Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 116ZA and to refer to Amendment 116E, which stands in my name in this group. Both amendments touch on a similar point, although possibly from different perspectives. I note that my noble friend Lord Beecham and I have perhaps started in slightly different places on this part of the Bill, although maybe we are moving towards a middle position. As the House knows, I am one of those who has been more in the enthusiastic group who support the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements. I believe that they are capable of assisting enormously, in particular cases, in dealing with the problems with which we are faced in crime.

I am sorry that the Government have such a blinkered approach to where these deferred prosecution agreements can assist. What obviously lies behind my Amendment 116E is at least to enable other offences to be added to the list of those that are covered by deferred prosecution agreements without the need for further primary legislation. I have no illusions as to whether the Government will accept this amendment. I am grateful for the meeting to which my noble friend Lord Beecham has already referred and for the attention paid to what was said by a number of us in that meeting. I am also clear that the Government will not move, which is a shame.

Although my amendment deals with offences, the Minister will recall that not only I but others in this Chamber have been concerned also about the ambit of deferred prosecution agreements. It is not strictly speaking the subject of an amendment tonight but the question of reviewing this includes whether it can be reviewed not only to consider the efficacy of the system as it is being introduced but also whether its ambit is appropriate, both in terms of offences and, I repeat, in terms of individuals.

Perhaps I may say this to the noble Lord and, through him, to his ministerial colleagues and their officials: I believe that the Government are making a big mistake in not seeing the advantage of deferred prosecutions in other cases. In this House previously, in Committee, I referred to the benefits that I have seen, particularly in relation to drug offences. If you go to any Crown Court in the country—certainly, this was the case when I sat regularly there and I believe it is likely still to be the case—you will see case after case to do with drugs. It is either a drug offence, or an offence of petty theft, burglary, mugging or something of that sort to get money for drugs. It is hugely damaging to our society but we do not seem to be that good at finding solutions to it. I believe that the carrot and stick approach, which deferred prosecution agreements provide, is one way to deal with that.

I know that the Minister will not respond positively to that today and I know that he will not respond positively to my amendment. However, as my noble friend Lord Beecham said, I hope that there can be a clear commitment to review the operation. I ask the Minister to accept that that commitment should include looking at not just whether the system is working, as it is about to be enacted, but also whether it could be more broadly based in relation to offences or to individuals. If he cannot give that assurance, I, for one, would support—although this was not my position previously—my noble friend Lord Beecham’s amendment as a way of forcing that review.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I shall speak briefly to both amendments. While I support in outline the idea that there should be a review, the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Rosser, does not include a provision for an extension of the schedule. It seems to me that a review should be part of a continuing process. I agree very much with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that there is considerable potential for deferred prosecution agreements. I would expect a review to come out with a recommendation for extension, rather than for limitation, and certainly for continuation of the system unless it turns out to have been a failure, which is not the expectation that I have.

I also agree with the noble and learned Lord in his amendment. I think it is a shame that the range of offences is confined to financial and economic offences. I entirely understand the Government’s position that, at this stage, this is an exercise in putting a toe into the water in unfamiliar territory, and I accept that it is unfamiliar territory. However, the extension of the offences under paragraph 31 of the schedule is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. For my part, I do not see a huge distinction between adding other financial and economic offences to the list of offences under that procedure and adding the other offences of which we spoke at the meeting and in the debate in Committee. Health and safety and environmental offences have been mentioned, and drug offences were mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

We are in the middle of providing for what the Minister has called a rehabilitation revolution. I regard that as a useful phrase and a useful and beneficial concept. It seems to me that deferred prosecution agreements, with their potential for arrangements to be made to encourage future compliant behaviour, can be seen as part of that overall rehabilitation revolution. I know that my noble friend will not accept these amendments tonight, but I urge him to bear in mind, with those in his department in charge of these things, that a wider view can be taken of these agreements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I respectfully adopt and support most of my noble and learned friend’s comments and indeed most of his amendments. If I had a preference between Amendments 116A and 116B, I think it would be Amendment 116B, but it would be interesting to hear which way, if either, the Minister inclines on that particular aspect.

It seems very sensible that other possible consequences of a failure to comply should be incorporated, so I endorse Amendments 116C and 116D. As to the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser, we return again to the principle of having these novel matters debated openly before the new process is set in motion. In this particular case, it is a matter of having the financial penalties and parameters that would be proposed by the Sentencing Council subjected to scrutiny and debate but not, as I suggested in Committee, to an affirmative procedure. In retrospect, I think that was going too far and perhaps trespassing on the role of the Sentencing Council in an unacceptable way, although I note that there seem to be some judicial misgivings about the operation of the council. Be that as it may, it does not relate specifically to this point.

Again, bearing in mind the need to carry public opinion with us on this new process, it would be helpful to have that debate before the Sentencing Council’s proposals became adopted. The novelty of the process is such that not only would that be justified but it would actually assist in securing public acceptance. I can anticipate the next amendment, which is very much on the same line; again, having it debated should inform both public opinion and possibly the final decision-makers in a way that can only contribute to the success of the experiment, if that is what it is. I suspect that it will be a successful experiment on which we are embarking.

On the question of incentives, my noble and learned friend is right. It is quite clear from the American example—I repeat for the second or third time that very much larger sums are secured under the American system—that an incentive has to be provided. Whether that is a maximum of one-third or not is another matter. I am not entirely surprised that most respondents disagreed with a maximum of one-third; no doubt they would prefer it to be larger, which underlines my point, but there needs to be some open debate about this before a final decision is made.

In these circumstances I hope that the Government will, even at this late stage, acknowledge that there is substance in my noble and learned friend’s amendments, and I hope that they will also agree that my proposal would actually assist in gaining acceptance for this new process, both by the public at large and by those who will potentially be the subject of its operation. In that spirit, I beg leave to move the amendment in my name.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I will be brief. In relation to Amendments 116A and 116B, after two debates in Committee and our meeting, I am still entirely unclear why the Bill as drafted contains only the all-or-nothing choice in relation to financial penalties. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, pointed out, the arrangements proposed are that the financial penalty should be optional only, but if there is a financial penalty then it must be broadly comparable to the fine that would be imposed on a guilty plea. I suggest that that is illogical because there is no room for such a reduced financial penalty, and there is no reason why there should be no room for one.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 4th December 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

86A: Schedule 12, page 198, line 3, at end insert—
“Encouragement of diversity in appointments to the Supreme Court(1) Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 31, insert—
“31A Diversity
The Lord Chancellor and any selection commission convened under section 26 must, in performing their functions under sections 27 to 31, have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments.””

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, as everyone in this House recognises, our judges are widely respected nationally and internationally, for their fairness and impartiality, their integrity, honesty and incorruptibility, their intellectual rigour and their willingness to innovate in the development of our law. But we should not let our pride in the strengths of our judiciary beguile us into complacency about its weaknesses, because the reality is that for all its strengths, the judiciary is overwhelmingly too white, too male and too middle class to be representative of the society it serves. That leads to our judges being perceived as out of sympathy with contemporary Britain and overwhelmingly old-fashioned and out of touch, however far that may be from the truth in respect of individual judges.

It is nearly three years since the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger—whom I am delighted to see in her place today—reported in February 2010. We have just had the second report of the Judicial Diversity Taskforce, which records the practical steps taken since the publication of her report. There is no lack of expressed commitment to achieving more diversity, but there is still little sense of real progress being made. Both my noble friend the Minister and my right honourable and learned friend Ken Clarke, when Lord Chancellor, have publicly accepted as much in the recent past. As we heard in a previous debate, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee produced a report on this subject in March this year. The Committee pointed out then that:

“Only one in 20 judges is non-white and fewer than one in four is female”,

and expressed the strong view that,

“this disparity is undermining the public's confidence in the courts”.

We have made some progress. In 1998, only 10.3% of judges across the board were women and 1.6 % were black, Asian or from ethnic minorities. By 2011, those figures had risen to 22.3% and 5.1% respectively. But they are still a mile away from being representative of the nation as a whole. We still have only one woman Supreme Court judge out of 12; four women out of 37 judges in the Court of Appeal; and 17 out of 108 in the High Court. The figures for ethnic minority judges are proportionately worse: none in the Supreme Court, none in the Court of Appeal and only five on the High Court Bench. Even on the circuit Bench, the figures are just 16% and 2.5% respectively.

It is not just the appearance of being unrepresentative that distorts our judiciary. I firmly believe that the fact that there are so few women on the Bench has a substantial effect that distorts our substantive law. In Radmacher v Granatino, the case in which the Supreme Court held that ante-nuptial agreements should in general be respected, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale—the only woman Supreme Court judge—largely dissented from her male colleagues when she said,

“In short, there is a gender dimension to the issue which some may think ill-suited to decision by a court consisting of eight men and one woman”.

There are often gender and racial issues to cases. If the development of the law continues to be left to stereotype white male judges, that will diminish the respect held not just for our judges, but also our law.

In international terms, our record on judicial diversity is appalling. Of all the countries considered in a report by the Council of Europe this year, only Azerbaijan and Armenia were less representative than England and Wales. There is effectively gender equality among the judiciary across the rest of Europe. In the earlier debate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, mentioned the success in achieving gender equality in Canada and the United States.

All this is why I welcome the provision of paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Bill, but also why the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and I have put down amendments to enlarge its provisions and to enlarge the existing provision in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 that encourages diversity. Under Section 64 of the 2005 Act as it stands, there is an obligation already on the Judicial Appointments Commission to promote diversity. However, that only applies to appointments under Part 4 of the Act, which does not apply to the selection of judges of the Supreme Court. Our Amendment 86A would introduce an exactly parallel provision into Part 3 of the Act, which governs the selection of judges, the president and deputy president of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is at the pinnacle of our system of justice. If we omit a requirement to encourage diversity there, we cast doubt on our commitment to achieve it throughout the system. The Government and the Bill recognise the need to encourage diversity. That must be reflected at the top.

The reform proposed in paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Bill introduces the so-called “tipping point provision”—also called the tie-breaker provision—by which, where there are two candidates of equal merit, one may be preferred for the purpose of increasing diversity. Without that provision, the requirement that selection has to be made solely on merit prevents the commission from exercising its judgment in that way. However, paragraph 9 applies only to appointments under Part 4 of the 2005 Act; it does not apply to appointments to the Supreme Court. Our Amendment 86B would apply a similar tie-breaker provision to Supreme Court appointments as well.

It has been argued that such a provision is not necessary in relation to appointments to the Supreme Court, on the technical basis that under Section 27 of the 2005 Act such appointments are merely required to be “on merit”, rather than “solely on merit”, which is the requirement in Section 63 under Part 4. It is then said to follow that Section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 would permit recruitment to the Supreme Court on diversity grounds by using a tie-breaker principle. I am not sure that this distinction is a real one. But even if it is, there is nothing in Section 159 of the Equality Act that encourages, still less requires, tie-breaking. The combined effect of our Amendments 86A and 86B would do so. Tie-breaking does help. It should be explicitly encouraged on the face of the Bill throughout the system, and not merely, as the Government recognise, lower down than the Supreme Court.

Our final Amendment, 86C, would make it clear that the duty to encourage diversity is imposed on the Lord Chancellor in exercising his functions under Part 4 as well as on the Judicial Appointments Commission. Amendment 86D in this group, proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Powell, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jay and Lady Prashar, would add the Lord Chief Justice to the list, because the Lord Chief Justice may be a consultee of the commission even if he is not a member of the selection panel, which is a committee of the commission. So Amendment 86D is more comprehensive, on reflection, and therefore to be preferred to our Amendment 86C. Either way, however, the important point is that we now urgently need to give impetus wherever we can to encouraging diversity, so that we can move from merely paying lip-service to the concept towards actually achieving it.

I do not know whether and to what extent my noble friend the Minister will make concessions to these amendments, but I emphasise that they are entirely consonant with the provisions already in the 2005 Act and in the Bill before the House tonight. I simply say this: you cannot expect the public or anyone else to think we are serious about encouraging diversity if we have a system that encourages it from the Court of Appeal down but does not encourage it in the Supreme Court, which is the highest court in the land.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, can be very seductive at times, but let me try to respond to an extremely thought-provoking debate. I was interested in the mention by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, of girls going into boys’ schools and vice versa, because I have just had experience of this. My daughter has just moved from an all-girls’ school into the sixth form of an all-boys’ school. After a few weeks, I asked her, “How is it going?”. She said, “It’s wonderful, daddy, all the boys open the door for me”. That is an illustration of how a little change can bring behavioural changes, and that is probably what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was suggesting, whereby perhaps a few girls in the all-boys’ school of the upper judiciary might produce similar changes in attitude.

I was very grateful for the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, because this debate turns on an issue that I explained in Committee. There is no doubt that both the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have a duty under the Equality Act to promote diversity. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this does not apply to the Supreme Court and therefore implies some sort of ceiling in this, that is not true. We think that the tipping point in the Equality Act already applies to Supreme Court appointments and, therefore, that his amendment is not necessary.

I can put before noble Lords the standard brief that the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor already have these duties enshrined, and that the Equality Act takes care of the problems that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned. However, that would not be the right response to a debate that has contained most of the people whom I count as allies in what I still think is a battle to get greater diversity into our judiciary. I was told earlier that I was being pejorative when I talked about this being a trickle-up. However, the figures quoted by a number of speakers illustrate that there is still a need for leadership, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said. I applaud the leadership that her committee has given in this area, just as I applaud the leadership given by the noble Baronesses, Lady Prashar, Lady Neuberger and Lady Kennedy. However, we need that leadership elsewhere in the judiciary. I am almost tempted, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, to make it applicable to all the judiciary.

I am willing to be seduced here by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, as it would be an insult to the House and the opinions of people whom I respect immensely on this matter if I were simply to call a Division and bring in people who have not heard this debate to vote these amendments down. If noble Lords who have amendments in this group would withdraw or not move them, I will take this matter back to the Lord Chancellor. That will also give time for discussions with the Lord Chief Justice to see whether we can, in some way, meet the points that have been made.

I shall tell noble Lords where I am coming from. Recently, a very senior member of the judiciary pinned me in the corner and said, “If you do what you are trying to do to the judiciary, can you guarantee me that in 20 years we will still have a judiciary that is the envy of the world?”. I said, “Yes, but half of them will be women”. That may be overambitious but it is a lot better than a 50-year timescale or a “sometime, never” timescale. I therefore believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, that sometimes gesture politics is important.

Tonight, I want to take this debate back to the Lord Chancellor and let him ponder on it. It may be that I will have to resist when we return to the issue on Third Reading, but I do not want to resist tonight because the quality of the debate and the persuasiveness of the argument deserve another look at this matter. In that spirit, I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, everyone in this House knows that the commitment of the Minister to judicial diversity is very high, and I am grateful for his indication that he will consider this. I should say that I do not accept that the Equality Act deals with the position in the Supreme Court as satisfactorily as it has been suggested it might. The Bill should reflect uniformity all the way up the system. With the indication that my noble friend has given, however, I will of course withdraw the amendment and consider the matter with him between now and Third Reading.

Amendment 86A withdrawn.

Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I support both amendments. I am sure that it is not necessary for me to add my voice to the very distinguished contributions that have already been made in this regard. Both amendments turn upon undertakings that have been solemnly given—and, no doubt, in the best faith—by the right honourable Kenneth Clarke. I accept that completely. If there has been mischief, it has probably been the mischief of mandarins thereafter in trying to release him in some way from an undertaking that he solemnly and sincerely gave.

The other feature that is common to both amendments is that they deal with situations where preliminary machinery is set up before a person can qualify for legal aid. In both cases, in my view, that machinery imposes such a burden upon the potential applicant to make his or her case virtually impossible—in other words, a total denial of what otherwise would be a fair and just application by that person.

In the circumstances, bearing in mind the weight of authority that has been projected towards the Government in this case, it would be a very rash Minister who did not concede the obvious points made in the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is correct about the interaction of Regulations 39 and 53, and if it be that Regulation 53 in this regard is totally and absolutely governed by the relevant provision in Regulation 39, then that is it—the Government do not lose one millimetre advantage, because that situation has already been covered and fully determined. However, if that is not the case, then it seems that the argument put so powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, must have come into play. That is that the director could come to the conclusion that indeed all reasonable avenues had been pursued but that there were unreasonable avenues that had not been pursued. That would be an absurdity and a miscarriage of justice. It is either one or the other.

As far as the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, is concerned, it seems to me that there again is an irrefutable case. I am not at all clear what triggers the situation where there would be a review by the first tribunal. Would it be something entirely within the discretion of that tribunal, or would it be on application? If it is within the discretion of the tribunal, it is a very strange situation that a tribunal is invited to consider whether it is in error.

Of course, I draw the distinction that has already been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. There is a world of difference between a point of law and an error of law. When a judge has adjudicated in a civil case and is invited to grant leave to appeal, he is not saying, “I am wrong”, or, “I am sure that I am wrong, please appeal”. What he is saying is that there is a point of law that is properly arguable. That is a very different situation from a tribunal which says, “We are wrong”. In fact, I do not know of any other circumstance where such machinery exists in law, but I am sure I will be corrected with regard to that.

The basic principle that we are concerned with here is that legal advice on a point of law should belong to the beginning of an action, not to the end of it. So much anguish will be saved by a very modest expenditure. I believe that so much money from the public purse will be saved because there are undoubtedly downstream costs which will be massive in scale in relation to this. However, above all it is a question of miscarriage of justice.

We think of miscarriage of justice as a situation where a tribunal has come to an utterly wrong decision. It is not limited to that at all. A miscarriage of justice occurs where a person has a just, meritorious case, and on account of lack of money is unable to have that case properly adjudicated. If you ask any decent citizen of this land, whatever politics or total lack of politics he or she may have, “Do you believe in a miscarriage of justice?”, we all know what the answer would be.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Minister!

Justice: Legal Advice

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 27th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I recall some of those points being made during the course of the LASPO Bill. I rejected them then and I reject them now. We are continuing to spend a good deal on legal aid in this area, as I have pointed out, and we will be bringing in new measures to support advice services. Many of the areas covered are for advice rather than legal advice and we believe that if we can put in place proper advice services we can cover many of the fears that the noble Lord has raised.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, given that Citizens Advice has a wealth of experience in the area of social welfare law and, importantly, that it is not limited to giving legal advice but can also advise individuals in areas such as debt management, will the Government keep the funding of Citizens Advice under review to ensure that it can continue to provide its valuable and high-quality service?

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I pay tribute to noble Lords on all sides of the House who, during the course of the LASPO Bill, championed the cause of Citizens Advice and other advisory services. The Government are looking at the whole advice sector—the Cabinet Office has taken on that responsibility—and, in the mean time, the Government have put forward an advice service transition fund, worth £65 million over the next two years, to help promote collaboration and best practice in this sector.

Justice: Indeterminate Sentences

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

One of the reasons why we are studying the judgment is to make sure that we get this right. There are three very early cases which go back to before the reforms brought in by the previous Administration in 2008 in order to bring in more flexibility. It is interesting to note that the court did not find that IPPs themselves were in breach of the Human Rights Act. The weakness that quickly became apparent was the Catch 22 whereby the prisoners were supposed to carry out certain restorative and rehabilitative programmes that were not available. After 2008, the Government brought in some reforms and we have had further discussions with the Parole Board and NOMS to try to speed them up. But I emphasise again that we are not dealing with innocent people. These are people who have been before a court and found guilty of the crimes which have brought forward this programme. We are trying to manage them out of the system as quickly as possible, but with due care for public safety.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, one of the main grounds for the judgment against the United Kingdom was that there are, as my noble friend has said, insufficient facilities for courses to enable prisoners serving IPP sentences to qualify for release. Can the Minister say what extra rehabilitation facilities are now to be put in place to ensure that such prisoners can be released safely and quickly into the community?

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, one of the things that we have been discussing with both NOMS and the Parole Board is moving away from a system of box-ticking specific narrow training programmes to a more flexible judgment about whether a particular prisoner is suitable for release. Giving both NOMS and the Parole Board greater flexibility in treating, assessing and managing these prisoners will enable the Parole Board to make a balanced judgment, at the right time, about whether these prisoners should be released.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote]

My Lords, when I read the amendment I thought it absolutely appropriate to use the word that has been supplied. I very much hope that the Government will accept “requires” instead of “wants”.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 18 and 19 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 18 concerns information disclosed to a court, under the same paragraph—paragraph 27 of Schedule 16—as my noble friend’s earlier amendment; it relates to social security information and information to be disclosed by HMRC relating to a defendant’s finances. In both cases, the information is disclosed to assist the court in inquiring into the defendant’s financial circumstances. Sub-paragraphs (3) and (5) of paragraph 27 limit the purposes for which the disclosure is to be made and used—broadly for the purpose of assisting the court in dealing with the offender, with a general prohibition on further and wider disclosure. So far, that all seems entirely appropriate, but sub-paragraph (7)(b) appears to allow such information to be disclosed much more widely and outside the ambit of the proceedings before the court concerning the defendant, provided only that the information is summarised—what is sometimes called “gisted”—and anonymised by framing it in such a way that the defendant is not identified. That allows disclosure of social security and HMRC information relating to the finances of the offender for purposes other than his sentencing which was the purpose for which the information was originally obtained from the government bodies concerned.

What is the point of sub-paragraph (7)(b)? If there is a point to this collection of information, is this Bill and is this Schedule the place for its introduction? If we are to widen powers to obtain and use information in this gisted and anonymised form, then provisions authorising that should form part of a Bill concerning the collection of such information and not be added by a side wind in this way to a schedule which concerns sentencing and information required to assist the court with that sentencing.

Amendment 19 would ensure that, where social security or financial information about a defendant is obtained from the relevant government departments, the defendant must be shown that information and be told to whom it has been disclosed. It is fundamental that a defendant, about whom confidential financial information is obtained from government in connection with proceedings against him, should be entitled, as of right, to see that information to enable him to challenge and explain it, to know the information upon which the court is asked to act and also to know the identity of anyone to whom it has been disclosed. The paragraph, as drafted, permits such disclosure to him, or at least it does not prohibit it, by sub-paragraph (7)(a), but it does not require it and it should.

Will the Minister consider accepting the amendments or at least take them away and come back with amendments to the same effect?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, this group of amendments relates to provisions in Part 6 of Schedule 16 that enable the sharing of data between government departments for the purpose of setting fines and other financial penalties. My noble friend referred to definitions and what is where I will attempt in my response to Amendment 17 to make clear that, at each stage of the process, access to the data we refer to will be limited to only those with appropriate authority and a genuine need to see the data for the purposes of assisting a court that may wish to see it for sentencing purposes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee referred to the use of the word “wants” in paragraph 27 of Schedule 16. This is intended to ensure consistency with subsections (1), (2) and (3)(a) of Clause 22. We have not used such words as “requires” or “needs” in the Bill because, technically, the court neither requires nor needs access to information held by the Department for Work and Pensions or HMRC. The information in question could be obtained by other means; for example, by requiring the defendant to provide details of their own financial circumstances. The relevant person “wants” the information because it comes directly from the Department for Work and Pensions and HMRC and this is the most reliable way of giving the court the accurate information about the defendant’s financial circumstances. It may arise that financial circumstances have changed. There will always be provisions within such proceedings to allow someone in such a situation to be allowed to present an up-to-date position of their financial circumstances.

Turning to Amendment 18, tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, I can confirm that Part 6 of Schedule 16 allows for the disclosure of financial information obtained under these provisions in a summary format. Nevertheless, paragraph 27(7)(b) only allows for the publication of financial information if it is in anonymised form. I remind the Committee that under paragraph 28, the publication of any financial information without lawful authority is a criminal offence, punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment.

The purpose of allowing the publication of summarised financial information obtained under this provision is to allow anonymised financial information to be shared for the purposes of research and statistical analysis. This information will be invaluable in helping to identify trends in the criminal justice system and the financial circumstances of offenders.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that in light of these assurances, my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Marks will withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, of course I will not press my amendments. Nevertheless, I am not sure that the Minister has answered the point about the defendant’s entitlement to see the information. I accept my noble friend’s assurances that it is the intention of the Government that the information will be disclosed, but there is absolutely no reason why such a provision should not be in the legislation, rather than the current, rather negative, lack of a provision that exists at the moment.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, again, I assure my noble friend that the defendant would know of any such use of data. If any legal representative of the defendant wished to access that data, they would also be made available. I hope that we can clarify any other outstanding issues either before or on Report.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

23: Schedule 17, page 261, line 32, leave out “but may not be an individual”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 35, 45, 46 and 47. These amendments would broadly remove the restriction of deferred prosecution agreements—DPAs—to corporate bodies, partnerships and unincorporated associations by permitting DPAs to be entered into with individuals and would instead restrict DPAs to cases where a sentence of imprisonment would not be likely on a guilty plea. The later amendments in my name, along with the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, would widen the offences for which DPAs might in future be permitted beyond the range of financial or economic crimes.

To put these amendments in context, I welcome the innovation represented by the introduction of DPAs into this country by this Bill for two principal reasons. First, they are an effective device to ensure that criminal behaviour—sometimes very complex criminal behaviour—is met by a sanction. The compulsory imposition of a financial penalty, which is the subject of an amendment in my name in the next group, would ensure that that was the case. They bring about a saving of trials which in this country are, and have been, notoriously uncertain of outcome, as well as extremely expensive, so that they have used up a very large part of the criminal justice system’s overall budget. Secondly, they offer an opportunity for prosecutors to agree a programme of compliance requirements with offenders, and thus offer a chance to change behaviour, so they are part of the toolkit of the rehabilitation revolution, about which we have heard so much in the context of the Bill.

DPAs are for use only in suitable cases. It is important to avoid the worst excesses of such arrangements in the United States where it has been said that they have been used as the rich man’s route to plea bargaining. I suggest that they can and should be used to achieve voluntary compliance in the future with the requirements of the law across a range of fields. The limit on that is that it should not be acceptable for DPAs to be agreed where otherwise a sentence of imprisonment would be appropriate.

It follows that Amendment 23 removes the requirement that a DPA may not be agreed with an individual. In support of that amendment, I ask rhetorically the question, why the distinction? Why should it be that a criminal offence by a corporation, a partnership or an unincorporated association should be treatable by a DPA, but not an offence by an individual? As I suggested in the Second Reading debate we had in Committee, the question is not whether an offender is an organisation or an individual but whether the nature of the offence is suitable for a DPA. The distinction has been drawn that an individual can be imprisoned and an organisation cannot. But I suggest that that distinction is artificial because it is of course possible to provide that DPAs will be entered into only in cases where imprisonment would be unlikely in the case of an individual.

At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury suggested to me that nothing in the Bill explicitly stated that DPAs were not appropriate for an offence warranting imprisonment. The answer is that in the Bill as it stands such a provision would be unnecessary because it applies only to corporations, partnerships and unincorporated associations. But if it were extended to individuals, I suggest that it would be necessary to make it clear that it was not to be seen as an alternative to imprisonment.

I quite take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, at Second Reading, that, because of the behaviour-changing arrangements that can be made in DPAs, they might in some circumstances be suitable for drugs offences and the like which would otherwise warrant a sentence of imprisonment. At this stage at any rate, with this very new procedure, I would be wary of introducing a system that could be seen as allowing offenders effectively to buy their way out of a sentence of imprisonment.

Hence, under Amendment 35, we confine DPAs to offences not warranting such a sentence even if the limit to individuals were to be lifted. That would happen at the preliminary hearing where, on the application by a prosecutor for a declaration that a DPA might be appropriate, that would not be able to be granted were a sentence for imprisonment to be appropriate.

Amendments 45, 46 and 47 in my name and Amendment 44 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, concern the types of offences that might be made the subject of DPAs. The noble and learned Lord’s amendment would effectively allow the addition of any offence by removing the restriction to economic and financial crime. I should make it clear that my amendments are sample amendments only. They are not intended at all to be exhaustive and I have not attempted to conduct a trawl through the statute book to look for appropriate offences. They are intended to be probing and to give examples only of the way in which categories of offences might be usefully made broader.

Amendment 45 suggests that,

“a breach of regulations which is not punishable by imprisonment”,

taken at its broadest, might be an appropriate amendment. Amendment 46 deals with environmental offences under the Protection of the Environment Act. Some of those are punishable by imprisonment as well as by fines but, were the restriction to be only to those offences which would not be likely to warrant a sentence of imprisonment, that would be appropriate.

Similarly, health and safety offences seem to me—as indeed they seemed to be to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, at Second Reading—to be an appropriate area for such broadening of the offences. I have some experience from practice of the way in which the Environment Agency operates in respect of cases of environmental pollution. In fact, it has been operating for some time on the basis that it will agree not to prosecute offenders in circumstances where the offenders agree to pay compensation to clean up pollution and to put in place with the Environment Agency programmes of compliance with legal requirements for the future. That system works well and I suggest that it could be extended on a formal basis, as is suggested in the schedule, far more widely.

I ask noble Lords to support these amendments, and for the Minister to consider taking them back and doing something with them.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am not getting at my noble friend because he referred to my intervention last time, but I hope that he will forgive me if I am misunderstanding this. Perhaps other noble Lords are also unsure as to the impact of the removal of the words, in paragraph 4 on page 261, line 32,

“but may not be an individual”.

Does that not mean that the only persons who may enter into a DPA with a prosecutor are the ones mentioned, namely,

“a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association”,

so the removal of the words in his amendment will not actually make any change?

I see that my noble friend has tabled Amendment 24, which does refer to individuals. However, I wonder whether that is not, so to speak, negatived by the removal of those words; but, as I said, I may well have got this wrong.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, my noble friend is, as always, entirely on the ball. My amendment is wrong in exactly the way that he mentioned. It should be “or an individual” rather than,

“but may not be an individual”.

So the words that ought to go are, “but may not be”, to be replaced by the word, “or”. For that, I apologise, and I hope that I will be allowed to alter my amendment accordingly. I am not proposing to press it in any event, but we can bring it back on Report if necessary, in a better form.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 44 standing in my name, but I want to speak to Amendment 23 as well. Before I do that, and so that I do not have to repeat this on later groupings, I want to repeat the declaration of interest that I made on 30 October at col. 575. I also want to repeat my belief that this is a very useful addition to what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has described as the armoury for prosecutors and for law enforcement agents. I think that that is absolutely right. On 30 October, I explained how I had been thinking about this when I was in office and, indeed, I introduced at the other end of the scale of offending something that was equivalent: conditional cautions. I believe that this is worth while and I think that the former Solicitor-General, Sir Edward Garnier, deserves credit for having pushed this forward. I had the benefit of talking to him about this before these amendments came forward into this Bill. So I do support them in principle. The few amendments that I have put down are designed to try to make it as workable as possible, given that the principle is there—others may take a different view about the principle—and to make it as useful as possible.

There are some technical amendments but also one or two that relate to the scope of DPAs. I want to underline the fact that I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who has made this point. The important issue about a DPA is that it is not just punishment. It can become punishment, but it is about changing behaviour and about compliance. It is a carrot and stick approach.

On the point raised by Amendment 23 about whether this should be capable of being extended to individuals, I repeat what I told the Committee on the previous occasion, that it was actually in the context of individuals that I first saw the benefit of arrangements of this sort. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has referred to drug offences, and he is quite right. I saw in operation in the United States deferred prosecution agreements being used as a powerful tool to change the behaviour of people who were drug offenders and who seemed incapable of holding down a job and therefore living a life beneficial to themselves, their family and the general public. This was achieved by the combination of a strong statement that if they did not comply in particular ways—taking drug tests regularly, staying clean, following the advice of probation officers or the equivalent—they would suffer serious imprisonment, and the inducement that if they did comply, not only would they not go to prison but they would not have a conviction either. That could be very important to them in terms of getting jobs in the future. On more than one occasion, I watched judges who were speaking on a very direct basis to offenders, reminding them of their obligations and saying, “This is what you have got to go through. This is how you have to comply if you want to get the benefit of this arrangement”. So I think that this is potentially very valuable for individuals, and I ask the Government to think again.

The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, is of course right about the technical issues on the amendment, but I think that the purpose behind it is very clear and, if the principle were accepted, I am sure that the Government would sort out the precise wording to make it work. I do not think that the noble Lord can change the amendment while on his feet.

In the same context, I turn to Amendment 44 in my name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for his intervention. As I said in my opening comments, it is not something that the Government are entirely ruling out, but it is the Government’s view at this stage that because this is something new to our justice system, the provision would be focused on organisations. However, I hear very clearly and my ears have not been closed to the points made by the noble and learned Lord. It is a matter that we will examine at some future point in time when this particular DPA scheme is reviewed, as I am sure it will be.

Generally speaking, the law on corporate criminal liability is such that, in order to achieve a conviction, a prosecutor must show that the “directing mind and will” of the organisation satisfies the necessary fault element for the offence. This is often difficult to show, especially in increasingly large, globalised and more sophisticated organisations. Cases can often involve lengthy and protracted investigation, with associated high financial and resourcing costs, with no guarantee of success.

Our proposals will not change the law on corporate criminal liability. However, they will offer an additional route for holding to account organisations that are willing to engage in the process and might otherwise face prosecution. These issues are not present to the same extent in relation to prosecuting individuals. However, I have noted with great interest what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has said about his personal experience and the experience of the United States in this regard.

Furthermore, one of the elements that the Government considered as regards prosecuting economic crime committed by organisations is perhaps not the same as that which applies to other areas such as health and safety. Therefore, an extension of the proposals to other forms of offending does not appear necessary at this time. In particular, we are not persuaded that a DPA would be the appropriate response where direct physical harm has been caused to an individual by the organisation’s wrongdoing.

As this process is new to our criminal justice system, the Government would like to tread carefully. Our view is that a narrow, targeted approach is the best course of action to begin with. As I have already assured the House, I shall keep the points raised by my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, under review. At a future time, should a case be made for applying deferred prosecution agreements to individuals, or for applying them to a broader range of offences, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has mentioned, it is right that we come back to Parliament with the necessary primary legislation to extend the scope of the scheme rather than seeking to do it through secondary legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, spoke to Amendment 48. The Government’s view is that that amendment is unnecessary. We have already provided an undertaking that we will review the operation of the scheme following its introduction, which is of course essential given the novelty of DPAs in our criminal justice system. Returning to a point that was raised by my noble friend, the Government are in any event committed to reviewing all new primary legislation within five years of Royal Assent. That was the previous Government’s policy on post-legislative scrutiny. We do not need to put such a review on a statutory footing or to sunset the scheme provided for in the Bill. If, following the review, changes to the scheme are necessary or desirable, we can of course bring forward further primary legislation at that stage.

The noble Lord, Lord McNally, and I have listened very closely to the compelling arguments that have been made. With the assurances that have been given to ensure that the matter is reviewed, I would be grateful if my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I hear the assurances that the Government are listening and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

24: Schedule 17, page 262, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) A DPA must impose on P a requirement to pay to the prosecutor a financial penalty broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on P on conviction for the alleged offence following a guilty plea.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 24, 25, 26 and 27. That suite of amendments has one purpose which is to make a financial penalty compulsory as a requirement of a DPA.

I suggest that there is an anomaly in the Bill as drafted. There is no compulsion to agree a financial penalty. It is one of a series of optional requirements. However, if a DPA contains a financial penalty, that penalty has to be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would impose on a plea of guilty. Therefore, the DPA has to have either no financial penalty at all or a full financial penalty comparable to the penalty that would be imposed by a court. The reason why I suggest that a financial penalty should be compulsory is to maintain public confidence in the new system and to prevent DPAs being seen as a soft option. That is particularly important if they are to be used only for economic and financial crime by corporations rather than more widely. At the moment, if a DPA can be agreed between an offender and a prosecutor without being subjected to the penalty that a court would impose, the innovation runs the risk of being tainted by the allegation that it amounts to no more than plea bargaining, the sort of suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury.

I entirely accept that there might have to be an exception allowed for cases of genuine inability to pay, either at the agreement stage or at the stage when a breach or possible variation is considered under paragraphs 9 and 10, or at both stages. Subject to that qualification, I suggest that a financial penalty comparable to a court fine in lieu of prosecution should be at the heart of the new arrangements. I beg to move.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I will make some observations about the noble Lord’s amendments in this group. I shall speak also to Amendments 28 and 29 in my name. It is worth reminding ourselves what the requirements of a DPA may be, as set out in paragraph 5(3). We have spoken as if the only requirement is likely to be a financial penalty. We talked about paying the price and buying one’s way out of trouble. However, a number of requirements may be included, not just the payment of a financial penalty. The words “financial penalty” appear in paragraph 5(3)(a). Paragraph 5(3)(b) refers to a requirement,

“to compensate victims of the alleged offence”.

Paragraph 5(3)(c) refers to a requirement,

“to donate money to a charity or other third party”.

Paragraph 5(3)(d) refers to a requirement,

“to disgorge any profits made by P from the alleged offence”—

no doubt to the person from whom they have been made, not to the prosecutor.

Paragraph 5(3)(e) refers to a requirement,

“to implement a compliance programme or make changes to an existing compliance programme relating to P’s policies or to the training of P’s employees or both”.

I wish to underline that that can be a very powerful tool for changing behaviour, but also an onerous tool. Frequently in cases where such a system exists, a monitor is required. The company then has to pay for an individual—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was such a person—who will have full access to what it is doing and whose job it will be, from inside, to see that it is complying with the programme. That can be a very powerful tool for making sure that it changes its behaviour—but, as I said, also an onerous one.

Paragraph 5(3)(f) refers to a requirement,

“to co-operate in any investigation related to the alleged offence”,

and paragraph 5(3)(g) to a requirement,

“to pay any reasonable costs”.

I invite the Government to reconsider even their proposal, whether or not they accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Possibly this is one of the more important amendments being considered tonight. I looked back at the Government’s response to the consultation on this offence. I noted from page 28 of the paper that more than half the respondents to the consultation did not agree that there should be a fixed minimum payment for a financial penalty. I wish to understand why, given that the majority of respondents took a different view, the Government have committed to this.

I am concerned about several things. First, if we impose this restriction, the DPA may be used in fewer cases, because it will become unattractive to agree to it. I recall that in a previous debate, in answer to a question from me, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, confirmed that the Government saw DPAs being used even in cases where the defendant did not admit guilt. In those circumstances, it becomes surreal to start talking about the financial penalty that would have been imposed on a defendant if they had pleaded guilty when they have not.

Secondly, the cost of the compliance programme—in terms not just of money but of obligation—can be sufficiently significant that it justifies saying, “No, you do not have to pay the same financial penalty”. I will also ask a question about financial penalties. That is why I read out the list. “Financial penalty” is only one requirement on it. I fear that by imposing this obligation, we may create a distorted view. For example, somebody may say: “What about the victims?” The answer may be: “I am afraid that I cannot afford to compensate them because you are making me pay a financial penalty which is commensurate with what I would have been fined, so there is no more money, or at least I am not giving you any more”. That is quite contrary to the principle in the criminal law that where financial measures are made, you treat the fine as the second thing, and if there is money for compensation, you try to get that paid first. I am concerned that this will have a counterintuitive and unsatisfactory effect.

I would avoid this sort of perverse incentive. I would avoid putting on the straitjacket. Of course I take the point about public confidence—although the more in this debate we invite the public not to have confidence, perhaps the more they will not have confidence. Perhaps we should start looking at this in a different way. My answer to this—as it was to the previous amendment—is that there is a double lock on a DPA in the form of the most senior prosecutors and the court. That is sufficient to ensure that what comes out of the DPA is satisfactory. I therefore do not support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. My Amendment 28 is designed to have the effect that the financial penalty should not be more than the fine would have been, which is obviously perfectly reasonable.

Amendment 29 deals with a somewhat different but equally important point. It seeks to change the provision in sub-paragraph (5) that a,

“DPA may include a term setting out the consequences of a failure by P to comply with any of its terms”,

and convert it to an obligation not a permission. This is on the basis that the DPA should state what will happen to you if you do not meet its terms—that is what this is all about—in the interests of both the public and the person who is on the receiving end of the DPA. It is an amendment of a different order but I invite the Government to consider it.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I broadly sympathise with the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on this part of the Bill. In particular, it is important to recognise that there needs to be some incentive—this is the American experience—for potential defendants to come to terms, and the noble and learned Lord’s formulation is in line with that. However, given that the Bill refers to the penalty being broadly comparable to a sum that might be levied by way of a fine on conviction for an alleged offence following a guilty plea, there is an implicit assumption that there will be a one-third discount from what would be the fine after a conviction. That is the way in which the system appears to work, so we are perhaps not terribly far apart in any event.

I am less clear about the attraction of Amendment 26. I do not quite follow why the payment to the prosecutor of a financial penalty should be taken out of the Bill. The prosecutor is not personally going to pocket the money, I assume.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Perhaps I may help. Amendment 26 is part of a suite of amendments. Amendment 24 provides for the compulsory imposition of a requirement to pay the prosecutor a financial penalty broadly comparable to the fine a court would have imposed. The amendments can only be read together. If you have Amendment 24, you do not need paragraph (3)(a).

[Lord Beecham]

I will not take the time to check that. I shall accept the noble Lord’s remarks and leave it to the Minister to respond.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

On this occasion I am certain that I have got the drafting right.

[Lord Beecham]

Well, there is a first time for everything.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

That is extremely helpful. With my advisers, I will look at the points that the noble and learned Lord has made. We do not go behind the Chair in this House, but he knows what I mean. I shall see if we can match up. I have found his remarks very helpful.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

In relation to my amendments, I understand what the Minister has said. The only point I would make is that it is possible to take the middle position, which is really the position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has put and which my noble friend has said he will look at. As the noble and learned Lord suggests, the anomaly is where you can have an all-or-nothing financial penalty that still exists, so it must be sensible to have a variable penalty if the noble Lord does not accept my Amendment 24.

Amendment 24 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

I must advise your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 34 and 35 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I shall speak briefly to Amendments 38 and 41. Amendment 38 is about public final hearings. Just as there are absolutely sound reasons for the preliminary hearing considering a DPA to be in private to avoid prejudicing any subsequent prosecution, if no DPA is entered into, and to avoid prejudicing negotiations for a DPA, so the final hearing should generally be in public unless there is still at that stage a substantial risk of prejudice. I suggest that that is essential for the public administration of justice and to build and maintain public confidence in these new arrangements. That is the point of Amendment 38.

Amendment 41 is on a similar theme. Under paragraph 12, the court may postpone publication of the terms of a DPA or of a decision on a breach, variation or discontinuance of a DPA if it appears to the court that postponement is necessary to avoid a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in any legal proceedings. This amendment limits any such postponement to the period of such continuing risk, so that as soon as the risk disappeared, publication would follow. Again, I suggest that that must be in the interests of the public administration of justice.

[Lord Beecham]

I have a good deal of sympathy with the amendments in this group tabled by my noble and learned friend and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I will be interested to hear the Government’s response. Both aspects seem to be matters that they should consider before Report.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 30th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Warnock. In relation to the past 30 years or so, Governments of every hue must stand in the dock and answer the accusation that they went out of their way to curtail the discretion that otherwise would have been vested in a judge or magistrate. Practically all Governments have done that and some of them more shamelessly than others. I am sure that anyone who has served in the courts in a judicial capacity, however senior or however humble, must be very aware of that.

The proposal that the Government are now putting forward in relation to the punitive approach is one of the most far reaching in that context. If it should be the case, as I assume it to be the Government’s case, that one-third of community orders which are made without a punitive element according to their definition must in all cases be dealt with in a different way, save for a very minuscule minority that is exceptional, then it is a very far-reaching and drastic proposal.

I fully accept that the Government are talking not so much about punishment in the sense of the disposal of a case of a person who has committed a crime but about something else, which connotes the idea that the experience of the defendant should be painful. My Latin is not all that good but does the word punishment not come from punitas? Is punitas not one and the same thing as pain? It is poen in Welsh and pain in English. Is that not really what the Government are after?

However, I think that the argument put forward by the Government, which has been described as offensive by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and alarming by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is highly offensive. The 2003 Act had a vast range of community disposals. In many ways, they were imaginative, flexible and double-banked. The sentencer had a huge armoury at his or her disposal.

As I understand it, the Government are now saying that that failed to achieve its purpose. The people who were charged with imposing sentences missed the whole point. At some time after 2003, tens of thousands of sentences every year which should have involved a punitive element did not achieve their purpose because that element was missing. That statement is either correct or incorrect. If it is correct, it must mean that many people sat in judgment as magistrates, circuit judges and recorders who should never have been there. They were missing the whole point. However, if that statement is incorrect, it is one of the most unjust indictments of the administration of justice that there could ever have been. It is one or the other.

I ask the Government: where is the evidence that in tens of thousands of cases, year by year, at some point in time after 2003, that has been happening? I feel it is a policy and a gesture that is cosmetic rather than real and intended to give the impression of toughness. The greatest toughness to my mind that can be achieved in relation to the administration of justice is doing that which is right, that which you know to be just and that which you consider to be proper by society, irrespective of whatever prejudices tabloid editors might have against you. That is the toughness that the Government should seek to achieve.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the test for these amendments is whether they work in making community orders more effective and in cutting reoffending as a result. It is quite plain from the debate today that it is common ground in this House that seeking reform and rehabilitation of offenders, while recognising the importance of offering redress to victims, provides a balanced approach, which offers a far greater prospect of cutting reoffending than a programme of increasing prison terms and prisoner numbers.

However, if there is to be a compulsory requirement imposed for the purpose of punishment in community orders—it is noteworthy that the phrase punitive element is not used—it is very important to recognise what is meant by punishment in this context. In an enlightened society, the punishment involved in a prison sentence is the loss of liberty for the offender, not the imposition of a harsh and inhumane regime for prisoners serving their sentences. Therefore, the punishment element in a community order should be reflected in a lesser but none the less significant loss of liberty—the liberty to do as one pleases within the law—by the imposition of some compulsory sanction that restricts that liberty.

It should not follow that the activity that offenders are obliged to undertake by community orders must be unpleasant, degrading or harsh. It is not likely to be helpful to force offenders to do some kind of hard labour for the sake of it, much as some elements of the press would wish us to do so. It is likely to be helpful, however, to oblige offenders to acquire work and life skills that will help them to find work and take their place in non-criminal society. Compulsory training, useful work—particularly work that benefits the community—treatment for addiction and anger management, and, importantly, a significant commitment to compensation, may all have their place in a regime of punishment, as may curfews monitored by electronic tagging that oblige offenders to remain at home for a reasonable number of hours in the day. I reiterate the point made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee that 16 hours hardly seems a reasonable number of hours in a day.

From what I have said, it follows that I welcome the passage in my noble friend’s opening speech that this is how the Government see the punishment provision. But I can foresee the way in which the provision is presently worded leading some to question what is meant by punishment. It is important that it is absolutely clear, as my noble friend suggested, and as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, wanted clarified, that the discretion as to what is the punitive element in a sentence is a discretion to be exercised by the sentencer and that he or she can comply with the requirement in the schedule in a way that he or she reasonably sees fit.

I would add a couple of words about one or two provisions of this part of the schedule, to which the House may wish to give attention next time. The reference to “exceptional circumstances”, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, as being the circumstances required to invoke the exemption from the requirement for a punishment element or a fine in a community order is far too strong. Exceptional is a very powerful word in statute and runs the risk of being more restrictively interpreted by the courts than my noble friend’s speech would indicate that the Government intend.

I also add a minor point that the proposed provision that breach by a contractor of the code of practice for electronic monitoring will not give rise to a civil cause of action may offer contractors, who are likely to be private contractors, an unwarranted level of immunity, and may weaken public confidence in how they perform their duties in respect of an intrusive form of punishment.

I add a word or two about restorative justice. The provisions of Paragraph 5 of the schedule have been welcomed across this House. By bringing offenders into contact with their victims, restorative justice helps them to understand the impact of their offences and assists victims to feel that society cares, understands the ordeals that they have been through and responds to them. For far too long, victims of crime have been treated as witnesses only, and even the introduction of victim support over recent years has failed adequately to address this. I know from my own experience and that of others that an arrest and a flurry of statements following an offence are followed up with a couple of letters offering counselling by way of victim support, when the victims may not need or want such counselling. Then far too often there is a silence, without the victims even being told what has happened because the offender has pleaded guilty so no evidence is needed from them at a hearing. That leaves a gaping hole in the system of providing victims with proper redress, and it needs covering at all stages of the process.

Deferring sentence to allow for restorative justice activities may prove a turning point for offenders and victims, and the evidence to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, referred so far supports this. But for all these proposals to fulfil their potential, they must be properly resourced in terms of people, preparation and funding. To improve the effectiveness of community orders in the ways proposed, we will need more people, more money and adequate training. Much will turn—and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, made an extremely valuable and important point—on the outcome of the Government’s consultation on the probation service. While there may be good reasons for the increasing use of private and voluntary sector providers, as suggested in the consultation paper, it is very important that we do not dissipate or even risk dissipating the expertise that exists within the public sector probation service—and I share the worries of many noble Lords in the Committee. For example, there is a proposal in the consultation paper to allow existing probation services to form separate probation trusts to compete with private and voluntary sector providers for work from the commissioning probation trusts. That seems structurally awkward and doomed to fail. We must find a way to retain what is best in the probation service and not lose the talent that we have.

Resource will also be needed to provide for the restorative justice proposals. Sentencers will need training, and facilitators will need to be available to provide a service during the short periods when sentence is deferred. There will need to be national, not patchy, cover. These are serious challenges; if met, I believe that they offer serious prospects of improvement and, ultimately, savings of resources and great social benefits. But the implementation of these proposals so that they achieve their potential will be a significant challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

There is much to ponder and debate today, on recommittal and Report. For the moment I have to say, on behalf of the Opposition, that judgment is reserved.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I welcome the proposals for deferred prosecution agreements in the proposed new schedule. They provide a comprehensive and workable code for a useful new procedure. The proposals are no worse for being an American import. Although I note the point of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that in America aggressive prosecutors may misuse such procedures, I do not believe the proposals in these amendments echo that danger.

These proposals are not dissimilar to procedures familiar in this jurisdiction over a number of years. Tax penalties, VAT penalties and customs penalties are examples of authorities not prosecuting when offences are committed but where the process of prosecution is replaced by the imposition of a penalty. Even the humble fixed penalty for motorists has its parallels.

The development these proposals introduce is a voluntary agreement to defer a prosecution where a company or a partnership is prepared to commit to payment of money to the prosecuting authority, to victims or to charity, to introduce compliance procedures and to co-operate in investigations.

The procedures are similar in many ways to the way in which the Environment Agency has operated over a number of years by enabling polluters to avoid prosecution for environmental offences by ensuring that offenders voluntarily clean up the pollution caused, pay any necessary compensation and introduce procedures in future to ensure compliance with the law. These arrangements save large sums of money, avoid the uncertainty of prosecution, ensure future compliance and extract compensation for victims and the prosecuting authorities where appropriate.

I do not believe that there are parallels between these proposals and hugging hoodies, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, suggests. They establish a way of achieving the results to be gained from a successful prosecution, sometimes in exceedingly complex and difficult cases, without the costs and uncertainties of getting those results.

Of course the criticism may be made that DPAs amount to something akin to plea bargaining. In one sense that criticism is justified. However, the provision at paragraph 5(4) of the proposed new schedule—that the amount of any financial penalty agreed between the prosecutor and P, the offender, must be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on P on conviction for the alleged offence following a guilty plea—goes much of the way towards answering that criticism. The two-stage arrangement proposed in the schedule also adds transparency and protection of the public to the proposals.

I have two points for consideration which may suggest that at this stage the proposals do not go far enough. Paragraph 4 of the schedule provides that P, the party entering into an agreement with the prosecuting authority, may not be an individual. I am not entirely clear why the distinction between individuals and corporations or partnerships needs to be drawn. It seems to me at first blush that it is the nature of the offence that is important, not the nature of the offender. I would suggest that the common threads running through cases suitable for DPAs are, first, the willingness of the offender to admit to guilt; secondly, the willingness to pay a financial penalty; thirdly, and perhaps of paramount importance, the suitability of a financial penalty and compliance measures to the facts of the case and to the seriousness of the offence; fourthly, a willingness to co-operate in an investigation of how the offences happened so as to assist the prosecuting authority in understanding the offences and in taking measures to avoid repetition; and finally, a willingness to put compliance measures in place on the part of the offender to ensure that there is no repetition of the offences. I would suggest that these conditions can be as easily met in the case of an individual offender as in the case of a corporation or partnership, even though DPAs would of course be more commonly suitable for corporations or partnerships.

It has been suggested that a distinction can be drawn between individuals and organisations from the self-evident fact that a corporation cannot be imprisoned. I am not sure that that answers the point. If an offence warrants a sentence of imprisonment—this is an important answer to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—the prosecuting authority will not agree to a DPA in the first place, and that is whether the sentence is warranted for an individual or for the officers of a company in their individual capacity. So DPAs cannot be used where a sentence of imprisonment ought to be imposed, if a sensible prosecuting authority is in place and goes before a judge seeking permission to make such an exceptional agreement.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am most grateful to my noble friend. Can he tell the Committee where that provision is to be found in the proposed schedule?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

It can be inferred from the fact that there is a proposal that the prosecuting authority has to go to a judge at the preliminary hearing to persuade the judge that the case is suitable for a DPA. If a prison sentence ought to be imposed on the person “P”, that agreement would not be forthcoming. That, I suggest, would be the effect of the proposal, although it may be necessary to make it clear by amendment; I appreciate that.

My second point is that the offences covered in Part 2 are economic and financial, and only financial and economic offences may be added to the list by delegated legislation. I wonder whether the restriction, not as to the legislation but as to the offences, is entirely justified. Environmental offences, for instance, seem appropriate. There are other random examples of offences contrary to regulation that might be suitable, such as offences against fishing regulations regarding net mesh sizes and permitted catches. Those may be examples, and there are many more. There are other regulatory provisions where DPAs might be appropriate. Perhaps it may be as well to let us see how DPAs work with the offences listed in the schedule at this point and then look to amend the legislation in the future. Certainly as a member of your Lordships’ Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform, I see the difficulty of adding large numbers of offences to the list by delegated legislation, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, pointed out. However, I suspect that our early suspicions of DPAs will wane in practice and that they may become tools of wider use and greater utility than is now envisaged.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, first I want to declare an interest. As my noble friend Lord Beecham said, I had something to do with an earlier consideration of similar problems when my party was in Government and I was in office, and I want to say something about that in a moment. I also declare that I am currently a practising lawyer and that I and my firm get involved in the sort of cases that this may be concerned with. I have seen how these systems work in the United States and I have thought about them quite hard. I want to make it clear that broadly speaking I am in favour of the proposal for deferred prosecution agreements. However, I have some questions that I will come to, and I understand very well the point made by my noble friend about the timing of the proposals being brought forward.

Before I turn to the substance of what I want to say, I am a little confused at the moment about the procedure that is being followed. This may be because unfortunately I was detained from coming to the House when noble Lords were considering the previous group of amendments. I came in at the tail end to hear something that I am not quite sure I understood, about matters being discussed again on a future occasion. But unless I have misunderstood, I notice that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has moved government Amendment 155ZB, which provides for the introduction of a schedule relating to deferred prosecution agreements. Without, as it were, dissent, we seem at least to have got the concept of a schedule into the Bill. Whether that means that the noble Lord is going to move the schedule as a complete schedule, I am not sure, but if he does, that gives rise to questions about whether there will be any real opportunity to debate or amend its provisions. I want to ask some questions about the detail, so I would be grateful if the noble Lord could explain the situation.

Inheritance (Cohabitants) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Friday 19th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am grateful to the House for permitting me to speak in the gap. I had not put my name down to speak because I was not clear that I could be here for the whole of the debate. I strongly support the Bill because it addresses a serious and important injustice, which is that under the present law cohabitants, on the death of their cohabiting partners, are left entirely without means of support.

I have listened carefully to the arguments against the Bill, particularly those put by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. She argues, supported by a number of quotes, that there are many who choose to cohabit rather than marry, and many who would not wish their cohabiting partner to inherit. Such people can of course make a will, making it clear that they do not wish their cohabiting partners to inherit. What we are dealing with here, though, is the default position. Under the present law, a right of challenge or a right to apply for provision is available to people under the 1975 Act, and that will remain the position. However, when one is looking at what the default position should be, I entirely agree with the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, that for most intestates, and for society in general, the first priority should normally be given to the relationship in which the deceased was living at the time of his or her death. The Bill, with its modest but important proposals, addresses that priority and gets it right.

I entirely accept the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester in suggesting that attention needs to be given to the needs of separating couples who cohabit. I accept that that needs to be answered, and indeed have made that position clear in this House before. I hope to introduce a Bill in due course that will give effect to the proposal of the Law Commission that there should be limited provision for cohabiting couples who separate in those circumstances. However, that is not the Bill before the House. This Bill addresses a limited but important proposal made by the Law Commission, and I urge the House to give it our support.

Defamation Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this Bill and in doing so refer to my registered interests as a practising barrister and arbitrator. I had the privilege of serving on the Joint Committee of both Houses under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Mawhinney and, like others, I pay tribute to his excellent and courteous chairmanship. I also add my tribute to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill for all the work and learning he has devoted to this issue over many years, for his Bill and for the help he gave the Joint Committee.

The balance between reputation and freedom of speech is now wrong. It is tilted against freedom of speech. Libel cases and the threat of such cases, often unwarranted, have been used by the wealthy and their lawyers to stifle legitimate criticism and debate. So, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, has just pointed out, academics who question the safety of medical procedures or pharmaceutical products, or journalists who investigate a company’s employment practices, have been warned off and forced to back down rather than run the risk of ruin. That runs strongly counter to the public interest in legitimate debate. But it is not only defendants who are frightened off. Private citizens, irresponsibly defamed in the media, are also deterred from action to protect their reputations by the cost and complexity of seeking legal redress. This Bill rightly seeks to shift the balance in favour of freedom of speech and at the same time to simplify and modernise the law in what has become an arcane and complex area.

I turn to Clause 4 of the Bill, which rewrites the Reynolds defence. My noble friend Lord Lester has argued persuasively that it would be better to omit the list of factors on the question of responsible publication and instead to state the broad principles in the Bill, which he set out in his speech. He would then leave it to the courts to develop those principles case by case. My provisional view—and I only differ from my noble friend Lord Lester in detail and with great diffidence—is that a reasonably clear set of guidelines would be helpful. It must not be exhaustive and it must never become a checklist of hurdles. We must avoid the kind of nightmare for publishers and broadcasters of which the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, spoke. Clear guidelines would provide an easily understood code, which is one of the aims of the Bill, enabling an intelligent layman to look up the law on the internet and understand it without the need to search for the cases and read the judgments in them to try to discern how the law is likely to be interpreted.

Alongside a public interest defence, the law should provide a public remedy for those defamed by reports that are genuinely published in the public interest but that turn out to be inaccurate and cause harm. This, I suggest, can be achieved without trespassing on editorial independence, as the noble Lord, Lord Black, suggested that it might. When that happens, a prompt public retraction or clarification and an apology, prominently published, should at least be encouraged. I would like to see provision for the court to take into account a prompt offer of such redress when dealing with libel cases. This could be introduced as part of an early resolution procedure or it could be as an alternative to a Clause 4 defence. Either way such a provision would be a welcome development of the law and would go much further than an offer of amends under the 1996 Act.

The Bill does not restrict the right of corporations to sue for defamation. The Joint Committee wrestled long and hard with this issue. One the one hand, corporations are not natural persons and have no feelings. Large corporations can and do use their financial muscle to stifle legitimate debate by threatening to sue their financially weaker critics. Such corporations may have other ways of protecting their reputations without suing their critics for libel. On the other hand, not all non-natural persons are big and powerful. Defamatory statements can destroy legitimate businesses. Weighing these arguments, the Joint Committee recommended, as had the Bill proposed by my noble friend Lord Lester, that corporations should still be able to sue, but only if they could show at least a likelihood of substantial financial loss. The Bill contains no such restriction, because the Government’s response to the Joint Committee argued that the serious harm test filled the gap. I do not entirely accept the Government’s argument. Serious harm to reputation is not the same as serious financial damage. The chilling effect of allowing corporations to sue is severe. In my view, they should have to show that serious financial loss is likely in order to be entitled to sue. The Bill as drafted fails to address this issue.

The changes in the substantive law proposed in the Bill are not enough to transform the system. As has been said, the staggering costs and the procedural complexity of defamation proceedings are at least as much to blame as the substantive law for the present inadequacy of the system. We must accept that defamation cases will never be cheap, but we could make them simpler and quicker and therefore less expensive. To do so we need changes to the rules to dovetail with the changes in the Bill.

First, there should be a single early resolution appointment in every case to determine as many issues as possible. I give a few examples: whether the serious harm test is met; issues about meaning; whether a statement was a statement of opinion, and whether the basis of an opinion was sufficiently indicated; whether a statement was on a matter of public interest; whether a subsequent publication was materially different from an earlier publication. Such an early resolution appointment would clarify issues quickly and would, I suggest, often lead to settlement. Furthermore, any claim that did not meet the serious harm test would be struck out.

Secondly, there should be more active, court-led case management throughout the life of every case. Thirdly, courts should be far readier to stay proceedings to allow for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution, with costs consequences for failure to co-operate. Fourthly, we need some realistic costs control, including, in the light of LASPO, protection for less well off claimants. Qualified one-way cost shifting in defamation cases would do much to assist. Fifthly, I suggest, as the Joint Committee proposed, at least to trial this: all but the most complex defamation cases should be heard in county courts, with designated judges to manage and hear them in trial centres around the country.

I welcome the letter from my noble friend the Minister yesterday to all Members of your Lordships’ House promising to bring forward such procedural changes, but the Government’s response to the Joint Committee on the timetable for procedural change lacked urgency. I will take up a point made by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney. While it is right, of course, that the rules are the responsibility of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, I remind the House and my noble friend that the Lord Chancellor has the power, under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act 1997, to give notice requiring that committee to make rules for a specified purpose. If he does so, the committee must make such rules within a reasonable time. It seems to me that for your Lordships properly to consider how we achieve meaningful overall reform in this area we should see the proposed procedural changes at the same time as we consider the substantive provisions in the Bill even if there may subsequently be changes in the light of any recommendations of Lord Justice Leveson. At the moment we are legislating while seeing only half the picture. I therefore urge my noble friend the Minister to encourage the new Lord Chancellor to draw up a draft and publish it quickly so that we can see the entire picture in its frame.