Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

My Lords, I want to make a point about something that is not directly related, but which I found quite odd. A few weeks ago, I was arrested for speeding. It was the first time in 40 years that I had actually done anything wrong while driving. Interestingly, the notice I received clearly said that the fact that I had no other points on my licence was irrelevant because that would be unfair to others. I do not understand how, if you have been a good guy and have never done anything wrong, that cannot be a positive factor, yet in this Bill we are accusing people and putting them immediately in the negative, even though there is no serious proof. I therefore support the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I too support these amendments, for all the reasons given by the noble Lords who tabled them. Of course, the principal amendment seeks regulations and lacks specificity. It does not seek to define all the circumstances for retaining, recording, using or disclosing personal data relating to hate crimes or non-criminal hate incidents or otherwise. That is sensible, and it is now for the Government to accept the principles that underly this amendment and come forward with proposals. Of course, I accept the caution which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, brings to the question of regulations that are unamendable; nevertheless, this is a complex area that needs a complex response.

The principles engaged are important. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, pointed out, this amendment is not concerned with established hate crime or in any sense with defending hate crime. It starts from the principle that personal data deserves protection from the arbitrary retention, use and disclosure by the police, enforcement agencies and authorities generally, and the converse principle that disclosure should be subject to the rule of law and to principles of accountability—points made by many in this debate, and briefly but eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, a few moments ago.

The conduct with which these amendments are concerned is not provably, still less proved, criminal—a point made by many. They seek to control the arbitrary retention, use and disclosure of personal information, based on a subjective perception of a citizen’s motivation, in the absence of solid evidence or proof. It is subjective, one notes, because it is often based on the subjective view of another citizen—no better informed, necessarily, than the citizen about whom the information is then held.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, spoke on the basis that subsection (7) was in a different category from the rest of the clause. I prefer the way that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put it, when he set out the principles that underlay the whole of this amendment. It is not often that I find myself agreeing with almost everybody in the House, including, at one and the same time, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—but I do. Even on this occasion, although I understand the hesitations voiced by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, she and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, accepted the need for regulation in this area.

The amendment is directed at achieving sensible limitations on the retention, use and disclosure of data to others. This is an area where the Government ought to act and that has become controversial, with the emergence of guidelines that are, frankly, offensive to justice and parliamentary democracy. I therefore invite the Minister—I believe that I speak for the House in doing so—to return to the House with proposals that accept the principles that we have enunciated and will give rise to amendment of the Bill, to its vast improvement.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, it is unusual to have such unanimity across the House in Committee on something that is superficially a very complex matter. I agree with two noble Lords in particular. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was very succinct: he said that the information that the police retain should be subject to parliamentary or government control and not to police guidance. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in being cautious about regulation and having a full role for Parliament in any rules that are introduced.

I am sure that this is a very complex matter. I have just been wondering whether, in my role as a sitting magistrate in London, I would see this information. I obviously routinely see the police national computer—PNC—list, which includes convictions, cautions and bail conditions. If we go ahead and have a “bad character” application for a trial, additional information may be disclosed to us—to do with allegations of, say, a domestic abuse nature.

I was also thinking about my role sitting as a magistrate in family court, where I routinely see allegations that have not been substantiated in any court but have been recorded over many years in social services reports. I think that it is right that I see those allegations when we as a court are making decisions about the way that children should be treated in the context of a family court.

I give those two examples, which are different to what noble Lords have spoken about, to acknowledge the complexity of the situation with which we are dealing. I am sympathetic to the points that have been made by noble Lords, but I am also sympathetic to the Government addressing this with an open mind. I will listen with great interest to what the noble Baroness says about whether they propose bringing back any amendments at a later stage of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, for two minutes, I want to throw a pebble into what seems like calm water. I totally support everything that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester has said. However, we need to ask ourselves: what is a child? If somebody talks to me socially and says, “Do you have any children?”, I say, “Yes, I have two.” They are grown-up men who flew the nest a long time ago.

However, adults with a learning disability are sometimes cared for by their parents, if they have chosen that the child should not go into care. Their family unit is mum and dad, who are in their 70s or 80s, and somebody with a learning difficulty who might be in their 50s. That is not what we think of as a nuclear family, but we still have to care for the child of those elderly parents, and when one parent dies there are all sorts of problems. Mencap has done a lot of work on this and I have worked with it on it. We really need to be careful about how we legislate for adults who have the mental capacity of a child.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the right reverend Prelate for not just these amendments but the care and time she gives to compassionate consideration of the criminal justice system generally. I am also grateful to the other authors of this group of amendments. We on these Benches fully support them.

In this House, we have repeatedly stressed the special needs of women in prison and the effect of custody on women and their children. I entirely take the point made by my noble friend Lady Jolly and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that there are others who are cared for who need our concern. In terms of legislation, we have achieved no more than lip service. These amendments would put that right by imposing real duties on courts and judges to gather the necessary information and consider the effect of custody on children in making bail and sentencing decisions for their primary carers.

Duties would be imposed on the Government to collect the data necessary to enable informed decision-making about the effect of imprisoning primary carers on the lives and futures of their children. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that Amendment 218 on data collection could—and should—have gone further than requiring data on the number of prisoners as primary carers and the number and ages of the children affected. For example, it would be helpful to include data as to the arrangements made for looking after those children following the imprisonment of their primary carers. For instance, we should know how many children have to be taken into care, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. We can and should consider that further on Report.

Noble Lords have had the benefit of the excellent briefing from the charity Women in Prison. The statistics it has collated tell a grim story. More than 53,000 children each year are affected by their primary carers being sent to prison and 95% of children whose mother is imprisoned are forced to leave home. One sentence encapsulated it all for me: “We’ve been sentenced,” says a mother, “but they’ve been sentenced with us.”

This point was at the heart of the opening speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. Parental imprisonment is for children a well-recognised predictor of mental ill-health, poor educational attainment and employment prospects, and future criminality for the children concerned. It is often said that criminality runs in families. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said that in answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. The extent to which we fail the children of carers in the criminal justice system tends to make that a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The problem is made worse by the preponderance of short sentences among those passed on women offenders. Some 62% of sentences passed on women are for terms of six months or less, despite all the evidence that such sentences do far more harm than good, that offenders who receive short sentences are generally far more successfully rehabilitated with community sentences than with prison sentences, and that the damage to children of imprisoning their primary carer stems principally from the initial, sudden separation—the loss of home, the loss of parental care, the dramatic changes for children, that follow immediately on parental custody, often without any preparation or warning.

In the Joint Committee on Human Rights 2019 report on children whose mothers are in prison, the committee quoted the 2007 report of the noble Baroness, Lady Corston:

“[t]he effects on the … children every year whose mothers are sent to prison are … nothing short of catastrophic.”


The committee cited the evidence of a girl called Georgia of 15, who I think is the girl whose evidence was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen. She said:

“On the day of her trial, I was at home in the living room, dancing to MTV, and I got a phone call from my brother. He said, ‘Mum’s gone’. I thought he was joking. I had to ask him about five times. From being the young girl who was dancing in the living room, I automatically took on my mum’s role. I did not even have time to adjust to the custodial sentence. It just leaped.”


The amendments in this group rightly cover bail—that is Amendment 110—as well as sentencing decisions. The effect upon children of a remand in custody of their primary carer may be even worse than that of a prison sentence. It usually comes at the very beginning of the criminal process, often without any warning at all, and its effect is immediate, devastating, and of uncertain duration. Against that background, it is highly significant, and frankly shaming, that a very high proportion of women remanded in custody—66% of magistrates’ remands, a higher figure than that given by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and 39% of Crown Court remands—do not ultimately lead to a custodial sentence, largely invalidating the original remand decision. Amendment 110 would make bail more likely for primary carers, which would be a real benefit.

For sentencing courts, the duties proposed in Amendments 215 to 217 would lead to an immediate improvement in sentencing practice, as judges complied with these duties imposed by law in the interests of the children, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, stressed, where until now they have been subject only to non-binding sentencing guidelines, a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. For that reason, I disagree with the point expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who questioned whether these amendments were necessary at all. I completely agree with the view expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that judges and recorders are hugely concerned not to send women who are primary carers for children to prison. But the fact remains that far too many primary carers do get sentenced to prison. I believe that over time, these amendments—because judges and recorders follow the law—would also lead to a general change of culture among the judiciary, and possibly in government as well, preventing courts sending primary carers of children to prison.

Before closing, I will add a word or two about sentencing pregnant women to prison. It is particularly welcome that Amendments 216 and 217 cover the special position of the unborn children of pregnant women facing custody. We have all been appalled by the report last month of Sue McAllister, the Prisons and Probations Ombudsman, into the death of Baby A in September 2019 at HM Prison Bronzefield, and the care of Baby A’s mother in the time leading up to and around her baby’s birth, when she was left alone in her cell—an account also mentioned by the right reverend Prelate. But it should be remembered that Baby A’s mother was described in that report as

“a vulnerable young woman with a complex history who found it difficult to trust people in authority.”

That description can be applied to the majority of pregnant women who find themselves in prison and, indeed, to the majority of young women prisoners. We should take care not to forget that, particularly given that three out of five women in prison have minor children. I urge the Government to respond positively to these amendments.

Libel and Defamation Cases: Cost to Public Funds

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very important point. There are, of course, the defences of truth and, in relation to what is said in court, there is of course absolute privilege. As the Minister who played a significant part in taking the Domestic Abuse Act through this House, I will certainly want to ensure that the protections it gave to women are not undermined by people exploiting the law of defamation.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Defamation Act 2013 was an important coalition achievement. The pre-legislative committee on which I served was unanimous, so we now have the serious harm threshold, the serious financial loss requirement for companies and the defences of honest opinion and publication in the public interest. To curb libel tourism, as the Minister has just said, Section 9 requires any claimant outside the UK to show that

“England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place”

for defamation action. It was a test applied strictly by the Court of Appeal last year in Wright v Ver. While we should certainly keep the Act under review, is not the law now restrictive enough?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that the law is well balanced. We think that the Defamation Act 2013 is working well. I thought I heard the noble Lord say that Section 9 applies where a claimant is domiciled outside the UK, but I think that it is actually where the defendant is so domiciled. With that small correction, I agree with the noble Lord.

Hillsborough: Collapse of Trials

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Mr Justice Davis held that the offence of perverting the course of justice did not apply to a public inquiry, because it is an administrative function of the Government rather than a process of public justice. If that is the current state of the law, even given the specific offence under the 2005 Act mentioned by the Lord Chancellor, will that not undermine the whole point of public inquiries and destroy public confidence in them? Will the Government urgently amend the Inquiries Act to reverse this decision, particularly in view of the impending inquiry into the handling of the pandemic, where we know there will be significant conflicts of evidence?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we will of course keep this point of law under consideration but not for the reasons the noble Lord gives, if I may say so respectfully. The Prime Minister has already confirmed that the Covid inquiry—if I can call it that—will be established on a statutory basis with full formal powers. That means that Section 35 of the Inquiries Act 2005 will apply. That makes it an offence to commit acts that tend

“to have the effect of … distorting … altering … or preventing … evidence”

from being given to a statutory inquiry.

Criminal Justice Review: Response to Rape

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, as the Minister in the other place made clear yesterday, the underlying statistics in this area are indeed regrettable. He made it clear that he is taking personal leadership on this matter because rape is a cross-agency issue. We have the police and the CPS, both of which are rightly independent of government, and we have the Courts Service and the judiciary. Everybody must come together to improve the current performance.

The rape review will be published shortly after the Recess. I am afraid I cannot provide advance notice of its details today but I very much hope that, when they read it, the noble Lord and the whole House will welcome it because we intend it to be a transformational document that will lead to transformational change. Supporting victims of rape is an absolute priority for this Government; we have invested significant sums in that.

Let me give the House just one example of a change that can be made and which has real consequences. We have put in £27 million to create more than 700 new posts for independent sexual violence advisers. They stand with victims throughout the process. We have seen what is terribly called victim attrition. People opting out of the system goes down by 50% and more than 50% of people stay in if they have these advisers to help them. We will work, I hope with the noble Lord, to improve the statistics in this area.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, delaying the report to await the Court of Appeal judgment on CPS charging decisions is understandable, but one wonders why the report has taken two years. This is a dangerous crisis. Rape prosecutions were down from more than 5,000 in 2016-17 to fewer than 1,500 in 2019-20, in spite of an increase in reported rapes. In 2020, more than 52,000 rapes were reported but there were only 843 convictions. Potential rapists become ever more confident of impunity, and the lives of women and girls become ever more threatened.

Without second-guessing the report, may I press the Minister on two points? The first concerns ending the culture among young men and boys that condones harassment, even rape, and expresses the arrogantly sexist view that “she was asking for it”. We see it in schools, universities and colleges. Will he pledge substantial extra resources for citizenship education to turn this around and teach respect for women and girls?

The second point concerns that trauma of legal proceedings and probing the sexual history of rape victims. In his report from Northern Ireland, Sir John Gillen recommended that victims have legal representation to oppose the disclosure of their personal data, including mobile phone records, and to oppose them being cross- examined on their sexual history in cases where such issues arise. Will the Government agree to provide that?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is not correct that the review was delayed solely because of the judicial review of the CPS policy. The noble Lord will be aware that the court concluded that there had not been a policy change, although, frankly, I accept that that does not mean that there were no important issues for the CPS to address. The delay was also in part because we wanted more engagement with victims’ groups. We are delighted that Emily Hunt has joined us; she can give us, and has given us, invaluable insight from her position as a victim.

As far as the culture is concerned, the noble Lord is absolutely right. This is a cross-governmental issue. It is fair to say that, in schools and colleges, there is now more understanding of what consent means and, if I can put it this way, of what consent does not mean. If I may be personal for a moment, frankly, I see that in the education my own children get at their schools. They get an education that I do not think people in this House would have got when they were at school.

On legal proceedings, the noble Lord is absolutely right. There are careful rules now over when a claimant’s sexual history is relevant to the case. Often, it is not. We have put in place a number of changes to ensure that complainants are better looked after by the courts system. For example, Section 28 is currently being rolled out. It will enable vulnerable victims and witnesses who are subject to intimidation to give evidence and be cross-examined online and on-screen in advance of the trial.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fullbrook, on her eloquent maiden speech, and look forward to future debates with her. In winding up this wide-ranging and challenging debate, I will concentrate on the proposals on justice, with some points on home affairs, although I will not try to add to what my noble friends Lord Paddick, Lady Bonham-Carter and Lord Clement-Jones said on culture and digital media, and their great importance to our well-being and economy.

Summarising the philosophy of our response to the Government’s proposals, today’s speeches from these Benches have been marked by a commitment to security and safety through freedom, the rule of law and compassion. As a society, we are more secure and safer if we respond to crime with a strong emphasis on prevention, real support for victims and the reform and rehabilitation of offenders. We are better governed if the Government are accountable in the courts for unlawful action; we are protected from abuse of power by our right to protest—witness Myanmar, Hong Kong and many others.

This approach is at the heart of the widely applauded Domestic Abuse Act, and the draft victims Bill, ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, has the potential for a similar achievement. We have long campaigned for the victims’ code to be given the full force of law, and we are heartened by the commitment to address violence against women and girls.

However, we do not approach the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill with the same confidence. Hostile reaction to date has largely focused on the proposed restrictions of the right to protest. Even the language of the government briefing has sinister overtones:

“Balancing the rights of protesters with the rights of others to go about their business unhindered, by enabling the police to better manage highly disruptive protests.”


The danger is that passivity and compliance may be encouraged by a disciplinarian Government at the expense of legitimate, if noisy, protest against injustice or abuse of power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, forcefully supported this position. At best, the Bill is an overreaction to occasional unacceptable behaviour by protestors, which is probably illegal at present anyway—a point also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.

In the Bill, the Government’s consistent emphasis on the so-called tough crackdown, longer sentences and increased police powers never falters. But there is nothing in the Bill to improve our national performance in preventing crime or on reform, rehabilitation and reducing reoffending, except for a dubious commitment to a new form of secure schools, which is unsupported by solid evidence or the necessary resources. There is also nothing to address the de facto discrimination against black and ethnic minorities, particularly young men. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester made these points eloquently, and my noble friends Lord Dholakia and Lord Paddick, the noble Lords, Lord Hastings of Scarisbrick and Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, all spoke of the inhumanity and overcrowding of our prisons and the disgraceful state they are in. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also spoke of the desecration of our probation services. A number of noble Lords mentioned the welcome commitment to a police covenant report on police welfare, including my noble friend Lady Harris, who spoke of police treatment centres.

We wanted a commitment from the Government for a strong and wide-ranging anti-fraud measure to attack online fraud and scamming, as recommended by the Government’s economic crime plan in 2019. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, concentrated on this point, and it was covered by my noble friend Lord McNally and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, the limited U-turn on this issue in the online safety Bill goes nowhere near tackling this scourge of contemporary life—an epidemic, as the noble Viscount called it.

Turning to the judicial review Bill, the Queen’s Speech promises to

“strengthen and renew democracy and the constitution”,

and promises legislation to

“restore the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the courts.”

However, the Bill now proposed is limited to introducing suspended quashing orders and to ending Cart JRs in which the High Court reviews Upper Tribunal decisions. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that suspending quashing orders will sensibly allow time for government to correct irregularities before implementing decisions, rather than quashing them immediately. My original reaction to the proposal to reverse the Cart decision was sympathetic, but I now rather doubt that the Government’s evidence on this stands up, so I look forward to debating the issue further in due course.

However, our greater concern, persuasively expressed by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Woolf, my noble friends Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Beith and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is that the language of the Queen’s Speech heralds a far wider reform of judicial review. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his distinguished panel carried out a thorough and principled review of administrative law and effectively found that, in general, our system does not need radical overhaul, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, confirmed today. An attack on JR would threaten the rule of law and would be an unacceptable political response to a mistaken criticism of alleged judicial overreach, largely fuelled by the Government’s reaction to the Miller decisions.

On the proposed sovereign borders Bill, making asylum claims inadmissible for illegal entrants sounds, at first blush, justifiable. It is not. This proposal ignores the fact that many who run untold risks, sustain all manner of hardship and finally manage to find their way here, albeit illegally, have had no possible means of securing the visas that they would have required to enter legally. Without a workable and humane proposal for safe and legal methods of entry, as called for by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, this proposal would erect a barred gate against many who deserve our compassion and our welcome. We have a long tradition of offering sanctuary to the persecuted and to refugees. We are not talking only of justifiably outlawing people-smugglers but of making the grant of asylum dependent on authorised legal entry. On this issue, I strongly agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whose passion on it I share.

As we witness the horrifying rise in anti-Semitism here and abroad, we should remember that welcoming the oppressed demonstrates our civilisation and our compassion. By shutting our doors to the oppressed we side with their oppressors. I would add that, for all the elegance of his language and his clearly good intentions, we profoundly disagree with the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, to immigration and changes in the ethnic make-up of our society, which we believe do not weaken this nation but enrich and enhance it, just as the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, described.

The Government’s plans for reform of the Mental Health Act are welcome, particularly the proposals to reform the process of mental health detention, to deal more humanely with autistic people and to improve the management of offenders with mental disorders. This is all in line with concerns long expressed from all around this House.

Finally, I add to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said last Wednesday on the subject of criminalising coercive and controlling behaviour by charlatan counsellors or so-called psychotherapists who peddle their services to take over the lives of troubled young people, implant false memories of abuse by parents and families during childhood and create a dependence on themselves, alienating these vulnerable young adults from their parents and families in a damaging cycle of coercive control over their lives. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, highlighted many years of parliamentary endeavour on this subject, thwarted not by principle but by the “wrong Bill” argument—an argument that we should abhor. We also want to see a professional register that would support genuine professionals and their status, and encourage potential clients to seek help only from properly registered professionals. This is, perhaps, a small issue, but it is one on which this House has a great contribution to make. The Government should be in no doubt that many, throughout the House, feel strongly on these issues. This will give rise to amendments to the proposed legislation, and will not go away.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 21st April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on this Motion because we are well on course to achieve what we set out to do. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, for the commitment and assiduity with which she has pursued this topic in the face of assurances that, at times, have seemed to her complacent and misplaced. The seriousness with which this topic is now being addressed is a credit to her and many others.

I understand and accept entirely the Government’s concerns about judicial independence. Indeed, noble Lords will know that I have argued the case for it on any number of occasions in this House. I am not sure that either the amendment we put forward or the Motion that is now there in its place would have compromised judicial independence to the extent that the Government thought. However, we accept that judicial training is a matter for the judiciary. We also accept that, for many years, judicial training has been mandatory on induction and on a continuing basis for judges sitting in family cases, but it is important to ensure that such training is comprehensive, up to date and, above all, successful. That, I believe, is an objective we all share.

It is also important to recognise that there has been a problem with domestic violence victims feeling that they have been treated unsympathetically by the courts in the past. There is a deeply held feeling that the trauma that they have suffered has been insufficiently recognised, and that the particular trauma involved in court processes and reliving the violence that they have suffered has not been properly addressed. A great deal of evidence to that effect has been given in speeches to this House during the passage of the Bill.

We have made significant progress with the Bill towards making the courts more humane places for domestic violence victims. We have been assisted enormously by the many groups and individuals who have briefed us, particularly Women’s Aid, Claire Waxman —the Victims’ Commissioner for London—and many others. We are very grateful to all of them for their insights and suggestions.

There is room for much more progress. I am particularly concerned to see faster progress towards more judicial diversity. Throughout the debates on this Bill, it has been clear to all of us that ethnic-minority victims and parties to proceedings have suffered unduly from the difficulties and hardships caused by domestic violence. I believe that many share my view that a judiciary that more clearly represents the people who appear before it—in colour, background, age and gender—would appear, and be, more attuned to the challenges and traumas that victims face.

Throughout this process the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has been ready to meet us and listen to the concerns expressed. I am extremely grateful to him for all his help. We are particularly heartened by his assurances today, passed on through him from the senior judiciary, not only to the effect that there is a strong commitment to improved judicial training but also to the effect that considerable emphasis is placed on domestic abuse training. Particularly important is his telling us that the Judicial College already has in hand arrangements for judicial training in the light of both the provisions of the Bill and, no doubt, the discussions in this House and the other place concerning them.

In the clear expectation that judicial training directed at addressing the particular difficulties facing domestic violence victims is a high priority, I welcome the progress that we have made and agree with the decision made by the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, not to divide the House on this Motion.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, this amendment is understandable but misconceived and I am relieved that it will not be put to a vote. I declare an interest as a former chairman of the Family Committee of the Judicial Studies Board, which was the forerunner of the Judicial College.

I have recently been in touch with the Judicial College to find out what training there is at the moment and what is intended when the Bill becomes law. I hope that the House will bear with me as I bring noble Lords up to date. I propose to say quite a lot, despite noble Lords having heard from the Minister. I do not accept that the current training is not working. The Judicial College trains all judges at every level and all magistrates sitting in the criminal and civil courts. Judges and magistrates are identified as appropriate to sit in particular work such as domestic abuse, and they are ticketed to do so only after they have had sufficient training. They are not allowed to sit until they have had that training. The training involves a three-day induction course in a residential setting, followed by continual professional residential training throughout their time as a magistrate or judge.

The training in domestic abuse includes hearing from victims and victim organisations. A lot of online extra information and advice is also sent to judges and magistrates. However, the Judicial College is only part of the training. The president sets out instructions to judges in practice directions. PD12J, updated in 2017, which I have no doubt will be updated again, sets out how family cases involving domestic abuse should be tried. The Court of Appeal sets out instructions and advice on how to approach and try domestic abuse cases. An important judgment for the Court of Appeal, Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings), was given earlier this year. The three members of the court were the President of the Family Division, the chairman of the Judicial College and a member of the criminal sentencing panel, all of whom are involved in the training of family and criminal judges and magistrates. The president himself takes a personal interest in the training of family judges.

The House may be interested to know that in the H-N case, the Court of Appeal invited the various victims’ organisations, such as Women’s Aid, to be represented at the court and to give their views, which were carefully listened to by the court—and that was shown in the judgments. In the H-N case, the president set out some statistics which showed that 1,582 full-time family judges, some part-time family judges and 2,744 family magistrates sat in family cases in England and Wales. The president said that it is thought that domestic abuse allegations are raised in at least 40% of cases in which parents dispute the future of their children. That means that domestic abuse issues are raised in about 22,000 child cases each year. In addition, the courts received last year 29,285 applications for injunction orders seeking protection from domestic abuse.

It is obvious, as we have heard during proceedings on the Bill, that some judges get it wrong. That is obvious from the H-N case, where in four cases things went wrong. It is helpful that the Court of Appeal saw that and put it right. However, from the large number of cases tried by the courts, there are very few appeals to the Court of Appeal and I would suggest, despite what has been said—particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, who said that the training is not working—that only a comparatively small number of people have in fact had bad experiences and that most judges have got it right.

I am told by the Judicial College that the domestic abuse training is being updated in the light of the forthcoming Act and instructions from the most recent Court of Appeal cases such as H-N and several others. The new Act will become an integral part of the family training of judges at every level, and of magistrates. It will form part of the courses taken by the judges and magistrates trying criminal cases as well. It is across the board. The president has also set up a private law working group which includes domestic abuse. There is, therefore, a great deal of information, guidance and instruction to judges and magistrates on how to try domestic abuse cases, which it is their duty to follow, and they are given the training to do so.

It is not in my view that there is a lack of good training; it is that some judges do not seem to have benefited from it. I cannot see how any statutory guidance from the Lord Chancellor will improve how judges deal with such cases. It is a matter of trying to make sure that the limited number of judges who do not do well enough will do better. Much of that comes from appeals to the Court of Appeal, which can put the matter right and give sensible and helpful advice.

I am relieved that this matter will not go to a vote because, although I have not dealt with it, this is also, as the Minister has said, a constitutional issue of judicial independence. I hope that the House will now be satisfied that the Judicial College is doing the best job that it possibly can and will, with the new Act, do somewhat better.

Independent Review of Administrative Law Update

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for making the Statement available to us today. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his team for the work they have done considering judicial review. We may disagree with many of the things the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, says, but there is no doubt that he has made a very important contribution to the debate. He is a substantial figure in the law and in this House, and we greatly appreciate the work that he and his team have done.

I ask the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to explain why, extraordinarily, the Government have not published the responses to the call for evidence made by the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. In particular, why have the Government not published what the department said about judicial review? That is a very important aspect of the debate on this matter, and I would very much welcome seeing what it said, not just extracts.

Judicial review ensures that the Executive act in accordance with the law. The law mainly means Acts of Parliament. That is why the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, said JR is mostly “the servant of Parliament”. This Government have proved themselves disdainful of the law, as we saw during the passage of the internal market Act and in the Attorney-General’s abandonment of the rigid constitutional convention of independence. The most sinister aspect of the Statement the Lord Chancellor made in the other place is the Government’s intention to consult on increasing the circumstances in which judicial review will not apply and ousters will work more often. Judicial review requires the Government to act in accordance with Acts of Parliament and their powers, and not in an arbitrary, capricious or wholly unreasonable way. What problem do the Government have with that principle? Could the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, reaffirm the Government’s commitment to those principles?

Secondly, what is the problem with the current rules of ouster? In what areas do the Government wish the ouster to apply more readily? For example, do they wish it to apply more readily in setting aside the 0.7% target? Do they want it to apply more readily to the many cases of domestic violence and violence against women in which judicial reviews have been taken?

Finally, to what extent do the Government intend to pass an Act of Parliament to give effect to the proposal they make in the consultation?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the distinguished panel he chaired, for the hard work and painstaking research they put into producing their independent review. I share the right honourable and learned Lord Chancellor’s expressed view that

“judicial review plays a vital role in upholding the rule of law: it acts as one of the checks on the power of the Executive”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/21; col. 504.]

As his right honourable friend Michael Gove put it when he was Lord Chancellor:

“Without the rule of law power can be abused. Judicial review is an essential foundation of the rule of law, ensuring that what may be unlawful administration can be challenged, potentially found wanting and where necessary be remedied by the courts.”


The first of the two steps the Government plan to take now is the ending of the so-called Cart JRs, through which the High Court permits a judicial review although the Upper Tribunal has refused permission to appeal. They say that so few Cart JRs succeed that they are a waste of judicial resources. From the consultation questions, it is clear that this decision has already been taken. Should not the short consultation proposed have been more open on this, given that almost all Cart JRs are immigration cases and so of particular sensitivity?

The Government also propose to permit courts to suspend quashing orders to allow the Government a chance to act to correct the errors that made the original government action unlawful. The reasoning for this change is powerful, and on this issue the consultation seeks views on how to achieve this objective—and rightly so.

However, the rest of this Statement sets loud alarm bells ringing. The Lord Chancellor says that the Government want to

“go further to protect the judiciary from unwanted political entanglements and restore trust in the judicial review process.”

He talks of examining

“the use of ouster clauses”—

as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—

“the remedies available in judicial review proceedings, and further procedural reform.”

Bluntly, ouster clauses are clauses in statutes designed to ring-fence government decision-making and administrative action from court challenges by making them non-justiciable.

The panel was broadly opposed to the use of ouster clauses. Paragraph 2.98 of its report states:

“While the Panel understands the government’s concern about recent court defeats, the Panel considers that disappointment with the outcome of a case (or cases) is rarely sufficient reason to legislate more generally.”


Paragraph 2.99 states that

“while the use of such a clause to deal with a specific issue could be justified, it is likely to face a hostile response from the courts and robust scrutiny by Parliament.”

Paragraph 2.100 states:

“The decision to legislate in this area is ultimately a question of political choice. But when deciding whether or not to do so, the Panel considers that Parliament’s approach should reflect a strong presumption in favour of leaving questions of justiciability to the judges.”


We regard ouster clauses as an unacceptable threat by the Executive to insulate their future unlawful action against challenge. Except in certain well-established areas of prerogative action, they spell danger for the rule of law.

The consultation also proposes the introduction of prospective-only remedies. That would mean that past unlawful government action or SIs would continue to have effect, even if struck down for the future, so victims of past unlawfulness who had not had the means or the ability to challenge it would face gross unfairness. The Lord Chancellor says that this would

“create a system that encourages solutions to be found through political will rather than legal dispute, so that policy making as an exercise can be much more collaborative and better informed”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/21; col. 505.]


He does not say how or why. Perhaps the Minister can explain that theory to the House.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

I am grateful to both noble Lords for their questions and comments. I am sure that this is a matter which we will be debating on a number of occasions in this House, so this evening I am going to be relatively brief, not least because the position of the Government is, as we have said, that we would like to consult on a number of matters, and consultation means just that.

Turning first to the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I join him in paying tribute to work done by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the other members of this committee. They have done sterling work under the great pressure of a prevailing pandemic, and I am sure the whole House is grateful to them for the work they have done. I was very pleased to hear the praise given by the noble and learned Lord to the committee. Last August, he was tweeting that the Faulks committee was there to “dismantle judicial review.” I am pleased to see that, while the noble and learned Lord may tweet in haste, he has read the report and repented at leisure.

As far as publishing the evidence is concerned, we will publish the complete set of non-government submissions received by the panel next week once we have ensured that such publication is GDPR-compliant. That will be followed by a summary of the submissions by government departments to the panel’s call for evidence.

On ouster clauses, the noble and learned Lord used the word sinister. There is nothing sinister about them. There are two questions here: first, should one have an ouster clause at all? That is a matter for Parliament. Secondly, if there is an ouster clause, should it be enforced by the court? That is debated in the report and in the Government’s response to it. It is of central importance, which goes to the heart of the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. Perhaps I might say, without being flippant, that on this point public law is too important to be left only to public lawyers; that is why we welcome a broad consultation. I am sure that there will be debates on these matters in the future, in this House and in the other place.

As we have set out in our response, the question is essentially whether ouster clauses are being applied by the courts in the manner in which they are drafted and passed by this House and the other place. As to whether an Act of Parliament would be needed, which I think was the noble and learned Lord’s last question, it may well be, depending on which issues are proceeded with. For example, if we proceed with the proposal for a suspended quashing order, that might well have to be done by primary legislation. The Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed concluded that the common law position was that a suspended quashing order was not available.

I now turn to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. First, on Cart, the panel’s analysis is, as he says, very thorough on this point. The evidence shows that only a very small percentage of this type of judicial review is ever successful. We do not feel the need to redo the consultation exercise carried out by the panels in that regard; we are focusing our consultation on how best to give effect to the recommendation in the panel’s report.

On suspended quashing orders, I note and broadly welcome the noble Lord’s support for these as a matter of principle. Obviously, there are questions about how they would be implemented; I look forward to discussing that matter with him in due course. I hear what he says on ouster clauses and I have obviously also read the paragraphs to which he referred. I think where he got to was that the position on ouster clauses would be given robust scrutiny by Parliament. I welcome robust scrutiny by the noble Lord and, indeed, by other noble Lords, but the panel said that there are circumstances in which it may be appropriate for Parliament to oust or limit the jurisdiction of the courts if there is sufficient justification for doing so. Given that, we think that it is right to consult on that question.

The noble Lord makes the point that, if one is to have a prospective remedy, it is important in the interests of justice to ensure that people who may have been unfairly affected by the decision are considered. We are clear that there must be a means by which a court can make an order with retrospective effect if the circumstances require it. However, with respect to a court making a suspended quashing order, we would like to consult on whether that should be an available option and, if it is, the circumstances and safeguards that that option would bring with it.

I hope that I have responded to all the points raised by both speakers. I will check the Official Report to ensure that I have done so.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I warmly commend the sterling efforts of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, to see the introduction of new offences of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation. The noble Baroness generously mentioned a number of organisations and people who have helped her but she deserves huge credit for the way in which she has championed this action, which I am delighted to see in today’s amendments.

The noble Baroness’s speech was very powerful. The statistics that she shared with us about the relationship between strangulation and sex were shocking but, as she said, it goes much further beyond that as well. Indeed, she has explained at previous stages of the Bill that non-fatal strangulation and suffocation have the unique characteristic of being extremely harmful physically and psychologically but often with no external physical signs. Because of the lack of observable injuries and the lack of understanding of the seriousness of the offence, strangulation when charged is generally pursued as a summary offence of common assault in the magistrates’ court. Undercharging limits sentencing options, and a summary offence also deprives the victim and the defendant of the greater resources and attention devoted to a Crown Court prosecution. Without the establishment of a separate offence, those unique characteristics mean that more victims would suffer and be killed in future.

The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, creates a new criminal offence of strangulation or suffocation. The offence will apply where a person intentionally strangles another person, but it will also cover a range of behaviours, including suffocation and other acts that affect the person’s ability to breathe and which amount to battery. Alongside the new offence must go training and strong guidance to police forces and other statutory agencies about how it is to be implemented, but today is a very significant step forward. I am grateful to the Government for responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and I warmly welcome the amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too welcome the amendments. I welcome the new offence of non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. I echo the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, in saying that this is a very significant achievement for the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. As she generously said in opening the debate, many have helped to bring this new offence to the statute book, but she has been the driver throughout. This has not been for herself; her motivation has been to relieve the suffering of victims.

We on these Benches have given the noble Baroness our wholehearted support throughout. It was always an extraordinary anomaly that non-fatal strangulation was not a specific offence. As discussed in Committee, cases of strangulation were generally charged, and therefore sentenced, as assault occasioning actual bodily harm at most—for the reason, which she explained, that they often left little or no mark. The result was that strangulation and suffocation were undercharged and underpunished, and indeed often not punished at all. That was all despite the appalling truth that strangulation was so much the marker of more generalised domestic abuse, and despite the tragic fact that so often it turned out be a predictor of future killing.

I am very grateful to Ministers for engaging with so many of those concerned with the promotion of these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and I had the opportunity to discuss the legal aspects of the new proposed offence with Ministers, and the Government quickly saw the strength of the argument for a specific offence. It is a credit to Ministers that, after initial hesitation, they decided to include the new offence in the Bill and resisted the temptation to put it off to a future date. Because of the strong connection with domestic abuse, it is an offence that sits clearly within the Bill, but it was the right decision to work on this with the speed that we have. That decision must have saved many victims from further serious harm and has almost certainly saved lives.

It is right that the new offence is of general application, not just limited to domestic abuse. It would not have been appropriate to confine it to cases within the statutory definition of “domestic abuse” contained in the Bill, despite the overwhelming majority of cases falling within that category. That is because all cases of strangulation or suffocation are required to be treated as specific offences, for the reasons that I mentioned earlier.

I am grateful for the advice of Professor David Ormerod, the former criminal law commissioner at the Law Commission, for his help with the drafting. He changed my view on the consent issue; I had originally been of the view that consent should be no defence, but it is right that there is a defence of consent—to cover, for example, cases of sporting contests that lead to injury—provided that serious harm was unintended. That proviso is elegantly drafted in the amendments before us. I know the Government are also grateful for the generosity with which he gave his advice, and for the advice of the Law Commission.

In my view, the broad definition of “serious harm” in proposed new subsection (6) to include actual bodily harm is right. It will be less difficult to prove, in cases of both physical and psychiatric injury, than if the only harm that met the required criteria were those for grievous bodily harm or wounding offences under Sections 18 and 20 of the Offences against the Person Act. It is also right that the new offence has extraterritorial application under the new Section 75B, and we welcome that.

I commend the Government on behalf of these Benches for their comprehensive and well-modulated response to this new offence, and to the amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. I congratulate her once again. It is a victory for her but also for the many victims of this horrible crime. It is to be hoped that this provision will ensure that many others are spared both strangulation offences and the possible escalation to fatal violence thereafter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for the short intermission while we changed places. The government amendments in this group relate to special measures and the ban on cross-examination in person as they operate in civil proceedings. The Government have taken careful note of the debate in Committee on Clauses 62 and 64, particularly the argument that there should be equivalent protections for the victims of domestic abuse in the civil courts as in family courts. I am personally grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for our discussions about these issues. As I explained in Committee, while we want to ensure that there is parity between each of the jurisdictions, we also need to build in allowances for the differences. That is why the provisions in respect of cross-examination and special measures in civil proceedings differ from those in family proceedings.

I shall speak first to Amendment 32 in respect of Clause 62. It is worth noting that the original provision in the Bill was based on recommendations made by the Civil Justice Council in its report published last year entitled Vulnerable Witnesses and Parties within Civil Proceedings. However, having reflected on the representations we have received and the cogent arguments put forward in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Amendment 32 would extend eligibility for special measures to those at risk of domestic abuse in addition to the existing provisions which provide eligibility for special measures for the victims of specified offences. We see the force of the argument to include this measure so that there will be an equivalent level of protection for domestic abuse victims across the jurisdictions. The Civil Procedure Rules will lay out how this is to work in practice, but the instruction in the Bill is a clear indication that those victims who have not reported their perpetrator to the police will have an opportunity to let the court know where they are at risk of domestic abuse.

As the existing clause provides, judges will still need to consider whether the quality of a person’s evidence or the person’s participation in proceedings is likely to be diminished by reason of vulnerability and, if so, whether it is necessary to make one or more special measures directions. However, we believe that including provision for those at risk of domestic abuse will mean that these victims will be covered and given the ability to avail themselves of special measures.

I shall say a further word on that, which I mentioned in Committee as well. By their nature, civil cases have the potential to cover a much broader range of circumstances where there is no prior connection between the parties; for example, where a victim is suing an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse, an action against an employer where abuse is alleged, or in a boundary dispute. This amendment is therefore an appropriate step. The breadth of cases in the civil courts means that it may not be appropriate in all cases to grant special measures, although our amendment makes it likely that they will be granted where there is a genuine need.

I turn now to Amendments 33 to 40 to Clause 64. These introduce an automatic ban on cross-examination in person by a litigant in person if the party to proceedings has been convicted or cautioned in relation to a specified offence against a party to the proceedings or where there is a protective injunction between the parties. The witness may also introduce additional evidence to prove that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and this too can give rise to an automatic ban. The evidence would be based on legal aid evidentiary standards and may include a letter from a GP or an employer. This is provided for in family courts through Clause 63. These amendments would therefore move the position in civil courts substantially closer to the provision in family courts on a ban on cross-examination. However, as with the point I made in regard to Clause 62, we have to be mindful of the differences between the two jurisdictions.

The clause, in so far as it relates to banning the cross-examination of vulnerable parties or witnesses, again stems from the report by the Civil Justice Council. The council recommended that the prohibition of cross-examination by a self-represented party should be extended to cover civil proceedings, thereby ensuring some parity with the criminal and family jurisdictions. The council did caution, however, that the ban or prohibition should not be automatic and absolute, bearing in mind the broad range of cases that come before the civil courts.

As I have said previously in our debates on the Bill, we have concerns in relation to the civil jurisdiction that there should be an automatic ban on cross-examination where the position is only that someone is charged with an offence against an individual; that is, where the facts of the case have yet to be proven. In the circumstances where someone is charged with an offence, we believe that it should be left to the discretion of the court to determine whether a ban is appropriate on the facts of a particular case. That is because, as I have said, civil and family jurisdictions are different in type of case they deal with, the civil jurisdiction having a much wider range.

I believe that these amendments will give better protection to victims of domestic abuse and bring closer parity between the civil and family jurisdictions. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I explained in Committee the reasons for my amendments, which were directed at ensuring that special measures and the prohibition of direct cross-examination should be applied in civil cases on the same or a very similar basis as they are to be in family cases. Our debates highlighted the difficulties, fear and trauma for parties and witnesses in giving evidence and taking part in proceedings where they were victims or at risk of being victims of domestic abuse at the hands of other parties or witnesses. We spoke of the effect of reliving the trauma of abuse in subsequent court proceedings and the fear of the consequences of giving or challenging evidence given by or in the presence of perpetrators.

I argued that in many civil proceedings the risks and effects were the same. I mentioned disputes over property and goods, landlord and tenant disputes, employment disputes, inheritance disputes and business disputes—particularly when partners break up and the separation of their joint business interests gives rise to litigation. It is a truism for litigation lawyers that the disputes giving rise to the most bitterness and unpleasantness are precisely those where the litigants have a close personal connection. However, of course I take the Minister’s point that the range of disputes in civil cases is very much broader than it is in family cases.

The Government have listened to those concerns. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for the time that he and officials in his department made available to consider these issues and for the very useful discussions we had, which have led us to the position that special measures are now to be extended to persons who are or who are at risk of being a victim of domestic abuse, where the original unamended clause required that the person had to be the victim of a specified offence for which the perpetrator would have had to have been convicted, cautioned or charged.

I am delighted that the Government have agreed, no doubt because so many cases of domestic abuse never reach that stage—largely because so much abuse goes unreported or is never the subject of criminal investigation—that victims and those at risk of being victims should be protected in civil proceedings, as they are to be in family proceedings.

Although the amendments on direct cross-examination are complex, as the Minister has explained, they effectively offer broadly equivalent protection to victims of abuse in civil proceedings to that offered in family proceedings, which was the aim of my amendments. In addition to the discretionary protection which the court is to be able to give as a result of new Section 85F of the Courts Act 2003, to be introduced by Clause 64, there is now to be a clear bar on direct cross-examination in cases where the victim is a victim of an offence or protected by an injunction or where there is evidence of domestic abuse against the victim by a party or witness. The nature of the evidence to be required to trigger the mandatory bar will be specified in regulations. It is to be hoped that no undue formality will be required, but I am confident that will be the case.

These amendments achieve what I set out to achieve: to protect witnesses and parties in civil proceedings who have been subject to domestic abuse. I am therefore very pleased to have been able to add my name to the amendments and say—it is not the first time it has been said today—that this process has shown the House at its best. It has been a model of co-operation between some of us on the Opposition Benches and the Government of the day.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for pursuing this issue. It is not something I had focused on. The concessions he has got from the Government are welcome. There will be a ban on cross-examination in family courts and a broadly equivalent set of rules in the civil courts, although, as far as I understand it, there will still be some judicial discretion on these matters because of the wider nature of the types of cases heard in the civil courts. As the noble Lord just said, while the nature of the cases may be wider, the risks may be the same, particularly if the parties are personally connected in any way. I welcome these government amendments and congratulate the noble Lord on pursuing this matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 41 and 104 relate to Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. Last year we committed to exploring whether an amendment to the Bill was needed to clarify that Section. As noble Lords will be aware, it deals with barring orders, as they are often called, which allow courts to bar individuals from making further applications without permission of the court. Importantly, therefore, the order does not prevent access to the court; it prevents making an application without first obtaining the permission of the court to do so.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Newlove asked for an update on the progress of the work. On responding to an amendment on barring orders put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, I said that I would consider the issue of Section 91(14) carefully ahead of this next stage. I can assure noble Lords that I have done precisely that.

The sad fact is that perpetrators sometimes use the family court as a way to continue their abuse, often bringing their victims back to court repeatedly, which can in itself be a traumatising process. It is an abuse of the victims and also, therefore, an inappropriate use of the court process.

As it is currently formulated, Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 does not include any detail as to the circumstances in which such barring orders should be used. Courts have therefore elaborated the principles for when such barring orders may, and should, be made. Last year we heard compelling evidence from the expert panel in its report Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases that, while they can be an effective measure, Section 91(14) barring orders are not being used sufficiently to prevent perpetrators continuing their abuse through the use of court applications under the Children Act 1989.

Before I go further, I want to pay respectful tribute to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who delivered the seminal re P judgment in this area of law back in 1999. For over two decades the guidelines included in that leading judgment have been regarded as the main reference point for judges when they are making the often difficult decision on the use of Section 91(14). It is fair to acknowledge that it is clear from those guidelines that specific cases and types of harm, including harm from domestic abuse, are not excluded from consideration for a barring order. None the less, now is the right time for us to act on the evidence presented by the harm panel about how Section 91(14) is being understood and applied, particularly in domestic abuse circumstances.

As is evident from the many debates we have had on the Bill, we now know far more about the prevalence of domestic abuse and the different forms that it can take than we did in 1999. It is therefore right that as the Bill approaches the end of its parliamentary journey, we use the opportunity to clarify the ambit and application of Section 91(14) to ensure that we are providing greater protection to victims, survivors and their children.

The Government are clear that barring orders are available to protect parents and children where further proceedings would risk causing them harm, and particularly where proceedings could be a form of continuing domestic abuse. To that end, Amendment 41 introduces a new provision into the Children Act 1989: new Section 91A. The new section clarifies that the circumstances in which a court may make a barring order include where the court is satisfied that a further application made by the named person would put the child or another individual—for example, the parent victim—at risk of harm. It is a non-exhaustive example; the discretion is preserved, but an additional statutory indication is provided. As I have mentioned, this amendment responds to recommendations made by the harm panel.

The aim of Amendment 41 is therefore to make it clearer to courts and practitioners that Section 91(14) barring orders are indeed available where a further application would pose a risk of harm to a child or a parent victim, and in particular where that application could constitute further domestic abuse. In that context, I should highlight to noble Lords that while this amendment does not expressly mention domestic abuse, it refers to the concept of “harm” that is already found in the Children Act 1989. This is because the definition in Section 31(9) of the Children Act is already very broad. It already includes coercive control and other forms of domestic abuse, along with many other forms of harm.

We touched on that point in the government response to the Joint Committee’s recommendation to amend the definition of harm. As we said there, we believe that singling out a specific form of harm in any part of the 1989 Act could have unintended negative consequences and risk appearing to give greater weight to one form of harm than another. We do not want to create a hierarchy of harm. We have therefore opted for the wider concept of harm, consistent with the approach in the Children Act.

We have also responded to the harm panel’s report in a further way. The new Section 91A makes it clear that in determining whether to grant permission to make an application to a person who is subject to a barring order under Section 91(14), the court must consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the barring order was made. Our intention is to require that courts consider carefully whether the circumstances that gave rise to the barring order have materially changed, such that permission to apply should be granted. The amendment does not draw a red line such that permission can be granted only if there has been a material change of circumstances, but we believe that the inclusion of this provision, which requires the court to consider this question, will offer further protection to domestic abuse victims.

The amendment also makes it clear that courts can make these orders on their own initiative—of their own motion, as it used to be said—for example, without an application being made by the victim for an order to be made. This, too, is a response to the harm panel’s recommendations. We want to put beyond doubt that there need not be an application for a barring order in order for the court to consider making one. Of course, the court will still need to give due consideration to the making of such an order, but the amendment clarifies that the court can make an order on its own initiative.

The Government are therefore confident that the amendment will mean that barring orders are used more often by courts to protect victims of domestic abuse where further applications put them at risk of harm. It will also make sure that permission to apply will be granted only where the court has considered whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made, and also clarify that courts can make these orders on their own initiative. For those reasons, I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we support this government amendment and the amendment of the Title of the Bill that goes with it. As the Minister has explained, Section 91 of the Children Act permits the court to make a barring order—that is, an order forbidding someone, usually an applicant who has failed to persuade a court to make an order in his or her favour, from making an application for an order of a particular kind; this is usually but not always a repeat application—with respect to a child, importantly, without the leave of the court.

An order under this section still permits a further application for an order to be made if the court decides to permit it, which the court may in its discretion decide to do. This amendment, as the Minister has explained, extends the discretion to make a barring order if a further application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm. That is the real purpose and merit of this amendment: it is for the protection from repeated litigation of those who might be victims of domestic abuse, when that repeated litigation often amounts to a particularly unpleasant form of harassment by legal proceedings.

The jurisdiction is similar to the court’s jurisdiction to make civil restraint orders and civil proceedings orders against vexatious and unmeritorious repeat litigants in civil cases. Under this government amendment, a person subject to a barring order may of course seek permission to apply further to the court. That application for permission will be considered, but the court considering whether permission should be given to make a fresh application must consider whether there has been a change of circumstances since the making of the original order. That, I suggest, seems entirely sensible. The amendment therefore strikes a careful and judicious balance between protecting potential applicants and providing a safeguard against people being harassed by unmeritorious repeat litigation.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these amendments, which we support. As he explained, they put in additional strengthening factors for barring orders; of course, there are barring orders in place in the family courts in any event. The purpose, as he explained, is to make it crystal clear, and to set out clearly, what the court must consider where there is any risk for the children or the other parties through repeated litigation. However, there is discretion for the court, if there is a material change in circumstances, to decide to accept and hear the case. So I accept the amendment as presented.

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I have been overwhelmed with emails and messages from women who have experienced hopelessness with our legal system. No doubt we can deluge this Chamber with countless cases—I am sure that many noble Lords have been contacted and reached out to. All involve years of long-lasting and damaging court cases where children are forced into contact deemed unsafe. Mothers have experienced pressure to prove that their fear was real but that has been denied, so inflicting further injury to the mother and children. One survivor, speaking on behalf of many named survivors, said to me, “I am crying out for help and hope”. This amendment is one small aspect of our response to safeguard them and their children. I speak to give their voices in the Chamber today.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I expressed my concern in Committee at the proposal to abandon the presumption in subsection (2A) of the Children Act 1989 where there has been domestic abuse that has affected the child or the other parent. My concern was then, as it is now, that under the Children Act the welfare of the child must be the court’s paramount consideration.

The presumption requires courts, when making orders about arrangements for children, including their living arrangements and arrangements for contacts, to ensure that

“unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare”.

That presumption is supported by a great deal of evidence that for children to maintain a relationship with both their parents following a breakdown of the parents’ relationship is generally in their best interests. The presumption has stood the test of time. It serves to remind custodial and non-custodial parents in entirely non-abusive relationships that have nevertheless broken down that their responsibility is to try to help their children to maintain relationships with the other, non-residential parent.

But the presumption is rebuttable, hence the words

“unless the contrary is shown”.

In many cases involving domestic abuse, judges will not order contact, because the best interests of the child will not be met by their making an order for contact. That covers the cases that I suspect the noble Baronesses, Lady Uddin and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, are worried about.

However, as I attempted to demonstrate in Committee, there may be cases where acts of abuse should not lead to the conclusion that contact should be cut. In some cases, the child will have not witnessed, known about or been put at risk by an act of abuse, which may have been a completely isolated act, committed against its parent. I am reluctant to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, because I so rarely do, but I do on this occasion. I understand her concern and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, to ensure that children are protected from the harm of unsuitable and often dangerous contacts, but to provide that protection is the job of judges. It is not the task of Parliament to make absolutist rules that treat all cases where allegations of abuse are made in the same way. Judicial discretion in these cases should be left as it is, exactly for the reasons advanced by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.

I also do not accept that the proposed new subsection (4) should pass into law. It would provide that no court should make an order for unsupervised contact with a parent who is, broadly, facing proceedings for a domestic abuse offence, is involved in a fact-finding hearing for a domestic abuse offence or who has a criminal conviction for such an offence. There are two points that are conclusive against such a clause. First, in the circumstances of paragraphs (a) to (c) in the proposed new subsection (8) of Section 9 of the Children Act, there would have been no finding of guilt of domestic abuse. The presumption of innocence has to apply, a point well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. A judge hearing a contact application should not be barred by a statutory prohibition from making a finding of fact and an order after hearing evidence if they take the view that the welfare of the child would be best served by making such an order for contact, just because there is a statutory prohibition that operates without a finding of fact.

Secondly, this suggested prohibition would not be limited to cases where the alleged offending party is said to have been involved in domestic abuse against either the child or its other parent, so it would forbid a contact order between the prohibited parent and a child from an entirely different relationship. A court would be forbidden from making an order for contact with a child from a father’s relationship with a former partner, with whom a good relationship had been maintained by him and by the child, because of an allegation of domestic abuse lodged by a subsequent partner. Such an absolute prohibition would be wrong, and I cannot support it.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the proposed new clause in this amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would disapply the presumption that parental involvement furthers a child’s welfare in cases where there has been domestic abuse. It would also prohibit unsupervised contact for a parent awaiting trial or on bail for domestic abuse offences where there are ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic abuse or where the parent has a criminal offence for domestic abuse. I moved a similar amendment in Committee which did not receive the backing of a number of speakers in the debate or of the Minister.

In his response in Committee, the Minister said:

“I have a great deal of sympathy for the aims of these amendments, and I agree that more needs to be done to ensure that the courts take proper account of the impact that domestic abuse can have on children’s well-being and safety.”


He went on to say that

“following the recommendations from the Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts, the Government launched a review on the presumption of parental involvement”

which

“will focus on the presumption … and the impact on children’s welfare of the courts’ application of these provisions.”

He argued that it would

“be premature to amend the legislation relating to the presumption … before gaining the in-depth evidence from the review.”—[Official Report, 3/2/21; col. 2222.]

However, we should not forget that Women’s Aid’s Nineteen Child Homicides documents the cases of 19 children in 12 families who were killed in circumstances relating to child contact by a father who was the perpetrator of domestic abuse. The Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts said that it had

“received sufficient evidence to conclude that in the cohort of cases described in submissions the presumption further reinforces the procontact culture and detracts from the court’s focus on the child’s individual welfare and safety.”

The report also states:

“The panel is clear, however, that the presumption should not remain in its present form.”


There is thus some clear and, indeed, tragic evidence that the present arrangements relating to the presumption of parental involvement as opposed to solely what is in the best interests of the child, including its welfare and safety, are just not delivering the protections they should. However, in the light of the concerns expressed by some noble Lords in Committee, which have been repeated today, and the current review of the presumption of parental involvement, we did not put down the amendment for Report. Instead, we will continue to pursue this issue outside the discussions and debates on the Bill.

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[Baroness Uddin (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, I support this amendment, eloquently and powerfully detailed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Hamwee. I agree that confidentiality must be inherent in safe- guarding women survivors, many of whom may have endured prolonged periods of violence prior to reaching the safety of a refuge.

I have worked with refuges and inside a refuge. I know how hard it is to ensure the safety of not just one individual but of a number of women and their families. There may be instances where refuge addresses are revealed by residents being followed by a perpetrator, or, in fact, survivors may reveal the address if they return to perpetrators for the countless, complex reason debated on many occasions in this Chamber. Regardless, our statutory institutions, including the courts, must uphold the essential principle of safeguarding, not just for the sake of one survivor but for all those who reside in refuges and for the staff responsible for protecting all survivors in such refuges.

It is critical that we acknowledge this, and I look forward to the Minister being persuaded, much more eloquently than I could ever do, by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I thank the noble Baroness for moving this amendment and I wholeheartedly support her.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I supported this amendment in principle in Committee. I expressed one or two drafting reservations, one of which was about the point that not all refuges may have office addresses, but that has been amply answered by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. This amendment is extremely difficult to resist with any sense of logic or safeguarding at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has argued the case for it and I shall be extremely brief.

The point is that everybody has stressed the importance and value of confidentiality for refuge addresses. That flows from the very nature of a refuge: it is where women go—it is generally women—to avoid the consequences and a repetition of domestic abuse. Breach of that confidence leads to perpetrators discovering where their victims have gone. Discovering the whereabouts of their victims offers them a chance of harassing those victims further—of committing further abuse—so revealing a refuge address destroys the very concept that it is a refuge. It raises the risk of changing a refuge into a target. That is what this amendment is designed to avoid and I support it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, powerfully moved this amendment and went into the detail of the problems that arise when refuge addresses are revealed. I fail to understand why judges, in her words, are turning a blind eye to the requirement to keep the secrecy of a refuge; I fail to imagine why that might be the case. Nevertheless, either mistakes happen or some judges—very few—have an alternative view. What I understand from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is that she wants the Minister to put on record that guidance will be updated and to make it absolutely clear that this should not happen again. I do not know whether she is going to move her amendment or what will happen, but I would have thought that, at the very least, the Minister should be able to do that and say that guidance will be updated.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Uddin, both have experience of working in refuges and they know the importance of keeping these addresses secret. I hope we will hear from the Minister something that sufficiently reassures his noble friend Lady Bertin that this issue can be properly addressed once and for all.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

52: After Clause 68, insert the following new Clause—
“Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services
(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B. (2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.(5) A is to be taken to have shown the facts mentioned in subsection (4) if—(a) sufficient evidence of the facts is adduced to raise an issue with respect to them, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we had an extensive debate on our amendment in this form in Committee. We have brought it back on Report because we are determined to make progress on criminalising the fraudulent behaviour of the charlatan psychotherapists and counsellors this amendment is directed at. I believe we have made some progress since Committee and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, from the Department of Health and Social Care for their time, attention and sympathetic response at the meeting they arranged for a number of us who support this amendment.

I certainly think the meeting increased government understanding of the truly shocking wrongs these charlatans perpetrate towards the young people they prey on, the prevalence of this behaviour and the perniciousness of its effects—with the lives of many young and vulnerable people ruined, often permanently. Our debate and the meeting also reminded the Government of a long history of attempts to secure legislation curbing this behaviour and of the strength of feeling and determination of those who strive for change on this issue —an issue which is certainly not going to go away.

As we discussed in Committee, these totally unqualified charlatans ply their trade by offering what they call counselling or psychotherapy services, mostly to young adults, to whom they often charge very substantial fees. They then build up in their patients or clients—in reality, their victims—a misplaced trust in them and engineer a false dependence by a process of transference. This exploitation is often assisted by the perpetrators implanting entirely false memories in their victims of imagined but illusory abuse during their childhood, usually by their parents.

The process is aimed at alienating these young people from their parents and other family members—often permanently—inflicting profound and long-lasting psychological damage upon them. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, with all her extensive experience, tellingly described this unscrupulous exploitation of vulnerability, which is what this amendment aims to stop.

My understanding is that the Government maintain their position that the new offence we advocate should not be part of the Bill because, they say, there is a concern to confine the Bill to the domestic context, and these so-called counsellors and psychotherapists provide their services outside their victims’ homes. I disagree with that position for two reasons. The first is that this abuse is in fact domestic abuse, because its perpetrators, although not operating from within their victims’ family homes, are usurping the position of their victims’ parents and family members. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, put it in Committee,

“the self-styled development coach preys on their vulnerable clients and tears them away from their families, to the extent that they break off all contact and become estranged. There are countless such cases. The goal of such therapy is coercion and control, to debilitate and disable—abuse, if ever there was.”—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 23.]

Secondly, I do not believe we should be too precious about the ambit of a particular piece of legislation, including this Bill. The Domestic Abuse Bill before us amends other legislation in a large number of its provisions. Our amendment would add a new clause modelled on Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. Other amendments have been made to that Act in this Bill, notably the non-fatal strangulation offence incorporated in the Bill this afternoon, which inserts a clause of general application after Section 75—a clause which is not restricted to domestic abuse.

I suggest that if new legislation is necessary and within scope of the Bill—as the Public Bill Office decided our amendment was when it accepted it—we should legislate. The way to legislate on this issue is by adapting Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act, as we advocate.

It is high time for legislation. In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained the history of his involvement with seeking legislation on this issue when he was Solicitor-General. He raised the question of why, if they can legislate to outlaw this behaviour in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, we cannot legislate here. We have received no answer to that question.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, also made the point that we have been trying fruitlessly to make progress for more than 20 years. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, pointed out that this type of alienation is nothing new; domestic alienation has been happening for 50 years, with the quasi-healers operating with immunity. So have the other forms of domestic abuse we are tackling in this Bill—but we are now trying to tackle them. The Bill involves an enlightened process on which we are embarked, but we should take care that in seeking enlightened progress, we do not make it exclusive.

Both before and since the debate in Committee, I have received a number of letters—some long, all well argued, clearly emotional and universally tragic—from parents and other family members who have, through no fault of their own, lost the relationships they once enjoyed with children and relatives, leaving them heartbroken and bereft, on the basis of falsehoods peddled by exploitative quacks. My noble friend Lady Jolly pointed out the degree to which this so-called therapy is entirely unregulated, and she powerfully demonstrated how relevant that was.

At our meeting, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, raised the possibility of regulating psychotherapists by statutory instrument, and that is something we would be keen to follow up. However, it will certainly continue to be insufficient, as it has been to date, to rely on voluntary registration with the Professional Standards Authority, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, in Committee.

Strong and effective regulation will help and should be introduced, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Alderdice in his Private Member’s Bill as long ago as 2001. However, the thrust of our amendment is to criminalise this predatory abuse, and we need legislation to do that on the statute book. The Government seem to sympathise with that aim and the direction of our amendment, their unhappiness being at the prospect of including it in this Bill. But the one thing I have not heard from the Government is any suggestion that a coercive control offence modelled on Section 76, as this amendment is, is not a suitable way to achieve our aim. We therefore encourage the Government, even at this late stage, to accept this amendment or commit to legislation in this area.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and all other noble Lords who have supported this amendment, for again setting out the case for it. The amendment seeks to create an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour for psychotherapists and counsellors providing services to clients.

Amendment 52 seeks, in effect, to replicate the coercive or controlling behaviour offence under Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. This offence was created to close a gap in legislation regarding patterns of coercive or controlling behaviour in a domestic abuse context; that is, during a relationship between intimate partners, former partners or family members. As such, the offence applies only to those who are “personally connected” as defined within Section 76 of the 2015 Act. The amendment would extend the offence beyond those who are personally connected as defined by that Act so that it applied to psychotherapists and counsellors.

In Committee, and again today, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others have strongly made the point that unregulated and fraudulent psychotherapists are able to take advantage of their clients’ vulnerability by supplanting parents and families in the affections and minds of their clients, with the purpose of turning them against their friends and families through a process called transference. The noble Lord has suggested that this abuse should be caught by the controlling or coercive behaviour offence because therapists are abusing their position of trust and the dependence of their clients.

As my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier noted, we have had a number of debates on this issue and on the importance—in the Government’s submission—of preserving the meaning of “personally connected” in relation to domestic abuse, both in this Bill and, by extension, for the purposes of the Section 76 offence. The Government recognise that noble Lords have raised an important issue and have made some spirited and cogent arguments in favour of doing something now. However, we still feel it is important to acknowledge that domestic abuse, including controlling or coercive behaviour, is a unique type of abuse underpinned by an emotional and affectionate bond between the victim and the perpetrator, as well as a complex power dynamic. The paid-for or commercial nature of the psychotherapist-client relationship represents a fundamentally different power dynamic from that of domestic abuse. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and others, that is why we do not believe that it is appropriate to replicate the Section 76 offence in other contexts such as this. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for recognising that this might not be the right Bill in which to do it.

As I mentioned in Committee, this is a matter for consideration by the Department of Health and Social Care. I am pleased that a number of noble Lords who have spoken in Committee and again tonight had the opportunity to discuss it in more detail with my noble friend Lady Penn, on behalf of that department, and with me. I am glad they found the discussion productive, as we did. I am grateful to those noble Lords for their time and engagement with us and with officials from both the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care.

As noble Lords noted, there is at present a system of accredited voluntary registration by the Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care. The authority has a process for quality-assuring voluntary registers of health and care professionals in the UK who are not subject to statutory regulation. It currently accredits 10 voluntary registers relating to counselling and psychotherapy, providing assurance to the public in relation to around 50,000 talking therapy professionals. These registers should be used by service users to choose a practitioner to meet their needs and to be assured that they are safe, trustworthy and competent to practise. To gain accreditation from the authority, organisations must meet 11 standards for accredited registers. I set those out in Committee so will not do that again now, but any registrant who is removed from an accredited register for conduct reasons cannot join another accredited register.

I recognise that these registers are voluntary, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, but they provide assurance that practitioners who are on the registers are safe, trustworthy and competent. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, is right that more can be done in this area, and the Department of Health and Social Care is working with the Professional Standards Authority to improve awareness of the accredited registers programme and to encourage service users and providers—people such as GPs, as she says—to seek out the services of practitioners on an accredited register rather than unregistered individuals.

The Government are committed to a proportionate system of safeguards for the professionals who work in the health and care system, and from time to time we bring new professions into regulation. It is important that decisions to regulate a profession are evidence-based and consider the risks posed by the profession in the round, not just the risks posed by unscrupulous practitioners. The Professional Standards Authority has developed its “right-touch assurance” tool with the aim of providing advice on how best to regulate different groups in health and care. Where the Government are satisfied that the conditions for regulation of a profession are met, that can be taken forward through secondary legislation using powers in the Health Act 1999, a point that, as noble Lords mentioned today, we have explored in our helpful discussions since Committee.

The Department of Health and Social Care is currently conducting a programme of work to reform the professional regulation framework for healthcare professionals. That will provide an opportunity to consider whether the professions protected in law are the right ones and to ensure that the level of regulatory oversight is proportionate to the risks to the public.

I am conscious, as the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, set out in his contribution, that this is an issue that has been around for a very long time—since 1971, in some form—and he has been working on it for many years. I hope that reassurance and the points that have been raised, both in these debates and in our meeting since Committee, will be fed into that work. Perhaps this will provide further reassurance: as a couple of noble Lords have alluded to, one person who spoke in Committee but is not speaking today is my noble friend Lady Finn. If nothing else, I hope noble Lords will note that they have another person on the government side who is fully sighted on these issues.

The noble Lords who have spoken in favour of the amendment have once again underlined this important issue, but I hope they will accept why we believe this is not the appropriate Bill in which to pursue the regulation of psychotherapists and counsellors. I have no doubt that they will take the further opportunity to debate this issue soon in the context of Department of Health-led legislation and, moreover, as I have indicated, the issue of regulation can be considered afresh in the context of the forthcoming review of the regulation of healthcare professionals.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, spoke of a pathway. It may not have as many paving stones as noble Lords might wish but I hope that they can discern one, and that on that basis the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, it is late in the evening and I shall be brief. We have heard a detailed argument from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my noble friend Lord Alderdice as to why this amendment fits so clearly within the ambit of the Bill. From my noble friend Lord Alderdice we also heard how close is the link between therapy and domestic abuse, and from all around the House we have heard how overdue this measure is and that it is not a recent problem that we are seeking to address.

It is also significant that this amendment attracts support from doctors and lawyers and Members of your Lordships’ House who are neither. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said how common and how wrong it is that bogus therapists can take advantage of their clients, causing them real harm. The noble Lord, Lord Fairfax, was one of many Peers who know families who have been victims of this abuse, and he also powerfully argued for an end to inaction on the part of government. My noble friend Lady Jolly was another, who described graphically the behaviour of these charlatans as unethical and without shame. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, described our case on the amendment as a powerful case for change and called for action. So let us, please, not miss yet another opportunity, as the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, put it. As the noble Baroness said, compulsory registration must sit alongside criminal sanctions, in just the way as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, pointed out. An offence of coercive control modelled on the Serious Crime Act may not be the only way to achieve it, but it is a good one.

Whatever form an amendment of the criminal law takes, the House and the Government know clearly what it is that we are trying to achieve. They really ought now to be implementing change, rather than closing the road to change. The Government need to get over the temptation to insist on drawing the distinction between what the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, described as the emotional and affectionate bond that characterises domestic abuse and the type of abuse that these charlatans and quacks perpetrate on their victims. It will be interesting to see whether the Government can move away from insisting on that distinction. I described it earlier as a precious distinction, but it is purist at best.

“Not this Bill, not now” is no answer to the suffering of victims. We need the Government to be prepared to say, “Yes, this Bill and now”. At the very least, if they cannot say that, “The very next Bill, and soon”. We will take such opportunities as we can to bring about change. I accept that there will be opportunities to come, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, indicated, and they may well be in health-driven legislation. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment tonight, but we will be back seeking change in due course.

Amendment 52 withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

16: After Clause 31, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of sections 1 to 31
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of this Act to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review. (3) The review under subsection (1) must consider but is not limited to considering any evidence as to any effects of this Act—(a) by the imposition of longer prison sentences upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders on whom they are imposed;(b) upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison and a correspondingly smaller proportion on licence;(c) upon the radicalisation of prisoners other than those upon whom longer prison sentences are imposed or who are required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison;(d) on the degree to which those prisoners upon whom a serious terrorist sentence is imposed are segregated from other prisoners.(4) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.(5) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.(6) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report under subsection (5)(b) within one month of receiving the report.(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This Clause would require an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of the Act after one year, with particular attention to radicalisation in prisons and the effects of longer periods of imprisonment on reform and rehabilitation and radicalisation in prisons and of segregating serious terrorist offenders.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, by the amendments in this group noble Lords from around the House seek reviews of the impact of this legislation on the operation of our criminal justice system. Such reviews would consider: how we are dealing with terrorist offences, including the effects on the Prison and Probation Service and, in particular, the effects on prison capacity; the financial impact of the legislation; and the effect of the legislation on Northern Ireland.

The very fact that so many noble Lords seek such reviews, each with different emphases, demonstrates that however much the Bill’s provisions may chime with the prevailing public mood, for many of us they nevertheless cause uncertainty and misgivings. While we all recognise that terrorism must be dealt with extremely severely, on any view the Bill provides for radically harsher sentencing than we have had before. I suspect that the Minister and the Government recognise that this approach is not risk-free.

I shall concentrate on the review called for in the amendment in my name and the names of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Paddick. Our amendment is concerned with Part 1 of the Bill. To remind ourselves briefly of the ground we covered on day one in Committee, Part 1 deals first with sentences for what I might call ordinary criminal offences, punishable by two or more years’ imprisonment but aggravated by a terrorist connection; then, with serious terrorism offences and minimum custodial terms for offenders; with increased extended sentences for specified violent offences; and with other special custodial sentences for offenders of particular concern. The common threads running through all these provisions are, first, that judges’ discretion to impose more lenient sentences than prescribed in the legislation is considerably limited and, secondly, that terrorist offenders will generally spend much longer in prison than has been the case to date.

The review called for by our amendment is to be concerned, first, with the effect of the imposition of longer prison sentences on the reform and rehabilitation of those who serve them; secondly, with the likely outcome that longer sentences will mean offenders spending a greater proportion of them in custody and a lower proportion on licence; thirdly, with the radicalisation of other prisoners by those who will now spend far longer in custody and may have the dangerous potential to radicalise others who come into contact with them while in prison; and finally, on the segregation of serious terrorist prisoners serving these very long sentences. I make no apology for the fact that Liberal Democrats start from the position that while punishment plays an extremely important part in sentencing and that the more serious the offence the greater the punishment element in any sentence, nevertheless reform and rehabilitation, even in very long sentences, is a central purpose of sentencing.

Hope of reform and rehabilitation should motivate all who work within the system, as well as society at large. That belief is in our DNA. We do not believe that we should give up on serious offenders, even terrorist offenders. Nor do we accept that the lives of at least some among those whom we punish cannot ultimately be turned around.

Importantly, the review we seek calls for a person with professional experience of imprisonment for terrorist offences to be appointed by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. It was therefore heartening to note that on 25 January Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer, issued a statement saying that he had decided to review the subject of terrorism in the prison estate in England and Wales as part of his annual review of the terrorism Acts. His statement said that he was particularly interested in criminal behaviour which effectively encourages terrorism within prisons, in the status and influence of terrorist prisoners within them, in any connection to prison gangs, and in how to secure evidence of terrorist offences or terrorism-related activity in prisons. He is clear that his focus will be on terrorism because there is, he says, considerable literature already on radicalisation and extremism in prisons. Nevertheless, I would be surprised if he did not feel driven to consider, as part and parcel of considering terrorist activity within prisons, the question of radicalisation and extremism, and its effect on the prison population as a whole. Inevitably, he will also consider how to achieve reform and rehabilitation for as many terrorist offenders as possible.

One of any reviewer’s main starting points will be the work and findings of the 2016 Acheson review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, the recommendations of which many noble Lords mentioned earlier in the passage of the Bill. In setting out the context of his review, Ian Acheson wrote:

“Islamist ideology can present itself in prisons as a struggle for power and dominance in which perceived weaknesses are exploited by a gang culture which threatens or undermines legitimate authority and security”


and that Islamic extremism

“should therefore be a greater and more visible priority for NOMS, led by people with the time and resource to act swiftly and with authority.”

I make no apology for concentrating on Islamic extremism in the context of the type of terrorism that this country, and many others, have faced in recent years.

Perhaps the most significant of that report’s recommendations was that those few extremists who presented what Acheson called

“a particular and enduring risk to national security through subversive behaviour, beliefs and activities”

should be segregated in specialist units, where they would be given “effective deradicalization” programmes. It has been very disappointing that although the Government accepted this recommendation, as they did nearly all the Acheson recommendations, there has been so little action. When I have asked Ministers about this failure of promised implementation, I am afraid that the responses have been defensive or, worse, complacent.

In the wake of the London Bridge attack by Usman Khan on 1 December 2019, Professor Acheson wrote in the Times:

“I have evidence that the separation centres that I recommended be established to incapacitate those posing most risk are not filling up because of institutional timidity to deal with a terrorist threat that is more acute than senior officials want to admit.”


He then said that

“I remain deeply unconvinced that this service has the corporate leadership, competence or will to deal with terrorist offenders. I’m not sure any tangible progress has been made since my review concluded three years ago.”

My concern is that since the disastrous attacks in 2019, the Government have been so focused on tougher sentencing that other aims, just as important or even more so, have been sidelined.

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In the light of these remarks, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment and hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—who spoke to the noble and learned Lord’s amendment as well as to his own—will not move theirs when they are called.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and to the Minister for his detailed reply.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, with all his experience, had no difficulty in recognising the need for the review for which we have called, and clearly set out why a review after a year was appropriate. My noble friend Lord Paddick emphasised the need for deradicalisation and made the point, which ought to be obvious but was not addressed by the Minister, that everyone will be released at some stage so working to help them to be safe on release is therefore crucial. He also highlighted the clear danger that keeping offenders in prison for disproportionately long sentences may make them more likely to offend rather than less by further radicalising them, depriving them of hope and undermining their prospects of reform.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in speaking to the amendments in his name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out the risk of implementing increased sentences without a clear approach to making safe, new prison places available and to ensuring that the special implications for Northern Ireland are properly considered. Particularly important from my perspective, he stressed the role of the probation service.

In response, the Minister urged the Committee to accept that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is the appropriate reviewer of this legislation. I do not accept that. While his role is of course extremely important, it is not the same as someone tasked with a full review directed at the whole, overall impact of this legislation and focused on it. There is a well-established place for formal review after legislation is passed. Nor do I accept that it is necessary for reviewing the impact of this Bill that we should see, as the Minister appeared to suggest at one stage, what has happened on release at the end of offenders’ periods in custody or even after three years. What is necessary is to see, and see reasonably quickly, how these sentences are working and how they are affecting prisons and the prison population—including in particular how the presence of more, very long-term terrorists affects those already in prisons. We need to assess the financial and other impacts at an early stage and see how far the system is changed by the new long sentences.

The Minister questioned the impact of those long sentences because the number of prisoners is low—indeed, he went so far as to describe it as “minimal”—but that leaves out of account the impact of the number of prisoner years to be served by those on very long sentences and the importance of those prisoners within the system, including the danger of their glorification by other prisoners with an inclination towards terrorism.

For all the Minister asserting that enough review work and impact assessments have been done already, so that the reviews we seek are unnecessary, I disagree. However, in the hope that we will be able to discuss a programme for future review with the Government, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment at this stage.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, may I say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his warning against equating too closely the use of polygraphs in monitoring sexual offenders with their use on terrorist offenders, who obviously pose a very different problem? The Minister should consider that.

Sixty years ago, in 1961, I was proudly driving my red and black little Austin A40—new car, brand new wife—along the twisting road from Mold to Denbigh in north Wales. It was a snowy day, just like today—that is what reminded me of the incident. We were not in a hurry. I approached a bend well on my own side of the road at a reasonable speed. There was a car parked on the bend; a large lorry coming from the opposite direction at speed saw it late, swerved out to overtake it on my side of the road and, as he pulled back, his rear end hit my car.

I gave evidence in the Denbigh Magistrates’ Court and found it very stressful. A police sketch of the accident was produced which purported to show where my car had ended up, with a 30-foot, perfectly straight skid mark. I told the chairman of the Bench I thought my car had finished some 20 yards short of where it was shown on the plan. He said, “Don’t you appreciate this is a carefully prepared police plan of your accident?” I said, “Well, it is entitled ‘rough sketch plan’.” Everybody laughed—except the chairman. The defendant was acquitted of careless driving, with the chairman commenting that the wrong person had been prosecuted —it should have been me. However, the lorry driver’s insurers paid me and my wife damages for personal injury without any questions.

The point of this lengthy reminiscence is that witnesses are giving evidence up and down the country in Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts every day, but nobody has ever thought to put a polygraph test on them as they are questioned. Your pulse may be racing, your blood pressure through the roof; you may be sweating, wishing you were anywhere other than perched in a witness box above the well of the court with myriad sceptical eyes looking you up and down—not because you are lying, but you may be afraid that someone, like the chairman of the Denbigh Bench, may not believe you. There are also those pesky lawyers paid to make you out to be a liar with their ridiculous version of the event. That is why the present Domestic Abuse Bill calls for special measures for victims and their witnesses and the present overseas operations Bill has a presumption against prosecution altogether, to save old soldiers the stress of recalling bad times.

The purpose of polygraph testing, as I said at our last meeting on 26 January, is to measure the physiological response of a person to questioning. It depends on the proposition that a person who lies will demonstrate it by changes in his blood pressure, perspiration, heartbeat and so on. I pointed out last time that these conditions are explicable by the stress of being questioned, by being thought to be lying, even by the state of your stomach-turning digestion, or by fear.

Because these physiological changes do not demonstrate that a person is lying, at least to the degree of certainty required for a conviction, evidence of the result of a polygraph test is excluded in court. It is therefore very good policy that, so far, the courts of this country have refused to accept polygraph results as admissible evidence.

We have already discussed whether such evidence should be used where terrorists are released from prison to monitor their continuing behaviour in the community. The purpose of this amendment is to probe whether the Government harbour any desire to go any further: whether this restraint will be maintained if the results of such a test appear to be relevant to a future terrorist trial in a court. That is when principle is put to the test—when there appears to be an indiscriminate danger to the public.

I support this amendment and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on the proposal.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and others have explained, Clause 32 puts the imposition of polygraph conditions on serious terrorist offenders released on licence on the same footing as applies in the case of serious sexual offences. I say at the outset that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Thomas that different considerations apply with terrorist offenders and sexual offenders.

Yesterday, in Committee on the Domestic Abuse Bill, we discussed the use of polygraph testing for domestic abuse offenders released on licence—and again, different considerations apply. Nevertheless, I said then that my outright opposition to the use of polygraph testing anywhere in our criminal justice system had become more nuanced when the proposed use was for the limited purpose of monitoring compliance with licence conditions on release from custody. My outright opposition hitherto stemmed from the lack of proven reliability of polygraph testing and from the perception at least that it is directed to providing binary answers, true or false, to complex evidential questions—hence the use of statements such as “He failed a polygraph test”. Lawyers naturally prefer a system which depends on the careful and balanced evaluation of evidence, often conflicting or inconsistent, rather than certainty.

In part, as I said yesterday, I have become more sympathetic to the use of polygraph testing with the help of the comprehensive and very helpful learning session organised by the MoJ last Thursday, which was attended by a number of Peers, including the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee, as they have said. In addition, I accept that there are legitimate reasons for the use of polygraph testing to provide information to the police and others investigating serious offences and, in the case of terrorism, often potential offences that threaten multiple lives. However, accepting polygraph testing for those limited purposes does not mean that we can accept polygraph testing in criminal cases, and that will remain our position unless and until the reliability of polygraph testing is far more conclusively established than it is now. I agreed completely with the observations of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford on how stress can affect evidence given in a court and on how falsely polygraph testing may skew such evidence.

Our Amendment 19 would amend Section 30 of the Offender Management Act to ensure that evidence of any statement made by a released defender in a polygraph session, and any of his physiological reactions while being so examined, could not be used in a criminal prosecution of any person, not just the released offender. It is right that this amendment is billed as a probing amendment, but that is plainly right. However, at the moment, Section 30 does not say that. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wolfson, said yesterday in answer to me on the domestic abuse provisions:

“Section 30 of that Act provides unequivocally that any statement or any physiological reaction made by an offender during the polygraph session may not be used in criminal proceedings in which that person is a defendant.”—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 41.]


Therefore, the Government accept the principle that evidence obtained as a result of polygraph testing, or flowing from physiological reactions under such testing, cannot be used as evidence in a prosecution brought against the person being tested. It must be right that it should not be possible to use such evidence in the prosecution of anybody else, and the reasons mentioned by my noble friend Lord Thomas apply equally to that situation.

It therefore seems that, while this is a probing amendment, it is an amendment that the Government can and should plainly accept without compromising their position or anything that the Bill is trying to achieve, and that it is simply consistent with the position taken by the Government that polygraph-testing evidence cannot be used to secure a criminal conviction.

I stress, in the context of the danger posed by terrorism, that I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that deradicalisation is difficult to achieve. He described it as a holy grail. I emphasise that nothing we say would prevent those administering polygraph testing to released offenders from passing on to the police for the purpose of preventing terrorism information revealed to them. Nor should the police be inhibited from using such information passed on to them in investigating and avoiding terrorist offences.

Amendments 19A and 19B would have the effect of insisting on the affirmative resolution procedure for regulations making provision relating to the conduct of polygraph sessions further to a terrorism-related offence. I suggest that the need for the affirmative resolution procedure is obvious. I would be grateful, however, if the Minister could confirm a number of other points about the regulations proposed, not just for the conduct of polygraph sessions but for using information obtained in the course of such sessions in relation to recall from licence.

My understanding is that, as with sexual offences, and as we were assured yesterday with domestic abuse offences, no decisions on recall from licence can be taken as a result of a test indicating deception. If the result of a test implies that an offender is lying about breach of a licence condition or about further offences, for example, I understand that investigators may ask the police to investigate further before taking any positive action. There is therefore to be no recall on the basis of a failed test, which will lead to recall only if the police find other evidence establishing that a breach has occurred. I hope that will be confirmed in a terrorist context as well.

I also have some concerns about cases where an offender makes a disclosure in a polygraph test, confessing to behaviour that is a breach, and who might therefore be recalled. I asked yesterday about this and was told by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wolfson, that recall in domestic abuse cases may follow if

“disclosures made voluntarily by the offender during the polygraph examination … reveal that they can no longer be safely managed in the community. Those circumstances would also lead to a return to custody. The important point to bear in mind in that regard is that that is no different from a situation in which an offender makes such disclosures without the polygraph licence condition.”—[Official Report, 8/2/21; col. 41.]

I take that point, but I regard it as important that, before a disclosure in a polygraph test can lead to recall, there should be a hearing where the disclosure is either admitted by the offender to be true or can be tested so as to ensure that it is voluntary, genuine and true before a recall based on it is affected.

Yesterday I posed a number of questions to the Minister in relation to domestic abuse polygraph conditions. They are reported in Hansard, but the same questions are pertinent today in connection with this Bill. They concerned in particular: first, a guarantee that the results of polygraph testing carried out under the clause could not be used to secure convictions of a criminal offence; secondly, that recall from licence on the basis of a disclosure in a polygraph test of a breach of a licence condition will not be possible without a further hearing—the point I just mentioned; and, finally, whether evidence of a breach of a polygraph licensing condition could ever be itself based on evidence from a failed polygraph test. It would be helpful to have those answers in the context of this Bill relating to terrorist offences as well.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

I was going to make the same suggestion as my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, who made the point that this is an important issue that runs across departments. As he said, I am not sure that this is the right Bill in which to address it, but equally, I am concerned that there may not be a right vehicle at the moment. We have to find some way of dealing with this issue, which has been raised across the House. We have potentially dangerous people treating very vulnerable people and thus only making the situation worse. We should not allow that to happen and we must find a way of dealing with it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all who have spoken in this important and fascinating debate about some terrible behaviour. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained, the principle of this amendment has a long history of parliamentary support. It would rightly criminalise quack counsellors, who, as all have said, suborn vulnerable young people and exploit their weaknesses, in a way that amounts to a classic demonstration of how clearly abusive coercive and controlling behaviour is.

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Debate on whether Clause 69 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, opposition to clauses standing part of a Bill usually arises out of outright opposition, and in my case I said at Second Reading that I shared the view of my noble friend Lady Burt that polygraph testing on the present state of the technology has no place in our criminal justice system. The basic response of most lawyers to polygraph testing is to oppose its use in a criminal context precisely because there is no firm evidence of its reliability. We tend to the view, which I am sure the Minister understands, that a system of evaluating evidence whose reliability is not assured and produces essentially binary results—true or false—is inherently inimical to the approach of common-law lawyers used to a carefully balanced system of gathering, testing, and evaluating evidence.

However, my perception of polygraph testing has now become somewhat more nuanced. A major contributor to a shift in my view was an excellent teach-in organised by the Ministry of Justice last Thursday, very well presented by Heather Sutton, senior policy adviser on polygraphs and sexual offending, and Professor Don Grubin, emeritus professor of forensic psychiatry at Newcastle University. They gave a number of noble Lords a comprehensive outline of the way in which polygraph testing is used in the management of offenders subject to recall from licence under existing legislation. For my part, I have no experience of the use of polygraph testing, and no expertise on the subject. Opposition to its use as part of this Bill was canvassed in another place by my honourable friend Daisy Cooper MP. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Alex Chalk MP, provided a detailed and helpful response to a number of questions which she raised. As a result of his answers and what we were told on Thursday, I accept that there may be some force—subject to a number of questions—to the argument that there is a legitimate place for the use of polygraph testing in necessary cases, where its purpose is to avoid serious harm.

I add one particular proviso, among others, that evidence of polygraph testing must never be relied on as part of the evidence in a criminal case until its reliability is far more conclusively established than it is now. However, as I understood it, we were assured last Thursday—I would be grateful for confirmation of this from the Dispatch Box—that no decisions on recalls from licence can be taken as a result of a test indicating deception. If the result of a test implies that an offender is lying about a breach of a licence condition or about further offences, for example, investigators will ask the police to look further to see what the truth is before taking any positive action. There is therefore no recall, as I understand it, on the basis of a failed test, which will lead only to recall if the police find other evidence establishing that a breach has occurred.

However, I have some concerns about cases where an offender makes a disclosure in a polygraph test confessing to behaviour that is a dangerous breach and might therefore be recalled. It is important in such cases that the veracity or genuineness of the disclosure and its voluntariness can be thoroughly tested before any recall can take place. Our understanding was that such a disclosure would be followed generally by a hearing before a recall was confirmed, but again I seek confirmation of that.

This is genuinely a probing amendment. It is for that reason that our stand part opposition is coupled with Amendment 191, through which I advocate regulations to prevent Clause 69 being brought into force before such a scheme is piloted. I note that the Government propose to pilot these provisions before rolling them out. However, we ask that regulations bringing Clause 69 into force are not made permanent before Parliament has had an opportunity to consider a report from the Government on that pilot and has agreed to regulations being made permanent under that clause.

I appreciate that polygraph testing is used already in the case of high-risk sexual offenders to manage compliance with licence conditions and that it is included in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill for monitoring terrorist offenders released on licence. As I understand Clause 69 of this Bill, testing will be imposed on adult high-risk offenders who are convicted of serious offences involving domestic abuse, including coercive or controlling behaviour in the domestic context, breaches of restraining orders and of a domestic abuse protection order, who have been sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment. I understand that its application will be limited to offenders released on licence and to monitoring their compliance with licence conditions. However, I understand that it is also proposed to include on a discretionary basis offenders for whom concerns about the risk of reoffending would justify mandatory testing to manage risks posed by the offender to the community.

I pose a number of questions to the Minister in connection with that and other issues. Is there a cast-iron guarantee that the results of polygraph testing carried out under the clause could not be used to secure convictions for a criminal offence? To what extent could an offender be recalled from licence on the basis of a polygraph test in which he made disclosure of a breach of condition of his licence? What would be the procedure for such a recall? What is the effect of a breach of polygraph licensing conditions to be? Could evidence of such a breach be itself based on a failed polygraph test? What are the Government’s proposals for piloting in respect of polygraph tests in connection with monitoring compliance with licensing conditions in domestic abuse cases? Will there be a report of any such pilots back to Parliament? Will Parliament have an opportunity to consider the question of polygraph testing before the regulations make it permanent?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this is not the only Bill currently in your Lordships’ House that seeks to extend the use of polygraphs. I am not surprised that lawyers and what I have learned in another Bill to call operational partners have different starting points in their attitudes and expectations of polygraphs. My position is similar to that of my noble friend.

Given that we have more than one Bill proposing to introduce polygraph conditions, is this indicative of a policy change on the part of the Government, with wider use of polygraphs—perhaps wider than just these two Bills? If so, what consultation and evaluation has there been? I appreciate that it is intended that there will be a pilot of the use under this Bill, which my noble friend seeks to be absolutely sure about in Amendment 191.

Last week, during Committee on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, I asked about consultation with the probation service with regard to the balance between periods of custody and licence—a different point. I have now received a letter from the Advocate-General for Scotland, for which I am grateful, which, inter alia, said:

“The Probation Service is not normally consulted in respect of the creation of new custodial sentences or their licence periods.”


It is, of course, the licence period in which I am interested.

I have a similar question about consultation on the use of polygraphs during the licence period. The provisions preclude evidential use. As I understand it—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—their purpose is to discourage reoffending. I have said before that I would prefer to put effort into training probation officers in spotting small signs of what is the truth, what is editing the facts and what are porkies.

The Home Office fact sheet published in conjunction with the Bill refers to eligibility criteria as if there are criteria beyond what is in the Offender Management Act and the Bill. Another question is whether there are additional criteria. It also refers to high-risk perpetrators. Does that mean more than the custodial sentence, as provided by the Act? Does it mean more than repeat offences? Can the Minister say something about the assessment tools in arriving at the conclusion that someone is high risk?

The Home Office factsheet refers to risk as a test. The briefing last week to which my noble friend referred was very interesting and informative, and clearly those involved with the current use of polygraphs on sex offenders are enthusiastic—one would have expected that. But we were told that, in the US, historically there has been some inappropriate or, one could say, dodgy use. I was interested that the accreditation was to standards set by the American Polygraph Association. Given that our legal systems are not identical, has the Minister any comment on that?

I had understood that it was not possible actually to fail a test, because the examinations are used to point probation officers to an offender’s possible actions and behaviours, but that term is also used in the fact sheet, where it refers to “sanctions for failing”. One step available is the imposition of additional licence conditions. My noble friend mentioned DAPOs, or domestic abuse prevention orders. Can a polygraph test be used to prompt an investigation as to whether a DAPO or, indeed, a domestic abuse prevention notice, has been complied with before custody? Can a court dealing with a DAPO require a polygraph?

I suppose that one could summarise our attitude to Clause 69 as positive but remaining to be completely convinced—so possibly somewhere between yes and no.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that we have had no luck getting in contact with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and to the Minister for his careful response. I echo both his thanks to those in his department who organised the learning session last week and his view that it sets a good example; it would be very good to hear more often from experts in the department—particularly about the use of technology, where Members of this House perhaps have less expertise than they do in other legal areas.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked a number of questions, some of which were answered by the Minister. I am not sure that he addressed the question of what is meant by, and what the criteria are for, “high-risk” perpetrators. She also wanted to know what exactly is meant by “failing” a test; I understand, as did the Minister, the concept of evaluating a test, but there is a problem with our general understanding of results of polygraph tests as binary and with the use of the term “failed test”, which frequently figures in discussions around this issue. Given his echo of the description of answers as “somewhere between yes and no”, as expressed by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the Minister clearly appreciated that these tests cannot provide definitive answers. Will he and others give consideration to how far they should be treated as more indicative than binary?

I am less concerned about the use of information, as described by the Minister, that is derived from polygraph testing and used to submit information to the police for further investigation, which would then come up with real evidence. I am, however, a little concerned about recall based on disclosures. I understand the point that there is some similarity between disclosures that arise as a result not of polygraph testing but of, for instance, discussions with probation officers; however, I still think that there need to be safeguards. The Minister may like to consider those and put out some guidance as to how they are to be dealt with.