(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wonder whether I might assist the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, as I appreciate that the microphone did not come on at the beginning. I also appreciate that he is speaking from a position where many noble Lords are leaving either side of him. Perhaps noble Lords could leave speedily and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, might just hesitate for a few seconds to allow them to speed past him.
My Lords, on Monday I listened with great interest to what the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, said about the proposed secure college in moving his comprehensive Amendment 43C and to what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said about the site selected for it and the unanimous opposition of all involved NGOs to the proposal. Both explained vividly why the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and I feel sufficiently strongly about it to oppose Clause 29 standing part.
Before explaining my case, I compliment the Minister on honouring his admonition to the House at Second Reading to keep an open mind and for not resorting to the rhetoric used by his Secretary of State about what he clearly regards as his pet project. At Third Reading in the other place, Mr Grayling said that it was beyond him how the Opposition could criticise his once-in-a-generation reforms, urging them to “think again” before they played party politics,
“with the future of young people … and to turn away from siren voices that said that this was a brutal new regime”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/14; col.1071.]
At a public conference I attended, he said that opposition to the secure colleges that he and the Deputy Prime Minister were committed to delivering with haste was a “totem of the left”.
Independent Cross-Benchers do not play party politics. I entirely agree, along with, I suspect, the vast majority of this House, with the Secretary of State’s analysis of why reform is needed and that the educational content of child custody must be improved. My criticism is not about the imposition of an alleged brutal new regime but, rather, that we lack any information about what regime is to be imposed on an establishment whose formation flies in the face of all the evidence of what does or does not work to satisfy the needs of children in custody. The Minister made much of the importance of allowing potential contractors to be creative and innovative but, as many noble Lords have pointed out, there are practical limits to that, such as the perpetual movement of children in and out of places of detention, requiring many individual syllabi.
My criticism is based on what I saw, marked, learnt and inwardly digested of the practical realities when responsible for inspecting secure children’s homes, secure children’s centres and young offender institutions, and on what I have seen and heard subsequently. Both at Second Reading and on Monday, the Minister said—unarguably—that we need to do better at rehabilitating young offenders because youth custodial outcomes are presently not good enough. By recognising that some people would continue to require separate specialist accommodation, the purpose of Part 2 of the Bill remains to establish a statutory framework for a pathfinder secure college, which the Government suggest is a solution to the problem. Educationalists and others will be invited to deliver a broad and intensive curriculum to support and engage young people. The House has already debated a consultation on the rules to ensure that establishments operate safely and securely, which is to be launched before Report.
In that connection, can the Minister confirm or deny that the person in NOMS responsible for writing the rules and policies for secure colleges is the former governor of HMYOI Brinsford, who was moved after the Chief Inspector of Prisons gave it a dreadful report, describing it as the single worst jail he had ever visited, to HMP Hewell—which is about to receive a dreadful inspection report—and from there to this role in NOMS? If that is true, I must question the judgment of whoever made the appointment.
While admitting that transformation could not happen overnight, the Minister claimed that the Government’s vision was justified by the fact that small local facilities simply could not deliver the high-quality and broad-ranging facilities that meet the diverse needs of young people. If Parliament did not share that vision, the construction of the next generation of facilities would have to take place within the existing framework.
My Lords, I had not meant to speak but feel moved to do so because I was very persuaded by what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said. He spoke of the Brinsford young offender institution, which is in my former constituency. He and I became acquainted because of the assiduous attention that he devoted to that institution. His initial report—which was an exceptionally damning one, as I am sure he would agree—led to a turnaround in that institution of a very marked nature, and, indeed, he reported on it more favourably later on. It seems to me that we have had no more effective or dedicated Chief Inspector of Prisons than the noble Lord, and he devoted particular time and attention to young offenders. He speaks with an authority that very few people can begin to command. All I would say, very briefly, is that if the noble Lord—having looked in detail at a proposal which does have certain superficial attractions—has come to this conclusion, it behoves government and others to think again very carefully indeed.
I hope that my noble friend the Minister, for whom I have a very great regard, will give an undertaking to have further consultations with the noble Lord and others to try to come up with a solution that meets the requirement that we all surely have—the rehabilitation of young offenders, many of whom have backgrounds which do not condone their actions but explain what they have done. Young people need, above all, that tough love and care and concern of which the noble Lord spoke. I found his remarks exceptionally persuasive. If he believes that what we need in this country is to learn from what has been achieved in other countries, particularly Spain, we should seek to do that.
Clearly it would be wrong to divide the House today on this—the whole purpose of this House is to have exploratory Committee sessions and then to come back, perhaps to vote, on Report. I hope that a vote will not be necessary, because this is not a subject that ought to divide us on party lines. We should have a totally common concern about it. I urge my noble friend to have the sort of discussions that I have just mentioned so that we can put some flesh on the bones. It is a very vague proposal. We do not really know what we are voting on. It is a little reminiscent of that extraordinary episode a couple of days ago.
Let us take to heart what the noble Lord said in his extremely persuasive speech and try to find a solution that really will fit all. I suspect that would be a solution that relied on a number of disparate facilities rather than creating one institution which would be—I hate to think of this—a sort of national for-profit institution. The only profit that can truly be achieved from having any sort of change in the way we treat our young offenders is the profit that rehabilitation brings and the fact that they do not offend again.
My Lords, I am a patron—probably the only patron—of a secure unit in Exeter, which, when the children are there for long enough, does an extremely good job. The education there is excellent. The unit receives children under the terms of the Children Act—Section 25, I think—and, certainly in the past and probably still now, children who have offended. It is a good institution. I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said. I am very concerned that this excellent small unit, which does a useful job in Exeter, will be completely got rid of in favour of a large secure college situated somewhere which is miles away for the children who are not from Devon and Cornwall.
My Lords, earlier today I spent some time with an academic who left a young offender institution at the age of 15 without any qualifications. He has some sympathy with what the Government are proposing. As my noble friend said, the impulse to put education at the heart of meeting the needs of these young people is absolutely right. My difficulty, I am afraid to say, is that there is so little detail in what the Minister is proposing that I can see many very poor outcomes arising from it. As parliamentarians, we need to know more about what is going to be delivered to these young people.
I visited the Orchard Lodge unit that my noble friend described and, like him, I was most impressed by the high quality of multidisciplinary services that these young people receive. There may be lessons to be learnt from the research into the educational outcomes of looked-after children. I think that Professor Sonia Jackson was the academic who first drew attention to the disparity in educational outcomes between looked-after children and the general population of children at the end of the 1990s. This is relevant because many among the population in the secure estate have come from local authority care. She wrote to me recently, updating her research and looking again at the continent. She found that the United Kingdom has the best statutory framework for looked-after children and care leavers that we know of. That is a great endorsement of what this Government and the previous Government have done in terms of the legislative framework around these vulnerable young people. However, she also found that we have poorer educational outcomes than many countries on the continent. She ascribed this to the fact that we have such low expectations in terms of the educational qualifications of those who work near these young people.
As I mentioned earlier, in Denmark 90% of staff in children’s homes have a degree-level qualification and in Germany 50%. However, only 30% do in this country. As an authority was telling me recently, less than half of the managers of children’s homes have a degree-level qualification. If we are looking carefully at the policy to improve educational outcomes for our troubling, and often very troubled, children, we must take on board what my noble friend has said and his example from Missouri, where units are staffed by people with degree-level qualifications. I am reminded of the very interesting fact that the principal indicator for a good educational outcome for any young person is the level of qualification of their parents. If a parent has a degree, it is likely that their child will get a degree. It seems to make sense to look at the level of qualifications of people who work near these young people and to ensure that, as far as possible, they are well educated, so that those young people are likely to do far better in their own education.
My Lords, for the first time I have some hope that there may be an answer to the problem of that part of the Bill that has troubled everyone on all sides of the House, and which will never work in practice no matter how well intentioned it may be. We have now had from my noble friend a very clear outline of the sort of institution that would make sense.
As we all know, so many of the children who end up in this position not only have had appalling backgrounds but often have had no education at all. One of the first things needed is a basic test of the extent to which they are able to read or write. I hope that the Minister will take this issue away and be persuaded that his proposals are absolutely no good and will not have the support—let alone the extra cost that they would involve. They would provide a solution that would be totally unsatisfactory.
My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. In his introduction, he gave a very comprehensive analysis of the secure college proposals and came up with positive alternatives, which he has every reason to believe would be more favourable than the secure colleges model.
I want to concentrate on one particular aspect that, as far as I know, no other noble Lords have looked at, and that is the costs involved. As I understand it, an adult male prison place costs about £40,000 a year; a place in a male young offender institute costs about £80,000 a year; a secure training centre place costs about £140,000 a year; and a place in a secure children’s home costs about £210,000 a year. Not surprisingly, those costs are completely dominated by the staffing ratios, which are what control the costs of running prisons. When I put the issue to the former Minister, Jeremy Wright, regarding the proposed staffing levels for the secure colleges, his answer was that that would be a matter for the company that was bidding for the contracts. However, this is fundamental to the cost and the quality of the education provision for young people in custody.
Why are the Government so reticent in talking about what they hope to be the running costs of these institutions when they are up and running? Like all noble Lords, I have had many briefings on this matter, and there was reference to a cost of £60,000 a year per boy in a secure college. I have not found any further reference to that and I do not know whether the figure is right, but the House would be better informed if we knew exactly what the Government aspire to in reducing the per-year costs of having boys in these secure colleges. The Government should not be reticent; there is nothing wrong with trying to save costs, but the Committee would be much better informed if it knew what cost they aspire to.
My Lords, I hesitate slightly to speak in this debate, not least because I am still rather new to your Lordships’ House and new in my role as bishop to prisons. However, I cannot help but note the wise advice of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, in encouraging some space for rethinking. Many of us would applaud the overall intention expressed by the former Prisons Minister to establish somewhere that is primarily an education facility but with detention aspects. The difficulty for some of us is that we cannot at the moment see the detail of how that might be provided. Some of the points that have just been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about staffing levels and so on are key to this. We encourage the Government to have the courage to be a bit more prescriptive regarding who might be the eventual provider than is the case now.
If a mechanism could be found for us to move forward without the need for the Committee to divide on this—which would put some of us in a difficult position—I am sure that it would be appreciated. Like others, I look forward to the Minister’s response in the hope that some consultative way forward on this might be found. I am sure that many of us around the Committee would be more than happy to be part of such a process.
My Lords, having seen fashions come and go in a long career of working with young people, I am concerned that this proposal might be yet another fashion. What we know of the young people we are talking about is that we have reduced the number of those needing these sorts of facilities to those with the greatest level of disturbance, who come from the most complex backgrounds, and who are going to need extraordinary intervention.
What we know most of them have in common—in my experience and, I am sure, that of my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham or any of us who have worked with these young people—is that they have had failed relationships. In fact, few have had any consistent relationship, many of them from when they were babies. This will have affected their total development. We know that the one thing that works for young people who have had a series of failed relationships in their families and thereafter, including in their education with their teachers, is one-to-one, close intervention, where they build a relationship—sometimes for the first time—and are able to learn from that that one does not have to have negative consequences.
I applaud the Government’s intention in building this college to pay attention to the education of these young people. Other people who have heard me speak on the Floor of this House about the previous Government’s phrase “Education, education, education” will have heard me say that, “Without welfare, welfare, welfare, children do not learn”. Relationship understanding helps children to learn; a deficit in it cannot be made up unless they have some sort of understanding of what makes people work and that they have value. They can then build their esteem.
I join other noble Lords, following the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in asking the Government to think about this programme again. The intention is good, but they would regret the outcomes. I say very seriously to the Minister that, in my time, I have run these huge establishments as a director of social services and as an assistant director. I have closed them. I have run small establishments. I have seen what works. I have no doubt that this fashion will be regretted in the future if it goes forward. The Government have a wonderful opportunity to put something else together that will cost less, be of better quality and really make a difference to these children’s lives.
My Lords, I said everything I wished to say about secure colleges and the proposals when I spoke to the amendments in my name on Monday. However, I associate myself with the positive suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Cormack, backed up by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol and others, that, given the very serious difficulties that face the present proposals for the implementation of the clause, this might be an opportunity for the Government to consider withdrawing it and coming forward with something else.
I repeat that we all applaud the proposal to give young offenders in the prison estate more educational opportunity. We all share the view that young people in the prison estate are there often precisely because they have not had educational opportunities in the past. In a sense, it is not what is in the Bill—the provision that the Secretary of State may provide secure colleges—that we object to; secure colleges would be capable of having all the aims that were set out in our amendment, but would be provided in a very different way from that which is presently proposed. Our concern, which my noble friend now understands is shared across the House, is that the proposal for implementation by the single pathfinder college that is now envisaged runs counter to all the evidence on the future of our penal system for young offenders. For that reason, I suggest the Government may wish to reconsider the whole future of the secure college proposal.
My Lords, I am not as expert in the matters raised as many who have already spoken in this important debate, but I have one advantage, which is that I am fully instructed by the Prison Reform Trust. The second is that, at one stage, I had to make a report—known as the Strangeways report—into deep problems in our prison system. Certain general lessons were set out in that report, which I think I am right in saying all those who are knowledgeable in this area still regard as being the right recipe for positive progress. We have had great advantage in hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, based in turn on what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. I urge the Minister to take the very wise course that is being pressed upon him. We do not want to make a mistake of the sort that has been indicated could happen.
My Lords, as noble Lords have already demonstrated, there is no shortage within your Lordships’ House of people with not only an interest in but considerable expertise of—derived perhaps from professional or even judicial experience—the problems that we are discussing. However, I think we would all agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that there is none with the particular degree of involvement and expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. The House is indebted to him for his continuing interest in this problem and for the positive way in which he seeks to assist the Government and, through the Government, society in dealing with an intransigent and difficult problem affecting numbers of our young people.
I was particularly interested to hear from the noble Lord today about the local academy which is to start, I think he said, next year, and also about the Missouri experience. If indeed there is—and it is clear that there will be—an opportunity to see how the proposed academy, which I think he said would be built in Haringey, works, then surely it would be sensible to learn from that experience and, if it is successful or even if it is not, to build on that experience in order to craft a way of dealing with the Government’s proposal here. As I said at Second Reading, and again on Monday in Committee, we all agree with their proposal to the extent that we recognise the importance of providing education as part of the way of dealing with the problems of these young people. If, instead, the Government go ahead with their own proposal, next year there will be built an institution catering for 320 youngsters. There is a widespread view in this House and certainly outside it that that is simply too large a number of young people to afford a realistic possibility of attending adequately to their problems.
It so happens that I had tabled an amendment which proposed a much smaller college as a pilot. The number of places that I suggested was 50. I did not know about the Missouri experience in suggesting that figure but, on the basis of some of the discussions that have been held outside this Chamber, it seemed to be a reasonable size. I am reassured by the noble Lord’s confirmation that that appears to be a very successful project. Again, I commend that kind of approach to the Government in looking at how they might carry forward their very well intentioned objectives. I also refer them to the experience of Finland, which has a very good record in dealing with youngsters who have committed offences, and it has a successful record in ensuring that they emerge from care—let us call it that rather than “custody”—into society.
I do not know the extent to which the Government have looked beyond these shores, as the noble Lord suggested and as I am now suggesting, to see what the experience of other countries and jurisdictions might contribute. However, as matters stand, many of the criticisms that were voiced earlier remain unanswered. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked a perfectly valid question about her local institution. She asked where the secure unit in Exeter will go. The same question remains to be asked about a whole range of institutions that are currently operating at, as I acknowledge, different rates of cost.
In Committee on Monday, I referred to the fact that the number of places in secure children’s homes has been reduced to 138, so there has clearly been a reduction—of 28 places nationally—in that area. It remains to be seen what the future will be not only of those homes but of the other training facilities, because it is envisaged that some of those who are currently in other institutions will transfer to this new college and presumably any other new colleges that might come on stream. Therefore, there is a very real risk to the kind of institutions that the noble and learned Baroness referred to.
As the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said, there is so little detail in the proposal that it is difficult to be confident that, at the end of the day, we will emerge with a fully developed project that will do the job which the Government intend—we agree with that intent—to see carried out. I do not expect the Minister, just two days later, to answer the questions that I posed on Monday. However, some of them are worth repeating. As is his normal, courteous practice, he said he would identify questions asked by noble Lords, write to us and place the reply in the Library. I will touch on some of them as a gentle reminder of some of the issues that were raised. One was the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, in particular, its concern that there was no equality impact assessment. That seems particularly important in relation to gender, as there is a real concern about the current proposal of having girls in the same large institutions as boys. A second concern was the requirement for special educational needs to be catered for.
There are also questions around the secure children’s homes, to which I have already made reference. The Minister implied that there were, perhaps, some shortcomings in these establishments. What improvements in service have been identified as requiring attention? We have heard from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that a place in one of those homes costs around £200,000 a year. If that is regarded as too high, what do the Government consider an appropriate figure, both for the individual, on a per capita basis, and in terms of the aggregate cost? Reverting almost to the question posed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, how many children now in secure homes do they envisage will transfer to the larger college? It is slightly disturbing that the duty to use best endeavours to ensure that the needs are met of children who have been assessed as needing EHC plans would be placed on the principal of a secure college. On Report in the other place, the Minister said that,
“a great deal of further thought will be given to how those needs can be met”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/5/14; col. 538.]
It is only two months since that observation was made, but can the Minister indicate—not necessarily today—that that has been followed up and with what result?
Many noble Lords are concerned, as I am, about staff to children ratio. Can we be assured that it will not simply be left to the contractor to opt for a figure just in terms of numbers, but that these will be numbers with the sort of qualifications that, as noble Lords have indicated today and in previous debates, would surely be required to attend to the complex needs, including the educational needs, which are the main object of the project?
My Lords, listening to the debate three further brief points occur to me. First, I discussed the matter of cost with an academic who currently works in the area of care leavers and has done through his career. He is a graduate who came through care and spent time in the secure estate. How much should we spend on young people while they are in care? He pointed out the immense cost of failing to intervene effectively. It could be many millions of pounds if one thinks of time in the adult secure estate, time spent in the health service, and time just not working. That is one aspect to keep in mind when thinking how much one needs to spend at this point to avoid poor outcomes later.
Another point is on gender equality. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, and I visited the first mother and baby unit to be opened in a secure training centre. A significant number of young girls, if they are included in this college, may be pregnant or may already be mothers, so we need to think about how to manage that particular issue. There is one more point on the question of cost. It may be cheaper to employ more qualified staff. Research on the continent shows that one can have lower ratios of staff if the staff are more qualified. Indeed, this question of cost is very interesting. It should not, perhaps, discourage us hiring very well qualified people to work with these young people if the ratio can be less because of their higher qualification.
My Lords, this has been a very useful and well informed debate. It continues the debates we had on Monday. I respectfully ask those in the Chamber at the moment to read the debate on Monday in which I gave a reply—I think for more than 20 minutes—in which I dealt with a considerable number of the points raised, although I did not purport to deal with all points. Indeed, I said on that occasion that I was proposing to write to sweep up any points that on examination of Hansard I had not dealt with adequately. I adhere to what I said then and will include any further points that have arisen out of the debate today.
What has emerged—as my noble friend Lord Cormack quite rightly said—is that we all have the same concern about providing the most helpful outcomes for troubled young people. It was also common ground that the focus on education is most welcome. What there is a lack of confidence in at the moment is whether the secure colleges can provide precisely what all of us in this House would wish to achieve for young offenders. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is quite right, of course, that many of those who find themselves in this situation come from troubled backgrounds. Many have been in care and present particular challenges for whatever establishment is going to have them when they are serving the sentence passed by the court.
The clause which is the subject of this stand part debate is the statutory framework for the creation of secure colleges so that the Government can trial a new approach to youth custody. Clause 29 provides the Secretary of State with the power to provide secure colleges, which is a new form of youth detention accommodation in England, and replaces the current Section 43 of the Prison Act 1952 with the new section. The current section gives the Secretary of State a power to provide young offender institutions, remand centres and secure training centres. As your Lordships will know, there are no remand centres in operation. The new Section 43 will additionally give the Secretary of State the power to provide secure colleges in England and Wales. Clause 29 introduces Schedule 5, which makes a number of amendments to other legislation to reflect the fact that secure colleges are being introduced.
I remind the Committee of the context for our proposed reform of the youth custodial estate. At present, we pay around £100,000 a year for a place in youth custody, and yet almost 70% of young people go on to reoffend within 12 months of release. In the case of secure children’s homes—the advantages of which were very much emphasised by those in debate on Monday—the cost rises beyond £200,000 a place, and yet the reoffending outcomes are no different.
Does my noble friend accept that the comparison of costs for secure children’s homes with other institutions is perhaps a little unfair? It is the nature of secure children’s homes that they take the most difficult and troubled children, so the costs per year of a place in such institutions is necessarily considerably higher.
It is true, and I am going to come on to deal with that. The different establishments are there, in the view of the Youth Justice Board, to deal with the different challenges that the individuals present. My point is that secure children’s homes are no panacea. The starting point is that the overall rate of reoffending is simply not acceptable. That is why we are introducing secure colleges.
I entirely accept the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that the Government should be aware of the long-term cost as well as the short-term cost. Indeed, the whole purpose of secure colleges is that, with the benefit of proper education, the Government consider that there should be a cost-saving in the long term because of the accrued benefit for young people who go to secure colleges.
I am sorry to intervene at this point, but it is sensible to do it now rather than later. Are we to infer from that that the Government’s ultimate intention is to dispense with the 138 places in secure children’s homes or is it their view that there will still be some place for secure children’s homes? If so, how will they approach determining how many?
I respectfully ask the noble Lord to be a little patient; I am going to deal with that point in the course of my remarks. I have not been speaking for long. I have been much criticised for not giving the House information. I should perhaps remind the Committee that there were meetings offered first to the party opposite, then to this side and to Cross-Bench Peers. There has been written information and there was a further meeting at which the details of secure colleges, including demonstrations on visual display units, were supplied. That, together with the answers I have given and the answers I propose to give further, should give the Committee at least as much information as it can reasonably expect.
I have heard in the course of the debate arguments that there are better ways to improve the youth custodial estate and particular emphasis was placed on the secure children’s homes. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for whose expertise the Committee is indebted, mentioned a number, in particular Diagrama, a Spanish not-for-profit organisation that runs custodial facilities. The Ministry of Justice is aware of the work of Diagrama, and it is an example, as I understand it, of the type of innovation that we want to introduce and attract into secure colleges. We have, as I said previously, an open mind, and we are anxious to encourage innovation. However, as the noble Lord quite rightly said, he would not expect me to comment from the Dispatch Box on the advantages or disadvantages of the specific matters that he raised in his speech, valuable though his contribution is to the general approach to trying to find the right answer to these difficult problems.
My Lords, I have a question. I apologise if the Minister dealt with it on Monday, when I was unable to stay for that part of the discussions. I referred, in my brief speech, to the family provisions for putting children into secure accommodation under, I think, Section 25 of the Children Act. Will any of those children go into secure colleges? If they will not, there is a real danger that there will not be any places for them if small secure units do not have both the children who offend under the criminal law together with the children who are beyond control under the Children Act.
I dealt with these points on Monday. We are proposing to keep these secure children’s homes open for the appropriate offender. The involvement of the Youth Justice Board will, we suggest, ensure that the right offenders find their way into secure colleges.
My Lords, I must admit that I am disappointed by the line that the Minister has taken, particularly in view of the very helpful contributions made by the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Marks, and the right reverend Prelate. I had hoped that, by outlining all these suggestions, we would not have merely one solution put forward to us—pathfinder or not, staged or not—but there appears to be no give on the general intent. Yes, the Youth Justice Board is responsible for commissioning, but what the Youth Justice Board has always been responsible for commissioning is a situation that it inherited. So far, I am not aware that there has been any attempt to look right across the whole system and perhaps design something using the existing situation to make better use of it to provide the aims that we all want. The Government have come up with the solution of the secure training centre, which has attracted opposition from all those who have had anything to do with young offenders. I hope they will be given more attention.
I am grateful for the contributions that have been made across the Committee. As I said at the start, I do not intend to seek the opinion of the Committee with a vote at this stage, because we all have to go away and read not only what happened on Monday, to which the Minister referred—indeed, some of it has come up again—but what has been raised here. I hope that the Government will have considered this, on calm reflection, when we come back to it on Report. The Government will know that many people long to take part in the deliberations and contribute what they have because they feel excluded from this. They feel that this is a solution that has been put to them without any explanation. Yes, there have been meetings and they have had the site explained, but we have not had all the details of the regime and answers to all the other questions that have come up, because the Government have admitted that they simply will not know the answers to those until they have opened the envelopes from the competitive bidders.
Personally, I would have been much happier if any development of a site by a contractor was in conjunction with the provider of the education to make certain the contractor is doing what the education provider needs. However, as we do not know who the education person is, what is the point of a designer going ahead with something that the person who is going to use it has not had any say in?
I very much hope there will be a great deal of consideration. As I say, I hope the Government will engage those who want to get involved to make sure the solution for our young children is the best possible, based on all the experience there is and all the good practice that is known.
My Lords, the Committee will be pleased to hear I will not detain it long on this amendment, which follows similar amendments moved during earlier parts of the Bill. The amendment seeks to ensure that the Freedom of Information Act procedures will be available in respect of the operation of the secure colleges, if they are built, by designating them as a public authority. The amendment would require the Secretary of State, when entering into a contract to provide or run a secure college with another person that is not a public authority, to designate that person as a public authority for the purposes of that section of the Act.
The Minister just referred to two possibilities: one is that the Secretary of State enters into a contract with such an outside body to provide the facility; the other is that the Secretary of State, the department or some other public body—perhaps the Youth Justice Board, which is a recognised public body—would carry out that function. The intention, clearly, is that it should be a contracted-out service. I understand that four bidders to provide the service have been selected, and I believe them to be—I may be wrong and, if so, no doubt the Minister will correct me—effectively private sector bodies.
My Lords, Amendment 44 seeks directly to extend the Freedom of Information Act to providers of secure colleges who have entered into a contract with the Secretary of State under Schedule 6 to the Bill. The amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, is similar to Amendment 11, which we debated in Committee on day one. It would provide for private providers not currently subject to the Freedom of Information Act to make information available both in response to FoI requests and proactively through publication schemes.
As the noble Lord said, the amendment differs in one respect from Amendment 11 in that it would lead to the formal extension of the FoI Act to providers of secure colleges, whereas the amendment debated previously sought to achieve the same ends in relation to providers of outsourced electronic monitoring services through the code of practice that the Secretary of State would issue under new Section 62B of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act, which is being introduced through Clause 6 of the Bill.
As we set out in the debate on Amendment 11, the Government recognise that there are concerns about the position of private providers of public services, under the Freedom of Information Act. The issue of outsourced public services was considered in some detail during the post-legislative scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act carried out by the Justice Select Committee in 2012. The committee recommended the use of contractual provisions, rather than the formal extension of the Freedom of Information Act, to ensure that transparency and accountability are maintained. In particular, the committee said that it believed that,
“contracts provide a more practical basis for applying FOI to outsourced services than partial designation of commercial companies under section 5 of the Act”.
The committee also felt that,
“the use of contractual terms to protect the right to access information is currently working relatively well”.
The Government recognise not only that concerns exist in this area but the potential challenge that the increased delivery of public services by non-public sector providers poses to transparency. It is for that reason that the Government accepted the committee’s recommendation. Later this year, the Government will issue a revised code of practice under Section 45 of the Freedom of Information Act to promote transparency about outsourced public services in response to FoI requests. As we explained in the debate on Amendment 11, the guidance to be provided in the code will promote and encourage the use and enforcement of contractual or sub-contractual obligations to ensure that contractors provide information held on behalf of public authorities. It will go further than the current obligations under the Act. It will encourage contractors voluntarily to provide additional information beyond that held on behalf of the contracting public authority where, for example, doing so would help the contracting public authority to provide a more meaningful response to requests.
The Government and the Information Commissioner will monitor the effectiveness of the code. If it does not prove successful, the Government have said that they will consider what other steps may be necessary to ensure accountability, including the possible formal extension of the Freedom of Information Act to contractors. As I have indicated previously, we believe that our approach represents an appropriate balance between transparency and minimising burdens on business. As a result of the steps that we are taking, I suggest to the House that the measures proposed through these amendments are, with respect, unnecessary. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I will withdraw the amendment and I am grateful to the noble Lord for reaffirming the Government’s general position. He did not—I do not criticise him for this—quite deal with the further point I made about having a monitor, particularly the issue of the Secretary of State reporting on the outcome of such issues. He may wish to consider that. I hope we can clear up that point because, if the Secretary of State is issuing or preparing a report, it should be in the public domain. That may very well be intended but perhaps we can deal with that matter before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 48A and others in this group. Amendment 48A is largely self-explanatory. The Children and Young Persons Act was enacted in 1933, well before the advent of the internet or any sort of social media. The purpose of this amendment is simple: to make it beyond any doubt that any repeating of things that are sub judice to do with a child’s identity would be prohibited and that orders under Sections 39 and 49 apply to social media just as they do to print and broadcast media. That is the effect of Amendment 48A.
Amendment 48B, which is in my name and the names of other noble Lords, seeks to close a legal loophole whereby children can be named before they are charged and appear in court. This is an anomalous situation that makes a mockery of the anonymity protection. In the recent tragic case of the murdered Leeds schoolteacher Ann Maguire, the Sun newspaper printed the name of the boy accused of her murder before he was charged. Now that the matter is before the court, it is illegal to name him. This is an illustration of the loophole that this amendment seeks to close. Pre-charge naming undermines any anonymity later afforded by the court. I am pleased to see that noble Lords from other sides of the House have added their names to this amendment.
The purpose of Amendments 48C and 48D is that anonymity provided by Sections 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 should last for a lifetime. Lord Justice Leveson has ruled that Section 39 orders expire when the child reaches the age of 18. This judgment is being appealed and the appeal is due to be heard in autumn this year. Lord Justice Leveson has said:
“It is for Parliament to fashion a solution: the problem requires to be addressed as a matter of real urgency”.
He is referring to precisely this question of whether anonymity should continue beyond the age of 18. The purpose of Amendments 48C and 48D is that the default situation should be that anonymity should be granted for life unless a court orders that it be lifted.
Why is this a good principle? The principal aim of all youth justice is to prevent reoffending. I would argue that naming a child as an offender, particularly in this day and age, would work against that child’s interests. Their name is likely to get on to the internet and to stay on the internet. It will make it more difficult, once the child is identified and named as an offender, for that child to change their ways. More than that, it will punish innocent families. We know that children identify very strongly with their siblings, more strongly than adults do. I have been made aware of a number of cases where the names of children who have been charged with an offence have come to light and the families, particularly the siblings, of the children have suffered as a result. This only serves to worsen the situation and to set back the prospect for rehabilitation. That is the purpose of Amendments 48C and 48D. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 48B, as have my noble friends Lady Linklater and Lord Carlile of Berriew. We have also tabled Amendment 48F. However, the purposes of our amendment are identical to those of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, so I will be brief.
There are three purposes to this group of amendments. The first is to ensure the extension to electronic media of those provisions dealing with restrictions on reporting of offending by children—restrictions that in a previous era applied to newspapers and standard television broadcasts. The public electronic media should all be treated in the same way. The second purpose, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, is to deal with pre-charge naming of children, which undermines the anonymity granted to them only later. Section 44 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 would deal with that but has not yet come into force. The purpose of the final subsection of the proposed new clause in Amendment 48B is to deal with that. The third point, as the noble Lord explained, is to amend Sections 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to establish that anonymity given to children should last beyond their 18th birthday unless there is a substantial reason why the position should be changed. That would be subject to an order of the court. In those circumstances, I invite the Minister to accept these amendments and ask the Committee to do so, too.
My Lords, it would appear that in this area, as in others, we are short of information about the number of cases in which young offenders are named. There does not appear to be a dataset indicating how many of these young people are being named and, apparently, has there been no research of any great depth on the impact of being named on such young offenders or their families—as my noble friend pointed out, particularly in relation to their siblings.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as long ago as 1989, stated that as well as the right to privacy, “best interests” of the child should always,
“be the primary concern in making decisions that may affect them”.
It is striking that, although it is a matter for the courts whether the child should be identified, the applications tend to be made by the media on the grounds of public interest. The capacity of the media to identify their interests with the public interest is of course unlimited, but in this rather sensitive area it might be thought that the principles of the convention should be taken a great deal more seriously. Some of the ways in which the media have portrayed young offenders, complete with photographs—my noble friend mentioned a case where a child’s photograph was prominently displayed—and emotive language such as how “young thugs” should be dealt with, are not conducive to meeting the requirements of the convention, which we should all respect.
I understand that the Government are looking at the existing law on reporting restrictions and had indicated that they would be coming to a conclusion some time this year. They may not have done so, but I do not know whether the Minister is in a position to indicate when that review might be completed. It would be helpful to the House to know when that might occur. In fact, the Government—I should, in fairness, say successive Governments—have not responded to the UN committee’s report, which is dated as long ago as 2008. In addition to the general principle to which I referred, that report made the strong point that respecting privacy should extend especially to avoiding messages that expose the child to shame and are against their best interests.
This is potentially quite a serious issue. From my experience as a councillor and, indeed, as chairman of the social services committee in Newcastle in the 1970s, I recall very well the famous case of Mary Bell, who was a young child when she committed offences that became notorious. Rather like the subsequent Bulger case—or rather, those who were guilty of killing Jamie Bulger—she became exposed to a great deal of publicity. That made assimilation into adult life extremely difficult for her, as it has for other defendants, it would appear, including those in the Bulger case. This is a very sensitive area in which we need a clear position from the Government in terms of a response not only to the amendment but perhaps more importantly to the UN convention requirements of as long ago as 2008.
Of course, there may be public interest in knowing what is happening, but a public interest in knowing does not necessarily amount to a matter of public interest. The two terms become confused. I hope that that is not the position that the Government ultimately end up with. There are clearly issues here that can have a long-term impact on young offenders. I entirely take the Minister’s point: the whole point of dealing with these young offenders is to ensure they do not offend again and can assume their place in society. We should not facilitate making that any more difficult by permitting disclosure when it is not necessary. I hope that the Government will look sympathetically at the amendment moved by my noble friend and respond to the long outstanding report and recommendations of the UN convention.
None of us would say that people—even young people—who commit serious crimes should not be punished or go through the processes that the law prescribes. They should not, however, be subjected to public obloquy in addition to that. It is rather disconcerting that, at the time of the riots in London a few years ago, the Home Secretary seemed keen to publicise the identity of some of those, particularly young people, who were involved in criminal and quite disgraceful behaviour. I think that many of us would feel that, in that sort of case and for that sort of young offender, publicity might be regarded as almost a badge of honour and is therefore not to be encouraged from any perspective. I hope that that situation will not recur. In the mean time, we have a number of offenders, some of whom are involved in very serious offences, whose anonymity has been done away with in a way that cannot be conducive to helping them to reform and to assume a normal place in society.
My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and those tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Dholakia. All have shown considerable commitment to the subject of how we respond to children and young people in the youth justice system. Some have direct experience of how children and young people are dealt with in court, as magistrates, lawyers or counsellors, in one or more of those capacities or in some other capacity. I welcome the opportunity to debate the issue of youth reporting restrictions. Noble Lords’ amendments bring into focus a range of issues, each of which I will deal with in turn.
First, as to online content, noble Lords are seeking to address a potential lacuna in the existing reporting restrictions framework which was remarked upon by the High Court in the case of MXB v East Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust. The court commented that information that would normally be prohibited from publication in a newspaper could be published and made available to the public via Facebook or Twitter. The present position therefore appears to be not entirely clear, although it may conceivably become clearer in the light of further developments in case law. However, we know that the publication of information through online content is in many ways quite different from the more traditional forms of communication that Sections 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 were intended to cover. For example, information can now be published, updated, viewed and replicated almost instantaneously in a way that could not have been envisaged by Parliament many decades ago.
However, the ability to view such information may be restricted by the author of the online content to a very limited set of individuals indeed. We must be mindful of the boundary between private correspondence via e-mail, which the current youth reporting restrictions framework, rightly, in no way seeks to curtail, and publication to the world at large. It is worth noting that, in its recent reports on the law of contempt, the Law Commission considered what statutory definition might capture online content and identified a drafting solution very different from that put forward by the noble Lord. I wish to reassure noble Lords that the Government are aware of the concern that has been raised and are giving further thought to this very technical and complex issue. In light of that assurance, I hope that, in due course, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
As to criminal investigations, Amendment 48B, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to commence Section 44 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which has been on the statute book for some time. Section 44 applies whenever a criminal investigation begins into an alleged offence and means that no information enabling the identification of a young person under 18 suspected of committing the offence may be reported by the media. Section 44 also gives the Secretary of State the power to extend the protection to children and young people who are alleged to have been the victims of, or witnesses to, a criminal offence but only by means of an affirmative order. Hansard indicates that on 29 June 1999, during Committee stage in the other place, the affirmative procedure in respect of victims and witnesses was introduced by the Opposition when in government. A number of objections were raised in respect of Section 44 and were considered in a process in which parliamentary scrutiny went hand in hand with discussions with the print and broadcast media. I have recently received letters from the Newspaper Society and the BBC outlining similar misgivings.
During what I referred to as hand-in-hand discussions, it was suggested that it may be time to look at whether the media’s own regulatory arrangements to protect vulnerable young people could be strengthened in a way that is specific to young people who might be harmed by publicity about crime. Given the significant restriction that Section 44 potentially imposes on the freedom of the press and the possibility that its aims might be achievable through other means, it was determined that Section 44 should be extended to victims and witnesses only after both Houses had been given the opportunity to debate the issue again. Since then, the section has never been commenced and guidance and regulations have been pursued instead.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that response, which I found constructive in a number of respects. On Amendment 48A, the noble Lord said that he would give further thought to this matter and pointed out the issue of the amendment being so broadly worded that it might include private correspondence by e-mail. I acknowledge the point: the matter needs to be looked at more carefully.
On Amendments 48B and 48C, the noble Lord referred to the previous Government introducing the affirmative procedure and the adoption of new self-regulation procedures within the media. These are probing amendments and we on these Benches will consider whether to bring them back on Report. I acknowledge the points that the noble Lord made in addressing them and I was pleased with his response to Amendment 48D, when he said clearly that he wants to revisit the issue on Report. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 48A.
My amendment would give 17 year-olds detained by the police the right to be held in local authority accommodation rather than a police station. I draw the Committee’s attention to the “Newsnight” programme broadcast on Monday 14 July, in which parents whose children had been affected by the current arrangements spoke very movingly about their experiences. I would be glad to furnish your Lordships with a link to that. Certainly, I will make it my job to ensure that those taking part in the debate have that link.
Children under the age of 17 already have the right to be placed in local authority accommodation, and for good reason. Police custody is an unsuitable environment for children. It is a highly intimidating environment and staff are not trained to support vulnerable children, unlike in local authority accommodation. Recent cases have demonstrated the terrible consequences that can result from detaining children in such an unsuitable environment at what is a deeply frightening time for them.
Kesia Leatherbarrow was a vulnerable 17 year-old. Her inquest has not yet taken place but we know that she was discovered dead in a garden in December 2013, after being arrested and held in a police cell for three days. Kesia was arrested for possession of cannabis and criminal damage. She was kept in custody at Ashton police station over the weekend before being sent to Tameside magistrates’ court on the Monday morning. She was bailed to return the following day, when the youth court would be sitting, but died shortly afterwards. Being held in the more supportive environment of local authority accommodation might have made all the difference. She could still be with us today.
Seventeen year-olds can appear very adult, but they are not: they are children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is clear on this point—children are those below the age of 18, and all are entitled to the same protections. A 17 year-old should not be treated differently from any other child. However, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act is inconsistent on this point. The police station is the only remaining part of the criminal justice system where 17 year-olds are not uniformly recognised as children. The one other part where an anomaly exists—the Criminal Justice Act 1991 in relation to cautioning—will be amended by this Bill.
In police stations, 17 year-olds have some of the protections afforded to children but not all. This is an ongoing issue and one which the Home Secretary has said she will resolve. However, I am disappointed that she has not yet done so, despite a clear ruling from the High Court. In 2013, in the case of HC v Home Secretary, Lord Justice Moses ruled that it is unlawful for 17 year-olds in the police station to be treated as adults and denied the protection of having a parent or other adult with them, which is given to younger children. The court ruled that they must not be treated as if they were adults. In particular, they must be allowed to have a parent or appropriate adult with them. After the case, the Home Office accepted the court’s ruling and gave assurances that it would conduct a full review of all laws that treated arrested 17 year-olds as adults, not just the provision of an appropriate adult. For example, in a letter to Nick Lawton, whose son Joe killed himself after being treated as an adult in police custody, the Home Secretary wrote:
“We will ensure that in future that 17 year olds will receive the appropriate assistance and support while they are in police custody”.
Then in response to a Parliamentary Question in October 2013 the Minister for policing said:
“We will consider all legislation which appears to treat 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice system and bring forward legislative proposals as necessary”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/10/13; col. 65W.]
Despite these assurances, the Home Secretary has so far made only limited changes that were specified by the High Court, which means that 17 year-olds now have the right to have a parent with them, as I have mentioned.
The point of most concern is the fact that young people have no right to be transferred to local authority accommodation even if the police are concerned about them and can see that they are very vulnerable. The police still do not have the right to make such a transfer. This is the matter that my amendment addresses. The parents of Kesia Leatherbarrow, along with the parents of Joe Lawton and Eddie Thornber, two other children who died after being treated as adults in police custody, are campaigning to get the Home Secretary to make the changes necessary to ensure that 17 year-olds are always treated as children in law. A recent letter to the Home Secretary said:
“I personally am very upset and feel wronged by both your letters because you have only changed one part of the code and failed to take the steps to get Parliament to amend any other relevant legislation. Had you looked into and changed all the legislation, as you intimated in your letter to me, there was a good chance that Kesia would be with us today. You could include in the current Bill before Parliament changes to Section 38(6) of PACE about the transfer to local authority care as opposed to being kept in a police cell overnight … We are distraught that another 17 year old has died unnecessarily when you as Home Secretary were fully aware of your duty to 17 year olds. While we cannot bring back our own children, we will not stop campaigning on this issue until every piece of legislation that treats 17 year olds as adults in the criminal justice system is amended to give the most vulnerable among us the help we are entitled to under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other laws”.
We owe it to these families and to 17 year-olds throughout the country to ensure that they have the protection to which they are entitled. The right to local authority accommodation is a fundamental protection that is available to all other children, and I hope that the Government will make good on their promises and accept my amendment. I recognise that they have been looking at this issue, I beg the Minister to bring something into this legislation, perhaps by the time we reach Report. We can then be confident that no more young lives will be lost in these circumstances. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support this amendment. I urge the Minister, before we reach Report, to take the opportunity to contact a really wonderful NGO, Just for Kids Law, which is run by a remarkable set of lawyers led by Shauneen Lambe. The lawyers have been supporting and sometimes acting as intervenors in cases involving young people of 17 who are being kept in custody or interrogated without an accompanying adult. Anyone who is the parent of a teenager or whose children were recently teenagers knows that at that age a person is on the cusp of adulthood. They are moving out of childhood and into adulthood. It is often a very difficult stage where young people appear to be very mature and yet at the same time they are childlike and vulnerable, as the noble Earl said. I know that the Home Secretary and the Home Office have been looking at this issue—I see that the Minister is nodding his head in confirmation. For some time there has been a problem around the ages defined in different pieces of legislation. I would urge the Government to look at this amendment closely. Even if a categorical answer cannot be given to us today, I hope that the opportunity is taken to speak to the people at Just for Kids Law because they really know their stuff in this area. They have all the details about the families who suffer so terribly at the loss of their children.
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Listowel. Article 1, as he said, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as a person under the age of 18. In 2010 the Government made a commitment to have regard to children’s rights when developing law and policy affecting children. In the majority of the youth justice system, 17 year-olds are rightly treated as children and so are entitled to the same protection as all other children. The police station is the only part of the criminal justice system where 17 year-olds are not—uniformly, at any rate—recognised as children.
At present, one other anomaly remains: 17 year-olds are still not entitled to the protection afforded to other children when they are cautioned. However, I think we all welcome the fact that Clause 32 rectifies that. Of particular concern is the fact that if they are detained by the police, 17 year-olds are not entitled to a local authority bed—my noble friend made the point firmly that they must still be detained in police custody.
Police custody is an intimidating and frightening environment that is unsuitable for children, particularly the sort of children who are as damaged as those who are likely to be in that situation. We have heard about the tragic consequences that can result, and I offer my condolences to the family of Kesia Leatherbarrow, the 17 year-old who was found dead following detention in police custody. By contrast, local authority accommodation has trained staff. As my noble friend Lord Listowel has mentioned on many occasions, trained staff are important in such situations. They are more supportive and far more appropriate.
I cannot see the rationale for denying 17 year-olds access to local authority beds. It is clearly desirable and is in keeping with the UNCRC. The Government are still making progress in other areas to ensure that 17 year-olds are treated as children in the youth justice system—for instance, under Clause 32. I urge them to do the same with regard to the provision of local authority beds, and to accept the amendment.
My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and to other noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, for raising a matter of concern and for pointing out the inconsistency that now applies, particularly in regard to the welcome change that the Bill incorporates, and to which other noble Lords have referred, about having an appropriate adult present when a 17 year-old is being charged or interviewed.
Noble Lords have spoken in moving terms about the problems faced by vulnerable young people in the circumstances that the amendment addresses. Clearly, from their point of view, it would be highly desirable for a different sort of accommodation to be made available. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who has not participated in the debate, might agree that it is better from the police’s point of view if they do not have responsibility in an area where, as the noble Baroness has just pointed out, they do not have the expertise to look after vulnerable young people who might be capable of inflicting harm upon themselves in a difficult and unusual situation.
Both sides of the equation, as it were, argue for a change and a degree of consistency across the legislative framework. It would, however, be desirable, if it has not yet been undertaken, to consult with the Local Government Association representing local authorities in England and Wales to ensure that the local authorities have an awareness that this will, necessarily, impinge to some degree upon their responsibilities, and for an adjustment to be made in the financing that would no doubt be required to provide a safe, temporary haven for these young people before they make their court appearance. If the Minister is unable to give an unequivocal response today, I join others in hoping that, between now and Report, matters might be progressed.
This may be seen primarily as a matter for the Home Office but it is clearly of interest for the Ministry of Justice and I hope that the two departments between them—possibly with, as I said, the involvement of the Department for Communities and Local Government and maybe even the Department for Education, which has a potential interest in respect of children’s services—might come to a fairly rapid conclusion about what is not an inherently complex matter in a way that would satisfy the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and, more particularly, those who have undergone a traumatic experience with their own children and do not wish to see that repeated in respect of other 17 year-olds and their families.
My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the contribution that the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has made to our debates generally on the plight of young people, particularly those who are or have been in care, who, sadly, often find themselves in the position that this amendment particularly focuses on. I join others in expressing the Government’s deepest sympathy with the family of Kesia Leatherbarrow. It was, as all noble Lords have pointed out, a tragic case.
The main purpose of the amendment is to include, within the definition of “arrested juvenile” in Part 4 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 17 year-olds in the context of police detention following charge. I acknowledge that although 17 year-olds may often appear confident and adult, that can conceal vulnerability, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, pointed out. In line with the current treatment of 10 to 16 year-olds the amendment would have the effect of requiring a 17 year-old who has been charged and denied bail to be transferred to local authority accommodation when it is both appropriate and practicable for the police to do so.
I understand that this proposed amendment, which has at its heart a laudable intention, is related to the Hughes Cousins-Chang High Court ruling of April last year. The Government did not appeal that ruling and accepted the findings of the court, which related solely to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act codes of practice C and H. Specifically, the ruling required that 17 year-olds, when arrested on suspicion of committing an offence, must be provided with an appropriate adult and have a parent or guardian informed of their detention. The Government made these changes in full as soon as possible, allowing for the statutory obligation to consult on all changes to the PACE codes, and these provisions were made mandatory in October.
Since the implementation of the High Court ruling, the Government made clear their commitment to review the primary legislation relating to the treatment of 17 year- olds as adults in the criminal justice system. This was to consider whether changes should be made for similar reasons. I can confirm, as noble Lords have already indicated, that an internal review has already been launched and that the work is continuing. Whereas this amendment concerns specifically the case of detention following charge, the review covers all the legislation where 17 year-olds are treated as adults in the criminal justice system. It includes, for example, Section 65 of PACE, which relates to the age at which a person can give their independent consent to the taking of fingerprints, impressions of footwear, and intimate and non-intimate samples at the police station.
The Home Office review also covers the consequential changes that would need to be made to other legislation should 17 year-olds be regarded as juveniles. For example, an amendment to Section 37(15) of PACE, which is the proposition here, would also require amendments to the Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991, the Bail Act 1976, the regulations of 1991, the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, and so on. These are just some examples, for which other departments have responsibility. Those examples demonstrate the breadth and complexity of the legislation, which needs to be properly thought through before change is made.
It is of the utmost importance that any change in the law is workable in practice and not merely symbolic. We need to be sure, for example, that local authority accommodation will be available to 17 year-olds were the law to be changed, that adequate transportation exists and that police officers are trained properly to understand the requirements of this change. The appropriate adult change, which has been referred to, is considerably less complicated operationally than that which is the subject of this amendment. Any amendment to primary legislation needs to be subject to proper consultation, appropriate consideration and full scrutiny by Parliament. This amendment, though laudable in its aims, represents, we respectfully say, a somewhat hurried approach to the issue of how we treat people at the age of 17 at the front end of the criminal justice system.
The noble Baroness, Lady Howe, referred to the police’s knowledge of young people in dealing with 17 year-olds. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, tried to elicit a contribution from my noble friend Lord Paddick as to the unsuitability of the police to deal with 17 year-olds.
In fairness, I was not saying that the police were not suitable but that it is placing an undue burden upon them. That is a rather different point.
I stand corrected by the noble Lord. I would remind the House nevertheless that the police are under a duty, under Section 11 of the Children Act 2004, to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. The statutory guidance accompanying Section 11 makes clear that these arrangements include adequate training and dealing with children aged under 18.
While this is clearly an important issue and one that the Government take extremely seriously, for the reasons that I have given I am unable to commit myself to having an answer by Report. I hope that we will have, but I am afraid that I am unable to give that commitment. I can say that the review is a matter of importance and will be thoroughly undertaken. I hope that, with that reassurance, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his careful and considered reply and his kind words to me. Perhaps he could write to me on whether or not he has a final date for the internal review. I am grateful to the Minister for his considered and sympathetic response to the amendment. I will take away what he says and consider it over the Recess. I thank all the noble Lords who spoke in the debate for their contribution and for their support for the amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the Government have tabled a total of 14 minor and technical amendments to this clause, Clauses 38 and 39 and Schedule 7. As noble Lords will be aware, the intention is to introduce a new single justice procedure alongside the current written charge and requisition procedure. These changes are necessary in order to ensure that our new procedure fits together with some older provisions on the summary justice procedure in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.
Amendment 49 is essentially a drafting amendment, clarifying that the single justice procedure notice must be served on a designated court officer, rather than a court building.
Amendment 50 relates to an issue raised during the House of Commons Committee about the information sent with the notice about the defendant’s DVLA record in cases involving driving offences. We undertook to consider this further and ensure that the provisions allow a single justice to view a defendant’s driving record before sentencing, as is currently the case under the written charge and requisition procedure. We believe the current drafting is too restrictive, so this amendment introduces a new provision that will enable a single justice to try cases using documents that have been described to the defendant, as well as those served on the defendant. It makes clear that in order to rely on any previous convictions, the prosecution must give the accused notice of their intention to do so at the time of serving the single justice procedure notice.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has tabled an amendment to Amendment 50. As I have said, Amendment 50 allows the prosecution to give notice to the defendant of their intention to rely on certain information. The noble Lord’s amendment would limit that information to information that is specified as relevant to the charge.
With great respect to him, I do not think that amendment is necessary. The existing and cardinal rule of evidence will of course apply: all evidence which is irrelevant or insufficiently relevant to the facts in issue should be excluded. It has never been our intention, in tabling Amendment 50, to depart from these rules. Prosecutors can be trusted, as they currently are under the written charge and requisition procedure, to abide by these rules and put before the court only information relevant to the case.
The weight attached to the evidence will remain a matter for the single justice, on the advice of his or her legal adviser. We have introduced further safeguards, which I will come to in a moment, to make clear that a single justice can, of course, consider the nature of the evidence when deciding whether to refer a case to a traditionally constituted magistrates’ court. Therefore, if the single justice has doubts or concerns about the evidence before him or her, he or she can refer the case to a Bench of two or even three magistrates. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, not to move his amendment.
Amendment 53 relates to Amendment 50 and provides further clarification on admissibility. The principle behind Amendment 53 is that evidence is admissible as long as it has been served on the accused at the same time as the single justice procedure notice. This provision also introduces additional safeguards in Section 16F(2), which points a single justice to consider whether he or she should proceed with a case under the new procedure where the nature of the evidence suggests that it would be not be appropriate to do so.
Amendment 51 introduces a provision that makes explicit that, where the accused has indicated that he or she wishes to plead guilty in their response to the single justice procedure notice, the court can try the case as though the accused has indeed pleaded guilty.
Amendment 52 provides some clarification to new Sections 16B(1) and 16C(1), which are to be inserted in the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 by Clause 38. It makes clear that there are two distinct occasions when a single justice will consider the appropriateness of using the single justice procedure: prior to conviction and post conviction. This amendment aims to avoid the situation where a single justice may decide to refer a case to a traditional magistrates’ court simply because it would be inappropriate to sentence without first having convicted and issued a summons in the proper way.
Amendment 54 adds to the range of sentencing powers available to a single justice in respect of driving offences resulting in penalty points on an offender’s licence.
The next set of amendments modifies current legislative provisions to ensure that they operate effectively in cases heard under the single justice procedure. Amendment 57 makes changes to Section 11 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which provides that a court cannot impose a disqualification from driving in the absence of the defendant unless a hearing has resumed after an adjournment. Where a single justice is considering imposing a driving disqualification, and the defendant has indicated they wish to make representations on that, the single justice will already have adjourned the case and summonsed the defendant to a traditional magistrates’ court. This amendment ensures that the traditional magistrates’ court can decide the case without having to go through the process of adjourning it again.
Amendment 58 provides that in any case where the single justice considers that the accused is “likely” to have been misled by a variance between the written charge and the evidence presented by the prosecutor, the matter is no longer appropriate for consideration under the single justice procedure and should be referred to a traditional magistrates’ court. This will ensure that a less stringent test applies for cases dealt with under the new procedure.
Amendments 59 and 60 apply to cases involving prosecutions for traffic offences which may result in disqualification from driving. They concern the requirements in such cases for the defendant to present his or her driving licence to the court on the day of the trial. These arrangements are set out in Section 7 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Amendment 59 modifies these arrangements for cases heard under the single justice procedure. Instead of having to present their driving licence on the date of the trial, defendants will be required to present their licence post conviction once they have been notified by the court of the intention to disqualify. Amendment 60 is a consequential amendment resulting from these modified arrangements. It provides that in cases where the defendant has been issued with a receipt after having surrendered their driving licence in relation to another offence, it would be appropriate for them to produce this receipt instead of their driving licence.
The final set of amendments is purely consequential amendments to other legislation. Amendment 56 enables a summons to be served in Scotland and Northern Ireland following a decision by a single justice that it is no longer appropriate to continue trying a case under the single justice procedure. Amendments 61 to 63 ensure that the single justice procedure applies to Section 68 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993, Section 55 of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 and Section 164 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
As I have indicated, all these amendments are necessary to ensure that the single justice procedure works effectively, that it works well alongside other relevant provisions within our legislative framework and that it works in a way which continues to protect the rights of defendants. I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome the Government’s move to single justice procedures. I have sat on many hundreds of these types of cases and it is absolutely not necessary for three justices to sit to make such determinations.
I have three amendments—the noble Lord referred to them in his comments—which the Magistrates’ Association has asked me to put forward to clarify particular issues. As the noble Lord said, Amendment 50A is an amendment to the Government’s amendment which seeks to add that specified and relevant information should be made available to the court. The concern raised by the Magistrates’ Association is that magistrates should have access to the right information, such as DVLA records, as appropriate. The amendment was worded in a wider sense because if one was dealing with television licences one would need information on non-payment. The amendment is to ensure that magistrates, when sentencing, have specific and relevant information in front of them.
Amendments 50B and 51A would require the court to give public notice of trials under the single justice procedure and to publish the outcomes of these trials. I know the Magistrates’ Association has been consulted fully on these changes and everyone is aware that we are dealing with high volume, low level regulatory cases more than anything else. Nevertheless, it is important that these cases are dealt with properly and that the public should have confidence in our legal system. Therefore they need to know when the trials are happening and the results of those trials. The purpose of the amendments is to provide some clarity on what the Government intend to do in making sure that the trials and their results are well published.
As the Minister pointed out in his comments, if anyone turns up for a trial, the matter would be put off to be dealt with by a Bench of three. That is, of course, right and proper.
It is some 23 years since I last appeared before Newcastle magistrates. I should make it clear that I was in a professional capacity, although I had the pleasure recently of seeing them in a political capacity. As I think I mentioned at Second Reading, I attended a meeting of what is now the Northumbria Bench—in the current state of play, of course, there is no longer just a local Newcastle Bench. Unlike my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who of course has long experience as a sitting magistrate, I was initially attracted to the notion that some have suggested; namely, that, although the procedure is generally to be welcomed, it should be not one magistrate but two who sit on these matters. However, I am persuaded not only by the eloquence and logic of my noble friend but, perhaps more relevantly, by the almost unanimous opinion of the local Bench in Newcastle and Northumbria that such a precaution is unnecessary.
There are, however, a number of issues, which are the subject of amendments to which I shall now refer. The first of those is Amendment 49A, which would ensure that there is a proper procedure for determining which offences can be tried under the new system. It is obviously sensible for many of the offences which have been canvassed in discussion—television licences and matters of that sort—to be dealt with in this way, but the amendment would require that the issues be determined by regulations and approved by Parliament. We do not want added to the list for disposal in this way matters which are not necessarily the first that come to mind as more or less formalities. It would not be asking too much of the Government for them to indicate what they intend and how many offences and for them to proceed by way of regulation. In this case, the negative procedure would be quite acceptable.
Amendment 49B would remove the automatic paper trial if the defendant did not respond to the notice that would have been given. There is a potential for difficulty to be encountered here if, for example, the defendant does not understand English or the purport of the document. What is sought in the amendment is that failure to respond would not itself trigger the automatic transfer to dealing with the case on the papers.
Amendment 49C, on the provision of evidence in respect of vehicle licensing cases, would require the court to be satisfied with the position as recorded by the DVLA, so that the defendant would have an opportunity to say that matters had been dealt with on the basis of the DVLA providing information. It is a relatively modest requirement.
I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this useful debate. In addition to my response and the moving of government amendments, the debate has enabled the Government to place on record the rationale behind these provisions, which are broadly welcomed. I am reassured to hear, as I knew was the case, that the Magistrates’ Association is very much in sympathy with this, as are magistrates such as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and Newcastle magistrates’ court, which, sadly, misses the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. There is general consensus that this is a move in the right direction. Nevertheless, I also understand that there is the feeling that there should be safeguards to ensure that there is no sense that these hearings take place behind closed doors unless it is entirely appropriate that that should be the case.
I shall deal first with Amendment 49A, which seeks to require that the list of offences to which the new single justice procedure should apply is set out in secondary legislation. Our intention is that all summary, only non-imprisonable, offences should be in scope of the procedure. However, we anticipate this procedure being used only in the more straightforward cases, such as where the particular circumstances of the case mean there is no direct victim or specific threat to public safety involved, or cases that involve offences designed to regulate the conduct of some particular activity in the public interest where there is a minimal or no mental requirement needed to prosecute. In legal terms, this would mean cases where there is no mens rea or it is easy to prove mens rea.
We expect offences that are technically in scope of the legislation but which might not be suitable for the new procedure to be initially filtered out by prosecutors who make decisions on the handling of these types of cases on a daily basis. It will, of course, be for a single justice to decide whether a case is appropriate for this procedure, and he or she can refer it to the ordinary court at any time. I fully understand the temptation to try to limit or specify a list of offences to which the single justice procedure might apply. However, we have high-quality magistracy in this country who are well used to exercising their powers to determine the right forum within which cases should be heard.
Amendment 49B relates to the rights of the defendant under the single justice procedure. Our provisions allow the court to use the single justice procedure unless the defendant explicitly states that he or she does not want that to happen or intends to plead not guilty, in which case it will automatically be referred to a traditional magistrates’ court. The objective of the single justice procedure is to address the current situation, whereby a significant number of defendants fail to engage with the process at all. Although the effect of the amendment would be to allow a single justice to consider any case, regardless of the defendant’s response, I understand that the intention is to remove the ability of the single justice to hear cases where the defendant has not responded. I recognise that this may be in response to concerns about the assumption that, where a defendant does not engage, the case should nevertheless still be heard by a single justice. However, it should be remembered that the defendant will have the right to request a traditional hearing in open court at any point before his or her case is considered by the single justice. If a defendant does not know about the case until after it is finished, they can make a statutory declaration to that effect, which will start the proceedings again from the beginning.
Amendment 49C would introduce a new requirement that the documents sent to the defendant with the single justice procedure notice should include a copy of the submission from the DVLA informing the court of any penalty points on the defendant’s driver record. It is the explicit responsibility of the holder of a driving licence to ensure that it is kept up to date by surrendering it as and when required for details to be changed or endorsements added. If there are endorsements on a driving record that do not appear on the counterpart of the corresponding driving licence, the licence holder might well be committing a further separate offence. I assure noble Lords that courts will have direct access to DVLA records. The days that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, remembers of a moth-eaten driving licence being handed up to the justices have departed. A single justice will have information about an offender’s previous offences before them when trying a motoring offence.
My Lords, I am sorry to disabuse the noble Lord, but those days are not departed. In fact, it is far more common for the defendant not to be able to produce a driving licence at all.
I defer to the noble Lord’s experience in that regard, although the new format of the driving licence makes it slightly less destructible than its predecessor. I maintain nevertheless that the courts do have access to the DVLA records, so, when trying a motoring offence, a single justice will have the information even if the defendant does not produce a driving licence at all. I am therefore confident that the safeguards we have built into this procedure make the amendment unnecessary.
Amendment 50AA would remove the provision that a court can decide a case under the single justice procedure other than in open court. That would undermine one of the main drivers behind this policy. We consider the time wasted and costs incurred in requiring magistrates to sit in open court and decide cases disproportionate in the type of straightforward, low-level cases that this procedure will apply to. Safeguards are in place to enable a prosecutor to ensure a case is heard in open court by issuing a requisition and a defendant to ensure the same by indicating his or her wishes in response to the single justice procedure notice. I reassure the noble Lord that the fact that a case is heard under the single justice procedure will not impact on the court’s duty to ensure that proceedings are open and transparent. The press and public will continue to have access to information about these cases, as they do now.
Amendment 50C would allow a single justice to hear and consider evidence from a party to the case if they turn up when the single justice is considering the case. In practice, parties will not know when a case will be considered by a single justice under this new procedure, so it is extremely unlikely that this situation would occur. However, there is a risk that it could be seen as encouraging prosecutors to turn up and assist the court. That could be perceived as unfair and unequal, particularly if the case was being heard other than in open court. We could not allow evidence to be heard by a magistrate when a single justice was making a decision, as that would lead to unfairness if the other party had not been given the opportunity to consider that evidence. In any case, there is clear provision in the Bill stating that when a person wants to be heard by a magistrates’ court, they are perfectly able to request a hearing.
Amendment 51B would introduce a legislative requirement to publish in advance details of cases to be heard under the single justice procedure and to publish the outcome of these cases. It is, of course, vital that the media and the public continue to have access to information on these cases under the new single justice procedure. However, the appropriate place for such provisions is within the Criminal Procedure Rules. Those make it clear that certain specified information must be made available to journalists and other members of the public on request. The rules also allow the court to make certain additional case information available to third parties on request. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee will be invited to review the Criminal Procedure Rules to make sure that they are fit for purpose for the single justice procedure.
I can reassure the noble Lord that the fact that a case is heard under the single justice procedure will not impact on the court’s duty to ensure the proceedings are open and transparent. The press and public will continue to have access to information about cases, as they do now. There is a protocol in place between Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, the Newspaper Society and the Society of Editors whereby magistrates’ courts routinely make written lists of cases and results available to local media, most often by e-mail. This arrangement will continue.
Amendment 52A introduces another condition on which a defendant can make a statutory declaration so that, in addition to being unaware of the proceedings, the defendant can state that they did not understand the information contained in the single justice procedure notice and the accompanying documents. This deals with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about things such as language difficulties. The associated documentation sent to defendants under the single justice procedure will be no more complex that the documentation which is currently sent in this type of case; indeed, we are confident that the flexibility afforded by this new procedure will enable us to make the whole system for these cases more easily understood by defendants. As with the existing process, prosecutors have developed strategies to identify those who may require further assistance and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is also considering, as part of implementation planning, how it will continue to discharge its duty to provide assistance to unrepresented defendants. The provisions, as set out, provide magistrates’ courts with the flexibility they need to operate the single magistrate procedure effectively while ensuring that the rights of defendants are protected.
I will say a little more about the suggestion put forward by the noble Lord about the availability of information on case outcomes. I agree that the information should be available as soon as possible after the trial has concluded. In both cases, the noble Lord suggests that this should be within 21 days. However, such detailed procedure should not be contained within the legislation itself. As I said earlier, the appropriate place for such detail is within the Criminal Procedure Rules.
We know that journalists and the general public seldom attend to watch this type of hearing and this is the reason behind the protocol to which I referred. As to the listing, we accept that it is vital for there to be access to information and we anticipate that cases will initially be listed in the same court buildings as they are at the moment. This arrangement with local media will replicate exactly what currently happens in practice. In future, we will want to take advantage of the fact that consideration of cases in writing can happen anywhere, and maximise the efficiency that can be derived from this greater flexibility. In doing so, we will want to maintain flexibility and transparency.
There are opportunities, as part of the criminal justice system digitisation agenda, to look more radically at how we can use the opportunities of digital to preserve and perhaps enhance open justice. It is our intention to make case information available on a self-service basis and enable the press and public to access cases in real time and follow the progress of the digital process online in a more meaningful way than they can at present. The rule committee will be invited to review the rules to ensure they are fit for purpose for the single justice procedure. I am sure that such a review will want to take into account the proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Any necessary amendments can be made, subject to annulment by either House of Parliament in the usual way.
I hope that, in the course of rather too long a response to those amendments, I have been able to allay any concerns and explain the thinking behind the single justice procedure. With that reassurance, I hope noble Lords will not press the amendment.
That was a very thorough response for which I am extremely grateful, but one thought has just occurred to me in relation to some of the noble Lord’s later remarks. I may be wrong, but I understand that it is possible that some of these cases will be taken, as it were, to some other court and thus will not necessarily be heard in the place where the offence was committed. Perhaps I have misunderstood the noble Lord, but if that is right, does that not make the question of the openness of the process in terms of recording the outcome more difficult? There will not be a local reporter in, say, Newcastle for a case that has been transferred from there to Middlesbrough. Perhaps the noble Lord could look into this because I would be interested to hear his views on it. I think that it would be regrettable. If we are to have this process, it should be based in the local court where the offence occurred and where it would normally be dealt with.
Perhaps I may look into that and confirm the position in writing to all those who have taken part in this debate.
My Lords, I can be quite brief. This amendment arises from a conversation which began at Second Reading when the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I identified the problem of children and vulnerable adults who are dependent on an adult who is sentenced to a prison sentence being left without support when the offender is sent to prison. It is estimated that some 200,000 children have a parent in prison at any one time, which is nearly three times the number of children in the care system. They are twice as likely as other children to experience behaviour and mental health problems, and three times as likely to go on to commit an offence themselves. Sixty-five per cent of boys with a convicted father will themselves go on to offend. Therefore, there is an obvious need for these people to be picked up and supported, yet there is no official way of identifying them or ensuring that their need for support is taken care of.
Organisations such as Barnardo’s and other members of the Families Left Behind campaign report from their work in prisons that a lack of identification of the children or vulnerable adults dependent on a parent or carer remanded in custody or sentenced to imprisonment often puts the child or vulnerable adult at risk. They have records of cases where children have been left with friends or neighbours as a temporary measure and are then passed on to other friends or associates; cases where children have been left with individuals who misuse drugs and alcohol; cases of children left at school with no one to collect them and with no one contacting the school; and cases of children left with elderly relatives, relatives with disabilities, relatives in distress or relatives living in poverty who have offered to step in to provide emergency care but do not really have the resources to do so.
In the past, the probation service would have stepped in to bridge the gap but, with the probation service progressively becoming more of an offender management and less of a social service, a vacuum has opened up. In 2011, with the support of the NSPCC, Action for Prisoners’ Families and HM Courts and Tribunals Service, Pact published a range of resources aimed at promoting good practice in relation to children and dependent adults whose primary carers had been sent to prison, including guidance asking magistrates to check that there were no immediate welfare needs. Three years on, however, it is clear that many courts are not following this guidance, and there continues to be a lack of awareness of the need to make sure that arrangements are in place for the care of children and dependants of people placed in custody. Accordingly, the Families Left Behind campaign is calling for a statutory duty to be placed on courts to ask an individual, when they are sentenced to prison or held on remand, whether they have any dependants. If they do, steps can then be taken to ensure that appropriate care arrangements are in place.
At Second Reading, the Minister acknowledged the problem and undertook to consider it. I am very grateful to him for the constructive discussions he has made possible and to the members of the Bill team for the positive contribution they have made and for all their help in getting the amendment right. As a result, I am hopeful that we now have an amendment that the Government can broadly support. The Minister felt that a statutory duty might be a bit heavy-handed and suggested that the amendment might be better couched in terms of guidance. Accordingly, the amendment now seeks to achieve its effect through directions, although I note that the word “duty” remains in the heading of the proposed new clause. The Minister may have something to say about that.
The amendment would amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Bail Act 1976 to put in place a system for courts to establish whether an individual sentenced to prison or held on remand has children or vulnerable adults who are dependent on them and who may need immediate welfare support. The proposal is that, immediately following the decision to send someone to prison, the defendant will be asked by the court whether they have children or vulnerable adults dependent on them and, if so, whether care arrangements are in place. If there are no such arrangements, the defendant will be given the opportunity to make a phone call to family members to inform them about the situation and make the necessary short-term arrangements, such as for collecting a child from school or nursery, or ensuring that they are not left at home alone. If this does not achieve a satisfactory result, the court should direct an appropriately qualified person in the court—for example, probation staff, the defendant’s legal representative, court staff, a voluntary sector organisation or a police liaison officer—to take specific action before the defendant leaves court. Where necessary, this may entail contacting the appropriate local authority children’s or adult social care team.
I hope the amendment may give us a basis for moving ahead consensually on a matter which, once pointed out, has prompted concern across the whole House. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Low, in this matter and I am grateful to the Minister for the co-operation that he and his office have shown in relation to the amendment.
I declare an interest as the chairman of the Thames Valley Partnership, a criminal justice organisation which, as it says on the tin, is in the Thames Valley. I came across this problem in relation to some of the partnership’s work, as there is at the moment absolutely no statutory requirement for anyone, for instance, to inform a school that a child attending the school has a parent who is now in prison. The failure to do this is also often compounded by the embarrassment of the other parent. She is not going to mention it but the other children in the playground will know who has just had their father sent to prison and the bullying and exclusion start. This relatively short amendment, which imposes the lightest of requirements on the sentencers, fills an obvious lacuna.
I apologise to the House that I was not in attendance for the first 30 seconds of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Low, so I do not know whether he mentioned the fact that the numbers are vast—200,000 children, which is three times the number in care. Obviously, that is not every year in terms of sentences but there is a long-term impact. Some of the work done by the Thames Valley Partnership shows that children increasingly, as they grow older into their teenage years, lose contact with the parent in long-term custody.
I hope the Government will accept the amendment. I understand there are a number of routes we can take between now and Report. Whether this is done through statute or practice direction, I hope that we can close the gap which leaves children vulnerable when some parts of the agencies of the state know what has happened but are not talking to one another.
My Lords, my name is on the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Low, has made a powerful speech. I do not intend to repeat his arguments and I shall not detain the Committee long.
In this case we must surely be seeking a balance. There is the need to ensure that the position of children or dependents of a person detained in custody is properly protected at a time of considerable trauma and family disturbance. The impact on the children of a parent, particularly a mother, going to jail has been well documented—it has been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Low, and in briefings that your Lordships will have received from Barnardo’s and other NGOs—and that is one side of the balance. The other side of the balance is that we have to do this without tying up the courts in extensive bureaucratic form filling, much of which is time consuming and may prove ineffective. It is the balance between those two considerations that Amendment 55A seeks to achieve.
All that remains for me to do is to thank the Minister, his officials and, indeed, the Government for the courtesy they have shown in considering this difficult matter. I hope that this redrafted amendment will commend itself to him.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Low, and other noble Lords on Amendment 55A. I do so having supported a similar amendment to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill in November 2013, to which an amendment was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, with my support. This is a straightforward request. It simply requires the courts to inquire whether individuals who are refused bail or are sentenced to prison have caring responsibilities for any children or vulnerable adults; and, if they do, to allow them or another—probably social services—to take the appropriate action to provide care and support. With representatives of the Families Left Behind campaign, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and I had a very good meeting with the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, who was very helpful and encouraging to us at that time. I was even more encouraged later when I received a reply to a letter I had sent to Lord Justice Gross, the senior presiding judge in England and Wales, who agreed to reissue existing guidelines to the courts on this matter. Although that is certainly most welcome, we need to underpin the whole issue with this amendment.
My Lords, I also support the noble Lord, Lord Low, and other noble Lords on Amendment 55A, which will help meet the needs of a vulnerable group of people. As we have heard, they are children and adults dependent on someone who is sent to prison. This amendment is supported by the Families Left Behind campaign, which includes a number of organisations that offer support to the children and families of offenders through direct provision of services, advocacy and research. One such organisation is the children’s charity Barnardo’s, and I declare an interest as one of its vice-presidents.
In an Oral Question last year, I asked the Government to give consideration to this issue by putting measures in place to protect vulnerable children. Barnardo’s has found that children of prisoners are a highly vulnerable group who are twice as likely to experience depression and problems with mental health, alcohol and drug abuse. They are more likely to live in poverty and poor accommodation or to be part of the care system. We have recently been hearing about how many children and young people have been abused while in care—something which destroyed their lives for ever and imprisoned them. Sadly, many of these young people go on to offend and are disproportionately represented among young offenders. These children suffer through no fault of their own.
The reasons for parental imprisonment often relate to family problems, including domestic violence or drug and alcohol abuse. This is not a perfect environment for any child to be brought up in. It can seem to them that the whole world is against them. Despite all this, there is currently no requirement to identify any child or dependent adult that an individual remanded or sentenced to prison may be leaving behind. Believe it or not, there is not even the slightest check on arrangements for their safety, care or well-being. Therefore, these children—as we have heard, there are around 200,000 of them—are unlikely to be offered any targeted support because often there is no record of them and no requirement to identify them. Disturbingly, they are not known to children’s services.
This is why Barnardo’s and the Families Left Behind campaign call for the introduction of a statutory duty on courts to ask whether an individual has dependants when they are sentenced or held on remand, in order that it can be confirmed that appropriate care arrangements are in place. This will not impact on courts’ resources or create any additional work. It will just be a case of asking two simple questions. Barnardo’s has found that defendants will not necessarily volunteer this information without being asked.
Therefore, I ask the Minister whether the Government will create a statutory duty on courts to identify defendants who have children dependent on them. By collecting this data, we will be better placed to detect vulnerable children with a parent in prison and ensure that these children get the support they need. Like the Families Left Behind campaign, I believe that Amendment 55A will ensure that children and adults are better protected when their loved ones are in prison.
My Lords, I, too, have had correspondence from those very concerned about this issue. I do not intend to take up your Lordships’ time by going further into this whole matter, but in as far as this is not already in place it clearly needs to be, and the sooner it is put into effect the better. I am still rather surprised that it does not exist automatically as a natural procedure in court.
My Lords, first, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for not being in the Chamber for the whole of his contribution. I wish to make a couple of points. The first is that this is good practice within magistrates’ courts at the moment. Certainly, every court I have sat in has made these inquiries. Nevertheless, I take the point that it may not be universal practice and it may not be a statutory requirement.
Secondly, I wanted to pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, about informing the schools and so on. It seems to me that this amendment does not go that far; all it does is allow the defendant to make a telephone call. Some of the defendants I see in front of me would make a telephone call, but one might not have confidence in the telephone call that they made. Therefore, I think there needs to be a more active inquiry by, for example, social services or the probation service about the possibility of dependants at home. Nevertheless, I agree with the objectives of the amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s response about the practicalities and also whether the amendment goes far enough.
I am delighted to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Low of Dalston, Lord Blair and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. With their wide range of experience they have correctly identified that, despite the best of intentions, the support of the Courts Service and of charities, in too many cases courts are not making sufficient checks with regard to the immediate welfare needs of children and dependent adults. The amendment seeks to put in the Bill what should happen at present but has clearly not been delivered in many cases, and that is a matter of much regret. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that this is a fairly small measure but it deals with an important issue that needs to be addressed.
My noble friend Lord Touhig told the House of a number of young people and children who were put into difficult situations because simple provisions were not in place. I agree also with many noble Lords when they said that the children of prisoners were a highly vulnerable group of people who need to be looked after.
As the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, explained to the Committee, the amendment will require the courts to inquire of a defendant who has been sentenced or remanded to prison whether they have dependants and whether arrangements have been made for them. If they have not, they would be allowed to make a phone call to make arrangements or, where that is not possible, the court could direct someone to take action before the defendant leaves court.
People sometimes need to be sent to prison. All this amendment does is to seek to ensure that adequate immediate provision is made for dependants. As the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, said, all we are requesting is for two simple questions to be asked. I do not think this amendment in any way places a burden on the courts that could not be handled. If the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is going to say that, I hope he will explain very carefully why he thinks that is the case and answer the point that I and other noble Lords have made in this debate, which is that the voluntary provision has failed and that continued failure is likely to cost far more to dependants and to their welfare.
I see the provision working fairly simply. When I sat in court as a magistrate, although that was some time ago, courts adjourned for all sorts of reasons. It is very easy for questions to be asked and action taken. It is also true that in many cases, especially if the defendant fully expects to receive a custodial sentence, arrangements for dependants will have already been made.
All we are looking for is a clear set of proportionate responses to come into play with the welfare of the dependants of someone who has received a custodial sentence at their heart. I hope that the Government can either accept this amendment or at least look at this issue again and the problems that have been identified before we come back to it on Report.
My Lords, the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Low and Lord Blair, and my noble friend Lord Hodgson, seeks to place a statutory duty on a court to inquire into the arrangements for care of dependants of those being sent into custody. I recognise that the proposed new clause is a revised version of one debated by this House during the passage of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill 2013. I welcome the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the interest that he continues to show in this important issue, just as I welcome the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, with her connections with Barnardo’s. I should also reiterate that I was grateful, too, for the opportunity to discuss some of the details of the previous version of this new clause, not the one that finds its way into the amendment, with the noble Lords whose names appear on the amendment, together with some staff from Barnardo’s.
As my noble friend and predecessor in this position, my noble friend Lord McNally, said last year, the Government completely understand the concern behind this proposed new clause. We should all be concerned with the welfare of children and other dependants of those who are about to be sent into custody. I do not disagree with anything noble Lords have said about the importance of protecting these children and vulnerable adults. We should all recognise that the children of those sent into custody can be subject to immediate risks to their welfare, and there is the risk that they themselves will fall into crime.
The Government support the desire to identify and ensure that children of offenders are cared for. Unfortunately, the Government cannot accept this new clause, even in its revised form, for the reasons that I will explain. The new amendment seeks, via an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to require the Lord Chief Justice to issue a practice direction under his powers in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. In this way, Parliament is being asked to approve a provision which would require the Lord Chief Justice to issue a practice direction and require the Lord Chief Justice to issue a direction with the particular content set out in this proposed new clause. This, noble Lords will appreciate, would amount to an inappropriate restriction on the Lord Chief Justice’s powers and discretion to issue practice directions which the Constitutional Reform Act is designed to protect. However, I understand the thinking behind this amendment and the Government agree that it would be better to approach this problem not by a statutory duty, but by more practical measures. This might include, via the independent bodies that are responsible for these things, guidance, practice directions or procedure rules.
We welcome the changes that noble Lords have made to the clause, which goes some way to addressing the concerns expressed in regard to the earlier version. We remain concerned, however, by the focus on post-sentence or post-remand consideration.
The proposed new clause applies only to the post-sentence process, or the process following the decision to withhold bail, but the existence of dependants is also of vital importance to the decision to remand or sentence to custody—in other words, pre-sentence. As for the Sentencing Council, the current sentencing guidelines already specifically mention care of dependants in relation to the approach to the sentencing decision. There is a clear process for making representations to the court with regard to sentence. Information supplied post-sentence, although it may help with making care arrangements once a person is sent into custody, is simply too late to enable the court to consider the full circumstances of the offender.
My noble friend talks about the importance of this information being inquired about before sentencing. But is it not better that it should be inquired about at some point rather than not at all?
I entirely agree with my noble friend. It is important that it should be acquired before sentence rather than after sentence.
The Children Act 2004 already requires inter-agency co-operation to safeguard and promote the well-being of the child. It is important that probation staff—albeit that in the view of the noble Lord, Lord Low, they have become more concerned with offender management —those working in court or those preparing pre-sentence reports have a responsibility to consider the impact of custody on an offender’s children. All those who have read such reports will realise that that is almost always a central feature of them. If there is a likelihood of custody then children’s services will be alerted by probation to ensure that arrangements are in place to safeguard the well-being of any children. We are working to ensure that this system of assessment and referral is as robust as possible for both pre-sentence report assessment and court practice. This is a very important role for the new National Probation Service.
Much reference was made to the existence of troubled families, and quite rightly so. The Government understand the challenges and poor outcomes faced by children dealing with parental imprisonment, including higher risk of mental illness, poor educational outcomes and offending in later life. I agree it is important that these families receive appropriate support, alongside support for offenders’ rehabilitation and for tackling inter- generational offending. We have already had conversations with organisations such as Barnardo’s to discuss the issues raised by its report On the Outside, published in May this year, and intend to expand our discussions wider to other government colleagues, criminal justice system agencies and practitioners such as legal representatives.
The scope of this approach is potentially very wide—childcare is obviously a pressing concern—but there are also other concerns for families of offenders: financial support, continuing accommodation and so on. This is another reason why it is simply not realistic for the criminal courts to step in and manage an offender’s life after they have been convicted. However, there is a role for government here. That is why we are working across government, and in partnership with local authorities under the troubled families programme, to turn around the lives of 120,000 families suffering from the most complex problems by May 2015. We have already announced an expansion of the programme to an additional 400,000 families from 2015-16. The next phase of the programme will focus on families with a broader range of problems.
I should also mention the important role of the charitable voluntary sector. My noble friend Lord McNally has in the past paid tribute to the work that organisations such as Pact have done and continue to do to support the families of those in custody. I add my own appreciation of that important work and my commitment that the Government will look at how we can both publicise and support the services those organisations provide. I am glad to hear that Lord Justice Gross is concerned that some further guidance should be given in relation to the problem identified by the amendment.
Perhaps I did not make it clear that, in his reply to me, Lord Justice Gross said he would reissue the existing guidelines, not set out any new ones.
I am grateful for that clarification. Perhaps reissuing the guidance will bring it home to those who see it. Perhaps for the first time it will remind them of the pre-existing obligation.
I started my response with a list of reasons why the Government could not accept the proposed new clause, but we believe that the issue should be addressed. It is a difficult area but we are now making progress in developing consensus on the best approach. I hope we can continue to work with noble Lords who have consistently shown an interest in this matter, with Barnardo’s, with the judiciary and with the legal profession to develop the best way to tackle this issue. Although I cannot accept the amendment, we are very much concerned to ensure that nobody should slip through the net in the way that the amendment is directed. I hope that, with the reassurance I have given, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
The amendment identifies a problem. The Government refer to guidance and advice. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said that in his court there is not a problem. What worries me is that there will be best practice in lots of courts but there will be one or two cases where that is not the case. That is why we want this duty on the face of the Bill. I am worried that guidance will not be enough. That is my main problem.
In fact, the amendment places a statutory duty on the Lord Chief Justice. Of course, whatever one does in terms of guidance, not all courts are necessarily going to be as good as each other, but we hope that, by taking various different steps, we can ensure, in so far as it is possible, that the problem that can exist is unlikely to arise in practice.
Is the noble Lord saying that if the amendment was worded to put a duty on the courts and not on the Lord Chief Justice, the Government would look at that?
No, I am saying that I do not think that a statutory duty is the answer.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate. It bears out my contention that there is concern about this issue across the House. Indeed, that concern is shared by the Government. Like the Minister, I would hope that we are not yet at the end of this discussion and that discussions and work can continue with a view to finding a solution around which we can all unite. We have a bit of time because of the Recess and we will not be coming back to this until Report in the autumn. In particular, I would like to thank the Minister for his meticulous reply, to which I have listened carefully. There are obviously a number of issues that need to be addressed. There was the question that the amendment related purely to after sentence. We put that in because we were concerned about issues of this kind contaminating the sentencing process. However, if the noble Lord feels that that is not an issue, that can certainly be revisited. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, made some useful points about the inadequacy, perhaps, of a telephone call and that in some respects it is important that whatever process we put in place should go further than this amendment. I very much welcome having further discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about that and seeing whether there are ways in which we can take account of the concerns that he raised.
The most important points came from the Minister about the inappropriateness of trying to achieve what we want to achieve through a practice direction. We thought that, in that way, we were seeking to put in place a more light-touch process than creating a statutory duty, but if that is not appropriate, we can certainly revisit that and avoid trying to do things by statutory practice direction—trying to effect practice directions by referring to them in the amendment.
I would make this point, to which I think the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, also referred. The Minister indicates that we should work through a range of pragmatic steps that can be taken by a variety of bodies and that they might be collected together in guidance, but there is evidence that guidance is not working. There is guidance around but there is still a problem. I continue to feel that there is a need for whatever we put in place to have a statutory basis. Therefore, I would like to continue discussions with the Minister to see whether we can get a statutory basis with which he is happier and which would give what we are all trying to achieve a bit more teeth than the guidance, which is not working, would appear to have. With those remarks and, in the hope that we can do more work over the summer and come back with an agreed result in the autumn, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 63A is designed to provide clarity about the operation of Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, inserted by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which made low-value shop theft a summary offence. Your Lordships may recall that although theft from a shop of property valued at £200 or less became a summary offence, the defendant’s right to elect to be tried by the Crown Court was retained. Where it is exercised, Section 22A provides that the case is to be sent to the Crown Court. The basis on which the magistrates’ court would now do so is that once the defendant has elected, as the court has no option but to send to the Crown Court, the offence becomes indictable only and falls to be sent there on that basis under Section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
Amendment 63A provides absolute clarity about the basis on which such a sending takes place as it is not sufficiently clear in the legislation. It makes clear that a low-value shoplifting case in which the defendant elects is to be treated in the same manner as an either way offence in which the defendant has elected. The magistrates’ courts will still be obliged to send the case to the Crown Court where the defendant elects and will continue to do so under Section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act. Amendments 84A and 84B provide for that change to come into effect two months after the Bill is passed. Amendment 63F is required to put beyond doubt the role of the court in relation to the imposition of the criminal courts charge.
The Serious Crime Bill includes a provision that amends Section 13 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make clear that the imposition of the confiscation order should not be taken into account when the court makes a victim surcharge order. That is because the court has no discretion over whether to impose victim surcharge, or how much. In a similar way, the court’s charge will be imposed by the court in any case where an adult is convicted of a criminal offence and the charge levels will be specified in secondary legislation. Amendment 63F therefore makes a similar change to Section 13 of the Proceeds of Crime Act to include the criminal court’s charge as an order in relation to which the imposition of a confiscation order should not be taken into account. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the amendments. I am not quite sure what difficulties have been occasioned by the subject of the first amendment, in particular, or whether this proposal will make any difference in the real world. Could the noble Lord kindly explain it a little further? Unless he can show that it has, in fact, led to difficulties, I am somewhat puzzled.
In respect of the second matter, I suppose the question of consistency is relevant. I wonder whether there has been any review of the impact of the victim surcharge order in relation to outstanding fines. This, of course, deals with the confiscation order but, as we have established, there is a huge backlog of confiscation orders that have not been enforced and fines that have not been collected. While this is a tidying-up exercise, the practical effect may be negligible unless considerably greater efforts are made to enforce both fines and confiscation orders. Perhaps the noble Lord will enlighten us as to what the Government will do about the substantial backlog running into, as I recall, something like £2 billion under these heads. Otherwise, this will become a cosmetic change, with no real likelihood of the grave current situation being improved. In fact, unless additional resources are provided, matters will potentially get worse since efforts are presumably not now being made which would be brought into the scope of the provisions on confiscation. That might be an added case load which there seems little realistic prospect of achieving. Perhaps the noble Lord could clarify, in respect of both these matters, where the Government are and, more particularly, what they will do to make sense of the confiscation order procedure under whatever head it takes.
The noble Lord asked whether any problems have arisen. We are not aware of any, but the purpose of the amendment is simply to clarify the position for the purposes of a good law. The Government’s view on the existing drafting is that, after election for trial, this offence is sent up under Section 51(2) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The noble Lord is no doubt anxious to know the answer to the question. This is not stated clearly in the 2013 Act and the interpretation has consequences which, although not significant in practice, make little sense. One example is low-level shoplifting cases where the defendant, as elected, would be brought within the ambit of the unduly lenient sentence scheme. The present amendment clarifies the position and avoids the consequences; it is the simplest way to deal with the issue.
Amendment 63F is simply a consequential amendment to remove any possible doubt as to whether the court has any discretion over imposing the criminal courts charge or the level of that charge. It would not be appropriate for courts to exercise discretion over a charge that directly contributes to the funding of the courts, but we will consider the role of charging in the next group of amendments. If I may, I will deal then with the questions of charging and victim surcharge and the appropriateness of those.