Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this Bill. As my noble friend has explained in his lucid and comprehensive introduction, it implements some of the proposals in the Law Commission’s 2011 report, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death.

Particularly welcome is the improvement of the position of spouses and civil partners as compared with the position of remoter relatives. It is entirely right that where a deceased leaves a spouse or civil partner but no children, the spouse or civil partner should take the entire estate. It is also right that where there are surviving children as well as a surviving spouse or civil partner, then that survivor should take not just the statutory legacy absolutely but also his or her half of the residue absolutely. The complication and the capacity for encouraging disputes that was inherent in the existing arrangement, whereby the survivor’s half interest was held on a life interest only, should be done away with. I believe that these and other changes in the Bill chime with contemporary views of family life. They also accord more readily than do the present arrangements with the economic realities of dependency. These changes will help avoid the difficulty, the expense and the time involved in bringing claims for family provision under the 1975 Act as well.

In the case of family provision, my noble friend has stated that the Government intend to abandon the provisions presently in the Bill to reform the domicile threshold for bringing a family provision claim. Families and family wealth are increasingly international, and not only among the wealthy. I would suggest that there are cases where claims against the estate of non-domiciled deceased persons ought to be capable of being brought. It may be that habitual residence of a potential claimant is not an appropriate test for the reasons of Scots law and practice that my noble friend gave. But in this respect, as he reminded us, the provisions in the Bill differ from the Law Commission’s original proposals. The Law Commission report recommended that the existence of real property in England and Wales, or property to which domestic succession law applied, should be the alternative threshold condition apart from domicile of the deceased, whereas, as my noble friend has said, the Bill in its present form would have established habitual residence of the potential claimant as the alternative threshold condition.

I wonder whether the existence of real property here, or property to which domestic succession law applies, should, as the Law Commission proposed, even in the absence of domicile of the deceased or habitual residence of the claimant, justify a financial provision claim. I hope that the Government, rather than simply abandoning the position by amendment, will consider whether there is an alternative way of effectively widening the present threshold.

In connection with family provision claims, it is plainly right that we should add as an eligible person a child treated by a parent as a child of the family; that change is plainly welcome.

The Bill, however, implements only one part of the recommendations of the Law Commission’s 2011 report. As my noble friend also pointed out in his introduction, the other part comprised its recommendations for provision for cohabitants to take under the intestacy rules after five years’ cohabitation, or two years if the cohabitants had children living with them. Those proposals were incorporated in a separate draft Bill, the Inheritance (Cohabitants) Bill, which was annexed to the Law Commission’s report.

The Government have not sought to implement those provisions either in this Bill or in any other Bill. I differ from my noble friend and the Government in my assessment of the wisdom of this. It was left to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill to bring in a Private Member’s Bill in the terms of the Law Commission’s draft in the previous Session in an attempt to secure the implementation of these recommendations relating to cohabitation. That Bill fell for lack of time and government support after Second Reading in this House. Its provisions are now included in my Cohabitation Rights Bill, which was introduced in this House earlier this month.

The fate of those provisions is not my only concern in this area. The Law Commission in 2007 produced a lengthy and detailed report entitled, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown. In that report, the commission recommended a limited scheme of financial relief to adjust economic disadvantages arising out of cohabiting relationships and to share the benefits derived from such relationships.

Again, my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill introduced a Private Member’s Bill in 2008 which would have introduced reforms which were not the same as but similar to those proposed by the Law Commission. The Labour Government did not support that Private Member’s Bill, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, then the Attorney-General, saying that the Government wished to await the outcome of research into how the Scottish legislation to similar effect, passed in 2006, was working.

In September 2011, four years after the Law Commission’s 2007 report, when I asked an Oral Question of the Government on this issue, they announced the same day by Written Ministerial Statement that there would be no action taken by the Government in this Parliament to implement the Law Commission’s proposals. Those proposals on financial relief on relationship breakdown are now the central part of my Cohabitation Rights Bill. However, in the nature of things and despite any optimism on my part, it may be some time before that passes into law.

Meanwhile, more and more cohabiting couples in England and Wales—nearly 6 million people now cohabit in the United Kingdom—go without the legal protections on breakdown or death that the Law Commission has firmly recommended that they should have. This is against the background of widespread public confusion about the position in law of people who choose to cohabit. In a British Social Attitudes survey in 2006, no less than 58% of respondents thought that cohabiting couples who split up were probably or definitely in the same position as married couples. The myth of the common law marriage is widespread, but it is just that, as your Lordships know: a myth without any foundation in law.

Reform of the law relating to cohabitation enjoys widespread judicial support. Scotland has had a cohabitation law similar to that proposed by the Law Commission since 2006. Ireland introduced similar legislation in 2010. This is what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, our one woman Supreme Court judge—and how regrettable it is that she is the only one—said last July, in a major case on the Scottish Act in the Supreme Court, Gow v Grant:

“The main lesson from this case, as also from the research so far, is that a remedy such as this is both practicable and fair. It does not impose upon unmarried couples the responsibilities of marriage but redresses the gains and losses flowing from their relationship”.

She concluded:

“‘The Act has undoubtedly achieved a lot for Scottish cohabitants and their children’. English and Welsh cohabitants and their children deserve no less”.

This is not good enough. The Law Commission’s proposals on separation were made in 2007 after a long and detailed consultation, and on intestacy in 2011. They were thorough and carefully considered. The Law Commission is the independent body set up by Parliament to recommend to the Government necessary law reforms, with a mission to keep the law fair, simple and modern. Yet in spite of repeated pleas from the professions and the judiciary at all levels to implement the commission’s proposals, no action has been taken.

I am not saying that any proposal of the Law Commission should automatically be implemented without parliamentary scrutiny—far from it. Of course it is for Parliament to determine what proposals it will implement and what it will decline to implement. However, the point of having the Law Commission is to achieve reform of the law, and that central function risks being thwarted by the failure of government at least to bring legislation before Parliament to implement the commission’s proposals. I suggest that the default position at any rate should be that the Government should bring forward legislation for consideration by Parliament when the Law Commission makes detailed proposals for law reform.

As a result of a decision taken by the conference of my party in Glasgow this autumn, the implementation of the Law Commission’s proposals on intestacy and on relationship breakdown is now Liberal Democrat policy. However, that in a sense highlights the problem. Proposals of the Law Commission for law reform should not have to be the stuff of party politics. I do not disagree with my noble friend Lord Henley that this fast-track procedure should not be available for every controversial proposal of the commission, but that does not mean that the proposal should not be brought before Parliament to be debated in the usual way. Governments of all parties should regard it as incumbent upon them to bring legislation before Parliament to implement Law Commission proposals.

Under the protocol set out in the Law Commission Act 2009, agreed between government and the commission, the Lord Chancellor is under a duty to report annually to Parliament on progress in implementing Law Commission reports. The Government must take that protocol seriously and indicate a high duty in this area. The progress on cohabitation reform suggests that such a duty has not been taken sufficiently seriously to date. The Bill is welcome but does not go far enough. One is left with an uncomfortable sense that we are implementing the easy and non-controversial proposals and ducking those that are more controversial. I adapt the words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale: the Law Commission’s proposals deserve better than that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, we have had a good debate, which I am sure bodes well for very interesting discussions in the Public Bill Committee. I again put on record my thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for taking on the responsibility as chair of that Committee. As noble Lords will have gathered, I am also much reassured by the presence close by of Professor Cooke as I try to give answers to matters raised by noble Lords.

The first of my noble friend Lord Henley’s questions was about the situation where there is no surviving spouse or children. In such a case, the law remains the same. As to how the fixed sum was reached, that came out of a study in 2005, which made me think that it might be ripe for looking at again. On the question of whether this is a surprisingly large sum, one of the factors is housing, which makes it relatively easy for an estate to have quite large sums in it. Nevertheless, I am told that it affects at the moment only 2% of estates, partly because, as was mentioned, people who have a house and realise that its value is rising have the incentive to make a will.

The point that my noble friend raised about chattels is one that we may well explore in Committee. As I think my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, it is in respect not just of jewellery but of paintings and other things where there might be a wavy line between investments and chattels. That is certainly something to look at. For the same reason that I will refer to when I come to the interventions of my noble friend Lord Marks, I assure my noble friend Lord Henley that this procedure will be used only for non-controversial reforms. That is its strength and why Parliament has confidence in it. We should keep to that kind of discipline.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, the noble Lord, Lord Wills, took us to interesting areas. However, the noble Lord was right to point out the danger of mischief and of the abuse of elderly and isolated individuals. Much of that is the responsibility of the Office of the Public Guardian, which also comes within my ministerial responsibilities. Allegations of theft or overcharging by any professional are serious and concerning but I do not believe that this Bill is the right place to tackle such misconduct. The Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Bill does not directly deal with wills but instead focuses largely on situations where no will has been made. Dealing with the concerns raised by the noble Lord would not only expand the content of the Bill to deal with wills but would mean taking it into the territory of professional legal regulation, which would be a very significant step and is already dealt with under the auspices of the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Law Society. However, the Committee will undoubtedly consider the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, carefully unless the chairman rules that out. Not that I am not suggesting that will happen—we look forward to an interesting debate on any amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wills.

My noble friend Lord Marks gave us a glimpse of the detail into which Liberal Democrat conferences go in making policy. I cannot quite remember the debate myself, but I am sure there were many speeches from the floor that dealt with our policy on this. I have to say to my noble friend that he used a good deal of his speech to talk about things that we have not done and were not in the Bill. These are very relevant and may well need to be brought before Parliament, but he gave the game away at the end of his peroration when he described the issues that we have left out of the Bill: he will see when he reads Hansard that several times he used the word “controversial”. It is because they were controversial that they fell foul of the request of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, that we stay clear of that.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I draw my noble friend’s attention to a distinction that I hoped I had made between controversial proposals of the Law Commission, which I suggest ought to be brought before Parliament for legislation, and non-controversial proposals, such as are included in the Bill, which are suitable for this procedure. I hope I was making it clear that I do not suggest that this fast-track procedure is suitable for controversial legislation, but I do suggest that the Law Commission should not be frightened or intimidated away from introducing controversial proposals. Indeed, when considering its new, 12th—I think—programme of law reform, it has made it clear that it does not propose to steer clear of controversial proposals. I believe that that is thoroughly laudable.

[Lord McNally]

I could not agree more. I also say that I take very seriously my responsibility to bring the non-controversial parts of the work before the House.

Whether we should take the non-domicile question out of the Bill can be looked at in Committee. It seems to me that what we have done is no more than to recognise the realities we face in our relations with our Scottish colleagues, but I take on board the point made by my noble friend Lord Marks that in an increasingly international world some of this might have cross-border dimensions.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee made the point about housing now being a big part of any inheritance. She also raised the question of inheritance tax implications. We can look at that in Committee if necessary, but on her specific question about the commencement provision, there is no precise timing as yet, but the intention is that commencement will be all at one time.

I was extremely pleased by the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Shaw, both for his welcome for the Bill and for the personal example that he gave, which was extremely helpful to the Committee. I shall treasure the compliment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd; I shall tuck it away. We will have to leave it to the historians to decide whether it is Wills, Ashton, Etherton or one of the joint parentages we were talking about earlier in the debate. Nevertheless, the fact that the noble and learned Lord has been willing to take on the chairmanship has given an impetus and confidence to this procedure.

I was greatly sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, did not take this opportunity to give us a quote from Bleak House. Surely there is one somewhere here.

Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 22nd July 2013 Grand Committee

The substance of these regulations and the main changes contained within them have been debated at length through the passage of the Crime and Courts Act. As I have already mentioned, the changes made through the Act were a product of a government consultation and recommendations from the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity and the Constitution Committee. The regulations have been developed in consultation with the judiciary and the JAC and have received the required approval from the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court, where relevant, before being laid before Parliament to consider. I therefore commend these draft regulations to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I wish to make a brief general point about judicial diversity in connection with these regulations. The Committee knows that my noble friend is a forceful advocate of judicial diversity. The Government’s commitment was apparent during the passage of what is now the Crime and Courts Act, and in particular in their promotion of the provisions which find expression in Schedule 13 to that Act. While not wishing to make any judgment about the recent appointment to the position of Lord Chief Justice it is, from the diversity point of view, a shame that the extremely highly thought-of female candidate was not selected. That would have been real and very public progress.

These regulations implement the new systems in ways that are both detailed and welcome, but the imperative is to ensure that we move towards a much more representative judiciary with more women, more ethnic minority judges and judges from a far broader range of social background. These regulations can be no more than a step on the way to achieving that. While they are detailed and welcome provisions, to achieve real change we need a deep and continuing change of culture. That was highlighted in the report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger and mentioned by my noble friend. I look forward in the future to Government and the judiciary working together to achieve that change.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I shall make a short point relating to the Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations. Before I explain my point, I should declare an interest. I recently retired as deputy president of the Supreme Court. For the past four years I have been a member of the ad hoc commission and thus responsible, along with the president, for a number of appointments, which have included something like a third of the court now sitting as the Supreme Court across the square.

My point relates to diversity in a rather unusual way. As the Minister has explained, one of the aims of redesigning the composition of the selection commission described in Part 3 of these regulations is to meet the recommendation that the commission should no longer be seen to be appointing or selecting for appointment people in their own image. It may be that that was a fair criticism at the time when I was sitting as one of the two judicial members of the panel since the president and I were both men, but I have just retired and I have been succeeded by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond. In a way, this follows on from a point just made by the noble Lord that one may regret for diversity reasons the choice of Lord Chief Justice. I make no comment on that, but one great advance that has been made in the Supreme Court is that we now have the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who is a very vigorous proponent of diversity and is probably best suited of anyone to sit on such a commission.

It is a great misfortune of timing. If she had been in my position when the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, came with her members to visit us and to discuss the change, I am sure that the noble Baroness would have seen—it would have been perfectly obvious—that the noble and learned Baroness was there and that we had on our team every component for diversity one could possibly have wished for. As the noble Lord rightly explained, when the draft regulations were discussed with us, it was impossible to make the point that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, might be my successor because I had not yet resigned and the selection process for my successor had not yet taken place. Therefore, we were very cautious not to make any prediction about who would succeed me. The succession process produced this result only about four weeks ago.

It is a great misfortune of timing has led us to the position where the noble and learned Baroness will now be excluded from participation in the selection process. The regulations are very carefully drafted because the composition of the selection commission in Regulation 11 provides for a senior UK judge to be nominated to take the position which I previously occupied. It is quite clear, if you read Regulation 11(1)(e) with Regulation 14 and Regulation 2, that the senior UK judge can be any senior UK judge other than a judge of the Supreme Court. So it is quite clear it can only be the president who would be the Supreme Court member, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, has no prospect of playing any part in the work of the commission.

The way that the appointments have gone in the Supreme Court in recent years means that there will be no fresh vacancy, I think I am right in saying, for two or three years. Now that I have gone, the way is clear for the court to settle down without any real change. However, in two or three, or possibly three or four years’ time, a significant number will retire and fall to be replaced, and the noble and learned Baroness will still be there. The composition of what one might call the next but one Supreme Court will be greatly influenced by the work of this commission. It is a great pity that the reform has taken this form. As I said earlier, I doubt very much whether it would have done before, but I must concede that the Minister is absolutely right to say that the regulations were shown to us. We did the best we could in our discussions to make this point without naming names.

The purpose of my intervention is to express regret at this turn of events and hope that perhaps one day it may be possible to recognise the enormous qualities of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the major contribution she would be able to make to increasing diversity in a way which concerns us all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

I repeat that these regulations have gone through the most thorough mincer in gaining the approval of the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court. They have been examined by the Constitution Committee and very thoroughly by both Houses. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, is making a new point. I can only take it back to colleagues but that was not how we saw the position in terms of having CILEx members. I think that a CILEx member is now a judge, although admittedly of a tribunal. CILEx members can apply for judicial office. Although I cannot withdraw the regulations, I will draw this to the attention of the Lord Chancellor and—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I wonder whether part of the answer to this is that membership of CILEx is one of the three possible qualifications. Members of CILEx are practising in all fields of the law. All this is saying is that a member of CILEx can be appointed to the commission. It has nothing to do with the possible appointment of a CILEx member to a judicial post.

[Lord McNally]

That is most certainly true. When I saw the noble and noble and learned Lords gathering, I should have known that this was not going to be an easy task. One of the great benefits of the House of Lords—those who know that I am an avid reformer should take note of this—is there are not many places where one could get such profound legal advice so cheaply. For that, I am extremely grateful to noble and noble and learned Lords. I would again ask that they pass these regulations, but with the firm promise that the points that have been raised will be drawn to the attention of the Lord Chancellor.

Legal Aid

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I add my congratulations to those of noble Lords who have already spoken to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on securing the debate and the way in which she opened it. I also declare an interest as a practising barrister. My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury, who is unfortunately unable to be here, asked me to say that, as one who has fought for legal aid all his professional life, he wishes that he had been able to contribute to this debate.

In the debate on the gracious Speech, I suggested that there was a need for a fresh settlement between the Government and the professions over legal aid. I am bound to say that the past few weeks have more than ever convinced me of that. The Government and the professions appear at times to be in a hostile stand-off. It is bad for both the Government and the professions, but it is also bad for justice and bad for the public’s confidence in our system of justice.

The starting points are that we recognise the need to save money in this area and that the professions must recognise that the Government do not owe them a living. However, the Government must accept that the professions are not simply special pleading but have genuine and justified concerns about access to justice for the many who need, but who cannot afford to pay, lawyers. Of course, they include the most vulnerable in our society, but we should not forget that they also include millions of ordinary people who can meet their day-to-day expenses but cannot afford the sudden demands of expensive legal costs for them or their families.

A new settlement can be achieved only by dialogue, and it is therefore welcome that the Government have already been responsive to the consultation, particularly over the issue of choice of lawyer. For myself, I regard the right of a defendant to choose his lawyer as fundamental for three reasons. First, it is wrong for the state which prosecutes a case to choose the lawyer on the other side. Secondly, it is essential for a defendant to have confidence in his lawyer. That brings practical benefits in sensible and early guilty pleas where appropriate. Thirdly, choice in this area is a simple matter of liberty.

I confine myself in this short speech to making a handful of points about the Government’s proposals. Much of the controversy has of course centred on PCT. I suggest that there is much force in the argument that competition based on price rather than quality risks lowering standards. If we set only a minimum standard, we will get advocacy of a minimum standard—the so-called race to the bottom. Tendering should be based on quality as much as on price, and that should be made explicit in the application process. A precedent for that is to be found in the Health and Social Care Act, where, on persuasion, substituting competition on quality against a tariff for the original proposal for competition on price significantly improved the Government’s proposals.

The Government have invited the Bar Council to help to design a system of tendering based on quality. It is a matter of regret that the Bar Council has not accepted that invitation. Exactly that kind of dialogue is what I consider to be important. When the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, next sees the Bar Council she might consider taking that back to suggest a change of view in that area.

A further area of concern is the number of providers and their distribution. I believe that a reduction from 1,600 to only 400 providers is far too great. It will badly affect smaller firms and reduce the possibility of both choice and competition.

Attention has been drawn to the problems in multi-handed cases, where a number of defendants may need separate representation. However, I suggest that those problems could be addressed in part if we reconsidered how far the existing professional rules on conflicts of interest are working in accordance with the public interest. Should it not be possible for solicitors in the same firm to act for defendants in legally aided criminal cases where there are conflicts between the defendants’ accounts but no financial conflicts of interest for the firms concerned? Of course, there would have to be safeguards in such a system to ensure that confidentiality was maintained, but barristers in the same chambers have always appeared against each other and the distinction between self-employed barristers and partners in the firm is not, in my view, an overwhelming obstacle.

However, the present proposals risk creating advice and representation deserts where no appropriate legal advice or representation is available. This the Government have recognised, but the proposals also risk creating specialism deserts. The danger of advice deserts could be addressed by increasing the number of providers in more sparsely populated areas. The specialism issue is more difficult. I fear it may become impossible to find solicitors specialising in particular areas of crime—for example, fraud or sex offences—throughout large areas of the country. Correspondingly, specialist lawyers may find that work in their fields is not financially supportable, so specific measures are needed to allow specialists to practise.

I turn briefly to civil legal aid. The proposals on judicial review are claimed by the Government to assist in ensuring that applicants’ lawyers will be paid only for cases in which they get permission, which will filter out weak cases. However, in practice many of the strongest cases are settled at the pre-permission stage where the body, often a local authority, admits fault and settles. Why should we not fund cases such as those, especially since the Government are rightly committed to encouraging early and economical settlement of litigation? The proposal to deny an oral permission hearing in all cases deemed to be totally without merit, while it may be acceptable in cases where there is legal representation, is entirely unacceptable in cases where a judge is needed to tease out the applicant’s case on an oral hearing.

Finally, in the time available, I shall say a word or two about the residency test. I suppose it is possible to conceive of arguments about why the residency test may be at least a relevant consideration in some cases, but given the examples set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine, it is very difficult to see that it can be imposed justly in a blanket way. If the Government are not prepared to reverse this proposal, I urge them at least to preserve a discretion. There are other areas for consideration, but I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, before the next speaker, I remind noble Lords that this is a time-limited debate, and the limit for speeches from the Back Benches is six minutes.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, in supporting this amendment, I would associate these Benches with everything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has said in welcoming it and in thanking the Government and congratulating them on the way in which they have considered and recognised the particular needs of women in the system. In Committee, we moved certain amendments which would have required the recognition of those needs at various points in the system and we are content that this all-embracing amendment meets them.

I would also associate myself with what the Minister said in tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who has campaigned so hard for recognition of the needs of women in this area. As a spokesman on these matters for one of the coalition parties, it gives me particular pleasure to note that we have made a great deal of progress on two of the significant issues for which he has campaigned—restorative justice and women offenders.

I particularly welcome the commitment in this amendment to transparency because, as has been pointed out during the passage of this Bill, we are entering a new era for the probation services. The ability to monitor what is being done after this legislation is passed is of considerable importance.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I join the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in congratulating the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and thanking him for bringing this matter to the fore in the debates on the Bill. I am happy to break the habits of a brief parliamentary lifetime and congratulate the Minister on his constructive response. I hope he finds this habit catching, in which case I promise to reciprocate.

Like other noble Lords, I have received a briefing from the Prison Reform Trust. While welcoming the amendment, there are a couple of matters on which they seek some assurance—and I would echo their request. First, that the Government should require the contractors to specify—within the contract specifications —what particular services would be provided for women, and that the tender criteria, in turn, as part of the contract, would give sufficient weighting to that element. I imagine that should not present any difficulties but it would be good if the Minister could confirm it. Equally, the commissioning bodies will be given guidance along those lines.

Perhaps I may raise a point related to women prisoners that is not specifically covered by this amendment but which has been referred to in the course of our debates—that is, resettlement prisons. It is a welcome concept and certainly should help to reduce reoffending by ensuring that women serve their prison sentences, or at least the latter part of the sentence, closer to where they are likely to return on release. I raised a question in earlier debates about the specific position of women in this respect because, as I understand it, there are only 13 women’s prisons in the country and they are not necessarily geographically distributed in such a way as to facilitate the Government’s intentions. I am not asking the Minister to confirm specifically today, but it would be good to know that that is being considered and that it is an objective which it is hoped the Government will seek to achieve. It would largely complete the work raised by the concerns now embodied in the amendment, which these Benches certainly fully support.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: Part 1

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, the Act has been in force for 99 days. It is difficult to get an accurate picture of what is happening in this sector because of a surge of applications before 1 April. However, as I said, the department is carrying out a variety of checks and researches on the impact and we will keep a careful study of what happens.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, can my noble friend say at this stage how far organisations such as Citizens Advice appear to be coping with the changes? In particular, what, if anything, are the Government doing to assist Citizens Advice and others in the sector to introduce new methods of working to help them provide their services where legal aid is not available?

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I think we have had these figures before, but since 2010 the Government have provided around £160 million to support the not-for-profit sector, £107 million for the transition fund administered by the Cabinet Office and £20 million via the advice services fund 2011. In 2010-11, the income of the national citizens advice organisation was £62.3 million, with one of its largest grants being £18.9 million from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. However, Citizens Advice is also getting contracts under the new Legal Aid Agency civil contracts; 35 such contracts were granted to citizens advice bureaux.

EU Treaties: Justice and Home Affairs Opt-Outs

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 1st July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

I agree with both noble Lords that the European Union Committee’s report was, as one would expect, extremely thorough and thought-provoking: hence the fact that the Government are studying it very carefully. We have written to the noble Lord to beg for a little more time to produce a response. Perhaps I may therefore give him a response with which I am sure he is well familiar: the response will be coming shortly.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, in the event that the Government were to exercise the opt-out, what improvements to the European arrest warrant system in particular would in their view be desirable in order to opt back in, at least to the arrangements for combating serious cross-border crime?

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, that is a good example of why we are giving careful thought to this array of measures. The European arrest warrant has played an important role in speeding up extradition arrangements between countries and represents the type of practical co-operation that we should all support. However, despite its success, the use of the warrant for trivial offences has damaged its reputation with many, and lengthy pre-trial detentions have also caused problems in some cases. It is those areas of proportionality and practicality in using the warrant that we are trying to address, both in discussions with our European partners and in looking at the process as it affects our own dealings with this warrant.

Legal Aid

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

No, my Lords. When one gets into one of these processes, those kinds of letters are sent to various distinguished newspapers and of course we take note of them. We are doing two things. We have never hidden the fact that part of what we are doing is because of financial constraints. The legal aid budget has to take its share of the burden of our spending cuts but we are trying to do that in a way that retains the fundamental access to justice. We have consulted very thoroughly. We have had some 16,000 responses, which we are working through. We will try to come back with constructive proposals, so long as the legal profession recognises that we have to make the savings that are necessary for the taxpayer.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords—

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, it was a Labour Question to begin with. If the responses to the consultation demonstrate that there are savings to be made in other areas, particularly in the resource-hungry high-cost criminal cases, will my noble friend’s department use those savings to mitigate the harshness of the legal aid cuts in other areas where the effect of the proposed cuts is most serious?

[Lord McNally]

We are certainly looking across the piece and making decisions. Our current thinking is not to compete crown court advocacy and very high-cost crime cases. We have made separate proposals to reduce fees in this area, which are set out in the consultation. However, my noble friend is right. Under the current system, the most expensive single criminal legal aid case in 2010-12 cost the taxpayer £8.5 million. Under our present system, this would reduce to £6 million. The total cost to the taxpayer of just the top three cases in 2011-12 was £21 million.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I will make one very brief point in relation to this. Of course, one has sympathy with the overall notion that it is important that the classification of offenders as low, medium or high-risk is carried out with a great degree of care. However, I would suggest that the classification reflected in the title of the new clause as proposed in the amendment,

“Low, medium and high risk offenders”,

is more likely to be accurate than the classification in proposed subsection (2) of the amendment, which deals with the classification of offences. The reason for that is found in the words of proposed subsection (2), which says that,

“the definition of a low or medium risk offender shall not include offences of a violent or sexual nature, stalking or domestic violence”.

That would mean that any ordinary common-law offence of assault, any assault occasioning actual bodily harm or any low-grade affray would take an offence out of the classification that would enable the offender to be classified as low or medium risk. These classifications need to be capable of fine-tuning and I have serious doubts whether it is appropriate for that fine-tuning to be given effect by a classification that merely considers the offences rather than the offenders.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, this has been a brief debate but I fully appreciate and accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that it is an important one and I hope that I can respond constructively.

I thank my noble friend Lord Marks for his intervention. It is questionable whether the kind of fine-tuning in this area to which he referred is done at arm’s length. It is done by the professionals on the ground.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has referred in a number of his interventions to the Chief Inspector of Probation, Liz Calderbank, and the concerns that she has expressed. I make it clear that we have carefully considered the points she has made in response to our consultation. Our strategy document specifically sets out how we will seek to ensure that some of her concerns are met. The Secretary of State has met the chief inspector to discuss her concerns and she will continue to make an input as we develop this policy.

Another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was the importance of victims. We share that concern. We are retaining the victim liaison role for all cases to which it applies. We are committed to ensuring that the reformed system is responsive to the needs of victims, and we decided it was right that the public sector should continue to exercise its experience and professionalism in conducting this role.

In discussing these areas, it is easy to exploit public emotion and concern when one refers to sex offenders, murderers or rapists. Let us be clear: every offender who poses a high risk of serious harm to the public will continue to be managed by the public sector probation service. Public sector probation professionals will decide on the allocation in each case. They will retain management of every offender who poses a high risk of serious harm to the public and every offender who falls under the multiagency public protection arrangements—or MAPPA. We will not get into second guessing the judgment of probation professionals about who poses a high risk of serious harm but we will have a very clear set of rules.

The public sector will have overall responsibility for public protection and the Ministry of Justice will ensure the effective management of risk of serious harm. We will set out clear expectations and standards in service level agreements and contracts with both the public sector probation service and market providers. Day-to-day responsibility for managing the risk of serious harm that an offender poses sits with the organisation allocated the case management according to the standards set. This will be the public sector in the case of those who pose a high risk of serious harm and contracted providers in the case of those whose risk of harm is assessed as medium or low.

Let me reassure noble Lords that this matter of risk has been foremost in our minds when designing the new system. Although the majority of offenders will in future be managed by contracted providers, we are clear that every offender who poses a high risk of harm to the public will continue to be managed by the public sector National Probation Service. We are also clear that it will be professionals in the National Probation Service who assess the risk posed by every offender at the outset. By the way, I take pride every time I read the words “National Probation Service”. One of the good things that will come out of these reforms is a National Probation Service with the esteem and professional recognition that it deserves.

We have already recognised that the public will want reassurance that those who have committed the most serious sexual and violent offences will be managed by the public sector probation service. That is why we have said that anyone managed under multiagency public protection arrangements will remain with the public sector, whatever their risk level. That includes offenders who have committed serious sexual or violent offences and other offenders who may cause serious harm to the public. The proposed amendment would go further, requiring all those who have been convicted of violent or sexual offences, stalking or domestic violence to be treated as high risk regardless of the length of sentence imposed. Many of those individuals will already fall to be managed by the National Probation Service under MAPPA, but we believe that a blanket approach like this goes too far and would not be effective in identifying those individuals who need the most careful management. Indeed, it would mean major changes to the way the current probation framework deals with offenders. While I am sure that is not the noble Lord’s intention, I hope it will help if I explain how risk is assessed and managed, and why this amendment would cut across professional discretion.

Assessing and managing the risk posed by offenders is a complex job involving a great deal of professional expertise. It needs to take a wide range of circumstances into account. The offence of which an offender has been convicted is only one of the relevant factors and is not always a good indicator of risk. There will be many others: age, criminal history, education, employment, substance misuse, interpersonal issues, and accommodation status, for example.

It is vital that the experienced professionals can use their expertise to make the right decisions to protect the public. I believe that it should be those practitioners, rather than Parliament, who should decide what constitutes a high risk of harm. Automatically deeming high risk an offender who has committed a particular offence could mean subjecting that individual to supervision that is significantly in excess of what is warranted. Indeed, there is a possibility that for low-risk offenders, providing overly heavy supervision and intervention might actually increase rather than decrease their risk.

It might also provide some reassurance if I set out in more detail how the process will work once the initial allocation has been made. During our consultation, we were told that splitting the management of offenders between the National Probation Service and the contracted providers would require clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities at every level and a clearly defined process for managing rapid changes in offender risk. We agree, and we have built those into the design of the new system.

We are developing a risk management system that is both proactive and responsive to changes in risk. At the heart of our system is the recognition that at an operational level those managing an offender must have day-to-day responsibility for managing the risk of harm posed by that offender. This will be the National Probation Service in the case of those who pose a high risk of serious harm and contracted providers in the case of those whose risk of serious harm is assessed as medium or low. However, we also recognise that risk of serious harm can change during the course of a sentence, and we are putting a series of safeguards in place to ensure that changes in risk are picked up and appropriately acted on and that responsibilities are clear at every level.

We will pursue an approach that will build on existing good practice. We already know that good quality offender management practice supported by clear policies and close multiagency work are the necessary building blocks for effective risk management. The new National Probation Service and providers will be required to interact and work together to ensure a cohesive approach to managing risk.

I turn to the detail of the process we envisage. The National Probation Service will conduct an assessment at the outset, which will determine who manages each offender. It will be the National Probation Service in the case of those who pose a high risk of serious harm, and contracted providers in the case of those whose risk of serious harm is assessed as medium or low.

During the course of the sentence, providers will be required to risk-manage the offender within their case load We will place contractual obligations on providers to ensure that they have appropriately trained staff and organisational policies for the management of risk of serious harm. Where there is a significant change in circumstances that indicates an increase in the risk of serious harm, the contracted provider will be required contractually to refer the case to the National Probation Service. It will be for the National Probation Service to confirm whether the risk of serious harm is high.

If a decision is reached that the risk of serious harm has escalated to high, the responsibility for the management of the case will transfer to the National Probation Service. Where case transfer happens, this will be achieved in such a way that it does not destabilise the offender. Involvement with the provider could continue, while the case responsibility will be with the National Probation Service.

I am confident that the measures that I have outlined will provide a robust system. I understand that noble Lords share that desire to ensure that the new system builds and improves on the good practices that now exist. However, I come back to the point that it is the skilled and experienced practitioners in the public sector National Probation Service who are best placed to make the risk decisions.

As I said at the beginning, I welcome this intervention, particularly with the noble Lord’s assurance that he does not intend to divide on this amendment. I make no apologies for going into detail in my reply, which I hope will be of assistance to him and to the House in seeing how we are developing this matter.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

9: Clause 3, page 3, line 42, after “scale,” insert—
“( ) recommend to the Secretary of State that the notice given to the offender under section 256AA be varied in one or more ways which the court may specify,”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, this is an amendment that I moved with my noble friends in Committee, and I do not propose to repeat extensively the arguments that I put then. They are in essence that the present options for sanctions under new Section 256AC that are available to a court upon breach of supervision requirements are in essence punitive and involve a short term of imprisonment, a fine, an unpaid work requirement or a curfew. We stress that the court may well find it necessary and more appropriate on investigation of a breach of supervision requirements to have regard to the rehabilitation of the offender so as to make desirable changes to those supervision requirements. The court having investigated the breach will be in the strongest possible position to make such a recommendation. I have in mind in particular the power of the Secretary of State to make requirements to participate in particular activities in accordance with instructions given by the supervisor: drug-testing requirements, drug appointment requirements and so forth.

When we proposed the corresponding amendment in Committee, my noble friend the Minister was kind enough to say that we had made a sensible and practical suggestion. He promised to examine the technicalities of the process and to return to the matter at a later stage. Therefore, I now look forward to hearing from him the results of that examination. I beg to move.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, my noble friend has accurately reported my remarks in Committee, which did not, he will have noted, commit me to bringing forward a government amendment; I have taken legal advice on that. However, I am grateful to him for the characteristically clear and reasoned way in which he has made the case for Amendment 9.

I said in Committee that my noble friend’s amendment seemed a practical suggestion and I undertook to take it away and examine the technicalities of the process. I am happy to say that on the issue of principle that the amendment raises, the Government are persuaded by my noble friend’s arguments.

There might well be circumstances in which a court dealing with breach concludes that the rehabilitation of the offender would be better addressed by a variation of the Secretary of State’s supervision conditions. The Government agree that it should be possible for courts to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State and that there should be a process for acting on that recommendation. This should apply whether or not a court decides to impose a sanction for breach. In other words, a court could impose a sanction and recommend that future supervision conditions be changed, or impose no sanction but make a recommendation.

That brings me to the question of how we best achieve this. I have sought advice on the legal position. There is nothing in law that would stop a court making a recommendation of this sort. A magistrate or district judge could do this simply by stating their opinion about the requirements that the offender is subject to when summing up.

An explicit provision for this in the Bill would therefore be unnecessary. It could be seen as restricting the discretion of the court to make recommendations in other areas where no specific power exists. It could also mean putting in place a new specific court process for making the recommendation, rather than the relatively informal process that would occur now.

To my mind, the more important question is how we put in place a process within prison and probation services for ensuring that a court’s recommendation is acted upon by those setting supervision conditions on the Secretary of State’s behalf. There is a precedent for this. Probation and prison instructions already set out a process for cases where courts make recommendations about future licence conditions at the point of sentence. This involves probation staff present at court recording the recommendation and passing it to prison governors.

There is a presumption that governors should implement the court’s recommendation, except in cases where the offender’s circumstances have changed between sentence and release. I am happy to make a commitment that we will put in place a similar process for breach of supervision, with a similar presumption that those setting conditions should act on the court’s recommendation unless there are exceptional circumstances. To make sure that courts are aware of their ability to make recommendations to the Secretary of State, the Government will also discuss with the Sentencing Council whether it could include this in future guidance on dealing with breach of supervision.

In summary, I reassure my noble friend that he has made a persuasive case. I know he believes that it is better to get the processes right and get these things done properly at the sharp end rather than simply write things into the Bill. What I, as a layman, initially took to be a very good idea has been confirmed as such by the professional and legal advice that I have been given. I am not sure whether a Pepper v Hart judgment could be applied to what I have just said, but it is a very clear indication that we want to put the noble Lord’s very good suggestions into practical effect. I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord in that respect.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am not sure whether this is a case of Pepper v Hart, because I do not think that there is an ambiguity to resolve. I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for that very full answer. I accept, of course, that there is nothing in law to prevent a court making a recommendation of the kind that he indicated. I am also very grateful to him for the care he has taken to ensure that the Government can give a commitment both as to the court making recommendations on a breach hearing and to ensuring that such recommendations are given effect. Both halves of that equation seem equally important. I of course accept the Government’s commitments on these points and therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

Alternative Business Structures

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, referral fees are viewed with a certain suspicion, particularly when, as in the case of motor insurance, they were rising to about £800 a pop. That obviously fed into the cost of the insurance. After the first look, it was decided that the greatest abuse took place in motor insurance, and so we concentrated on that area. However, we will consult the regulators and consumer groups to see whether our experience of the ban should be extended to other areas.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the Solicitors Regulation Authority has approved licences for a number of alternative business structures, where claims management companies and even legal expenses insurers have joined forces with solicitors’ firms. In this way, solicitors effectively get personal injury cases in return for a commercial benefit—precisely what LASPO sought to avoid. Will the Minister make it clear to the SRA and the profession that if ABSs clearly undermine the referral fee ban, further legislation is an option?

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, more than that, LASPO already allows us to extend the powers, if necessary. We therefore want to see the evidence that is emerging. If these groupings of separate facilities and companies seem to be using means to bypass the ban on referral fees, we will revisit our powers under LASPO. I understand the concern of the House on this matter.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 11th June 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

24B: Before Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
“Presumption in favour of community sentence orders
(1) Section 152 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (general restrictions on imposing discretionary custodial sentences) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) Where a court has discretion to pass a custodial sentence or impose a fine or a community sentence, the court must not pass a custodial sentence for a term of less than 12 months unless it is of the opinion that—
(a) the requirements of subsection (2) are satisfied, and(b) there are special reasons which justify a custodial sentence,and has had regard to the provisions of section 256AA.(2B) A court passing a custodial sentence for a term of less than 12 months must state in open court the reasons for its opinion that there are special reasons which justify the sentence.”
(3) In subsection (3), after “(2)” insert “or (2A)”.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, this amendment, in my name and that of my noble friends Lord Dholakia and Lady Hamwee, builds upon the general principle embodied in Section 152 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which is, in the words of the section, that:

“The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or … offences … was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence”.

That is a sensible principle that is soundly based on the wealth of evidence that short sentences are not only unhelpful but in many cases profoundly damaging. That evidence has been commissioned by the Howard League for Penal Reform and by many others. The findings are well known to the House. Short sentences are disruptive. They cut offenders’ ties with their communities, with their jobs if they have them, and with their families. They introduce offenders, particularly first-time offenders, to a culture where reoffending is the norm.

It is of course to be hoped that the impact of this Bill will reduce the reoffending rates of this cohort of prisoners by introducing periods of supervision, but balancing a hoped for mitigation of damage against the evidence that we have of actual damage still leads to the conclusion that short sentences are to be avoided.

Our amendment goes a stage further than Section 152 and is an attempt to address the risk that was identified by several noble Lords at Second Reading. The risk is that the availability of short sentences of imprisonment that will carry an automatic period of supervision upon release will make short sentences more attractive to sentencers. The point was put succinctly in particular by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who said:

“The Bill will create problems, as has already been indicated, as there will be a temptation in some courts to undermine the objective of the Bill by seeing the proposals for dealing with reoffending as justifying short sentences”.—[Official Report, 20/5/13; col. 653.].

A little later he said:

“What can be achieved by a short sentence in prison can always be better achieved, in my experience, by a community sentence”.—[Official Report, 20/5/13; col. 654.]

The existing provision in the Criminal Justice Act deals with the seriousness of the offence or offences. The suggested provision in our amendment would make it very clear to sentencers that the availability of a period of supervision should not lead to or encourage the imposition of short sentences. The court would have to be satisfied not only as to the seriousness of the offence or offences themselves but that there were special reasons to justify a custodial sentence, and those reasons would have to be stated in open court. The principle would be strengthened that short sentences are to be avoided unless they are really necessary in an individual case. I beg to move.

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

My Lords, I have a favourable approach to this amendment, which would be a substantial change in practice. However, it is important that we do not present the question of short custodial sentences and community sentences simply in terms of hard or soft sentencing, although that is what actually happens in the media comment on some of these issues. For me, the real question is what arrangement is more likely to protect the public against continuing crime. That is the issue that we face in this amendment. At present, we have short custodial sentences, which do of course protect the public for a short period, but because the reoffending rate is high we also have periods when the public are not protected because we get a continuation of crime. The question is: can we do better?

The amendment does not take away the power of a court to impose a short custodial sentence where there are special reasons for doing so. Like the noble Lord who presented the amendment, I think that part of it is well drafted and correct and that we should concentrate on the special reasons. Furthermore, it requires the court to explain its decision in such cases. Over a period, such explanations will provide a good basis for assessing the effectiveness of the proposals. It is certainly possible—in my view, probable—that the proposal in the amendment, with a presumption for community sentences, will reduce crime and thus benefit law-abiding citizens. Therefore, I have a favourable presumption for the presumption.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, before my noble friend replies, having been asked direct questions, perhaps I may reply briefly. I envisage that there would be a wide range of special reasons. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggested, they would include a history of breach of previous supervision requirements. However they might also encompass areas of special risk to do with the particular offender. The shortcoming of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 at which this amendment is aimed is that under Section 152 only the seriousness of the offences is taken into account. There may well be reasons to do with the offender that could justify a custodial sentence, but the point of the amendment is to make it quite clear that in the absence of such special reasons, whether they are to do with history, special risk or other reasons, the presumption in favour of a community sentence should apply.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, I have found this to be an extremely helpful debate, and as the movers have indicated that it is a probing amendment, I will take it away to consider, but in my reply I will make it clear that we do not think the amendment is necessary at this moment.

I understand the points that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has quoted, and that my noble friend Lord Dholakia mentioned, that the Bill might encourage judges to go for the best of both worlds by passing a short sentence that will immediately qualify for the 12 months of rehabilitation. I certainly share my noble friend Lord Dholakia’s view that short sentences are too short to rehabilitate, but just long enough to disrupt, the life of the person sent to prison and introduce them, perhaps for the first time, to all the bad influences that can be found in a prison. On the other hand, as the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, rightly recognised, we face media and—to a certain extent—public opinion that sees community sentences as somehow softer than prison sentences. Part of the aim of our reforms is to position community sentencing and the rehabilitation process that goes with it more positively in the eyes of the public, so that they have greater confidence in it.

I was grateful for the words of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, in his intervention, because there are two things that become one. He put firmly on the record that in his experience, judges will not be tempted to go down the road that my noble friends fear. I think that he has said before—certainly other magistrates have—that sometimes for a repeat offender or somebody whose circumstances make setting them back into the community even more dangerous to themselves and the community, a short custodial sentence can be of benefit, so the idea of ruling them out entirely is not the way forward.

As my noble friend has explained, Amendment 24B would create a new clause in an attempt to bolster what is often referred to as the “custodial threshold”: that is, the test set out in Section 152(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to which my noble friend referred, with which all courts must comply when imposing a custodial sentence.

It is perhaps worth noting again what Section 152 says:

“The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.”

It is an onerous test. It means that a court cannot impose a custodial sentence unless the offence was so serious that a fine or community sentence will not do; in fact, it cannot be justified. It is also worth noting that this test has to be read in conjunction with Section 153 of the 2003 Act. That requires a court when imposing a custodial sentence to ensure that the sentence is for the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence.

My noble friend’s amendment would add to the existing provisions a requirement, where a court intended to impose a custodial sentence of less than 12 months, that there be “special reasons” which justify the custodial sentence of less than 12 months. We have already heard in debate that magistrates and judges do not believe that they impose custodial sentences other than as a last resort. It is natural to ask what are these special reasons or circumstances that are not covered by the original test. Could the special reasons relate to a history of previous convictions? If so, the current custodial threshold test already applies because, under Section 143 of the 2003 Act, a court must consider relevant and recent convictions as an aggravating factor which makes the offence more serious. It is seriousness that is the key driver in determining the nature of the sentence and meeting the custodial threshold test.

I suggest to my noble friend that the special reasons he may have in mind must already be considered when the court decides on the sentence and whether a custodial sentence is merited under Section 152. So although of course I appreciate what my noble friend is attempting to achieve—that is, a statutory presumption against sentences of less than 12 months—I am not convinced that the amendment would actually do what is intended.

Let me make the point that the Government do not intend or expect that sentencers will change their current behaviour in any significant way in response to the provisions in the Bill. We do not expect to see an increase in the number of short custodial sentences. Offenders who do not meet the custodial threshold should receive community orders or fines. I hope that noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have judicial experience will agree that it would be wrong for any judge, and contrary to the provisions of the existing law, if a sentencer decided to “up-tariff” an offender into custody so that they could receive 12 months of supervision.

I should also deal briefly with the second part of the amendment, which would require the court to give an explanation of the special reasons that merited a custodial sentence of less than 12 months. I point out to my noble friend that the current law already requires all courts imposing any sentence of any length to give reasons for the sentence passed. That is contained in Section 174 of the 2003 Act. Invariably, a sentencer will begin their explanation of a custodial sentence by setting out why the offence is so serious that it merits a custodial term. The further provision is, I suggest, unnecessary. I understand the good intentions behind the amendment. No one in this House wants to see short custodial sentences passed for offences that do not justify them, but that is why we have the current threshold test and a right of appeal against sentence.

We need to provide sentencers with a range of sentences in which they can have confidence. That is why we made the changes to community orders in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. We have to stop offenders reoffending to such a degree that they end up having to be considered for short custodial sentences in the first place. We also have to realise that some offenders will merit short custodial sentences. We need to focus on making those sentences more effective at rehabilitating offenders so that not only are they imposed as a last resort, they should be the last sentence that the offender receives.

I acknowledge the efforts of my noble friend on this amendment, but, although I recognise his intention, I ask him to withdraw it. Given the spirit in which it has been moved, I will discuss the matter further with the Lord Chancellor and others, but I suspect that our position as I have just set out will remain unchanged.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that detailed and helpful response, and for the indication that he will consider the matter with us. The question really is whether the existing safeguards are sufficient in the light of the additional supervision requirement and whether there is ground for the concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, that there might be a temptation for sentencers to err. In that spirit, I withdraw the amendment at this stage.

Amendment 24B withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

26: Clause 13, page 12, line 16, at end insert—
“(1A) In giving any instructions to the offender under subsection (1), the responsible officer shall have regard to—
(a) the suitability of any appointments having regard to any caring commitments the offender may have and the compatibility of activities with the offender’s family circumstances;(b) the suitability of activities and place specified under subsection (5) if the offender is responsible for a child and it is desirable that the child accompanies the offender.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 30 in the same group. Amendment 26 concerns rehabilitation activity requirements, which are essentially instructions to an offender to attend appointments or to participate in activities. These are imposed as part of a community order or a suspended sentence order by a responsible officer, defined for these purposes as a probation service provider.

This amendment will ensure that such requirements do not conflict unnecessarily with the caring commitments or family circumstances of the offender concerned. That object will be achieved by requiring the responsible officer to have regard first to,

“the suitability of any appointments having regard to any caring commitments the offender may have and the compatibility of activities with the offender’s family circumstances”,

and, importantly, by,

“the suitability of activities and place specified … if the offender is responsible for a child and it is desirable that the child accompanies the offender”.

This may well be the case for people who have responsibility for children, cannot simply leave them and have to take them along to the activity.

Amendment 30 is designed to achieve a similar outcome for any other requirement that might be imposed as a result of such an order. It would amend Section 217 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That section currently requires the court to ensure that such requirements avoid conflict with, under Section 217(1)(a), “the offender’s religious beliefs” and, under Section 217(1)(b), the times at which the offender,

“normally works or attends any educational establishment”.

It would be entirely reasonable and desirable to add to that list of matters that are not to be conflicted with a requirement that orders avoiding conflict with the offender’s caring responsibilities. That is what Amendment 30 seeks to achieve.

These amendments are consistent with the Government’s desire to ensure that rehabilitation measures in this legislation are targeted particularly at helping women offenders, who often face particular difficulties within the criminal justice system. They would make the Bill more sensitive to those difficulties and to the demands of family life. The amendments are primarily aimed at avoiding conflict for women offenders who are the subject of community orders or suspended sentence orders, and are designed to enable them to fulfil the requirements of such orders without making it unduly difficult for them to meet the demands of caring for families. However, the amendments are gender-neutral, as you would expect, because many male offenders have similar commitments. It is important that appointments and activities can be arranged in a way that does not interfere unduly with family commitments, be those commitments to take children to school, to be at home when children are at home without alternative childcare or to look after elderly or disabled relatives. The same goes for all requirements, whether unpaid work requirements, curfew requirements or any others. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I support the general thrust of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. As he said, they would oblige a responsible officer to have regard to the offender’s caring commitments when arranging a community sentence.

My understanding of the present position is that in probation reports, done by what will be the National Probation Service, probation officers will take into account personal circumstances when making recommendations to the court on the likely sentence. It would be the responsibility of the responsible officer that the sentence is completed as required by the court and in a timely manner.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, in particularly my noble friend Lord Marks for highlighting in his contribution the importance of both family matters and, of course, sensitive issues of faith, which is also relevant to a fair percentage of our prison population.

This group of amendments would place an additional duty on responsible officers instructing offenders under the new rehabilitation activity requirement created by Clause 13, and would also place a new duty on the courts when imposing community orders and suspended orders more generally. To address first the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about organisations’ or providers’ commercial interests right away, it would be wrong and totally inappropriate for those to supersede any other offender requirements. The whole point of rehabilitation is putting the offender at the centre.

I do not agree with the noble Lord’s three cohorts—the groups he put together. Even the no-hopers are worth a try. We need to ensure, in all the reforms we put forward, that anyone—even people whom society at large perceives as no-hopers—is worth a try. We should seek to assist them to become productive citizens of society.

Noble Lords may also find it helpful if I briefly explain what Clause 13 provides. It creates a new rehabilitation activity requirement that will combine key elements of the existing supervision and activity requirements available under community orders and suspended sentence orders. At present Section 213 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for a supervision requirement that may be imposed as part of either order. The requirement involves attending appointments during the period of the order with either the responsible officer or another person determined by the responsible officer. Section 201 of the 2003 Act provides for an activity requirement as part of either order. Under an activity requirement, an offender must first, present himself to a person specified in the order for a specified number of days, and secondly, participate in activities specified in the order for a specified number of days.

Clause 13 repeals both those requirements and merges them into a single rehabilitation activity requirement. Under the new requirement, offenders must comply with any instructions given by their responsible officer to attend appointments, participate in activities, or both. These instructions must be given with a view to promoting the offender’s rehabilitation, although they can serve other purposes as well. The effect of the clause is to allow the probation provider who is the responsible officer, rather than the court, to decide the exact details of what appointments or activities the offender should take part in to maximise their chances of turning away from crime.

Amendment 26 would require a responsible officer who is instructing an offender to attend appointments or participate in activities under this new requirement to take account of the offender’s family circumstances and, of course, any caring responsibilities that the offender might have. That would mean ensuring that appointments were suitable, that activities were compatible with the offender’s family circumstances, and that any place to which the offender was sent to take part in activities was suitable if the offender needed to take a child with them.

Amendment 30, although inserted into the clause about programme requirements, would apply to all requirements under any community order or suspended sentence order. It adds to the provision in Section 217 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that already requires a court to avoid, as far as possible, any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs and any interference with his or her work or education. The amendment would add to Section 217 a new duty requiring the court to avoid—again as far as is practicable—any interference with the offender’s ability to carry out any caring responsibilities that he or she might have.

As I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate, the criminal justice system at all points endeavours to accommodate the personal circumstances of an offender. Courts will always sentence an offender in the light of their individual circumstances, together with the circumstances of the offence. Indeed, the law requires, where a court imposes a community order, that the requirements chosen must be, in the court’s opinion, the most suitable for the offender.

In addition to these general requirements, I can assure all noble Lords that there are already important safeguards in place to address childcare and other caring responsibilities where an offender is sentenced by the courts. These issues are covered in the assessments carried out when compiling pre-sentence and other reports that are considered by the courts before sentencing.

Probation staff will also respond to requests by the courts for specific information about family circumstances and courts will sometimes adjourn briefly so that such issues can be considered. If an offender is reluctant to divulge information about their children for fear that they may be taken into care, a post-sentence interview will often elicit the necessary information or the offender might tell their lawyer. If necessary, liaison will take place with local authority safeguarding authorities, or social security emergency duty teams, to safeguard the child or vulnerable person in question. In addition, the Sentencing Council has made it clear in its guidelines that:

“Where the offender is the sole or primary carer of the victim or other dependants, this potentially should be taken into account for sentencing purposes, regardless of whether the offender is male or female”.

Both courts and responsible officers are public authorities within the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998. This means that they are required to balance the need for the offender to attend appointments and take part in activities in order to secure his rehabilitation against his right under the Human Rights Act to respect for his private and family life. This point was well made by my noble friend Lord Marks.

What this adds up to is a clear indication that the courts already take all possible steps to avoid, as far as is practicable, any interference with the offender’s ability to discharge any caring responsibilities that he or she may have. For this reason, I argue that Amendment 30 is unnecessary. With these assurances and clarifications, I hope that my noble friend will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am again grateful for that helpful explanation of the Government’s position. The difficulty, as I see it, is something that I hope that we can consider between now and Report. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out, we are entering an entirely new era in the provision of probation services. The Minister is entirely right to say that best practice and sentencing guidelines require the courts and responsible officers—who are now in the public sector probation service—to have regard to caring responsibilities. However, there is a risk that in the new regime, which is a new world for probation provision, there will be a departure from best practice or, at any rate, a temptation to depart from it. I hope that, by amending the Bill in a similar way to our amendments, we could send out the message that family commitments have to be taken into account just as faith and education commitments are. In those circumstances, I invite the Government to consider these amendments carefully and sympathetically before we come back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.