(10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my name is on the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, although it was not meant to be—there was some confusion between “Sally” and “Sal”—but I am glad that it has remained there. I also commend the noble Baroness for that neat handover of the chair.
The noble Baroness introduced the amendment thoroughly, but, reading the briefing from the Victims’ Commissioner, I remembered one experience of a friend. It was nothing as extreme as a homicide, but her husband died unexpectedly on a business visit to the United States. It was hugely emotionally difficult for her, as well as practically difficult: different language is experienced even in the United States, and certainly there are different procedures and cultures. One needs signposting to the right people, who can deal with the procedures as well as support. I remember her talking about the difficulty in bringing him home.
My Lords, I welcome this discussion and having a sense of clarification about who a “victim” is in a Bill at least half of which is about victims. I especially support Amendments 2 and 8, but I have some questions for those who tabled the other amendments. Although having too narrow a definition can be a problem, it strikes me that we could cause real problems for victims if we had too broad a definition. I am obviously thinking about resources and overstretching support. So many people can be victims of crime if you start broadening it so much.
As hinted at by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in her interesting Amendment 3, it is a tragedy for the families of perpetrators too. They can also be victims, and whole ranges of people—friends, acquaintances and other people who have genuinely suffered—could say that they are victims, but are we seriously trying to put them all in scope? I want to know how we can ensure that, even if we are acting in generosity to try to broaden the definition, we do not water down a focus on the actual victims of crime that the Bill is designed to help. In other words: where do we draw the line?
In that context, I am slightly concerned about a broadening of what now constitute victims of crime. In Amendment 4, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, explained, it then becomes anti-social behaviour. He gave a moving account of what it feels like to be a victim of anti-social behaviour, but we could probably all stand up and give moving accounts of being victims of something—bullying and all sorts of other behaviour that makes people suffer. I am slightly concerned that we might end up relativising the experience of victims of crime in an attempt at broadening this too much. Whether we like it or not, culturally, we live in a society in which victimhood is valorised. I do not want the Bill to contribute to that relativising experience, because there is a danger that, if we make it too broad, we could trivialise the real victims of crime. But then you could rightly ask me: who do I mean by “real victims”? I do not want it to go so far so that we lose all sense of its meaning.
I have worked with the Foreign Office on this as well, and every time I have gone there, its first point of call is “We don’t have many resources; there’s not much money; we make the money from passports; it is only a small number of families that come through”. If we keep putting it to the Foreign Office, it will keep batting it the other way. Not only are we talking about families dealing with countries with different languages which are trying to get financial gain and who also have jobs to hold down but we have a Foreign Office that really does not do much for them and they feel lost. I appreciate what the is Minister saying, but I think it is about resource. I am not asking for lots of resources, but I want them to work collaboratively to help those families resolve the issues.
My Lords, I of course understand the point that the Minister is making—procedures in other countries and what is available in other countries by way of support are different—but should that stop us requiring part of the Government, the organisation in this country which has immediate, close responsibility, to take on a role of proper signposting, which may be to equivalent services? Partly, it is interpreting, but it is obvious that there is a lacuna here.
If there has been a homicide abroad and those families are living here, there is a real danger that the message will be that the Government think that that homicide does not matter as much as a homicide that happened here. The Government might say that they do not have the resources. I pointed out that it is about 80 homicides per year—the numbers are not huge—but those people who are so severely traumatised, retraumatised and carry on being further damaged by the experience often become enormous consumers of resources because of mental health services, because they are unable to work and so on, and eventually they may need benefits. There are all kinds of things that they may need. It is a false economy to look at it in terms of resources to the FCDO. I hope that the Minister will meet me and others to discuss ways that the victims’ code could be asterisked where there are things that may not be as appropriate if the homicide occurred here, but it would say that the lives of British citizens are of equal value wherever they are in the world and that whether it was a terrorist attack, a homicide here or a homicide overseas, those lives are of equal value.
My Lords, I open by reiterating my noble friend’s point about acknowledging the way in which the noble and learned Lord wound up the previous group of amendments and about working consensually across the Committee as we progress through the Bill. My second point is simple, but I think it worth making. As noble Lords will know, I sit as a magistrate in London in family, youth and adult jurisdictions, and I rarely see victims. I see victims only in trials—they sometimes turn up to trials to give evidence—and I hear from victims only when I sentence and the victim’s impact statement is read out. Through all the rest of the processes which I routinely go through sitting in a magistrates’ court, I do not hear from victims, and I do not see them. It is a simple point, but I thought it was worth making.
The Minister also had his four As, which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has just referred to—awareness, accessibility, accountability and affordability. We agree with those as far as they go, of course, but of course many of the elements in Committee will concern whether accountability should be enforceability. That will be the crux of a number of our debates in Committee.
This group deals with child victims. Amendment 5 in my name clarifies that the definition of “victim” should include a child who is a victim of abuse and exploitation that constitutes criminal conduct. I will go through the amendments in the group and then comment more widely. Amendment 6, and Amendment 10 in my name, extend the definition of “victim” to a child who is
“a victim of child criminal exploitation”.
Other noble Lords will speak to that as well. Amendments 7 and 11 seek to ensure that the explicit definition of a victim includes those who are subject to modern slavery—another aspect that we will debate within this group. Amendment 9, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, is specifically about verbal abuse of children.
While the Bill makes important reference to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and to children as victims of domestic abuse, the same organisations that fought for that Act are now asking for the same ambition to be applied to children who have experienced abuse and exploitation. Last week, I and other noble Lords now present in the Chamber went to a survivors’ presentation organised by a coalition of charities led by the NSPCC, where we heard first-hand about survivors’ experiences and how the support organisations and criminal justice system responded to their trauma.
What was particularly telling about those survivor experiences was that, although the abuse itself was, of course, wholly negative, we did hear from one or two survivors who had had a relatively good experience of the criminal justice system—although there were other experiences that were much more negative. That contrast made those testimonies even more powerful. This morning, I, the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, visited the Lighthouse project in Camden. This provides a one-stop shop for child victims of sexual abuse. It is a model of how these services should be provided.
It is in that context that this group is being debated. I want to set out the scale of abuse and exploitation of children. Children—that means people under 18—make up about 20% of the population. The Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse has found that children are the victims of about 40% of all sexual offences. One in 10 children in England and Wales is sexually abused before the age of 16 and that number means that there are an estimated half a million child victims every year.
Children abused by parents or carers are almost three times more likely to experience other forms of domestic abuse as well, and it was found that 42% of childhood abuse survivors suffered more than one type of abuse. The Bill explicitly recognises children as victims only of domestic abuse and as a result fails to acknowledge the multiple forms of abuse and exploitation that children can experience. They can be subjected to multiple forms of abuse and exploitation during their lifetime. To avoid failing these children, the definition of a victim must cover all forms of abuse and exploitation, in addition to domestic abuse.
The victims’ code of practice recognises that those under 18 are vulnerable and affords them enhanced rights. The children’s coalition, a coalition of charities that are informing what I am saying now—and has no doubt briefed all noble Lords here in Committee as well—has argued that there should be consistency across all legislation, recognising as distinct victims all children, not just those who are affected by domestic abuse. The coalition urges government to ensure that the Bill reflects the code by ensuring that children who experience abuse and exploitation, in addition to those who experience domestic abuse, are in the Bill so that the entirety of the harm they experience is explicit within primary legislation.
If the definition is not amended, the children’s coalition foresees that this will have unintended consequences for the relevant authorities and those in charge of delivering victim support services. Resources will be directed to focus on the needs of children who are victims of domestic abuse above other forms of harm. The coalition is concerned that there is the potential for a hierarchy of abuse that would leave thousands of children affected by other forms of abuse and exploitation without recognition and, ultimately, without support. By not explicitly recognising children as victims in their own right, the Bill could have significant implications for the level and quality of support available.
I am told that evidence already shows that a lack of support for children following abuse and exploitation exists and that ensuring that children and the full scale of the harm they experience are explicitly in scope will act as a cornerstone for responsible agencies commissioning services to make sure that they reflect the needs of children in full. So this is a specific example where legislation will make a difference.
It is impossible to design an effective justice system response to childhood victims without understanding the scale of what we are talking about, which I set out earlier. This cannot be done without recognising all forms of abuse, but this is a specific example where the black letter of the law will have an impact on the services that are delivered to childhood victims of abuse that falls outside the scope of domestic abuse. It is in that spirit that I beg to move Amendment 5.
My Lords, I have Amendments 7 and 11 in this group and I want to be clear that I agree very much with the views that are behind all these amendments.
I hope that my first question—a technical question—will not be regarded as negative. Is a child a person within Clause 1(1)? That will affect amendments and how they are framed. My second question is probably a bit indelicate. It has only occurred to me this evening, while listening to the examples that your Lordships have given. It is a direct question to the Minister. Is the MoJ aware of examples of possible candidates—that is probably not a very happy term—who have been exploited or subjected to criminal or marginally criminal behaviour, which have not made their way to us? It may be possible. I possibly should not put the Minister on the spot now, but maybe we can talk about what the MoJ has considered and discarded. Amendments 7 and 11 have been brought to us by Hestia, which supports victims of modern slavery. It is concerned with ensuring that those who are born to victims of modern slavery are covered.
I know that we have Clause 1(2)(b), which refers to circumstances
“where the person’s birth was the direct result of criminal conduct”,
but it would be very unfortunate if we were to run into the weeds of whether someone is a victim of rape—in other words, what is the relationship between the mother and the offender?—or if there is a doubt as to who is the father because the woman has been subjected to forced prostitution and the object of multiple rapes, because that kind of issue detracts from the support that is needed by the children of victims of modern slavery or human trafficking, whose experience in itself requires support.
My Lords, I did not quite catch what the Minister said when referring to Clause 1(2)(a). Was he saying that a child who is the child of a victim of modern slavery will fall within
“seen, heard, or otherwise directly experienced”?
I am not sure what “directly experienced” extends to. Is his argument that the child of a victim of this particular crime would fall under Clause 1(2)(a)? I am sorry; the Minister talked about it but I did not quite hear.
My Lords, I think that is the Government’s position. In most cases the child will experience the effect of criminal conduct, that being the effect on the mother. That is a sufficiently direct nexus, as it were, to bring it within the scope of the clause.
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I want to say a few words about restorative justice but, before I do, I give my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, on what she has just said. I am happy to help and assist in whatever way I can.
I acknowledge that this does not apply to all victims, but for some victims, restorative justice can be a transformative tool that can empower victims to move forward. Over the years, I have met many victims who have given me their true thoughts on restorative justice. In my last term as Victims’ Commissioner, I published two reports on restorative justice and was satisfied from my findings that the majority of victims that I spoke to who had participated in it had found it to be a positive experience. However, the ONS crime survey for England and Wales in 2019-20 found that just 5.5% of victims were given the opportunity to meet the offender. Between 2010 and 2020, this percentage has not increased above 8.7%, while 26% said that they would have accepted an offer to meet the offender if it had been made.
Funding for RJ is no longer ring-fenced by the MoJ. Police and crime commissioners make the decisions on how much they spend on RJ from their victims budgets. This has led to a wide variation across England and Wales in the provision of services, as we have heard. In 2023, the Why me? charity published a report showing that the lowest reported spending by a PCC on such services was £6,250, while the highest was £397,412. The type of crime where RJ is available varies, as do the conditions of service provision.
Data collection on the provision of RJ is poor, preventing effective monitoring of what is happening on the ground if national criminal justice agencies are unsure as to what they are required to do. For example, the HMPPS guidance issued last year states:
“When a victim … requests information about restorative justice services, the VLO must provide it within ten working days”.
This is not in line with the victims’ code of practice, which includes the right to receive information about RJ and how to access RJ services. It does not depend on whether the victim has requested it. In short, access to restorative justice has become a postcode lottery.
I hope, therefore, that these amendments and the debates that we have heard across the Chamber will prompt the Minister to give this House reassurance that such concerns about the provision of RJ are, and must be, seriously addressed. Lots of money has been spent, and it would be so sad not to carry on when victims would like to have that option.
My Lords, I also support the importance of providing for restorative justice. I had a look at the current code of practice to see what it has to say. I was a bit surprised that a paragraph referring to RJ, which is obviously deliberately separated from the right to access support services generally, starts:
“If you report a crime to the police, you have the Right to be referred to a service that supports victims, including Restorative Justice services”.
I do not know whether this is a real point or a non-point, since the offender has to be involved by definition and, by definition, the offender would have been reported to the police, but it seems to me to be inconsistent with Clause 1(5) and the whole ethos of the Bill. I was not clear either whether paragraph 4.5 in the code is dependent on being entitled to receive enhanced rights—ER—for victims who are considered vulnerable or intimidated, the victims of most serious crime or persistently targeted.
The debate is, to an extent, that crime has been defined at different levels: it has been for serious crime, but I argue that it is not only the most serious crimes for which RJ is appropriate. I was glad that the noble and right reverend Lord mentioned reducing reoffending because, looking at the whole picture, that is a very serious and important aspect. My name is to his amendment, and the noble Baroness’s amendments appeared without giving me time to do that.
In this group, I have Amendment 17, to provide for a single point of contact—a “victim care hub” was the term used by the London victims’ commissioner, who was particularly keen that we should address this, as you would expect from her own experience.
On the usual issue of timely and effective communication, there are other amendments dealing with another aspect of this, which is that justice agencies are struggling to deliver victim care with awareness and in compliance with the victims’ code, which the London victims’ commissioner said was at seriously low levels.
In the 2019 review into the code, the Victims’ Commissioner for London recommended a victim hub model. We have had reference this evening to the Lighthouse in Camden, and she also refers to the lighthouse model in Avon and Somerset—a single point of contact to help a victim throughout the process. Such a model would secure more effective compliance with the code, which was discussed by many noble Lords at Second Reading.
In June 2022, the office of the Victims’ Commissioner launched a victims’ survey. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, is nodding. This dealt with experiences as a victim of crime, ran for eight weeks and gathered 489 responses from self-selecting individuals. All this bears out what we have been referring to: a lot of dissatisfaction, and a lack of confidence in the system. I understand that less than a third of respondents were aware of the victims’ code. In London, a user satisfaction survey for one quarter in 2022-23 showed only 25% of victims being made aware of the code.
What would a hub do? Such a service would provide a single point of contact, key updates on case progression, information and advice; answer questions; refer on to specialist support—signposting by another name, although perhaps referring is more than just signposting—and ensure and monitor that entitlements under the code are being delivered. This would not replace existing support services but would be a navigator; perhaps that is close to signposting. It would also provide information on what to expect and clarity, and simplify the whole thing.
I am conscious of the time, so I will not go through all the case studies in the briefing, other than to make a few quick references. The commissioner refers to good practice in Quebec, where I understand there is a similar model: the support worker—I do not know if that is the right term—is embedded in police stations and courts, which gives them access to computer systems and, hence, to victim records. I found the case studies quite shocking. I should not have, because from what noble Lords have said, we should all be expecting to hear shocking stories, but that is why we have the Bill. To me, to have a victim care hub seems blindingly obvious.
(10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on behalf of the Government, I entirely accept the value of the various outcomes that the noble Lord just mentioned. We should celebrate success stories, particularly in relation to female offenders—mentioned by the right reverend Prelate a moment ago—and youth offenders. As the noble Lord just indicated, there are far more options for community sentences available now than there used to be. There is tagging, alcohol tagging, alcohol treatment and drug treatment. Quite a range of possibilities are therefore open to the court, combined with the national drug strategy being run by the Department of Health to get people off drugs. I cannot promise to ensure increased capacity, but the Government are certainly working to that end.
My Lords, speaking not just from these Benches but as chair of the Justice and Home Affairs Select Committee, we found it persuasive that community sentences are followed by much lower rates of reoffending than custody. We know that prisons are “universities of crime”. Should this not be a message that the Government promulgate?
My Lords, the actual message is, in essence, for the Sentencing Council to transmit. The Government and Parliament set the framework, the Sentencing Council sets the guidelines, and our independent judges impose the sentences. The Sentencing Council’s present guidelines emphasise that community orders can be highly positive, last longer than short custodial sentences and involve important restrictions on day-to-day liberty; and that breaching them can result in significant adverse consequences. We must entirely combat the idea that community sentences are a soft option, and that is the Government’s position.
(11 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I share the view that victims deserve a Bill to themselves. Extending the Bill to prisoners reflects how our system treats victims, whom I prefer to think of as survivors: necessary for a trial but, in many ways, peripheral. It is largely due to those working in the sector that I clocked this. I thank all the stakeholders and organisations for their briefings; they are so valuable, and not referring to them in a debate such as this does not mean that they have not been read.
I will spend several of my few minutes on Part 4 of the Bill, but that is not because I am not concerned to make the rest of the Bill as good as it can be. I welcome that the Government have brought forward Part 1, and I hope the Minister can see calls to make the victims’ code enforceable and make the duty to collaborate effective, for instance, as supportive.
I found it shocking to discover that a victim has to pay for a transcript of a trial—something that my honourable friend Sarah Olney has been pursuing—and at such cost. Is that open justice? Surely technology should make transcripts much cheaper to produce. Even if you are relaxed, it is not easy to take in everything when you are listening, and I am often quite surprised when I read Hansard after a debate. Stress makes that harder. I understand that the Government are to undertake a one-year pilot on the production of a transcript, but only for limited categories of offences. Will this be for those offences in all courts? On what criteria will the pilot be evaluated? Will victims be consulted throughout the process?
I will be surprised if I am the first to ask what news there may be on getting offenders to hear—one cannot make people listen—the sentences and sentencing remarks. I accept that this is not a straightforward matter at all.
It is also shocking that victims are deterred from counselling because of defendants’ access to counselling records and how they may be used. Confidentiality is essential for counselling to be effective. If an assault left a victim with a broken leg, you would regard immediate treatment as essential.
Another issue of confidentiality—which has been mentioned several times—is the need for a firewall regarding immigration information. On these Benches we did all we could to remove the immigration exemption from what became the Data Protection Act 2018. The practical implications of the issue can be immense when the police automatically and, it seems to me, quite casually pass information to the immigration authorities. That enables the perpetrator to threaten the victim with disclosure—if that is not misusing the term. We should protect victims by protecting their data. I do not imagine the Minister is in a position to comment on last week’s judgment from the Court of Appeal on the application by the organisation the3million and the Open Rights Group, but I hope he will be able to do so when we get to an amendment—and an amendment there will be—on a firewall.
We have plenty to consider when we come to the provisions about major incidents and the role and powers of advocates—which in some cases read to me as assisting the Secretary of State rather than the victims. I do not pretend to have a full understanding of the requirements of those caught up in an incident—which is such a small word—but dealing with the media, which can play an important part, is not always easy. That is an issue for discussion, along with legal representation at any inquest.
For people trapped in the nightmare of IPPs, we cannot restore what they have lost—as we have been reminded, what they have lost is hope—but let us put things right to the extent that we can.
I find it difficult to read Part 4 as being as much about victims as it is about prisoners, but I am willing to learn. I do not think it is being soft, woke or whatever term is current to say that prisoners have rights. The penalty for their offence is the loss of liberty, not the loss of rights. It must have taken some brass neck on the part of the original signatory of the statement that the Bill is compatible with the convention rights when it actually disapplies some of them in terms. The affable and thoughtful noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, was put in a rather difficult position on this, I suspect.
As somebody has already said, there is more messaging and more nibbling away at human rights to appease those who say they are not British. The numbers of people affected may be low, but that does not mean the rights are not significant. The court is to
“give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing the risk to the public from persons who have committed offences”.
That seems to me to pitch incarceration against rehabilitation. I wish I thought that the latter was intended.
There is no right for whole-life prisoners to marry or form civil partnerships. What is the evidence that their having the right undermines public confidence? We are told that there is evidence, and one instance has been cited. Should we go on the basis of one example? What about the partners and children of those prisoners? The numbers may be vanishingly small, in the jargon, but for each individual the issue can be far from the vanishing point.
As for parole, how can I put this? The current Lord Chancellor is clearly treading a line between loyalty to his Government, and therefore his predecessor, and his own instincts—but the Bill still too much follows the design of his predecessor. The figures in the Explanatory Notes give the context of about 26,000 cases reviewed by the Parole Board each year, with fewer than one in four prisoners reviewed judged to meet the statutory test for release, and less than 0.5% of those released convicted of a serious offence within three years. The implication that is being read into the need to have people with a law enforcement background sitting on the Parole Board is that the board is too soft.
On the power of the Secretary of State to remove the chair to maintain public confidence, my own confidence comes from confidence in the chair’s independence and confidence in colleagues—if I can call them that—such as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and their views on this subject. When the Justice and Home Affairs Committee met the Lord Chancellor in October, he was asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, to confirm that the statutory power to remove the chair is under consideration. He said that it is something that he continues
“to have an interest in”.
I hope I have not stolen a line from her speech. Indeed, he said:
“There are all sorts of aspects of this legislation that are under consideration”.
I look forward to hearing more over the course of the debates on the Bill, and very much look forward to hearing the next speaker.
(1 year ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too will miss Lord Judge keenly. He was so wise and encouraging, and such fun. I wish we had longer, because I would like to pursue the important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Patten, about casual racism, but I will not at this moment.
We have become accustomed, particularly in home affairs, to legislation being used to send messages. It does not always mean that something will be done, although inflammatory messages do something in themselves —they inflame. I hope—not in vain, I hope—that in this Session we will see the Government focus on walking in the shoes of those whom their legislation and messages affect.
I want to mention something that is unlikely to get any other mention today. There is a growing rhetoric about the need for the police to focus on “fighting crime”. I am not suggesting that it is not important to prevent and reduce crime. Of course it is. However, whether it is appropriate to do so by creating new offences or for the Government to tell the courts precisely what penalties to impose is another matter. The rhetoric sometimes includes the suggestion that, for the police to be effective and productive, some issues should be removed from the policing agenda or at any rate downgraded.
I must declare an interest. I am on an advisory board for the charity Missing People. We are worried that it would be all too easy for a policing response to someone going missing to slip down the agenda. There seem to be rumours to that effect. When someone goes missing, a lot of people—particularly that person’s family —are affected, so this is relevant to the topical issue of trust in the police, as well as important in itself.
The police are the only agency that has particular powers, resources and skills to find missing people and help them to safety. More than a thousand people died while missing in 2021-22; deaths have increased by 40% in the past five years. Missing reports are often related to crime, either as a cause or because the person is victimised while away. This is very stark in the case of children: so many are victims of sexual and criminal exploitation. For adults, missing can be an indicator of exploitation, trafficking, modern slavery, or a warning sign of escalating domestic abuse. I do not suggest that responsibility lies with the police alone, but the police are in a very particular position. All public services face huge pressures, but we must not introduce policies which allow vulnerable people to fall through the gaps by reducing the policing response, or that design people out of support. Success in this area may not grab the headlines, but that does not reduce its significance. I thought the Minister would be asked dozens of questions today. I am not sure that he has been yet, but mine is to ask for an assurance that he has heard this point.
As with so many situations, it is essential to address the underlying causes of criminality, which goes as well for something which is not criminal such as homelessness. This is something that the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I chair, is currently looking at in respect of community sentences—the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Blunkett, have trailed this. It is welcome that this has risen up the Government’s agenda, and I hope we can encourage better use of community orders. In “better”, I include tailoring the order to the individual offender whose real need is mental health, or substance abuse treatment, or education, and supporting them to the point where a chaotic life can be sorted out. This requires treatment to be available, and probation officers in sufficient numbers and with sufficient experience. This should be the lens, not just a way to reduce the prison population.
The committee recently met Claire Waxman, the victims’ commissioner for London. She said:
“There is a misconception that all victims want really long sentences for their offenders and that is all they are calling for. Actually, many just want the offenders to stop, and to be reassured that no one else will be harmed by that individual”.
Vera Baird, who was the national Victims’ Commissioner, talked about how victims, who are also often witnesses, are treated as almost incidental:
“The existence of the adversarial system … means that the focus is on the defendant”.
She went on to say that victims need to be told
“that they are a valuable citizen and that the nation cares about them”.
I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, is speaking today, with her role as interim or new Victims’ Commissioner—I do not know how to describe her position because I certainly do not want to call her a retread. She will speak for many of us when she reminds the House, as I am sure she often will over the next few months, that the Victims and Prisoners Bill must not let prison policy eclipse the interests of victims. No doubt the Bill will be a principal focus for the House in the legislative programme.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I fully agree that there needs to be close interdepartmental co-operation in dealing with this difficult issue.
My Lords, there are many reasons why community sentences may be far preferable to custody, but they do not come without cost. They are more complex than
“cleaning up our neighbourhoods and scrubbing graffiti off walls”,
in the words of the Statement. I think the Minister agrees that services for treatments to address the mental health and addiction problems of many offenders, generally provided by the third sector, must be properly resourced, widely available and centred on each individual. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House, which I chair, has heard evidence of their underfunding alongside the overloading of the Probation Service, which is very reliant on inexperienced staff. Can I urge the Minister and the MoJ to have consultation with the treatment providers? I commend to him the quite detailed written and oral evidence which has been given to our committee.
My Lords, I am sure the evidence before and the conclusions of the committee will be borne well in mind.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford, who is unable to be here today, has her name to these amendments so I am speaking on her behalf, as it were, and on behalf of these Benches.
I make the general point that interim relief is an intrinsic and sensible part of our law. Injunctions are generally to prevent something happening, to maintain the status quo until there can be thorough consideration of a case. It is that way round because the person who wants to prevent that something happening is at risk of an action which would have a major effect on him—the other way round does not work in the same way. In this case, the action—removal from the UK —would effectively be the end of the story for the claimant and, if not that, it would at least make pursuit of claim from outside the UK very difficult indeed. That is quite different from the depiction we heard last week of a witness on a video link from another room or another building with all the normal support and access to his representatives.
This afternoon, I received an email from the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law—I stress “Bingham” and “rule of law”; noble Lords will note that title—with quite a long summary of a report on this subject which I understand is to be published tomorrow. It concludes that although improvements could be made to the process in the European Court of Human Rights, they do not affect the court’s jurisdiction to indicate binding interim measures. It makes the point that, when states signed up to the European convention, they expressly accepted that:
“In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.
So as not to detain your Lordships from making another trip to increase your steps through the Lobbies this evening, I will not read the whole of the summary. However, I make the point that the UK Government have proactively promoted the binding force of interim measures, advocating that other states, such as Russia, treat them as binding and comply with them. Given the provenance of that advice, I take it—and I hope your Lordships take it—very seriously.
My Lords, I hope that the Minister when he speaks in a moment will explain what this is intended to deal with. It is only specific to these circumstances; is it that a certain number of lawyers are making a certain amount of money and he thinks that that is not helpful to the policy that the Government intend to put forward?
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who moved this amendment with great skill. I am not going to make a long speech in support of him, because he does not need it. My observation, from refugees and asylum seekers whom I have met in a particular role during the last year, is that many complain that the legal advice they were able to obtain locally, wherever they were placed, was often not accurate, and they had to go through a second round of legal advice.
It is essential that people have access to competent, accurate and correct legal advice, or at least legal advice that might be correct, to enable them to challenge the case made against them. Many of the cohort of people we are talking about are numbed by the experience they have had. They did not expect to be treated as they have been by the United Kingdom. Perhaps, as the Government claim, one might argue that there are some good reasons for their being treated in that way, but to deprive them of the most basic legal advice will cause offence not only to lawyers in your Lordships’ House but to many others.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford has put her name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which he explained very fully, and these Benches support. One often hears that immigration law is too complex for non-lawyers to understand—I have long held the view that it should not be—but, frankly, it is too complex for many lawyers as well. You need to be a specialist, and that is recognised by the system, but one still hears some horror stories.
The realities of legal advice for anyone in detention in the immigration system have long been bleak. There may be advice sessions but they are 30 minutes long, and it takes a long time for the client to be brought to meet the solicitor, which eats into the 30 minutes. Even with the most articulate client, it can take quite a long time to take instructions. I was a practising solicitor for many years and this cohort, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, consists of individuals whose English may be inadequate. Interpretation is therefore required, which is cumbersome and difficult for everyone. In any event, they have a story that takes support to tell, and that requires a lot in the telling.
Given the relentless speed of the processes under the Bill, this amendment is very necessary. The Government have recognised that legal aid has a place here, given what they have done so far in the Bill and the consultation on the rates. Raising concerns about legal aid became even more relevant with last week’s impact assessment, which drew attention to the problems of accessing legal aid and legal aid services, especially outside London and the south-east. We are very happy to support this amendment.
My Lords, I am a Member of this House whose memory of legal aid probably goes back to before others were here. I was called to the Bar in 1963 and took an active part in legal aid, being not only a recipient of legal aid cases but sitting on legal aid committees. I view it as one of the great social achievements of the Labour Government ending in 1951, and it has been a matter of great sadness that its extent and benefit has been so diminished over the years.
We have here a very important need for legal aid. Most if not all of those needing legal aid will not be able to speak English, will have no knowledge of English law and will be left isolated without that assistance. For that reason, I strongly support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Bach—although, most regrettably, he is not putting it to a Division.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support these amendments and the speeches that were just given. I want to make two points only. First, it is extraordinary to me that Schedule 1 shows a list of countries with which this country has no agreement. I cannot understand how one can put into primary legislation a list of countries with which the Government hope to have an agreement, when that is not yet happening.
Secondly, I spoke earlier, at greater length, about the unaccompanied child who comes to the age of 18. Your Lordships have only to think of a child of 10, and we know that some children of 10 have come through. With any luck, a child of 10 will not be kept in Home Office accommodation; he or she is likely to go into the care of a local authority under the Children Acts and will very likely be fostered. It is comparatively easy to be fostered at 10. The child would have spent eight years at an English school, would have grown into speaking English, probably forgetting his or her own language to some extent, and will be settled.
Immediately after the age of 18—subject to the Home Office’s inordinate delays in removing people, but assuming that it achieves something better in the future—he or she can be removed and will go to a country. At the moment, there is only one, unless the child is Albanian, when they would have gone back earlier. That child aged 18, just grown up, will find him or herself in a country the language of which they probably do not speak and he or she will know absolutely nothing. I hope your Lordships agree with me that that, quite simply, is cruel.
My Lords, I return to the terminology in general. I had tabled amendments in the last group on Monday night, which was a very big group. I could not find a polite way of describing drafting that I regarded as very poor. I resorted to saying that I thought it was
“not a very imaginative way to describe a situation”.
The Minister responding said that the term “in general” is
“not new: it is the test set out”
in legislation of 2002. He continued:
“Including a country in Schedule 1 simply requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that it is considered generally safe”.
He then said that “the individual”—and noble Lords are absolutely right to remind us that we are talking about individuals, not amorphous cohorts of people—
“would still have the opportunity to challenge their removal”.
Later in the debate, when a similar point came up again, the Minister said:
“This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places”.—[Official Report, 5/6/23; cols. 1216-35.]
Having criticised the terminology in general, given that the opportunities to challenge Home Office decisions in 2002 were considerably more than are presented in the Bill, I would like a detailed understanding of the Minister’s explanation of using the processes available.
My Lords, Clause 7 relates to further provisions about removal. I have three amendments in this group. Amendment 55—I apologise for the grammatical error in it—would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance about the criteria for the order in which individuals are to be removed. It is not likely to be a tidy process and, as we have been debating for two and a half days now, an awful lot of people will be involved.
Therefore, as much transparency as possible about the process is required. For instance, will decisions be taken on the basis of how long individuals have been detained compared with others, where they have been detained, the receiving country, a mixture of all of these, or none of them? On Monday we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, about a woman who had been waiting for 10 years—sadly, not that unusual a situation. The people who will be subject to these provisions are left not knowing what is going to happen to them. The lack of certainty is, to my mind, a cruelty among many others. To know not just that the decision is unfavourable but when its implications are going to be felt in the form of removal, as distinct from detention, will be very relevant.
Amendment 55A probes the process of notifying the Secretary of State under Clause 7(3)(b) regarding a suspensive claim, that the individual P
“does not intend to make a suspensive claim”
and proposes that that can be made through an immigration officer. I assume that that is the case. After all, the Secretary of State does not deal personally with every single application. However, with regard to the reference to notification being given orally, I want to raise the problem in my mind that it is too easy to be misrepresented when you make an oral representation, or simply not heard. I hesitated about tabling an amendment here because, on the other hand, I do not want to disadvantage an asylum seeker by requiring notification in writing if that is a difficult thing to do. I assume that P’s representative can give the notification on P’s behalf, but I would be glad of that assurance and also to know who that representative can be. Would it have to be a legal representative or could it be somebody who was providing support through one of the many organisations that work in this sector?
Amendment 57A would leave out the term “or indicated” in Clause 7(8). That provides for directions to transport officers about removal in a ship or whatever other vehicle
“specified or indicated in the direction”.
What does “indicated” mean? Does it mean “a ship” or “a train”? I suppose the latter would be Eurostar or perhaps a train between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic—I do not know. It seems—again referring back to the previous debate—that “indicated” is perhaps a rather loose term. I may be wrong—I will probably be told that it is used in other legislation—but I would be glad to hear from the Minister what we should understand by it. I beg to move Amendment 55.
My Lords, I have Amendment 57 in this group, and also the clause stand part debate. I will address my Amendment 57 first, but there are serious matters in the clause as a whole which I will come back to in a moment.
Amendment 57 addresses the far-reaching and perhaps unrealistic legal obligations being placed on private actors and companies to effect removal. This includes the captain of a ship, the pilot of an aircraft, the train manager or the train driver being required to enforce removal of an individual by enforcing detention on the ship, aircraft or train, if required, to prevent disembarking before removal has been fulfilled—and also of course to do it the other way round, as these people are mandated to ensure that the person is taken by those means of transport to the country to which they are being deported.
Two things arise from this part of the clause. One is that it gives inordinate powers to the Secretary of State to requisition not just ships, boats, aeroplanes and whatever else but the services of those who run those means of transport to detain and restrain those who are being transported. I will address in a moment the criminalisation of those people in making them subject to this sort of regulation.
The Explanatory Memorandum says that the Government will procure those services by privately chartering planes or ships or whatever but, clearly, this part of the clause, as drafted, gives the power to the Government to requisition those services. The Explanatory Memorandum also says that the Government can requisition scheduled services—scheduled flights to Kigali, perhaps. There are no direct flights from the United Kingdom to Kigali, by the way, and the flights are all operated by airlines based mostly in the European Union. So the Secretary of State can intervene in scheduled flights and require that they take the asylum seeker to a destination.
The other problem is that clearly, there has been no consultation on this matter with those who are now going to be required by the Government to execute this role on their behalf. To emphasise that, I will read to the Committee the views of the UK Chamber of Shipping, the people whose vessels are likely to be requisitioned:
“We are greatly concerned about these clauses becoming law which could require the ship’s master and crew to detain passengers, something which they are not trained to do, at the direction of the Government. The clauses also seem to allow the Secretary of State to set the period for which a ship’s master is required to detain a person on board a vessel—this could potentially lead to a situation where a ship’s crew is stuck in port for an indeterminate amount of time having received an instruction to detain individuals who are then awaiting the outcome of various legal processes to determine their rights. We are concerned that this puts seafarers at much greater risk from positions of conflict and potential harm”.
That is from the chamber of shipping, which obviously has not been consulted. We have also received a letter from the RMT that makes the same points.
The issue here now is: why has this power been taken? The situation is very similar to that in the Nationality and Borders Bill, which, Members of the Committee will remember, would also have criminalised seafarers who perform humanitarian rescues of persons in distress at sea and bring them to the UK, but those provisions were dropped from that Bill because these people should not be criminalised in this manner.
My first question to the Minister is: if it was determined and agreed by Parliament that this sort of clause was not required for the Nationality and Borders Bill, what is different now? How are the circumstances different? Is it because there are many people—airline pilots or crew, perhaps—who have not been willing to deport people in the manner the Government propose? Secondly, is it because the Government are not intending to provide anyone to accompany these people on their journey but are expecting them to be dealt with entirely by the crews of existing means of transport?
It is beyond my ability to understand why this law is now being put in place when it was previously deleted from an Act that had some of the same intentions. It seems to me that this is an unworkable section of the Bill, particularly in respect of people’s understanding of how they are to be expected to carry out jobs for which they have received no training, in which they have no experience and which they may find morally repugnant.
I do not have the answer to that at my fingertips but, if I may, I will revert to the noble Lord with it. I suspect that the availability of legal advice will be drawn to the attention of individuals at the earliest possible time, but I will check that point and come back to the noble Lord.
In conclusion, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made some valid points on which I will further reflect. I hope I have at least gone some way to respond to the probing amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. On that basis, I ask whether she is content to withdraw her Amendment 55.
My Lords, it is Committee stage and, as the whole Committee knows, that is what I will do.
On this amendment, the Minister said, possibly twice, that things will be done “as soon as practicable”, but we know that not very much is practicable. It sounds like a parallel, idealised—well, it is not ideal to me but it may be in the Government’s mind—universe where all is possible. On the previous group, my noble friend referred to being somewhere within the wizardry of Oz. I do not know who is which character, and perhaps it would be inappropriate to speculate. However, the point about uncertainty in the minds of the individuals concerned is serious, which is why I made it earlier.
I do not think the Minister answered my question on Amendment 55A about whether notification can be given by a representative of the individual and whether that has to be a legal representative or could be a support worker from an organisation in the sector. Is he able to respond to that now?
I also asked a question to which the Minister did not reply, about a person escaping from South Sudan via Kenya. Kenya would be treated as an unsafe country because it is in Schedule 1. Could the Minister respond to that when he has a moment?
I apologise for not answering the noble Baroness’s question. Yes, is the answer; representatives could be provided in that way.
To reply to the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord referred to about someone from South Sudan travelling via Kenya, it would depend on the facts of the specific case and whether the conditions were met. It is perhaps not directly relevant to the debate we are having on this amendment, but I am happy to consider that hypothetical in more detail and write to the noble Lord.
To be absolutely clear, is the Minister saying that notification can be given via any representative and that they do not have to be qualified in a particular way?
That is certainly my understanding. If the situation is any different, I will let the noble Baroness know.
I think that is quite important, as it matters how these things work in practice. Having said that, and as I indicated, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also have various other amendments in this group. I feel I should speak very slowly in the hope that those who have the other amendments in this group arrive in time to introduce them.
Amendment 30 relates to Clause 5, which is one of the removal provisions. A number of noble and learned Lords, all learned in the sense that one generally understands it—I can see one of them in her place—have put a good deal of work into the other amendments in this group. I do not want to pre-empt what they and my noble friend Lord Paddick will say, so I will leave that support unspoken.
Clause 5(4)(b) places the Secretary of State above the law and above the courts, because the first hurdle to making a protection or a human rights claim is that
“the Secretary of State considers there are exceptional circumstances”
preventing removal to a particular country. This amendment is intended to probe what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”. I hope the Minister can expand on this. We have examples in subsection (5) which are about particular countries and not individuals. I suspect that they may include situations which are the subject of many other amendments in this group, and if so we should spell that out and not make it a matter of discretion. I am questioning the Secretary of State’s discretion, as I understand it—reasoned discretion, one hopes—or consideration that there are exceptional circumstances which prevent removal to a particular country.
It was only when I was preparing for today that I paused on the word “prevent”. Does it really mean preventing removal, which to my mind conjures up pictures of protestors preventing take-off of a plane carrying a particular individual? Or does it mean that removal is inappropriate or risky because of the reception—in the broadest sense—at the other end; or that there are circumstances which mean that removal would be unsafe? If it is about treatment at the other end, I am not sure that “prevent” is the right term.
I very much support the amendments—which we will hear about in a moment— extending the list of countries and parts of countries which are dangerous to return people to.
My amendments are directed at, and opposing, the notion that an individual can be safe in a part of a country if he is not safe in another part of the same country. Not every country is in a tidy unity, but where there are laws, they tend to apply overall. Where there are prejudices in a country, those who may be a threat to an individual will be free to travel between different parts of the country. Those are Amendments 52A to 52D, Amendment 52G and Amendment 53A.
Amendments 52B and 52D challenge the proposition in Clause 6(1) of removal if “in general” there is no serious risk of persecution or that removal will not “in general” contravene obligations under the human rights convention. What is meant by “in general”? I do not understand the term in this context. It is not fair to call it a lazy term, because I appreciate the vast amount of work that goes into drafting any Bill—however much one dislikes it—but it is not a very imaginative way to describe a situation. If you cannot give an example, you should not be trying to use generalised terminology. This seems to be another demonstration of the Government clutching at anything they can to deny obligations to asylum seekers. I beg to move Amendment 30.
My Lords, I apologise for my slightly late arrival in the first minute of this debate. I rise because I am the signatory of a number of amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton, and because I have some amendments in my own name: Amendments 33A, 34 and 35.
The aim of all these amendments is to ensure that something happens which I feel should not cause any differences with the Government. I think it may be a matter of interpretation or a matter of adding a few words to the Bill. Principally, it relates to the treatment in third countries of people who fall within the LGBTQ group. Section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that a state is a safe third state in relation to a claimant if
“the claimant’s life and liberty are not threatened in that State by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.
I focus on the words
“member of a particular social group”.
I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, will acknowledge that the definition of a “particular social group” has been to the courts. Indeed, government guidance has been issued which accepts that being a member of the LGBTQ+ community, subject to the facts being established—obviously, there is a consideration of the facts in every case—entitles that person to protection from Section 80B, as I quoted. The purpose of these amendments, therefore, is to ensure that people who are seeking asylum because they are a member of that social group—or another definable social group—do not lose the full protection of the law by reason of the content of Schedule 1 to this Bill, and the provisions of Clause 5 in particular.
My Lords, at this stage I do not think I can elaborate beyond the answers I have already given. This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the care with which he has responded to these amendments. I do not know whether I am right, and I do not want to embarrass him, but I sensed a slight feeling of discomfort with the issues we are having to address. I applaud him for that.
It seems to me that noble Lords have been both practical and principled in this debate. I agree with the analysis about half an hour ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of the position, but the practicality has been by testing the reality of different circumstances. It was the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who said that, when faced with the situation of somebody one knows well being in this precarious position, it all looks very different. I agree; it is rather similar to feelings about people who come from other cultures. We are suspicious of them—“But not So-and-so—no, she is fine”.
On Amendment 30, I will read the report of what the Minister has said. I was not challenging most of subsection (4). It was simply the discretion, and I take what has been said about the Secretary of State having to act reasonably and so on. Subsection (5), however, says that “exceptional circumstances include”. That, to me, raises questions about what might not be included on the face of the Bill.
The Minister is quite right that I was trying to read “prevent” as someone being put at risk, and I think the Bill should say so because a person is prevented from being removed only if, in his individual case, he falls within the exceptions. That is not the natural understanding of the term. I have to say that I remain very concerned about the issue of a part of a country. A conflict in one part of a country can spread very fast, and can the risk to an individual—if he is persona non grata in one part of the country, that can become known in another part of the country very easily—and we are talking about individuals.
I am still a bit confused about “in general”. I understand that the lists we have are an amalgam of previous lists. The Minister defends the position—I think I am right in saying—by referring to procedures that can be used to challenge a decision. We are going to get to some more of this later in the Bill, but noble Lords have already shown their concern about the very narrow circumstances in which challenges—if I can use the term broadly—can be made.
A couple of things have come up in the Minister’s response that have made me think again about these. I would have mentioned some in any event, but I sure that noble Lords will understand that I am, at this moment, speaking a little bit slowly for reasons of time. If there is to be a negotiation about a home country and whether to have a negotiation with that country, does that actually raise the risk of drawing the individual to the attention of the authorities in that country and putting that person in greater jeopardy than he may have been?
The notion of acceptance by the receiving country has also been raised. I do not know whether the Minister can answer this tonight; if he can take a couple of minutes to do so, it would be helpful. If the UK and other countries are going to say, “Will you accept this individual?”, does that not, again, put that individual in jeopardy, because the reason for his having sought asylum in the UK will become known? We are in Committee, so the Minister is free to reply if he can help at this point.
My Lords, I expect that I am being asked to play a sort of night watchman role in continuing the batting until stumps are drawn. As far as I know, it is not the case that the Government intend to engage in negotiations in relation to particular individuals. The Government’s general policy is to engage in discussions with particular countries about reciprocal arrangements and migration partnerships. There are various reports of other countries that are currently engaged in discussions.
Subject to correction—I am sure my noble friend Lord Murray will put me right—I think it is very likely to be the case that a lot of what we have discussed tonight in relation to Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda is simply not going to arise. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others are sceptical about that and it may be that the Government need to provide some further reassurance to satisfy noble Lords. Perhaps the noble Baroness will forgive me for noticing the time.
I am grateful to the Minister. That has raised further issues in my mind about what information may be given—not necessarily about an individual—to a receiving country, whether the questions may be asked and how the UK responds.
I think stumps probably can be drawn, though it is not in my gift to say so. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 30.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too am appalled and shocked by the existing situation. But I submit that we are making quite good progress with the 2021 Act, the Home Office review and much greater awareness among the police, the CPS and the judiciary. We are also working with women in prison on these various issues.
My Lords, as the Minister is unable to answer the question about the timetable for the appointment of the Victims’ Commissioner, could he at any rate take back the importance of a Victims’ Commissioner being in post, especially at a time when we are considering so much which should be considered from the point of view of victims?
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my name is to the opposition to Clause 29 and the other clauses mentioned in this group as well. Of course, opposing Clause 29 is a consequence of opposing the other clauses, all of which, we say, should go. I have written down “clauses on interpretation”; the term “laundering” had not yet occurred to me, but I follow the point about the interpretation or laundering of the refugee convention. The overall point, as I say, is that they should all go.
On Second Reading, I described it as perverse to use domestic legislation to impose an interpretation of an international convention. Since then, at earlier points in this Committee, we have heard much more powerful, analytical, legally informed responses, and, though I am speaking before the contributors to whom I am referring, I think I would be much better following them—that is not intended to be at all disrespectful to the Minister, nor indeed to the very experienced lawyer from whom we have just heard. The humanitarian arguments have been very well put, but the short point I took away from an earlier day is inarguable. We are party to the convention: it is our law; it is well-established law. If we were to leave the convention—which, of course, I am not advocating—that would be another matter. But we have not left it, and I hope we are not going to.
My Lords, I add my voice to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Chakrabarti, in saying to the Minister, for whom I have considerable respect—I know of his own track record in the area of international law and the upholding of human rights—that beyond the legal arguments that have already been put to him is the reputational damage to this country, not least because of international issues, some of which he will be aware of.
Anything that we do to dilute our commitment to the 1951 convention on the treatment of refugees—any unravelling or unscrambling of our commitments—is to be deplored. I will give two examples to the Minister. I co-chair the All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea and am vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Uyghurs. In the case of North Korea, we, the United Kingdom, will regularly raise with the People’s Republic of China the refoulement policy of sending North Koreans from the PRC, to which they have escaped, back to North Korea, knowing that terrible things, including executions, will happen to them when they are sent back—a clear dereliction of the commitment to which the PRC signed up in the 1951 convention on the treatment of refugees.
In the case of Uighurs, Turkey is presently considering sending back Uighurs because of an agreement that it has reached with the People’s Republic of China. Everyone in your Lordships’ House—notably the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who is in his place; he raised this issue with me as recently as last week, in another debate—is well aware that there are 1 million Uighurs in detention centres and camps in Xinjiang, and we know of terrible atrocities that have occurred. Our own Foreign Secretary has said that a genocide is under way. In that context, for any country, and in the case of Turkey a NATO country, to be sending people back, again in violation of its duties in the 1951 convention, seems to be deplorable. However, the United Kingdom can hardly start lecturing others not to do these things if we ourselves are going to unscramble and diminish the importance of the 1951 convention.
I suppose that, as a post-war baby, I have maybe too much admiration for what was not entirely a golden age, but think about all the things that were put in place at that time: everything from the Marshall aid programme to the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, with its 30 articles that set out our rights on an international basis, and the 1948 convention on the crime of genocide. Given all those things that have been put in place, we should think extraordinarily carefully before we do anything to diminish or dilute them. That is why I hope the Minister will give proper consideration to the interventions that he has heard so far—I am sure he will—and, between now and Report, see what more we can do to ensure that we do nothing to diminish the importance of the 1951 convention.
My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that it is, as he says, about more than our reputation and not being able to lecture or set a good example to others? It enables others to point to us.
The Minister keeps saying that each state will define the refugee convention, and he alluded to the EU qualification directive; there is also the procedures directive. I declare an interest, as I worked on both directives as an MEP. Of course, that was an attempt not for each state in the EU to do its own thing but to have a collective set of laws which interpreted the refugee convention in detail and, as far as I know, complied with it. That prevented each country doing its own thing in a potentially destructive way.
I have an associated point, to save the Minister bobbing up and down too much. I entirely take the point about non-political crime. I just wanted to make it clear that I was referring only to that bit of the Bill when I mentioned the case. I was not suggesting that it was the prompt for the whole of this part. But can the Minister explain more about the impact of our leaving the EU? Does that give us a legal opportunity, or is this happening because it is a convenient political point in the calendar, as it were?
On the first point, of course the EU sought to interpret the refugee convention for all its members. But that actually makes my point, because it is only for the members of the EU. All the other states will interpret it in their own way. If you want to hand over your interpreting power to the EU, that is fine if you are a member—but I suggest that that does not cut across my basic point.
As to the effect of leaving the EU, if we have hitherto signed up to various interpretations through EU regulations, we now have an opportunity to look at the matter afresh, as I said when I began. To go further into that point would go way beyond the scope of this group.
Finally, I come back to the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about “scrapping” —I think that was the word she used last night as well—the Human Rights Act. I said last night, and I will give the same answer now, that the Human Rights Act brings into English domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights. We have reaffirmed— I did it yesterday; I will do it again now—that this Government will stay in as a signatory to the convention.
I shall go on to Amendment 113, which deals with unaccompanied minors. The main effect of this amendment would be to put a considerable number of children in serious danger. As drafted, it applies only to children already in the EEA, but it would obviously be a major incentive for families now outside the EEA to pack their children off to Europe in the expectation that they could go on to the UK. The amendment is also widely drawn to include nieces, nephews, grandchildren, siblings, spouses—all from families that are very large in any case.
We have seen how opening this route would encourage minors to make dangerous journeys. In 2016, when there was talk of the UK taking significant numbers of children, the numbers of unaccompanied children literally doubled overnight. That is according to evidence given to the relevant parliamentary committee by the Home Office director responsible in December 2021. We have to consider the wider consequences of this, to which may be added the difficulties already facing the authorities in correctly assessing the age of those claiming to be children. We have discussed this before in Committee and we know that, in the last available year, 1,100 persons claiming to be children were found to be adults. This amendment is dangerous and unwise, and should not be accepted.
My Lords, I have been encouraged to say a word—it was only going to be a word, but it will be a few more now—in support of my noble friend Lady Ludford. I am pleased that she has taken on this cause. I am not seeking to analyse every one of these amendments, but they are about protection in every sense of the word, which is what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham was saying. I applaud the Government for enabling the reuniting of some families, but I am thinking about those who have not been reunited, where there are problems.
I had a similar experience to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, in a meeting with Brandon Lewis and a battalion of officials, when I remember being told that the rules are quite adequate—but they are discretionary.
We have been asked by the noble Lord, Lord Green, to think about the real world. The real world is not just in the UK. One of the aspects of children being alone in the UK is the cost to local authorities, which can be very substantial when children are here by themselves. One needs to include a number of factors when balancing the question of costs.
I would like to echo whoever it was who pointed to the importance of siblings being able be together. A child or young person—frankly, anybody coping with the experience of being a refugee—needs the support of family. A sibling can be such a support to a child; I have heard siblings speak of this. These amendments have my support.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for his tireless work on family reunion, born out of his own personal experience. I also pay tribute to my noble friends: my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who ran the first leg with her Private Member’s Bill, before handing over to my noble friend Lady Ludford.
It is better for families to be together, not just for their own welfare but so that they can look after each other, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee had just said, rather than being looked after by the state. We strongly support Amendment 112. Amendment 113 would provide a mechanism for those unaccompanied refugee children who had reached an EEA country and who have a family member in the UK to be reunited with that family member. Amendment 114
“would require the Government to produce a negotiating mandate to seek reciprocal arrangements, with other states, on safe returns and safe legal routes.”
I am guessing that would be something akin to Dublin III. Amendment 117 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, would change the Immigration Rules to allow people currently in Europe to come to the UK to seek asylum—effectively be given a visa—if they have a family member in the UK. This is a subset of my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s Amendment 118 in the next group. We support all these amendments.
My Lords, I am sure this was not at the top of his list, but the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has reminded us of the role of the arts in this area. Artists, playwrights and others could express better than the rest of us what they feel, and audiences could perhaps get a wider and deeper understanding of the issues involved. The area of arts and culture is hugely important in this.
Earlier this evening the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said that we will continue to grant humanitarian protection, and Amendment 118 seeks to extend that to a humanitarian visa. I will explain it as quickly as I can, because what is most important is that we hear what the Minister has to say. If it is a “Sorry, no”, we need to understand why. I express my gratitude to Garden Court Chambers for drafting this amendment, which spells out the requirements and the process.
The amendment seeks to provide an exceptional route by which a person abroad—not in this country—can obtain a visa to come to the UK to seek asylum. At the moment, it is generally not possible to claim asylum in the UK unless one is already here. This visa could be applied for from anywhere in the world. The person would have to show that, if made in the UK, the claim
“would have a realistic prospect of success”,
and also that
“there are serious and compelling reasons why”
it should be considered in the UK. In assessing that, the entry clearance officer would take into account the extent of the risk of persecution or serious harm—persecution having the meaning that it has in the UN refugee convention, and serious harm meaning treatment that, if it occurred in the UK, would be contrary to Article 2, the right to life, or Article 3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, of the European Convention on Human Rights.
If a humanitarian visa is granted, the person will be granted a visa—I stress that—of at least six months’ duration. The Home Secretary could set conditions such as restricting access to work. On coming to the UK, the person will be deemed to have made an asylum claim and will go through the normal asylum process like any other asylum seeker, so the normal processes would not be sidestepped. There would be a full right of appeal, which is Amendment 119.
I have written down the words “Controlled and organised process”. Those working in the sector have long advocated humanitarian visas, which would be one of a suite of safe and legal routes. The humanitarian visa route would not be something that many could take advantage of, but it is significant and structured.
I will leave that there; as I say, the Minister’s response is more important tonight. However, on Amendment 119A, I will say that I was not surprised to see it. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, never misses an opportunity to buttonhole someone who might assist the women judges, other lawyers and others in Afghanistan. What she is seeking is only temporary, in the same way as a humanitarian visa would be. It is one thing to get people out of the country when they are at risk—she has had the most extraordinary success—but it is another to find somewhere for them to go.
I will not repeat myself—well, I am going to repeat myself just briefly. If the Government saw refugees as human beings, they would already have written these amendments into the Bill. We are pushing at a closed door at the moment. We should be taking more refugees and creating more safe routes.
I have a word of warning, which is that there will be many climate—ecological—emergencies over the next decade or so and, given that we have contributed a large part of the world’s accumulated CO2 emissions, we have to understand that we have a moral duty to take our share of climate refugees. It is already happening. There are parts of Africa that are now almost uninhabitable because of climate change, and other places will shortly follow. We have to understand that refugees are not a temporary problem but a permanent problem, and there will be a lot more. If we prepare well and put the programmes and the funding in place, we can cope and do it well. However, while the Government treat refugees as criminals and unwanted people, I am afraid that I see this simply as another reason why the Government have to go.
My Lords, Amendments 119C and 119D propose a code of practice for professionals involved in the assessment and care of people seeking asylum. Refugees and asylum seekers often have complex health needs influenced by experiences prior to leaving their home country, during transit or after arrival in the UK. Common examples include untreated communicable diseases, accidental injuries, hypothermia, malnutrition, poor maternity care and inadequately treated mental illness. These are made worse by the barriers to assessment and treatment that they face right from their arrival in the UK to the conclusion of the process and beyond. One common risk factor for poor health and well-being among this community is trauma. This may be the very trauma that they are fleeing from, the trauma of the journey or the psychological distress of overcrowding, the lack of privacy and the absence of culturally appropriate community support upon their arrival.
The World Health Organization reports double the rate of depression and anxiety in a humanitarian crisis; that is worth noting. Mental illness can influence the ability of asylum seekers to present their claims in a coherent way. The assessment of credibility is a fundamental aspect of the asylum decision-making process, and the decision-making immigration officer needs information to make their decision but they may be faced with a person with symptoms associated with a mental disorder and the psychological effects of trauma, such as memory loss, an inability to express or even feel emotions or profound guilt and shame at what they have experienced. Such trauma, which disproportionately affects women, may also lead to a reluctance or delay in disclosure that can negatively affect the application, as already highlighted in Amendment 40, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.
The current government policy, as set out in the guidance on adults at risk in immigration detention, centres on indicators of vulnerability, including persons suffering from a mental health condition or impairment; victims of torture; those who have been a victim of sexual or gender-based violence; those who have been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery; and those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Once a person has been identified as having an indicator of risk, the “adults at risk” policy identifies levels of evidence for that risk. The level of evidence is used as a measure of the degree of risk, which is then weighed against a range of immigration factors when making decisions regarding the immigration process, particularly the detention of the person. However, the Royal College of Psychiatrists has raised concerns that people with significant mental illness may have difficulty in being effective self-advocates or may lack a full appreciation of the extent of their own vulnerability. They may lack the mental capacity to make decisions relating to their immigration situation. Many do not have access to a robust assessment process or, if identified as lacking relevant capacity, to a system designed to safeguard them or advocate for them in their best interest.
The Helen Bamber Foundation says that in its experience persons with significant mental illness, as well as those with evidence of past torture, sexual gender-based violence and those with PTSD, are being detained despite their mental-health-related vulnerability. The assessment and identification of mental health problems requires appropriately trained staff in a facilitative environment as well as close multidisciplinary working.
For some, the treatment of mental illness will require specialist trauma-focused therapeutic support. I am told that this is not happening in existing facilities, such as Napier Barracks. It is intended that through these amendments the mental health, mental capacity and physical health of asylum seekers would be assessed and considered properly on arrival and throughout the asylum claim processes, and that the treatment and care of asylum seekers would be sufficient to ensure their health and well-being by standardising and regulating a process that would apply to numerous agencies, public, independent and third sector.
The Secretary of State said in the other place that the Bill will increase the fairness of our system so we can better protect those who are in genuine need of asylum and continue to strengthen our proud record of supporting those in need. The amendments seek to support the Government in achieving just that. I beg to move.
My Lords, my name is on this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, knows whereof she speaks, so I shall not attempt to do more than support her. To me, this is a matter of professional judgment, which she has brought, but also of common sense. What I hope is my common sense has been informed by what I have heard over quite some years, including, very significantly, in the debate that we had last week. It is clear that in the UK—it may in this context be England and Wales—the systems, if they can be called systems, for assessing the health needs of asylum seekers are patchy and often inadequate.
It is also common sense that assessment should start from a solid, informed base, incorporating the best, up-to-date understanding and experience, so a review is important. So is consultation with those who are expert in the field. I support the amendments.
My Lords, I support these amendments, to which I was pleased to add my name. I thank the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Helen Bamber Foundation for their help.
Many of us have already highlighted how provisions in this Bill will seriously harm the mental and physical health of people seeking asylum, through, for example, leaving group 2 refugees living in limbo with uncertain status or by placing people in vulnerable circumstances in accommodation centres that function as quasi-detention and have been shown to have a terrible impact on health.
The amendments are a positive step that aims to ensure that the physical and mental health needs of people seeking asylum are prioritised and that there is a comprehensive, co-ordinated approach to addressing those needs in line with our obligations under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 to
“recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.
Numerous reports and work by organisations such as the Helen Bamber Foundation, Freedom from Torture, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Equality and Human Rights Commission show that people seeking asylum face barriers in accessing services, including health services, throughout the asylum process, from their arrival in the UK to the conclusion of the process and beyond. They are also more likely to have specific healthcare needs caused by distressing experiences in their country of origin and traumatic experience during their journey seeking refuge.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, explained, there are numerous points in the asylum system where the physical and mental health of people seeking protection affects their ability to engage in the process or is worsened by the system we have in place. One particularly troubling example is the detention system, which the noble Baroness has talked about and is the subject of a later group of amendments—I shall scrub what I was going to say about that, given the lateness of the hour.
I am aware that the Home Office is currently engaging with the NHS, NGOs and other stakeholders through groups like its asylum seeker health steering group and associated subgroups. This is welcome, but much more is needed. The current guidance is inadequate and its implementation patchy. Codes of practice focused on the health and care of people seeking asylum and the responsibilities of all those engaging with them in the asylum system would not only increase the fairness and efficiency of the system but provide better protection and support to those in need of asylum.
I hope that the Minister will look kindly on these amendments, which I think are part of the solution.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this brief debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for her amendments, which would insert two new clauses concerning the introduction of codes of practice to underpin the Secretary of State’s approach to identifying physical and mental health needs in the asylum system. It may assist if I clarify why the Government believe that these amendments are unnecessary.
Asylum seekers are already entitled to access medical services, including those related to mental health, that are provided by the NHS, in the same way as British citizens and other permanent residents. The Home Office provides accommodation and subsistence support to all asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, but medical services—including those related to mental health and trauma—medical assessment and treatment are provided by the NHS. At every stage in the process, from initial arrival to screening, and to the substantive asylum interview, our approach is to ensure that the healthcare needs and vulnerabilities of asylum seekers are identified and taken into consideration where it is appropriate to do so. We ask a broad range of questions —in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—in the screening interview to establish a claimant’s needs, including any vulnerabilities or well-being needs. Claimants have signposted to them additional sources of support and advice as appropriate. Where any safeguarding concerns are identified, the Asylum Safeguarding Hub will look to make referrals to relevant bodies and signpost relevant organisations to the claimant.
As I say, where needs are identified we ensure that there is access to professional care, and assessments are conducted by professionally trained healthcare providers. While the Home Office clearly considers it vital to safeguard all aspects of asylum seekers’ health, the responsibility for assessing health issues rests with the statutory agencies of the NHS and social services. Therefore, we do not believe there is any need for further regulation in this area. Asylum seekers have every opportunity for their needs to be identified. The standard of care they would receive as a result of those needs is identical to that received by a British citizen—we should all, at this point, pay tribute to the work of the NHS. Therefore, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to withdraw her amendment.
Before the noble Baroness responds, it may be that this amendment could be worded to put more emphasis on the guidance of those who come into contact with asylum seekers, rather than just assessment. Does the Minister accept that this is a very specialised area? Without for a moment being critical of the NHS, I suggest that that specialism needs to be recognised and learning from it made available to those who come into contact with the cohort we are discussing.
My Lords, I cut my speech rather, because of the time, and I feel that maybe I did not manage to explain adequately. These are people with complex health needs. They are not just like any other patient in the NHS. They have had very difficult experiences and have difficult mental health needs. It is difficult for them to try to explain about their trauma to the first interpreter or the first person assessing them that they meet. This is something where it often takes years for people to trust sufficiently to be able to explain the impact on their situation, their circumstances, and their life chances. This is not just having an assessment and a conversation. It is about building a relationship of trust when people have experienced the most terrible circumstances. That is the difficulty.
I will give one quick example. One still very troubled lady, whose asylum claim was successful, described her claim and subsequent requests for ongoing support as “seriously retraumatising”. The paperwork that she received was confusing and negative in tone, with any success hidden somewhere in the small print. She asked, “Why do they do that to me? Why can’t they communicate with me? Why should I struggle so much? I feel like I’ve been through another fight”. This lady feels like giving up, despite the fact that her claim was eventually successful.
These amendments seek to see people treated fairly, compassionately and with more skill and understanding, so that they have the best hope of healing and settling in the UK. I thank noble Lords who have supported these amendments. I hope that the Minister will think again and accept the spirit of what I have proposed; otherwise, I and others will bring these amendments back on Report.
I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in what she had to say, but I would like some clarification. She said clearly that the effect of this clause is to criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK, which was the conclusion reached by the JCHR, of which she is a member. Does the Minister agree with the conclusion that this is what Clause 39 means? If she does not agree, what does it mean? If she does agree, I have a conundrum that is a variation of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has twice rehearsed now. He made the point that if an asylum seeker is deemed inadmissible, how do they even get to Clause 11 to be affected by the differential?
I have the same conundrum around criminalisation. If the very act of seeking asylum makes someone a criminal, how do they even get to Clause 11? I do not understand how Clause 11, inadmissibility and criminalisation interact with each other. It is rather late to go into this but, if the Minister cannot do it now, a letter to all the members of the Committee would be very helpful to clarify this interaction.
My Lords, the fact that I am going to say that I could not agree more with my noble friend Lady Ludford and will not add to that should not be taken to reduce the strength of that view.
I added my name to Amendment 122 from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for the reasons she explained. After I did, I realised that there is a question to be asked about new subsection (E1), which makes it an offence for someone knowingly to arrive in the UK without an ETA, an electronic travel authorisation; I would say that it would be the same to enter, but I am not sure it would be possible to enter the UK without an ETA.
I feel very uncomfortable about new subsection (E1) which makes it an offence to do something under the ETA rules when we do not have those rules. The ETA is not in effect yet. Your Lordships may think it right, when we see what the scheme is, that an offence be created—but not at this stage.
My Lords, like others, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. I have to put it on the record that it is now 11.04 pm and we are debating major legal innovations with massive consequences.
I want to ask the Minister just one question. Let us imagine a person caught in these circumstances, who has gone on a small boat, been intercepted by the Royal Navy and brought to shore, arrived in the UK and put in jail for four years. That person is very likely from a country in a state of turmoil to which it is utterly impossible to return them for any conceivable time in the future after their four-year jail term. How does the Minister imagine the fate—the life—of that person proceeding from the point they walk out of the jail doors?