Public Office (Accountability) Bill: Exclusion

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I join with everybody in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and thanking her for raising this issue and for the powerful and eloquent way in which she opened the debate and presented her arguments.

As we have heard, the question that the debate raises is whether it is right that Schedule 2 to the Bill would exclude parliamentarians from both Houses from the definition of public authorities and public officials who might be guilty of an offence of misleading the public under Clause 11. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, who described this as a very difficult issue that was not going to be simple to determine and that required a great deal of consideration.

On the one hand, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out, the exclusion of parliamentarians from the ambit of this offence could well be perceived by the public as putting parliamentarians above the law. Some Labour MPs have expressed that view in the House of Commons and the media, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, gained powerful support from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth. The noble Lord also made the point, which is of considerable significance, that Ministers acting in their executive capacity would be liable to be prosecuted under this offence, whereas shadow Ministers would be in an entirely different position. On the other hand, if the exclusion were removed, it could be said that Peers and MPs might be deterred from speaking freely on important issues, and that is the basis on which parliamentary privilege is founded.

The reason given in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill for the exclusion of parliamentarians is, and I quote,

“in recognition of long-standing conventions around the independence of the judiciary”—

who I might say are also excluded from offences under Clause 11—

“and Parliament’s ability to regulate its own affairs. These institutions have their own processes for establishing and enforcing ethical standards”.

No more detailed explanation was given on behalf of the Government in Committee by the Minister at the MoJ, Alex Davies-Jones MP; she referred only to long-standing conventions of self-regulation and independence. For my part, I am not sure that is a convincing response. In my view, the mere existence of long-standing conventions should not prevent Parliament examining those conventions and, if necessary, legislating to overturn them.

I have a great deal of sympathy with the position taken by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. She rightly points out that the Clause 11 offence is directed not at innocent mistake or honest disagreement but at deliberately or recklessly misleading the public, when the accused knows, or ought to know, that their act is seriously improper. That is a pretty heinous wrong, and one that the Bill is rightly determined to prevent and penalise. The threshold for conviction is a high one. So why, she asks, should parliamentary privilege and MPs’ and Peers’ freedom of speech get in the way of that worthwhile aim, against the background that we have seen of unacceptable institutional cover-ups and outright dishonesty by some official bodies, which this Bill is intended to address?

My concern with the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is not, principally, that without the exclusion parliamentarians would in practice be prosecuted for this offence. Rather, it is that without the exclusion parliamentarians could be threatened, publicly and in correspondence, with prosecution, and that the threat of attempted prosecutions could deter MPs and Peers from speaking their mind openly and without fear of the consequences. It is in that context that the protection of parliamentary privilege is genuinely an important democratic protection.

It is true that under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3, proceedings for a Clause 11 offence could be brought only with the consent of the DPP. Nevertheless, the whole process of investigation and consideration, and the threat of prosecution, could have a chilling effect on parliamentarians and parliamentary debate. It is therefore not only freedom from prosecution that is important but freedom from the threat of prosecution.

I am reminded of the argument around SLAPPs litigation—SLAPPs standing for the obscure description of strategic lawsuits against public prosecution. As we all know, SLAPPs are unmeritorious actions threatened or brought, often for alleged defamation, generally by powerful or wealthy individuals or organisations, to frighten off critics who would attack them in the press or elsewhere. SLAPPs are used as a form of oppressive censorship of investigative journalism and legitimate criticism, which we are rightly attempting to regulate, control or penalise.

In the context of this Bill, a parallel argument was advanced at Second Reading in the House of Commons by the Conservative MP Mike Wood. He foresaw a risk of parliamentarians being subjected to what he called “politically motivated lawfare”—I note that was an expression repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—which the exclusions are designed to prevent. I have to say I found some of the examples from the noble Lord, Lord Young, a little overstated at times, but nevertheless it is a point that is worth making. I found the argument of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, very persuasive, including his distinction, which may not be directly on point but is helpful, between lying about politics and lying about personal characteristics. That distinction is illuminating.

We should not be so complacent as to believe that parliamentarians would be so immune to threats as always to stick to our guns in the face of them. Parliamentarians expect and welcome criticism, argument and disagreement. However, I suggest that the threat of prosecution for speaking their mind is not a legitimate hazard of parliamentary life. At worst, it may drive some to trim or curtail their arguments, even if not abandoning them. On the whole, and with some hesitation, I have come down on the side of parliamentary privilege and in favour of the exclusion that is written into the Bill, despite the very powerful arguments set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, and others.

Prisons: Education

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I shall address those two separate points. Data collection is something that challenges me every day, along with vetting. As someone who has run a business where I had all the information at my fingertips, I find it frustrating, as I know other colleagues do, that we do not get all the information we need to manage—but that is something that I am working on.

On neurodivergent prisoners, we have made big strides in appointing neurodiversity managers in prisons, but also in focusing not just on classrooms but on the environment where prisoners are. Some of the most inspiring work that I have seen in prisons recently is on autism wings, where staff are heavily trained to support these often vulnerable and challenging prisoners. When they do, the prisoners’ behaviour completely turns around and they go from being challenging, often violent prisoners to being those who really engage with the regime and get the skills they need.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, among the challenges to successful education in prisons are excessive hours spent in overcrowded cells and the lack of internet access alluded to by the Minister. What plans do the Government have to address both those challenges in the context of prison education?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

There are some good reasons why we do not want internet everywhere in prisons, but 90% of the English estate now has digital learning in its cells in various ways: Launchpad or Coracle. My vision is that we need to go much further with that, as well as offering a much wider curriculum on iPads or computers in cells, because that is an increasingly popular way for prisoners to educate themselves.

Court Reporting Data

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a 10-minute Urgent Question, so questions must be brief. We will now move on to the Lib Dems.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we are all committed to open justice, but so we are to the protection of sensitive personal data. Minister Sackman told the Commons yesterday, as has the Minister here, that Courtsdesk had been sharing with an AI company, no doubt for commercial purposes, personal data of defendants and victims, including full names, personal addresses and birth dates. Minister Sackman said that at least 700 individual cases were involved in that direct breach of contract by Courtsdesk, which Courtsdesk has accepted was a breach.

I suggest that we accept both Ministers’ accounts as accurate, as, notably, did Conservative MP Sir Julian Lewis, who, unlike his Front Bench—and indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen—rightly described this as a “cause of great concern”. How and when do the Government propose to replace Courtsdesk with an alternative provider? Meanwhile, can the Minister say how HMCTS will deliver accurate information in a more easily accessible and digestible form? By all accounts, journalists are currently finding the MOJ’s presentation of data to be fragmented, impractical and difficult to navigate.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I reassure your Lordships’ House that all journalists can access the information in exactly the same way as they could through Courtsdesk—it is just a slightly more complicated method: they have to go through HMCTS. The point about Courtsdesk was that it provided a slightly more convenient method, but there is no material that journalists could get then that they cannot get now.

Secondly, the agreement with Courtsdesk, which was a licensing agreement rather than a contract, was entered into by the previous Government as a pilot, which is why it applied to magistrates’ courts only. This Government decided that it might be better to make it available to more than one commercial company. We are in the process of looking at new licensing agreements, which lots of companies can bid for if they wish to, including Courtsdesk if it would like to do so. Anybody who can reassure us that they will treat our data with the respect and dignity that victims and defendants deserve will probably get that licence.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord is probing at this stage and I am with him in wanting to see procedures from the point of view of victims, but I simply do not know whether magistrates have the same powers as Crown Court judges. When we debated this issue before, we were told about the powers that judges have now, without the need for an extension.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, came quite close to my question. Magistrates come from a very different background. Do they currently have the same powers as the judges who will be covered by this legislation, quite apart from the powers that are given by the Bill, in dealing with recalcitrant—if that is the right word—defendants?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the way in which he has explained these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for injecting a note of caution and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for injecting a note of questioning about the proposed amendments.

In their explanatory statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, state that the amendments in this group probe

“the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts”.

The noble and learned Lord explained why he suggests that there is no difference, for the purpose of this power, between the Crown Courts and the magistrates’ courts.

I should make it clear that we on these Benches start from the position that defendants should be obliged to attend court for their sentencing hearings. But the fact that they are obliged to attend court does not lead to the conclusion that the courts ought to have the power to get them to court however much they wish to resist.

It is, of course, important from the victims’ point of view—this is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—that the defendants who have committed offences against them are in court for the occasion when they are brought to justice. It is appropriate, therefore, that in the right cases, the court should have the power to order them to do so.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out what a serious power this is. It is particularly a serious power, as I will come to say, because the use of force is sanctioned to get defendants to court. We have heard tell, in the press and in the House of Commons, from some of the wilder speeches—if I may put it that way—of, in effect, the court having the power to order that offenders be brought to court by considerable force and in chains. I am quite clear that that is not the way the Bill puts it; it puts it in terms of the use of force being reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. Nevertheless, it is a very serious power.

It is also important from the offenders’ point of view that they should come to court, first, to hear what the court says about their offences as well as what their counsel and the prosecution say about their offences. It is also important because their attending court and listening, hopefully with some care, to what goes on at their sentencing hearing may be taken as a sign of their understanding of the import of the hearing. If an order is made, the breach of such an order to attend court for a sentencing hearing is a sign of a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant. A lack of remorse will usually involve a court treating a defendant more severely than it might treat a defendant who does show remorse for the offences that they have committed and an understanding of the impact of those offences on the victims.

The scheme of this Bill is to bring in a very strong regime of compulsion with a specific incorporation of provisions about contempt of court and significantly, as I adumbrated, about the right to use force to bring defendants to court who are unwilling and refuse to attend their sentencing hearings. The conditions for the new regime, as set out in the Bill, are that the defendant has been convicted and is in custody awaiting sentencing by the Crown Court. That brings into play the kind of reservation that the noble and learned Lord spoke about. This new regime is designed to deal with serious offences. A third condition is that the offender has refused or is likely to refuse to attend the sentencing hearing.

It follows that the code for punishment for contempt should be confined to adult offenders. The amendments seek to make this procedure and all its features applicable to a wider group of offenders, and to magistrates’ courts as well as Crown Courts. I ask the Minister and the noble and learned Lord when they close how far a change to include magistrates’ courts will help victims. One can see how it is justified and might help victims in serious cases, but I question how far the use of force will ever be in the public interest. One must question the purpose of the use of force. It could be twofold. It could be to force offenders to face up to their offences and help them to avoid reoffending. It could be to help the victims by letting them see that those who have committed offences against them are being brought to justice. There may be force in that.

However, there is also a risk, which may be important, of forced attendance becoming a means for defendants to get publicity for themselves, their offences and their resistance to justice: to portray themselves as public martyrs and, in some cases, to make political gestures that could be thoroughly undesirable. If these orders became the norm, those dangers would be real. If it is to have a positive effect, this power is likely to be much more effective for serious cases in the Crown Court than it is for cases in the magistrates’ court. Of course we take the point that the scope of hearings in magistrates’ courts has been increased over what it was before the distinction was changed. Nevertheless, I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response on the distinction. Our position at the moment is that the distinction is plainly justified.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.

Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.

Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.

However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.

However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.

Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.

There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.

For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make two observations. The first relates to the remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in relation to how judges will exercise these powers and whether guidance will be given. No doubt the Lady Chief Justice will consider whether to give guidance, or such guidance might be given by practice direction or be the subject of discussion at the Judicial College, but the handling of this is entirely for the judiciary. It is difficult enough, and it certainly would not be in any way appropriate for the Ministry of Justice to give guidance. It seems to me that the exercise of this judicial power must be for the judicial branch of the state and it alone—unless, of course, Parliament in its infinite wisdom decides that it wants to set down the criteria. I strongly urge Members not to do that.

The second relates to a more practical point, and that is the ability of the victim to intervene in the decision and to be able to make a request. It is sometimes forgotten that a transformation occurred during the 2000s and the next decade in the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service dealt with victims. There was a time when the victim was regarded as peripheral to the way in which the courts operated and to matters that had to be taken into account. That position changed remarkably and for the better. I think it is appreciated that the judicial power to have someone brought into court has to be exercised with the greatest degree of thought. If the Crown Prosecution Service were to request this to happen, I would be astounded if it had not consulted the victim. In my experience, that is what often happens in these difficult circumstances. There is a discussion as to the best way of proceeding and it is very important that this is approached in that sort of way.

If the victim was to be allowed to make the request directly, this raises the question as to how. Is this to be done in open court with the discussion of the various issues? Is it not best left to the wisdom of the Crown prosecutor and the judge’s ability to ask questions as to the victim’s views? It seems to me this is a much more efficacious way of dealing with the matter rather than bringing the victim in personally—because there is no suggestion of a victim’s advocate for this—to what will be, if this power is to be exercised, an occasion of great difficulty. The last thing anyone wants to happen is to provide secondary victimisation by an awful scene in court. I urge the Government to exercise very considerable caution in considering this amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, once again I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his note of caution about Amendment 3—and Amendment 8 in the case of service personnel—which would allow victims to request that an order be made. I completely agree with him that it is a matter for the judiciary to exercise its discretion as to whether orders are made. I am not entirely sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, took into account quite how difficult it is going to be to make these orders. I suggest that the caution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about bringing the victim in as effectively a party to such an application is a point well made. But I accept that it is right that the victim’s voice should be heard. I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that the victim’s voice in court now is heard in a way that it certainly was not decades and even years ago. But a formal position whereby the victim was entitled to make a request is probably undesirable, though it is quite clear that the victim’s voice should be heard and that guidance to and from the judiciary should reflect that.

Amendments 4 and 9 are effectively seeking a very serious conflict:

“If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim, or, where the victim is deceased or is unable to be consulted … a family member or other appropriate representative”.


That would put the victim in a wholly invidious position of effectively making the victim compulsorily a party to the application for an order. That is likely to stoke up hostility between the victim and the offender, which we are trying to avoid or at least reduce, and even possibly between the victim and the court, which would be a thoroughly undesirable position. Far better, I suggest, to leave it to the judge to decide how the victim’s views should be sought and taken into account, without imposing any duty on the court to consult the victim at any stage. It would be much better for the Bill to remain silent on how the victim’s views should be sought, but the expectation will be that they will be sought, and I have no doubt that that is how the judiciary would approach this exercise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst propose that the provisions in Clauses 1 and 2 apply to offenders from the age of 16, rather than only to those aged 18 and over. As drafted, Clauses 1 and 2 are explicitly limited in their application to those aged 18 or over. That is a departure from the original Conservative proposal for this power, which would have required the court to consult the relevant youth offending team if the offender in question was under 18. We therefore believe that the blanket threshold of 18 should be examined.

The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is, of course, 10 years of age. Even if it is believed that the age of criminal responsibility might reasonably be set higher than 10—a subject of recent debate in this Chamber—there is widespread cross-party consensus that it should be significantly lower than 18. Indeed, Scotland, after extensive consultation and careful consideration, chose to set the age of criminal responsibility at 14, reflecting evidence of developmental science and, indeed, public expectations in the field of criminal law.

A 16 year-old who has been convicted of a serious offence will be expected to go before a Crown Court judge to receive their sentence, yet will face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing under these provisions. That appears inconsistent with the intent of these provisions.

We have seen both in recent cases and in parliamentary proceedings on this Bill how deeply distressing and unfortunate it can be for victims and families when an offender refuses to face the court at sentencing, an act described by Ministers as a “final insult” to those already traumatised. It is difficult to articulate why someone aged 16 who has been found guilty of a serious offence should be exempt from measures designed to ensure that they confront the consequences of their own criminal actions.

We should also reflect upon the wider tapestry of civic responsibility that has developed, and which this Government would also confer upon 16 year-olds. The Government have proposed to lower the voting age to 16. Someone aged 16 can marry; they can pay tax and join the Armed Forces. They assume a suite of responsibilities in civil society. They are treated as autonomous agents in a host of legal and social contexts, and to exempt them uniquely in this narrow but important sphere from the requirement to attend their own sentencing hearing when convicted of a crime appears inconsistent with those wider developments.

We owe it to victims and to the public to ensure that the measures we put on statute reflect a coherent and principled approach. These amendments ensure that they align with the realities of criminal responsibility and the Government’s wider policy. Someone who commits a serious crime at 16, such as murder or serious violence, should not be placed beyond the reach of these important attendant provisions. That is the inconsistency which appears to us in the present form of Clauses 1 and 2.

Accountability cannot be robust at conviction and sentencing in substance but simply optional at the point of sentencing in practice. We have seen very recent examples of relatively young people aged 15 and 16 committing the most heinous offences, in some instances murder. There can be no doubt, of course, that the existing framework for youth justice should be maintained and remain separate and distinct from these provisions. Nevertheless, when it comes to those of 16 years and older, their personal conduct does take them before the Crown Court. They appear there for sentencing and there is no principled justification for differentiating on the basis of age alone between 16 and 18 when culpability and legal responsibility have already been established. With that in mind, I respectfully commend these amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, briefly, these amendments would treat offenders over the age of 16 in the same way as offenders over the age of 18 in relation to three aspects of the compulsory attendance regime. The first aspect is the requirement that the court consult a youth offending team before making an order; the second is the use of force against young offenders, and the third is the use of prison sanctions in the case of service offenders.

The Member’s Explanatory Statement explains that these amendments probe why these provisions apply only to offenders over the age of 18. The position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken is that they should apply to everyone over the age of 16. I suggest that the answer to the question is that, modest as they are, these provisions make different arrangements for offenders under 18 because they are designed to protect 16 and 17 year-old offenders, who are children and not yet adults. I submit, and we on these Benches believe, that it is right that contemporary criminal justice attempts to treat offenders under 18 in a way that acknowledges the particular vulnerabilities of 16 and 17 year-olds.

In the first group of amendments today, the noble Baroness said that the Government broadly agree with that position. The amendments seek to remove the distinction between 16 and 17 year-olds on the one hand and adults, albeit young adults, on the other. We say that this would be a retrograde step and that it should be opposed. I would add that of the measures that are proposed in the amendments, those sanctioning the use of force against 16 year-olds—to bring them to sentencing hearings against their will—would be particularly egregious and potentially very damaging.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do apologise.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Not at all. I apologise. I waited for the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to introduce his amendment before I spoke.

I will speak briefly to Amendment 40, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and then to Amendment 67, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I will say nothing on Amendments 46 and 47 on child sexual abuse, except that I fully support them, for the reasons that have been given.

Amendment 40 is on fraud, bribery and money laundering. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, rightly says that it is not the first time that he has brought this issue before the House or before Parliament. Indeed, he has been a formidable campaigner on the issue for a number of years. On these Benches, we think he is right about it. It is a very difficult area on which to propose legislation in precise or specific terms. With this amendment, he seeks to require a review of the whole area of fraud, bribery and money laundering within the UK and abroad.

The background is the inevitable inadequacy of existing civil proceedings, in this jurisdiction or elsewhere, not only from a jurisdictional point of view but because of the inevitable cost of civil proceedings, the difficulty of valuation and the difficulties of enforcement for the victims of substantial economic crime. They cannot be properly compensated by the existing regime of compensation orders. A review is needed to consider how compensation might be ordered and to consider the principles that are brought into play by complex economic crime for criminal activity here and abroad, and not always just in one jurisdiction but often across countries and in multiple jurisdictions.

The noble and learned Lord highlights our poor record as a country—though rightly he says that we are better than many—in providing compensation for victims of economic offences. He highlights that there may not be just individual or corporate losers; there can also be organisations or states which deserve compensation but for which, presently, our law and the law elsewhere makes no proper provision.

These are difficult issues and there are very difficult issues concerning quantification. The inadequacy of how we fail the victims of overseas corruption and other economic crime amounts, in effect, to our holding our hands up and admitting defeat in the face of those issues. The review for which the noble and learned Lord calls needs to be illuminated and energised by some extremely innovative and imaginative thinking which holds out the prospect of real improvement of the position and accepts that we may not be precise in any award of compensation. A real attempt to provide adequate compensation can be made and should be made.

I am bound to say that I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that grasping this issue could enhance the business reputation of London as a centre of economic and business excellence where others have failed in this area.

Amendment 67, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks a review of sentencing guidelines to insist on compensation which is commensurate, they say, with the value of stolen items, although I appreciate that the way the amendment was opened goes wider than cases of theft.

Prisoners for Palestine: Hunger Strikes

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question and concern, because we were all concerned about what was happening. I spent an awful lot of time making sure that all the policies and procedures in place were being followed, which they were. Obviously, this is about how the health partners in prisons work together. Having spoken to a number of them on a regular basis, I was proud of their professionalism, compassion, kindness and care. They did a fantastic job in very difficult circumstances.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord pointed out that prison hunger strikes are not unusual. Now that these particular strikes have ended, how far have the Government got in considering two issues: first, the length of time these prisoners spent on remand; and secondly, whether it might be sensible to establish a specialist unit within the prison estate to provide, where practical, necessary medical assistance to hunger strikers, within the existing guidelines of course, so as to mitigate the costs, publicity and security implications of transfers to regular NHS hospitals?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

So far as the court backlogs and the length of time on remand are concerned, the situation is of course similar to what I inherited in the prisons. We need a sustainable system. We cannot have a system where we run out of prison places and victims have to wait years and years to see justice done. That is why the review by Sir Brian Leveson is so important. One of the areas where we can make a real comparison with the Prison Service is how we use technology to improve the way data links together, so we can speed things up.

So far as how the system works within our prison estate, unfortunately this is a well-trodden path. Even in my private office, three of my team were prison officers before I worked with them and have all had experience of food refusal. They all told me that there is a highly experienced team that deals with this. So, I am satisfied with the process.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 21st January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks will no doubt repeat some of the niceties, but I too am glad to see this step forward. I shall ask the Minister some questions on the government amendment.

First, there is the phrase

“sentencing remarks … relevant to”

the victim will be supplied. From what the Minister has said, is that distinguishing one particular victim from another victim in the same case, or what is meant by sentencing remarks relevant to the victim? I have to say that, if I were a victim, I would think that everything that was said in sentencing would be relevant. It also occurs to me that, if the court is required to edit the remarks before supplying them, that is actually more work for the court, which is something that the Government are obviously aware of. I take it that “remarks relevant to the victim” are different from

“circumstances in which, for the purposes of this section, sentencing remarks are relevant to a victim”,

in paragraph (11) of the proposed new clause. Can the Minister clarify what is meant by “circumstances” in this context?

There is also provision for the “omission of information” and making

“further provision about the supply of a transcript”,

which I take it covers not supplying it, though I am obviously not pushing that point. Like the noble and learned Lord, I am concerned to know about publication. A number of us have heard from the Lady Chief Justice of the progress that has been made and the success in using new technology in this context. I also ask what consultation is planned on circumstances, on exceptions and so on—the various points that will be covered by the regulations.

The Minister has said, and we are grateful for this, that answers will be given to questions asked by my honourable friend the Member for Chichester. Briefly, they are whether the term “victim” is to be the same as the definition used in the victims’ code, including where the victim is unable personally to request sentencing remarks; and, where the amendment provides for exceptions, what sort of exceptions—this goes back to my point about consultation—and what sort of information may be omitted. And possibly overarching all this, will the Government be publishing a review of the pilot that was carried out recently? We have heard about it, we gather it has been successful, if limited, so can we hear more about it?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we will also support the Government on their amendments in lieu. I say at the outset how grateful I am, and we on these Benches are generally, to the Minister and the Government for tabling the amendments in lieu, which mean that victims will have full transcripts of sentencing remarks free of charge. These will explain the reasons that offenders have been sentenced as they have and will enable victims to understand those reasons, come to terms with them and consider them.

I am also grateful, along with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the Minister’s kind remarks about me and him, and for his engagement with us throughout the course of this Bill and on these amendments in lieu. This Bill, which we agree is a better Bill for its passage through this House, has benefited enormously from the work that he, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, and the whole of the Bill team have put into providing an expert and collaborative approach to the Bill.

Age of Criminal Responsibility

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 21st January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, there are certain cases where the offending is so serious that a criminal justice response is required. For example, everybody in your Lordships’ House will remember the case of the killing of James Bulger, in which two 10 year-olds were involved. The important thing is that every effort is made to keep children out of the criminal justice system unless it is absolutely necessary to monitor them and to contain them in the public interest.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Government and this House take pride in pursuing evidence-led policy, yet an age of criminal responsibility of 10 flies in the face of all the evidence about brain development, general maturity, responsibility and judgment. As the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, Scotland has raised the age to 12, and many European countries have an age of 12 or 14. Granted, the UN convention does not insist on a particular age but the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child urges states to adopt 14 as the minimum age. How can a progressive Government justify criminal responsibility for 10 year-olds?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the efforts made to keep children out of the criminal justice system are all going in the right direction. In 2024, only 13% of all children sentenced were aged 10 to 14 and that is a sustained downward trend.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

420: After Clause 148, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to review treatment of childhood convictions and cautions(1) Within a year of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the management of childhood convictions and cautions.(2) The report must consider at least—(a) the prevention of automatic disclosure of childhood conditional cautions;(b) the prevention of adult treatment of offences committed by individuals who were minors at the time of the offences in question taking place;(c) the range of childhood convictions which are removed from standard and enhanced checks after five and a half years.(3) In considering the areas outlined in subsection (2), the report must consider the policy merits of reform of the existing management of childhood convictions and cautions, and which actions would be required in each case for reform to take place.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report reviewing how childhood convictions and cautions are handled within one year of this Act being passed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in this group on childhood convictions, Amendment 420 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Brinton seeks a general review and report on the management of childhood convictions and cautions. Later in the group, there are four specific amendments. Three are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, with all his wide experience of working as a magistrate, particularly in the youth court, and is also in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Spellar and Lord Hampton; the other is tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. I support all four specific amendments. They are all consistent with our general proposition that we should be very careful before we mark people out with a criminal record for mistakes committed when they were children.

I am grateful for the briefing we have received from Unlock and Transform Justice. They make a number of helpful proposals for reform. Our amendment calls for a report to be commissioned and laid before Parliament within a year to enable Parliament to be fully informed on the issues and possible reforms in this difficult area —and it is a difficult area. We must not only consider the position of young people who acquire criminal records that may blight their futures but balance their position against the need to protect future employers and others who might be affected by repeat offences in the future, in particular vulnerable children, and society as a whole.

The position of children in England and Wales is exacerbated because we have a very young age of criminal responsibility—10 years old—with the result that, in this jurisdiction, children aged between 10 and 17 can be convicted of criminal offences. This compares with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Scotland, which raised the age of criminal responsibility in 2019, and with Germany, Spain, and Italy, where it is 14, along with many other countries. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states to set a minimum age of criminal responsibility without expressing what that should be, but the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child urges states to raise the age to 14.

The reasons why this matters are not confined to the unfairness of punishing children for crimes when they lack the maturity or responsibility to be held criminally responsible by state laws. The unfairness extends to exposing them to the long-term disadvantage of being scarred with criminal records acquired for childhood offences for longer than is necessary for the protection of the public and often well into their adulthood.

There is a wealth of evidence of the ages at which young people’s brains and cognition mature. Although it differs, the best evidence provides that full maturity is not reached until the early 20s and that full responsibility does not develop until the late teens at least. That matches the obvious and instinctively understood reality that children and young people are that much more likely to get into trouble than adults. Yet, we do not presently match our law on the acquisition, collation and disclosure of criminal records to that obvious reality.

There are many injustices. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds and minority communities are much more likely to acquire criminal records than children from more privileged backgrounds. There is a vicious circle in operation here. Disadvantaged children are overwhelmingly more likely to be in care, to be excluded from school and to develop personality disorders and other mental health issues. Those factors make them significantly more likely to commit offences and get into trouble with the law.

By saddling children with criminal records, we make their disadvantages worse in securing employment or training opportunities, and even in further education. Fines and community orders generally stay on a child’s record for two years on a basic check, and maybe for much longer if an enhanced check is sought, which it is likely to be for any work in a school, for example.

It is not just convictions, though, that damage children. Cautions in childhood can prevent children and young adults securing employment. A basic DBS check provided by the Disclosure and Barring Service, which it is open to any potential employer to seek, will disclose youth conditional cautions, which are intended to be an alternative to formal criminal proceedings. Such conditional cautions can be given to anyone aged between 10 and 17 and avoid the need for criminal proceedings. That is clearly a sensible strategy to provide an alternative criminal justice solution to avoid the need for proceedings and a formal conviction. However, the caution will stay on the child’s record on a basic DBS check for three months or until the conditions have been complied with, whichever is earlier. Even in that time, the caution is capable of being really damaging to that child’s prospects.

Then again, the effect of court backlogs has been, as we know, that convictions are delayed. Such delays may last from the date when a person charged with an offence was a child to a date long after that child’s 18th birthday, so they are then an adult. So, a person can commit an offence as a child and be convicted as an adult but, for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, the date when the conviction becomes spent depends on the date of conviction rather than the date of the offence. So, through no fault of their own, children’s convictions for offences that ought to have been spent are unspent for far longer.

This is an area in serious need of review. We need wider consideration of all the issues concerning the treatment of criminal records acquired for childhood offences, including: whether and for how long children’s offences should stay on their records; how far the seriousness of the sentence passed should be the sole or even the main criterion for convictions becoming spent; what other criteria there should be; whether conditional cautions should be treated as giving rise to a criminal record; how far it should be open to children convicted of offences committed in childhood to apply for their records to be expunged—when, to whom and on what basis; and how far such offences should still be disclosed on standard and enhanced higher-level DBS checks.

These are serious issues affecting many lives that are currently blighted by a past that sticks with them, and they are important to society as a whole. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not think that I can improve on what I have said. I will make inquiries into the statistical evidence that we hold and write to the noble Lord.

I reiterate that I am very happy to meet any of your Lordships, including, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Carter, ahead of Report to discuss these issues in more detail. In the meantime, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the support that I have had from across the Committee, and for the very detailed and helpful response from the Minister. I will gladly take up her invitation to have a discussion. It is important that the Government intend to review this area, at least in part. If we can commission a review of the sort that I have suggested, I would be very pleased to help with that. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 420 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 12th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

Before I begin, I can update the House that the Scottish Government have granted an LCM. This covers the provisions in the Sentencing Bill on the treatment of national security offenders, which affect the executive competence of Scottish Ministers. I am very grateful to the Scottish Parliament for working with us.

I start by thanking the many noble Lords who have contributed to the Bill through debates in this Chamber and the extensive discussions that have taken place beyond it. Those contributions have shown the very best of this House. I am especially grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for their support and engagement on key measures in the Bill. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for their informed interventions and constructive challenge. Lastly, I thank my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Blunkett for their contributions. I have enjoyed working with, and have learned a lot from, all noble Lords in your Lordships’ House. I also want to thank the officials who have been involved in the Bill’s preparation and passage, who have supported me so ably.

This is a significant Bill. As I said at Second Reading, it will put our justice system on a sustainable footing fit for the future, one that prioritises victims, fairness and accountability, and one that prioritises punishment that works, but, with the help of your Lordships’ House, we have gone even further to strengthen the Bill. Through its passage, we have added safeguards, and increased transparency, around the new approvals processes for the Sentencing Council; made it a statutory requirement for the Government to lay an annual Statement on prison capacity before Parliament; agreed to remove the power for providers of probation services to publish names, and photos, of individuals subject to an unpaid work requirement; and brought hope to those serving IPP sentences, and their families, by offering a faster and safe route to the end of their sentence.

Alongside this, we extended the whole life order starting point to include the murder of probation officers, and we made sure that this extends to current or former police, prison and probation officers where they are murdered in connection with their duties, even if it occurs while they are off duty or after they have left the service. I pause here to again pay tribute to former prison custody officer Lenny Scott as well as his family, who I am meeting tomorrow, for their dignified and determined advocacy on his behalf.

Finally, I again recognise the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for his tireless and tenacious leadership on tackling gambling addiction. As he knows, I share his concerns, and this is something I have committed to look at very closely.

I finish by again thanking the many noble Lords and officials who have helped shape, strengthen and support this Bill through to its Third Reading. It will prioritise victims, bring stability to our justice system, and better protect the public. I am very proud of this Bill and look forward to working on its implementation. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, for his kind and generous introduction. This is an important Bill and we on these Benches have supported its principal purposes throughout—those being to address the extreme prison capacity crisis, to move away from reliance on more and longer prison sentences, and to introduce a presumption against short sentences of immediate imprisonment and switch to greater use of suspended sentences, coupled with community supervision. Our concerns now are to ensure that the Government’s ambitions for probation are properly resourced and met, and I know the noble Lord knows how challenging achieving those ambitions will be. It will involve better use of technology, effective use of tagging and in particular making a real success of the recruitment, training and motivation of the Prison and Probation Service.

The noble Lord also knows how much we on these Benches appreciate the engagement that he and the whole Bill team have had with us, but also with other noble Lords across the House. His approach to this Bill, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, have been a fine example of co-operation across the House driving significant improvement in legislation. We have made important changes and, I think, without wasting time. Among other welcome changes, we are particularly grateful to the Government for agreeing to the removal of Clause 35, with its unfortunate proposals for probation officers to take and publish photographs of offenders undertaking unpaid work. We are also very grateful for the Government’s commitment to thorough, open and regular reporting on prison and probation capacity and staffing. I pay credit to the contributions of my noble friend Lord Foster in this area, as well as for his contributions on gambling.

We believe that the Bill has the potential to move us towards a more effective and humane sentencing system that concentrates on rehabilitation of offenders and reducing reoffending and puts victims at its heart.

One issue that will need further consideration from the Commons, and again here, is the provision of free transcripts, for which this House voted, which would benefit public understanding, and particularly victims’ understanding, of how the justice system works. I hope we will find an agreed and acceptable way forward on this issue, despite the Government’s concern, which I understand, as to the initial cost of providing free transcripts.

Finally, on the other side of the balance, it is a shame that we have not made the progress that we sought in ending the scandal of IPP prisoners still in prison or on licence for years after their tariff sentences have been served. That is serious unfinished business, and the appalling injustice involved remains to be fully addressed. I know that Members around the House hope that it will be effectively addressed soon. Nevertheless, we are extremely pleased to see the successful passage of the Bill through the House.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to all noble Lords for their constructive engagement on this important Bill at every stage of its passage. On behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, in thanking the Minister for the open and courteous manner in which he engaged with the House throughout the Bill’s consideration.

We on these Benches are particularly pleased that the Government tabled Amendment 53. We are proud to have championed the case for addressing a serious and unjust gap in the law relating to the imposition of whole life orders for the murder of police and prison officers. We too acknowledge the determined campaigning work carried out by the parents of Lenny Scott after the murder of their son in February 2024. We also welcome the Government’s decision to extend this provision to probation officers, who carry out exceptionally demanding and important work in the service of the public.

I also thank the Minister for Amendment 58, which introduces an annual report on prison capacity. This is an issue which we pressed strongly in Committee. If Parliament is to legislate for significant changes in sentencing and release policy, it is only right that the public are provided with a regular and transparent account of the prison estate. While we would have preferred the Government to commit to a more detailed report, this none the less represents a welcome step forward.