Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord McNally
Actually, I knew that. As Harold Wilson said when he retired and Jim Callaghan succeeded him, “I have made way for an older man”.
I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, but let me be blunt. I am always suspicious of Ministers who at any time rest too much on a report, no matter how learned. I do not rest the case for the 25% cap on that being Lord Justice Jackson’s original recommendation, although indeed it was. A sharp-eyed lawyer would say that the noble Lord’s quote about Lord Justice Jackson did not endorse the counterview but simply said that it had merit, which is not the same as advocating that the Government change their policy. Even if it were, this is the Government’s policy. It is the right policy because it protects the future earnings and the future cover for victims in these cases. It remains our policy on that merit, and we are willing to defend it on that basis.
I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about speed. I pointed out that very little of what we are doing is entirely new. We fully recognise that at this time there is a need for ability, nimbleness and fleetness of foot in all parts of the legal profession, if we are to take advantage of the changes that are going through. We are not persuaded that the timescales we have set are unreasonable, and we will not be deferred from the course that we have set. We have taken account of reasons for delay regarding mesothelioma and privacy, which I quoted. However, these orders will go through to take account of the fact that LASPO comes into effect on 1 April 2013.
Perhaps I might deal with a number of the specific questions that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised. He was very correct to raise the issue of the American experience in DBAs. I also met the organisation that came over to present its case. I left that meeting with some of his concerns about what this might bring into our legal system. The noble Lord’s description of hedge funds for legal claims is something that we are very conscious of. What we have decided so far is to keep the matter under review. That phrase can often hide weasel words and weasel intent, but we want to see just how much this is going to become a factor in our legal system, while making sure that some of the warning signs that the noble Lord has quite legitimately raised are on the radar of Ministers as well. We will keep this matter closely under review.
The noble Lord raised the issue of VAT on the 25% cap. The 25% cap on success fees is as recommended by Lord Justice Jackson. Including VAT on the success fee on lawyers’ fees within the cap will provide further protection for the claimant’s damages and add certainty for the claimant as to the likely deduction from their damages. This approach is also consistent with the existing cap of 35%, inclusive of VAT, on payments to be made from damages in respect of DBAs in employment matters. The noble Lord also asked about the indemnity principle. DBAs are an alternative method of funding and it would be for solicitors to advise their clients on the most appropriate method of funding according to the circumstances of each case. He also mentioned there being one set of regulations. There is one set of regulations covering both civil litigation and employment cases, as recommended by the Civil Justice Council. We have listened to the concerns of the Law Society and others that there should not be too much regulation in respect of civil litigation in these instruments. This is because failure to comply with the provisions in the instruments would make the agreements unenforceable. As I have said, lawyers are properly regulated in any event.
The noble Lord asked whether the cost of ATE insurance is within or outside the 25% cap. This is an expense and is therefore outside the cap. On why DBA regulations do not contain requirements on termination for civil litigation, as in employment cases, the DBA regulations of 2010 made provisions for employment cases which can be taken forward by non-lawyers. Detailed safeguards need to be built in as a result. Civil litigation can be conducted only by lawyers, who are subject to their own professional regulations.
I think that that covers most of the issues. If not, perhaps I might say to the noble Lord that I welcome the thoroughness with which he has examined these regulations and, as I say, if I have not covered the questions in precisely the detail that I should have done I will make sure that a suitable letter is lodged in the Library of the House. I nevertheless think that the timetable that we have set, the consultation that we have undertaken and the changes that we have made after that consultation, with our having listened to the Bar Council, the Law Society and other interested parties, make the regulations fit for purpose. I therefore recommend them to the Committee.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, before my noble friend the Minister sits down, I have one question on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about damage-based agreements for defendants. It is my understanding of the regulations that DBAs are not appropriate for defendants, whereas conditional fee agreements are and always can be available to defendants. DBAs depend upon the damages awarded to the client or monies paid by another party to the party entering into the DBA. Clarification on that from my noble friend may be helpful, but it is certainly my understanding.
Lord McNally
I am grateful to my noble friend for that question. I am informed that neither the Act nor the regulations enable defendants to use DBAs, not least because a DBA is enforceable only where the agreement makes provision for the payment of the fee from damages awarded. My noble friend asks an extremely pertinent question and I hope that I have given a clear answer.
Defamation Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(11 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment, but I do so on the basis that the general restriction on companies suing for defamation is limited to the requirement in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause that trading entities should have to show actual or likely financial loss before being entitled to sue for defamation. As drafted, proposed new subsection (2) would introduce a restriction on companies that is not so limited and is entirely undefined.
However, the restriction in proposed new subsection (3) is in line with the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, on which I served, and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has pointed out, the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights as well. Whether companies should be able to sue for defamation was one of the issues that the Joint Committee was specifically asked to consider outside the ambit of the draft Bill, and we took a great deal of time and heard a great deal of evidence on this issue. The amendment accords with the sense of many who believe that corporate bodies trading for profit should not be in precisely the same position as natural persons in defamation law.
As in so much of the law in this area, the task is to strike the right balance between the right to free speech and the right to protect reputation. But it is a fact that companies cannot suffer hurt in their feelings and personal reputations in the same way as individuals can. Therefore, many have called for companies to be denied the right to sue for defamation. It is argued that companies have other ways to protect their reputations. It is argued that individual directors can sue, but to bring a suit for defamation is a serious undertaking and would expose those individual directors to substantial personal risk in costs when the real claimant should be the company. It is argued that large companies may have other steps they can take to protect their reputations by advertising or seeking publicity for their position, but that depends on their financial strength. A right to sue for malicious falsehood is often mentioned, but that is dependent on an ability to prove malice, which is notoriously difficult to do.
I take a different view. While companies do not have feelings that can be hurt, they can suffer financially, as my noble friend Lord Lester has pointed out. Defamatory statements about companies can have very serious consequences for their businesses, affecting the jobs of their staff and the prosperity of all concerned in them—whether or not untrue and defamatory statements are made with a view to profit by competitors or innocently by journalists. Therefore, it does not seem to strike the right balance to deprive companies of the right to sue for defamation altogether, quite apart from the fact that it would probably be contrary to the HRA to do so.
However, it seems proportionate and balanced to insist that companies and other non-natural persons trading for profit show that they have suffered or are likely to suffer substantial financial loss as a result of the defamation in respect of which they wish to sue. Imposing that condition recognises the difference in kind between individuals and non-natural persons trading for profit. It would not restrict the right of charities and other not-for-profit organisations to sue, and it is right that it should not do so; for example, charities can suffer from defamation in their future ability to raise funds, but it may be very difficult for them to demonstrate that. Proposed new subsection (3) of this amendment applies only to import a modest and proportionate restriction on the right of trading entities to sue and would introduce a valuable extra reform to this Bill.
Finally, I support the reform suggested by proposed new subsection (4) relating to bodies performing public functions, for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Lester have already given, but principally because bodies performing public functions should be open to public criticism, even if private, in just the same way that public authorities are.
The Archbishop of York
My Lords, I, too, want to add a sentence of support to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said.
I am patron of many charities and it would not be right if we did not strike the right balance. If a charity felt it was defamed because it was a body corporate, the restriction that has been put in here requiring the permission of the court is necessary. We are living in a very litigious society so if you are going to go to court to sue anybody, the permission of the court should be shown.
In proposed new subsection (3) there is the question of finance and the possibility of striking out if you cannot actually show that you have suffered loss. Because of that balance—that common sense that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, was talking about—I am very attracted to this, and I hope that the Government will accept both limbs of the amendment, because you really could not do one without the other. It strikes a balance. For such a very long time, individuals could sue but reputational damage, as well as financial loss, is often incurred by a number of charities and it would be good to be able to do the same thing in terms of bodies corporate.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I support what the noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Faulks, have said. I have to admit to having been a judge, but not a judge who tried this sort of case. I believe that this is a matter that should be left to the judiciary, and the amendment is overemphasising something that really does not need to be done.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, while the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is right to say that costs and early resolution are vital, I suggest that this extra strike-out provision is entirely unnecessary and, further, that it would introduce added uncertainty by bringing in a gloss on the serious harm test in Clause 1. In addition, it would add complexity to Clause 3 by introducing another test for whether or not there should be a strike-out. As has been said, the court is already able to strike out a case that has no merit; indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, conceded that. It is right at the heart of these reforms that the Government propose to introduce an early resolution procedure in the rules, so I cannot see why the amendment should be necessary.
Defamation Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Oh, elegant. Well, they are certainly not elegant and certainly not eloquent. Nevertheless, they are designed to make life a little easier for whoever hereafter will read this Act of Parliament. They are very modest drafting amendments, putting the definition right up where it first appears in two places, dispensing with the need for subsection (2) and saving words—which is never a bad thing in legislation. It is as simple as that.
As to the much more substantial amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, I await what the Minister has to say with more than usual intensity. I can quite see that there are many issues of some subtlety around this that need, as always, to be weighed. I am inclined to support them but I am waiting to hear from him.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I support the principle of Amendment 44A moved by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. The single publication rule in this Bill is an important reform for avoiding multiplicity of actions and is thoroughly welcome, but its impact is markedly diminished by restricting its application to republication by the same publisher. I can see no justification in principle for restricting a claimant suing on a second publication by the original publisher but permitting him to sue on a publication at a later date by a second publisher.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
In terms of audibility for all noble Lords, please could noble Lords make sure that their mobile phones are kept well away from the microphone because they cause issues with listening and difficulties for all concerned.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I rather hope it was not mine, but it might have been. At any rate, it has been moved now.
The proviso of republication in a different manner as the application of the rule in my view provides sufficient protection. That was the unanimous and strongly held view of the Joint Committee, and it is one which I urge the Government to reconsider. I would add one caveat which is that, while I support the principle of this amendment, I can see the need for its qualification to ensure that this situation is addressed. It is possible to envisage a first publication by an insolvent publisher and then a second publication by a publisher who is worth suing. It would be perfectly reasonable for a claimant to take the view that he did not propose to sue the first publisher, but that he did wish to sue a publisher at a later date when the original limitation period might have expired because that publisher was worth suing and was likely to be good for the costs and the damages. It does not seem to me to be beyond the wit of draftsmen to cater for that position and to allow suing a second publisher in those circumstances. Subject to that caveat I support the amendment.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
I was not proposing to speak to this amendment at all but it seems to me that there is an enormous distinction to be made between person A and person B as to which publication one is being denied by the Limitation Act the opportunity of proceeding in respect of. It is, with respect, not only whether the second publisher may be financially worth suing as opposed to the first publisher which must be catered to in this provision, but surely also the standing and reputation of the publisher. One can very well imagine a situation in which one simply would not be bothered to be defamed by person A because that person’s standing and reputation was itself so low and yet a republication by somebody of real repute and standing would trigger one’s intent to sue. So if this Amendment 44A is to be accepted, that sort of thing should be catered to, whether under the provisions of subsection 4, with a specific provision about material difference lying on occasion in the character and position, financially and otherwise, of the publisher, or in some other way, I leave to others to consider.
As to the other amendments, I agree with the view that Amendments 45, 46 and 47 are a simpler and more elegant fashion of expressing those provisions. As to Amendment 47B and the proposed insertion of new Section 5A, I am neutral as to how desirable it is to spell out these considerations which shall not be regarded as materially different. I would respectfully suggest that the expression should be not,
“shall not be deemed to be”—
it is not a question of deeming—but
“shall not be regarded as”,
but that is a very minor point indeed.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney. Again, this was a recommendation of the Joint Committee. We took the view, I suggest rightly, that it is entirely correct that cases against those who are not domiciled here or in a convention country should be restricted if they are brought by claimants who are themselves domiciled outside the jurisdiction. But I do not think it right for a local potential claimant within the jurisdiction to be debarred from suing a foreign defendant for a libel that has caused the local claimant serious harm here, even if there may be other countries that are at least as appropriate. For example, an Italian newspaper could publish a libel in Italy and England that would cause a local English claimant damage in both jurisdictions. There may be reasons for the defendant to argue that Italy would clearly be the most appropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute but, as it stands, this section would debar the English claimant from suing in England.
The clause is intended to restrict libel tourism so far as is consistent with the Brussels and Lugano conventions. It does that, but it should not also restrict local claimants from suing foreign defendants here when their reputations have been damaged here, even if there may be other jurisdictions in which they might equally well or better sue.
The amendment achieves what should be the aim of the clause. I am not sure that the proviso relating to harm is necessary, because I would be content to rely on Clause 1 for the serious harm test. But subject to tidying it up, I suggest that the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, is entirely justified.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I briefly comment on what the noble Lord, Lord Singh of Wimbledon, said. I have to stick to my earlier analysis, but after hearing what he said, if his amendment had incorporated the purport of that I would have been very sympathetic to it—notwithstanding what my noble friend Lord Lester said, because his clause would address a different issue. The only question I have is whether the security for costs arrangements that can be invoked here might not come to the aid of the person to whom he refers.
Lord McNally
My Lords, this has been an extremely useful debate. From the beginning there has been a question of whether libel tourism exists, and there are varying views on this. Indeed, without breaking too many confidences, when I explained to a very senior member of the Government that we were trying to curb this so-called libel tourism, he said, “Are you sure? Should it not be the more the merrier?”. He had the idea that if foreigners wanted to come and use our excellent legal and judicial services they should be welcomed. In another respect, of course, we make a great play of the excellent facilities at the Rolls building for doing just that. However, there was a problem not only with the numbers but in the use of threats to stifle publication or opinion—the so-called chilling effect—and it is right that we have had this debate.
Amendment 48 would mean that the effect of the provisions on libel tourism reflected in Clause 9 would be narrowed as cases where the claimant is domiciled in England or Wales would no longer be caught even if the main impact of the alleged libel was outside England and Wales. The Government do not consider that narrowing the scope of Clause 9 is appropriate. It would mean, for example, that a Russian oligarch domiciled in England and Wales could sue a person outside the UK/EU in the English courts in circumstances where the alleged main harm to his reputation has occurred in, say, Uzbekistan.
Although I am sure the hearts of my colleagues behind me will sink, I have listened to the debate and I will study again the remarks made and the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Perhaps I may correct something that I have said. My example, which was off the cuff, of Italy was wrong: it ought to be the United States or somewhere outside the Brussels and Lugano conventions.
Lord McNally
I was just thinking that myself, but I did not want to raise it.
Broadly, at the moment we consider it is right that these cases should be caught by the test and therefore not automatically take place in our courts. Where a claimant in a case where the defendant is domiciled outside the UK, EU or Lugano convention states is unable to satisfy a court that, of all the places in which the statement complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place to bring the action in respect of the statement, then he or she should be refused access to our courts and should be required to seek redress abroad. Such cases are not likely to arise with any frequency but, when they do, they give rise to legitimate concerns about libel tourism which uses up the time and resources of our courts.
We do not believe that the requirement to show that England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place to bring the claim will cause undue inconvenience to claimants domiciled here who legitimately wish to bring an action in this jurisdiction to protect their reputation. It is likely that in most cases where a claimant is domiciled in England and Wales the Clause 9 test will be satisfied as the main harm to reputation will have been caused here and, in those circumstances, a claimant will readily be able to show that this is the most appropriate place to bring the claim. However, claimants should not be able to use our courts to pursue libel actions which are more appropriately heard elsewhere, even if they are domiciled here.
Amendment 49 would make a small amendment to Clause 9, but would have an undesirable impact on its effectiveness. Clause 9 provides that a court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action to which the clause applies unless it is satisfied that, of all the places in which the statement complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring an action in respect of the statement.
Amendment 49 would remove “clearly”. We do not believe that this would be appropriate. Great concern has been expressed in Parliament and elsewhere about libel tourism. The amendment would reduce the strength of the test to be applied by the courts and could have the effect of leading to their allowing more claims to proceed in this jurisdiction in instances where the question of whether this is the most appropriate place to bring the claim is more marginal. We believe that most people who have commented on these issues would agree with us that it is important to give a signal to the courts that Clause 9 should be applied robustly, and that claims should be allowed to proceed only where this is clearly the most appropriate jurisdiction.
Turning to Amendment 50, I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Singh, about drafting. Perhaps I may say in passing that as soon as he starts speaking my mind comes to mornings when I feel tetchy, down-at-heart and at war with the world, and his mellifluous voice comes on “Thought for the Day”, and, at the end of it, I always feel a little bit better about the world. The amendment would require an organisation or individual bringing an action against a person domiciled in the United Kingdom to provide evidence that it or he has funds in the UK to meet any costs that might arise were the action to be unsuccessful. As the amendment is drafted, this would apply where both parties are domiciled in the UK as well as where only the defendant is domiciled here. This would put potential claimants with limited resources at a serious disadvantage, as has been said by a number of those who have spoken in this debate. For example, it would mean that if an individual wished to bring an action against a national newspaper based in the UK, he or she would have to show that he or she had sufficient means to pay the newspaper’s costs, which could be substantial, in the event that the action was unsuccessful. This would considerably restrict access to justice.
However, the point that the noble Lord, Lord Singh, raised and the specific examples that he gave should give us pause for thought. As with the other points made about the way in which our laws are being used, the ability of those from abroad with resources to intimidate those making legitimate criticism of their behaviour should give us pause. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, gave assurances on that matter. As always with advice from the noble Lord, I wish to take it away and consider it, and ask my advisers whether the assurances that he gave are sufficient to protect against the abuses. How we protect against the kind of threat and intimidation that comes short of reaching court, I do not know, but perhaps one of the defences is that, when the Bill becomes an Act, people will be more aware of the protections in our law against such intimidation.
We recognise the concerns that exist about the costs of defamation proceedings for both claimants and defendants, and are firmly committed to reducing them. As I have mentioned in debating earlier amendments, the provisions on costs protection which we have asked the Civil Justice Council to consider, together with changes to the Civil Procedure Rules to support early resolution of key issues, will help claimants and defendants of limited means to bring and defend claims.
I have given noble Lords an assurance that I will look at this debate and see whether we have got the balance right. I am not sure that I can give any idea that we are going to give up “clearly”; I am going to defend that to the very last. I can see us at some future date on Report voting at 11.20 pm on whether “clearly” should stay in the Bill, with the noble Lord, Lord Browne, seeing an opportune moment to defeat the Government. Until that moment, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, this amendment is designed to probe the Government on the possibility of creating a defamation county court. The idea of having such a court has already been discussed in a previous session of your Lordships’ Committee. It was a recommendation of the Joint Committee, at least in a pilot sense. At this time of day, I shall spare your Lordships the pain of having to listen to me read the whole of the paragraph that refers to this from the Joint Committee’s report.
However, for the purposes of the record it is paragraph 87, which I will read in short. It starts with a sentence that I think we would all agree with:
“Some witnesses argued that costs would be reduced if libel cases were generally dealt with by county courts rather than the High Court”.
It goes on to make a good argument, concluding:
“The Ministry of Justice should implement a pilot scheme to determine how this proposal might work in practice”.
This amendment is our attempt to set a statutory framework for such a pilot scheme. The idea behind it is to significantly reduce the costs of defamation proceedings; an issue that we have agreed is a shared concern.
The drafting of this amendment will prove not to be perfect but it is intended to be a probe. However, it is based on the Patents County Court. By way of background, the Patents Court is not a county court in the usual sense but a specialist court for the resolution of intellectual property disputes. It was originally set up in 1990 but was set up under its most recent guise in late 2010, with the aim of providing efficient intellectual property case trials as an alternative to costly and time-consuming High Court trials.
The key provisions of the Patents County Court are that costs are on a fixed scale, capped at £50,000, while the damages that the court can award are limited to £500,000 and each trial is aimed to be concluded—wait for it—within two days. The court has recently started giving non-binding opinion, generally during the case management conference stage of proceedings and before trial, as to the likely outcome of the case. I suspect that all noble Lords in this Committee would welcome that environment for the early and swift deliberation of cases that got to trial, never mind the issue of some pre-trial provision or alternative dispute resolution, which noble Lords have previously discussed.
When this idea was discussed during our previous session, the Minister said that he would go away and think about the idea. With this amendment I am providing an opportunity for the Minister to tell us where his thinking presently is. For the purposes of the record, the exchange that I am referring to was with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks during the first day in Committee at col. GC 458. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I strongly support allowing county courts to hear all but the most serious defamation cases. As the noble Lord has said, it was a recommendation of the Joint Committee; indeed, it was the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and I who advocated it very strongly on that committee. Quite apart from the complexity of the law and the arcane procedures that we have developed, one of the main reasons why costs have become so high in these cases has been the development of a highly specialist Bar and specialist solicitors, all conducting cases very expensively exclusively in the High Court.
The simplification of the defences in this Bill, coupled with the simplification of procedure and more extensive and earlier case management, should make it possible to reduce the complexity of defamation cases substantially. In those circumstances, the development of county court expertise with designated judges to manage and hear these cases would make justice, importantly, more local, quicker, cheaper, simpler, and in all ways more accessible. Of course there will always be cases that are complex, difficult and paper-heavy. They will require High Court expertise and the attention of specialist High Court judges. However, I hope that for the generality of cases county courts will become the norm and that therefore the cases will become simpler to sue, to defend and to resolve. We recommended trialling county courts for defamation cases; I ask that that happens soon.
Lord Mawhinney
My Lords, just as I paid tribute earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, for his contribution, so I pay tribute also to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Without them I am not sure that the Committee would have come to this conclusion. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has just eloquently explained our thinking and our reasoning. Indeed, my noble friend Lord McNally may remember that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, had one or two questions for him on this subject when he came to give evidence.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, said that we proposed a pilot, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has confirmed that. I would add that we proposed a pilot in part because we thought that this was such a radical idea that the Minister would need some help in dealing with the legal profession. We could hear the legal profession lining up against this idea and we wanted to side with the Minister, so we suggested a pilot. However, he should not be unaware of the fact that he will have one or two sessions of arm-wrestling with people who were not overly persuasive to the Committee before, hopefully, he gives effect to this particular amendment.
Defamation Bill
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Morris of Aberavon
My Lords, I make a brief intervention. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, in moving his amendment, but I need a little further assistance. I am not quite clear about his purpose. I do not think that he specified—I was listening as best I can—the distinction that he makes between a statement which is defamatory and a statement which, additionally, might be unlawful. The danger I see, if they have the same meaning, is that the courts will look at the provisions very carefully and regard them as otiose. What purpose is intended? Does it create an additional burden on the complainant? When he makes his representations under the clause, will the complainant have to define in what way the statement is unlawful? Perhaps we could have assistance on that score.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I shall speak in broad support of the sentiment behind Amendment 27 in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and my noble friend Lord Allan, but first I address Amendment 26, which I support as a bare minimum. I also address the point put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, to my noble friend Lord Lester. I think that my noble friend understated the position on what is defamatory and what defamatory means. As I have always understood it, a statement is defamatory if it causes the necessary damage to reputation. It may then be that under existing law, a defence of justification can be mounted which shows that the defamatory statement is justified as true. That does not stop the statement being defamatory, but it stops the statement being unlawful. In other words, it starts off as defamatory—I see learned agreement on the other side of the Room—and then one looks at the question of defences.
It follows that without the word “unlawful” in paragraph (b), the requirement that the complaint,
“sets out the statement concerned and explains why it is defamatory of the complainant”,
goes only half way and is nowhere near enough. I echo the sentiments expressed by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney about the view of the Joint Committee on the Bill and the topic: the purpose of whatever procedure we adopt is to give some protection, as far as is practicable, to persons defamed on the internet and, on the other side, to impose some responsibility on website operators, without ensuring that an operator is stuck with liability for all the material posted on his site.
I strongly supported, and indeed took some part in formulating, the notice and takedown procedure for material from unidentified authors proposed in our report, with the possibility of an operator securing a leave-up order for material that, although it was from an unidentified author, nevertheless the operator believed ought to stay up—for instance, in the case of whistleblowers. The Government have opted for a different procedure, and it is right that that procedure draws the correct distinction that we drew between the posts of identifiable authors, who can then be identified and sued, and anonymous material. Whatever system we have, though, it is important that there should be some quick and cheap option that levels the playing field between complainant and author or operator. The detailed notice of complaint as envisaged by Amendment 27, as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has explained, is a satisfactory first step.
I appreciate that it can be said that, subject to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, the word “unlawful” is required, but regulations could be made within the ambit of “defamatory and unlawful” that would expand upon the requirements for a detailed notice of complaint. However, I suggest that it is better that, rather than being left to regulation, the broad contents of the notice of complaint should be spelt out in statute. I say that because one of the purposes of the Bill, as we saw it in the Joint Committee, was to make the law as accessible as possible so that anyone could look up what procedures would be required by looking at the Act. By effectively leaving the requirements for a notice of complaint to delegated legislation, the simplicity of accessing the statute and accessing law on the internet is reduced.
It would then be necessary to add to the requirements for a detailed notice of complaint, something like Amendments 25A and 25B proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in the previous group. I, too, was pleased to see the Minister’s response to those amendments show at least some flexibility or promise thereof. We would then have the beginnings of a system to ensure that, where defamatory material was posted by an operator, the detailed process of complaint would get some publicity because the notice of complaint would be put on the website by the operator. That would offer some partial protection to the person defamed. I applaud the suggestion that if the operator then fails to put up such a notice of complaint, which he can do, he must take his chances and accept that he is made liable to be sued by the deprivation of the Clause 5 defence.
I reiterate what has been said: neither the proposed system nor any system that we could possibly devise would be perfect, for the simple reason that my noble friend Lord Lester mentioned earlier today—namely, that we are trying to formulate a local response to an international phenomenon. However, I suggest in answer to some of the defeatism—the Minister was defeated up to a point in his earlier reply—there is no reason to give up on the problem because the system is not perfect and therefore do nothing. It is worth doing all that we can, I suggest, for two reasons. The first is that we can ensure fairness in respect of posts that are subject to our jurisdiction. The second, I suggest, is that by what we introduce in legislation, we can set an example of best practice for website operators elsewhere.
I would like to say a word or two about civil procedures that would be appropriate either under Amendment 27, under Clause 5 or under the regulations. I suggest that it is essential that any such procedures we adopt respond fully to the point made by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury that the procedures that involve going to court can be very expensive. The answer from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, that this can be dealt with in the ordinary way before Masters is a partial answer only, because those of us who have attended before Masters, and have prepared interim applications before Masters and district judges in other cases, know that they themselves can be very expensive indeed.
What we envisaged on the Joint Committee was a quick and cheap paper-based or internet-based procedure, with specialist district judges simply looking at the case presented to them on paper and making a decision. Those specialist judges would give their decision, but it would of course be only a holding position, because action would be deferred. However, it is not right to introduce, by what we do now, a whole new level of expensive procedure in respect of internet actions, which, from the McAlpine case, we know can sometimes result in £5 awards or £5 settlements over a very large number of cases. Those cases need to be kept small, simple, quick and cheap.
Lord Allan of Hallam
My Lords, I remind the Committee of my earlier declaration of interest that I work for Facebook, which is a reasonable-sized website operator. In supporting the amendment that I and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, have tabled, I first wanted to set out that we all have a common goal here, whichever side of the debate we are coming from. In a sense, it has been divided into sides, but I think that there is one common objective: unlawful defamatory material should be swiftly removed from wherever it should appear, whether in print media or on the internet. At the same time, there should be minimal collateral damage to content that is not unlawful. We want content that is lawful to stay up and people to be able to share it with each other, and content that is unlawful to come down. It is a simple objective, and both Amendments 26 and 27 are trying to take us towards that.
Amendment 27, in particular, is crafted in the context where we have people who are prepared to use any legal tools that we make available in ways that we did not perhaps intend, and will use them maliciously. There is no doubt that tools that are made available for people to request take-downs of internet content are used, and will be used, by people who are seeking to interfere with the freedom of speech of others. We must make sure that we have crafted the tools in such a way that we minimise that possibility, as well as maximising the opportunity for people to get content taken down that should be taken down. The objective is that 100% of the requests made through this process should result in the right form of action and that that action should be swift. I think the amendment, by specifying in more detail the form which the notice should take, is aimed to create what one might call a well formed notice. A well formed notice that has all the necessary information will be able to be acted on swiftly by the recipient of that information—in this case, the website operator—and the solution can be reached more speedily.
Lord May of Oxford
Many of the more celebrated cases in the libel tourism that has generated all this activity, such as the £1.5 million spent by the journal Nature in defending a plainly factual but defamatory statement about an Asian journal that was created simply to publish the papers of the sponsor, are of just that character. The statement were plain fact, but the action brought in this country by people outside it cost huge sums of money. The action involving Simon Singh was another example. What he was saying was plainly factual but was defamatory; it was intended to be so in every meaningful sense, and properly so. Somehow we keep losing sight of this in the legal elegances.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I trespass on the noble Baroness’s time by giving another simple contemporary example. If I had said during his lifetime that Jimmy Savile was a horrible paedophile, that would have been seriously defamatory. Had I had access then to the information that we have now and he had sued me, I could have justified that. It therefore would have been defamatory but not unlawful. It is as simple as that.
Transforming Rehabilitation
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, a major contributor to reoffending in the past has been the lack of support for prisoners on release, who at present often come out with very little money, as my noble friend has pointed out, nowhere to go and usually no work to do. Will the Minister ensure that the really welcome new commitment to mentoring and support for all prisoners on release is quickly implemented, properly resourced and thoroughly monitored by government?
Lord McNally
Yes, I hope so. I hope that one thing that is seen as a real breakthrough in these proposals is that we will be extending support services to those sentenced to less than 12 months. As many studies have shown, those short sentences have often been the source of most reoffending. Again, to make the point that there is a more holistic approach than that, in the Crime and Courts Bill we are trying to make community sentencing more acceptable to the public by putting a kind of punishment element into them so that they are not seen as the soft option to prison. That is another part of what we are trying to do, as is involving other departments such as the DWP and those dealing with health and social services. It is clear that a more holistic approach to rehabilitation is going to get the most results.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2012
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Lord McNally
I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, again alleged that that commitment was made. It was not made by the previous Lord Chancellor. The commitment was to examine the case for the First-tier Tribunals. As I have reported back to the House on numerous occasions, the decision was that in the circumstances it was far too expensive. It would be nice to have fatal Motions as yet another round in the legislation process, but I ask the House and the Official Opposition to think carefully. If fatal Motions are going to be used in this way, they have great repercussions, not least on our relationship with the other place.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, can the Minister confirm that legal aid remains available for advice on appeal from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal in welfare cases? Can he also confirm that where there is a point of law on which an appellant has a reasonable prospect of success, legal aid is and will remain available for the preparation and presentation of an appeal to the Upper Tribunal?
Lord McNally
Yes, that is case. It is also worth making the point that some of the noises from the other side make it sound as though the Government have been totally unfeeling and refusing to listen.
Defamation Bill
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Lord Mawhinney
My Lords, the Joint Committee’s report was published 14 months ago. It is a fairly accurate account of the months of work it put in to produce that report. This is one of the instances where 14 months has assumed considerable significance. I will be truthful, as noble Lords would expect me to be, but I have not had time to go back, prior to this Committee stage, and read all the evidence that was given to us. However, my memory is that by and large we concentrated on the list because the list already existed. We listened to evidence from people who wanted to tweak the list. My recollection is that there was no discussion of a slightly more radical solution—or, if there was, it was of a passing, almost ephemeral nature. However, I do not believe that such a discussion actually happened. Given that three other members of that committee are present, they can correct me if my memory is in error.
I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who is a distinguished member of the committee. He took upon himself the role of reminding us that if we wanted a radical change of the law, we were going to create—to use his memorable phrase—“a cottage industry for the lawyers” until the new law had settled down. We paid attention to what the noble and learned Lord said. Had there been a significant discussion about a radical alternative to the list, I guess that at least some thought would have been given to whether or not we were going to generate a new cottage industry. He will recall that I was slightly more relaxed about cottage industries than perhaps he was, in part because it seems to me that any time the law is changed, lawyers and judges will always want to have a say in determining what it actually means before the whole issue moves forward.
I come back to the significance of the 14 months, because the conversation about a radical alternative to the list has emerged in that time. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who, in turn, introduced me to Sir Brian, and we spent a certain amount of time talking about whether the list was the best way to proceed or whether something more general and more dependent on the common sense and good judgment of the courts would not be a better way forward. I do not wish to unduly embarrass him, but I thank my noble friend Lord McNally also, because he and I had some conversations around this issue as it became clear to all of us that doing away with the list and having a more general statement would almost certainly be the right way forward. From looking at Amendment 23, it is clear to me that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, was having similar conversations to those that I was having, because that amendment is a good summary of where the new thinking should be placed.
My noble friend Lord McNally concentrated on the words,
“all the circumstances of the case”,
and I have underlined them. I am not sure that I entirely buy the official interpretation of those words that his officials have given him. I am of either the old school or the new school but I am not sure which. I think that, just occasionally, it helps to have the obvious stated in a Bill for the avoidance of any misunderstanding or, indeed, any potential mischief-making. In supporting the thrust of what the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, have suggested, having the words,
“all the circumstances of the case”,
in the Bill would be a happy addition.
Perversely, that takes me to the amendment I have proposed. It emerged out of conversations that were held 14 months ago and it is an accurate reflection of one more addition to the list that emerged from our considerations. However, I am happy to acknowledge that in the intervening time my noble friend Lord McNally, and indeed the noble Lords, Lord Browne and Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, have moved the conversation forward to a much better place. With that in mind, when the time comes, I shall not move Amendment 17.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I found the question of whether we should or should not have a list of factors in Clause 4 a very difficult one. In the Joint Committee I was certainly of the view—a view I expressed at Second Reading—that a list of factors would be helpful, primarily because it would enable members of the public to look at the statute on the internet to see what kind of factors might or might not be important in determining whether a publisher would be held to have acted responsibly.
I remember the arguments around this issue in Joint Committee, and my noble friend Lord Mawhinney may like to think back to them. However, I have now been persuaded that the list of factors arising out of the Reynolds case has been treated as a checklist and used by claimants and defendants alike, and by their solicitors, to put their opponents to very costly proof at the pre-action stage in a way that has tended to be oppressive and increase costs. There is a serious risk that a codified list of factors as set out in the unamended Bill would have the same effect. I now accept that a statement of general principle is the right approach, but I have reached that conclusion with some difficulty.
It is important to note that the way the test is now expressed in government Amendment 14 combines an element of subjectivity with an element of objectivity. That is really the answer to the question put by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury to my noble friend Lord McNally when he decided not to move his amendment. I am bound to say that I thought that my noble friend Lord McNally did himself an injustice in declining to answer the question because he had in fact already answered it in his opening remarks on his own amendment. The element of subjectivity is that the court will have to look at what the defendant believed, and that is a subjective test. It will then have to look at whether that belief was reasonable, and that is an objective test. That combination will enable the court to develop the law on the basis that it is an issue of fact which will necessarily take into account all the circumstances of the case. My concern is allayed by that because it seems unlikely that the case-by-case development—the cottage industry development to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, referred—will not create too much difficulty. However, it is a danger, and I hope that it is one that the courts will be careful to consider.
Amendment 15, tabled by my noble friend Lord Phillips—
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I entirely take what my noble friend has said and agree with it. However, would it not be advisable, if only to help the general public and the lawyers? Under Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, the double test—the subjective and objective tests—which he outlined, could be more clearly enunciated.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I am bound to say that I am worried about the way in which the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Phillips makes that suggestion. I appreciate that he does not intend to move it. It seems to me that one can do no better than require the court to look at all the circumstances of the case. As a matter of drafting, I am not entirely sure that the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is necessary. It seems to me implicit that,
“all the circumstances of the case”,
have to be taken into account. That phrase is usually used in statute to say that all the circumstances of the case “included but not limited to”, and then it goes on to a checklist. We are not having the checklist so I am not sure that that requirement is necessary to be expressed.
My worry about the way in which my noble friend Lord Phillips—
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am catching a bad habit from sitting next to my noble friend Lord Phillips and interrupting but since he does not intend to move Amendment 15, is not the vice of his approach that he will seek to make the court into the editor?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
If it will assist the House, I will withdraw it post haste.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I would rather that my noble friend Lord Phillips did not withdraw it. I was about to address it in terms that agree precisely with the interruption helpfully made by my noble friend Lord Lester but at a little more length. It seems to me that the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Phillips invites the judge to enter into a critique of the position of the defendant and, in using the words “manner, balance and content”, one is requiring the court to decide on whether the defendant should have written what he has written. That seems to me to be inimical to freedom of speech and to go very much against what this defence is trying to do. The importance of the defence is that it is a liberalising defence. It seems to me that that would narrow it in an unacceptable way.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 22, which, rather unfairly, I will comment on before the noble Lord, Lord May, has spoken to it. The question is whether the words used should be “editorial” judgment or “the publisher’s” judgment. It may be that one could argue for the use of both phrases but it seems to me that we need these concepts to go wider than simply editorial judgment. We live in a world where many of the statements to which this defence will be referable will never go anywhere near an editor: they will be published on the internet by individuals and will not bring editorial judgment to bear. It seems to me that the beauty of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord May, or something very like it, is that it allows for a publication with a much wider ambit than the government amendment. However, by and large, I support the government amendment wholeheartedly.
Lord Mawhinney
May I offer my noble friend a personal apology? I said that there were three distinguished members of the committee here present. I will be honest with my noble friend and say that my eyes saw him but my brain did not register the fact. Of course, there are four distinguished members present. I want to correct the record and, in so doing, express my appreciation for his contribution to the committee.
My noble friend invited me to reflect back on our conversations about the list. I well remember conversations about whether the list would become a tick-box exercise and the damaging impact that that would have on courts having to make decisions so that every item was covered. However, I do not remember any conversations about a radical alternative to the tick-box approach. I hope that he will accept that that is my best memory of the conversations that we had.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, of course I accept that. I would like to say that I am grateful for the apology, but I am not sure that I am. I had worked out that there were four of us and I had not worked out who was left out, but now I know that it was me. It matters not, perhaps, what the conversations were, as I think that I have made the point.
Lord May of Oxford
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 22 but in a broader context, as I believe that it relates directly to some of what many people feel to be the unsatisfactory elements of the Bill in its present form and Clause 4 in particular. In saying that, I express my appreciation of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and the Government generally for helpfully moving things forward in response to earlier worries. I much appreciated the noble Lord’s comments, particularly in connection with Clause 4.
The Government’s proposed amendment to Clause 4 is a big improvement. The proposal significantly to modify Clause 4, which in its original form was largely an unhelpful codification of existing law, has been widely welcomed by those campaigning for a public interest defence—some 60,000 people have been involved one way or another. They and many of those involved in the awful cases that have given rise to the broad campaign for reform have been unable effectively to use a defence that was designed for newspapers. It is too complex and usually hugely expensive. It is certainly not suited to what medical specialists say at a conference, to reports on consumer issues or to reports on human rights.
Given that the Government appear to have recognised this fundamental point, I believe that they should clarify things further by changing the wording of Amendment 21. It says:
“In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest, the court must make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate”.
The phrase “editorial judgement” has the subtext of newspapers. That covers much of the matter, although not necessarily legalistically. It would be much clearer if it said, “such allowance for the publisher’s judgement as it considers appropriate”. I notice that, despite the many sensitive comments that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has made, he was not minded to accept this amendment, but I will persist with it.
I want to go little more widely. This amendment addresses part of a more general problem, in that the Bill still seems to many readers to focus on newspapers, editors and corporations. We need to recognise that the central need that has provoked the entire issue of the revision of the Bill is for a well drafted protection of individuals acting in the public interest. It needs to correct the current internationally notorious and embarrassing situation which is being abused by those with deep pockets who travel to the UK with the specific aim of using our existing legislation and its whacking great costs to prevent individuals speaking out on issues of public interest, particularly in biomedical and other scientific contexts. I realise fully that this is only part of a larger problem.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
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“Encouragement of diversity in appointments to the Supreme Court(1) Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 31, insert—
“31A Diversity
The Lord Chancellor and any selection commission convened under section 26 must, in performing their functions under sections 27 to 31, have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments.””
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I spoke on the topic of judicial diversity at some length on Report and I shall not detain the House long in this debate.
There is a consensus across this House and in Government on how important it is that the arrangements for encouraging judicial diversity should apply across the court system and particularly in the Supreme Court, and that the duty to encourage diversity should be specifically imposed at the highest level. It is for that reason that I welcome the Government’s Amendment 8. to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I have added our names. By imposing the duty, as the amendment does, to,
“take such steps as that office-holder”—
either the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales—
“considers appropriate for the purpose of encouraging judicial diversity”,
the duty is imposed in respect of those two officeholders’ exercise of all their functions where that duty may be relevant.
Amendment 8 may make my Amendment 6 unnecessary because it applies to judicial appointments to the Supreme Court. This leads me to my Amendment 7, which would permit a tie-breaker or tipping-point procedure to apply to appointments to the Supreme Court. There is no difference in principle between the Government and the movers of this amendment—myself, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—as to the appropriateness of such a procedure. The procedure applies to other appointments lower down the system as a result of the Bill, but without the amendment it does not apply to appointments to the Supreme Court.
The Government have no difficulty in accepting the principle but my noble friend expressed the view that its application was already permitted by Section 159 of the Equality Act 2010. I took the liberty of writing in some detail to my noble friend to explain why I took a different view and, while I may not have completely convinced his officials of the rightness of my position, I now understand that the Government are inclined to resolve the issue by putting the matter beyond doubt at a later stage in the passage of this Bill. On the basis that I am right about that and that the amendment will be made, then I am grateful to the Government for their concession and will say nothing more at this stage.
Lord Beecham
Perhaps the Minister would care to fortify himself before these debates in the same way that Mr Churchill did.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
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Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 116ZA and to refer to Amendment 116E, which stands in my name in this group. Both amendments touch on a similar point, although possibly from different perspectives. I note that my noble friend Lord Beecham and I have perhaps started in slightly different places on this part of the Bill, although maybe we are moving towards a middle position. As the House knows, I am one of those who has been more in the enthusiastic group who support the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements. I believe that they are capable of assisting enormously, in particular cases, in dealing with the problems with which we are faced in crime.
I am sorry that the Government have such a blinkered approach to where these deferred prosecution agreements can assist. What obviously lies behind my Amendment 116E is at least to enable other offences to be added to the list of those that are covered by deferred prosecution agreements without the need for further primary legislation. I have no illusions as to whether the Government will accept this amendment. I am grateful for the meeting to which my noble friend Lord Beecham has already referred and for the attention paid to what was said by a number of us in that meeting. I am also clear that the Government will not move, which is a shame.
Although my amendment deals with offences, the Minister will recall that not only I but others in this Chamber have been concerned also about the ambit of deferred prosecution agreements. It is not strictly speaking the subject of an amendment tonight but the question of reviewing this includes whether it can be reviewed not only to consider the efficacy of the system as it is being introduced but also whether its ambit is appropriate, both in terms of offences and, I repeat, in terms of individuals.
Perhaps I may say this to the noble Lord and, through him, to his ministerial colleagues and their officials: I believe that the Government are making a big mistake in not seeing the advantage of deferred prosecutions in other cases. In this House previously, in Committee, I referred to the benefits that I have seen, particularly in relation to drug offences. If you go to any Crown Court in the country—certainly, this was the case when I sat regularly there and I believe it is likely still to be the case—you will see case after case to do with drugs. It is either a drug offence, or an offence of petty theft, burglary, mugging or something of that sort to get money for drugs. It is hugely damaging to our society but we do not seem to be that good at finding solutions to it. I believe that the carrot and stick approach, which deferred prosecution agreements provide, is one way to deal with that.
I know that the Minister will not respond positively to that today and I know that he will not respond positively to my amendment. However, as my noble friend Lord Beecham said, I hope that there can be a clear commitment to review the operation. I ask the Minister to accept that that commitment should include looking at not just whether the system is working, as it is about to be enacted, but also whether it could be more broadly based in relation to offences or to individuals. If he cannot give that assurance, I, for one, would support—although this was not my position previously—my noble friend Lord Beecham’s amendment as a way of forcing that review.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I shall speak briefly to both amendments. While I support in outline the idea that there should be a review, the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Rosser, does not include a provision for an extension of the schedule. It seems to me that a review should be part of a continuing process. I agree very much with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that there is considerable potential for deferred prosecution agreements. I would expect a review to come out with a recommendation for extension, rather than for limitation, and certainly for continuation of the system unless it turns out to have been a failure, which is not the expectation that I have.
I also agree with the noble and learned Lord in his amendment. I think it is a shame that the range of offences is confined to financial and economic offences. I entirely understand the Government’s position that, at this stage, this is an exercise in putting a toe into the water in unfamiliar territory, and I accept that it is unfamiliar territory. However, the extension of the offences under paragraph 31 of the schedule is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. For my part, I do not see a huge distinction between adding other financial and economic offences to the list of offences under that procedure and adding the other offences of which we spoke at the meeting and in the debate in Committee. Health and safety and environmental offences have been mentioned, and drug offences were mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
We are in the middle of providing for what the Minister has called a rehabilitation revolution. I regard that as a useful phrase and a useful and beneficial concept. It seems to me that deferred prosecution agreements, with their potential for arrangements to be made to encourage future compliant behaviour, can be seen as part of that overall rehabilitation revolution. I know that my noble friend will not accept these amendments tonight, but I urge him to bear in mind, with those in his department in charge of these things, that a wider view can be taken of these agreements.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I respectfully adopt and support most of my noble and learned friend’s comments and indeed most of his amendments. If I had a preference between Amendments 116A and 116B, I think it would be Amendment 116B, but it would be interesting to hear which way, if either, the Minister inclines on that particular aspect.
It seems very sensible that other possible consequences of a failure to comply should be incorporated, so I endorse Amendments 116C and 116D. As to the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser, we return again to the principle of having these novel matters debated openly before the new process is set in motion. In this particular case, it is a matter of having the financial penalties and parameters that would be proposed by the Sentencing Council subjected to scrutiny and debate but not, as I suggested in Committee, to an affirmative procedure. In retrospect, I think that was going too far and perhaps trespassing on the role of the Sentencing Council in an unacceptable way, although I note that there seem to be some judicial misgivings about the operation of the council. Be that as it may, it does not relate specifically to this point.
Again, bearing in mind the need to carry public opinion with us on this new process, it would be helpful to have that debate before the Sentencing Council’s proposals became adopted. The novelty of the process is such that not only would that be justified but it would actually assist in securing public acceptance. I can anticipate the next amendment, which is very much on the same line; again, having it debated should inform both public opinion and possibly the final decision-makers in a way that can only contribute to the success of the experiment, if that is what it is. I suspect that it will be a successful experiment on which we are embarking.
On the question of incentives, my noble and learned friend is right. It is quite clear from the American example—I repeat for the second or third time that very much larger sums are secured under the American system—that an incentive has to be provided. Whether that is a maximum of one-third or not is another matter. I am not entirely surprised that most respondents disagreed with a maximum of one-third; no doubt they would prefer it to be larger, which underlines my point, but there needs to be some open debate about this before a final decision is made.
In these circumstances I hope that the Government will, even at this late stage, acknowledge that there is substance in my noble and learned friend’s amendments, and I hope that they will also agree that my proposal would actually assist in gaining acceptance for this new process, both by the public at large and by those who will potentially be the subject of its operation. In that spirit, I beg leave to move the amendment in my name.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I will be brief. In relation to Amendments 116A and 116B, after two debates in Committee and our meeting, I am still entirely unclear why the Bill as drafted contains only the all-or-nothing choice in relation to financial penalties. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, pointed out, the arrangements proposed are that the financial penalty should be optional only, but if there is a financial penalty then it must be broadly comparable to the fine that would be imposed on a guilty plea. I suggest that that is illogical because there is no room for such a reduced financial penalty, and there is no reason why there should be no room for one.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
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“Encouragement of diversity in appointments to the Supreme Court(1) Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 31, insert—
“31A Diversity
The Lord Chancellor and any selection commission convened under section 26 must, in performing their functions under sections 27 to 31, have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments.””
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, as everyone in this House recognises, our judges are widely respected nationally and internationally, for their fairness and impartiality, their integrity, honesty and incorruptibility, their intellectual rigour and their willingness to innovate in the development of our law. But we should not let our pride in the strengths of our judiciary beguile us into complacency about its weaknesses, because the reality is that for all its strengths, the judiciary is overwhelmingly too white, too male and too middle class to be representative of the society it serves. That leads to our judges being perceived as out of sympathy with contemporary Britain and overwhelmingly old-fashioned and out of touch, however far that may be from the truth in respect of individual judges.
It is nearly three years since the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger—whom I am delighted to see in her place today—reported in February 2010. We have just had the second report of the Judicial Diversity Taskforce, which records the practical steps taken since the publication of her report. There is no lack of expressed commitment to achieving more diversity, but there is still little sense of real progress being made. Both my noble friend the Minister and my right honourable and learned friend Ken Clarke, when Lord Chancellor, have publicly accepted as much in the recent past. As we heard in a previous debate, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee produced a report on this subject in March this year. The Committee pointed out then that:
“Only one in 20 judges is non-white and fewer than one in four is female”,
and expressed the strong view that,
“this disparity is undermining the public's confidence in the courts”.
We have made some progress. In 1998, only 10.3% of judges across the board were women and 1.6 % were black, Asian or from ethnic minorities. By 2011, those figures had risen to 22.3% and 5.1% respectively. But they are still a mile away from being representative of the nation as a whole. We still have only one woman Supreme Court judge out of 12; four women out of 37 judges in the Court of Appeal; and 17 out of 108 in the High Court. The figures for ethnic minority judges are proportionately worse: none in the Supreme Court, none in the Court of Appeal and only five on the High Court Bench. Even on the circuit Bench, the figures are just 16% and 2.5% respectively.
It is not just the appearance of being unrepresentative that distorts our judiciary. I firmly believe that the fact that there are so few women on the Bench has a substantial effect that distorts our substantive law. In Radmacher v Granatino, the case in which the Supreme Court held that ante-nuptial agreements should in general be respected, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale—the only woman Supreme Court judge—largely dissented from her male colleagues when she said,
“In short, there is a gender dimension to the issue which some may think ill-suited to decision by a court consisting of eight men and one woman”.
There are often gender and racial issues to cases. If the development of the law continues to be left to stereotype white male judges, that will diminish the respect held not just for our judges, but also our law.
In international terms, our record on judicial diversity is appalling. Of all the countries considered in a report by the Council of Europe this year, only Azerbaijan and Armenia were less representative than England and Wales. There is effectively gender equality among the judiciary across the rest of Europe. In the earlier debate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, mentioned the success in achieving gender equality in Canada and the United States.
All this is why I welcome the provision of paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Bill, but also why the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and I have put down amendments to enlarge its provisions and to enlarge the existing provision in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 that encourages diversity. Under Section 64 of the 2005 Act as it stands, there is an obligation already on the Judicial Appointments Commission to promote diversity. However, that only applies to appointments under Part 4 of the Act, which does not apply to the selection of judges of the Supreme Court. Our Amendment 86A would introduce an exactly parallel provision into Part 3 of the Act, which governs the selection of judges, the president and deputy president of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is at the pinnacle of our system of justice. If we omit a requirement to encourage diversity there, we cast doubt on our commitment to achieve it throughout the system. The Government and the Bill recognise the need to encourage diversity. That must be reflected at the top.
The reform proposed in paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Bill introduces the so-called “tipping point provision”—also called the tie-breaker provision—by which, where there are two candidates of equal merit, one may be preferred for the purpose of increasing diversity. Without that provision, the requirement that selection has to be made solely on merit prevents the commission from exercising its judgment in that way. However, paragraph 9 applies only to appointments under Part 4 of the 2005 Act; it does not apply to appointments to the Supreme Court. Our Amendment 86B would apply a similar tie-breaker provision to Supreme Court appointments as well.
It has been argued that such a provision is not necessary in relation to appointments to the Supreme Court, on the technical basis that under Section 27 of the 2005 Act such appointments are merely required to be “on merit”, rather than “solely on merit”, which is the requirement in Section 63 under Part 4. It is then said to follow that Section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 would permit recruitment to the Supreme Court on diversity grounds by using a tie-breaker principle. I am not sure that this distinction is a real one. But even if it is, there is nothing in Section 159 of the Equality Act that encourages, still less requires, tie-breaking. The combined effect of our Amendments 86A and 86B would do so. Tie-breaking does help. It should be explicitly encouraged on the face of the Bill throughout the system, and not merely, as the Government recognise, lower down than the Supreme Court.
Our final Amendment, 86C, would make it clear that the duty to encourage diversity is imposed on the Lord Chancellor in exercising his functions under Part 4 as well as on the Judicial Appointments Commission. Amendment 86D in this group, proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Powell, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jay and Lady Prashar, would add the Lord Chief Justice to the list, because the Lord Chief Justice may be a consultee of the commission even if he is not a member of the selection panel, which is a committee of the commission. So Amendment 86D is more comprehensive, on reflection, and therefore to be preferred to our Amendment 86C. Either way, however, the important point is that we now urgently need to give impetus wherever we can to encouraging diversity, so that we can move from merely paying lip-service to the concept towards actually achieving it.
I do not know whether and to what extent my noble friend the Minister will make concessions to these amendments, but I emphasise that they are entirely consonant with the provisions already in the 2005 Act and in the Bill before the House tonight. I simply say this: you cannot expect the public or anyone else to think we are serious about encouraging diversity if we have a system that encourages it from the Court of Appeal down but does not encourage it in the Supreme Court, which is the highest court in the land.
Lord McNally
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, can be very seductive at times, but let me try to respond to an extremely thought-provoking debate. I was interested in the mention by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, of girls going into boys’ schools and vice versa, because I have just had experience of this. My daughter has just moved from an all-girls’ school into the sixth form of an all-boys’ school. After a few weeks, I asked her, “How is it going?”. She said, “It’s wonderful, daddy, all the boys open the door for me”. That is an illustration of how a little change can bring behavioural changes, and that is probably what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was suggesting, whereby perhaps a few girls in the all-boys’ school of the upper judiciary might produce similar changes in attitude.
I was very grateful for the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, because this debate turns on an issue that I explained in Committee. There is no doubt that both the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have a duty under the Equality Act to promote diversity. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this does not apply to the Supreme Court and therefore implies some sort of ceiling in this, that is not true. We think that the tipping point in the Equality Act already applies to Supreme Court appointments and, therefore, that his amendment is not necessary.
I can put before noble Lords the standard brief that the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor already have these duties enshrined, and that the Equality Act takes care of the problems that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned. However, that would not be the right response to a debate that has contained most of the people whom I count as allies in what I still think is a battle to get greater diversity into our judiciary. I was told earlier that I was being pejorative when I talked about this being a trickle-up. However, the figures quoted by a number of speakers illustrate that there is still a need for leadership, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said. I applaud the leadership that her committee has given in this area, just as I applaud the leadership given by the noble Baronesses, Lady Prashar, Lady Neuberger and Lady Kennedy. However, we need that leadership elsewhere in the judiciary. I am almost tempted, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, to make it applicable to all the judiciary.
I am willing to be seduced here by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, as it would be an insult to the House and the opinions of people whom I respect immensely on this matter if I were simply to call a Division and bring in people who have not heard this debate to vote these amendments down. If noble Lords who have amendments in this group would withdraw or not move them, I will take this matter back to the Lord Chancellor. That will also give time for discussions with the Lord Chief Justice to see whether we can, in some way, meet the points that have been made.
I shall tell noble Lords where I am coming from. Recently, a very senior member of the judiciary pinned me in the corner and said, “If you do what you are trying to do to the judiciary, can you guarantee me that in 20 years we will still have a judiciary that is the envy of the world?”. I said, “Yes, but half of them will be women”. That may be overambitious but it is a lot better than a 50-year timescale or a “sometime, never” timescale. I therefore believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, that sometimes gesture politics is important.
Tonight, I want to take this debate back to the Lord Chancellor and let him ponder on it. It may be that I will have to resist when we return to the issue on Third Reading, but I do not want to resist tonight because the quality of the debate and the persuasiveness of the argument deserve another look at this matter. In that spirit, I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, everyone in this House knows that the commitment of the Minister to judicial diversity is very high, and I am grateful for his indication that he will consider this. I should say that I do not accept that the Equality Act deals with the position in the Supreme Court as satisfactorily as it has been suggested it might. The Bill should reflect uniformity all the way up the system. With the indication that my noble friend has given, however, I will of course withdraw the amendment and consider the matter with him between now and Third Reading.