Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Horam Excerpts

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if, like other noble Lords, I preface what I say about the amendments in this group with a few general remarks about the proposals in the Bill for the reform of judicial review. In his Second Reading speech, the Minister described judicial review as,

“one of the most important means by which government and other public bodies can be held legally accountable for their decisions and actions”.—[Official Report, 30/6/14; cols. 1541.]

As Frances Gibb, the legal editor of the Times, reported in today’s edition, he stressed that the Government regarded judicial review as,

“terribly important and we are not trying to get rid of it”.

If that is right, we should have little difficulty, as a result of these debates, in persuading the Government to accept amendments to the proposals and to the Bill to ensure that judicial review is not threatened, as I and many other noble Lords believe that currently it is.

I suggest that the Government ought to respect the following six principles. First, judicial review exists for the purpose of enabling the citizen to hold the Executive to account. Secondly, of its nature, judicial review is a public law remedy. It follows that there is often, although not always, a significant public interest in ensuring that a judicial review case is heard and determined over and above the private interests of the citizen or citizens who bring the application.

Thirdly, judicial review cases, of their nature, attract support from numbers of concerned citizens and organisations—sometimes campaigning organisations—with an entirely legitimate interest in the issues involved. Fourthly—perhaps this is not a principle but part of the factual background—judicial review inevitably is often unpopular with government. It is therefore important that Parliament and the courts should be astute to ensure that it is not stifled by unduly restrictive procedures or rules. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, used the word “sensitive”; I suggest that is an entirely apt description of the requirement.

Fifthly, because financial gain is often not the primary purpose of judicial review cases, it is important that they can be brought without undue expense and without unacceptable financial risk for those who bring them, often out of public concern.

I believe that the sixth principle can be expressed very simply. It is this: trust the judges. Because, constitutionally, judicial review exists for the courts to hold the Executive to account, the best way of ensuring the robustness of that review procedure, and of gaining and maintaining public confidence in the procedure, is for the judges and not the Executive to be trusted to administer it.

I turn to Clause 64, which, as your Lordships have heard, seeks to ensure that any judicial review proceedings that can be classed as academic must fail. The test the clause seeks to apply is whether an unlawful decision by an arm of the Executive has, in fact, led to a “substantially different” outcome for the applicant from that which a lawfully reached decision would have produced. If it is “highly likely”—I repeat the criticism of that phrase—that the unlawful conduct has not made such a difference, the Bill proposes that leave to apply for judicial review must not be given. If leave is given and it turns out that the case is academic in the sense I mentioned, relief must be refused.

I accept that there may be purely academic cases that should not proceed to a hearing, even where it can be established that no part of the Executive has acted unlawfully—but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, pointed out, the courts already have a discretion to refuse permission or relief in such a case. However, I know of no convincing evidence that in practice a significant number of cases is, or has been, brought in which it can fairly be said that the unlawful decision-making at issue must have made no difference to the outcome for the applicant.

However, the real issue here is whether the fact that a case turns out to be academic in that sense should inevitably lead to its being dismissed. I suggest that there will often be a public interest in having the conduct of the decision-maker examined and, if necessary, overruled if the decision made turns out to have been unlawfully made—even where it may be said to have made no difference.

My noble friend Lord Carlile mentioned the question of a lack of consultation where the repeat exercise, when consultation is properly carried out, may lead to the same result. However, to condemn the lack of consultation and to refuse relief in spite of it is, I suggest, entirely wrong. There is also the question of cases where points of law need clarification or where points of procedure or fact need establishing, and need establishing in the public interest, even where a decision might have made no difference.

Therefore, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Carlile seek to make the refusal of relief in a case that turns out to be academic discretionary rather than mandatory and to add an extra condition for the refusal of relief. Relief, we submit, should be refused only if an application is both academic in the sense proposed in the Bill and such that the public interest or the overriding objective of dealing with a case justly does not require that it be determined. Our amendments would apply those tests both at the permission stage and at the relief stage in the High Court and in the Upper Tribunal.

I am not among those who hold the view that Parliament should never legislate on the subject of judicial review. It is the right of Parliament in our democracy to do so, and in that I differ slightly perhaps from the arguments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. However, I suggest, along with him, that we should be extremely careful before restricting by legislation the right of the courts to intervene in unlawful decision-making by organs of government where the court considers it appropriate to do so.

I can add only that the way in which judicial review has developed over the past few decades has demonstrated the very considerable respect for the breadth of discretion by executive decision-makers. It would be appropriate for the Government now to show similar respect for the need for discretion to be exercised by the judges.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

With great respect, I think that it may be our turn.

[Lord Horam]

I do not think that anyone on this side has spoken yet.

Everyone who has spoken so far has been a lawyer, with the exception of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I am not a lawyer; I am an economist, but perhaps I introduce a rather separate vein of thinking into this debate, which is extremely interesting and very important for the conduct of government.

The issue that concerns me as an economist and as a previous government Minister is delay. Almost all judicial review cases involve considerable delay. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, rightly and very fairly mentioned the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights which went into the whole business of judicial review. In that case, the Government’s response indicated several instances where there had been great delay as a consequence of judicial review cases. I will not go through a long list, as that would weary the Committee, but I shall give some examples. A development of 360 homes in Carmarthenshire was delayed by 18 months. A development in east London which would have created 500 jobs was delayed by 15 months. The expansion of Bristol Airport was delayed. Very often, in the judicial review in question, the case was found to have no merit whatever, but there was still delay.