countries have approached the question differently. There is nothing wrong with that, provided that they are all acting in accordance with the Vienna convention in good faith in seeking to interpret their obligations.

Respectfully, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, essentially accepted that basic proposition under the Vienna convention, and he was obviously right to do so. He sought characteristically carefully—if I might say so—to seek disclosure of the legal advice on which the Government are relying, while recognising the conventions which apply to that. I listened carefully to what he said. I will read Hansard to see whether there is anything more I can say in writing to him; I do not want to rush from the Dispatch Box. There may or may not be anything more I can say, but I will read that point carefully. I think he recognised that there are conventions in this area which do apply.

However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is not a question of having to agree with all the other signatories. This is not about amending the refugee convention; it is about interpreting it. That is a very different thing. If you want to amend a contract, you need the other party’s agreement, but interpreting a convention is for each state party.

I will say a few words about the substantive clauses, although I think it is fair to say that those were not really the Committee’s focus. Clause 29 sets out how key terms which are defined in the following clauses will be applied; they are the key components of the refugee convention. Clause 29 also revokes the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. Those are the regulations through which we transposed our obligations under the EU qualification directive 2004. Because we are out of the EU, we need to do that in a different way.

However, we will continue to grant humanitarian protection to eligible individuals who cannot be removed from the UK to their country of origin if their removal would breach the UK’s obligations under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR. It is important to clarify—I am sure Members of the Committee know this—that these are not individuals protected under the refugee convention. However, we will make further changes to align the entitlements of permission to stay granted on the basis of humanitarian protection to that provided to group 2 refugees.

In response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we believe that Clause 33 provides a system of effective protection from persecution. Clause 34 deals with relocation, but I do not think any noble Lords spoke to it directly, so I will just refer to it and move on.

On Clause 35, of course we have a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, but that should not apply to those who commit serious crimes, putting the communities that host them at risk and endangering national security. We believe we are right to define and legislate in this area. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that that is a good example of serious non-political crime. That is a phrase in the refugee convention, but it is not further defined in it. Each state has to look at it and define it, in accordance—always—with the Vienna convention.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The Minister keeps saying that each state will define the refugee convention, and he alluded to the EU qualification directive; there is also the procedures directive. I declare an interest, as I worked on both directives as an MEP. Of course, that was an attempt not for each state in the EU to do its own thing but to have a collective set of laws which interpreted the refugee convention in detail and, as far as I know, complied with it. That prevented each country doing its own thing in a potentially destructive way.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I have an associated point, to save the Minister bobbing up and down too much. I entirely take the point about non-political crime. I just wanted to make it clear that I was referring only to that bit of the Bill when I mentioned the case. I was not suggesting that it was the prompt for the whole of this part. But can the Minister explain more about the impact of our leaving the EU? Does that give us a legal opportunity, or is this happening because it is a convenient political point in the calendar, as it were?

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 105 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who cannot be here tonight, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to whom I am grateful. I also thank Women for Refugee Women and ILPA for all their work on this amendment.

The amendment would remove the narrow restrictive and requirement in Clause 32 that, in order to qualify under the “particular social group” grounds of persecution for recognition as a refugee under the convention, two conditions must be met. The amendment would replace this with an either/or condition. As I will explain, this would be in line with international standards and UK case law.

This is a small amendment, but it is significant, as the UNHCR has made clear. The UNHCR explains that Clause 32 is one of a

“series of changes that would make it more difficult for refugees who are admitted to the UK to be recognised as such.”

The case for the amendment is, in effect, set out in its detailed legal observations, which have been invaluable to our scrutiny of the Bill. The UNHCR warns that narrowing the definition of “particular social group” in the way that the clause does

“could exclude some refugees from the protection to which they are entitled … In the UK and other jurisdictions, the particular social group ground has proved critical in the protection of those with claims based on gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, status as former victims of trafficking, disability or mental-ill health, family and age.”

This view is endorsed by the Bingham Centre, which warns:

“The result will inevitably be to refuse protection to people who, as a matter of international law, are refugees.”


It picks out this clause as one of a number that are particularly troubling to it from a rule of law perspective.

The UNHCR explains the origins of the two conditions and why it has recommended that they should be treated as alternative, rather than cumulative, tests. The argument was endorsed by the late Lord Bingham, acting in his judicial capacity, when he ruled that the cumulative approach taken in Clause 32 was wrong because

“it propounds a test more stringent than is warranted by international authority.”

Thus this approach, the UNHCR points out, has been affirmed in the UK courts over an EU interpretation. I cannot resist observing that it is rather odd that a Government committed to taking back control from the EU is so keen to apply an EU interpretation that has been rejected by the British courts. Indeed, on the previous group, the Minister said that our starting point should be that we had left the EU, so could he perhaps explain why that does not apply to this clause?

In their briefing, Women for Refugee Women—WRW —and ILPA include an example, taken from Garden Court Chambers barristers, of what this might mean:

“a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic”—

one shared with other members of a group—

“but also that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in her country of origin. The latter is of course much more difficult to establish than the former because this is judged by the perceptions of the society in her country, and it can be very challenging to find objective evidence on women as a distinct group.”

WFW and ILPA also point out that there was “no pre-legislative consultation” on this clause because it was not included in the New Plan for Immigration. Can the Minister explain why this is the case? Moreover, the equality impact assessment on the Bill, which has been described as “superficial and inadequate” by barristers at Garden Court Chambers, fails adequately to assess the impact of the change on groups in vulnerable circumstances.

As I have already noted, the UNHCR has warned of the likely implications for a wide range of such groups. I particularly draw attention to how this clause is likely to have an adverse impact on women fleeing gender-based persecution—a group that the Government claim to care about. As I made clear on an earlier amendment, it is one of a number of such clauses that have to be viewed in the context of the failings that already exist. According to WRW and ILPA,

“Over the years, there has been substantial research on the failures of the Home Office in delivering a fair asylum process, and on the reasons why many women who flee gender-based persecution may be wrongly denied protection.”


Most recently, as I noted last week and gave the Minister some weekend reading on, the British Red Cross has published research that details experiences that

“highlight the distrust and disbelief women can face when discussing traumatic experiences of violence”,

especially, but not only, when interviewed by men. One survivor’s words are recounted:

“you feel so low and you feel so degraded and you’ve been violated and you were [telling] your story, you were expecting to be heard and to have someone who shows you some form of sympathy.”

In the Commons Public Bill Committee, the Government justified their position by asserting that the new clause was necessary to bring certainty to an area bedevilled by conflicting authority. But ILPA and WFW give that argument short shrift, pointing out:

“There is no conflicting authority: the UNHCR and the senior UK courts have a clear and constant interpretation. It is the Government that seeks to depart from this shared interpretation of the Refugee Convention, and it does so without warrant or proper justification.”


So can the Minister provide a more convincing justification today of a clause that, in the words of Women for Refugee Women and ILPA

“reverses case law of senior UK courts, contravenes UNHCR standards, and reinstates an erroneous EU law standard”?

If not, will he agree to this amendment?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, all of these clauses seek to restrict access to the protection of the refugee convention. I will speak to Amendments 103 and 104 to Clause 31 and Amendment 111 to Clause 37, which are all in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and which I have co-signed. However, I share the view of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that all of these clauses should in fact be removed.

The problem with Clause 31 is that it changes the standard of proof for the test of whether a person is a refugee. It creates two limbs of the test and changes the bar from “reasonable likelihood” to

“on the balance of probabilities”.

Although the refugee convention does not prescribe the standard of proof, UNHCR’s handbook says:

“The requirement of evidence should … not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.”


So, for 20 years, the UK courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied a “reasonable likelihood” standard of proof in a composite and holistic manner.

Clause 31 overturns this established interpretation of the law by dividing the overall test into a series of sub-questions and applying different standards of proof to different limbs of questioning, to require the person to prove on a balance of probabilities that they fear persecution and the decision-maker to revert to a test of reasonable likelihood in assessing whether the person would face persecution and lack state protection. It is quite a mishmash, and a complex and confusing one—not least for already burdened caseworkers. As we have heard so frequently in this Committee, if the Government really want to fix a broken asylum system, why are they making everything more complex and building in delay?

As the Bingham Centre points out, Clause 31

“allows for rejection of a person as a refugee because they failed one of the steps”

imposing that higher hurdle,

“whereas if the test was taken in its totality, the person may have been accepted as a refugee.”

The process may well lead to exclusion from sheer error because of all these complex, different bits of the test. Either the JCHR Amendments 103 and 104 should be accepted, or Clause 31 should be deleted.

On Amendment 111 to Clause 37, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has said, we object to the lowering of the threshold for regarding a crime as particularly serious such that a person can be expelled. It is designed to—and will—exclude many more people from the protection of the refugee convention. Not only is the threshold sentence reduced from two years to 12 months but it changes the rebuttable presumption of “particularly serious” into an unchallengeable assertion.

This is disproportionate; a blanket exclusion is incompatible with the refugee convention, which envisages a crime that is a major threat and expulsion as a last resort. Bear in mind that the Bill seeks to impose a four-year sentence for the mere act of arriving in the UK without permission, which most refugees have to do. That gives you a measure of the lack of proportion in what is supposed to be a serious crime under the remit of the Bill; I am not validating or endorsing any crime, but under the refugee convention it has to be “particularly serious”, and the Government are departing from that.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I confine my brief comments on this group to Clauses 31 and 32, both of which have been touched on, respectively, by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Lister.

Clause 31 is peculiarly objectionable. As has been described, it divides up what should be a single, holistic question into a series of sub-questions and compounds that error by the differentiation in some important respects of standards of proof. It imposes an objectionable higher standard of proof on one critical provision. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights says in its report HL Paper 143—pages 39 to 41—it raises the standard of proof from a “reasonable likelihood” to a “balance of probabilities”.

The overall holistic approach to Article 31 was established as long ago as 1995 in a case called Ravichandran, which reported in 1996 in immigration appeal report 77. I confess that I wrote the lead judgment, but it has been consistently applied by the higher courts ever since. To quote one passage, the approach to Article 1A of the convention should be

“a single composite question … looked at in the round and all the relevant circumstances brought into account”

to see if there is a real risk.

Those promoting this clause should read a devastating critique of Clause 31 last month by Hugo Storey, the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges who has just retired from being an Upper Tribunal judge. He has no doubt that it will lead to “prodigious litigation”; in six compelling pages that those responsible for the Bill must read, he explains precisely why.

Clause 32, on the question of the particular social group, has been dealt with. It seeks to overturn Lord Bingham’s judgment in the case of Fornah, in the Appellate Committee of this House back in 2006, which was all about a 15 year-old girl trying to avoid female genital mutilation in Sierra Leone. I was a junior member of that court, and this clause tries, contrary to that clear judgment, to introduce a conjunctive approach to the two relevant criteria. It would be a grave mistake and cause grave injustice.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether it is the time of the evening that prompted that reference to dinner; otherwise, it is not immediately apparent to me what the relevance of it was. I will come back to that rather less substantive point—if I may say so, respectfully—at the end.

Let me deal first with Clause 31. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He is right that there are points of principle that underlie these amendments; they underlay the last group as well. I too will try not to repeat the points that I have made. There are points of principle that are at issue between us, and we have set out our respective positions. We believe that the test set out in Clause 31 is compliant with our international obligations. More specifically, we believe that it will provide, and lead to, better decision-making, because it sets out a clear test, with steps for decision-makers, including the courts, to follow. That will lead to greater consistency.

Turning to Amendments 103 and 104, although I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and I agree with the importance of us carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under Article 1(A)(2) of the convention, we do not agree with these amendments because, taken together, they will essentially maintain the current standard of proof system. In so far as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering said that it was, to a certain extent, a probing amendment, let me try to explain.

First, this is not about setting aside decisions of the court. The courts are there to interpret the legislation as it stands—that is what they do. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background, in so far as it is consistent with our treaty obligations. Clause 31 sets out a clear, step-by-step process. I hear the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that it should be—so far as legislation can be—in simple language and a clear test. The problem at the moment is that there is no clearly outlined test as such. There is case law, there is policy and there is guidance in this area, but the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. What we seek to do here is to introduce distinct stages that a decision-maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. We believe that this will lead to better and more consistent decision-making.

At its core, in Clause 31(2) we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and that they fear what they say they fear to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts, and those are facts in Clause 31(2); namely, more likely than not. It is reasonable, I suggest, that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions. We have looked carefully, of course, at the often difficult situations that claimants might come from and the impact that might have on the kinds of evidence that they can provide. However, we consider that our overall approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test.

There is international precedent that supports our decision to raise the threshold for assessing the facts that a claimant presents to us to the balance of probabilities standard. Both Canada and Switzerland—highly respected democratic countries, dare I say it—have systems which examine at least some elements of a claimant’s claim to this higher standard. Respectfully and rhetorically, let me ask this of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said that this was confusing and complex. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said that she had horror at it. The higher standard is used in Switzerland. Does the horror extend to Canada and Switzerland as well? There is nothing wrong in principle with adopting the higher test for some parts—I will come to it in more detail—of the decision-making tree.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Does the Minister recall that I did not just say that it is about the higher standard? It is about having different limbs and different requirements under those different limbs, and switching from “reasonable likelihood” to “balance of probabilities” as part of the composite test, which is not holistic but is in different parts. That is what is confusing, not just a change in the standard of proof.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect, it is not confusing at all, because Clause 31(2) establishes the facts, and that is all a balance of probabilities. Then, in Clause 31(4), the decision-maker turns to questions of the future. It is at that stage that the reasonable likelihood test is the appropriate test, because the decision-maker is looking to assess what might happen in the future. That is why we have a lower test at that stage. It is quite usual in law to have different stages of a test and different levels of probability at each.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

106: Clause 36, page 37, line 18, leave out from “Kingdom” to “country” in line 20 and insert “for a substantial period and were given or could reasonably have expected to have been given protection under the Refugee Convention in that other”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give effect to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ recommendation that clause 36 be amended to ensure that it does not contradict the protection Article 31 provides to asylum seekers who have passed through other countries on their way to the UK.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 106 in the name of, and at the invitation of, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I will speak also to Amendments 109 and 110.

If Clause 36 is not amended or deleted, it will contradict Article 31 of the refugee convention. It seeks to punish or penalise a refugee for arriving in the UK to make an asylum claim by a route that took them through other countries. The requirement in the refugee convention to come directly was intended only to prevent a person who had acquired refugee status and protection in one country deciding to switch to another. Excluding a person from asylum in the UK simply because they stopped in France, Germany or Belgium, perhaps for a night’s rest, is completely unreasonable. The UK courts have confirmed that any merely short-term stopover en route to an intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of Article 31 of the convention.

Any other interpretation, as the Government seek to impose in Clause 36, means, as in so much of this Bill, a shirking of the sharing of international responsibilities, such that looking after refugees falls overwhelmingly on countries neighbouring the countries of conflict from which the person is seeking to escape. Therefore, Amendment 106 would at least amend the clause, which, however, we might find later, needs to be deleted. I beg to move.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 107 in my name, which relates to Clause 36 and provides that a refugee will have come directly to the United Kingdom for the purposes of Clause 11, notwithstanding that

“they have passed through the intermediate country on the refugee’s way to the United Kingdom by way of short-term stopover”.

Those words in the amendment reflect the reasoning and decision of the Administrative Court in Adimi, where my noble and learned friend Lord Brown presided. They also reflect the approval of Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in a case called Asfaw.

In this respect, Clause 36 is an important part of the Government’s policy. The reason for that is that it provides a definition of “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11 that makes a distinction between group 1 and group 2 refugees. Under the provisions of Clause 11, if the refugee does not come directly from the place of persecution, they inevitably cannot be in group 1.

Secondly, it is important because, as I pointed out in a previous debate on this Bill, the provisions for describing coming to the United Kingdom directly, as defined in Clause 36, also reflect the provision in the admissibility provision in Clause 15. Your Lordships will recall that, in Clause 15, if there is a connection with another state, the refugee’s claim is inadmissible; in fact, it is not recognised as a claim at all and there is no right of appeal. Clause 15 provides that, if you fall within one of the five conditions inserted in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 by the clause, you have a connection. One of those conditions, condition 4, is that

“the claimant was previously present in, and eligible to make a relevant claim to, the safe third State … it would have been reasonable to expect them to make such a claim, and … they failed to do so.”

So there are two essential elements of the policy behind the Government’s provisions for asylum, where the question of the meaning of coming “directly” is extremely important. I pointed out to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that there was a muddle here. If condition 4 in Clause 15, as I have described it, is satisfied, you never get to a distinction between group 1 and group 2 because your claim is inadmissible. The noble Baroness was going to look at that and let me know the position from the Government’s perspective, but I have not yet heard from her.

Before I address what coming “directly” means—as I said, my amendment reflects the reasoning and conclusion in Adimi, and the adoption of the decision in Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in Asfaw—I want to say a couple of things about what appears to be the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, to interpretation. I do not think you need to be a lawyer to appreciate that if, under the aegis of the United Nations, you agree with other states in the world that you will conduct yourself in a particular way and that an agency of the United Nations has a responsibility for overseeing both the implementation of that agreement and that disputes between member states in relation to the meaning and the application of the agreement—here, the refugee convention—will be referred to an international court, there must be a point in time when one has to identify core values. If there are no core values, there is nothing to adjudicate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to Article 35, which requires member states to co-operate with the United Nations body responsible for oversight in relation to the implementation of the refugee convention. So what one has to do here is decide whether what the Government are doing in putting forward these proposals goes beyond the core principles in the refugee convention, which must be applicable generally to member states—otherwise, all the clauses I have referred to, Article 35, co-operation and adjudication by a court are totally meaningless and impracticable.

So I take issue with the broad statement of principle, as I understand it, put forward by the Minister. He said that it was perfectly acceptable for every member state signed up to the refugee convention to decide, from its perspective, what the convention meant. If that were correct and he was saying that it was for Parliament to decide what it meant for the United Kingdom, it would mean that changes could be made by each successive new Government as to what they felt would be appropriate to support their policy. Well, that is obviously nonsense, if I may respectfully say so.

What the courts have done—and this would be the approach of the all the courts of the countries signed up to the convention—is try to understand what the refugee convention was intended, by those who made it, to mean. The starting point is always the travaux préparatoires leading up to the convention—what was said and what was done—and then trying to understand whether there has been a deviation and, if so, why. That has been exactly the approach put forward and implemented in both Adimi and Asfaw.

The starting point, inevitably, for the interpretation of this particular convention is, as I think the Minister said, the Vienna convention on the interpretation of treaties. I do not think it has yet been said that we are entitled to change, and that we have changed, that treaty according to what we think it ought to say. It provides in Article 31.1:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”


That phrase, as has been noted by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I think, was applied by the UK’s highest court, the Supreme Court, in a case called ST (Eritrea) in 2012 as meaning that there is a duty to give the refugee convention

“a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble”.

I have to say as a starting point that I have seen nothing so far in this part of the Bill which is a “generous and purposive interpretation”, having regard to humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in the preamble of the 1951 convention. Every provision that people have addressed appears to be, as it has been put, a mean-spirited approach to refugee applications.

It is against that background that I now turn to the meaning of “directly”. I have already referred to the clear decision in Adimi on this point about stopping at intermediate countries by way of short-term stopover. Just to give this a bit of flesh, what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said then was:

“I am persuaded by the applicants’ contrary submission, drawing as it does on the travaux préparatoires, various Conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s executive committee … and the writings of well respected academics and commentators … that some element of choice is indeed open to refugees as to where they may properly claim asylum. I conclude that any merely short term stopover en route to such intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of the Article, and that the main touchstones by which exclusion from protection should be judged are the length of stay in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying there (even a substantial delay in an unsafe third country would be reasonable were the time spent trying to acquire the means of travelling on), and whether or not the refugee sought or found there protection de jure or de facto from the persecution they were fleeing.”

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. I am trying to work out exactly what I am being asked to agree to here. Perhaps I may ask the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—maybe not the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—and certainly my noble friend on the Front Bench: am I being asked to end or at least change the first safe country principle by accepting these amendments? If that is the case, I have grave concern about an increase in what is known as forum shopping. Perhaps I can say to the Hansard writers that forum is spelled “forum” and not “foreign”, which is how it was reported last time. Foreign shopping is what you go to Paris to do; forum shopping is a rather more serious matter.

It is important because this country is an exceptionally attractive place for people seeking to find the best future for themselves. I explained last time that the very fact that debates are going on your Lordships’ House shows how much concern we have to make sure that the rights of people are looked after. It is also an extremely flexible job market once you are here. Getting and maintaining a job is much easier than in some of the areas such as France, where there is a much more rigid job market. There is a non-contributory health and social security system. There is a diaspora from nearly every country in the world. Your mates are here, so you want to come here to join them. We would all want to join our mates. As a last point, you have learned the English language, which is the lingua franca of the world and, in particular, the lingua franca of technology.

I hope that, when my noble friend comes to answer the debate, he will bear in mind that, if we were to accept this, it will open up the borders for people who are seeking—I do not say that they should not seek—the best future for themselves and, as such, are not abiding by the first safe country principle. We are not in a position to provide the answer to a lot of these people.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I know the noble Lord has listened to a lot of the previous debate. He will know there is no such thing as a first safe country principle under the refugee convention. I tried to explain what the obligation was—namely, not to move on if you have refugee status or protection in a country. The UNHCR has made it clear that there would never have been a refugee convention if there had been a safe first country principle, because countries abutting the problematic countries—for example, Jordan, Iran and Pakistan—have had to accept everyone. No other countries like the UK would ever have had any refugees because we do not abut conflict zones. I am sorry, but this must be rebutted every time it is trotted out.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I will address Clause 36 very briefly, which I discussed last week in the context of Clause 11. I confine myself today to asking two questions.

First, do the Government accept, as I suggest they must, that Clause 36 would overrule the judgments of Lord Bingham and, among others, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in Asfaw, fully affirming what had been said on the relevant issues in the judgment I gave in the Divisional Court in Adimi? This has all been elaborated on today by my noble and learned friend, Lord Etherton.

Secondly, if so, are the Government overturning Asfaw and Adimi because, disinterestedly, they genuinely think those decisions are clearly wrong—or because they think an alternative and more anti-asylum seeker interpretation may arguably be available to them?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am certainly not trying to be flippant. What I am saying is that we have a refugee convention that sets out our international obligations. We are abiding by those international obligations. It may—I underline “may”—be that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022. That might be the answer. At the moment, however, my focus as a Justice Minister is on making sure that this country abides by its international obligations, and that is what we are doing. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My answer to that last point is that if that is what the UK Government feel, they should convene a conference to renegotiate the refugee convention, but they are not doing that. A large number of noble Lords in this Committee believe that the Government are riding roughshod over the refugee convention in a way that demeans this country and sets an extremely poor example, not least to those countries on the front line, which are taking the overwhelming majority of people seeking protection. We have bandied around the statistics in the last few days in Committee, but we are not in the top category of countries in terms of the numbers, which are manageable. They would be particularly manageable if the Home Office got its act together in the way it decides asylum cases initially—if it invested in the initial consideration of the claims and did not make the law ever more complex, with ever more delays and ever more prospects of litigation. It seems we are banging our heads against a brick wall somewhat, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 106 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

112: After Clause 37, insert the following new Clause—
“Refugee family reunion
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the date of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a statement of changes in the rules (the “immigration rules”) under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (general provisions for regulation and control) to make provision for refugee family reunion, in accordance with this section, to come into effect after 21 days.(2) Before a statement of changes is laid under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with persons he or she deems appropriate.(3) The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules providing for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for family members of a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.(4) In this section, “refugee status” and “humanitarian protection” have the same meaning as in the immigration rules.(5) In this section, “family members” include—(a) a person’s parent, including adoptive parent;(b) a person’s spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner;(c) a person’s child, including adopted child, who is either—(i) under the age of 18, or(ii) under the age of 25 but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum;(d) a person’s sibling, including adoptive sibling, who is either—(i) under the age of 18, or(ii) under the age of 25, but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum; and(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State may determine, having regard to—(i) the importance of maintaining family unity,(ii) the best interests of a child,(iii) the physical, emotional, psychological or financial dependency between a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection and another person,(iv) any risk to the physical, emotional or psychological wellbeing of a person who was granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, including from the circumstances in which the person is living in the United Kingdom, or(v) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(6) For the purpose of subsection (5)—(a) “adopted” and “adoptive” refer to a relationship resulting from adoption, including de facto adoption, as set out in the immigration rules;(b) “best interests” of a child must be read in accordance with Article 3 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

On behalf of my noble friend Lord Paddick, I will move Amendment 112 and speak to Amendments 113 and 117, which I have co-signed. The reason I have been given the honour of moving Amendment 112 is that it reproduces my Private Member’s Bill, which in fact has its origins with my noble friend Lady Hamwee and will have its Committee stage just after recess.

The Conservative Party likes to call itself the party of the family; I believe it needs to demonstrate this. Amendment 112 would build on existing safe routes for family reunion to enable a wider range of family members to reach the UK without undertaking unsafe journeys. This is the real way to stop most of the dangerous channel crossings and put the smugglers out of business.

In the letter and attached chart that the Minister sent to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and kindly made available to us all, the Government set out the current safe routes. Even under part 11 of the Immigration Rules, while adult refugees do not have to pay a fee for the visa they do have to pay for travel to the UK, and the integration loan cannot be used for that. Legal aid is also not available, at least not in England and Wales—I do not know about Scotland or Northern Ireland—and they can bring in only their spouse and their under-18 children.

As in my Private Member’s Bill, Amendment 112 would permit dependent children up to the age of 25, as well as adopted children. Crucially, it would permit children recognised as refugees to sponsor their parents and siblings to join them. Although sibling reunion is in theory possible under paragraph 319X of the Immigration Rules, in practice the barriers are often insurmountable. Not only does the visa cost almost £400 but the young sponsor has to show that they can financially support and accommodate their sibling without recourse to public funds, and that the justification for reunion is “serious and compelling”. All these are tough tests to fulfil. Paragraph 297, which governs whether children can join parents or non-parent relatives who have settlement status imposes a fee of £1,500, and then the same serious and compelling test.

Despite promising in a response to the consultation on the New Plan for Immigration to give creator clarity, no guidance has been forthcoming. Can the Minister tell us in her response when that guidance will be forthcoming, and how many visas have been issued under paragraphs 319X or 297 over the last five years?

I reaffirm my support for Amendment 113 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and Amendment 117 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. These both aim to boost family reunion opportunities for unaccompanied minors and for entry to seek asylum, in part substituting for the loss of the Dublin regulation. I also support other amendments in this group. I beg to move.

[Lord Hylton (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to three amendments in this group. I note that they are all new clauses. New clauses are necessary to improve this Bill, and they are essential to humanising our present systems, let alone what may emerge from the Bill once it becomes an Act.

Reuniting families split by wars and persecution brings huge benefits; I think we can all agree on that. Amendment 112 enfranchises both children and their parents. It also empowers the Secretary of State to add new kinds of relationships. Amendment 113 should, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has just mentioned, reduce dangerous crossings of the channel.

On Amendment 114, we all know that the neighbours of Syria and Iraq have been subjected to and have accepted huge influxes of people. The same is also true of southern European states. For these reasons, there is an urgent need for equitable burden sharing. This, in turn, will require much greater international co-operation. We can do our part in this country by using family reunion. Our neighbours and allies are entitled to know what our intentions and proposals are in this respect.

The wording of all three amendments can, I expect, be improved. Will the Government accept at least their principles, take them away and bring them back in pristine condition?

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The amendment could simply create further incentives for more adults and children to be encouraged, or even forced, to leave their family and risk hazardous journeys to the UK in order later to sponsor qualifying extended family. That plays into the hands of criminal gangs which exploit vulnerable people and goes against the main intention of the Bill. We must do everything in our power to stop this dangerous trend. I hope that, with that, the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, who has given us detailed responses. Some of her points do not really take account of what inspired this set of amendments, which is that people do better if they have the support of their family. It may not be quantifiable, but my noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned the case of a sibling. I can imagine having that my brother or sister with me in a strange place would be an enormous support. The way the Minister replied—which is obviously in her brief—was all about the numbers: never mind the quality, feel the width. We are talking about quality of life, integration and the chances that the person who gets status would have to thrive in the UK. The Home Office is a bit blinkered on this matter.

The Minister told me that the promised guidance on paragraphs 319X and 297 would be coming “in due course”. That is a phrase that always chills the spine; I hope it is not too far away. It would be interesting to know what constitutes “serious and compelling” circumstances, as people are finding that it is very difficult to get through that test. I also note that she said that there is no data in published statistics on how many applications are granted under either of those two routes, and I look forward to her successful efforts to find that. It is a bit surprising that there are no published statistics on that, but I hope she has success in locating some.

The Minister said that there is no need for statute. I obviously disagree, because I am promoting a Private Member’s Bill that would put it into statute. A lot of the problem here is that there is too much discretion and moving of the goalposts, so people do not know what they can rely on. It is all just too difficult, and there are numerous hurdles.

I listened to the Minister. I am fairly disappointed with what she said, but, as of now, I cannot do other than beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 112 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 115, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which I have co-signed. Of course, it aims to provide a safe route for unaccompanied children from countries in Europe and broadly reproduces what we all know as the Dubs amendment to the Immigration Act 2016. There have been warm words, deservedly, about the role and record of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs; what better way to put that into something concrete than for the Government to accept Amendment 115?

I support all the amendments in this group, but I will just speak in support of Amendment 116, in the name of a noble quartet of Conservative Peers, which would provide for “at least 10,000” refugees to be resettled annually. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has discussed the ins and outs of that figure, but it is better than 1,000 a year, which we hear was the low achievement last year. This figure happens to be Liberal Democrat policy, so I very much agree that it is a moderate and sensible amendment. As I say, I support all of the other amendments in the group.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure that I should support a Liberal Democrat policy this evening; none the less, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said about the importance of targets. I am sure that one of the reasons that local authorities are reluctant to accept more people is the uncertainty that they have at the moment. They genuinely have a shortage but, inevitably, they hold back when they do not know exactly how many are expected.

I have long argued for targets in this area; I think they are an important part of it precisely because you need sensible planning, frankly, and this could be a way forward. Whatever the numbers may be, we ought to have a proper debate each year on refugees, asylum seekers and immigration as a whole, in which the Government’s plans are set out and we can all make a contribution, in the Commons as well as here, and decide what should be the targets for the following year. This would give everyone, including local authorities, some confidence and certainty about what they are expected to do.

I am afraid I do not think that that will actually reduce the numbers of people coming across the channel—I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on this point—for the reasons that I spelled out previously. Demand is so great that people would still try to cross the channel, even if we expanded the number, for certainty, of people coming across under safe schemes. None the less, the idea of having transparency and target setting is very valuable.

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Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

120: Clause 39, page 40, leave out lines 5 to 9
Member’s explanatory statement
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to prevent “arrival” in the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance, rather than “entry” into the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance, becoming an offence.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the effect of Clause 39 is to criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK, even if the person has no option but to flee. Clause 39 makes arriving in the UK without leave, without ever actually entering the UK, a criminal offence. I am therefore moving Amendment 120, with the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which would remove the relevant part of Clause 39.

I note that whereas a person violating Clause 39 could get a sentence of four years in prison, I recently saw in the media a case of modern slavery which attracted a suspended sentence. So having the temerity to arrive to claim asylum is considered multiple times more serious than enslaving and exploiting someone.

Clause 39 criminalising arrival would cover people intercepted in UK territorial waters and brought into the UK, and presenting themselves to an immigration official to claim asylum. They would arrive, even if they do not enter. Note that this is not targeted at traffickers and smugglers but at the sorry individuals being smuggled and seeking asylum. Why should they be criminalised? Remember that no visa exists for the purpose of claiming asylum—the noble Lord’s amendment wants to rectify that—and it is impossible to claim asylum without coming to the UK. It is a classic Catch-22 situation.

The clause is inconsistent with Article 31 of the refugee convention, which obliges signatories to

“not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees … present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”

This non-penalisation is at the core of the refugee convention—even Australia has never considered criminalising irregular entry.

Of course, if an asylum seeker becomes a criminal as soon as they arrive, this can have implications for their future as a refugee. They will have a criminal record and be deemed to be not of good character, and this will impact on their ability to integrate, to settle and, down the line, to acquire British citizenship.

As we discussed on an earlier group, the definition of “particularly serious crime” is being lowered to a 12-month sentence. Since they could get a four-year sentence under Clause 39, or 12 months on a summary conviction, the person could lose their protection against expulsion and refoulement simply as a result of arriving in the UK to claim asylum. It is pernicious to criminalise someone who simply arrives in, not enters, a country— there has always been a distinction between the two. I am afraid that it is somewhat Kafkaesque—I maybe overuse that phrase—as well as pernicious and unnecessary. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 121 and 122. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for lending her support in signing Amendment 122. As the noble Baroness set out, and as we heard from the Deputy Chairman, if Amendment 120 carries favour with the Committee, Amendments 121 and 122 could obviously not be moved.

I intend these amendments to probe my noble friend the Minister. The thinking behind this is that it represents the concerns expressed to me by Law Society of Scotland, to which I am grateful for drafting the amendments and the wording that it has used. Rather than just deleting the offending wording in new subsections (D1) and (E1), I am proposing to delete “arrives in” from the relevant sections of Clause 39 and insert “enters” instead.

Clause 39 of the Bill adds a new component to the existing offence of illegal entry, and subsection (2) thereof adds new subsections to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. New subsection (D1) makes it an offence for someone who “requires entry clearance” to arrive in the UK without “a valid entry clearance”. An entry clearance is a visa issued before travel, because it becomes leave to enter when the person enters the UK. The burden of proving that a person holds valid entry clearance lies on that person. This is of concern, given that EU citizens are not routinely given any physical evidence of their entry clearance if they apply using the UK Immigration: ID Check app—no visa vignette is placed in their passport. So the key addition to the offence provision is to make arrival an offence.

The Explanatory Notes clearly state:

“The concept of ‘entering the UK without leave’ has caused difficulties about precisely what ‘entering’ means in the context of the current section 24(1)(a) of the 1971 Act.”


Entering is defined in Section 11(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, which I recall studying at the University of Edinburgh some time ago, as disembarking and subsequently leaving the immigration control area. Arrival is not given any technical legal definition, so it will simply mean reaching a place at the end of a journey or a stage in a journey. So it is unclear whether a person needs to reach the mainland in order to arrive in the United Kingdom.

My first question to my noble friend is: can she clarify at what point a person arrives in the United Kingdom? The Explanatory Notes and the separate definitions of the United Kingdom and United Kingdom waters seem to suggest that arrival on the mainland is necessary. The new provisions will allow prosecutions of individuals intercepted in UK territorial waters and brought into the UK, who arrive in but do not technically enter the UK, as set out in paragraph 388 of the Explanatory Notes.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests in the register. I was much involved with the Modern Slavery Act and the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Field, so I feel I have some knowledge of this. I do not know whether the Minister, who is not at the Home Office, realises the extent to which all the non-governmental organisations of this country—including the Salvation Army, which works for the Government on modern slavery, together with the anti- slavery commissioner—deplore this part of the Bill without exception. This Minister may not know that but, goodness me, the Home Office does.

I am very concerned about children, but I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, so I propose to refer specifically to Clause 58. Again, because he is not at the Home Office, the Minister may not have read the statutory guidance on the Modern Slavery Act. I have it with me—it was published this month. I wonder whether the Home Office’s right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, because the requirement to be timely in providing the information needed is totally contrary to the entire work set out by the statutory guidance.

I do not want to bore the Committee, but I must refer very briefly to one or two points so the Minister can know. Under “Introduction to modern slavery”, the guidance says:

“It is important for professionals to understand the specific vulnerability of victims of modern slavery and utilise practical, trauma-informed methods of working which are based upon fundamental principles of dignity, compassion and respect.”


For goodness’ sake, does Clause 58 have anything to do with that? The guidance sets out how you should deal with identifying potential victims of modern slavery. In particular, paragraph 3.6 on page 35 states:

“In practice it is not easy to identify a potential victim—there are many different physical and psychological elements to be considered as detailed below. For a variety of reasons, potential victims of modern slavery may also … be reluctant to come forward with information … not recognise themselves as having been trafficked or enslaved”


and, most importantly, may

“tell their stories with obvious errors and/or omissions”.

One important aspect—which the Home Office on the one hand states in the statutory guidance and yet is clearly totally unaware of in relation to the Bill—is that a lot of victims who come to this country are given a story by the traffickers. That is the story they tell first, and it will not be the truth. Just think what will happen to them consequently under Clause 58. They will be treated as liars who have not given accurate information. Through the NRM—imperfect though it is—they will probably have got to reasonable grounds, but then they will get this appalling notice and find themselves not treated as victims. This is totally contrary to the Modern Slavery Act. It is totally contrary to the best of all that has happened in this country, in the House of Commons and this House, which will be ruined by this part of the Bill.

Having worked in this sector since about 2006, I am absolutely appalled that the Government think they are doing a good thing in putting this part of the Bill forward. For goodness’ sake, will they for once listen and get rid of it?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 153 and 155 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Before I do so, I fully associate myself with the powerful words of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The only correction I will make to the noble Lord is that the Modern Slavery Act originated in the coalition Government, and we had a Liberal Democrat Minister in the Home Office in the person of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, who was here earlier.

Group 1 covers amendments and proposed deletions to very objectionable clauses, as we have heard. Clause 57 shifts the onus from the state to the potential victim to identify themselves and possess the relevant expertise to know what information is relevant to a slavery and human-trafficking determination. There is no provision for the specified date for supplying the information to be reasonable, or for whether and how an extension could be granted. Can the Minister say whether there will be guidance on these matters? As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked, will notices be served on all asylum applicants or only on some? There would be potential for these notices to be discriminatory, in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, if they were served only on certain categories of people. What criteria will be used if only certain people will get these notices?

There is no clarity or guidance as to what might be considered good reasons for why information has arrived late. Vulnerable or traumatised victims might take time opening up; they might well be unfamiliar with the legal process, or they might not realise that a particular detail was relevant until later. There at least needs to be guidance on what constitutes good reasons to improve legal clarity and certainty, otherwise Amendment 154 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, needs to be accepted.

On Clause 58, the Court of Appeal in a 2008 case said that the word “potentially” should be included if the decision-making authority were required to assess late supply of information as damaging to credibility. Hence, Amendment 153, inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, changes “must take account” to “may take account” as potentially damaging to credibility. Amendment 155 would amend Clause 58 so that it does not apply to child victims or victims of sexual exploitation, similar to Amendments 151D and 152 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

The bottom line is that Clauses 57 and 58 should not be in this Bill and, as has been said, Part 5 as a whole should not be in this Bill. They are arguably in breach of both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

I think that my noble friend Lord Paddick will refer to the worries of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner—we are all very conscious of this matter. Indeed, Dame Sara Thornton has a comment article in the Times today, to which I shall refer in a later group. She has been very active, not least in briefing the JCHR and outlining her extreme worries, and we have heard from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The whole of the sector believes that this tightening up, to the disadvantage of vulnerable and traumatised victims of human trafficking and slavery, is wholly inappropriate.

[Lord Henley (Con)]

My Lords, I have not yet spoken on this Bill—I missed the Second Reading for reasons beyond my control—but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which issued a number of reports on the Bill. I want to refer to the 11th report, covering Part 5, where we unanimously, as a committee, came forward with a number of recommendations. I hope that the Committee will bear with me—bearing in mind the strictures of the Chief Whip a day or two ago—if I make a brief intervention on this to support those amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. The noble Baroness was speaking to Amendments 153 and 155, but all of us are also, to some extent, in support of all the other amendments, and take note of everything that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said.

I offer my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his very kind words about all the work my right honourable friend Theresa May has done on modern slavery over the years. I served briefly in the Home Office, as I have served briefly in a great many departments, before I was moved on—as happens so often. I know from when I served with my right honourable friend just how seriously she took this issue—she treated it as important even before she became Home Secretary. She was a member of the shadow Cabinet in the run-up to the 2001 election and then continued with this work beyond. She will be grateful for everything the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said. If I do not pass it on to her, I am sure she will read Hansard.

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[Lord Deben (Con)]

I am sorry to remove my mask, but I am told in the Climate Change Committee, of which I am chairman, that we have to have a British ETS which is not aligned with the rest of Europe because that is what we want. Why does it apply to climate change but not to modern slavery? On both of those issues we are in advance and wish to continue to be in advance. I do not understand this alignment element.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Can I join the maskless crew? Surely international law, and certainly EU directives, are usually a minimum requirement, so if we wanted 45 days and a European instrument said 30, that is brilliant; it is better. It at least complies, so what is the problem?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I hear from all sides of the Chamber, including from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I want to speak to the JCHR amendments in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Those were very strong words from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I found them extremely persuasive, including his remarks on one-nation conservatism. I see the noble Lords, Lord Fowler and Lord Deben, in their place, and I commend the speech of Sir John Major today, which I have followed a little on Twitter.

Amendment 159 was inspired by the JCHR and seeks to remove the discretion around whether a person who has a positive reasonable grounds decision and a conclusive grounds decision pending could avoid removal. Instead of saying that the competent authority “may determine” that removal should not take place, if that is appropriate in the circumstances of the case, we suggest it “must”.

Clause 59 has already changed the Modern Slavery Act so that we are talking about people who “are” victims of slavery or human trafficking, not those who “may be”. Therefore, it is surely right that such victims, who have been given an additional positive reasonable grounds decision for new or more recent slavery or trafficking allegations, must not be removed.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. I was proposing to deal later with the expression “bad faith” and its source, but, to help him at this stage, it is not drawn from any comparable legislation, nor from the authority of the courts. We do not hark back to that. Rather, the nature of the problems that must be confronted in relation to this is sufficiently protean and diverse that a need was identified to arrive at a broad expression in the Bill, and “bad faith” was the language selected after consideration among Ministers and officials to represent that.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but I now realise that he has now moved on from Clause 61 and is talking about Clause 62. I was wondering whether he was going to answer my point about incompatibility with the ECHR memorandum. That says that

“where the person’s previous conclusive grounds decision was negative, the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2) of ECAT.”

However, you are not protecting them from removal in the meantime under Article 61, as far as I can see, so how is the Bill compatible with the ECHR memorandum?

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

The point I was seeking to make by that expression is, I think, the same one that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar made earlier, when he spoke about this—it is as familiar to the noble Baroness as a practising barrister as it is to me, and I think it was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. If we have a list that sets out heads A to E, and then counsel attempts to rely on point F which is not otherwise comprehended, or not specifically enumerated but which may be comprehended within the expression “or any other circumstance”, that always—as my noble friend Lord Wolfson said—places counsel at a disadvantage.

On the threats, or potential threats, and the potential scope for abuse which lie within the power of a person seeking to exploit and make a false application under these circumstances, what we are seeking to do is to identify a phrase or term which is sufficiently wide to encompass all those potential points. Noble Lords in the Committee have identified, under reference to the traffickers and criminals whom it is the intention of the entire Committee to thwart, their cunning, resilience and resourcefulness in finding ways to slip between the cracks of aspects of legislation.

Amendment 169 does not provide a definition of “public order”. I reassure the Committee that we adhere to relevant provisions in our international obligations but it is unnecessary to specify that in legislation, and we are satisfied that the current definition of public order complies with ECAT.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering proposes that we replace the “bad faith” provision with one of “improper claims”. That proposal can be addressed in conjunction with Amendment 163, which seeks to remove the bad faith provision entirely. Another reason for the expression “bad faith”, and its breadth, is to avoid inadvertently excluding administrative mistakes made when submitting claims, which may be interpreted as falling under “improper claims”. We believe that “bad faith” is the appropriate language.

In answer to submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, under Amendments 169, 161 and 164, which seek to exclude children from this clause, ECAT does not specify an age limit. We deem it important that the United Kingdom maintains the full scope while ensuring that all decisions to withhold the protections of the NRM are balanced against our priority to safeguard children. The proposal set out in these amendments would create, in effect, a two-tiered system that could encourage those looking to misuse the NRM protections to provide falsified information regarding their age. We all sat late enough the other night in relation to the age amendment provisions elsewhere in the Bill for me not to wish to go into that area again, but we are concerned lest the proposals in the amendment provide an opportunity for persons to provide falsified information.

In relation to Amendment 168, the Government are aware that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery may already have been convicted of serious offences or be involved in terrorism-related activity. I make it clear that neither the additional recovery period nor the public order disqualifications can be taken as being a blanket disqualification. Any decisions relating to disqualifications will be taken on an individual basis, taking into account the individual’s circumstances and vulnerabilities. This includes consideration as to the nature of any criminal exploitation that may have been made of them and the need to safeguard individuals. We think it is right that further details of how to apply this discretionary element should be set out in guidance for decision-makers rather than being placed in the Bill. That will give the Government the flexibility to meet the needs of victims and respond to changing patterns of criminal activity that may seek opportunities to misuse the NRM.

We do not consider that Clause 62 will present a barrier to people who have had convictions and prevent them coming forward, because of that discretionary approach and because there will not be a blanket disqualification on the basis of public order. All of us—the whole Committee, I am sure—want victims of modern slavery to continue to come forward for identification and support, irrespective of their personal circumstances or the circumstances in which they came to be exploited. However, we maintain that it is right that the Government can remove individuals who pose a threat to public order from the protections and support that the NRM affords.

Together with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, was concerned lest such victims did not come forward if they had criminal convictions. First responders should still always refer victims into the national referral mechanism, in line with modern slavery statutory guidance, even where the individual has had a previous recovery period or has a criminal conviction. Decision-makers trained in the field will then carefully consider each individual case and take into account specific vulnerabilities and the needs of each individual, again on a case-by-case basis.

The recovery period may be withheld following a reasonable grounds decision, and the rights that flow from a conclusive grounds decision may also be withheld at that stage if relevant disqualifications apply. I emphasise that we will carefully consider each individual case to ensure that people who genuinely need protection and support will receive it. I reiterate that it is right that we should be able to withhold rights from individuals where appropriate—for example, from those who pose a national security risk to the United Kingdom.

I return to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The protections of the NRM will be withheld in accordance with Clause 61 only when so to do would be compliant with our international obligations—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am glad to hear that the Government want to comply with our international obligations—some of us feel that that is not entirely evident from the Bill—but I was asking about compatibility with the European convention against trafficking. Clause 61 allows “a competent authority” to remove someone even when a conclusive grounds decision is pending. I am sorry to repeat myself, but the European Convention on Human Rights memorandum, produced presumably by the Home Office for the Bill, says at paragraph 76.d:

“the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2)”.

That is not what Clause 61 does; it allows the Government to remove the person. They are not “protected from removal” pending a new conclusive grounds decision, so the ECHR memorandum and the Bill are in direct contradiction. Can the Minister take further advice and answer that point? If he cannot do so today, I am sure that he will be able to write to me. I am pretty sure that this was identified by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is why we wanted to change “must” determine the person’s removal to “may”, so that there is wiggle room that might be in compliance with ECAT. On the face of it, I cannot see that this provision is compliant, notwithstanding the assertion in the memorandum that it is.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

The noble Baroness graciously affords me the possibility of replying perhaps in more detail and later. Unless I have further information to provide to her, I propose to take that course. I am obliged to her for her consideration.

In relation to how to assess whether a person is involved in terrorism-related activity or is otherwise a national security concern, the Government have extensive experience of assessing these things, together with our operational partners, and using these assessments to inform executive decision-making.

Whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is a crucial part of consideration for public order disqualification. Amendment 165 would weaken the United Kingdom’s ability to withhold protections from people of terrorism concern, and we therefore consider that it would increase the risk to the national security of the UK.

Regarding Amendment 166, NRM referrals for foreign national offenders and foreign nationals held on remand are rising, with an average of 85 per month for the first five months of 2021, compared to 19 per month in 2018. It is right that foreign nationals who have been convicted of the serious offences referred to in Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 should be included within scope for consideration of the public order disqualification. This ensures that we will have a clear definition provided for in legislation to support decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick has his name to Amendment 170. I know that he—I join him in this—is always pleased to have an opportunity to support the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich. Given that we are now past 4 pm, which, in the terminology of this House, was to be the lunch hour, I will not say anything more on this amendment. I hope that noble Lords can read between the lines.

Similarly, I particularly support Amendment 171A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for reasons to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred.

Finally, when I bumped into the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, the other day, I said, “I don’t know what you’re going to say but I’ll support you”. He said, “I thought you would”.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, we have been quicker than I anticipated but what my noble friend said is true; I must admit that I am starving.

I will speak to Amendments 171 and 172 from the JCHR, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. They aim to remove the worst of Clause 64. Leave to remain is important for victims who are vulnerable to destitution and further exploitation without welfare benefits and other entitlements but, according to the anti-slavery commissioner, the number of victims being granted discretionary leave is very low. In 2015, it was 123. In 2019, it was 70. In the first three months of 2020, it was only eight; we do not have statistics for the whole of 2020-21.

Being granted leave can improve mental health by offering stability and thus a chance of recovery, but the equivalent reference to assistance and support in the Modern Slavery Act reads “physical or psychological harm”; that includes social harm. This Bill would put the law out of line with that and raise real doubts about compatibility with Article 14 of ECAT, which uses the phrase

“necessary owing to their personal situation”.

That is wider than what is in Clause 64(2)(a), which is why I commend Amendment 171 to the Committee. I was pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, refer to the JCHR’s report; he also mentioned the importance of family relationships.

Amendment 172 aims to rectify the omission from Clause 64 of any consideration of the best interests of the child so as to make it compatible with ECAT and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. I seem to have mixed up my notes; I am sorry about that because I will now go back to Amendment 171.

In a case last year, the High Court held that refusing to grant discretionary leave while a slavery victim’s asylum application was being processed violated Article 14 of the European Convention on Action against Trafficking. It appears that, before amendments were made in the other place, Clause 64(2)(a) included a reference to the victim’s social well-being as well as their physical and mental health. However, it was removed on Report. Can the Minister explain why? Would the Government like to rectify this omission in the Bill regarding personal, situational and social harm so as to make me, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the JCHR very happy?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in the interests of time, let me just say respectfully to the noble Lord, Lord McColl, whose amendments I have signed, that I very much support him and the arguments and points that he made so well. We look forward to the Minister’s response. I pay tribute to the doughty work the noble Lord has done over a number of years to try to move the Government in what many of us regard as a simple and sensible way forward. Let us hope.

I shall speak to my Amendment 171AA. Clause 64 provides for limited leave to remain

“if the Secretary of State considers it is necessary for the purpose of (a) assisting the person in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm … (b) enabling the person to seek compensation”—

unless this can be done outside the UK

“or (c) enabling the person to co-operate”

with law enforcement. The standard, however, does not meet the UK’s obligation to children under the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking. Article 14.2 of ECAT specifies that in the case of children, residence permits

“shall be issued in accordance with the best interests of the child.”

Paragraph 186 of the Explanatory Report to ECAT explains that

“the child’s best interests take precedence”.

Amendment 171AA, which is a probing amendment, simply asks why the Government cannot include leave to remain where children are protected and where it is in the best interest of the child.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendments 172B and Amendment 174A relate to Clause 67.

I say at the outset that I do not want to reopen a debate about Brexit, but I do want to reopen a debate about the practical implications of the UK being outside the EU and how it relates to the protection of children and those who are victims of slavery and trafficking.

The Government actively chose to opt into the trafficking directive in 2011, stating that it would send a powerful message to traffickers. The modern slavery strategy of 2014 stated that opting in showed

“our commitment to working with other countries in Europe to drive up standards across the continent in tackling trafficking.”

Can the Minister say what has happened to that and how the Government are demonstrating those continuing commitments? Why is Clause 67, on disapplying the directive, necessary? What the Committee would like from the Minister—which may be difficult to do now as he may need to refer to others before coming back to us—is to explain which specific provisions of the Bill the Government consider to be incompatible with the directive? The Government have not given any detail on this. Is it victims’ rights or children’s rights? In other words, what difference has it made, what was covered and what is not covered? These answers are necessary for us to make a comparison and see whether there are any gaps which we believe would be important to close.

In the Commons, the Minister said that

“the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.”—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 2/11/21; col. 547.]

I hesitate to suggest this, but I certainly would not be able to tell noble Lords exactly which bits have been applied, which have been disapplied and whether it makes any difference. Can the Minister provide clarity on this? Are we disapplying it under this Act, or have the Government already decided that it does not apply? In other words, has it just been abandoned?

My amendment does not prevent the disapplication, but simply asks the Government to complete an impact assessment before this part comes into force—including identifying which parts of the Bill are incompatible and, crucially, what impact this would have on the identification and protection of victims of slavery. The Government may have already conducted an impact assessment but if so, I could not find one. If they have, it would be interesting for the Committee to note that. This is particularly important because a Google search finds all sorts of regulations and legislation which have been passed, presumably to protect victims of slavery and trafficking. So, my amendment is a simple probing amendment to ask the Minister what difference the disapplication has made. How do we know it has not made a difference if we have no information about the difference between what there was and what there is?

I do not intend to commence a huge new debate for this Committee, but I want to use this grouping as an opportunity to highlight the issue of internal trafficking and county lines. The Minister will know that large numbers of children are referred to the national referral mechanism. He will also know that 34% of referrals are British citizens. There is a real problem with slavery and trafficking within the UK. Euphemistically, this is called county lines, and we know what that means. This will be the tip of the iceberg. The Government have set up all sorts of initiatives to try to deal with this, but what I am seeking to do is simply to raise the issue of slavery and trafficking of children—British children—within the UK. How big is the problem, what is its extent and what are we doing to get on top of it? People of this country would be shocked at the numbers of British children being trafficked and enslaved. Often, including in the debate we have had on this Bill, much of the discussion has been about people coming into the country—rightly or wrongly—what the numbers are and what the impact of the new provisions will be.

Although this is a probing amendment, it is nevertheless really important. I am pleased to see that the Home Office Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, is now in her place. Perhaps these are issues that should be debated elsewhere, but county lines and internal trafficking are important issues and the number of British children in slavery is increasing. It is a growing phenomenon that is a great shock to us all, and we need to do more to tackle it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to lend our support from these Benches to both the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. The subject of retained EU law is one on which it is easy to go down a rabbit hole. But at least this is being put in primary legislation instead of being done by the stroke of an executive pen, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Frost—who is, well, I had better not say—who used to be the Brexit Minister, appeared to suggest would happen. So, I suppose we should be grateful for small mercies.

The EU trafficking directive is, in a sense, a classic EU directive. It aims to get common standards as a measure of human rights protection, in order to establish robust provisions to prevent and prosecute the crime of trafficking and to protect, assist and support its victims. But also, the point of trying to get similar standards was to facilitate cross-border co-operation between member states’ law enforcement authorities through police co-operation, exchange of information and best practices, and dialogue between police, judicial and other authorities. Sometimes misunderstood, the whole point of EU harmonisation was to enable things to happen better, not least law enforcement.

I too do not want to rerun the issue of Brexit, but it is hard to see how pulling out of the EU trafficking directive is a Brexit opportunity. It is a lost opportunity to co-operate internationally across European borders with Europol on major crime. I am afraid that major criminals are one of the beneficiaries of Brexit.

It is a great pity that the part of the TCA on security is so thin. Things like the EU trafficking directive deserve a place in it. You can withdraw unilaterally, but that means you do not get the reciprocity of other police forces co-operating when you have criminal perpetrators who come from all over. Of course, we know this is an international crime. The EU directive also enables the pursuit of action in non-EU countries, such as raising awareness, reducing vulnerability, supporting and assisting victims, fighting the root causes of trafficking and supporting third countries in developing appropriate anti-trafficking legislation. That is an action that would rebound to the benefit of EU countries and the UK, if we were to stay plugged in to the EU’s directives. So, I do not see that pulling out is other than a lose-lose situation.

On the other amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as has been mentioned—I believe this figure comes from Care UK—in 2020, 34% of all potential victims of modern slavery referred to the NRM were UK nationals. So, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is right to focus on that and on the many children involved in county lines drug dealing. We fully support the call for a report on these issues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Suttie, for raising this issue, and I think some very good questions have been asked. I have a different question. In the absence of an electronic travel authorisation, are there problems in enforcing immigration, asylum or indeed criminal law? Can we be reassured that there would not be an incentive for people who want to come to the UK to come in large numbers through the Republic of Ireland? That would be my one concern in trying to address the very real issues across the border that have been identified, and which you see in other countries where you have borders—especially where there has been a practice of having no border.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will very briefly give support from these Benches to all three of these amendments. They all demonstrate the practical consequences of Brexit. I declare a bit of an interest on Amendment 175—not that I am neither British nor Irish but that I am both British and Irish. In fact, I have been Irish from birth without for a long time realising it, but I have now just got my passport, so I am a dual national.

But it makes no sense—and the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, gave very graphic examples of how silly it is to try to stop people crossing the border. It is not just about tourism; it is about work and business. Surely it is not in the spirit of the good relationship that we have with the Republic of Ireland, or of the Belfast agreement, or of everything that we want to work, Brexit or no Brexit—or despite Brexit. We want to have very good relations on the island of Ireland. I am not sure how it would actually work, but trying to stop people would be a nuisance, to put it at its mildest, and harmful from every direction.

On the point about the ETA system having to rely on the clunky Interpol system, my noble friend reminded me that we are going to be debating the report from the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, in a couple of weeks. We do not have access to SEIS or ECRIS, or other EU instruments, and this is not good for operating an ETA system. So it would be very good to hear from the Minister whether he has anything positive to say about how to remedy the practical consequences, to use a neutral word, of Brexit, both for internal travel on the island of Ireland and for how the ETA system can work optimally.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Perhaps I, too, should declare that I am both British and Irish since birth. I understand the difficulties locally that potentially arise and have been so well illustrated by the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, but I wanted to ask the Minister whether he could put this in the context of the common travel area. Does it really exist in practice as a reciprocal arrangement? I specifically ask because I have never been able to land at Shannon Airport, even on a direct flight from Heathrow, without standing in a queue and presenting a passport—yet when I return and land at Heathrow, I walk straight through and am guided past the passport gates. To what extent is this common travel area being operated by the Irish Republic on a genuinely reciprocal basis? Could it not in a sense be tied up with this issue?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I recognise that the Bill removes discrimination against those, including some descendants of Chagossians, unable to claim previously through their mothers or unmarried fathers. But with this amendment we are talking about a limited number of people, in the hundreds—maybe 800 to 1,000—who, as descendants of Chagossians evicted from the islands, will still have no rights to British overseas citizenship and, in due course, British citizenship even with Part 1, even though they would have that right if they had not been evicted. In Committee, the Minister’s only answer was that

“offering this right is contrary to long-standing government policy.”—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 497.]

That position does not take into account the exceptional nature of what happened to the Chagossians. No other British Overseas Territories citizens suffered this fate. Chucking out colonial subjects in the modern age was also, I hope, contrary to good government policy. If an exception could be made for the Chagossians then, one can be made now.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, in Committee there seemed to be some representations from noble Lords who did not know about the plight of the Chagos Islanders; they were hearing about it for the first time. There is so much injustice in the world that it is very difficult to keep track of all the consequences of British and American imperialism, but it is one of the beauties of your Lordships’ House that any of us can table amendments that can be debated and discussed. I say a big thank you to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for debating this issue and for her powerful speeches on this cause. Having had the issue raised in Committee, and now again on Report, no one can claim ignorance of this real injustice. We have to take action. It is time for the United Kingdom to make reparations for forcing changes on the Chagos Islanders. This amendment is the beginning of that process and the Greens support it completely.

--- Later in debate ---

I have explained to the noble Baroness that we do not want to treat EEA nationals differently from other nationals who are required to meet the same requirements for naturalisation in terms of lawful residence. The government amendment we have tabled on lawful residence will benefit EEA nationals and their family members, as well as others who have acquired indefinite leave to remain in the UK, as previous residence will not be reassessed. For the reasons I have set out, I imagine the noble Baroness will be pleased and happy not to press her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I very much thank the Minister, who has taken a very welcome personal interest in this matter, which is very encouraging. The government amendments are interesting and represent some progress, but they are unspecific for EEA citizens, and there is still that discretion, not certainty, that the Secretary of State “may” but not “must” do this.

As I said in Committee, I was grateful for the concession, announced by the Minister and which she has just talked about, to the effect that the Government would

“amend the Immigration Rules … to disapply any requirement for a Lounes dual national”—

this area is littered with technical terminology—

“to have held CSI in order to sponsor applications by relevant family members”

for settlement. I would be very grateful, as we asked in Committee, to know whether there is any further knowledge of what progress there is on that change to the Immigration Rules.

So far, so good—but on the other two arms of my amendment, on registration of children as British citizens and naturalisation as British for an EEA settled person, both without looking at past CSI history, as my amendment asked for, the Minister said in Committee that

“it would not be right to single out EEA nationals”,

and she has repeated that. We are slightly in the same territory as we were on the Chagos amendments, whereby the Government say that they cannot do something specifically for this group. The Minister also said in Committee that

“it would not be right to treat certain nationalities differently”—[Official Report, 1/2/22; col. 794-95]

and she is maintaining this approach.

However, EEA nationals are being treated differently. They have resided previously in this country, often for a long time; a large chunk of an international treaty, the withdrawal agreement, is devoted to them and to their counterparts, British citizens in the EU, and legislation specifically covering them; and there are various arrangements for monitoring and supervising how they are treated. So they are a special case. I would just mention that some children who should have been born British were not, and now have to be registered at a cost of more than £1,000 because of the specifics of the situation of EEA nationals.

After the meeting of the UK-EU joint committee last week—the committee on the withdrawal agreement—Vice-President Šefčovič recalled that

“it was a commitment from both of us that we will do our utmost for the UK nationals in the EU and the EU citizens staying in the UK.”

An EU official was reported as saying that the Commission would consider whether to launch consultations on citizens’ rights, and could ultimately trigger an arbitration process. I am not saying that those remarks were targeted at this specific problem, but that reminds us that there is an oversight mechanism for the fate of EEA citizens.

The CSI issue affects only EEA citizens, nobody else, so removing it entirely from being a virus—I called it “snakes and ladders”—in our immigration regime, would simply bring EEA citizens into line with all other migrants, who do not have a CSI problem. When Prime Minister, Theresa May said:

“The requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance is an EU requirement, and as long as we are members of the EU, it will continue to be there. Once we leave, we can indeed remove it”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/6/2017; col. 315.]


It is true that the Government removed it for applicants for settled status but, as I hope I have explained through the passage of this Bill, the problem is that it pops up later. You do not get rid of it; that is why I call it a virus. You do not get rid of it—it sort of comes back.

What is not to like about removing red tape? I suggest that while the new government amendments represent some progress—again, I thank the Minister—they still rest on discretion and do not treat EEA citizens on the fair, legally secure basis that I believe they deserve under the withdrawal agreement. I hope that the Government can do more and ward off any possible action from the European Commission and enforce a slightly more secure basis.

If I cannot get what I really want—acceptance of my amendment—I ask the Minister to confirm at least that, when implemented, the guidance will be updated to always state that the Secretary of State will always exercise her discretion in favour of applicants by not inquiring as to whether they had CSI and by treating self-sufficient persons, students and their family members as not having breached immigration laws. That should be in guidance as a firm commitment. Otherwise, I would like to hear the Minister further.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we support much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has just said and some of the questions she has put forward. No doubt, the Minister will respond to those questions. It has to be said that the Minister has come forward with some amendments that do improve the situation.

Can I just emphasise the important points the Minister made and clarify, in the light of the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that she said it would apply to all residents, not just EU residents? That is an important point that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made, and the House needs further clarification on what “all”—not to be pedantic—actually means in these circumstances for clarity of legislation.

Having welcomed the step forward the Minister has clearly made, I think that what “exceptional” means is also important—so that the Secretary of State will not use the power to prevent somebody without CSI gaining citizenship other than in exceptional circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, again, is right to ask for greater clarity about how “exceptional circumstances” will be defined and whether there will actually be guidance that any future Home Secretary will have to take into account in determining whether leave to remain should be changed to a full citizenship status in the particular circumstances with which this group of amendments is dealing.

I thank the Minister for coming forward with those amendments and trying to meet many of the concerns that were raised in Committee and before. I look forward, with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I am sure, to the answers to the important questions that have been raised, notwithstanding the amendments before us this afternoon.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for the points they have just made. I did refer to guidance in the points I was making in introducing. Yes, the guidance will make things clear.

In terms of “all”, “all” means all nationalities; the provisions will apply to all nationalities. I know the noble Baroness says this is a particular EU problem, but we are trying to make provisions that apply to all countries.

In terms of that point about “may” and “must”, “may” rather than “must” reserves the “may” for the most exceptional cases where it would not be appropriate to take that more generous approach. The provisions will be applicable to the vast majority of applicants, apart from those “may” applicants where a generous approach would not be appropriate—for example, criminality. I hope that explains it to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I do thank the Minister for that reply. I am not absolutely certain. It may just be that I did not follow the detail, but I am not sure I quite heard that the guidance, apart from in the exceptional case of criminality, will say that the Secretary of State will always exercise her discretion in favour of EEA applicants by not inquiring about the CSI record of the people that it affected.

I have some understanding for what she said about people with a criminal record but, that apart, I should like to hear—perhaps I will not get this today—that the guidance will say that, in normal cases, for EEA nationals, there will always be a good outcome in disregarding a CSI gap. I am not sure that I have quite heard that. I do not know whether the Minister wants to clarify that now, or whether I should just accept—

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I cannot make an absolutist comment, but I was trying to explain to the noble Baroness that anyone in the normal run of things—other than, for example, serious criminality—would be caught by the government amendments.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the Minister for that further clarification. I think I have got as far as I am going to get—

[Noble Lords]

Order!

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Thirdly, there is the specious claim that the right to work after six months might lead to an unmanageable intake of asylum seekers in the first place. Yet, not least as stressed by the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee, these is little evidence to back up that assertion. Instead, the main reason for asylum seekers coming here is the need to escape from intolerable circumstances in their own countries, as we are now witnessing through the thousands of Ukrainians fleeing from war. For all these reasons I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to accept this amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the arguments have been put very well and very strongly. I am very pleased to co-sign the excellent amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. Her speech was really excellent. Others have demolished the pull factor argument and I do not wish to say any more on that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said in Committee:

“To relax the policy would be totally to undermine everything that the British people voted for in 2019”.—[Official Report, 3/2/22; col. 1062.]


This has really nothing to do with Brexit, but the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, just quoted a statistic of 70% of people supporting asylum seekers being able to work. That is quite similar to a YouGov poll today which says that 77% of the British public support relaxing visa restrictions on Ukrainian refugees, refuting the idea that the public do not appreciate these arguments, whether it is about refugees or, in this case, asylum seekers.

This is not a partisan proposal; it has been said that it is thoroughly Conservative—I would like to say it is thoroughly Liberal Democrat or Labour as well—but it is not of itself party political. To us, its proponents, it is a win-win. It enables asylum seekers to stand on their own two feet, support their families, pay tax—that is the economic side—and to help them integrate. I cannot remember whether I quoted it in Committee, but I saw a statistic that said that if asylum seekers do not get that sort of flying start—and of course those who do not qualify for refugee status will have to be removed in the normal way, whether they have been working or not—it can take 10 years to recover from a period of initial deterioration. People’s mental and physical health, their self-regard and ability to mesh with their community is so damaged by not being able to work in an initial period that it takes a very long time for them to recover, and that harms the host society.

I do not believe that the Government are on the same page as public opinion on this one. It really it not logical. If the Government were able to meet the target, which they are failing at horribly, to make an initial decision within six months, then this proposed new clause would not come into effect, because the right to work comes into effect after six months. There is nothing to fear if the Government actually put their resources into frontloading the system—as so many of us have argued for ad infinitum.

Accepting this amendment is a no-brainer, and the noble Baroness has got a considerable brain, so she is going to find it quite difficult to refute the truly heavy arguments for this amendment.

[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

My Lords, I give my strong support to Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. She has eloquently made the case for this amendment, so I do not intend to take a great deal of the House’s time, but I wish to add a few brief remarks in support.

At Second Reading, I raised the question of how different our migration policy might be if we stopped looking at asylum seekers as either victims without agency or criminals seeking to exploit us and instead as future citizens and neighbours. In this light, the right to work for asylum seekers who have waited six months or more for a decision represents an excellent opportunity. It would be good for asylum seekers and for the soul of this nation. Such people are often left without agency or dignity. Their identity becomes limited to a sort of victim status. Being unable to work leaves them dependent on the state or at risk of falling in with illegal labour exportation.

Legal employment represents a chance for people to contribute to their own welfare and that of the common good. It is a way for them to bring their skill and efforts to their new communities, to make friends and to integrate. It provides an opportunity for others to meet and understand these newcomers, and to see them as willing contributors rather than chancers or criminals.

Work is not just a means to a wage or an economic benefit to a business and a community—although, as we have heard, it might be all these things—but innately social. It is activity done with and for others. It is a contribution to common life. That is something we should look to foster and encourage, as it is a means of building stronger ties of fellowship, stronger communities and stronger citizens.

This argument has been advanced before in this place and has been rejected. However, with new recommendations from the Migration Advisory Committee and the sense of momentum we can hear in the House this evening, I hope we might be able to make some progress.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

47: After Clause 37, insert the following new Clause—
“Refugee family reunion
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the date of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a statement of changes in the rules (the “immigration rules”) under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (general provisions for regulation and control) to make provision for refugee family reunion, in accordance with this section, to come into effect after 21 days. (2) Before a statement of changes is laid under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with persons he or she deems appropriate.(3) The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules providing for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for family members of a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.(4) In this section, “refugee status” and “humanitarian protection” have the same meaning as in the immigration rules.(5) In this section, “family members” include—(a) a person’s parent, including adoptive parent;(b) a person’s spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner;(c) a person’s child, including adopted child, who is either—(i) under the age of 18, or(ii) under the age of 25 but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum;(d) a person’s sibling, including adoptive sibling, who is either—(i) under the age of 18, or(ii) under the age of 25, but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum; and(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State may determine, having regard to—(i) the importance of maintaining family unity,(ii) the best interests of a child,(iii) the physical, emotional, psychological or financial dependency between a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection and another person,(iv) any risk to the physical, emotional or psychological wellbeing of a person who was granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, including from the circumstances in which the person is living in the United Kingdom, or(v) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(6) For the purpose of subsection (5)—(a) “adopted” and “adoptive” refer to a relationship resulting from adoption, including de facto adoption, as set out in the immigration rules;(b) “best interests” of a child must be read in accordance with Article 3 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the Ukrainian family scheme drives a welcome coach and horses through the usual Home Office approach to refugee family reunion, which is to oppose anything but a very narrow definition of “family”. The Home Office, in my opinion, seeks to restrict this safe route very considerably. As I understand it, the new scheme would allow children as well as adults to sponsor parents, grandparents, siblings and their immediate families, as well as allowing adults to sponsor their children over 18. It does not go as far as Amendment 48 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, in including, for instance, reunion with an aunt or uncle, and I look forward to him speaking to that amendment.

The Ukrainian family scheme is not the normal, routine Home Office approach. That approach was expressed at Second Reading of my Private Member’s Bill on refugee family reunion, and in Committee in response to my amendment, which was essentially the text of that Private Member’s Bill, as is Amendment 47 today.

In Committee on this Bill, the Minister said that the Home Office recognised

“that in some cases there will be exceptional and compassionate circumstances which warrant a grant of leave”

for the purposes of family reunion and that the guidance on exceptional circumstances would be “published in due course”. Can the Minister tell us what progress has been made in publishing that guidance? Yet again, as so often, the basis of the policy is just the exercise of discretion. It does not give certainty.

The Ukrainian family scheme is of course welcome, but in its recognition that, having fled to safety, refugees need their families, it should be a precedent, not an exception. As to allowing children to bring in family members, the Minister said at Committee stage of this Bill that

“noble Lords will at least grant that I have been consistent in opposing that sort of policy, because of its negative consequences”,

which, she claimed would creative incentives for children to be encouraged and forced

“to leave their family and risk extremely dangerous journeys to the UK in order to sponsor relatives.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1474.]

In fact, it is the lack of safe routes such as family reunion that force dangerous journeys. Families Together, the coalition of 90 NGOs, talks about how the existing rules mean

“that those family members who have become separated but are not covered by the rules are left with the invidious choice of staying put in insecure and dangerous places or embarking on treacherous, expensive, unregulated journeys.”

I agree with another NGO, the excellent Safe Passage, that:

“Safe routes save lives, reunite families and support refugees to rebuild their lives … welcomed by our communities.”


I hope that the Government will take the precedent of the Ukrainian family scheme and widen it out to their family reunion policies. I beg to move.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 48 in particular. I say at the outset that I am grateful to the Minister for the trouble she has taken to give me a chance to talk to her and her officials about the clause and the Government’s view of it. Although I do not think that either of us was persuaded by the other as a result of our conversation, nevertheless I am grateful for the trouble she went to.

I want to just say a word or two about the background. Until we left the EU we had the benefit of the Dublin treaty, particularly Dublin III. To summarise, the benefit of that was that a refugee child or a child claiming refugee status could seek to join a relative living in this country. For example, a Syrian boy in France could apply to join an uncle in Birmingham or Manchester. That worked fairly well. The figures show that it was quite successful and it was an important part of reuniting families.

When we were concerned that Brexit would put an end to all this because the Dublin treaty would no longer apply, this House passed an amendment to the 2017 legislation so that the Government would negotiate to continue the family reunion provision after we left the EU. That was passed by this House on a vote, it was eventually accepted by the Government in the Commons and it became the law of the land. Then came the 2019 legislation and the Government took the provision out again, for reasons we never understood. Many of us were alarmed that something that had been passed could just be reversed, as it were, by other legislation.

Partly to conciliate me, I think, the Minister arranged a meeting. I was quite surprised that there were three Government Ministers and seven officials at the meeting, and me: it was sort of 10 to one. The effort was made to persuade me that everything would be all right under the then Immigration Rules. The then Immigration Minister was Brandon Lewis. He looked me in the eye and said, “Don’t you trust me?” I found this quite difficult. I said, first, “There is no guarantee you will stay in your job for very long.” Indeed, within weeks he was promoted to Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Secondly, I said, “I may trust you personally but I don’t trust the Government.” I am afraid that is still my position on this legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

I outlined some of the other things we have been doing in the debate on a previous group so I will not go over them again, but what I have outlined is an extremely generous and expansive package befitting the need of Ukrainians for our refuge and protection. On that point, I hope that noble Lords will withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the Minister. I still hope that some lessons will be learned from the Ukrainian family scheme, about which we will probably have some exchanges shortly. I hope for wider reform in future. I heard everything the Minister said but I still think that there needs to be fundamental reform of the family reunion rules for all the good reasons expressed in this debate. However, I am not going to make any further progress so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.