Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 30th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Warnock. In relation to the past 30 years or so, Governments of every hue must stand in the dock and answer the accusation that they went out of their way to curtail the discretion that otherwise would have been vested in a judge or magistrate. Practically all Governments have done that and some of them more shamelessly than others. I am sure that anyone who has served in the courts in a judicial capacity, however senior or however humble, must be very aware of that.

The proposal that the Government are now putting forward in relation to the punitive approach is one of the most far reaching in that context. If it should be the case, as I assume it to be the Government’s case, that one-third of community orders which are made without a punitive element according to their definition must in all cases be dealt with in a different way, save for a very minuscule minority that is exceptional, then it is a very far-reaching and drastic proposal.

I fully accept that the Government are talking not so much about punishment in the sense of the disposal of a case of a person who has committed a crime but about something else, which connotes the idea that the experience of the defendant should be painful. My Latin is not all that good but does the word punishment not come from punitas? Is punitas not one and the same thing as pain? It is poen in Welsh and pain in English. Is that not really what the Government are after?

However, I think that the argument put forward by the Government, which has been described as offensive by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and alarming by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is highly offensive. The 2003 Act had a vast range of community disposals. In many ways, they were imaginative, flexible and double-banked. The sentencer had a huge armoury at his or her disposal.

As I understand it, the Government are now saying that that failed to achieve its purpose. The people who were charged with imposing sentences missed the whole point. At some time after 2003, tens of thousands of sentences every year which should have involved a punitive element did not achieve their purpose because that element was missing. That statement is either correct or incorrect. If it is correct, it must mean that many people sat in judgment as magistrates, circuit judges and recorders who should never have been there. They were missing the whole point. However, if that statement is incorrect, it is one of the most unjust indictments of the administration of justice that there could ever have been. It is one or the other.

I ask the Government: where is the evidence that in tens of thousands of cases, year by year, at some point in time after 2003, that has been happening? I feel it is a policy and a gesture that is cosmetic rather than real and intended to give the impression of toughness. The greatest toughness to my mind that can be achieved in relation to the administration of justice is doing that which is right, that which you know to be just and that which you consider to be proper by society, irrespective of whatever prejudices tabloid editors might have against you. That is the toughness that the Government should seek to achieve.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the test for these amendments is whether they work in making community orders more effective and in cutting reoffending as a result. It is quite plain from the debate today that it is common ground in this House that seeking reform and rehabilitation of offenders, while recognising the importance of offering redress to victims, provides a balanced approach, which offers a far greater prospect of cutting reoffending than a programme of increasing prison terms and prisoner numbers.

However, if there is to be a compulsory requirement imposed for the purpose of punishment in community orders—it is noteworthy that the phrase punitive element is not used—it is very important to recognise what is meant by punishment in this context. In an enlightened society, the punishment involved in a prison sentence is the loss of liberty for the offender, not the imposition of a harsh and inhumane regime for prisoners serving their sentences. Therefore, the punishment element in a community order should be reflected in a lesser but none the less significant loss of liberty—the liberty to do as one pleases within the law—by the imposition of some compulsory sanction that restricts that liberty.

It should not follow that the activity that offenders are obliged to undertake by community orders must be unpleasant, degrading or harsh. It is not likely to be helpful to force offenders to do some kind of hard labour for the sake of it, much as some elements of the press would wish us to do so. It is likely to be helpful, however, to oblige offenders to acquire work and life skills that will help them to find work and take their place in non-criminal society. Compulsory training, useful work—particularly work that benefits the community—treatment for addiction and anger management, and, importantly, a significant commitment to compensation, may all have their place in a regime of punishment, as may curfews monitored by electronic tagging that oblige offenders to remain at home for a reasonable number of hours in the day. I reiterate the point made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee that 16 hours hardly seems a reasonable number of hours in a day.

From what I have said, it follows that I welcome the passage in my noble friend’s opening speech that this is how the Government see the punishment provision. But I can foresee the way in which the provision is presently worded leading some to question what is meant by punishment. It is important that it is absolutely clear, as my noble friend suggested, and as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, wanted clarified, that the discretion as to what is the punitive element in a sentence is a discretion to be exercised by the sentencer and that he or she can comply with the requirement in the schedule in a way that he or she reasonably sees fit.

I would add a couple of words about one or two provisions of this part of the schedule, to which the House may wish to give attention next time. The reference to “exceptional circumstances”, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, as being the circumstances required to invoke the exemption from the requirement for a punishment element or a fine in a community order is far too strong. Exceptional is a very powerful word in statute and runs the risk of being more restrictively interpreted by the courts than my noble friend’s speech would indicate that the Government intend.

I also add a minor point that the proposed provision that breach by a contractor of the code of practice for electronic monitoring will not give rise to a civil cause of action may offer contractors, who are likely to be private contractors, an unwarranted level of immunity, and may weaken public confidence in how they perform their duties in respect of an intrusive form of punishment.

I add a word or two about restorative justice. The provisions of Paragraph 5 of the schedule have been welcomed across this House. By bringing offenders into contact with their victims, restorative justice helps them to understand the impact of their offences and assists victims to feel that society cares, understands the ordeals that they have been through and responds to them. For far too long, victims of crime have been treated as witnesses only, and even the introduction of victim support over recent years has failed adequately to address this. I know from my own experience and that of others that an arrest and a flurry of statements following an offence are followed up with a couple of letters offering counselling by way of victim support, when the victims may not need or want such counselling. Then far too often there is a silence, without the victims even being told what has happened because the offender has pleaded guilty so no evidence is needed from them at a hearing. That leaves a gaping hole in the system of providing victims with proper redress, and it needs covering at all stages of the process.

Deferring sentence to allow for restorative justice activities may prove a turning point for offenders and victims, and the evidence to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, referred so far supports this. But for all these proposals to fulfil their potential, they must be properly resourced in terms of people, preparation and funding. To improve the effectiveness of community orders in the ways proposed, we will need more people, more money and adequate training. Much will turn—and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, made an extremely valuable and important point—on the outcome of the Government’s consultation on the probation service. While there may be good reasons for the increasing use of private and voluntary sector providers, as suggested in the consultation paper, it is very important that we do not dissipate or even risk dissipating the expertise that exists within the public sector probation service—and I share the worries of many noble Lords in the Committee. For example, there is a proposal in the consultation paper to allow existing probation services to form separate probation trusts to compete with private and voluntary sector providers for work from the commissioning probation trusts. That seems structurally awkward and doomed to fail. We must find a way to retain what is best in the probation service and not lose the talent that we have.

Resource will also be needed to provide for the restorative justice proposals. Sentencers will need training, and facilitators will need to be available to provide a service during the short periods when sentence is deferred. There will need to be national, not patchy, cover. These are serious challenges; if met, I believe that they offer serious prospects of improvement and, ultimately, savings of resources and great social benefits. But the implementation of these proposals so that they achieve their potential will be a significant challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

There is much to ponder and debate today, on recommittal and Report. For the moment I have to say, on behalf of the Opposition, that judgment is reserved.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I welcome the proposals for deferred prosecution agreements in the proposed new schedule. They provide a comprehensive and workable code for a useful new procedure. The proposals are no worse for being an American import. Although I note the point of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that in America aggressive prosecutors may misuse such procedures, I do not believe the proposals in these amendments echo that danger.

These proposals are not dissimilar to procedures familiar in this jurisdiction over a number of years. Tax penalties, VAT penalties and customs penalties are examples of authorities not prosecuting when offences are committed but where the process of prosecution is replaced by the imposition of a penalty. Even the humble fixed penalty for motorists has its parallels.

The development these proposals introduce is a voluntary agreement to defer a prosecution where a company or a partnership is prepared to commit to payment of money to the prosecuting authority, to victims or to charity, to introduce compliance procedures and to co-operate in investigations.

The procedures are similar in many ways to the way in which the Environment Agency has operated over a number of years by enabling polluters to avoid prosecution for environmental offences by ensuring that offenders voluntarily clean up the pollution caused, pay any necessary compensation and introduce procedures in future to ensure compliance with the law. These arrangements save large sums of money, avoid the uncertainty of prosecution, ensure future compliance and extract compensation for victims and the prosecuting authorities where appropriate.

I do not believe that there are parallels between these proposals and hugging hoodies, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, suggests. They establish a way of achieving the results to be gained from a successful prosecution, sometimes in exceedingly complex and difficult cases, without the costs and uncertainties of getting those results.

Of course the criticism may be made that DPAs amount to something akin to plea bargaining. In one sense that criticism is justified. However, the provision at paragraph 5(4) of the proposed new schedule—that the amount of any financial penalty agreed between the prosecutor and P, the offender, must be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on P on conviction for the alleged offence following a guilty plea—goes much of the way towards answering that criticism. The two-stage arrangement proposed in the schedule also adds transparency and protection of the public to the proposals.

I have two points for consideration which may suggest that at this stage the proposals do not go far enough. Paragraph 4 of the schedule provides that P, the party entering into an agreement with the prosecuting authority, may not be an individual. I am not entirely clear why the distinction between individuals and corporations or partnerships needs to be drawn. It seems to me at first blush that it is the nature of the offence that is important, not the nature of the offender. I would suggest that the common threads running through cases suitable for DPAs are, first, the willingness of the offender to admit to guilt; secondly, the willingness to pay a financial penalty; thirdly, and perhaps of paramount importance, the suitability of a financial penalty and compliance measures to the facts of the case and to the seriousness of the offence; fourthly, a willingness to co-operate in an investigation of how the offences happened so as to assist the prosecuting authority in understanding the offences and in taking measures to avoid repetition; and finally, a willingness to put compliance measures in place on the part of the offender to ensure that there is no repetition of the offences. I would suggest that these conditions can be as easily met in the case of an individual offender as in the case of a corporation or partnership, even though DPAs would of course be more commonly suitable for corporations or partnerships.

It has been suggested that a distinction can be drawn between individuals and organisations from the self-evident fact that a corporation cannot be imprisoned. I am not sure that that answers the point. If an offence warrants a sentence of imprisonment—this is an important answer to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—the prosecuting authority will not agree to a DPA in the first place, and that is whether the sentence is warranted for an individual or for the officers of a company in their individual capacity. So DPAs cannot be used where a sentence of imprisonment ought to be imposed, if a sensible prosecuting authority is in place and goes before a judge seeking permission to make such an exceptional agreement.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am most grateful to my noble friend. Can he tell the Committee where that provision is to be found in the proposed schedule?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

It can be inferred from the fact that there is a proposal that the prosecuting authority has to go to a judge at the preliminary hearing to persuade the judge that the case is suitable for a DPA. If a prison sentence ought to be imposed on the person “P”, that agreement would not be forthcoming. That, I suggest, would be the effect of the proposal, although it may be necessary to make it clear by amendment; I appreciate that.

My second point is that the offences covered in Part 2 are economic and financial, and only financial and economic offences may be added to the list by delegated legislation. I wonder whether the restriction, not as to the legislation but as to the offences, is entirely justified. Environmental offences, for instance, seem appropriate. There are other random examples of offences contrary to regulation that might be suitable, such as offences against fishing regulations regarding net mesh sizes and permitted catches. Those may be examples, and there are many more. There are other regulatory provisions where DPAs might be appropriate. Perhaps it may be as well to let us see how DPAs work with the offences listed in the schedule at this point and then look to amend the legislation in the future. Certainly as a member of your Lordships’ Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform, I see the difficulty of adding large numbers of offences to the list by delegated legislation, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, pointed out. However, I suspect that our early suspicions of DPAs will wane in practice and that they may become tools of wider use and greater utility than is now envisaged.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, first I want to declare an interest. As my noble friend Lord Beecham said, I had something to do with an earlier consideration of similar problems when my party was in Government and I was in office, and I want to say something about that in a moment. I also declare that I am currently a practising lawyer and that I and my firm get involved in the sort of cases that this may be concerned with. I have seen how these systems work in the United States and I have thought about them quite hard. I want to make it clear that broadly speaking I am in favour of the proposal for deferred prosecution agreements. However, I have some questions that I will come to, and I understand very well the point made by my noble friend about the timing of the proposals being brought forward.

Before I turn to the substance of what I want to say, I am a little confused at the moment about the procedure that is being followed. This may be because unfortunately I was detained from coming to the House when noble Lords were considering the previous group of amendments. I came in at the tail end to hear something that I am not quite sure I understood, about matters being discussed again on a future occasion. But unless I have misunderstood, I notice that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has moved government Amendment 155ZB, which provides for the introduction of a schedule relating to deferred prosecution agreements. Without, as it were, dissent, we seem at least to have got the concept of a schedule into the Bill. Whether that means that the noble Lord is going to move the schedule as a complete schedule, I am not sure, but if he does, that gives rise to questions about whether there will be any real opportunity to debate or amend its provisions. I want to ask some questions about the detail, so I would be grateful if the noble Lord could explain the situation.

Inheritance (Cohabitants) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Friday 19th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am grateful to the House for permitting me to speak in the gap. I had not put my name down to speak because I was not clear that I could be here for the whole of the debate. I strongly support the Bill because it addresses a serious and important injustice, which is that under the present law cohabitants, on the death of their cohabiting partners, are left entirely without means of support.

I have listened carefully to the arguments against the Bill, particularly those put by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. She argues, supported by a number of quotes, that there are many who choose to cohabit rather than marry, and many who would not wish their cohabiting partner to inherit. Such people can of course make a will, making it clear that they do not wish their cohabiting partners to inherit. What we are dealing with here, though, is the default position. Under the present law, a right of challenge or a right to apply for provision is available to people under the 1975 Act, and that will remain the position. However, when one is looking at what the default position should be, I entirely agree with the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, that for most intestates, and for society in general, the first priority should normally be given to the relationship in which the deceased was living at the time of his or her death. The Bill, with its modest but important proposals, addresses that priority and gets it right.

I entirely accept the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester in suggesting that attention needs to be given to the needs of separating couples who cohabit. I accept that that needs to be answered, and indeed have made that position clear in this House before. I hope to introduce a Bill in due course that will give effect to the proposal of the Law Commission that there should be limited provision for cohabiting couples who separate in those circumstances. However, that is not the Bill before the House. This Bill addresses a limited but important proposal made by the Law Commission, and I urge the House to give it our support.

Defamation Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this Bill and in doing so refer to my registered interests as a practising barrister and arbitrator. I had the privilege of serving on the Joint Committee of both Houses under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Mawhinney and, like others, I pay tribute to his excellent and courteous chairmanship. I also add my tribute to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill for all the work and learning he has devoted to this issue over many years, for his Bill and for the help he gave the Joint Committee.

The balance between reputation and freedom of speech is now wrong. It is tilted against freedom of speech. Libel cases and the threat of such cases, often unwarranted, have been used by the wealthy and their lawyers to stifle legitimate criticism and debate. So, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, has just pointed out, academics who question the safety of medical procedures or pharmaceutical products, or journalists who investigate a company’s employment practices, have been warned off and forced to back down rather than run the risk of ruin. That runs strongly counter to the public interest in legitimate debate. But it is not only defendants who are frightened off. Private citizens, irresponsibly defamed in the media, are also deterred from action to protect their reputations by the cost and complexity of seeking legal redress. This Bill rightly seeks to shift the balance in favour of freedom of speech and at the same time to simplify and modernise the law in what has become an arcane and complex area.

I turn to Clause 4 of the Bill, which rewrites the Reynolds defence. My noble friend Lord Lester has argued persuasively that it would be better to omit the list of factors on the question of responsible publication and instead to state the broad principles in the Bill, which he set out in his speech. He would then leave it to the courts to develop those principles case by case. My provisional view—and I only differ from my noble friend Lord Lester in detail and with great diffidence—is that a reasonably clear set of guidelines would be helpful. It must not be exhaustive and it must never become a checklist of hurdles. We must avoid the kind of nightmare for publishers and broadcasters of which the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, spoke. Clear guidelines would provide an easily understood code, which is one of the aims of the Bill, enabling an intelligent layman to look up the law on the internet and understand it without the need to search for the cases and read the judgments in them to try to discern how the law is likely to be interpreted.

Alongside a public interest defence, the law should provide a public remedy for those defamed by reports that are genuinely published in the public interest but that turn out to be inaccurate and cause harm. This, I suggest, can be achieved without trespassing on editorial independence, as the noble Lord, Lord Black, suggested that it might. When that happens, a prompt public retraction or clarification and an apology, prominently published, should at least be encouraged. I would like to see provision for the court to take into account a prompt offer of such redress when dealing with libel cases. This could be introduced as part of an early resolution procedure or it could be as an alternative to a Clause 4 defence. Either way such a provision would be a welcome development of the law and would go much further than an offer of amends under the 1996 Act.

The Bill does not restrict the right of corporations to sue for defamation. The Joint Committee wrestled long and hard with this issue. One the one hand, corporations are not natural persons and have no feelings. Large corporations can and do use their financial muscle to stifle legitimate debate by threatening to sue their financially weaker critics. Such corporations may have other ways of protecting their reputations without suing their critics for libel. On the other hand, not all non-natural persons are big and powerful. Defamatory statements can destroy legitimate businesses. Weighing these arguments, the Joint Committee recommended, as had the Bill proposed by my noble friend Lord Lester, that corporations should still be able to sue, but only if they could show at least a likelihood of substantial financial loss. The Bill contains no such restriction, because the Government’s response to the Joint Committee argued that the serious harm test filled the gap. I do not entirely accept the Government’s argument. Serious harm to reputation is not the same as serious financial damage. The chilling effect of allowing corporations to sue is severe. In my view, they should have to show that serious financial loss is likely in order to be entitled to sue. The Bill as drafted fails to address this issue.

The changes in the substantive law proposed in the Bill are not enough to transform the system. As has been said, the staggering costs and the procedural complexity of defamation proceedings are at least as much to blame as the substantive law for the present inadequacy of the system. We must accept that defamation cases will never be cheap, but we could make them simpler and quicker and therefore less expensive. To do so we need changes to the rules to dovetail with the changes in the Bill.

First, there should be a single early resolution appointment in every case to determine as many issues as possible. I give a few examples: whether the serious harm test is met; issues about meaning; whether a statement was a statement of opinion, and whether the basis of an opinion was sufficiently indicated; whether a statement was on a matter of public interest; whether a subsequent publication was materially different from an earlier publication. Such an early resolution appointment would clarify issues quickly and would, I suggest, often lead to settlement. Furthermore, any claim that did not meet the serious harm test would be struck out.

Secondly, there should be more active, court-led case management throughout the life of every case. Thirdly, courts should be far readier to stay proceedings to allow for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution, with costs consequences for failure to co-operate. Fourthly, we need some realistic costs control, including, in the light of LASPO, protection for less well off claimants. Qualified one-way cost shifting in defamation cases would do much to assist. Fifthly, I suggest, as the Joint Committee proposed, at least to trial this: all but the most complex defamation cases should be heard in county courts, with designated judges to manage and hear them in trial centres around the country.

I welcome the letter from my noble friend the Minister yesterday to all Members of your Lordships’ House promising to bring forward such procedural changes, but the Government’s response to the Joint Committee on the timetable for procedural change lacked urgency. I will take up a point made by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney. While it is right, of course, that the rules are the responsibility of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, I remind the House and my noble friend that the Lord Chancellor has the power, under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act 1997, to give notice requiring that committee to make rules for a specified purpose. If he does so, the committee must make such rules within a reasonable time. It seems to me that for your Lordships properly to consider how we achieve meaningful overall reform in this area we should see the proposed procedural changes at the same time as we consider the substantive provisions in the Bill even if there may subsequently be changes in the light of any recommendations of Lord Justice Leveson. At the moment we are legislating while seeing only half the picture. I therefore urge my noble friend the Minister to encourage the new Lord Chancellor to draw up a draft and publish it quickly so that we can see the entire picture in its frame.

Elections: Registration

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

Perhaps someone from Northern Ireland will intervene, but, again, the language is not borne out by the facts. It did not totally collapse. In this gradual process that we are bringing forward, we are learning from the examples and lessons of the Northern Ireland experience, as well as looking at some of the practices that are going on there now. Northern Ireland votes are a standard joke but we are now learning lessons about voluntary registration and its success in Northern Ireland.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the existing system, whereby householders can in theory be prosecuted for failing to return their registration forms, has not worked, largely for the simple reason that no one can tell who the responsible householder is in households with more than person. Therefore, does not individual registration offer a good opportunity at least to consider a meaningful compulsory system, and is that not important, given that the electoral register determines not just the right to vote but also the call-up for jury service?

[Lord McNally]

Those are very valid points. To put the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, into perspective, I again emphasise that the annual canvass will continue to support the maintenance of the electoral register. Significant work, including public awareness campaigns by the Electoral Commission, will be funded in 2014-15 to manage the transition to individual electoral registration. In both those years, door-to-door canvassing will be used by electoral registration officers as part of a wide suite of powers to encourage people to register to vote. This is a step forward against electoral fraud. Instead of making emotional interventions, it would be good if the Labour Party would endorse it and get on with encouraging people to register.

Community Legal Service (Funding) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2011

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Listowel]

My Lords, I regret that I, too, must support the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, because of my concerns about the impact on child welfare. I regret doing so, because I know that the Government take the welfare of children very much to heart, and I thank the Minister for ensuring that domestic violence issues have been kept out of the scope of the order and that tandem representation of children in private law cases will be untouched.

I remind the Minister and other Members of the House of Article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states:

“In all actions concerning children”—

whether undertaken by legislative bodies or other institutions—

“the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”.

I should be very interested to hear from the Minister how the best interests of children have been considered in this move by the Government to cut legal aid.

Children need the best experts and lawyers in the immensely complex cases that they are often drawn into. My concern is that those experts will be driven out by the further cut in their finances. Expert witnesses to the family courts—including paediatricians, child and adolescent psychiatrists, educational psychologists, adolescent psychotherapists and independent social workers—are all subject to the 10 per cent cut, having already had their fees seriously cut. For clinicians working in London, the situation is worse, because London-based practitioners are allowed to charge only two thirds of the amount charged by those based outside London. As everyone knows, it is more costly to practise in London.

I am concerned that because of the impact on expert witnesses there will further delays for children in the courts and that poor decisions will be made. If a child is taken into local authority care and the wrong decision is come to, it will stay with that child for the rest of his life and possibly for the rest of his children’s lives. We need to get those decisions right and we need the right expertise.

A further concern of the expert witnesses is that they cannot deal directly with the Legal Services Commission but have to work indirectly through solicitors. Perhaps the Minister could look at that, because it would certainly be an improvement if they could deal directly with the commission.

I look forward to the Minister’s response. I hope that he can give some comfort to your Lordships.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I rise with a heavy heart to speak against this annulment Motion. It is with a heavy heart because, for all my professional life, I have been a devoted supporter of legal aid. I declare an interest as a barrister who over the years has done a great deal of publicly funded work. My first ever motion to a Liberal Democrat conference was on the promotion of legal aid. The Liberal Democrat Lawyers Association, which I chaired for a number of years, drank a toast every year at its annual dinner to the Legal Aid Fund, a toast proposed by a prominent lawyer. It is noteworthy in the context of today’s debate that the toast was changed some 10 years ago to “justice for all”, as an ironic response to cuts in civil legal aid made by the then Labour Government. I chaired a policy group entitled A Right to Justice, which helped to define Liberal Democrat policy on improving the legal aid scheme. My party has always taken as its starting point for discussion on this topic that access to justice is a crucial right and that legal aid funding provides a vital public service. There is no point in having rights enforceable at law if citizens cannot secure those rights in courts of law. I know from many years’ experience of him that that is the position my noble friend the Minister takes as well.

However, while there was much to agree with in all the speeches that have been made so far in favour of the Motion, we live in difficult times. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, fairly acknowledged, savings must be made. The provisions of the order are estimated to deliver £120 million of the £350 million of savings that the Ministry of Justice is required to make in legal aid over the spending review period from 2011-15. If we do not make those savings, matters can only get worse and later cuts will have to be deeper.

On a personal note, in Greece, my wife's home country, I have seen at first hand the effects of the extreme austerity measures cutting back public expenditure. The cuts could have been much less harsh had the Government there got a grip on the public purse earlier when all the signs of overspending were plain for all to see.

The need to make savings in the legal aid budget was recognised by the Labour Party in Government who made some 30 attempts to limit it, reducing fees in real terms across the piece as they did so, between 2006 and their leaving office. Furthermore, that was before the full extent of the deficit became apparent and the need for deficit reduction and cuts across the board became as clear as it is now. On 18 May 2009, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether the Labour Government would maintain the rates of legal aid payments in family law cases. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, replied:

“Family legal aid costs have risen unsustainably from £399 million per year to £582 million per year in the past six years. We need to control these costs in order to protect services for vulnerable clients”.—[Official Report, 18/5/09; col. 1201.]

In the consultation paper sent out by Ministry of Justice in July 2009, for which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as legal aid Minister, was responsible, its proposals were described as follows:

“Our legal aid system is one of the best funded in the world. We spend around £38 per head on it annually in England and Wales, compared to £4 in Germany and £3 in France. Even countries with a legal system more like ours spend less; for example, both New Zealand and the Republic of Ireland spend around £8 per head”.

I regard the fact that we still spend considerably more than comparable countries on legal aid as a matter for pride. That is still the case but it highlights the degree to which the legal aid budget must bear its share of the economies that have to be made.

The Labour Government's consultation paper continued:

“While we devote considerable resources to legal aid—£2bn annually—”

the figure is now £2.2 billion—

“our resources are limited, and we need to review regularly how legal aid funds are being spent, and whether we are securing value for money for the taxpayer and providing the services that the public need”.

The Government's response to the consultation, published in January 2010 and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said:

“The Government wants to ensure that we rebalance the legal aid budget as far as possible in favour of civil help for those who need it most. But we also need to ensure that the resources we currently devote to civil legal aid are being targeted appropriately, and that the rules for granting funding are as robust as they need to be to ensure that resources are expended on meritorious cases … The intended effects are to redirect resources onto higher priority areas, and to ensure that funding is only granted to eligible clients”.

The words “rebalance” and “redirect resources” would inevitably have involved real terms reductions in fees. Labour’s 2010 election manifesto said:

“To help protect frontline services, we will find greater savings in legal aid and the courts system”.

When this Government's consultation paper on legal aid was published, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, very fairly said, as he said tonight:

“It would have been hypocritical of Labour to say we would not cut anything. If we had, we would be rightly criticised”.

It is beyond doubt that the reductions in fees embodied in the order, which the noble Lord seeks to annul, do make it more difficult for the already hard-pressed community legal practitioners, mentioned in the Motion, to thrive and will make it more difficult for barristers, junior and senior, who work on publicly funded work. We agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that such practitioners carry out an essential service for those least able to afford it. This order does involve a 10 per cent cut in their fees and in the fees of barristers for publicly funded work across the field of civil and family law, not just social welfare law. It includes—I would suggest rightly—a limit on experts’ fees for the first time. It is going to be more necessary than ever for lawyers to practise as efficiently as they can and the harsh reality is that they will earn less from legal aid work. However, I am far less clear that their core viability is threatened.

We will be debating these issues—and the other issues about the scope of legal aid mentioned by the noble Lord, but not the subject of this order—in full when the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill comes to this House shortly. I hope we will also be able to explore during the course of this Parliament other ways in which savings might be made without damaging the quality of the justice system. Progress is being made in exploring the achievement of savings through alternative dispute resolution procedures. I believe there is also room for improvement in the efficiency of the court system to produce savings. In the family field, I look forward with great hope to the final report of the Family Justice Review chaired by David Norgrove.

I would make it clear from these Benches that we have been, and are, heavily involved in discussions with practitioners and others , including many civil and family law practitioners, both barristers and solicitors, who have quite rightly expressed their concerns to us. We will examine closely with Ministers whether, and how far, the Bill achieves fairness and the protection of the vulnerable in the use of extremely limited resources. We would hope and expect that in due course, in a reviving economy, any gaps in provision that emerge will be refilled. However, that there must now be some cuts in fees is inevitable in these straitened circumstances.

In advancing this annulment Motion I suggest that the noble Lord and the Labour Party need to tell us what choices they would have made, or would make now, in cutting the legal aid budget. What were the cuts that he was intending to implement? How would they not have threatened hard-pressed community practitioners? Until those questions are answered fully, I suggest that, however regrettable the need for fee cuts in civil and family proceedings, it would not be sensible to divide the House on this Motion.

[The Lord Bishop of Ripon and Leeds]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for raising this issue tonight and for concentrating my thoughts—like those of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel—on the welfare of children as they are treated by our legal system. We spent the whole of this afternoon talking about the treatment and rights of children. I look forward to the Government’s response and comment on the ways in which children can be particularly protected in our legal system by the way in which the distribution of fees is arranged throughout that system.

I am still puzzled by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and why it should be this area in which we look for savings. A number of noble Lords have spoken of areas, in criminal law, for example, where there could be significant savings. Why should it be this area? I think of the work, for example, of Henry Hyams, a firm of solicitors in Leeds which takes some 2,000 cases a year from the most deprived areas of Leeds. They tell me that almost all of those cases involve the welfare of children.

That takes us to the effect of these cuts on those clinicians who provide reports to assist the courts in making determinations about the safeguarding of children—professionals who provide evidence of injury and of abuse and who are often key to the welfare of children. We have improved immensely our understanding of childcare in our society, and much of that has been due to the diligence of such professionals. We are all made very aware when a mistake is made by one of those professionals; we forget the thousands of cases when accurate decisions are taken about children’s welfare and their future. The debate that we had all afternoon and this debate come together in looking at the well-being—again—of children, and of their place in our society.

Clergy in pastoral work are often aware of the time spent both by those clinicians and by lawyers with their clients, seeking the best way forward for children and family life, often in work that is undertaken quite outside the fee system. We claim to be a society that puts the family first; social welfare law is an important part of enabling us to do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke of the way in which he hoped that, if there were gaps in our provision, they would be able to be filled again as the economic situation becomes better. But the most important part of our response to the difficulties in which we find ourselves is that those who are most deprived in our society should be those whom we seek to protect from the cuts being made. The Government and many local authorities seek to do that, yet in this particular instance those cuts are bearing at their hardest on those least able to bear the brunt of them.

Cohabiting: Law Commission Report

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will introduce legislation to enable qualifying cohabitants to apply for financial relief on the breakdown of their relationship, as recommended by the 2007 Law Commission report on cohabiting.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, while declaring an interest as a barrister undertaking some family work, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, as has been confirmed in a Written Ministerial Statement, the Government do not intend to take forward the Law Commission’s recommendations for reform of the cohabitation law in this parliamentary term.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer, although I confess it was disappointing. Does he nevertheless agree that it is unjust, as the slightly wider Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, recognised some time ago, that cohabitants who separate, no matter how long they have lived together and even if they have children, cannot in England apply to the courts for financial relief to compensate for careers abandoned, time spent looking after children or contributions to their cohabitants’ success, and if so, is it not surely now time to implement the Law Commission’s sensible and limited scheme, which would not undermine marriage or civil partnership and which has been widely applauded by the judiciary and the family professions?

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, first, I pay tribute to the Law Commission for its work, not just on this matter but in general. I am a very firm supporter of the Law Commission and the work it does, and I know that this House has played an important role in bringing Law Commission recommendations into law. However, the Government have decided not to implement the Law Commission’s scheme in this parliamentary term, because major changes to family legal aid are being implemented next year, and further reforms of the family justice system are also on the horizon following the final report of the family justice review, which will be published in October. We do not believe it would be sensible to seek to implement further changes in the law governing cohabiting couples during this period.

Personal Injury Lawyers

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 7th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

Whether it is a matter for the OFT or the regulator is a balance of judgment. The noble Lord is right that the figures are showing a doubling. One of the factors that one must look at is the unbelievable increase in whiplash claims, about which I know the Association of British Insurers has held talks with my colleague Jonathan Djanogly. It is far too easy to find in even the most minor of accidents that subsequently whiplash is claimed, along with quite substantial damages. One of the weaknesses in the system is that the insurance companies find it easier to settle and pass on the costs to the customer than to fight these bogus claims in the courts.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that this practice of insurers charging solicitors referral fees for names is not only unethical and offensive but ensures that the claims are handled not by the most competent or well qualified solicitors but by those who are prepared to pay the most to buy the clients—thus effectively depriving their clients of their right to choose the best lawyers to handle their cases? Is that not another good reason for implementing Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendation for a ban on such fees?

[Lord McNally]

I agree with my noble friend. I hope that the more the public are aware of what the noble Lord described as this “dirty little secret”, the more it is in the public domain and the more that all parts of the insurance industry, including the insurance companies, solicitors and the consumers, will demand—and we will respond to that demand—to ban it.

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Friday 13th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, while I declare an interest as a practising barrister, I should add that I have never conducted a case in this precise area of the law, so while I am grateful to my noble friend for looking at me when suggesting that experts in this area of the law were due to speak, I doubt his accuracy. However, I congratulate my noble friend on bringing this Bill forward for a Second Reading and on what I must say was a masterful exposition of its terms.

As noble Lords will have appreciated, this Bill involves three distinct reforms, each of which, I would suggest, is beneficial and necessary to correct anomalies in the present law. The first reform set out in Clause 1 is that where a parent disclaims an interest in an estate, whether on intestacy, which is the alteration to the Administration of Estates Act 1925, or under a will, which is the alteration set out in Clause 2 of the Wills Act, that disclaimer does not bind his or her children. As my noble friend has explained, it achieves this by treating the disclaiming parent as having died immediately before the intestate or the testator who is, as he rightly pointed out, usually a grandparent, so that the children can inherit directly. This is a sensible and sympathetic reform. It is right that a parent can disclaim, for whatever reason, for himself or herself. However, it is wrong that that disclaimer should bind his or her children. That may cause not only loss to the children, but if they know of the disclaimer, it may also cause stress to the grandparents, who then know that their grandchildren will not inherit.

The second reform uses the same device on intestacy and under wills to ensure that the forfeiture rule does not disinherit the children of a person who forfeits his or her inheritance. There are of course clearly understandable reasons for the forfeiture rule, which is now defined by the Forfeiture Act 1982. The rule provides that someone who has killed another—often, but not always, a parent—cannot inherit from the victim’s estate either on intestacy or under the victim’s will. That applies to anyone party to the killing as well. The rule is obviously primarily intended to ensure that killers who kill to gain an inheritance are deprived of the fruits of their crime. However, the present operation of the rule also prevents the children of the killer from inheriting the victim’s estate. Since again the most predictable circumstances in which this can operate are where a son or daughter kills a parent, the effect is to cut the victim’s grandchildren out of the inheritance. That is anomalous and unfair, as the Law Commission recognised.

In DWS, the case where a son had murdered both his parents and therefore could not inherit under the forfeiture rule, which has already been cited and which was the case that led to the reference to the Law Commission, the result was that his child could not do so as well. The judgment of Lord Justice Sedley has already been read out in part, but I hope that I will be forgiven for trespassing on the time of noble Lords for a moment or two more to mention another passage of that judgment where, using very plain English, Lord Justice Sedley said:

“Most people in the situation of the two deceased parents in the present case, if told that in such an unimaginable event their son would be disqualified from inheriting and asked what they would then like to happen, would say that they would like their estate to go their grandchild”.

That is the result at which this part of the Bill is aimed.

In western society, we reject the principle that the sins of the father shall be visited upon the children from generation to generation. We are right to do so, and the Bill recognises that.

The third reform is designed to protect the interests of the children of a single parent under 18 who dies before reaching majority. At present, if someone under 18 and single has a child and inherits from a parent under an intestacy while still under 18, the child cannot inherit and the parent’s interest in the estate passes to other relatives. Again, that is plainly wrong. The Bill uses the same device to treat the parent as having predeceased the intestate, again usually a grandparent, so that the interest in the grandparent’s estate will pass from the intestate grandparent to the single parent’s child.

These are small reforms. They are, I suspect, entirely uncontroversial. They may sound complex, but they are relatively simple in their application.

The DWS case was in 2001; the Law Commission’s consultation was in 2003; and that led to the Law Commission’s report in 2005, a thoroughly commendable report. This Bill comes before this House in 2011. We must do better. We do not know how many possible heirs have been deprived in a grandparent’s estate between 2005 and 2011, but surely it cannot be right to tolerate a delay of that length in the implementation of such an uncontroversial proposal.

The Law Commission brings great expertise to these questions. It consults widely, as it did in this case. It reports in detail and generally with very well reasoned and intellectually sound recommendations. We have it in our power to pass uncontroversial Bills introduced into the House of Lords with some speed. Yet the Law Commission’s implementation log, admittedly most recently updated only in November 2010, says that the last report to be implemented was that from 2006, which led to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Even that delay is substantially too long. There are a number of reports since 2006 awaiting implementation. We now have an annual reporting requirement on the Law Commission. We have a protocol between the Law Commission and the Government under which procedures are governed. I simply invite the Minister to give some attention to how we may ensure that in simple and straightforward cases uncontroversial reports of the Law Commission are brought to Parliament more quickly than hitherto.

That said, commencement under the Bill is a matter for the Secretary of State. It is to be not less than three months after Royal Assent. I simply urge the Minister, once that short period, which is no doubt designed to enable lawyers to catch up with the provisions, has elapsed, to bring them into force as quickly as possible.

Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) Order 2011

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd March 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, these statutory instruments are necessary to support the implementation of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, which will come into force on 6 April 2011. The Family Procedure Rules are being made as required by the Courts Act 2003, which gives power for new rules to be made for all family proceedings. This means that one unified set of procedures can be applied to all types of family proceedings in all types of courts dealing with such cases. The Courts Act provides that the rule-making power is to be exercised with a view to securing that the rules are both simple and simply expressed.

The Ministry of Justice and the Family Procedure Rule Committee—the body established to make the rules—have developed a set of rules to cover all family proceedings in the High Court, the county court and the family proceedings court. The new rules will bring a number of benefits, including modernisation of some language, a single unified code of practice for all family courts and, where appropriate, harmonisation of the procedure in family proceedings with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules. In fact, the approach followed in the Family Procedure Rules is already being applied to adoption proceedings. The Family Procedure (Adoption) Rules 2005 used the new approach to support those proceedings. When the new Family Procedure Rules come into force on 6 April 2011, they will help fulfil the Government’s intention that the new approach should be extended to all family proceedings.

The two instruments we are considering today are critical to the operation of the new Family Procedure Rules. They ensure that the new rules will operate as intended, and that other enactments will refer appropriately to those rules. I hope that the Committee will support their approval. I will take each instrument in turn.

The Family Procedure (Modification of Enactments) Order 2011 makes amendments to other legislation in consequence of the coming into force of the Family Procedure Rules. For example, Article 6(b) of the order inserts a new subsection (3) into Section 54 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. That new subsection provides:

“In family proceedings a magistrates’ court may stay the whole or part of any proceedings or order either generally or until a specified date or event.”

This gives magistrates' courts the same power to stay—in effect, halt—proceedings that the High Court and county courts already have. As a result, the procedural rules referring to such stays in the Family Procedure Rules can apply to all courts dealing with family proceedings. The order also amends various enactments which currently refer to rules which are to be superseded by the Family Procedure Rules 2010. This means that, from 6 April 2011, those enactments will refer to the 2010 Rules or to specific provisions within them.

The Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) Order 2011—the destination of appeals order, as it is known to its friends—makes various minor amendments to the routes of appeal. It provides that appeals from decisions made by a district judge of a county court will lie to a judge of that court and that appeals from decisions made by a district judge of the High Court, a district judge of the principal registry of the Family Division or a costs judge will lie to a judge of the High Court. It puts in place provisions in existing rules regarding the destination of appeals from a district judge which would otherwise be lost as those rules are replaced by the Family Procedure Rules. The new destination of appeals order consolidates these provisions with the provisions from an existing destination of appeals order, so that the routes of appeal in family proceedings are dealt with in one place. This is in line with our policy of simplifying the way in which rules for family proceedings are presented. Part 30, “Appeals”, of the practice direction that supplements the Family Procedure Rules sets out all the routes of appeal and the practice steps that people will need to take, which will provide considerable assistance to a person who wants to appeal against a court’s decision.

These orders have already been debated in the other place and have been approved. Members were generally supportive of the Family Procedure Rules and approved these provisions which support the implementation of those rules. The two statutory instruments are important to make it possible for the new Family Procedure Rules to operate as intended, and to ensure that other legislation is properly amended in consequence of the coming into force of those rules. The rules will bring considerable benefits to people involved in family proceedings. I hope that noble Lords will approve these two draft orders so that the benefits of the new rules can be fully achieved.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, we plainly welcome the move towards uniformity of procedures among the High Court, the county court and the magistrates’ court and the move to a single code of practice and harmonisation where possible, although it is not always completely possible, between family proceedings and other civil proceedings under the CPR. I particularly welcome the provisions that will give magistrates’ courts the power to stay proceedings and to make orders for costs in a way that they have not been able to do so in the past.

Also of considerable importance is the move to give magistrates’ courts the power to make an order of disclosure against non-parties. The lack of such a provision for the magistrates’ courts has been, and is, capable of giving rise to delay. When witnesses turn up, the documents are not in court and there has to be an adjournment in order for them to be obtained. For that provision to be effective, it should be borne in mind that the burden is on solicitors and litigants to ensure that they use the order and the provision by applying for orders for the production of documents in good time so that, when matters come for a hearing, all the documents are before the court.

The destination of appeals order is also extremely helpful in dividing appeals from the junior judges in the High Court to High Court judges from appeals from junior judges in the county courts to county court judges. However, one further point that I would make, which is a matter for listing officers rather than for the legislation, is that those of us who practise in family proceedings will well know that we have extremely experienced district judges at both levels, but we also have a number of rather less experienced deputy High Court judges and deputy county circuit judges sitting as circuit judges. It is a matter of importance that we do not list appeals from very experienced district judges before very much less experienced deputies at the senior level. That is not a point for the order, but it is a point of some importance in practice.

Justice: Judicial Appointments

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 17th March 2011 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress is being made in improving gender and ethnic diversity in judicial appointments.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, in February 2010, the independent advisory panel on judicial diversity published its report, which detailed a number of recommendations to deliver speedier and sustained progress to a more diverse judiciary without diminishing appointments on merit. In response, the judicial diversity taskforce was established to oversee the assessment and implementation of those recommendations. The taskforce met last Monday to review what has been achieved to date, and will publish its report on progress shortly.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his helpful Answer, but given the lamentably low number of women judges and the virtual absence of ethnic minority judges among our senior judiciary, which bears a very poor comparison with those of other European and other common law jurisdictions, does he agree that it is time for urgent and effective action and that all necessary steps should be taken to ensure that the recommendations of the taskforce that he mentioned, set up as a result of the recommendations of the advisory panel chaired last year by my noble friend Lady Neuberger, are implemented in full and without delay?

[Lord McNally]

My noble friend makes a correct assessment of the figures for judicial appointments. The meeting last Monday was my first with the diversity group, and I made it very clear that as far as I am concerned, the concept of trickle-up is not a response to the diversity problem that we face in the judiciary.