17:11 - Division on Amendment 1 - Ayes: 272 / Noes: 141 - Amendment 1 agreed.
18:05 - Division on Amendment 2 - Ayes: 201 / Noes: 193 - Amendment 2 agreed.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, I always think it is extremely helpful for the courtesy of the House if the Opposition make not only their case but mine as well, but perhaps it will help if I also put forward a few ideas.
This Bill has been two years in preparation. It has been a draft Bill, it has gone through pre-legislative scrutiny, it has gone through all its stages in the House of Commons and it has spent four very full days in Committee. One of my fears over the past two years, and certainly since the Leveson inquiry was set up, has been that this discrete Bill dealing with defamation would be engulfed by the Leveson tsunami. Given the way in which matters are handled in this House, even if it agreed with every word of both amendments, it would be—to put it mildly—impetuous for it to vote for amendments that run to three pages in the Marshalled List, with in one case a weekend and in the other less than 24 hours’ notice of their content. In other circumstances, some of the old barrack room lawyers in this place would have drawn attention to that.
There is no doubt in my mind that we are dealing with one of the most serious challenges to political parties and to Parliament in the past 70 years. I have never been in any doubt that how we respond to Leveson will be a test of how each and every one of us carries out our responsibilities in this Parliament.
To put my own attitudes in context, I have been campaigning for the strengthening of press regulation for 15 years. Some 10 years ago when the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, and I tabled some modest amendments on press regulation, I was told from this Dispatch Box by the Labour Minister of the day that our proposals were the “slippery slope” to a state-regulated press. I say that because I do not want people to assume that there is total moral rectitude on that side and none on this side. I do not believe that the proposals I made 10 years ago were a slippery slope towards a state-controlled press. I do not believe that the proposals before the House today are a slippery slope towards a state-controlled press. That is not the issue before this House.
There is an issue before the House that cuts many ways. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has summed it up: trust. I hope that my noble friend Lord Black realised, from the reception to some of his remarks, that the media still have a long way to go before there is any sense of trust in what they are doing to rectify the harm that they have done to our body politic. I hope that one of the values of this debate is that each of the party leaders understands the question of trust which hangs over their intent. I am as frustrated as anybody that two months have passed since publication of the Leveson report. There is a strong case for getting things moving. If this debate has helped to stimulate progress, that is certainly a value that it has. There is a value in all three parties putting their cards on the table. This is not a time for secret diplomacy.
I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that we should still strive for the prize of all-party agreement on this. We want a settlement about the relationship of our media with Parliament to carry all-party endorsement.
My noble friend Lord Elton asked me a question which an old campaigner such as him knows that I cannot answer on behalf of the Government. He wants to know whether the Government would support legislation in this matter if these talks collapsed and my noble friend Lord Hunt failed to deliver. I cannot speak for the Government but I know my party’s policy; namely, that if there is no agreement and we cannot achieve the tripartite agreement that I believe is the prize, we certainly would be in favour of legislation in this area.
Therefore, there has to be some understanding and balance about this almost unique move that we are going through. From our long relationship, the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, knows that I fully understand where he is coming from. There is power in the Back Benches. This show of Back-Bench power today sends a necessary message which breaks the dreadful silence to which he referred. He perhaps has not studied the rest of the Bill as fully as he might. Other parts of the Bill try to deal with access to justice, including costs, as referred to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, where we are pursuing the Leveson recommendations on qualified one-way costs shifting.
The debate has brought up a number of issues that Members should ponder. Over the years, I have been on the same side as almost every Member who has contributed to this debate, including the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, in her call for a cheap, effective and independent answer. I will come to the point about independence in a moment.
When the noble Lord, Lord Lester, was having his skirmishes and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and my noble friend Lord Faulks were making their points, it crossed my mind that passing these amendments as they are might cause even more work for my learned friends while the judges work out the intentions of Parliament in passing these proposals. As I have said, that is the danger in such matters.
My noble friend Lord Fowler is an old ally. He rightfully called for what I think is the rational approach; that is, to look at the building blocks and at how they can be placed. The suggestions here may indeed be the right building blocks. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that there is an expectation in the public at large and in both Houses of Parliament for Leveson to be implemented. However, Parliament has a right to look at these matters. I still believe that the tripartite talks are our best way to make lasting progress. That is where I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky. It is always tempting and alluring to say that this is the best chance we have or that “tomorrow never comes”, as the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, said. But sometimes it does come and I do not think that we should abandon hope. I noticed that my noble friend Lord Phillips referred, while supporting the amendments, to the fact that they are defective.
The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York reminded us about trust. I hope that we can face the question of how we can use the next few weeks—I am not talking about months or years—to restore the trust that clearly has been damaged in the conduct of these talks. There is a danger that passing these amendments today will be a diversion and not progress as regards what I and the House want to see.
It is a matter of judgment, and the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, and the other movers of amendments will have to make their decision. However, let me comment on the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which I very much welcomed because it brought up to date and put on the record the very detailed work that he has been doing and the real progress that has been made. He was right to remind us that Lord Justice Leveson himself said that the industry has the responsibility to set up the new structure. On the question of independence, I can say only that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I were on the executive of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders— a modest body, as you can tell from its title— some 40 years ago. On the basis of that, I have no doubt that this difficult task is in safe and independent hands.
When Lord Justice Leveson’s report was published, all agreed that the inquiry had uncovered a shocking culture of wrongdoing at the heart of certain elements of the press, which the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, referred to. There was also, as Leveson pointed out, an inadequate system of press regulation—something that I described in this House as a “sweetheart organisation”. The Prime Minister has stated that the status quo is not an option, and the Deputy Prime Minister has said that we must not now prevaricate. We are all agreed that a tough and truly independent new system of self-regulation is required to ensure that real change happens. At the same time we must ensure that there is freedom of expression for the press, which is a cornerstone of our democracy.
To that extent, I understand the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, in tabling his amendments, as well as that of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. I sympathise with the concerns that the Leveson report needs to be implemented and with the noble Baroness’s wish to see progress on this important issue. We are all agreed on the need for action and I welcome the noble Lord’s contribution to finding the right solution. However, I remind noble Lords that when the Leveson report was published, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister agreed that a cross-party approach was the best way to ensure that a consensus could be reached on these contentious issues—and very few of us in this House would disagree with that. It is right for Parliament to send clear messages to our respective party leaders but, as I said before, the tripartite way forward is the prize that we all should seek.
To that end, the cross-party talks have been taking place over a number of weeks and the Government remain committed to ensuring their success. These discussions are not to be taken lightly. No fewer than 10 meetings have taken place between senior representatives from across the parties, and those representatives include the Secretary of State for Culture, the deputy leader of the Opposition and, from this House, my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. From what I have heard, the talks have been constructive, although I also accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that there seems to have been a certain lack of momentum in recent days, which makes this debate not unwelcome.
Lord McNally
Have I said something that I should not have said?
I should like to update noble Lords on some of the discussions that have already taken place on Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendations. First, recommendations concerning the press and police have been considered by the cross-party group and measures are being developed further by the Home Office, on which the Home Secretary will report to Parliament shortly. Secondly, Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendations regarding the press and politicians have been considered and are now being taken forward by the Cabinet Office.
Thirdly, there have been discussions on the complex issues raised by data protection. As the Minister with responsibility for data protection, I am looking with my right honourable friend the Justice Secretary at the best way to take this forward, preferably once we have a clear idea of what we are doing as far as the tripartite talks are concerned. This is a complex series of decisions. Furthermore, the talks continue to consider, among many other issues, the best way to recognise the new press self-regulatory body. While there are areas of differences, there are also many areas of agreement. There is a widespread desire for a cross-party solution to this issue of fundamental importance to our democracy. A great deal of work has already taken place in talks and these amendments risk pre-empting their outcome.
This brings me to the key issue: whether statute is the most appropriate route to delivering the underpinning that Lord Justice Leveson sets out. This question has been the topic of impassioned debate not only today but across the weeks since the report’s publication. The cross-party talks have considered a number of options, including various draft Bills—among them the Bill prepared by my noble friend Lord Lester. In addition, there have been discussions about a proposed royal charter. To add to the debate and to demonstrate to this House that concrete progress is being made, I can announce today that a draft royal charter proposal will be published next week—the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is well informed.
As I hope noble Lords will recognise, I have outlined just a few of the issues that are subject to detailed consideration in cross-party talks and with stakeholders. I am convinced that an approach agreed cross-party, if it can be secured, is the best way to do justice to Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals and to ensure a new system of press regulation which can enjoy secure and real public confidence.
I recognise the strong feelings in this House and the desire to send a message. I am sure that that message has been clearly heard. However, I ask noble Lords to allow those cross-party talks to reach their full and considered conclusion rather than to bring legislative proposals before this House at this stage. The noble Lord was wrong to say that this is the end of the matter; the Bill will have a Third Reading and go back to the other place.
This is, of course, a matter of judgment. However, I feel that with the progress that is being made on the kind of things to which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, referred, and given that the royal charter proposal will be on the table next week, there will be a chance in the next few days to give some real impetus to these talks. As I said previously, there is no doubt in my mind that the real prize is not a victory or defeat on this amendment today but a successful outcome to the tripartite talks. That would give us the real holy grail here, which is a cross-party endorsement which sticks in parliamentary and legislative terms and has widespread support among the public. I hope that, with those remarks, my old friend will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve
My Lords, it has been a very instructive debate. I think that it has become clear to many of us how little many of us who are not close to the cross-party talks know about what is actually being said or discussed. There is, I am sorry to say, and as the most reverend Primate reminded us, a serious question of trust here that is not going to be remedied quickly. A number of issues speak directly to that. Perhaps I may address one which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised. He spoke repeatedly, as he has previously, about independent regulation, and he was reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, that independence is not just a matter of one’s belief that one is a person of independent judgment; it is also a question of institutions, structures, how one is appointed and to whom one is accountable. Our debates would be very much clarified if we did not speak of a self-regulation body that lacks an appropriate form of accountability to a recognition body as a form of independent regulation. It is less than that.
I have every faith in the good intentions of the noble Lord and his colleagues in seeking to define a way forward, but without the statutory recognition body which is integral to Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals, we have no reason to expect that that will endure across the vicissitudes of time and self-interest. We have repeated experience that what passes for self-regulation has been self-interested regulation. That is why many of us are extremely anxious on behalf of our fellow citizens who have been victims of intrusion and defamation, and lack remedies.
I will withdraw Amendment 1A, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hollins. It is a complex amendment and it is imperfect. Greater clarity will be served if noble Lords make a straightforward decision on supporting the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, and colleagues. That puts the issue squarely. We would all acknowledge that the details of these amendments—Amendment 1 and the amending amendments—are not perfect. They probably cannot be perfect at this stage. However, I hope that noble Lords will feel willing to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, knowing that it affords the Government more than one opportunity to reconsider the matter and come back on it. As the Minister indicated in his very interesting reply, it also affords some further time for reflection. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1A.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am unused to getting such unanimous support from all sides of the House. I am grateful for the interventions from my noble friends Lord Lester, Lord Faulks and Lord Marks and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. As has been pointed out, we are being asked here whether there should be provision in the Bill requiring the court to strike out actions that do not meet certain thresholds, unless the interests of justice require otherwise.
The noble Baroness has made clear that the intention underlying the amendment is to make the law as clear as possible for the ordinary citizen. We share that aim, and have tried as far as possible to make the Bill accessible and readily understandable to those who may need to refer to it. However, the provision that she proposes is simply unnecessary, and could itself cause confusion and unnecessary cost.
As the Government have made clear in previous debates on this point, the courts already have a power in Rule 3.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules that permits them to strike out all or part of a claim where there are no reasonable grounds for bringing it or they consider it to be an abuse of process. The courts are very familiar with that power and we have no doubt that they will use it more often in defamation cases once the new higher threshold of serious harm is in place.
The noble Baroness expressed concern that the Civil Procedure Rules were couched in permissive rather than mandatory terms. We do not consider there to be anything in this point. We see no reason why a court would allow a case to continue if the threshold test were not met.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I support of this amendment and do so by adopting the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, which, I think, in turn adopts what I described as the compelling argument put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in Grand Committee on 19 December at col. GC 522. I commend the recommendation of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, to the Minister.
In rereading the debate in Grand Committee, I am reminded that he offered a very similar opportunity to the Minister on that occasion, which the Minister scorned. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, was awaiting the letter that became the letter of 9 January 2013. I recollect that in col. GC 528 in the same debate the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, indicated that he might be able, in the same vein as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, to give the comfort that the noble and learned Lord was seeking. I have to say—this should not surprise anybody—that we were all, I think, persuaded by the noble and learned Lord’s argument in relation to Telnikoff and why it should not still be considered to be the law in the same circumstances. I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to the opportunity that he has on this occasion to resolve this issue once and for all.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I indeed hope that this will be resolved once and for all. If my noble friend is going to withdraw under the temptation that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, can bring this back at Third Reading, I would rather that he tested the opinion of the House. I will try to make as clear as possible on the record the Government’s opinion on this, but I cannot start trying to rerun 20 year-old legal battles.
Clause 3 provides for the honest opinion defence to be available if three conditions are met. Amendment 5 provides that the second condition in subsection (3)— that the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion—is met if the defendant indicates the subject matter of a letter or article appearing in a newspaper or other publication and the date when it appeared.
On the basis of our discussions with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, on whose behalf my noble friend is speaking this evening, we understand that the core issue underlying the amendment relates to what should be taken into account in determining whether the statement complained of is one of fact or opinion. We consider that this goes to the first condition in Clause 3(2)—that the statement complained of was one of opinion—rather than to the second condition in subsection (3).
At common law, when deciding whether a statement is one of fact or opinion, the court can look at the statement only in its immediate context. So if the statement appears in a news story or in a letter to an editor, the court can look only at the particular news story or the particular letter. The intention behind Amendment 5 is to change this so that the court can also look at other documents that provide a context for the statement.
This is a difficult issue, as is evidenced by the varying judicial opinions that were expressed when this was considered by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords some 20 years ago in the case of Telnikoff v Matusevitch, to which my noble friend has referred. However, on balance, and with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, the Government believe that the current law is in the right place. We consider that it should be clear from the document in which the statement appears that the author is expressing an opinion, otherwise a reader cannot know that there is a judgment to be made. They must be entitled to accept as a fact something that is presented as a fact. It follows from this that we cannot accept Amendment 5. Although the Bill abolishes the common law, we can see no reason why the courts would depart from the current approach.
As I have said, a defendant who satisfies the first condition that the statement is one of opinion must also satisfy the second condition that the statement must indicate, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion. Amendment 4 would replace the word “basis” with the words “subject matter”. The provisions in the Bill reflect the test approved by the Supreme Court in Spiller v Joseph that,
“the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, the facts on which it is based”.
We consider that the word “basis” more accurately captures the essence of that test.
I hope that, on that basis, not only will the noble Lord withdraw this amendment, but that when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, returns to these shores and reads Hansard, he will accept that he has had a good run for his money but that this is where the Government’s view is and where it will remain.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. The further the Bill proceeds through this House, the more I am convinced that he would have made a superb Queen’s Counsel. Maybe as a result of his experience, that will be his next career.
I have no idea whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, will be satisfied by the Minister’s answer. I cannot control or fetter him in any way. As I understand it, the Government’s position is that the second condition—
“that the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion”—
was based on the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, in Spiller v Joseph, in which he held that it is not a prerequisite of the defence that readers should be in a position to evaluate the comment for themselves. My understanding is that the Government’s position is that Clause 3(3) has been prepared on that basis, and that the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, is therefore unnecessary.
I see the Minister nodding. I hope that the ministerial nod, which I now record in Hansard, will cause the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, to treat it as sufficient for his purposes and for those of Pepper v Hart. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am grateful to the contributors to the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Taverne, expressed the concerns of Sense about Science, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, spoke on behalf of, or was briefed by, PEN. These are organisations that I have listened to, and have had contact and dialogue with, throughout the two years’ gestation of the Bill. My aim remains to get as close as possible to the aspirations of those organisations. I suspect that in the end they will still say that we have fallen short but, particularly in Clause 4, we have tried to move in a direction that makes the law better and clearer. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for his comment on our work on recasting it.
Amendment 8 is a government amendment that owes its authorship to the noble Lord. I am grateful for that and I hope that our acceptance of it is a demonstration of my willingness to listen as the Bill has proceeded. Our amendment provides for the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case in deciding whether the requirements for the public interest defence under Clause 4 to be satisfied have been met. This amendment responds to concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, in Committee that following government amendments to Clause 4 which, among other things, removed the list of factors for the courts to consider, there was a risk that the courts would simply invent a new checklist in interpreting and applying the new defence—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Taverne.
In the context of that debate, I indicated that we did not believe that a provision requiring the court to consider all the circumstances was strictly necessary, because the courts would do this in any event. I also indicated that in developing a body of case law the courts may inevitably decide that particular factors are relevant in determining whether the defence has been established in a case. That remains our view. However, on reflection, I believe that it would be helpful to send a signal to the courts and practitioners to make clear the wish of Parliament that the new defence should be applied in as flexible a way as possible in light of the circumstances.
Amendments 6 and 7 would change the second limb of the test for establishing the public interest defence under Clause 4, whereby it would be satisfied if the defendant could show that he could reasonably have decided that publishing the statement was in the public interest, rather than that he reasonably believed that that was the case. This is intended to make the test more objective, as noble Lords have indicated. It reflects concern that the provision as currently drafted could lead to claimants seeking to introduce arguments relating to the defendant’s motive, which the courts have indicated is not relevant in relation to the common-law defence. While a claimant might seek to introduce arguments about the defendant’s motive, given the strong signal given by the courts in cases such as Flood to the effect that such considerations are usually irrelevant, we think it highly unlikely that the courts would entertain them.
Let me say here—the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has indicated that he is listening carefully to this—that my absolute intention is for this part of the legislation to embrace and reflect Flood. We are concerned that adopting the wording of the amendment could shift the focus more towards what a hypothetical defendant might have known or what steps they might have taken. This would not reflect the Flood judgment. In Flood, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said that the courts were examining whatever the defendant,
“knew (and did not know) and whatever they had done (and had not done)”.
To paraphrase, the courts have to focus on what the defendant’s state of knowledge was and what steps they took prior to publication. We consider that the current wording in Clause 4(1) better captures this test and better reflects Flood.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Perhaps the Minister could be referred by his officials to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, actually said in paragraph 113 of the judgment, where he said that there was a single question, which was,
“could whoever published the defamation, given whatever they knew (and did not know) and whatever they had done (and had not done) to guard so far as possible against the publication of untrue defamatory material, properly have considered the publication in question to be in the public interest?”.
As I read that, it is very close to Amendment 6. I mention it because this is a question purely of what was meant, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne, indicated.
Lord McNally
I shall certainly draw that intervention to the attention of my officials. My briefing poses the question: does the new reasonable belief test reflect the current law or change it? It then goes on to say that our intention is to reflect the current law as articulated in cases such as Flood and we believe that it does so. It states that the test draws in particular on the way in which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, approached the question in Flood. It then quotes exactly the same section of the judgment. As an innocent in this jungle of legal jargon and judgments, it does not surprise me that two sides of the case should quote the same judgment. We think that we have got it right and that what we have reflects the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. We were doubly blessed in our Committee because we had both the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, to give us wise legal advice. It is interesting that, in anticipating a question on that, my briefing should draw on exactly the same quote from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, to defend what we have done as my noble friend Lord Lester claims for his amendment.
On Amendment 9, my noble friend Lord Phillips joined my noble friend Lord Lester in general castigation, and the noble Lord, Lord Browne, gave them some qualified support. I have warned my noble friends to be wary of qualified support from the noble Lord, Lord Browne; it leads them only into bad ways.
The amendment would remove Clause 4(2), which deals with reportage. “Reportage” has been described by the courts as,
“a convenient word to describe the neutral reporting of attributed allegations rather than their adoption by the newspaper”.
Subsection (2) is intended to catch the core elements of reportage as articulated by the courts. These are that where the defendant publishes an accurate and impartial account of a dispute between two or more parties, the defendant does not need to have verified the information reported before publication. This would not, however, absolve the defendant from the need to satisfy the court that, in all the other circumstances of the case, it was reasonable to believe that the publication was in the public interest.
Lord McNally
“(1A) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), in determining whether the defendant has shown the matters mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.”