Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I rise to speak to the group of amendments to Clause 42. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has made clear, Clause 42 proposes the imposition of the criminal courts charge to cover the costs of providing the judiciary and the rest of the court system. Such a charge is proposed, as he has also made clear, to be compulsory for offenders of 18 and over unless the offence is of a class listed in regulations as excluded.
I have put my name to a number of amendments, along with my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Linklater, and in some of those we are joining with those proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Kennedy of Southwark. Our principal purpose in those amendments is to ensure that the criminal courts charge is recoverable on a discretionary basis. I put that quite apart from the arguments about whether the sums sought to be recovered will in fact be recovered and I agree with the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that the Government’s expectation in this regard is entirely optimistic.
Quite simply, we can see no point in setting out a requirement that the criminal courts charge be imposed in cases where it will not do any good and is unlikely ever to be recovered. It will no doubt be argued by my noble friend the Minister that the power to remit the criminal courts charge under new Section 21E at a later date, some time after it is imposed, will provide an answer to the point we make. However, I am bound to say that I doubt it will. Will the Minister clarify what the Government see as the point of imposing a mandatory requirement that a defendant pay a charge and coupling that with a power to let the defendant off the charge if he cannot pay it? In many cases, the reality is that the inability to pay the charge in the first place is obvious throughout.
That really is the problem. In a very large number of cases, there is absolutely no prospect that the criminal courts charge will prove to be recoverable. We entirely accept that in those cases where a defendant can afford to pay the charge because he or she is in work or has means, then the court should be able to impose one. The courts charge in those circumstances would make it clear to the defendant that the public insist that the cost of providing the services of the court should be met, at least in part, by the defendant. That would have two salutary effects in those cases. First, the public would recover some of the costs that have been defrayed in order to bring and prosecute the case. Secondly, the court would be making it absolutely clear to the defendant what trouble, inconvenience and expense he has caused, and that he should pay for at least some of the extra costs.
However, as we all know and as was made absolutely clear in Committee, many offenders come before the court without work and means, beset by complex problems of inadequate education, physical and mental health, harsh and criminal backgrounds, dysfunctional families and, above all, a lack of employment opportunities. What such offenders need, as has again been repeatedly stated, is rehabilitation and support. Generally, we are all agreed in this House that where a custodial sentence is not absolutely necessary, rehabilitation and support should take place in the community. One of the cardinal aims of any rehabilitation programme should be to enable offenders to secure employment. Until they do so, there is no prospect of their being able to afford to pay the criminal courts charge.
I suggest that saddling all offenders, regardless of circumstances, with outstanding debt is a thoroughly bad idea. I am concerned that the existence of an outstanding charge will make it much more difficult for an offender to secure credit. That, in turn, may make it that much more difficult for him to secure employment. Even if it is only that he needs to buy suitable clothes for interviews or perhaps a bicycle or other transport to get to work, he will not be able to fund them. Furthermore, the fact that such an offender has a charge hanging over his head is likely to be a disincentive to his securing employment because he will know that the repayment of the charge will come from any income he may earn. Now, that may be a less meritorious argument but it is none the less valid for that.
It is also important that the court should have the discretion to set the charge at an appropriate level. There is no such discretion in the proposal made in the Bill. Where the court decides to impose one, it should be for the court to set the level of the charge. It should not be a one-size-fits-all penalty, any more than a fine should be. Plainly, there must be a maximum. That is appropriately defined in new Section 21C as,
“the relevant court costs reasonably attributable to a case of that class”.
However, to say that a charge in that maximum amount is the only charge that may be imposed is unhelpful and unrealistic. It is not sensible to rely on a power—again, at a later date—to remit a proportion, because that involves effectively indicating to a defendant that some of the charge will not have to be paid. The advice will be: “If you cannot pay it all don’t worry, pay what you can and you will be let off the rest”. That is hardly an incentive to pay. It would be far better for the courts to set a sensible and achievable figure at the outset.
Turning to our amendments therefore, we would make the charge entirely discretionary. Our Amendment 63ABA would make it clear that the court would have to consider the justice of the case, having regard to the circumstance of the offender and of the offence and, where appropriate, to the circumstances of any failure to comply with the requirements of a court order. That last point is necessary to deal with the fact that the charge may be imposed for failure to comply with the requirements of a community order or a suspended sentence order or with a supervision requirement.
Amendment 63AFA would leave out subsection (4) at the end of page 41. That subsection rather strangely requires a court to leave out of account a defendant’s liability to the criminal courts charge when considering the penalty,
“for an offence or for a failure to comply with a requirement”.
I see no reason for that provision. If a court regards it as being important to bring home to a defendant the extent of the costs he has caused to the system, why should it not be free to impose a criminal courts charge and lower any other financial penalty accordingly? That salutary discretion is specifically removed by the subsection, and we suggest that it should therefore go. Amendment 63AM would enable a charge lower than the maximum to be imposed, while Amendment 63AN is a tidying-up amendment that would enable the court not just to remit some of the charge, but to remit any interest on the charge when remitting it.
In summary, our position is that a criminal courts charge will be a useful new tool in the court’s armoury when sentencing, but we do not see it as sensible simply to tie it to the overall cost of the justice system. We do not see any reason for tying the court’s hands in such a manner as inevitably to reduce its power to do justice in ways that are not tailored to the individual cases before it.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am struck by the direct relationship between the speed with which the Minister is racing through his brief and the embarrassment he no doubt feels at the material he is giving to the Committee. I cannot believe that the good and noble Lord is really convinced of the case he has been asked to put. That would not surprise me, because much of what we have heard is simply beyond credence. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, in a very powerful speech, made the essential point that—among other things—the court should have discretion on the amount. None of us is any the wiser about what kind of sums we are talking about. The Minister certainly has given no examples, except to say that it will be related somehow to the cost of the individual case. How is that to be calculated? On what basis will that be apportioned? Are we just talking about the cost of prosecution? That can be covered anyway, under the existing framework. Are we talking about a contribution to the cost of maintaining the court building or the cost of the judicial salaries in a higher court? There is no indication of how this cost is to be calculated and then passed on.
Equally, although the noble Lord rightly pointed out the provision in the Bill that the Lord Chancellor will prescribe the class of case to which the charge will apply, he has given no indication tonight—and I do not think that it was done in the other place either—of what kind of cases are envisaged. Why do we not know which cases are likely to be included? What will be the process, if any, for parliamentary approval of the classes as prescribed by the Lord Chancellor? Will Parliament be permitted any consideration in this, or will it simply be a matter of the Lord Chancellor’s fiat?
The Minister’s suggestion that it would be improper for the court to determine the amount because that would somehow reflect a vested interest on its part is simply risible. It is an absurd suggestion. The notion that magistrates or High Court judges will be influenced to make rather larger requirements of prisoners because that will somehow affect them, or the court system, is an insult to both the judiciary and the magistracy. It cannot be something that the noble Lord seriously believes. His scriptwriters need to go back to wherever they were taught their craft.
In addition, and worryingly, the Minister suggested that there is no deterrent effect because the charge will be imposed only long after a plea was entered. That is absurd. The fact that the court is in a position to impose a charge is known to the defendant before he appears there; it certainly ought to be. Of course, it may influence a defendant as to the nature of a plea, particularly in the case of an appeal.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Is not the noble Lord slightly mistaken? It is the fact that the court is bound to impose the charge that is known to every defendant before they go into court.
Lord Beecham
I am not known for being mistaken, but I am happy to concur with the noble Lord’s judgment of me. However, I am not happy to concur with the Minister’s judgment of the situation because it is simply fallacious, particularly in relation to an appeal, when the costs will necessarily be significantly more than they would be at first hearing. Of course, appeals are not just confined to going from the magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court. There is also the question of an appeal from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal and, I suppose, ultimately to the Supreme Court, the costs of which would presumably be unimaginable to an ordinary defendant.
In my view the Minister’s case is in tatters, but let me put a further point. If we are talking about the cost of the case and the cost to the courts, where is the logic in not extending that to the costs—I am now looking at the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—of the police force or the probation service, which might also be involved with a particular client? Why are we confining this charge to the court process? There is no logic to this at all.
We still do not know how the £65 million figure is computed. No doubt the Minister, in fairness to him, does not know either. I cannot imagine he has been supplied with the information. Even if that figure were right, it is something like 3% of the total amount outstanding. The noble Lord gave figures for the uncollected sums for two quarters of 2012. I think my figures were slightly more up to date, if they were correct. However, he did not answer the point—I do not blame him, because presumably nobody has told him—as to why the Ministry of Justice does not know how much has been outstanding for longer than 18 months. Is there an implication that, if money is outstanding for more than 18 months, it would be written off? That would be curious, in the circumstances. There is also the point that the charge will apply to those who are sentenced to a period of imprisonment, presumably to be met after they come out, no doubt as part of their rehabilitation. Does this make any kind of sense, I ask rhetorically? The Minister may think it does; there will be few in this House or outside who would agree.
Of all the misconceived and less than half-baked ideas we have seen in the Bill, this proposal must surely rank in the front line. It is simply appalling and I hope the Minister will use his long experience of these matters, as both an advocate and as a recorder, to persuade his ministerial colleagues, in particular the Lord Chancellor, that he is bringing the whole system into a serious collision with reality, one that will do no good to the defendants, to the court system, or, frankly, to the reputation of those who are putting forward these proposals. However, as we are in Committee, I will not press the matter tonight. It is very probably one to which I and others will wish to return on Report. I hope the Minister will use his influence with the Lord Chancellor to see that some significant changes, at the very least, are made to these appalling, deeply flawed proposals. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising solicitor and partner in the international law firm DAC Beachcroft and as chairman of the British Insurance Brokers’ Association, and I have other interests recorded in the register.
The “have a go” culture has infected our civil compensation system for far too long. Claimants—and it is always claimants—see that there is no real penalty for trying on either that they have been injured at all or a deliberate exaggeration of the symptoms that they have suffered. The advertising by claims farmers and solicitors has undoubtedly played a part in this. The adverts for personal injury and for financial mis-selling continue to give the impression of free money. The starkest example that I can immediately recall was a full-page advert last November showing simply a bundle of £50 notes done up in Christmas ribbon. We all recall those original adverts saying, “Where there’s blame, there’s a claim, and it won’t cost you a penny”.
That is why I welcome Clause 45 as part of the Government’s initiative to tackle this. I certainly support its introduction. Measures are, of course, already available to tackle the completely fabricated claim, but I fully support the idea that a claimant with a genuine claim who then dishonestly exaggerates it should put their whole case at risk. That, after all, is what would happen if one was unwise enough to put in a consciously exaggerated claim to one’s own insurance company. Why should it be any different if one proceeds with the same intent against another person’s insurance company?
I would like to hear more from the Minister on the choice of the phrase, “fundamentally dishonest”. I recognise that my noble friend has great experience of the English language, and I should declare an interest as having been for six years chairman of the English-Speaking Union, but, with due respect for his grasp of the English language, it seems to me that dishonesty is one of those absolute concepts: either you are dishonest or you are not, in the same way that you cannot refer to something as “very unique” or to someone as “slightly pregnant”. I know that a similar phrase was used in the Civil Procedure Rules following the seminal—perhaps I should now call it the “fundamentally seminal”—review by Lord Justice Jackson of civil legal costs, but I am not aware that it has been tested or scrutinised by the Appeal Courts as yet. I would welcome clarification from the Minister about the thinking behind the choice of this phrase.
I have received, no doubt like other noble Lords, material from those representing claimant personal injury lawyers who have expressed concern that this measure might go too far. I cannot agree with that. If a claim is brought which contains a dishonest element—and dishonest always means that there is proof of a deliberate intent to deceive—then that behaviour should rightly put the whole claim at risk. The effect of this clause is clearly a deterrent one which, as I have already explained, I strongly welcome.
It might be helpful to point out to noble Lords that Clause 45 is not unique—not even slightly unique—because an analogous provision can be found in Ireland, in Section 26 of its Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004. There, any plaintiff, as they are still called in Ireland, who knowingly gives false or misleading evidence will find their claim dismissed in total. The test is simply one of dishonesty rather than fundamental dishonesty. If there is a fear that the power in Clause 45 would be abused by overzealous defendants, the experience of more than 10 years in Ireland proves otherwise: the courts are alert to any attempts to abuse a provision that is expected to apply in only a small number of cases, and of course if the clause truly has a deterrent effect, it should mean fewer cases coming to court in the first place.
Let me finish by illustrating the concern over “fundamentally dishonest” with a stark example that was recently brought to my attention. It was a case tried in Stoke-on-Trent County Court earlier this year. Mr Steven Cotton is a 31 year-old heating engineer who now lives in Swadlincote, Derbyshire. In December 2008, he sustained an injury to his neck and shoulder while at work. It was frankly a modest injury and he was able to go back to work the following month, in January 2009, before a disciplinary matter at work intervened. At that point, he decided to bring a claim against his employers and to include in that claim an allegation of a lower-back injury. Matters progressed and, just a few months before trial, he put in a claim schedule for in excess of £1 million, despite his solicitors, Woolliscrofts in Stoke, being aware of video surveillance evidence showing Mr Cotton as being much less disabled than he was making out. I understand that the insurers facing this claim, AXA Insurance, were not impressed. They rightly defended the case to trial and the judge agreed that Mr Cotton had invented the lower-back injury as a deliberate exaggeration of his genuine neck and shoulder injury. The judge awarded Mr Cotton just over £18,000 for the genuine injury, which was less than 2% of the amount that he had falsely claimed, plus some of his solicitor’s costs. One might think that this degree of exaggeration would be enough to knock out the entire claim but, sadly, it was not so. On the one hand, Mr Cotton’s case is a classic example of why the clause is badly needed. On the other hand, it raises a question in my mind as to whether the addition of a second injury to an already genuine injury would be seen by the courts as fundamentally dishonest. The court in Stoke stopped short of declaring that Mr Cotton’s lower back injury was not a genuine medical condition, despite the surveillance evidence. I have a real fear that Mr Cotton might still be awarded damages after the new clause comes in when all right-thinking people would agree that someone whose claim had already been knocked out to the extent of 98% not being allowed should not receive a penny.
I turn to the second amendment in my name: Amendment 63FE. To me, the meaning of subsection (5) of Clause 45 is unclear. Subsections (2) and (4), for example, impose obligations on the court to follow a particular line of conduct by use of the word “must”. In contrast, subsection (5) is different in tone and appears to offer more leeway. I hate once again to split linguistic hairs with the Minister, but I would like some clarification on whether subsection (5) is really intended to be a discretionary “may”. I reassure noble Lords that there is some substance behind the point I seek to make. Subsection (5) appears to limit the legal costs consequences of a claim being dismissed in its entirety under the clause by restricting the costs award that could be made to the defendant to a sum net of the damages that would have been awarded to the claimant if he had pursued an honest claim. I wonder whether there is even a risk that subsection (5) simply undoes the good work of the rest of the clause. The dishonest claimant who is found out ends up paying his opponent’s cost but is able to offset the money he has forfeited by his dishonesty. To return to the example of Mr Cotton, he would still, in effect, get credit for the £18,000 awarded for his genuine injury. Does that not encourage the likes of Mr Cotton to have a go at the expense of insurers, which is where I was when I started? I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 63FDA to 63FFA. I do so with some diffidence because, in part, I disagree with my noble friend Lord Hunt. After the humorous and intelligent way in which he introduced his amendment, and given that I agree with a great deal of the sentiment he expresses, I am concerned about the extent to which I disagree with him.
I agree with my noble friend that there has been a culture of “going for it”. There has been an outbreak of “compensation-itis” that we no doubt acquired, in part, from the United States and which has bitten particularly deep into the culture of people who have had motoring accidents. I greatly agree that something needs to be done. The question is whether the clause does what needs to be done in the way it needs to be done.
As my noble friend explained, Clause 45 deals with claims for damages in personal injury cases where the claimant is guilty of fundamental dishonesty in the prosecution of his claim. Clause 45(2) provides that,
“The court must dismiss the primary claim”—
that is, the claim for damages—
“unless it is satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice if the claim were dismissed”.
The question I seek to pose is how far subsection (2) would leave judges free to do justice.
In my view, the subsection works against the interests of justice, or certainly risks doing so, in two ways. The first is by imposing a presumption in favour of dismissal, subject to a modest saving provision that, frankly, is difficult to understand. I am not sure I agree with my noble friend Lord Hunt that the word “fundamentally” adds nothing, but I certainly am of the view that the saving subsection,
“unless it is satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice if the claim were dismissed”,
is very difficult to understand. On one view of justice, and the view of justice which appears to be intended by the proponents of the clause, if there is dishonesty, it is not unjust for the whole claim to go. If that is the meaning, how does the saving provision come in at all? If, on the other hand, it means that the interests of justice seem broadly to require the claimant still to get some of his damages, does that amount to a duty to dismiss or is it merely a power to dismiss, which is what my amendments are directed to?
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I oppose Clause 25 standing part of the Bill. The clause would make a custodial sentence compulsory in the case of a second offence of possession of a knife in a public place. The sentence would be a compulsory minimum of six months in prison for offenders over 18 and of four months’ detention in the case of 16 and 17 year-olds. The clause was introduced into the Bill in the House of Commons by an amendment moved from the Conservative Benches by my honourable friend Nick de Bois. It was not supported by the Government and, indeed, Conservative Ministers abstained on it. I rather hope that my noble friend and other Conservative Ministers will abstain in this House.
Our reasons for opposing this clause in the House of Commons and again in your Lordships’ House are fourfold. First, mandatory minimum sentences are wrong in principle in all but a few special cases, because they remove judicial discretion and fail to allow for individual circumstances. Secondly, the clause is unnecessary, because knife crime is already falling, and runs counter to the aim of rehabilitating offenders. Thirdly, the clause would risk doing real harm to those affected by it, because many who should not be in prison would be imprisoned, damaging large numbers of principally young lives. Finally, the clause would be discriminatory in its effect, even if that is not the intention of its promoters, and so would risk doing serious damage to community relations in this country.
My first reason is one of principle. Determining sentences is generally far better left to judges. Our judges in the criminal courts hear the evidence in individual cases and fully take into account all the facts, including the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, before passing sentences. Obliging judges to take a course that they would not otherwise take necessarily involves forcing them to impose a sentence which they would consider unjust.
We completely agree with those who support the clause that knife crime is extremely serious, that everything should be done to discourage it and that in very many cases, particularly when an offence is repeated, possession of a knife in public will warrant a sentence of imprisonment. In those cases, judges can and do impose custodial sentences. They can, indeed, be legitimately encouraged to pass custodial sentences in such cases in sentencing guidelines. However, if they decide not to pass a custodial sentence in a given case, that is because they regard one as unnecessary, unwarranted or unjust. If the clause is intended to have any practical effect—if it is more than pure posturing—that effect would be to oblige judges to pass a custodial sentence when they would not otherwise do so. There is absolutely no evidence that our judges get this wrong or that they are, in some way, a soft touch and fail to impose custodial sentences when the public interest or justice demands that they should do so. The clause would be an entirely unwarranted restriction on judicial discretion.
That leads to my second reason for opposing the clause, which is that it is unnecessary. Knife crime is falling. The Crime Survey for England and Wales indicates a continuing reduction in crime overall and in crimes of violence in particular, including knife crime. I would suggest that this is one of the significant successes of the Government, all the more remarkable for being achieved against the background of very difficult economic circumstances. The number of young people in custody has fallen to a record low. In May this year, there were fewer than 1,100 young offenders in custody under the age of 18—a fall of no less than 200 from a year ago. The number of 18 year-olds in custody also continues to fall. Parliament and professionals in the criminal justice system have been working very hard and successfully to reduce the numbers of young people in custody. This has been a continuing theme of this Government’s drive to push down crime: rehabilitation to reduce reoffending, and helping young offenders in particular to get away from crime and criminals and lead law-abiding and useful lives. This has been the very point of the rehabilitation revolution and was at the heart of the Offender Rehabilitation Act that we passed this year.
Lord Faulks
There were quite a number of interventions. I will endeavour, very briefly, to say what I can within the terms that I speak today. On the question of sentencing guidelines, they are of course changed from time to time. It is a matter for the House to consider whether sentencing guidelines are an appropriate way to deal with this or whether it is more appropriate to use the clause as it currently appears in the Bill—whether that is called sending out a message, providing a deterrent or whatever construction one places upon that particular clause.
As to all the other matters, there is no question of a Liberal Democrat plot. I readily concede that this is an unusual situation. However, I am simply not in a position to say more than I have in answer to the various questions raised, except to say this: the issue for the House is fairly before the House, as brought by my noble friend Lord Marks, and it is whether the clause currently in the Bill should stand part.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, this has been an important debate. It has been a serious and sober debate. I agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, on that point. It has also not been a political debate in the sense that noble Lords on all sides have spoken both ways. My understanding of the Government’s position is that the position of Conservative Ministers remains as it was in the House of Commons; they will not support the clause as it stands, as inserted by the Back-Bench amendment; nor will they oppose it.
However, the position is that everyone in this House is agreed that we cannot, do not and never will condone knife crime. We all share the aim of driving knife crime down. I listened carefully to the points made, particularly those made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair. All of them of course have enormous experience of the criminal justice system. Other noble and learned Lords, notably the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, spoke the other way.
The points made against me and in favour of Clause 25 principally concern deterrents and sending a message. However, what has been entirely unclear is the notion that there is clear evidence that a message and deterrence are better sent by a mandatory provision in a statute than they could be by judges exercising their discretion—going on television if necessary, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, described; by action outside Parliament, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis described; or by sentencing guidelines, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, suggested, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.
Sentencing guidelines are daily used and daily applied, but they do not remove judicial discretion to sentence appropriately, departing from the guidelines where that is the right and just thing to do. I do not believe that deterrence by a mandatory provision in a statute is proven to have any beneficial effect at all. I believe that a mandatory provision for minimum sentences in a statute, to be imposed where judges would not—when wishing to do justice—otherwise impose them, removes judicial discretion and inevitably does injustice in a number of cases. For those reasons we oppose this clause.
Your Lordships have also heard the extent to which the clause is defective. It is not supported by either of the parties of Government. It is not supported by many of great experience who have spoken from the opposition Benches. It is not supported by many of those who have spoken from the Cross Benches. The Motion will be that this clause stands part of the Bill. I urge noble Lords to oppose the Motion and vote not content. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
“Offence of publishing a sexually explicit or pornographic image without consent
(1) A person commits an offence if they publish a sexually explicit or pornographic image of another identifiable person (whether or not that person is engaged in a sexual or pornographic act), unless—
(a) the identifiable person consented to publication;(b) the person who published the image reasonably believed the identifiable person would have consented; or(c) the person who published the image has reproduced an image that has already been published by another person. (2) For the purposes of this section it is immaterial who owns the copyright of the published image.
(3) In this section “publish” means to reproduce, share or otherwise distribute an image via the internet or other means.
(4) In this section a person is an “identifiable person” if—
(a) their face is displayed in the image;(b) any other identifiable characteristics are displayed in the image;(c) their name is displayed on, or otherwise connected to, the image; or(d) the image contains any other information by which the identity or address of the person could reasonably be ascertained.”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the term “revenge pornography” refers to the publication, usually but not always, on the internet, of intimate images of former lovers without their consent. This thoroughly nasty behaviour generally involves the perpetrator in taking advantage of his or her possession of sexually explicit images, generally taken or obtained in private during the course of an intimate relationship in circumstances where the parties, and certainly the party photographed, had every right to expect that the images would remain private.
Obtaining such images has become more common and much easier with the prevalence, popularity and sophistication of smartphones, with their ability to take or record high quality images, still and video, instantly and simply, with accompanying sound in the case of video. It is set to become even easier to take such images with the advent of cameras installed in glasses and yet further improvement in high definition video cameras in phones.
The widespread publication of such images causes, and is generally intended to cause, distress, humiliation and embarrassment for the victim—hence the name “revenge porn”. She or he—the victims are usually but not exclusively women—face the humiliation of their most private moments being exposed to family, friends, employers and the world at large. It is entirely predictable that such exposure can cause serious psychological and emotional damage even to those with robust personalities. Suicides as a result of such publications have been recorded. Worse still, the damage may often be increased because it follows the trauma of relationship breakdown and is caused by someone with whom the victim had previously been close. Publication can cause havoc in personal and family relationships and in relationships at work. The betrayal and the hurt it causes could hardly be worse. Such behaviour has been characterised by academics in the field as a form of abuse and I suggest that such characterisation is entirely accurate.
I have no hesitation in concluding that this practice should be criminalised and in asking your Lordships to pass legislation accordingly. I was therefore extremely pleased that in response to our Second Reading debate my noble friend the Minister indicated that the Government would be open to amendments of this Bill to that effect. I was also delighted when my noble friends Lady Berridge and Lady Morris of Bolton laid their Amendment 40, which is also in this group. I hasten to add that in my view there is neither magic nor any monopoly of wisdom in any particular wording. The point is to secure legislation to criminalise such behaviour with the most appropriate statutory language that can be found. I would mention, however, that I do have some concerns about my noble friends’ formulation of the proposed offence, to which I will come in a moment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken in this debate, and to the Minister for his strong indication that legislation will be forthcoming. It is clear that there is consensus on the nature of the problem and on the proposition that legislation is required to deal with it. I entirely accept the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, that it is important not to set the hurdle too high by requiring the motivation to be established. Our amendments did not do that. I also entirely accept the point made by my noble friends Lady Berridge and Lady Morris of Bolton that it may be sensible to record this as a sexual offence, to enable the consequences of it to be followed through.
I also take the point the Minister makes—that some offences already capture some elements of this kind of behaviour. However, he plainly accepted that this is not true of all such behaviour and, because the offence is so unpleasant and the consequences so bad, it seems clearly proved that we need a separate offence. I look forward to us all co-operating and trying to word this appropriately. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 42H is in this group, which I tabled in a rather more inquiring—and perhaps a rather less decided—frame of mind than the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Ramsbotham. I am not yet certain that there is not a role for new thinking on some commercial operations in these new institutions. I begin by apologising to the House for not having participated in proceedings on this Bill so far.
Amendment 42H is concerned with ensuring a high-quality educational experience for young people in these new institutions. As we have heard, this links into Amendments 44A, 44B and, to a lesser extent, Amendments 47 and 48. My interest in this topic comes from my involvement with the all-party parliamentary group on prisons, of which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is the chairman. From time to time, the group hears presentations which are exceptionally powerful and persuasive. The presentation of relevance to my being here tonight was given by the Prisoners’ Education Trust, with whose help I have tabled this probing amendment.
It is, I think, generally accepted that having somewhere to live and a job to go to are the most significant factors in reducing reoffending. As a subset of this, research shows that the higher the level of educational achievement, the higher the likelihood of finding employment. Therefore, I entirely endorse, and very much welcome, the Government’s commitment to improve the educational journey for young offenders. This probing amendment is designed to discover how things will work at a practical level in the context of the secure colleges that are proposed to be established under Clause 29.
It seems to me the first set of challenges revolves around location. Noble Lords have pointed out that young offenders in larger secure colleges may well be at some distance from the homes to which they will return at the end of their sentence. How will the continued education of those young people be linked into their local authority and/or other community support programmes? In addition, given the recognition of the useful role that release on temporary licence plays in rehabilitation, which seems to me entirely sensible, how will that fit in with a continued and progressive educational experience?
Secondly, within the institutions themselves, there seems to be a number of challenges to providing this worthwhile educational experience. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, there is the shifting nature of the population, with young offenders arriving and departing in a way that may be educationally disruptive and not at all helpful to a scholastic timetable. As the number of young people in custody decreases, there is also the likelihood that the residual number may be particularly disturbed and troubled, and therefore the emergence of gang culture may well become prevalent. It would be helpful if the Minister could give us his thoughts on how that could be tackled, and whether there are sufficient resources so to do.
Of course, one way to address these various challenges would be to increase the use of IT-based distance learning. It is a field which continues to develop very quickly. New IT approaches can capture the imagination of young people in a way that the more conventional pedagogic approach does not, and can therefore play a valuable role in supplementing the latter, more formal approach. Further, an online tutor could also help overcome the problems of transitioning to the community from the secure college. However, I am given to understand—the Prisoners’ Education Trust is concerned about this—that the Government have reservations about increasing these young people’s exposure to distance learning. Will my noble friend tell the House whether this revolves around the cost of the system, the availability of suitably trained personnel or, perhaps more prosaically, issues of IT security?
As I said at the outset, I am convinced that improving educational performance provides a significant chance of reducing reoffending among young people. Therefore, I welcome the Government’s commitment to it. It will require some fresh organisational thinking, which is why I think commercial activities might be helpful—especially, as we have heard already, in the context of these larger secure colleges.
To address this, my amendment proposes a requirement to establish an individual learning plan. In turn, the construction of the ILP will have to involve all relevant bodies, statutory and non-statutory. It will require the assessing of the individual’s prior educational achievement and, finally, a path for that individual’s future demands. In the amendment I argue that this customised approach is likely to provide the most efficient and cost-effective way forward.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, in this group I speak principally to Amendment 43C in my name, and in the names of my noble friends Lady Linklater, Lord Carlile and Lord Dholakia.
In spite of the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, to the effect that our amendment was unduly complex—
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I am very grateful: I certainly heard “complex” and was slightly surprised, because I have support from the Back Benches. I thought that we were rather saying the same things. A feature of this debate is that all the amendments in this group, including that of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, have been directed really towards the same concerns and issues.
Since the proposal for secure colleges was published as part of the Bill it has provoked a great deal of public and well informed criticism. For my part, I am indebted to the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, the Howard League for Penal Reform, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and others for their advice, for full and well informed briefings, and for meeting me.
We have sought in our amendment to set out two mandatory principles, the need for which we now consider is firmly established, and a number of aims that we believe the Secretary of State must strive to meet if the proposal for secure colleges is to be implemented. We completely agree with the aim of the Secretary of State to ensure that young people in custody enjoy full educational opportunities. He is right to start from the position that the involvement in education of many of our young people in custody has in the past been minimal and their educational attainment virtually negligible. If we are to address their criminality, a good starting point is to try to give them some genuine education from which they may benefit in their future lives. The question is how we achieve that effectively.
We are concerned that the idea that we could somehow create on a residential basis in the prison estate large but secure colleges with some resemblance to schools may be misguided and unrealistic. As I mentioned earlier today, the number of young people now in custody is below 1,100. On all the best evidence it is simply inappropriate to attempt to contain large numbers of those young people together, regardless of gender and age. As has been repeatedly emphasised in this debate and at Second Reading, young offenders in detention represent a group of young people with a mixture of diverse and serious problems.
The first subsection of our proposed new clause would therefore provide the two mandatory points mentioned: that secure colleges may not be used for the detention of girls or persons under the age of 15. The evidence has satisfied us that it is simply unsafe to mix boys of all ages from under 15 to 18 together with girls in custody in one institution. Given all the evidence, we cannot believe now that the Government would wish to proceed on any other basis. I invite the Minister to confirm as soon as he can that that is the position.
Our second subsection is designed to ensure that the welfare of persons detained in any secure college has to be the primary consideration that the Secretary of State will have in mind in making any decisions that affect the lives of those in custody. In one sense, that may be obvious, but we feel it should be clearly stated in the Bill.
Our third subsection, comprehensive or complex as it may be, sets out a number of aims that the Secretary of State should be required to keep at the forefront of his mind when setting up and providing any secure college. I do not shirk from saying that I fear that many of these aims are incompatible with what we understand to be the Government’s present intention to establish a large, secure college in the Midlands housing nearly one-third of all young offenders currently in detention.
The first consideration must be the provision of a safe and secure environment for all those detained in secure colleges. The next aim must be that any secure college is of an appropriate size. Having considered the question of size, I now have no doubt that what we mean by “appropriate” is “small”. All the evidence we have considered suggests that a small institution capable of giving young offenders individual attention is essential to rehabilitation and educational attainment.
We also believe that it is very important that young offenders are detained close to home. Their families should be able to visit them and stay overnight if necessary. We have stressed throughout this Parliament the importance of rehabilitating young offenders within their communities specifically so that upon release they may come out and rejoin their families, friends and communities with some hope of local employment to come. Education in custody should be directed to that end.
One aspect of the current proposal for secure colleges that causes us concern is the idea that young offenders may be moved miles from their families, which could prove profoundly damaging. An associated concern that follows from that is that supervision before and after release, which we have made a priority, will lack the continuity that we have promised. If an offender is in custody, as is proposed, in an institution near Leicester and is to be released to Cornwall, it is unlikely that there can be any meaningful continuity of supervision.
Furthermore, we believe that if secure colleges are to achieve what they set out to achieve, real thought needs to be given to the type of educational opportunities that can realistically be offered. It is bound to be very difficult to provide suitable courses for young offenders who are sentenced at different times, due to be released at different times and sentenced for different periods. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentioned that 79 days is the average period in custody. We cannot imagine that courses can be arranged that will meet the needs of more than a very few offenders at a time. Given what noble Lords have said, I ask my noble friend to elucidate what the Secretary of State has in mind. The question of distance or online learning raised by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts may well merit further consideration.
There is also the question of outdoor and sporting facilities and facilities for indoor recreation. It is crucial that the recreational needs of these young people be catered for. In the proposed very large pathfinder secure college, we are concerned that these facilities may be, if not entirely, at least very largely, lacking.
There is considerable concern, which has been mentioned by other noble Lords, about staffing and the need for staff with specialist training across a range of skills: not just teachers but counsellors, medics and others. My noble friend needs no reminding that many of the young offenders detained in these colleges will have special educational needs. Many of them will also have particular problems relating to their physical and particularly mental health. A number of young offenders have problems arising from drug or alcohol abuse; many come from profoundly dysfunctional backgrounds, many from criminal families. These issues need careful and focused personal attention. Will a secure college environment, as is proposed, be able to meet these needs?
Our final proposed new subsection would require the Secretary of State to consult the Youth Justice Board as to how the aims that we have set out might be achieved. I fear that there is a great deal of work to be done. We doubt that the present proposal can in its present state properly proceed, and we urge the Secretary of State to ensure that all decisions in this area are firmly based on sound evidence and good advice. The rehabilitation of young offenders is too important to be the subject of a gamble on a less than fully developed idea.
In summary, we fully support the Government’s aim to provide more and better education in custody, but we doubt that the present proposals for secure colleges have any realistic prospect of achieving it.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Linklater spoke to Amendment 43B as if it were part of this group. There is nothing more that we wish to say on that amendment, which is in a further group, and because of the time I wonder if the Minister could indicate if he has anything special to say about it, subject to anything that the Labour Front Bench wishes to say.
Lord Faulks
I am happy to deal with that amendment; in the interests of economy, that seems a sensible suggestion. The amendment raises a concern about how the enhanced and tailored provision offered by a secure college might influence the behaviour of the courts when making sentencing decisions in respect of children and young people—so-called up-tariffing, as it has been referred to in other contexts.
We have seen a fall in the number of children and young people sentenced to custody in recent years. I hope noble Lords will be reassured that statute and international convention already provide that a custodial sentence must be imposed only as a measure of last resort. Statute provides that such a sentence may be imposed only where the offence is,
“so serious that neither a community sentence nor a fine alone can be justified”.
That is referenced in the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s current guideline, Overarching Principles—Sentencing Youths, which goes on to explain that even when a threshold for a custodial sentence is crossed, a court is not required to impose it. Before deciding whether to impose a custodial sentence on a young offender, the court must ensure that all statutory tests are satisfied, taking into account the circumstances, age and maturity of the young offender. Those tests are that the offender cannot properly be dealt with by a fine alone or by a youth rehabilitation order; that a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance, or with fostering, cannot be justified; and that custody is a last resort. To demonstrate that the statutory tests have been followed, the court must, in addition, state its reasons for being satisfied that the offences are so serious that no other sanction is appropriate other than the custodial sentence.
As regards the length of the sentence, the court, again by statute, is required to set the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and those overarching principles I referred to earlier set out guidance on how the judiciary should approach deciding the length of the sentence for children and young people. Furthermore, courts will no doubt be aware that due to the variation in needs and vulnerabilities among children in custody, there is a range of provision. They certainly should be aware. As my noble friend Lady Linklater will know, there are secure children’s homes, secure training centres and young offender institutions, as well as, in future, we hope, secure colleges.
When sentencing children and young people, the court can determine only the type of sentence to be imposed and its length. The decision on which type of establishment a child or young person is placed in is taken by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, rather than by the court. Its experienced placement service considers factors specific to the young offender—for example, their age and needs.
Finally, the noble Baroness noted that the amendment would have the wider effect of fettering the discretion of the independent Sentencing Council by stipulating precisely what its guidelines should say. That is a road which I am sure noble Lords would not wish us to go down.
I hope, therefore, that I have assuaged noble Lords’ concerns sufficiently for them not to press this amendment also.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, Amendment 42L is merely formal. This group refers to the use of force in the secure colleges, and in particular to force against young persons detained there.
Amendment 42M, which is not purely formal, would require the secure college rules, in so far as they authorise the use of force against young offenders—it is much narrower than the other amendment relating to procedure—to be made by statutory instrument under the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. Under this amendment, it would also be a requirement that the Secretary of State should consult on the proposed secure college rules with the Youth Justice Board and the Independent Restraint Advisory Panel before laying a draft before Parliament.
The requirement for an affirmative resolution for secure college rules authorising force was a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, on which I serve. The recommendation was made notwithstanding that other prison rules—even for young people, as my noble friend has pointed out—are subject to the negative procedure. However, these are extremely important rules concerning the use of force against children. The committee was very influenced by the clear views of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2009 in C v the Secretary of State for Justice that the proposals for the use of force for the purpose of maintaining good order and discipline were, as they stand in the Bill, inconsistent with Article 3 of the European convention.
The provisions authorising the use of force in the Bill for contracted-out secure colleges are indeed profoundly discouraging. As I mentioned, force is to be permitted to be authorised for purposes which include ensuring good order and discipline on the part of inmates and attending to their well-being. These purposes are far too wide. They smack of a military origin and are out of sympathy with contemporary views on the restriction of the use of force against children. Your Lordships will wish to be extremely vigilant where we are concerned with the authorisation of such force. We accept the Joint Committee’s clear view that the proposed authorisation of force would infringe Article 3.
Contemporary views on the use of force against young people are that the correct way to frame such authorisation is to ensure that the force used is minimal and restricted to what is absolutely necessary. Our Amendment 42N attempts to achieve this and its purposes are restricted by reference to five conditions. It says that,
“the first condition is that the force is authorised only for the purpose of … self-defence or the protection of others, including the protection of the person against whom the use of force is authorised … the prevention of serious damage to property”,
preventing escape and carrying out an authorised search. The second condition, which is crucial, is that force can be authorised for use only “as a last resort”. The third is,
“that the force authorised must be the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose”.
The fourth is that the force must be used,
“for the minimum duration necessary to achieve”,
that purpose, and the fifth is that the force should be,
“limited to techniques forming part of an approved system of restraint”.
We have added to that a requirement that:
“Secure college rules must provide that”,
all those who are “authorised to use force” should have been properly trained,
“in the use of force and in minimum restraint techniques”.
This represents a sensible contemporary view of the appropriate authorisation of the use of force in such colleges as are proposed for the restraint of young people. We contend that these restrictions should appear on the face of the legislation, in the terms that we have described. I beg to move.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendments 46 and 46A in this group. All I want to say is that I for one simply do not understand why there is any need to have this proposal in here, when already there has been an independent review of restraint in juvenile secure settings, which was chaired by the previous chairman of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. She was a most eminent adolescent psychiatrist and she produced what were called minimum rules, which were published by the previous Secretary of State. If minimum rules for the use of restraint in secure children’s settings have already been produced by a Secretary of State, I simply cannot see why there is any need to go down this route, which seems to be an own goal of monumental proportions when there is already something to prevent you even being on that pitch.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for the response he has given. It appears, at least in principle, that all the conditions we set out in our amendments are accepted by the Government. We want to see some security about the future implementation of those conditions. However, we understand that the Government’s position is sympathetic to what we say. Saying that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Lloyd of Berwick (CB)
My Lords, for the reasons that have already been given, I support the amendment and I do so all the more willingly because it is very similar to an amendment which I tabled two years ago when we were debating the LASPO Bill. A very significant difference between the two amendments is that I thought that the review should take place after 30 years rather than 25 years. My reason was that 30 years is one of the starting points for determining tariffs under Schedule 21. A defendant with a 30-year starting point and no mitigating or aggravating features would look forward to a review after 30 years but not before. It would not particularly make sense that a whole life prisoner should have a right of review after 25 years when one with a 30-year starting point would have to wait for 30 years, but that is a small detail.
The debate on my amendment took place on 9 February 2012, at col. 390. There were 12 speakers on that occasion. All, except the noble Lord, Lord McNally, supported the amendment. The only reason which the noble Lord gave for not supporting the amendment was that the public was not yet ready for it and, for that reason, the other place would not accept it and there was no point in it passing through this House. During my reply, he said that it would be easier to reach unanimity if we could arrange a joint meeting of both Houses. That is exactly what has now happened in the sense that we have the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which includes Members from the House of Commons and the House of Lords. So far as I know, there was no dissentient voice from any Member of the Commons. Perhaps we may put that objection on one side.
Until 2003, there was no doubt that exceptional progress in prison qualified a lifer serving a whole life tariff for a review after 25 years. Somehow, that right was overlooked when the 2003 Act was being pushed through Parliament. There was no evidence that I know of that the right of review after 25 years was causing resentment or was in any way unpopular with the public. Certainly, those serving these sentences had done nothing that I know of to forfeit the right which they then had. For my part, I cannot believe that anyone in government made a conscious decision to remove this right. It seems almost inconceivable that they would have done, but there we are. All we seek to do in this amendment is to restore to these prisoners a right which they have lost, so far as I am concerned, for no apparent reason.
There are other equally strong arguments to support the amendment. Prisoners serving tariffs of 20 or 30 years are entitled to a review after they have completed their tariffs. It gives them light at the end of the tunnel and provides them with a reason for making progress if they can. In those cases, the review is justified both on practical grounds and on humanitarian grounds. Will the Minister say why those reasons precisely do not apply to those serving whole life sentences? One might think that it should apply all the more so. It cannot be that they are being deprived of this right for some symbolic reason, but if that is the case I would be very glad to hear about it.
I could understand if the Minister said, like the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that this amendment would never be accepted at the other end of the corridor, but I would have no sympathy with him at all if he said that we should wait until the Supreme Court has decided the appeal in McLoughlin. The decision in Vinter is clear: a life prisoner is entitled to know at the start of his sentence what he has to do to qualify for a review after 25 years. It is equally clear that exceptional progress in prison would be a qualifying ground. But Section 30 of the 1997 Act provides that a prisoner can be released only on “compassionate grounds”. A prisoner who has earned his review by making exceptional progress is not being released on compassionate grounds in any ordinary sense of that term. Whatever the Supreme Court may say, we will need primary legislation to change the word “compassionate” or make clear what the word “compassionate” means. I would have thought that we would need a different word or an additional word. That will require primary legislation. I see no reason to wait until the Supreme Court has expressed a view. Indeed, if we had the primary legislation now, maybe there would be no need for a hearing at all. We should, in my view, grasp the nettle now. That is why I support the amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I add only this to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in answer to my noble friend Lord McNally’s response. Not only is the Joint Committee on Human Rights composed of Members of both Houses, but members of all parties agreed unanimously on this report. My reasons for supporting the amendment are threefold. First, it is a matter of simple humanity. Secondly, I agree again with my noble friend Lord Lester and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that I do not believe the decision of the Court of Appeal in McLoughlin has put the current position in English law beyond doubt in the light of the clear decision of what is required by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Vinter. In any event, it is for Parliament to make the law clear on this issue. Thirdly, our obligation to honour our treaty commitments is an absolute one that must not be shirked.
My first point is the point of substance, independently of the convention: a whole life tariff without the prospect of review is incompatible with a humane approach or human rights-based approach to punishment. I remain firmly committed to the principle that one of the primary purposes of punishment is rehabilitation. This is embodied in statute law by Section 142 of the 2003 Act, which is the very Act on which whole life sentences are based. That provides, under the heading “Purposes of sentencing”, that:
“Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard to the following purposes of sentencing”,
the third of which is;
“the reform and rehabilitation of offenders”.
The imposition of a whole life order without any hope of release on rehabilitation grounds is incompatible with that statutory purpose of sentencing. It does not follow that a whole life tariff cannot be imposed by the sentencing court, but it does follow that, when sentencing, a judge should know and the offender should know that there is some prospect at least that in exceptional circumstances there will be a power to enable the offender’s release other than on purely compassionate grounds. Of course, it is understandable that in the case of the most heinous crimes the purpose of rehabilitation comes low down the list, but the absence of any possibility of review except on compassionate grounds, interpreted in the “Lifer Manual” as being, effectively, only in the case of terminal illness, removes hope completely in a way that is inhumane.
My second point is one that has been made: that the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Vinter was unequivocal. The court was absolutely clear that the effect of such an order is that a prisoner cannot be released other than at the discretion of the Secretary of State. I urge on the House the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the Secretary of State should not be the decider. There should be an independent body. That release would occur only on compassionate grounds under our statute. The court therefore held that a whole life order of imprisonment violated Article 3, which prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment and torture.
The United Kingdom judge, Judge Mahoney, emphasised that states were free to choose the means whereby they fulfil their obligation to “abide by” the Grand Chamber’s judgment in relation to Article 3. The Court of Appeal’s decision in McLoughlin leaves the position unclear, because the Court of Appeal appears to have held that the existing law permits release on other than compassionate grounds, contrary to the statute and to the finding of the European Court of Human Rights in Vinter. Whatever the Supreme Court may or may not do with McLoughlin, it is, I suggest, now for us in Parliament to make it clear what the law is in this crucial area and to do so in a way that unequivocally honours our treaty commitments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is quite simply to remove the power proposed in the Bill by Clause 6(3) to provide that the power to impose an electronic monitoring condition be mandatory. Amendment 14, which is also tabled in my name, is consequential upon Amendment 9.
The Committee will no doubt quite understand that the effect of subsection (2) is to amplify and explain the Secretary of State’s power to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the release on licence of prisoners. That is a desirable and sensible condition to be imposed where appropriate. The idea that by subsection (3) a new Section 62A is added to the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 giving the Secretary of State power by order to make it compulsory to impose an electronic monitoring condition evades explanation, I regret to say. The power under Section 62 already gives the Secretary of State power to make rules about the conditions for the imposition of such a condition. I simply invite the Minister to explain why the fetter on the Secretary of State’s future discretion is needed.
There may be cases where an electronic monitoring condition is not required or is inappropriate. I take as an obvious example the case of a prisoner who is disabled or is to be hospitalised on release. That is recognised in Section 62 as it stands. Making an electronic monitoring condition compulsory seems a retrograde step depriving a Secretary of State who brings it in by order and any future Secretary of State of the power or the right to exercise discretion not to make such a condition in appropriate cases. The amendment is a simple one, and the issue is a simple one. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Harris of Richmond) (LD)
My Lords, if Amendment 9 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 10 to 12 inclusive by reason of pre-emption.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Of course I will take advice on this, but as I have said already—and the noble Lord knows this as well as I do—representations are made in any form of government. I will of course endeavour to write to the noble Baroness. I will share with the Committee the details of that letter and place a copy in the Library.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, a great deal of what my noble friend has said in response to these amendments is entirely uncontentious. As I hope I have made clear, I have no objection to discretionary electronic monitoring of prisoners on licence, and no objection to improved tracking, technical improvements or effectiveness. I quite understand everything he said in that score.
My concern was with the element of compulsion added by new subsection (3). I regret that I simply did not understand my noble friend’s response on its drafting. He said that there was somehow a discretion in the order-making power under new subsection (3) that would enable the Secretary of State to take into account cases where it would be difficult, inappropriate or not sensible to impose electronic monitoring. It may be that we are talking about a matter of drafting. In that case, I urge my noble friends to look at the drafting.
New Section 62A provides:
“The Secretary of State may by order provide that the power under section 62 to impose an electronic monitoring condition must be exercised”.
The description of the order-making power states:
“An order under this section”—
which is an order that the monitoring condition power “must be exercised”—
“may … require an electronic monitoring condition to be included for so long as the person’s release is required to be, or may be, subject to conditions or for a shorter period”,
and may,
“make provision generally or in relation to a case described in the order”.
It may be that my noble friend is referring to the entitlement to make provision generally as imposing a discretion. If he is saying that, I would suggest that that no longer complies with the description under new subsection (1) of an order imposing “an electronic monitoring condition” which “must be exercised”. Furthermore, even if he were right that that would somehow allow electronic monitoring conditions not to be mandatory, I would respectfully suggest to him that that is a clunky way of providing for particular cases to be dealt with in accordance with the discretion, which is what I suggest ought to be maintained. However, on the basis that my noble friend will consider the drafting, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, in supporting my noble and learned friend Lord Brown and saluting my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd on his determined and tenacious momentum on this issue, I want to say just one thing. I am amazed that the Government are not tabling this amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, mentioned, £40,000 a year for 773 prisoners is £35 million per year. If you have an overstretched and underresourced Prison Service, surely it makes sense to examine where you could make savings to put the money to better effect, rather than spend it on prisoners who should not be there. I fail to understand why, in the face of all the arguments, all the legal statements and all the evidence, plus the legislation passed in 2012, the Government have not taken the common-sense step of approaching this forcefully themselves.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in paying tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for his campaign to achieve justice for IPP prisoners. I remember well the debate on 27 March secured by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who raised this issue on that occasion.
The continued imprisonment of those who are serving tariff sentences of less than two years for so long after those tariff sentences were completed, and now long after IPP sentences were abolished by the LASPO Act, is nothing short of disgraceful. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, mentioned “Fidelio”. In that opera, it took the courage of Florestan’s wife Leonore, who, dressed as Fidelio, risked her life to save her husband from unjust imprisonment, to secure his release. All that is necessary for this Government now is for the Secretary of State to exercise his power—given to him, as has been pointed out, by the second limb of Section 128 of the LASPO Act—to introduce a simple presumption in favour of release unless the continued imprisonment of any such prisoner on an IPP can be positively and clearly justified. It is a simple presumption. It meets the justice of the case. It answers any need that remains for the protection of the public. I suggest that this unfairness must be ended, and now.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, it is ironic that the Committee meets today, on Bastille Day, as the French Revolution effectively broke out with the release of a number of prisoners on what were presumably indeterminate sentences. I suppose that they might have been lettres de cachet. The House and the Committee are indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, who has constantly raised this matter.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, referred to “Fidelio”. I am not sure whether the Secretary of State would find himself comfortable in the position of the Minister in that opera; perhaps he would be more comfortable in another opera as Gilbert and Sullivan’s Lord High Executioner. Be that as it may, the noble and learned Lord raised a series of questions, implicitly or explicitly, to which we have had no reply thus far. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some indication of the Government’s thinking, if they have got that far, on the issues raised this afternoon.
The first question has already been asked but I will repeat it: why include a provision in legislation and then completely ignore it? Have the Government or, more particularly, the Secretary of State considered using the provision that this Government included in the LASPO Act? If they have, on what basis has that consideration taken place? Has the Secretary of State looked at any cases of the kind to which the noble and learned Lord referred—I would hardly expect him to look at them all—to come to a view about whether it would be right to exercise the discretion that was deliberately placed in his hands? If he has not, why not? What is the Government’s intention in relation to this section of LASPO? Is it to be ignored or is it at all to be used? If it is not to be used, why do the Government not have the courage of their apparent convictions and delete it? If it is to be used, when and under what circumstances will that be?
Questions have repeatedly been asked today about the resources available to the Parole Board to deal with matters of this kind. I asked the general question before to which others, including the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, have now alluded about the increased burden on the Parole Board as a result of recent decisions and the growing number of cases that it will be asked to look at in oral hearings. However, has any specific consideration been given to the resources required to deal with the cases of people who have been in prison for the length of time to which noble Lords have referred? Again, if not, why not?
There may be a concern in respect of some of these defendants as to what would happen if they were released and whether they might to some degree be a risk to the public. What investigations have been carried out to assess the need for investigation and inquiry by the Parole Board in support of those potential candidates for release who have served such a length of time? The overriding question is really therefore: what was the purpose of incorporating the Secretary of State’s discretion in the 2012 Act if it is to be treated as redundant? If it is not to be so treated and there is an intention to do it at some time, why the delay? As we have heard, many cases have been running for an unacceptable length of time. I hope that the Minister will be able to give some assurances that this matter will be seriously addressed and not simply left on the shelf in a way that does no credit to our system.
I think that the previous Government were rightly criticised on matters of this sort, in many respects, particularly in also failing to provide sufficient support for the Parole Board. However, their failure is relatively minimal compared to the looming failure which is likely to affect not only this category of prisoner but others who require the Parole Board’s intervention. I hope that the Minister can indicate, today of all days, that some movement will be made and that the Secretary of State will address himself to the plight of these people, and thereby avoid a further stain on the reputation of the Government in this respect.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
(a) prosecution would not be in the public interest, or(b) prosecution for the offence would be inappropriate having regard to the circumstances of either the offender or the offence.”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the purpose of these amendments is twofold. The first purpose is to widen the discretion to give the cautions allowed by Clause 15, which, as your Lordships will know, is headed, “Restrictions on use of cautions”. I preface what I say by making it clear that I fully accept that it is desirable to be reasonably restrictive about giving cautions where normally a prosecution would be the proper response to an admission of guilt. That is of course particularly important where the offence concerned is a serious one. Yet the scheme of the Bill is to permit a caution only if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the person or the offence in three categories of cases.
The first category is in the case of indictable-only offences, where,
“a constable may not give the person a caution”,
unless it is,
“in exceptional circumstances relating to the person or the offence”—
I will call that the “exceptional circumstances” test—and,
“with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions”.
The second category of offences is of those triable either way which appear on a list of what one would expect to be the more serious offences. That would meet the “exceptional circumstances” test but it would be the constable who gave the caution and there would be no need for the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The third category would deal with all other triable either-way offences—that is, those not on the serious list—and to offences triable summarily. The “exceptional circumstances” test would apply in those cases only to repeat offences: that is, offences that are similar to an offence for which the offender has been convicted in the previous two years. That leaves cautions available on an unrestrictive basis only in respect of those less serious either-way or summary offences which are, effectively, first offences of their type.
I suggest that the “exceptional circumstances” test is too restrictive; “exceptional” is a very strong word. An offence is not exceptional, for example, where it is a minor offence of its class or because the circumstances in which it was committed are otherwise such that a prosecutor might reasonably take the view that more harm than good would be done by prosecution. Dealing with the circumstances of the person, such circumstances would not be exceptional if a former recidivist is well on the way to rehabilitation and a repeat minor offence can be seen as an isolated lapse, where a prosecutor can reasonably and responsibly—and presently often may—take the view that a prosecution would serve no public purpose.
I start on these amendments from the position that there is no reason to undermine the traditional test for prosecutors and not to respect that test. That test requires, first, a likelihood of conviction and it is generally satisfied where there is an admission, as it is a precondition to giving a caution set out in this clause. However, the test also requires the prosecutor to be satisfied that a prosecution is in the public interest. I cannot see why, if that second-limb test is not met—so that a prosecutor does not think a prosecution is in the public interest—even in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the right to administer a caution should be removed and a caution should not remain within the range of possible actions to be taken where there is to be no prosecution. I suggest that there may be many cases—perhaps fewer, I concede, in the indictable-only category—where there has been an admission and a prosecution is inappropriate, and where a caution would nevertheless remain a sensible disposal. In such cases, I see no reason why a caution, which is often an effective disposal, should be available only in first-time summary offences unless the very high hurdle of exceptional circumstances can be surmounted.
The second reason for these amendments is that the decision-maker being provided for is, I suggest, wrong. The Bill provides, first, that the decision-maker in any indictable-only offence is to be the Director of Public Prosecutions, and that in any other case the decision-maker is to be the constable giving the caution. I suggest that the Bill has this wrong in both categories. Surely cautions should not generally be a matter for the DPP, even in indictable-only cases. It is of course likely that, even in indictable-only cases, a decision to caution instead of to prosecute will be taken in cases at the less serious end of the spectrum for that class of offence. It is surely not necessary that the DPP should be involved in a decision to caution in that case, wherever it occurs.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I understand that I am speaking after my Front Bench friend, but I want to make a couple of points. I understand from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the general intent of this group is to lower the hurdles by which cautions would be administered as a whole. He set out very clearly a different approach, but I think it is right to say that it is a lowering of the hurdles as a whole. As he said in his introduction to the amendments, we have seen a reduction in the number of cautions which have been administered in recent years.
I want to make a point that I have made in other contexts. The Government have set up scrutiny panels to review the appropriateness or otherwise of cautions that have been put in place. I thank the Minister for writing to me about this scheme. There are various pilot schemes which are following models in different parts of the country. They are in their very earliest stages and do not cover the whole country. Therefore my question for the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is about whether it is a bit premature to bring these sorts of amendments forward, when we do not have a proper answer to the question about whether the scrutiny panels are properly reviewing cautions and whether the group of people who sit on those scrutiny panels are satisfied that cautions are being appropriately administered. We do not even know exactly how those scrutiny panels will report their findings, let alone what those findings are. I understand that this is a debating point and that these are probing amendments, but I wonder whether putting forward this alternative approach is a bit premature.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I invite the noble Lord to deal with the proposition that his question ought to be referred to the Minister. Clause 15 is extremely restrictive of the use of cautions, and if it is premature to reform the rules for the use of cautions or the regime under which cautions are administered, as the noble Lord suggests, it is surely premature to reform it in the very radical, restrictive way proposed by Clause 15. The noble Lord is right to suggest that my amendments reduce the restriction, but at the same time they nevertheless preserve some restriction. The radical amendment is the new clause.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede
I take the point the noble Lord has made. I was really seeing this in the wider context of not just cautions but of out-of-court settlements as a whole. As we know, in London, for example, there are many tens of thousands of out-of-court settlements. Many of them are not cautions but other forms of out-of-court disposals which should be addressed by the scrutiny panels as and when they are running. Nevertheless, the point the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made is a fair one, and I acknowledge it.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Could the Minister reflect on the comments that he made earlier? I am sure that we will come back to this on Report. He talked about exceptional circumstances and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, talked about the public interest, but we need a bit more information rather than just saying that these are operational decisions. We may be poles apart here, or it may be nothing at all, but I want to test that further. Perhaps we can come back to that on Report.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has hit on the heart of this. I agree with my noble friend the Minister that it might have been sensible to deal in this group of amendments with Amendment 25 and the subject of the level of police officers. Perhaps, left as it is, we will deal with it later.
I suspect that my noble friend’s answer has not dealt with the gap that may exist between a prosecution that a prosecutor takes the view is not in the public interest and a case in which there are no exceptional circumstances, so that a caution is not available. My suggestion to the Committee is that there ought to be a choice between a prosecution on the one hand and a caution on the other. My noble friend has not dealt with the case whereby a prosecution is not in the public interest and a caution is not available under this clause because exceptional circumstances are not satisfied.
The other suggestion that I invite my noble friend to consider before Report is whether the test of exceptional circumstances, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, and which is dealt with in a number of cases relating to different statutes, is not simply too harsh, and that “contrary to the public interest” or “inappropriate prosecution” is a better test. But with those observations and knowing that my noble friend will consider it, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, as I suggested a moment ago, this amendment deals with matters that we dealt with in the previous group. It would omit the provision that it is,
“for a police officer not below a rank specified by order … to determine … whether there are exceptional circumstances for the purposes of”,
Clause 15. Therefore, the amendment really goes with the amendments that remove the requirement for there to be exceptional circumstances. It also goes with the view that I expressed in introducing the previous group of amendments—that it really ought not to be simply for the police to determine a question such as whether there are exceptional circumstances to justify prosecution, therefore meaning that there would not be a prosecution but there would be a caution. It ought to be the prosecutor who takes both decisions.
I shall speak also to Amendment 26, on which Amendment 27 is consequential, merely removing the passage providing for the affirmative resolution. Amendment 26 would remove subsection (7) which provides:
“The Secretary of State may by order amend this section so as to provide for a different period for the purposes of subsection (4)(b)”.
Subsection (4)(b) simply sets out a two-year period, which is the period within which a previous offence must have been committed. I fail to see how later experience will help the Secretary of State or anyone else determine whether two years is the right period. Given the experience of the criminal courts, the Committee knows whether repetition within two years is right. Experience is unlikely to change that because there is no doubt that an arbitrary period has been selected as in more cases than not it will be judged to be about right. In some cases, an offence committed three years ago ought not to be disregarded; in other cases, an offence committed a year ago ought to be disregarded. I simply do not understand why we should need an order-making power to change that two-year period.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, as I said on the previous group of amendments, we support this clause and the intention to oppose its standing part of the Bill is just a device to enable a debate to take place.
These amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would remove the power of a police officer to determine whether there are exceptional circumstances under which an individual can be cautioned, and would also remove the power of the Secretary of State to change the period of time from the current two years which can be taken into account and counted as a previous conviction. It is important to provide a police officer with the ability to make this determination. I was pleased to hear the comment about a senior police officer being involved. The proposal to remove a power of the Secretary of State in this regard is not one that we are persuaded to support. However, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will explain the intention behind these powers and the government process for determining whether they should be used. What parliamentary process will be used? It is important that there is adequate opportunity for robust challenge and scrutiny of what the Government are doing. I have no other remarks to add on cautions other than to say that there is concern about their use for indictable offences. We support the intention behind the clause.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his detailed explanation as to why the Government resist Amendment 25, particularly since I hope I made it clear that the amendment is effectively contingent on the “exceptional circumstances” test not being adopted and on the police not being responsible for the decision-making. I fully accept that, if that test stays and if the police are to make the decision, then a senior officer should be in charge.
I also make it clear by repetition that I, along with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, fully accept, as I said at the outset of the previous group, the need to be restrictive about giving cautions where normally a prosecution would be the proper response to an admission of guilt; I accept his point that that is the more important in serious cases. My question to the Government, which was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is simply whether “exceptional circumstances” is the right test, and how it is to be administered. I appreciate the indication that there will at least be discussions that take this forward. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Legal Systems: Rule of Law
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I, too, refer to my interests in the register and echo other noble Lords in congratulating the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, on securing this debate and on the eloquent and erudite way in which he opened it. We all know how much the continued high standing of the British legal system owes to his personal contribution.
I will not concentrate on our pre-eminence in the field of commercial law—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others have made that case well. I will add only a mention of arbitration and ADR. The development of a body of arbitration law by which parties are left free to choose their arbitrator, venue and procedure, underpinned by a strong enforcement regime, has been important for our international standing. So, too, has our reputation for ADR and the willingness of our courts and the professions to encourage and facilitate mediation.
The Motion speaks of the rule of law. To me, the cardinal principle is that the law, not the state, is supreme. As Dr Thomas Fuller expressed it in 1733:
“Be you never so high, the law is above you”.
Fuller was famously quoted by Lord Denning in the Gouriet case in 1977, again by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in his seminal book on the rule of law, and just now by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.
We in this country are confident of the independence and incorruptibility of our judges, which are guarantees of impartiality—we are fortunate in that—but certainty and consistency are also important for our reputation, and the doctrine of precedent has helped greatly with them. Transparency is also increasingly important, with electronic communications now disseminating information instantly and universally. I suggest that there is room for more televising of cases, particularly judgments and reasons for sentence. Of course, there must be restrictions, particularly on witness evidence, but more recording would enhance public understanding of judges’ decisions at home and internationally, unfiltered by an often populist and partial press.
Several noble Lords have mentioned the European Convention on Human Rights, the great work of, largely, British Conservative jurists, the vision of Winston Churchill, which substantially underpins our system and enhances its credibility. It allows the scrutiny of the exercise of state power by reference to a guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms justiciable in our courts under the Human Rights Act.
What do I see as the threats? I shall highlight just four. First, the political threat to the Human Rights Act is serious. Sadly, it comes largely from politicians, who are frequently complicit in falsely portraying it as a creature of the European Union and treating it, perversely, as a charter for the unworthy and a threat to law-abiding citizens. There is a crying need for a wider understanding of the reality—and, as several noble Lords pointed out, for respect for the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
Secondly, the contraction of legal aid as a result of austerity has risked access to justice, and so our international reputation for fairness. I hope that, where alternative funding methods cannot be found to fund legal advice and representation, in due course the Lord Chancellor’s powers will be exercised, as funds allow, to bring some of the excluded areas back into scope.
Thirdly, the threat to judicial review, mentioned by others, which we will debate later this month, threatens our reputation for the rule of law. The measures proposed would unfairly and unjustly choke off private funding to support challenges to the Executive, stifle interventions by public-spirited bodies and prevent judges from protecting litigants of limited means who challenge government action.
Finally, we have made far too little progress on judicial diversity. In the four years since the excellent report of the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, we at least passed the judicial diversity provisions in the Crime and Courts Act. However, last year, we missed a golden opportunity to appoint our first woman Lord Chief Justice. Since April last year, there have been three appointments to the Supreme Court Bench with not a hint of diversity among them.
The issue is important. Whatever we think of Oscar Pistorius and his trial, the international reputation of South Africa’s legal system has been immeasurably enhanced by our witnessing, day after day, the quiet, careful and considerate handling of his trial by Judge Masipa in a case mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.
To achieve judicial diversity, we must achieve more diversity in the professions. However, the reduction in legal aid and the uneconomic remuneration rates for criminal work reduce the number of lawyers undertaking publicly funded work. When I asked my noble friend about that on Monday, he said that,
“there is less for lawyers to do and inevitably there will be fewer lawyers to do it”.—[Official Report, 7/7/14; col. 10.]
That may be technically accurate, but, equally inevitably, the reduction is in those doing publicly funded work. The reduction in the standard of lawyer undertaking such work has been mentioned, and is important. Wishing no disrespect to either my noble friend or me, the more that the professions sound like him and me and look like him and me, the less we are likely to present to the world a judiciary that is genuinely representative of modern Britain.
We are rightly proud of our legal system but we cannot stand still, and I fear that we may not be keeping up in important areas.
Legal Aid: Social Welfare Law
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I refer the House to my registered interest as a practising barrister. My noble friend’s department has in the past largely dismissed fears for the future availability of publicly-funded barristers, given the cuts in the scope of legal aid and in remuneration rates. Does my noble friend share my concern at the 38% drop in available tenancies in chambers over the year to 2011-12 and the long-term decline in the availability of pupilages, particularly in chambers doing legally-aided work? How can we reverse this trend?
Lord Faulks
My Lords, that is a little way from social welfare law. Of course we need lawyers to represent those in every section of society in all sorts of fields. The fact remains that there is less for lawyers to do and inevitably there will be fewer lawyers to do it. It is important that the profession maintains high standards but I do not think that I can comment on numbers in particular chambers.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we come to the Bill at a time when crime is falling. In 2013, according to the Crime Survey for England and Wales, there was a 15% fall in crime overall to its lowest level in more than 30 years. The fall in violent crime has been particularly marked. It has fallen for each of the past five years, which is profoundly welcome. What is more, with the rehabilitation revolution and the measures we took last year in the Offender Rehabilitation Act, I believe we have started to tackle the scourge of persistent reoffending that has blighted the lives of so many of our young people. On these Benches we are particularly proud of the contribution in this area made by my noble friend Lord McNally, who I am delighted to see in his place today. I know the whole House welcomes his inspired appointment as chairman of the Youth Justice Board. In the criminal justice field, the Bill should be judged by its contribution to cutting crime in general further, and in particular to helping young offenders avoid reoffending.
The Bill creates new offences, which we welcome. The most significant proposals are those to make ill treatment or wilful neglect by care workers a specific offence and to create another offence for care providers of gross neglect of their duty of care. Those in their charge have a right to expect to be looked after professionally, carefully and compassionately. We have all been appalled by the many recent accounts of lack of care in care homes and hospitals. Mid Staffordshire, which was mentioned by my noble friend, Winterbourne View in Gloucestershire, and the care homes in Essex and Croydon recently exposed by “Panorama” are but other examples of what has too often become regular cruelty by carers, often attributable to systemic failures in the organisations that employ them. My right honourable friend Paul Burstow in the other place has worked hard in advocating such provisions as are now proposed. His expertise on the subject and his commitment to better care are well known. These new offences will help to prevent such ill treatment and neglect, and to deal effectively with these terrible cases where they occur.
A further specific offence of police corruption may add only a little to the existing law, but it will serve to make it clear to police and public alike that police officers are entrusted with special powers, that they hold a position and role in society that makes it incumbent upon them to observe the highest standards and that, if they should fall short of those standards and act corruptly, they can expect to be dealt with severely.
We also welcome the proposal that images of rape are to be classified as pornographic. That is obviously right, and the proposed defence that acts portrayed were in fact consensual strikes a reasonable balance. We will, however, seek to add a new clause outlawing so-called “revenge porn”—that is, putting intimate pictures of former lovers on the internet without their consent. This nasty practice, if not curbed by law, threatens to become more widespread with the advent of high-definition video cameras on phones and cameras built into glasses. Such mean acts of revenge can have profound and devastating effects on their victims’ lives, causing deep distress, often psychological illness and havoc within personal, family and work relationships. In the other place, my honourable friend Julian Huppert suggested making this practice an offence, and my right honourable friend Maria Miller organised an Adjournment debate on the subject.
On the issue of rehabilitation, we will be looking carefully at the proposals for secure colleges. My party has been at the forefront of advocating a greater emphasis on education in custody for adults and young offenders alike. I welcome my noble friend’s commitment to education for people in custody. However, I wonder whether the establishment of secure colleges may not risk large numbers of young offenders being sent to a small number of large institutions, often far away from their homes, instead of to smaller ones with more personalised care and more links with their homes and families. I invite my noble friend to consider, with other Ministers in the department, how we can ensure that sentences served in secure colleges will not jeopardise the greater opportunity for through-the-gate support, which we have been at such pains to provide and encourage for offenders close to their communities before, as well as after, release.
For my part, I am also unclear how meaningful courses are to be organised in secure colleges. Offenders are, after all, sentenced all year round, not just at the beginning of college terms. Their sentences also vary in length. I am concerned that college-style courses may simply not work for many offenders. We look forward to the consultation promised by my noble friend on the secure college rules. My noble friend Lady Linklater will deal further with this topic in due course.
If we have a general criticism of the Bill, it is that too many proposals in it would remove or limit judicial discretion. It seems to be infused with a lack of trust in our judges. I regard some of the proposals as presenting a real danger of injustice in cases which should be dealt with on an individual basis, not by the application of a blanket rule regardless of the particular circumstances.
The proposal in the Bill that I fear most risks injustice is that for a mandatory sentence of six months’ imprisonment for adult offenders, and four months for 16 and 17 year-olds, for a second offence of possessing a knife in a public place. This was proposed as an amendment in the House of Commons from the Conservative Benches by my honourable friend Nick de Bois. Regrettably, Labour MPs lined up alongside the Conservative Back-Bench Members to support it. Liberal Democrats in the Lower House opposed the amendment and we will do so again in your Lordships’ House.
Of course knife crime is extremely serious and we must come down very hard on it. In many cases where an offender repeats an offence of possessing a knife in a public place, he or she will richly deserve a custodial sentence, but that should be for judges to decide on a case-by-case basis. Compulsory custodial sentences are the wrong way to deal with the issue. They stop judges deciding who deserves prison and whether prison will do any good in a particular case. They threaten to affect young black people disproportionately because more of them are subject to stop and search. There is no proof that compulsory prison works. As my honourable friend Julian Huppert said in the Commons:
“The question … is whether we should do the thing that sounds the toughest or the things that actually work”. [Official Report, Commons, 17/6/14; col. 1034.]
We have put all our emphasis in this Parliament on keeping young offenders out of prison where we can and rehabilitating them to lead useful lives in the community. Compulsory sentences are costly and overcrowd our prisons. This is a retrograde step for rehabilitation.
It is true that the Bill would permit a court to refrain from passing the mandatory sentence if,
“the court is of the opinion that there are particular circumstances which … relate to the offence or to the offender, and … would make it unjust to do so in all the circumstances”.
But that only serves to make my point: if a particular circumstances exception is to be widely applied, it makes a nonsense of the provision for mandatory sentences; if only rarely applied, serious injustice is caused in a number of cases. We are not persuaded that there is any justification for this approach beyond, I regret to say, a desire to appeal to a populist press with an eye-catching message that we are tough on knife crime.
We are also concerned about the compulsory imposition of a criminal courts charge upon conviction, even for offenders who cannot afford it and for whom employment prospects may be affected by the existence of an outstanding charge because they cannot get credit and they are concerned by the effect on their earnings. I am concerned about the proposal that a court must dismiss the whole of a personal injury claim if it is tainted by fundamental dishonesty. As someone who has conducted many personal injury cases over the years for both claimants and defendants, my experience is that dishonesty in the presentation of personal injury claims is, regrettably, not uncommon. Defendants can often produce convincing evidence, with the aid of video surveillance or otherwise, to demonstrate that the degree of injury allegedly sustained by claimants, and the consequences of such injury, have been wildly exaggerated.
For my part, I have always believed that in appropriate circumstances, judges should have the power to throw out an entire case for extreme dishonesty or to reduce awards of damages to reflect the court’s view of such dishonesty. However, there are many cases which are affected by what might reasonably be described as fundamental dishonesty where the needs of the claimant for the rest of his or her life must come first and in fairness must be met, and where completely depriving the claimant of damages would be very wrong. But instead of giving a judge a discretionary power to reject an entire claim or reduce damages to an appropriate extent, this clause would provide that the court must dismiss the claim unless satisfied that the claimant would otherwise suffer substantial injustice. Once again, I sense a lack of trust in judges to act sensibly in the exercise of their discretion in accordance with the justice and requirements of the particular case that they are hearing.
I turn finally to the proposals for judicial review. Judicial review is the precious right of the citizen to challenge the Executive in the courts when a Government act unlawfully or exceed their powers. The law has been developed, as my noble friend said, over recent decades into what I suggest this House knows is an effective and elegant body of law. One understands that Governments do not relish being challenged in the courts: it is inconvenient. But it is the constitutional duty of this House to protect the right of challenge and to trust our judges to deal with challenges fairly and in accordance with the law.
The measures proposed in the Bill for judicial review risk deterring people with means from supporting legal challenges by making them disclose all their assets and threatening them with widespread orders to pay the Government’s costs personally. The proposals would prevent campaigning organisations and others joining in on cases as interveners to put the public’s case by making interveners pay all parties’ costs of their intervention and by preventing them getting their costs even when they win—and ex hypothesi therefore, even when they have shown that the Government were in the wrong. Campaigning organisations would find it harder to raise money to challenge the Government in the public interest. I welcome the indication from my noble friend today that the Government are open to persuasion on these provisions, but that persuasion needs to go a long way to produce a lot of movement.
Further provisions would allow the courts to protect litigants from costs orders—the so-called costs-capping orders—against them only in cases of general public importance. But what of the innocent member of the public who has been wronged in a particular but unusual case of government irrationality—nothing of general public importance but a serious case of injustice? Why should that citizen not have costs protection if the judge thinks it right that he should? In all these cases, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, pointed out, judges have at the moment appropriate powers in relation to costs and judges decide how they should best be exercised.
We will also wish to consider how far the proposed permissive power to make regulations to exempt environmental judicial review cases from the restriction on cost capping complies with our duty under the Aarhus convention to provide access to justice in environmental cases that is
“fair, equitable … and not prohibitively expensive”.
That will be difficult when the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee has found that under our existing rules, the United Kingdom already fails that test.
There is no evidence that our judges let frivolous challenges or challenges that are of academic interest only because they make no difference, consume public resources unnecessarily. There is no established need for the cost deterrents in Part 4, and a justified fear that they will stifle legitimate cases. We will scrutinise Part 4 very carefully and resist unwarranted intrusions by legislation into areas that are best left to judicial discretion, particularly where what is at stake is the citizen’s right to hold the Executive to account in our courts.
Digital Bill of Rights
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve
My Lords, I was referring to the draft data protection regulation—which is not a directive—not to the right to be forgotten.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, rightly raised this privacy issue in the Queen’s Speech debate. Most of us are, I suspect, blissfully unaware that the so-called location services on our mobiles act as an insidious spy in the pocket, constantly recording our every movement wherever we go. Should we not at least start by obliging smartphone and network providers to tell us clearly what personal information they collect and how, and how we, as consumers, can turn it off?
Lord Faulks
The noble Lord is right that this is a source of anxiety and a matter which continues to alarm all sorts of people and organisations. The consumer has a role to insist on this information being provided. That, rather than legislation, is probably the answer for the moment.
Prisons: Overcrowding
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, whether or not the present shortage is under control, as the Statement asserts, can the Minister assure those of us on these Benches that the Statement should not be taken as suggesting that the more prison places there are the better? Will he confirm that the Government’s aim remains to achieve a reduction in the prison population by reducing reoffending and keeping offenders out of custody through rehabilitation where possible? Is that policy not achieving some success? Does he also accept that an obvious way to free up necessary space in prisons is to enable the early release of the 3,500 prisoners who have already passed their tariff date for release but are still serving indeterminate sentences for public protection, which were, after all, abolished by the Government to their credit in 2012?