Finance (No. 2) Bill
(Except clauses 1 to 4, 12 and 13, and 19)
(6 months ago)
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The Chair
I remind Members that Hansard would be grateful if they emailed their speaking notes or handed them to a colleague in the room, and to please switch their phones to silent.
The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the clauses and the selected new clause have been grouped for debate. Matters grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate.
I call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 21 May) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 May;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 23 May;
(2) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 23 May. —(Nigel Huddleston.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Nigel Huddleston.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and will be circulated to Members by email.
Clause 5
Increase in thresholds to £60,000 and £80,000
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Nigel Huddleston)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham, and I thank all hon. Members for their participation in today’s debate. I also thank those who have submitted written evidence on a variety of the clauses we will discuss today, including the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group and others, and all those who have contributed to consultations as part of this Finance Bill process.
Clause 5 makes changes to the high income child benefit charge, or HICBC, as it is commonly called. It increases the threshold at which child benefit begins to be withdrawn, from £50,000 to £60,000. The Government are also increasing the threshold at which child benefit is fully withdrawn, from £60,000 to £80,000. That means that 1% is withdrawn for every £200 of income that exceeds £60,000; previously, the rate was 1% for every £100 of income that exceeded £50,000, and child benefit was fully removed once individuals earned £60,000 or above.
The HICBC is a tax charge and was introduced in January 2013 for recipients of child benefit payments, or their partners, on higher incomes. It applies where the highest earner has an adjusted net income—that is, their total taxable income, less certain reliefs, such as pension contributions—above the threshold, which is rising to £60,000. For individuals with incomes above the top of the taper, which is rising to £80,000, the tax charge is equal to the full amount of the child benefit payment.
The changes will ensure that the HICBC continues to withdraw child benefit from high-income families, as it was designed to, without unfairly penalising those on middle incomes. By halving the rate at which HICBC withdraws the child benefit gain, the Government are improving people’s incentives to continue working or to take up more hours. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that, as a result of both changes, those already working will increase their hours by a total equivalent to those of around 10,000 full-time individuals by 2028-29.
The changes made by clause 5 will have a positive impact for around 485,000 families, who will gain an average of £1,260 in 2024-25, which they can put towards the cost of raising their children. That includes around 170,000 individuals who will no longer be liable for HICBC, and 135,000 individuals currently paying the HICBC who will have it reduced. The remaining 180,000 are the families currently not claiming child benefit or families opting out of getting child benefit payments who are now eligible to receive payments without incurring a tax charge.
The increase in the HICBC’s adjusted net income threshold reaffirms the Government’s commitment to rewarding working families, by allowing them to keep as much of their hard-earned money as possible in a sustainable way. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
James Murray (Ealing North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee with you in the Chair, Mrs Latham. I am pleased to respond on behalf of the Opposition in the Public Bill Committee stage of the Finance (No. 2) Bill.
As we have heard from the Minister, clause 5 increases the adjusted net income threshold for the high income child benefit charge from £50,000 to £60,000, with effect from the 2024-25 tax year. The clause also amends the rate at which the high income child benefit charge applies to individuals with adjusted net incomes of between £60,000 to £80,000 in a tax year, and contains an administrative easement to prevent backdated child benefit payments from triggering a charge in 2023-24.
As we all know, due to high levels of inflation during the current Parliament, families across the country have felt the impact of threshold freezes, particularly in relation to income tax. Millions of people will be paying income tax for the first time or paying it at higher rates as a result of high inflation and the frozen thresholds. Similarly, the fixed nominal thresholds for the high income child benefit charge mean that more and more people will have been affected by the charge as a result of inflation. The adjustment to the thresholds in this clause will therefore be a welcome step for many families, and brings the number of individuals affected by the high income child benefit charge closer to what Parliament envisaged when the policy was introduced in the Finance Act 2012.
Although we support the measures in the clause and will not oppose them, we would appreciate some clarification from the Minister on one point. In particular, we understand that subsection (2) effectively halves the rate of clawback in the calculation of the charge, so the child benefit is fully withdrawn when the relevant adjusted net income reaches £20,000 above the initial threshold —that is, £80,000. I am grateful to the Chartered Institute of Taxation for pointing out that, because the clawback happens across a wider range of incomes, some individuals will be caught out by higher marginal rates of tax and will therefore likely need to file a self-assessment return. Is the Minister concerned that that will introduce more complexity into the tax system, and if so, what is he doing to communicate these changes so that taxpayers are not caught out?
Finally, we understand that the Government will be moving the assessment of the charge to a household basis from April 2026. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed when the Government will announce further details about the consultation on that change. Will he also set out the details of what he is doing to consult industry and professional bodies about it?
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham. We will not be opposing the clause, but I do want to make some comments about this paltry measure, which will help very few people in a cost of living crisis that the Conservative Government are trying to pretend is over and done with—in fact, they are saying that that is the case. That is not the reality for people in their homes across the nations of the UK.
The Minister said that the intention of this provision —I think I am quoting him correctly—was to allow people to “keep as much of their hard-earned money as possible.” That reflects incredibly badly on the way that this Government have conducted themselves by artificially boosting the cost of living through reckless actions such as Brexit and, of course, the mini-Budget. If they wanted to do something that was meaningful to help families, they could have copied the Scottish child payment in Scotland, which has lifted 100,000 children out of poverty. But no: they have decided to do this. They have also decided to keep the two-child limit on universal credit. That should be scrapped, and the Labour party should be joining in calls for that to be scrapped. The rape clause has no place in our society, and this measure will not go far enough to help families.
Nigel Huddleston
I thank my opposite numbers for their comments. I respectfully disagree with several of their points, and I will remind my opposite number, the hon. Member for Ealing North—as I do on almost every occasion—of the significant changes to the income tax threshold that the Conservative Government have brought in. It was £6,475 under Labour; it is now £12,570. That is a significant increase and it has taken many people out of paying income tax altogether, which is something we are very proud of.
The hon. Gentleman will be well aware that, as we have discussed on multiple occasions, the reason why taxes are higher than any of us would desire is the level of intervention required to support households and livelihoods during the pandemic and, more recently, the cost of living challenges since the invasion of Ukraine and the energy price shocks in particular. I would make a similar point to the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey, who also made those points. I remind him that we have made interventions in cost of living support to the tune of about £100 billion. With respect, half a million people will benefit from the changes that we are introducing. HICBC is not a small amount. It is a meaningful amount of money for a large number of people, and it comes on top of the many other support measures that we have introduced.
I thank the hon. Member for Ealing North for pointing out the easements and the fact that there will be automatic backdating. Hopefully, that will be a relief and good news, and be positive for many families. Child benefit is normally backdated by three months, but because of the timing of the implementation, some could overlap two tax years. We are trying to make that simple and bring it into one tax year.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the increase from £60,000 to £80,000 and the impact on marginal rates. The changes that were announced will reduce the total marginal effective tax rates, which includes income tax, employee national insurance contributions and HICBC, from about 64% to 53% for someone with, for example, two children. That is a good thing.
We recognise that high marginal rates introduce complexity to the tax system, but that needs to be weighed against other considerations when designing tax policy. The Government must ensure sure that they are committed to a fair tax system that supports strong public finances. Individuals will, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, still be required to submit a self-assessment tax return to declare and pay their HICBC liability. However, the Government announced in July last year that we are taking steps to allow newly liable taxpayers to pay the HICBC through their tax code without the need to register for self-assessment. Further details on this improvement will be shared in due course.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the consultation on moving to a household basis. We will announce further details of the consultation in due course and, as with all tax policy, any changes would be considered as part of future fiscal events. The Chancellor announced that the Government will be consulting on moving the HICBC to a system based on household incomes, and that change will be delivered by April 2026. If the hon. Gentleman is patient, we will announce further details on that consultation in due course.
A point was made about communication. There have already been significant communications on the changes to HICBC. There has been a lot of online and offline activity from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, various Government Departments and others. The campaign to raise awareness also includes working with, for example, parenting platforms such as Bounty and Emma’s Diary, and issuing emails through third party partners, including childcare providers. The hon. Gentleman raised an important point about not just making the changes, but ensuring that everybody is aware of them, so that everybody who is intended to benefit is able to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Reduction in higher CGT rate for residential property gains to 24%
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clauses 6 to 11 are related to the property tax measures in the Bill. I hope that Members will forgive me, but this is a slightly longer speech, as I will talk through each clause. Indeed, it is the longest speech that I plan on giving today, although it is not too long—please do not have a heart attack; I will not be reading every one of these pieces of paper.
Clause 6 cuts the higher rate of capital gains tax, or CGT, charged on residential property gains from 28% to 24% from 6 April 2024. CGT is of course charged on the disposals of buy-to-lets and second homes. Main homes are exempt through private residence relief, which means for that the majority of residential property sales no CGT is paid at all. Where a disposal is liable to CGT, gains are taxed at a lower rate of 18% for any gains that fall within an individual’s basic rate band and at a higher rate for any gains above that.
The 28% higher rate was deterring some sales of residential properties, so the Government announced a 4 percentage point cut to the higher rate at spring Budget 2024. That will encourage more landlords and second home owners to sell their residential properties, making more homes available to the market for a variety of purchasers, including first-time buyers. The OBR forecasts that there will be around 60,000 more residential property transactions over the next five years owing to the cut. As more homes are bought and sold, the Exchequer is expected to raise an additional £690 million in revenue over that period. There will be no change to the lower rate of 18% for private residence relief.
Clause 7 concerns multiple dwellings relief, or MDR, which is a bulk purchase relief in the stamp duty land tax regime. The clause abolishes multiple dwellings relief from 1 June 2024. Multiple dwellings relief allows anyone purchasing two or more dwellings in a single transaction or in linked transactions to calculate their stamp duty based on the average value of the properties purchased, as opposed to their aggregate value. Multiple dwellings relief was introduced in 2011 with the intention of promoting investment in the private rented sector, but a recent external evaluation found no strong evidence that it has done so, meaning that the relief is not cost-effective and is therefore not acting as intended.
His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has seen a high number of incorrect and abusive claims for the relief. Those have been driven by tax repayment agents, who often convince private individuals to make relief claims for the purchase of two dwellings when individuals have in fact only purchased one. One such example is somebody buying a large house with a separate indoor entertainment area, including a swimming pool and toilet, and that being counted as two properties when it is transparently one.
The changes made by clause 7 will abolish multiple dwellings relief for property transactions that complete on or after 1 June 2024. However, for contracts that were exchanged on or before 6 March 2024, relief will continue to apply regardless of when the contracts complete. The change will not impact those purchasing a single property. It will only increase the stamp duty payable by individuals or businesses purchasing two or more properties in a single transaction or as part of the same deal. Individuals or businesses purchasing six or more dwellings will continue to qualify for the non-residential rates of SDLT.
Clause 8 makes changes to ensure that first-time buyers’ relief from stamp duty land tax can be accessed by those purchasing new residential leases through a nominee or bare trustee, including victims of domestic abuse. A nominee is a person who holds the legal title of a property, while the beneficial ownership—the person who ultimately owns or controls the assets—is held by another person. A bare trust is a trust under which property is held by a person as trustee for another person who is fully entitled to all of the capital and income of the trust.
The measure also changes the definition of first-time buyers to ensure that individuals who use such arrangements cannot claim relief more than once. First-time buyers’ relief from SDLT is available where an individual who has not previously owned a dwelling purchases a home they intend to use as their only or main residence, but that is not currently available to individuals purchasing a new residential lease through a nominee or bare trustee.
The changes made by clause 8 will benefit certain first-time buyers of residential leasehold properties purchasing through a nominee or bare trustee, reducing the up-front cost of buying a home by allowing them to claim the relief they are entitled to. The changes bring those purchasers in line with purchases of residential freeholds and pre-existing leases using similar arrangements.
James Murray
Clause 6 applies to residential property gains by individuals, trustees and personal representatives. As the Minister set out, it reduces the higher rate of CGT that applies to such gains from 28% to 24%. The new rate will apply to disposals made on or after 6 April 2024. As we understand it, the lower rate is intended to remain at 18%, and the CGT rates that apply to carried interest gains remain unchanged.
The Government’s policy paper on this matter claims that the measure will be revenue positive for the Treasury and will generate more transactions in the property market, benefiting individuals who are looking to move home or get on to the property ladder. The Opposition will not oppose moves that reduce the rates of tax while also raising greater income. However, I would like to ask the Minister for more detail on the Exchequer impact of this measure. The Government’s policy paper reports expected spikes in revenue of an additional £310 million and £350 million in 2024-25 and 2025-26 respectively. That then falls significantly to an additional £45 million in 2026-27, and to just £5 million by the end of the forecast period in 2028-29. I would be grateful if the Minister set out his explanation for this pattern of expected income. Is he confident that there will be a permanently higher level of income as a result of this change after the end of the forecast period?
Clause 7 abolishes multiple dwellings relief—a relief from stamp duty land tax available on the purchase of two or more residential properties in a single transaction or linked transactions. The change will apply to purchasers of dwellings in England and Northern Ireland that have an effective date of transaction on or after 1 June 2024.
SDLT is a tax on the purchase of land or property, and ordinarily the amount of tax chargeable is calculated on the basis of the total amount paid for land or property. MDR, meanwhile, was introduced in 2011 with the intention of reducing a barrier to investment in residential property and to promote the private rented sector housing supply. We know that the Government evaluations have shown very little evidence that MDR achieved its original aims in a cost-effective way. We believe that clamping down on dubious claims and abusive tax reliefs is the right thing to do, so we will support the clause, but I have a few points of clarification to which I would be grateful for the Minister’s response.
First, I would like to ask the Minister about the reasoning behind the introduction of MDR in 2011. I understand that in September 2010, the coalition Government said in response to a consultation that
“the Government will not be taking these proposals forward at the present time”.
However, at the Budget of March 2011, a few months later, they announced that they would indeed introduce changes to the SDLT rules for bulk purchases of residential property. Does the Minister know why the Government at the time changed their mind?
Secondly, the Minister referred to abuse of the relief, so I would be grateful if he shared with us any figures or estimates of the cost of abuse of MDR since its introduction in 2011. Thirdly, we note that the Government said that they will engage with the agricultural industry to assess whether there are specific impacts of their changes to MDR that should be given further thought. Will the Minister let us know whether he is consulting with any other sectors?
Finally, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has indicated that for the domestic buyer in the build-to-rent sector, the divergence between the rates of SDLT applicable to residential property and those in the non-residential sector is large. There is a great deal of complexity in the system, so is the Minister aware of the potential for anomalies and for new behaviour to emerge around the acquisition and definition of property? I would welcome his assurance that he will work closely with relevant stakeholders to ensure there are no unintended consequences to the changes in the clause.
Clause 8 makes changes to the rules for claiming first-time buyer relief from stamp duty land tax in cases where the purchaser is buying a new lease via a trust or nominee. It applies to purchasers of dwellings in England and Northern Ireland, with an effective date on or after 6 March. We know there have been instances of first-time buyers using trusts or nominees to conceal their identities to protect themselves from behaviours such as domestic violence and stalking. The clause corrects issues arising over the eligibility of such claims. It provides an amendment to correct a defect in the relief in order to ensure that the underlying buyer, not the nominee, is eligible for SDLT, and we will not oppose it.
As we have heard, clause 9 amends out-of-date references and definitions used in legislation relating to the SDLT exemption for registered providers of social housing. As the explanatory notes make clear, that is to ensure that all registered providers of social housing that purchase property with the assistance of a public subsidy are not liable for SDLT. The measure seeks, first, to update outdated references following changes to social housing legislation; secondly, to extend the definition of public subsidy to include receipts from the disposal of social housing; and finally, to amend the definition of registered providers of social housing to confirm that certain entities such as English local authorities are eligible for the exemption, which removes an uncertainty.
The changes are set to apply to transactions on or after 6 March 2024, but we understand from stakeholder representations that there is some uncertainty relating to the “clarifications” set out in the measure. Can the Minister confirm whether purchases made before 6 March by local authorities will be treated as separate to this clause, or has any scope been given in the exemption for those purchases made before that date?
Clause 10 removes public bodies from the scope of the higher rate of SDLT of 15%. As the explanatory notes set out, that is consistent with the treatment of public bodies in relation to the annual tax on enveloped dwellings, which does not apply to public bodies. Given that this is a corrective measure, we will not oppose it, although the Chartered Institute of Taxation has pointed out that with the measure not being retrospective, there are concerns among stakeholders. We understand, again, that the measure will apply from 6 March, the date of the Budget when the measure was announced. Can the Minister clarify what the situation will be for a public body such as a local authority that may have incurred a 15% SDLT liability in the weeks immediately before this change was announced?
As the Minister set out, clause 11 restricts the scope of agricultural property relief and woodlands relief to property located in the UK. As the Government’s policy paper states, the former measure was put in place to ensure compatibility with EU law; it expanded the scope of agricultural property relief and woodlands relief to property located in the European economic area. Now that the UK has left the EU, this measure reverses those changes, so that property located in the EEA will again be treated the same as property located in the rest of the world. This is a technical measure, and we will not oppose it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
If I may respond briefly, I will answer the perfectly reasonable questions raised by the hon. Member for Ealing North in relation to several points in multiple areas. Regarding the overall impact, and if I may reference the change of the capital gains tax rate from 28% to 24%, the OBR estimates that this costing will have a positive impact beyond the current forecasting period and generate a small long-term yield, too. Of course, beyond the forecasting period, it is difficult to estimate the exact amount.
On the points that the hon. Gentleman raised about MDR and other measures, it is interesting that although there are examples of abuse, it is also the case that only 32% of businesses buying property to let said that this relief had an important influence on their purchase decision at all and only 45% were aware of multiple dwellings relief before making a purchase decision. That feeds into the overall picture of MDR not fulfilling the original intent and purpose, which of course was to support investment in the private rented sector. Again, it is building the picture that the relief is no longer cost-effective. The Government are continuing to engage with stakeholders in the build-to-rent sector and other sectors to ensure that we understand their concerns and we will continue to listen to representations made to highlight any exception or unforeseen impacts that the abolition of MDR could have in the future.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s welcoming of many of the other measures. He asked whether they would be applied before the April deadline. They will not be applied retrospectively—for example, the updates on the registered social landlord exemption will not be applied retrospectively.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the number of public bodies that have paid stamp duty at the 15% higher rate. The number of transactions—of those impacted previously —has been very small, and we therefore do not anticipate a huge impact.
Clauses 7 to 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Additional relief for low-budget films with specified UK connection
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clauses 14 and 15 make changes to better support the UK independent film industry. That is in recognition of the sector’s cultural importance and its role in growing and supporting UK talent. The Government have heard from several representatives of the British film industry, including the British Film Institute, about the specific challenges that the independent film industry faces. The Government also recognise the vital role that independent film plays in incubating UK talent.
The changes made by clauses 14 and 15 substantially increase the level of audio-visual expenditure credit available to smaller budget films from 34% to 53%. This increased rate for qualifying films is referred to as the UK independent film tax credit. The 53% tax credit will be applied on up to 80% of a film’s production costs, up to a cap of about £15 million. That translates into £31.80 back for every £100 spent, after accounting for corporation tax at 25%.
Films will also need to meet the criteria of a new British Film Institute test, with the expectation that films will have either a UK writer, a UK director or be certified as an official co-production. Clauses 14 to 15 set out the bulk of the measure, but further detail, including on the additional test, will be provided in a statutory instrument in due course.
Productions that start principal photography from 1 April 2024 will be eligible, and companies will be able to make claims from 1 April 2025 on expenditure incurred from 1 April 2024. The UK independent film tax credit is a transformational, generous, enhanced tax credit, which will boost the production of UK independent films and incubate UK film talent.
James Murray
As we have heard from the Minister, clause 14 introduces a higher rate of expenditure credit for independent films, defined as films below a maximum budget that have either a UK director or writer, or are an official international co-production. As the Government’s policy paper on this measure makes clear, the basic rate of credit under the audio-visual expenditure credit scheme is 34%. Independent films will now receive a rate of 53%, with the amount of credit capped to relevant global expenditure of £15 million. The Opposition strongly support the UK’s creative sector as one of the areas of the global economy in which Britain is world leading. As such, we will not oppose any measures that provide certainty and greater opportunities for growth in that critical sector.
Clause 15 provides the administrative framework for the previous clause and sets out that the higher rate will be available only on expenditure incurred from 1 April for films that commenced principal photography on or after that date. We understand that claims can in turn be made from 1 April 2025, so I would like to ask the Minister about the role of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, because we know that the new schemes will need to be properly explained through new guidance and may require new staff, as the Government’s policy paper makes clear. What is HMRC doing to ensure that the guidance remains timely and up to date for those wanting to make a claim? What will HMRC do to support those who want to apply for the credit so that they can understand how it operates? Similarly, what allocation of staff will be made to administer the measure?
Nigel Huddleston
I thank the Opposition for their support. I think there is agreement across the House on the vital role of the world-leading UK creative industries, and, in particular, our thriving film sector. In answer to the broad question put by the hon. Member for Ealing North, further information will provided by a statutory instrument that we will discuss in due course. His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will have a role in that, and the precise resource allocation is an operational decision for it. As the Minister who oversees HMRC, I will pay close attention to the issue and I will ensure that it is properly resourced. This is a very important policy area and we want to ensure that it is successful. Again, I am afraid that I will ask the hon. Gentleman to be a little patient and wait for the details in the statutory instrument, but we are consulting key stakeholders on that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Increase in theatre tax credit
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
We are powering through this— I have on my notes “tea break” by now, but it is not going to happen. That is no bad thing, and I appreciate the comments and input from hon. Members. I will repeat my thanks as well—a lot of work has gone into the measures that we are discussing today and many stakeholders have already contributed significant amounts, including through consultations.
One such area is what we are debating now: clauses 16 to 18 make changes to ensure that our world-leading theatres, orchestras and museums and galleries may continue to put on outstanding home-grown productions and attract inward investment. The orchestra, theatre, and museums and galleries exhibition tax reliefs have had rates of 45% for non-touring productions and 50% for touring productions and orchestral productions since October 2021, reflecting the unique challenges faced by those sectors during the covid-19 pandemic and the recovery period, which of course we are still in.
The rates were due to be reduced to 30% and 35% on 1 April 2025 and then return to their original levels of 20% and 25% on 1 April 2026. Clauses 16 and 17 change that so the tax reliefs will reduce to only 40% for non-touring productions and 45% for touring productions and orchestral productions on 1 April 2025, and will then remain at that level permanently. That was a key ask of the sector. Clause 18 removes the expiry date of the museums and galleries exhibition tax relief so that the relief similarly becomes permanent rather than ending on 1 April 2026.
The changes will benefit approximately 1,300 theatre companies, orchestra companies and museums and galleries that claim those tax reliefs on an annual basis. Our creative sector is vitally important to our national life and one of the fastest growing sectors in the UK economy. These clauses will bolster our theatres, orchestras and museums and galleries, ensuring that they remain among the best in the world. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
James Murray
As the Minister has set out, from 1 April 2025 the rates of theatre tax relief, orchestra tax relief, and museum and galleries exhibition tax relief will be set permanently at 40% for non-touring productions and 45% for touring productions and all orchestra productions. As we know, the so-called creative reliefs were previously set at 20% and 25% respectively. They were temporarily increased on 27 October 2021 to help the sector in its economic recovery from covid-19. As the Government’s policy paper notes, the rates were due to taper to 30% and 35% from April 2025. We welcome the fact that they will now be set permanently at 40% and 45% from next year.
We also note that, by way of these clauses, the Government are removing the 2026 sunset clause on the museums and galleries exhibition tax relief so that it becomes a permanent relief with no expiry date. In previous debates on earlier Finance Bills, I have asked the Minister to give clarity and certainty to the creative sectors, so I am pleased to say that that has been given to the UK’s world-leading theatres through these clauses. As I have said, we in the Opposition stand wholeheartedly behind the UK’s creative industries, and we will of course not oppose the measures set out today.
Drew Hendry
I briefly want to endorse the comments about these sectors requiring support. It is good to see some support for the sectors here, but we would like to see more in the future.
Nigel Huddleston
I do not have much more to add, other than to point out the strength of our creative industries in all four nations of the United Kingdom, which I am glad has been recognised across the Committee today. It is an incredible strength, and I am therefore pleased to hear today the very obvious cross-party agreement on continuing support for this vital sector.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 17 and 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Collective investment schemes: co-ownership schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury (Gareth Davies)
It is a great pleasure, as always, to see you in the Chair, Mrs Latham. Clause 20 begins the process of introducing legislation for a new type of investment fund—the reserved investor fund, which I will refer to from now on as the RIF. At Budget 2020, the Government announced a review of the UK’s funds regime, covering tax and relevant areas of regulation. The review had an overarching objective to make the UK a more attractive location to set up, manage and administer funds, as well as ensuring that UK investors can access a wide enough range of investment vehicles to suit their needs. In the years since, the Government have made a number of successful reforms. In order to build on these successes, the Government announced at spring Budget 2024 that we would be proceeding with the RIF.
The RIF will fill a gap in the UK’s existing fund offering by creating an onshore alternative to existing non-UK fund vehicles that are commonly used to hold UK real estate. Clause 20 provides a definition of the RIF and provides a power for the Treasury to make detailed tax rules through secondary legislation, consistent with the approach taken when introducing tax rules for other investment funds. A later statutory instrument will set out detailed tax rules for the RIF. The regulations will set out supplementary qualifying conditions for a RIF, entry and exit provisions, and rules that deal with breaches of one or more qualifying conditions.
The UK has a world-leading asset management sector. The RIF will play an important role in supporting that leadership by making the UK a more competitive destination for our fund management industry. Indeed, stakeholders from the financial services industry have already shown considerable support for the RIF. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham. I am pleased to respond to clauses 20 to 24 on behalf of the Opposition. Clause 20, as the Minister set out, introduces the necessary powers to set the scope and design of the tax regime and rules for the RIF. Labour welcomes the introduction of the RIF, as it will add to the investment products available here in the UK, particularly for the UK commercial real estate sector. However, the trade bodies representing investment managers and real estate fund managers, the Investment Association and the Association of Real Estate Funds, have raised some concerns that I would like to put to the Minister.
There was a widely held expectation across the sector that RIF would broadly mirror the conditions of the existing authorised contractual schemes, or ACSs, but offer less regulatory supervision, freeing the RIF to become a more flexible investment vehicle for a range of more experienced investors. Due, however, to the Government’s decision to categorise the RIF as an alternative investment fund instead of a special investment fund, the RIF and the ACS will now differ in two key aspects. First, the supply of fund management services will be standard-rated at 20% as opposed to being VAT-exempt, and secondly, an alternative investment fund comes with a requirement to raise capital from a number of investors with a view to investing it in accordance with the defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors. That makes sense for large-scale, open-ended funds with an ongoing investment strategy, but it clearly is not designed for funds that do not have a specified investment objective, such as funds of one, joint ventures, co-investment vehicles and acquisition vehicles, which instead were created for a particular purpose such as repackaging and selling existing assets to new markets. Since they do not exist to raise additional capital, the requirements associated with alternative investment funds risk being an unnecessary burden and disproportionate when applied to the RIF.
Gareth Davies
I am always grateful to see the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn in her place in opposition in these forums, and I appreciate her comments. I will first set out the background to the establishment of the RIF, which was based on significant consultation with industry to fill a specific gap for an unauthorised, contractual-based vehicle. As such, it was based on specific feedback from the industry. The hon. Lady asked a very reasonable question about classification of the fund, and I can tell her that that was considered to be part of the consultation, but in the end we decided to proceed with the structure that we have gone with in the legislation. However, we will of course keep that under review and continue to engage with stakeholders, and we will issue a report on the progress of the RIF in due course. Although we have not established it in the way that some may have wished us to, it is based on consultation and will be reviewed in due course.
Tulip Siddiq
I thank the Minister for his response. He said that he considered the options and decided to proceed with it as an alternative investment fund, but he did not actually set out the reasons why. Was there any reason why he decided that it made more sense to do that as opposed to a special investment fund, especially in line with the international comparisons that I gave?
Gareth Davies
This is designed specifically to fill a gap that was previously or currently filled by things such as Jersey property investment trusts. Where there are unauthorised, contractual-based schemes, we do not currently have a vehicle that fills that gap. What we are introducing with the RIF fills that gap and satisfies a vast amount of stakeholders who fed into the consultation, and we are proceeding with that today.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Economic crime (anti-money laundering) levy
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Gareth Davies
Clause 21 increases the economic anti-money laundering levy for very large firms, meaning firms regulated for anti-money laundering purposes and which have UK revenue greater than £1 billion per annum. The charge for very large firms increased from £250,000 to £500,000 with effect from 1 April 2024. There is no change to the charge for firms with revenue below £1 billion per annum. The levy was introduced in the 2022-23 tax year as a source of sustainable funding for measures to tackle economic crime and support the delivery of the Government’s commitments contained in the economic crime plan 2. The Government made it clear during the public consultation that levy charges may be adjusted periodically in response to new information, inflation or under-collection. The adjustment is made in response to receipts falling short of the levy’s stated £100 million revenue target.
The clause amends part 3 of the Finance Act 2022 to replace the current charge for very large firms with the new charge of £500,000 per annum. The change will impact an estimated 100 to 110 very large firms across the anti-money laundering regulated sector including, but not limited to, financial services, legal and accountancy firms.
No other aspects of the levy’s calculation or operation are changing and we therefore anticipate administrative impacts on affected firms to be negligible. This adjustment to the economic crime levy for the largest firms will put funding for measures to tackle economic crime on a sustainable footing, helping to protect UK citizens and make the UK a safer place to do business. Only the very largest firms will pay more and burdens will remain low. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
We support the measures in clause 21 to raise the funds needed to tackle money laundering, fraud and other types of economic crime, but I cannot ignore the fact that the Government’s efforts to tackle economic crime have been a complete failure. Fraud and scams, for example, have rocketed under this Government, with at least £7.3 billion stolen directly from consumer bank accounts in the UK through fraud last year alone.
Last year, the Government published their fraud strategy to widespread criticism from industry for largely rebadging old measures and re-announcing existing national teams, such as the re-announcement on the replacement of Action Fraud from 2022. The consensus from experts in the industry is that the measures in the strategy will not significantly move the dial, as they do not establish a regulatory framework for tech companies and telcos to participate in the fight against fraud, including through data-sharing with financial services firms and enforcement agencies to enhance detection and prevention measures.
UK Finance, for example, has stated that it is increasingly difficult to understand the imbalance between the financial services sector’s contribution through the levy and that of other sectors that do not contribute but are known to be introducing risk into the same system. We also know that most scams originate on social media or via telecommunications networks yet those sectors do not face the same obligations regarding contributions, nor do they compensate victims defrauded through their platforms. Does the Minister agree with UK Finance? Does he accept that until the Government find a way to bring the tech giants to the table, efforts to tackle fraud and scams will continue to fail?
UK Finance has also raised concerns about the transparency of the levy and reporting on economic crime. On reporting for anti-money laundering purposes, I have heard from numerous City firms that, despite frequent requests, they receive little granular feedback on the impact their reports make. Does the Minister agree that better feedback and wider publicity around successes could help AML-regulated firms to see the value and importance of work in this area more clearly, keeping it at the forefront of their minds? What are the Government doing to ensure that happens?
Drew Hendry
This is a welcome move in principle and in targeting economic crime, but I would agree with the comments we have just heard—this does not shift things in the way that they need to be shifted in order to deal with the issue. It does not seriously tackle online crime, which is relatively rampant, with people being conned and funds being taken illegally. It does not really do much for fraud and economic crime and fails to tackle issues such as money laundering. There has still not been enough action on limited partnerships, for example, which continue to allow unknown individuals to funnel money through those mechanisms. Why are the Government not taking this issue more seriously than through these minor actions in the Bill?
Gareth Davies
I am grateful for the comments from Opposition Members. I think we all agree that we want to tackle these issues in the most serious way possible, with the most force. I am comforted by the comments from the Financial Action Task Force, which previously said that the UK has one of the strongest regimes when it comes to tackling economic crime. The levy specifically seeks to fund the tackling of anti-money laundering rather than fraud or sanctions, which I will come on to in a second.
It is appropriate to stress that the levy is a targeted measure on the anti-money laundering regulated sector, therefore the proceeds go towards tackling anti-money laundering. That is in the context of the economic crime plan 2, which covers up to 2026 and is backed by £200 million from the levy plus £200 million of Government investment. We are taking broader action on fraud in the technology sector specifically, not least through the online fraud charter, the Online Safety Act 2023 and the telecommunications fraud sector charter.
The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey mentioned sanctions evasion. We are cracking down on kleptocracy and sanctions evasion through the economic crime plan 2. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation actively monitors sanctions evasion every single day.
On corruption, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office leads our efforts to support companies to tackle corruption and strengthen governance across the world. The Government are actively working with partners across the world to strengthen international standards, not least through the UN convention against corruption. In the UK, we also have the National Crime Agency’s international corruption unit. There is significant action to tackle fraud and corruption as well as sanctions evasion, but of course we can always do more and we are vigilant about that.
On the reporting and transparency of the levy, there was a reasonable question from the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn and from the sector. There will be a report on the levy this year and it will be reviewed in 2027. We will engage with stakeholders leading up to that review.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Transfers of assets abroad
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clause 22 makes changes to ensure that individuals cannot use a company as a device to bypass anti-avoidance legislation, known as the transfer of assets abroad provisions. Those provisions are designed to prevent individuals from transferring ownership of income-generating assets, such as real estate or stocks, to an overseas individual or entity while still benefiting from the income that the assets generate. The provisions prevent the moving of assets into offshore structures outside the scope of UK taxation being a simple tax avoidance route for UK residents.
The clause has been introduced following a Supreme Court decision. Prior to the decision, HMRC considered that shareholders and directors who controlled a company could transfer an asset and were therefore in scope of the transfer of assets abroad provisions. However, the Supreme Court decision means that a shareholder cannot be determined as a transferor, which therefore opens up a loophole that can be exploited by shareholders transferring assets abroad via a close company to avoid UK tax. A close company is a company with five or fewer participators, usually shareholders or directors, who have ownership or control over the business.
The changes made by the clause will introduce a provision that deems an individual as the transferor where they are participators in a close company that transfers an asset to a person abroad in order to avoid UK tax. The amendment also applies to transfers by non-resident companies that would be treated as a close company if they were UK resident. The changes will have an impact on transactions only where the purpose of the transfer is to avoid tax and will not have an impact on transfers that are genuine commercial transactions. The changes will apply to income that arises after 6 April 2024, regardless of when the transfer took place.
In situations where multiple shareholders are involved in the transfer of an asset, any resulting tax charge will be apportioned between those individuals in proportion to their respective shareholdings. Further details will be provided in HMRC guidance. The measure is expected to affect a small number of individuals a year and will raise about £15 million in tax revenue over the forecast period.
This change was anticipated by external groups and demonstrates that the Government are quick to crack down on tax avoidance loopholes. This clause prevents tax avoidance by ensuring that individuals cannot bypass anti-avoidance legislation by using a company to transfer assets abroad while still benefiting from the income they generate. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
We believe that individuals or companies generating wealth in the UK should pay their fair share, so we are in complete support of the aims of this clause. However, we have heard concerns raised by the Chartered Institute of Taxation about the effectiveness of the Government’s proposals and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on those concerns.
First, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has argued that the clause adds complexity to the tax system, because it uses income tax legislation to tackle perceived corporate tax avoidance. Clause 22 extends provision within the Income Tax Act 2007 to cover avoidance of any tax through transfer made by a closely held company. Could the Minister explain the thinking behind the Government’s decision to tackle corporate tax avoidance in this way, rather than through the corporate tax regime? Does he agree with the Chartered Institute of Taxation that it could add unnecessary complication to the tax system?
Secondly, the Chartered Institute of Taxation made the case that the Government’s position that any participator in a company is deemed to be involved in a company’s decision to move assets abroad is unfair. For example, a company may have several minority shareholders who have no participation in the running of the company. What is the Minister’s assessment of the case made by the Chartered Institute of Taxation that only major shareholders, directors and shadow directors should be assumed to be involved for the purposes of this legislation?
Thirdly, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has warned that these changes could damage the UK’s international competitiveness, because the test as set out in the legislation leaves too much discretion to HMRC, which compounds uncertainty for businesses. For example, a UK holding company that provides a loan to an offshore subsidiary that in turn generates profits could be caught by the changes, despite that being a routine transaction. The Chartered Institute of Taxation argues that that could lead to an increased number of inquiries and appeals to the tax tribunals and could seriously undermine the UK’s attractiveness for international headquarters.
What does the Minister make of those concerns? What steps will HMRC take to ensure that involvement and objection defences under the clause are not ambiguous or uncertain, and to ensure that those charges do not prove to be increased excessively for taxpayers?
My final point is that the changes introduced by clause 22 appear to be retrospective, as no date is specified whereafter transactions are affected; the clause says only that income arising after April 2024 is caught by the regime. Can the Minister confirm whether that is the case? Will commercial transactions that were carried out many years ago, but from which income arises after April 2024, still be caught?
Nigel Huddleston
I thank the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn for her comments. We very much appreciate the input that we have received from stakeholders and interested parties, including the Chartered Institute of Taxation. Some of those points are about broader issues around the TOAA regime, rather than specific to this legislation, but we do hear what they have to say.
I will respond to the hon. Lady’s points about the changes that apply to companies when the TOAA regime is primarily about individuals. The transfer of assets abroad legislation is an anti-avoidance provision aimed at preventing individuals from avoiding a tax charge by transferring an asset to a person overseas while still being able to enjoy the income of that asset in some way. It would be easy for an individual to sidestep the legislation by transferring such an asset to a company that they controlled before the company then made the transfer abroad. The legislative changes are aimed at preventing that situation and ensuring that the TOAA rules are applied as intended.
On the point about the legislation being broad, let us not forget that it is being brought in in response to the Supreme Court judgment; we are trying to make sure that it acts as intended throughout. The intention of the legislation is to put the situation involving transfers by companies back to how HMRC considered it operated before the Supreme Court decision. The transfer of assets abroad legislation aims to stop that tax avoidance.
It is also important to remember that the legislation does not bring a tax charge when the transfer is for genuine commercial reasons or when tax avoidance was not the purpose of the transfer. The new legislation gives individuals the opportunity to exclude themselves from the tax charge if certain conditions are met. We respectfully disagree with the CIOT on some of those conditions. We have outlined some of those, and HMRC will produce further guidance in due course.
On the retroactive criticism, the clause has retroactive effect because if it did not, it would have allowed individuals to abuse the loophole between the date of the Fisher judgment and the enactment of the legislation. Again, we do not believe that there will be a significant increase in complexity. The purpose behind the legislation is primarily to ensure that the regime acts as intended.
I will not go into the weeds on HMRC’s determination process—further guidance will be given—but HMRC will review the facts of a case to judge whether someone is directly or indirectly involved in the decision making of a company. It will accept evidence that shows whether someone is involved or not. However, any arrangements that are put in place purely to be used as evidence that an individual is not involved in the decision making of a company will be disregarded and a charge will be levied if the other conditions are met. As I said, HMRC will issue guidance on how it will approach the matter in due course. Decisions will be made based on the facts of each individual case.
I hope that I have given the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn some assurance. We appreciate the concerns that have raised by key stakeholders, and further information and guidance will be forthcoming.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Minor VAT amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clause 23 makes some minor, technical changes to VAT legislation relating to the DIY house builders’ scheme and VAT credit in the penalty reform regime, and allows for reform of the VAT terminal markets order. I will speak briefly about each measure in turn.
The DIY house builders’ scheme allows individuals building their own home, or converting a non-residential building to their own home, to recover VAT incurred on the cost. That puts individual house builders in the same position as property developers, who are able to sell new build residential property at a zero rate and recover the VAT they incur in the process of constructing new build properties. The scheme was simplified and made digital in December last year, which has significantly reduced the time taken for claims to be paid. Under the new process, only essential details are required on the claim form, eliminating the need for claimants to submit certain evidential documents up front. Based on the information provided on the claim form, HMRC can then request evidential documents to verify the claim.
Clause 23(1) will give HMRC a clear power under the DIY house builders’ scheme to require further evidential documentation, such as invoices, from the person who submitted a claim under the scheme. That will assist HMRC in verifying claims.
Clause 23(3) is a minor update to the existing powers that allow for reform of the VAT terminal markets order. The order reduces VAT administration burdens on commodities traded on specified markets, so the power will allow for simplifications to support businesses trading those commodities. The Government previously announced their intention to reform the order to reflect current market practices and to keep pace with market changes, such as trades in new products, including carbon credits. This clause takes that commitment forward.
Finally, subsections (4) and (5) make changes to ensure that VAT interest rules operate as intended. For most major taxes, the Finance Act 2009 requires HMRC to pay interest on amounts due from HMRC to taxpayers, and to charge interest on late payments to HMRC. Historically, that regime did not apply to VAT, which had its own interest rules. Harmonising the rules on interest was an important step in delivering the Government’s ambition to build a trusted, modern tax administration system. Changes made by the Finance Act 2021 brought VAT interest in line with taxes such as income tax from 1 January last year. In implementing the new interest rules for VAT, HMRC has discovered some minor defects in the legislation, which without correction would force it to act in a way that conflicts with policy intent.
Clause 23 will therefore make two changes to the interest rules. The first will address the situation in which interest ought to be repaid to HMRC because, following an assessment or amendment that reduces the amount of VAT credit, the repayment interest due is also reduced. It was always intended that HMRC could recover all these amounts through a simple automated process that does not add to burdens for taxpayers and HMRC alike. The IT system can already operate, but the legislation, mistakenly, does not always allow that automated recovery. The change will ensure that HMRC can do so in all cases instead of needing a different, onerous process for a minority of cases that the original legislation did not cover.
The second change will make sure that VAT-registered businesses are always protected by a provision that creates a fairer basis for the calculation of interest where they owed money to HMRC over the same time that HMRC owed money to them. The original legislation failed to extend that safeguard to all scenarios in which that could happen with VAT, undermining the fairness of the interest regime. To ensure that all VAT-registered businesses are treated equally, the changes will be given backdated effect to 1 January 2023, when the interest rules were introduced for VAT.
Clause 23 makes some small changes to ensure that policy works as intended and to further Government commitments on reforming the VAT terminal markets order. I commend it to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
The Opposition support the changes that will assist with compliance checks by making online applications equivalent to paper applications. Has the Minister considered adding the online application as a service to the agent services accounts so that an agent can prepare and submit the claim on behalf of their client?
We also support the provisions for modifying the application of VAT for terminal markets, as that will allow for further reforms such as bringing trades in carbon credits within the scope of the Value Added Tax (Terminal Markets) Order. We feel that is a vital and necessary step in developing this important market.
We support the changes to legislation that governs the interaction between late payment interest and repayment interest for VAT. Has the Minister given any thought to reinstating HMRC’s ability not to charge interest on VAT errors where the supplier did not charge VAT, with no loss to the Exchequer because the customer could claim in full?
Drew Hendry
On clause 23’s minor VAT amendments, there is very little to disagree with. VAT should be paid where it is due, and HMRC should pay interest where it should pay interest. That is to be welcomed.
However, on Second Reading I pointed out the paucity of thought and imagination that had gone into providing real help for people across the nations of the UK, and the kinds of thing that the Government could have done but have not. The clause title, “Minor VAT amendments”, just highlights the problem with the entire Bill. The Government could have taken some action to deal with the issues for people in hospitality by cutting VAT and doing something meaningful for tourism, but no: they have chosen to make these minor adjustments. They could have used VAT as a mechanism for helping our high streets to create economic zones that could boost life back into vital high streets and centres. Instead, they have taken to tinkering with the VAT rules.
My question to the Minister is why there is such a lack of ambition in his Government. Is it that this is a fag-end Government in a fag-end Parliament that has run out of ideas, or is it just that they do not care?
Nigel Huddleston
The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey has been charming until this point, and now he goes back to this. I know him very well; I am sure he does not mean it. First, he knows as well as anybody in this House that everybody who comes into Parliament cares: they care about their constituents and they care about the country. We are motivated to come here because we want to make the country a better place for our children and grandchildren.
I know that the hon. Gentleman occasionally gets rather vocal on some of these points, but I politely request that he be a little bit careful with some of his comments. I would never criticise the motivation, incentives or purposes of any colleague in this place. I may fundamentally disagree with some of their policies, but I will not disagree with their motivations. In saying things like “People don’t care” or “The Government don’t care,” I am afraid he is straightforwardly wrong.
Drew Hendry
I am very fond of the Minister, as he knows. We often have these back and forths, and I often have to rise to my feet to correct what he has said. I did not make any assertion about any individual; I was talking about his Government. I was very explicit about that. I just want to make that clear.
Nigel Huddleston
Yet again, I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s trying to clarify, but I am a member of the Government and therefore I am afraid that I do take offence, direct or indirect. But that is a side point to the matters under discussion.
The hon. Gentleman is making fair and valid points about the support that has been given, but I repeat that this Government, like every Government around the world, have had incredibly difficult circumstances to deal with. I do not think that there is any doubt whatever that the support measures that we have put in place to support lives and livelihoods have been incredible and stack up pretty well when compared internationally. That includes cost of living support, as I have mentioned.
I know that the hon. Gentleman is a huge supporter of the tourism, hospitality and leisure industry. We have spoken about that many times, and I know that it is particularly important to Scotland, where it is a disproportionately larger share of the economy than in England, for example, although it is important and large across every single constituency in the UK—and I do mean every single constituency. But the hon. Gentleman is being a little bit rich, because he knows as well as I do that there are other measures beyond VAT to support the hospitality and leisure industry. Of course, in England we have extended the 75% business rates reduction to the retail, hospitality and leisure sector, but that has not been done in Scotland, nor has it been done to its full extent in Wales.
Drew Hendry
I am grateful to the Minister for allowing a bit of back and forth on this. It is generous of him to do so. He fails to mention that in Scotland, 100,000 businesses are lifted out of business rates altogether through the small business bonus scheme. The record in Scotland shows that we are supporting businesses, and those businesses are very prevalent in the tourism sector.
Nigel Huddleston
I acknowledge the efforts made by the Scottish Government to support various sectors, but as I say, on that particular item, the hon. Gentleman will know as well as I do that it is a key ask of the industry in Scotland for the Scottish Government to follow suit with England and elsewhere.
The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn raised several points. Some were slightly out of the scope of the specific measures under discussion, including IT systems and other considerations, but I take on board what she says, as does HMRC, because there is a constant need to review and assess the scope of IT systems and so on. We do so on a regular basis; I spend a lot of time talking to HMRC about this, so I can assure the hon. Lady that the points that she raised are constantly under consideration. I will probably leave it at that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Collective money purchase arrangements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clause 24 makes further provision for collective money purchase arrangements. CMP arrangements are a new type of pension that have the benefit of pooling individuals’ pension pots to provide better incomes in retirement while limiting the liability of employers.
These changes will enable the Government to authorise the transfer of benefits to a member’s beneficiaries, such as their dependants, in the unlikely event that a member dies while a CMP arrangement is being wound up. That will ensure that such transfers do not incur an unauthorised payment charge of 55%, and it will deliver the Government’s commitment to provide the correct tax outcome for CMP arrangements.
The Pension Schemes Act 2021 introduced legislation to allow collective money purchase schemes to operate in the United Kingdom. This measure authorises the transfer of survivor benefits in collective money purchase pension schemes. This will ensure that Royal Mail Group, the first provider of a collective money purchase pension scheme, can launch its scheme as planned.
It is a complicated title, but with a simple purpose. As a result of these changes, an employee of Royal Mail will be able to sign on to a CMP, with all the benefits, without the risk of transferring survivor benefits being put through as unauthorised transactions. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
This clause is so uncontroversial that we give it our full support. For the first time, I agree with everything the Minister has said, and the Committee will be happy to know that I have no further questions for him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Interpretation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
I will be very brief, because the clause is fairly straightforward. It provides for the use of abbreviations for a variety of Acts. For example, it provides for the use of “CTA 2009” as an abbreviation for the Corporation Tax Act 2009. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
The clause provides for the Bill to be known as the Finance (No. 2) Act 2024 upon Royal Assent. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill to the House.
Nigel Huddleston
We have moved forward very quickly today. I thank everybody for their participation: you, Mrs Latham, all the officials in the House, the Clerks, and all those who have been working on the Bill at HMRC, HMT and other Government Departments. I repeat my thanks to the external stakeholders for their comments and to all those who have been involved in consultations. In particular, I thank the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, and the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group for their contributions to this Committee, including in written form, and all those who have participated today.
I look forward to the Bill progressing smoothly through its final stages. I thank everybody involved.
James Murray
I add my thanks to my colleagues in the Opposition: my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Kilburn; the Opposition Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Gower; and, of course, the Back Benchers who have joined us for this lengthy Committee session. [Laughter.] I place on the record my thanks to all the House authorities and to third parties, particularly the Chartered Institute of Taxation, whose expertise is always greatly valued.
Drew Hendry
I, too, rise to pass on my thanks: to you, Mrs Latham, for chairing, and to all the staff and others who have been involved. Whether we agree or vehemently disagree—often, as we have seen today, there are big disagreements—we never forget those people who work hard to produce the documentation and supporting information in all the arms of Parliament, including the House of Commons Library. Thank you.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly to be reported, without amendment.
Football Governance Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 21st May 2024
(6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill 2023-24 View all Football Governance Bill 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 21 May 2024 - (21 May 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 16 to 19 stand part.
New clause 8—Support to clubs—
“(1) The IFR shall provide reasonable and proportionate assistance to—
(a) regulated clubs seeking to obtain a provisional club licence;
(b) regulated clubs with a provisional operating licence seeking an full operating licence; and
(c) unregulated clubs which are reasonably likely to become regulated clubs in the next football season.
(2) The IFR shall provide reasonable and proportionate assistance to regulated clubs in their efforts to continue to comply with the conditions of a provisional or full operating licence.
(3) In fulfilling its duty under subsections (1) and (2), the IFR shall have regard to the factors listed in section 52(9).”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stuart Andrew)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. Starting with clause 15, one of the regulator’s main responsibilities will be to operate a licensing system for football clubs through which the majority of its regulation will be delivered. The licensing regime will cover all football clubs that have a team playing in any competition specified by the Secretary of State in regulations. It is proposed that it will cover the top five leagues of the English football pyramid, but that is subject to the Secretary of State’s discretion and parliamentary approval. I will use “specified competitions” as shorthand to denote those competitions covered by the regime. That means that football clubs will require a licensed, lawfully operated team in any of the specified competitions. A licensing system to enact regulation is not a new idea, with sectors such as communications, finance and healthcare all operating such a system.
The clause sets out the requirement for clubs to have a provisional or full operating licence, and the regulator’s power to grant those licences, subject to clubs passing the relevant tests, which are established in the following clauses. The licence will enable the regulator to regulate clubs through licence conditions set out later in the Bill. This will enable proportionate regulation tailored to clubs rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. An operating licence will specify which club the licence relates to, the team that the club is operating and any conditions attached to the licence.
I will move on to clause 16. The introduction of a football regulator into a previously unregulated sector will be a substantial change to the industry, but a necessary one to safeguard the future of English football. In order to provide for a graduate transition to being a fully licensed club, a club will initially apply to the regulator for a provisional operating licence. We see that as the natural first step to attaining a full operating licence. That will give clubs time to adapt to the regulatory system and make the necessary changes without being unfairly penalised for not being able to raise standards overnight.
The application for a provisional licence requires basic information on the club’s owner or owners, officers and senior management as well as a strategic business plan detailing things such as the estimated costs of the club and how they are expected to be funded. The regulator should look to make that process as simple and straightforward as possible, assisting clubs with their applications where necessary. It will be aware of the possible constraints on smaller clubs lower down the football pyramid. We envisage that the majority of clubs will meet the test for a provisional operating licence through the submission of basic information and documentation, and showing a readiness and willingness to work with the regulator to meet the mandatory licence conditions and free-standing duties.
Clause 17 outlines the granting of a provisional operating licence that will allow the club to operate for a time-limited period. That may be up to three years initially, although it could be shorter or extended depending on the circumstances. The provisional period will allow the regulator time to assess the current standing of the club and determine what steps it will need to take to obtain a full operating licence as well as giving the club time to take the necessary steps. The provisional licence will ensure that all clubs under the remit of the regulator meet basic fundamental requirements, in the mandatory conditions, that will help to safeguard the club’s sustainability and heritage.
There are three aspects of the test to grant a provisional operating licence. First, the club must operate a relevant team in a specified competition, which effectively means that the club must be in scope of the regulator. Secondly, the club will comply with the mandatory licensing conditions attached to the licence by the regulator. Full details of the mandatory licence conditions are in schedule 5 to the Bill, but they encompass a financial plan condition, a corporate governance statement, a fan consultation condition and an annual declaration condition. Thirdly, the club will comply with the duties on clubs as set out in part 5 of the Bill. If the regulator is not satisfied that the club passes all elements of the test, the clause gives a club the opportunity to engage with the regulator to rectify the issues identified. That collaborative approach will aim to ensure that clubs are given every opportunity to meet the requirements and gain a provisional operating licence.
Clause 18 states that in order to pass the test for a full licence, the regulator must be satisfied that a club is meeting the threshold requirements as set out in schedule 4 and that the club is complying and will continue to comply with the mandatory licensing conditions and free-standing duties on clubs set out in part 5. The regulator must also not have determined that any person who is an owner or officer of a club is unsuitable for the position they hold.
Clause 18 also details the power of the regulator to extend the provisional operating licence for a club. That will be done only if the regulator believes that the club does not meet the bar for a full licence at present, but will if given more time. As set out later in the Bill, the regulator will be able to sanction a club if it has to extend its provisional licence. Once a club has a full licence, it will not have to be periodically reviewed. Instead, the regulator would continue to monitor and supervise the club, and there will be an annual touchpoint in the form of the annual declaration, where the club will notify the regulator of any changes within the club over the past year that are relevant to the regulator. That is intended to minimise burdens while still ensuring that the club continues to adhere to the necessary requirements, including requirements that ensure that fans’ best interests are at the heart of the club’s decision-making process.
Clause 19 details the revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, as well as when the licence ceases to have an effect. For a provisional operating licence to be revoked, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should be engaging with the club throughout that period, and we expect that through constructive dialogue, a solution that avoids that drastic step can be found in all but the most serious cases. The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. To reduce as much as possible the regulator’s impact on ongoing sporting competitions, a revocation must not be before the end of the current season.
A licence will cease to have effect only if the club ceases to operate a relevant team. The most likely cause of cessation of an operating licence is that a club has been relegated from a specified competition and is therefore no longer in the scope of the regulator.
I understand the intention behind new clause 8, which would require the regulator to provide clubs with “reasonable and proportionate assistance” as they engage and comply with the licensing system. However, I can reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield South East that the Bill already achieves that in principle. It is already implicit that any good regulator should provide support and assistance to the regulated population as necessary, to aid their understanding and support compliance. But for the avoidance of any doubt, we have also explicitly codified that participative approach into the Bill through the regulatory principles. The regulatory principle in clause 8(b) encourages the regulator to
“so far as reasonably practicable, co-operate, and proactively and constructively engage, with…clubs”.
The regulatory principle in clause 8(c) encourages the regulator to be proportionate. Those two principles would encourage the regulator to provide clubs with assistance in engaging with the licensing system.
It is in everyone’s interest to maximise clubs’ compliance with the system and minimise burdens on them as much as possible. Indeed, ensuring a smooth transition and minimising burdens on clubs has been at the heart of our design of the licensing system. That is precisely why there is a two-step structure of provisional licences followed by full licences, with clubs given time and support to progress from one to the next.
Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Sharma. I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss the content of the operating licences that will make up the regulator’s regime. As the Minister has said, clauses 15 to 19 set out the process for applying and granting both provisional and full operating licences. I would like to welcome a few things about these clauses.
First, I welcome the ability for clubs to gain a provisional licence first, with the conditions in this licence providing the building blocks for the full-time licence. This process recognises the importance of the transition period, allowing clubs to take the necessary time to understand the new requirements and get themselves in order to meet them if needed.
I also welcome that clause 16 clarifies that any club can apply for a provisional licence, allowing those expecting promotion to the National League to be proactive. Further, I am pleased that the process will require a personnel statement to be provided. That will be crucial in ensuring that the regulator is able to hold the right people accountable for the proper fulfilment of the licence at any given club.
The clauses allow for an advocacy first approach, where the regulator will provide an encouraging and flexible pathway for clubs to gain their licences. Coupled with the enforcement power in clause 19 to ensure that the regulator has the teeth it needs in the event of non-compliance, the process in this part of the Bill seems to offer a fair and supportive approach to getting clubs up to speed with the full requirements.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right to highlight in new clause 8 that clubs should be supported in their transition to becoming fully regulated. That is especially important for those clubs in the National League and the lower tiers of the English Football League. In his evidence to this Committee, Steve Thompson, the managing director of Dagenham & Redbridge told us he was
“really worried that the extra reporting…will be more than a lot of them can manage without taking on extra staff.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 14 May 2024; c. 39, Q61.]
He also highlighted that most clubs at National League level operate on one or two full-time staff, with some working on volunteers alone.
I think the Bill has done a good job of ensuring regulation will be proportionate. Further, I believe reporting requirements have been minimised wherever possible and should in any case be balanced out by the benefits of good financial planning and governance. However, given the concerns of clubs, I understand why some may feel it is better to make it explicit that the regulator will support clubs that are or will be licensed.
I hope the Minister can use this as an opportunity to highlight some of the ways in which the Bill as it stands will adopt an advocacy first approach and offer clubs the assistance they need to keep up with the regime. I do not believe it is anyone’s intention for the regulator to have to use its enforcement powers on well-intentioned clubs that are genuinely struggling to comply.
Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Sharma. I thank the Minister for his positive comments on new clause 8, which are very much in line with what it is trying to achieve. I think the Minister said that the new clause is unnecessary because the essence and intention of it is already contained in other clauses, and the regulator would be expected to operate in providing assistance to clubs in line with the way described in new clause 8. I think I have got that right.
Mr Betts
The Minister is nodding on that point. On that basis, I will not push the new clause, because the Minister’s explanation, and the evidence we have heard, reassures me that clubs that are coming up from the National League and want that assistance will be helped in precisely the way the new clause would require of the regulator.
Stuart Andrew
I welcome the positive comments from the hon. Member for Barnsley East. She is right that we are trying to have a fair and supportive approach here and that clubs should be supported.
I want to reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield South East that we have tried to design the Bill so that it recognises that the level of activity at the top of the Premiership, for example, will be vastly different, and that, as we heard in the evidence sessions, many of the club officers in the National League will be volunteers and we would not want to overburden them.
Dame Tracey Crouch (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)
The Minister will have heard the concerns in the evidence sessions about duplication. Will he be kind enough to remind the Committee that it will be for the leagues, not the statutory regulator, to decide whether there is any duplication?
Stuart Andrew
My hon. Friend makes an important point. This will be the statutory regulator, and this will be where the reporting will need to happen. If the leagues add anything, it is for them to make that decision. As this process progresses, I hope they will see that there is no need for the extra layer of reporting and that the regulator’s powers will be sufficient to secure the future of English football.
Anna Firth (Southend West) (Con)
On behalf of a National League club, Southend United, I welcome the light-touch approach set out in clause 8(c). I welcome the Minister’s comments that where the National League is already regulating itself well, there will be a proportionate, light-touch approach to any additional regulation.
Stuart Andrew
At the end of the day, we want to ensure a standard approach to regulation to ensure that we secure clubs in the future. As I say, I hope that as the regulator starts getting up and running, the leagues will see that there is no need for duplication and will make decisions accordingly. Ultimately, however, it is up to them to make that decision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 to 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Threshold requirements
Ian Byrne (Liverpool, West Derby) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 4, in schedule 4, page 93, line 3, leave out from “has” to end of line 6 and insert—
“(a) adequate means by which to consult its fans about relevant matters, and
(b) structures and processes for effective engagement with its fans and takes the views of its fans into account in making decisions about the relevant matters.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 16, in schedule 4, page 93, line 4, leave out “consults” and insert—
“has structures and processes for effective engagement and consultation with”.
Amendment 8, in schedule 4, page 93, line 4, after “matters,” insert—
“including any proposal by the club
(i) to play matches in a competition to which the notice requirements in section 54(7) and (8) apply, or
(ii) to play home matches at a ground other than the club’s home ground, before giving notice of that intention to IFR under section 48(1),”.
Amendment 5, in schedule 4, page 93, line 17, at end insert—
“(4) The club’s establishment and continued delivery of such fan engagement must be independently assessed ahead of it being awarded a full operating licence and in the event of the breach of relevant licence conditions or provisions of this Act.”
Amendment 17, in schedule 4, page 93, line 12, at end insert—
“(2A) The IFR must—
(1) consult the Football Supporters’ Association on defining what constitutes effective fan engagement and consultation by clubs and,
(2) issue guidance on measures to be taken by clubs to ensure effective fan engagement and consultation and lay a copy of that guidance before Parliament within six months of this Act coming into force.”
Schedule 4.
Ian Byrne
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Sharma.
I welcome the line in the Bill that gives use the opportunity to secure the grounds. The Independent Football Regulator must grant approval for a disposal only when it is satisfied that the carrying on of the activity will not undermine the financial sustainability of the club. However, we would also like to see—certainly from the perspective of fans—a consultation of the supporters and the community.
I speak from experience: Liverpool supporters stopped the club relocating from Anfield to an out-of-town ground in Speke. That would have been utterly disastrous for the heritage of the club, as I mentioned to the English Football League chair, who was chair of Liverpool at the time. Also, Everton supporters stopped Everton moving from Goodison, again to an out-of-town stadium, in Kirkby, with a huge Tesco attached. Again, we are talking about something that would have been disastrous for the heritage of the football club, and we would not be seeing Bramley-Moore come into occurrence, potentially as one of the greatest stadiums in the world.
I am saying that to the Minister because that was football supporters changing the direction of travel. I warmly welcome that line on the Independent Football Regulator, but it would be fantastic if we could also consider what the amendment proposes, which is about ensuring that the community and supporters are talked to during any process about the movement of grounds.
Stephanie Peacock
Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements on clubs, which I will address before moving on to the amendments. The requirements cover sustainable resourcing—both financial and non-financial—and fan engagement. Before I address each of those areas in turn, I confirm that I welcome each of all the requirements as a whole.
The first condition is about financial resources. At this point, it is important to set out some context on football finances and regulation. As the Secretary of State said on Second Reading, clubs will not and should not be required to break even under the requirements. Ambition, investment and, indeed, a level of risk are fundamental to football and the pursuit of success. That is what makes the game so exciting and varied, something football fans never want to lose.
Owners Steve Parish and Tony Bloom emphasised that in their evidence to us, with Steve Parish saying of football,
“It is not a business with a profit principle…people’s desire to win will always trump their desire to make money.” ––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 14 May 2024; c. 59, Q94.]
Ian Byrne
The issues addressed in amendment 8 are paramount. FIFA is already talking about opening the door to games being played in another country, and the league seems to be making moves to play games in the USA. Unfortunately, that is the direction of travel that could come to our doorstep. Consultation with supporters and supporter bodies through the IFR will be hugely important if the Premier League decides that it wants to start playing games abroad, because that is a slippery slope for the heritage of football in this country.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for those comments; I am sure that the Minister was listening. I will come to the issue of playing games abroad in future Committee sittings, but I hope that the deterrent of the regulator’s enforcement, as well as the fact that the prohibition will apply whether or not a club is licensed, will be enough to dissuade clubs from making such plans anyway. A club that is willing to participate in a prohibited competition is a club that is willing to risk losing its licence, which would release it from the fan consultation requirements anyway.
The amendment is right to highlight that fans are not currently given a say in the Bill on changes to where their home matches are played. We will come to that point later, when we look at further amendments that give fans a say on stadiums.
Mr Betts
On the point about playing games abroad, which we will come back to later, it is interesting that although clubs will have to consult their fans, if the competition organiser decides to move games abroad and requires the clubs to do so as part of the competition requirements, there is no requirement for the competition organiser to consult fans. That seems to be a hole in the provisions that we will have to address at some point.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for that comment, which I will talk about later. I am sure that the Minister also heard it and will respond if he feels able to. For now, I ask the Minister to set out his thinking on why fans are not consulted on the heritage implications of moving a home ground. Overall, I welcome schedule 4 but would welcome a strengthening of the fan engagement provisions.
Stuart Andrew
Schedule 4 introduces the threshold requirements that clubs will have to meet to be granted a full operating licence. These are the three main areas of the regulator’s club licensing regime, which build on the freestanding duties and the mandatory conditions. Meeting the threshold requirements will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently and will be able to continue to operate sustainably in its financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas.
Although the threshold requirements are principles set in legislation, what each club must do to meet those requirements will not be the same. For example, what constitutes appropriate financial resources for a Premier League club will be very different from a League One club. A club might already meet the threshold requirements—for example, through naturally good operations or by complying with competition rules—in which case, the regulator will not need to intervene directly. If a club does not, the regulator can apply discretionary licence conditions to bring it up to the required threshold. That structure will allow for a proportionate system with requirements tailored to individual clubs, rather than the approach taken by the industry to date of blanket rules catering to the lowest denominator but applying to all.
The threshold requirement for financial resources means that clubs need an appropriate level of financial resources to support their long-term financial sustainability, accounting for their circumstances and risks. For example, that might include which competition the club competes in, its financial relationship with its owners, and the wider economic context in which it operates.
In particular, the regulator should take into account the club’s financial plan and its contingency plans for dealing with financial shocks. For non-financial resources, a similar requirement and process applies. “Non-financial resources” refers to things such as internal controls, systems and policies, as well as the information and people that the club has at its disposal. Although not financial in nature, those are important resources for any well-run club, so they need to be adequate. When assessing whether the resources are appropriate, the regulator might consider the skills and experience of the senior management and its corporate governance arrangements.
The threshold requirement for fan engagement requires that clubs adequately consult and consider the views of fans when making decisions relating to certain specified matters. As we heard from the FSA on Tuesday, this is the first time that there has ever been a requirement for fan engagement to this extent. The relevant matters are listed in the Bill and cover key off-pitch decisions, which the fan-led review highlighted as important to fans across the specified leagues. The threshold requirement is designed to work in tandem with the fan consultation mandatory licence condition. Through that condition, all clubs must regularly consult a representative group of supporters to discuss the relevant matters listed in the Bill, and that must be in place by the time a club receives a provisional licence.
Appropriate fan engagement will look different at every club and will partly be based on the size and complexity of the club’s fanbase. The threshold requirement has been designed to allow the regulator to recognise the inherent variation between clubs while ensuring that standards are raised where necessary.
Ian Byrne
Is the Minister confident that independence will be hardwired into engagement? Regarding the fan advisory boards, there are several examples of Premier League clubs flooding them with club employees. For engagement to work, it has to be completely independent so that we can hold the powers that be to account.
Stuart Andrew
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and I give that reassurance. If fans feel that the body that is currently being consulted is not truly representative, the independent regulator can have a look and, if necessary, apply discretionary licence conditions.
Fans, as everybody has said, are the foundation of any club. Putting in place a supporter engagement threshold requirement recognises that they must be consulted on key issues that affect their club. The requirement for clubs to have adequate means to consult their fans and to take fans’ views into account allows the regulator to consider the outcomes of fan engagement and whether the appropriate processes are in place at clubs and are being utilised.
Importantly, the regulator will be able to take enforcement action, such as censure statements, where it deems it appropriate following non-compliance with the licence conditions relating to the fan engagement threshold requirement. That is just one of the factors that results in a robust fan engagement requirement on clubs.
Amendments 4 and 16, however, seek to add something that is already captured in the legislation, with the difference in legal effect of “adequate” and “effective” being negligible. There does not seem to be a way in which a club’s fan consultation could be determined to be adequate without the structures and processes for effective engagement in place. Although the Government understand the intent to make sure that the fan engagement provisions in the Bill are strong, I can provide reassurance that that is the case already and I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby will be able to withdraw his amendment.
Turning to amendment 8, I have been clear that the Government agree with the need for many clubs to engage with their fans on more issues. We expect that the issues of joining a new competition or not playing matches at their home ground would already be captured by the “relevant matters” of
“(a) the club’s strategic direction and objectives;
(b) the club’s business priorities;
(c) operational and match-day issues;”
and matters relating to “the club’s home ground”. It is therefore already implicit in the “relevant matters”, so to add this amendment would be duplicative.
Stuart Andrew
The leagues will have to report to the regulator if they are making changes to any of the competition rules—that is a requirement within the legislation. If changes to competition rules were to impact any of the “relevant matters” in the Bill regarding fan consultation, the club will be required to consult the fans on the related club decisions. However, where changes to competition rules do not have such an impact, it does not seem appropriate to mandate that consultation. Therefore, I hope that the amendment will not be moved.
Mr Betts
Is the Minister saying that if there is a requirement by FIFA, UEFA, the Premier League or any other league for clubs to play their home matches away in another country, the clubs would have to consult the fans about that issue and the regulator would take account of that consultation, even if it was a requirement on the club by the competition organiser? Could the regulator overrule the requirement of the competition organiser in line with the fan consultation that a club would have to engage in?
Stuart Andrew
I think I understand the hon. Gentleman’s question, but my understanding is that that will be looked at on case-by-case basis. I want to ensure that I have exactly the right line for him and I would not want to give any misinformation, so I will write to him, if he will allow it.
On amendment 5, the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby is correct that fan engagement in football clubs is an integral part of football and capturing that in the Bill is essential. Regarding the specific amendment, I assure him that the fan engagement threshold requirement and the wider licensing regime already captures what the amendment is describing. As the Bill is drafted, before a club receives a full operating licence, the regulator—which is independent—will assess if the club has adequate means to consult fans and to take their views into account on a range of issues in the Bill. The test for a full licence, which is set out in clause 18, is such that a full licence cannot be granted unless the club meets the threshold requirements, including those on fan engagement.
Once a licence is granted, the regulator will continue to monitor the club’s adherence to all the threshold requirements, including on fan engagement. For the avoidance of any doubt, the regulator’s general duties in clause 7(4) explicitly require that. If the regulator identifies that a club is no longer meeting the fan engagement threshold requirement, the regulator can take relevant action to bring the club back to meeting that threshold requirement. Given that those elements are already a feature of the licensing regime, I hope the hon. Member will not move his amendment.
On amendment 17, the FSA has been extensively consulted from the fan-led review until now. I am incredibly grateful to Kevin Miles and all those at the FSA for their support—the amount of help and support that they have given to this process has been extraordinary. The Government expect that the regulator will continue that engagement with the FSA, and it is often likely to be a relevant stakeholder on fan engagement. It is therefore not appropriate for the legislation to bind the regulator unnecessarily, but I hope that that makes it clear that we expect the FSA to be consulted where relevant.
As currently drafted, the Bill is future-proofed so that the regulator may always consult the most appropriate stakeholders in relation to and at the time of a particular decision. The regulator will be best placed to establish what adequate fan consultation looks like in practical detail, given its position of oversight and understanding of each club’s fan base. Adequate fan engagement is not a one-size-fits-all, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East mentioned, and limiting it to a strict definition would water down the intention for clubs to be able to take a bespoke approach. The legislation has deliberate, in-built flexibility so that fan engagement expectations can be tailored to a club’s size, fan base and individual circumstances.
On the topic of guidance on fan consultation, it will be for the regulator to determine the most effective course of action in relation to producing and publishing any formal guidance, the contents of guidance and the timing of publication. As we heard on Tuesday, this is a key area for the FSA, and the Government expect that the regulator will work at pace on any required formal guidance, working throughout with appropriate stakeholders, including the FSA. Setting a legislative requirement for that may risk rushing the regulator’s work in the space without sufficient time for necessary consultation with those stakeholders, or force the premature publication of guidance to the detriment of its quality. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Barnsley East will withdraw her Bill—sorry, her amendment. [Laughter.]
Stephanie Peacock
We are all in agreement that one-size-fits-all is not appropriate, and that certainly was not the thinking behind the amendment. We certainly do not want to make measures more prescriptive; it is about ensuring that whatever means clubs choose to consult their fans are effective and focused on outcomes. We certainly do not want to rush the regulator; the text of the amendment says “within six months”. Although I am happy not to press amendment 16, I will push amendment 17 to a vote.
Amendment proposed: 17, in schedule 4, page 93, line 12, at end insert—
“(2A) The IFR must—
(1) consult the Football Supporters’ Association on defining what constitutes effective fan engagement and consultation by clubs and,
(2) issue guidance on measures to be taken by clubs to ensure effective fan engagement and consultation and lay a copy of that guidance before Parliament within six months of this Act coming into force.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in schedule 5, page 95, line 36, at end insert—
“8A Where a club’s fans have established legally registered Supporters Trusts, clubs must have regard to whether these bodies should become the appropriate representation in its fan consultation process under paragraph (8).” Amendment 7, in schedule 5, page 95, line 40, at end insert—
“(3) Persons selected as representing the views of the club’s fans should be appointed through a process that is democratic and independent of club control.
(4) Where the club’s fans have established a legally registered Supporters Trust, that body should have appropriate representation in the club’s consultation processes.” Schedule 5.
Stuart Andrew
Clause 20 requires the regulator to attach the four mandatory licence conditions to the provisional and full operating licences of all licensed clubs. These are basic and fundamental requirements of the whole regime, so apply to all licensed clubs, regardless of their individual circumstances. The mandatory conditions vary in what they attempt to achieve, and are set out in schedule 5, which I will discuss after amendments 19 and 7.
In our view the amendments risk undermining the key intention to implement a proportional and flexible system for fan engagement. Mandating specific forms of fan representation may lead to clubs being required to implement an entirely new way of engaging with their fans, even where existing frameworks are working well. Should it be deemed necessary, the regulator already has the power, established in schedule 5, to specify the means by which clubs are required to consult those representing the views of fans, which may include how a representative group of fans should be constituted. The regulator may specifically choose to require a club to implement a mechanism for the independent selection of fan representatives. On that basis, I hope that Opposition Members will not press the amendments.
The conditions set out in schedule 5 are related to core areas of financial management, corporate governance, fan engagement and reporting, and will form the foundations for the overall improved standards and sustainability of a club. Long-term financial sustainability is at the heart of the Bill, and is vital to make clubs more resilient to financial difficulties. The financial plan condition allows the regulator to understand the risk profile of the club and its plans for mitigating risks if necessary. To do this, the regulator needs detailed financial information about clubs. This allows it to establish the risk profile of a club and then, if necessary, to make a considered, proportionate intervention to reduce the risk of that club getting into financial difficulty.
As well as allowing the regulator to assess the risk profile of a club, a detailed financial plan will help clubs to establish their funding requirements over a period of time. Clubs need to have sufficient funds, or access to such funds, to support their intended level of spending. Clubs will need to model their financial plan against different scenarios and over different periods. They will also need appropriate contingency plans that they can enact if their finances worsen, in order to get them back to a sustainable state. This is to ensure that clubs can be ambitious and, equally, to prevent the failure to achieve those ambitions from putting the club’s long-term financial sustainability at risk.
Mr Betts
On corporate governance, I do not want to name names, but this relates to a club not too far from me. Is the Minister saying that in the future it will not be appropriate to regulate the corporate governance of a club if it merely has an owner who is the chairman, and no board of directors to run the club?
Stuart Andrew
The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point, which is why one of the mandatory conditions is good corporate governance. Some clubs do that extremely well, and he gives an example of one that may not be doing so well. For it to get a licence, the regulator would expect a minimum level of corporate governance.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 20 and schedule 5 provide us with the building blocks of a licensing regime. The Minister set out the mandatory licence conditions that all clubs must comply with in order to obtain a provisional or full licence. That will ensure that base-level requirements are fulfilled on key areas such as finances, corporate governance and fan engagement. I will speak briefly to each area in turn, and then address the amendments.
The first condition relates to financial plans. I will not spend too much time on it as we have already discussed financial resources. However, I believe that the requirement to submit a financial plan would be fundamental for clubs wanting to exercise best practice.
The second requirement is on corporate governance. As we just discussed, good corporate governance can help to deliver better business outcomes, improve the efficiency of decision making and demonstrate to stakeholders that a club is well managed, to the benefit of both fans and investors. Furthermore, as the Government’s White Paper says, poor governance can exacerbate financial issues, allowing reckless decisions to be made without challenge or scrutiny. Many clubs already engage in good corporate governance, and for those that are not, the introduction of requirements should genuinely help to move them towards best practice.
However, I have some questions about the content of the corporate governance code of practice, which will be published by the regulator and reported against by clubs. In particular, Fair Game and Kick It Out have questioned whether issues such as equality, diversity and inclusion will be included in the code. Indeed, the Government chose not to pick up the recommendation of the fan-led review to mandate EDI action plans through the licence regime, pointing instead towards enhanced industry assessments in that area.
I understand the need to ensure that existing structures that are working well are not disrupted, and to give the regulator a well-defined scope. Given the explicit focus that the regulator will have on good governance, however, it seems slightly odd to divorce the concept from the issue of EDI. The fan-led review said:
“Aside from a clear moral case, improving diversity is also a key aspect of driving better business decisions by football clubs. Diverse companies perform better”.
A football that welcomes everyone, then, is a football in which clubs have the best possible chance of success. But change is needed at almost every level for that to happen.
Kick It Out’s reporting statistics from last season show that it received a record 1,007 reports of discriminatory behaviour across the professional game, including a 400% increase in reports of sexism and misogyny. Meanwhile, in 2019, the law firm Farrer & Co found that across all professional football clubs only 7% of board directors were female. Just one club met the 30% target set for other industries, and only 7% have a woman in a leadership position on the board. Work must be done to address the problem across the board. I am keen to hear from the Minister about how whether issues such as EDI will form part of the governance code will ultimately be decided, and whether he has a view on whether they should.
I have spoken about fan consultation in detail during our discussions on schedule 4, so I will save repeating how important it is. However, I would like to raise some further concerns. Namely, I am disappointed that the Bill makes no provisions regarding supporters’ trusts, as noted by my amendment 19 and amendment 7 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby.
At the time of the fan-led review, 73 clubs had a community benefit society in the form of a supporters’ trust. Community benefit societies are incorporated co-operatives that conduct business for the benefit of their community. They must follow certain rules, including operating on a democratic basis and ensuring that any profits gained by a trust can only be reinvested into the club or returned to the community. Those minimum standards mean that CBSs in the form of supporters’ trusts operate with a broad level of consistency and reliability. Many of them have a long legacy of connecting with the local area, liaising with their club and organising on behalf of fans. Many trusts should therefore be viewed as an asset to the community that clubs can learn from and engage with positively. We saw that at first hand in our evidence sessions, with the insight that Action for Albion, Supporters’ Trust At Reading and Arsenal Supporters’ Trust brought us in respect of their clubs and the view of their communities.
I understand why the Bill has sought to ensure that fan engagement measures are not a one-size-fits-all. However, where trusts are established, I believe that clubs should consider them when forming their consultation processes. Amendment 19 would ensure that where a club’s fans have established a legally registered supporters’ trust, that body is considered for representation in the club’s fan consultation process. Clubs would not be bound by any hard-and-fast rules, but would be encouraged to consider the benefits of engaging relevant existing trusts.
That brings me to the broader issue of how fans will be selected for consultation. Amendment 7 suggests that fans are given a democratic mandate if they are to be consulted by the club regularly. That way they would have the backing of fellow fans, helping to avoid scenarios in which the fans are seen as a mouthpiece for the club directed at fans, rather than the other way round. I am keen to hear how the Minister thinks we can ensure that fans are both selected and treated fairly. Will there be standards or guidance on that specific issue?
Finally, I am pleased to touch on the annual declaration condition. Given that there is no requirement for licences to be renewed, it is right that there is a touchpoint for clubs with the regulator to ensure that everything is in order, but I have one brief question. The schedule outlines that the annual declaration must contain a summary of any “material change” at the club over the year. That phrase is used 11 times throughout the Bill, but its definition is not clearly set out. Will the Minister provide a working definition today, or write to me with one?
Overall, I am broadly happy with the contents of the clause and schedule, albeit with a few questions that I would like answering on governance code and on supporter involvement.
Rachel Hopkins (Luton South) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate on an important Bill. I would like clarification on a few points with regard to schedule 5, particularly—following the excellent remarks made by the shadow Minister, with which I wholeheartedly agree—paragraph 7(4), which states:
“Before publishing a code of practice or any alterations to the code, the IFR must consult…the Football Association, and…other such persons as appear to the IFR to be representative of persons likely to be affected by the code.”
Can I seek assurances from the Minister that fans and fans’ representative groups will be included as people who are likely to be affected by the code? They will take a deep interest in the corporate governance of their clubs, which is why we are here with this piece of legislation. Similarly, I would like to press for clarifications on reporting on equality and diversity and inclusion matters, which are a really important aspect of good corporate governance. Once again, I add my support to the remarks made by the shadow Minister.
Ian Byrne
I wish to support the excellent remarks by the shadow Minister, who gave a very comprehensive overview of why we need amendments to the Bill. There is a real worry, as I have outlined, that the clubs will seek to dilute the power of the supporter’s voice by filling the boards full of stooges, shall we say. We need some sort of system to ensure that boards are appointed through a democratic and independent process. Supporters trusts are a ready-made option. There are over 130 of them in the football world. They are democratic, independent organisations that have the trust of the wider supporter base, mainly. It would be foolish not to utilise that expertise and the system that is already in place.
If a club has not got a supporters trust we need to have some sort of oversight to ensure there are independent fan voices holding clubs to account, which will be a crucial part of the independent football regulator. We have got to ensure that those boards are fit for purpose and, as I said, not diluted by clubs that want to disempower supporters and supporter voices.
Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
I want to repeat the point I made on Second Reading about the corporate governance statement, which is part of the licensing condition. I think this is incredibly important—indeed, it will be important for the regulator, because it is part of the conditions of issuing the licence.
My right hon. Friend the Minister has said that the regulator will issue of a code of practice. It is important that we are clear what, in passing this legislation, Parliament intends this code of practice should contain. Competition organisers already require clubs to demonstrate many of the requirements discussed in this debate. For example, the Premier League’s own governance statement says that the Premier League handbook acts as the rulebook for all member clubs, which includes the clubs having to demonstrate
“minimum standards of governance and operation on a wide range of areas, from safeguarding and supporter relations to broadcaster access, stadium infrastructure and club academies”.
By asking for this sort of information, the regulator would merely be repeating requests which the clubs have to fulfil for their competition organisers anyway. I agree with the evidence we received from Kick It Out, which said that it would be extraordinary that such a corporate governance statement would not include the club’s policies on equality, diversity and inclusion. I do not think we would necessarily be asking for the clubs to do more work than they do already. We would simply be asking that their own policies in these areas be clearly set out in the corporate governance statement they give to the regulator. That would mean that the regulator would have the power to hold the clubs to account for those policies. If necessary, the regulator could even audit or investigate clubs if it felt they were in breach of those conditions, which would almost certainly be a breach not only of the pledges they have made to the regulator but of the rules of the competitions within which they play.
Dame Tracey Crouch
Will my hon. Friend clarify something? Is he saying is that there is no need to change any part of the Bill? This needs to be reflected in the intent of the corporate governance statement, and some of these things can be included without amendment to the legislation?
Damian Collins
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. That is exactly correct. I think it is a question of being clear as to what the corporate governance statement should include, either in the Bill or at least in the explanatory notes. The explanatory notes already say that a description of all the operations of all the elements of the club should be included; it would be extraordinary if we thought that that did not include a statement on equality, diversity and inclusion, or on the welfare of the players. This has been requested throughout the passage of the Bill. In particular, we have heard that at present there is no requirement for an EDI statement, nor are players mentioned at all. As my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford says, without changing the structure of the Bill, or maybe even its wording Bill, we could make it really clear that these things are included through these important corporate governance statements.
Stuart Andrew
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I agree with the hon. Member for Barnsley East that the guidance on corporate governance should be really helpful to clubs that are perhaps struggling with that, and puts it on a statutory footing. As my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe quite rightly points out, many of these clubs, by obligation of the leagues they are in, already have to provide a corporate governance code. However, as we go further down the pyramid, there are varying degrees of quality for that corporate governance code. That is why having a statutory requirement will, we hope, improve those standards. We recognise that some of those codes work well, but my hon. Friend is right: this will enable the regulator to hold those clubs to account for the way in which they are implementing those corporate governance codes.
Damian Collins
My right hon. Friend makes a good point. The requirements will differ at different levels of the pyramid. It would be wrong for us to require a club in League Two to meet the same corporate governance standards as a Premier League club. However, the provision could be worded to say that the corporate governance statements must set out how the clubs meet all the requirements they are expected to meet by the competition organisers for the competition in which they play.
Stuart Andrew
I expect that clubs would have to work closely with the leagues as well.
On the issue of EDI, I hope that it is clear this is an area that I personally feel very passionate about. We have made sure that the Bill and the regulator are tightly focused on the finances of clubs, the sustainability of the pyramid and fan engagement. We recognise the importance of equality, particularly, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East mentioned, in light of unacceptable abuses. I regularly engage with the Football Association and the leagues to put pressure on them and to work with them to do more to make improvements in this area. We also work with organisations such as Sport England and UK Sport, because it is not just football where this is an issue.
Dame Tracey Crouch
On the sports governance code, which I may have had a hand in helping to design and shape many years ago, is the Minister saying that when looking at the issue of corporate governance, he will draw on the experience of the sports governance code, which has specific EDI aspect it, or is it more about looking at the UK corporate governance code, which has elements of that but is certainly not as strong as the sports governance code?
Stuart Andrew
My hon. Friend makes a really important point, which I was just about to come on to. I am glad that she did so—it was a perfect introduction. She is absolutely right. The regulator can consider all of those, and I would expect that it would do so. It can draw on established principles such as, as she rightly points out, the code for sports governance and the UK corporate governance code. It can also draw on the Wates principles on corporate governance for large private companies, and it can also draw on the regulator’s own state-of-the-game reports. There is a whole host of information which I hope will address those issues.
I can confirm to the hon. Lady for Luton South that the phrase, “likely to be affected”, includes fans, so I expect that they will be consulted.
Damian Collins
My right hon. Friend’s response is helpful. If the Government are not willing to amend the Bill, and do not feel the need to do so, would he consider writing to the Committee, setting out the guidance which he would give to the regulator when preparing the codes of practice on what the corporate governance code should include?
Stuart Andrew
Yes, I would be more than happy to do that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 21
Discretionary licence conditions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 22 to 24 stand part.
Schedule 6.
Clause 25 stand part.
Stuart Andrew
I will begin with clause 21. Where needed, discretionary licence conditions will be used by the regulator to bring a club up to the required level of compliance with the threshold requirements. That means that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently, and will continue to be able to, operate sustainably in financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas, as per the regulator’s objectives. Those conditions will be in addition to the standardised mandatory licence conditions and, when applied, will be tailored to the club’s specific circumstances and identified financial risks. If a club already meets the threshold requirements set by the regulator, the regulator will not need to attach any discretionary licence conditions. That means that it can be light touch where appropriate, and need not directly intervene if the desired outcomes are already being met. Discretionary licence conditions could also be used to protect and promote the financial resilience of the football system. The conditions would be used to resolve risks that might not threaten any one club significantly, but their potential aggregated, correlated or multiplied effects may pose a significant risk to large parts of the football system, or the pyramid as a whole.
Clause 22 sets out the scope of the regulator’s powers to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition. Under the financial resources threshold requirement, discretionary conditions may only relate to one of four areas including debt management, liquidity requirements, and overall cost reduction, or they might restrict a club’s ability to receive illicit finance. The fourth area is integral and enables the regulator to restrict the club’s ability to access funding that it has reasonable grounds to suspect is connected to serious criminal conduct. It will empower the regulator to limit illicit finance, which is inherently unsustainable for a club.
Under the non-financial resources threshold requirement, conditions may only relate to one of three areas: internal financial controls, risk management, and financial reporting. As outlined in the previous clause, the regulator can also attach discretionary licence conditions to advance its systemic financial resilience objective. That objective is specifically to address systemic risks, or structural issues, by applying conditions to multiple clubs or even to all licensed clubs. Clause 22 limits the scope of discretionary licence conditions to only conditions that relate to debt management, liquidity requirements, and overall cost reduction.
To future-proof the regulated regime, the Secretary of State will have the power to amend the areas to which discretionary licence conditions may relate. However, that can be done only if the regulator makes a request in writing to the Secretary of State, having first held a consultation, explaining why an amendment is needed by reference to the purpose of the Act. That will limit the risk of unwanted, politically motivated scope-creep in the future.
Clause 23 sets out the procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions on clubs. The procedure outlined in the clause ensures that clubs and competition organisers are notified and given the appropriate opportunity to engage in advance when the regulator considers a discretionary licence condition is needed. Where appropriate, the regulator will seek to allow the relevant club and league to address identified issues and risks so that it does not have to intervene formally. That may produce a better regulatory response and outcome. The football industry may be best placed to address specific issues within the overall context of a league’s regulatory framework.
Ian Byrne
I thank the Minister for what he has said so far. I want to touch on a point for the clubs and, certainly, for supporters, having spoken to those of both Everton and Nottingham Forest, regarding profit and sustainability rules and the tariff that was served on them. At the moment, there seems to be zero confidence in the Premier League’s ability to govern that system and there are many calls—in fact, I got about 14 last night—from supporters right across the board who are asking why the independent financial regulator is not taking control of the whole profit and sustainability issue, any breaches and then levying the punishment to clubs in a manner that people think would be fair and transparent and, as I say, a process that they have a belief in. At the moment, they undoubtedly do not have that and that is a real worry.
It would be remiss of me not to touch on Manchester City winning the league yesterday and congratulate the club on that. However, there are 115 charges hanging over the club’s head and there is lots of disquiet around the whole process. It would have been welcome if the Minister had considered whether that should sit with the independent financial regulator to restore faith in the whole process, which, unfortunately, is not there.
Stuart Andrew
I understand what the hon. Gentleman says, but there is a balance about football having its rules and independence. We have to honour that in terms of relationships with UEFA and FIFA. However, we are ensuring that there is a regulatory regime that I hope will start to improve confidence among fans, as the hon. Gentleman describes. When it comes to the specific area under focus, if the regulator feels that the league’s proposition does not meet the objectives it needs to fulfil its duties, it can decide that it will still impose its own. The regulator will have to be satisfied that what the league is proposing will meet its required objectives.
Before any action is taken by the regulator, there will be a period where both the relevant leagues and clubs can make any representations and in which the relevant league, as a competition organiser, can also give a commitment to take action in lieu of the condition being attached or varied, as proposed by the regulator. Where the regulator is looking to attach financial discretionary licence conditions to a club, it must go through the relevant procedure to do so, as outlined in clause 23.
Clause 24 sets out further details on one key aspect of the procedure: a final, formal opportunity for competition organisers to offer a self-regulatory solution to a problem identified by the regulator so that the regulator does not have to step in. That is known as the competition organiser making a commitment in lieu of a financial discretionary licence condition. The clause is another important aspect of the regulator’s approach, which emphasises engagement and working with the industry to minimise formal intervention where possible. The regulator will still have powers to step in if the issue is not resolved, but it provides the chance for a competition organiser to present a football industry-led solution to an identified risk.
The regulator can accept a commitment if it concludes that that commitment should achieve the same results as the proposed discretionary licence condition and it does not conflict with the regulator’s objectives. If the commitment proposed by the league will not achieve the regulator’s desired outcome, the regulator can reject it—to repeat the point to the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby—and retains the power to intervene directly by imposing the discretionary licence condition.
Ian Byrne
For clarity, if the disquiet continues around the Premier League’s handling of the financial sustainability rules and the punishments it has meted out, and if the independent regulator believes it is not a fair and transparent system and that there are holes in the system, it can intervene.
Stuart Andrew
This is in relation to the mandatory conditions that all clubs have to meet under the regulatory regime. If the regulator identifies that a club is not meeting one of the mandatory conditions set out in the Bill on the financial side, it can apply its own discretionary conditions. If the league proposes a solution to the problem and the regulator believes that it will work, it can then allow the league to apply that. However, if the regulator feels that the proposal put forward by the league would not get that club up to the standards required, it can then impose its own rule. I hope that makes sense.
Schedule 6 outlines the procedure for when the regulator is minded to accept a commitment given by a competition organiser, and covers requests to vary an existing commitment. The schedule therefore expands on clause 24. As I say, if it does not accept the commitment, the regulator can impose the original conditions. The intention is that commitments could provide a less burdensome solution for all parties that still addresses the risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for the interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator. Schedule 6 sets out that procedure in further detail. The notification processes and timings set out in the schedule allow clubs the opportunity to make representations before the regulator accepts a commitment or requested variation of an existing commitment from a competition organiser, and before the regulator releases a competition organiser from a commitment.
Finally, clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary non-financial discretionary licence conditions. Such conditions, set under the non-financial resources and fan engagement threshold requirements, will not be subject to the commitments procedure involving relevant leagues as outlined in the previous clauses. Instead, the procedure is that the regulator must notify only the club and give the club a period of no less than 14 days to make representations. As per previous clauses, this is an important safeguard to allow the club to make its case. However, the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious. If the regulator believes that giving the club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately, without prior notice.
Stephanie Peacock
I will start by briefly addressing the broad provisions around discretionary licence conditions in clauses 21, 22 and 23 together, before moving on to a discussion on commitments in lieu of licence conditions, covering clauses 24 and 25 and schedule 6.
Looking first at the discretionary licence conditions, clause 21 allows the regulator to attach licence conditions that are specific to a particular club. This allows the regulator a mechanism to put the principles of proportionality and consistency into practice: every club will be required to meet the threshold conditions for a full licence, providing us with consistency, but where a club falls short, the regulator’s response can be bespoke, allowing for proportionality.
Clause 22 provides strict limits as to what the discretionary licence conditions can cover, ensuring that they are focused on the areas in which they are most needed. Finally, clause 23 requires the Independent Football Regulator to notify a club, as well as the relevant competition organiser, about a proposed financial discretionary licence condition before attaching it to a licence. This is a sensible provision, which allows for a club and the regulator to remain in conversation unless there is an immediate risk that further delay would threaten the club’s financial sustainability.
I will move on to the idea of commitments in lieu of discretionary licence conditions. This requirement, which was not initially proposed as part of the fan-led review or the Government’s White Paper, says that the regulator must invite the relevant competition organiser to give a commitment to make a rule of its own instead of the proposed condition’s being attached to the particular club’s licence. I understand that the reasoning behind that provision is to ensure that competition impacts can be reduced, allowing a competition organiser to try to ensure that one club alone does not have to face a rule that other clubs do not. Further to that, it exists to offer competition organisers an opportunity to improve consistency across clubs in following good practice. However, despite that, a number of concerns about these clauses have been raised with me, so I hope that the Minister can provide some further context in answer to some of the following questions.
First, it would be good to have confirmation that this provision cannot be exploited to delay the regulator from imposing licence conditions. Consultation will be incredibly important as part of the regulator’s functions, but the regulator must have the teeth to make an executive decision where needed. In that vein, it would be good if the Minister could provide some insight on what these commitments might mean for rule primacy.
I understand that the regulator will have the final say on whether a commitment in lieu is accepted, and that the discretionary licence condition must be dropped while a commitment is in force, but it still remains the case that any accepted commitment will mean that both the regulator and competition organiser will have oversight and scope in the same area. That could see clubs paying twice for two sets of overlapping rules. Who has ultimate power in these cases?
Another area where clarification is needed is on the topic of commercial sensitivities. Although the Premier League is in many ways representative of clubs, it is also a competitor to clubs when it comes to gaining big sponsorship deals. Can the Minister confirm that the regulator will be alert to the ways in which discretionary licence conditions are discussed with competition organisers, so that sensitive information is not disclosed? Indeed, in cases involving such commercially sensitive information, it seems slightly odd to think that the competition organiser, which will not have the full picture, would be better placed to create a rule than the regulator itself, which will be privy to more of the financial details.
Finally, it is welcome that the relevant club will be consulted about a commitment in lieu beforehand, as per schedule 6, but, for the other clubs competing in a relevant competition, who will also be impacted by the commitment, there is no right to consultation. That might seem strange to clubs that have done what is required of them to meet the threshold requirements; they face being subject to further regulation due to the specific circumstances of another club’s finances, without a fair say in the matter. I should be grateful to the Minister, therefore, if he would set out how the Bill will ensure that clubs are not ignored in the engagement process when the commitment in lieu being proposed will directly apply to them.
Stuart Andrew
The hon. Lady makes important points. The idea is that as we have a regulator on a statutory footing, which will improve standards, hopefully that will bring football along with those improved standards. However, she is right to highlight the point about sensitive information. The regulator will be on a statutory footing and will be able to look at that information.
That is why it is important for the regulator to allow the leagues and clubs to make representations. The leagues may be able to say, “We can offer a commitment in lieu that will address this and look at the detail of that,” but the regulator, having information from the club that may be sensitive and private, can work out that, “Actually, that commitment in lieu will not meet the objectives,” and therefore impose its own discretionary licence condition.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Part 4: overview and interpretation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
The Government’s White Paper laid out several failings of the existing owners and directors tests conducted by the football authorities. The tests are conducted on a self-declaration basis, and have allowed owners with long histories of business bankruptcies and owners later imprisoned for crimes including money laundering. To address such shortcomings, the Bill includes strong statutory owners and directors tests, a vital part of the new Independent Football Regulator’s regime.
Part 4 gives the regulator the power to test the suitability of prospective new owners and officers of regulated clubs. In certain circumstances, it also gives powers to test incumbent owners and officers. The clause provides an overview of part 4, and signposts the rest of the clauses in this part.
One element of the regulator’s tests is the fitness criteria for individual owners or officers. They will ensure that custodians have the necessary characteristics to run or own an important community asset. Subsections (7) and (8) of the clause specify the fitness criteria: having the requisite honesty and integrity; being financially sound; and, for officers only, having the requisite competence for their role at the club. Alongside other elements of the test, ensuring that owners and directors are suitably fit for their roles will better protect each club against unsuitable custodians, ensuring the sustainability of English football over the long term.
Stephanie Peacock
I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss the owners and directors tests. Football clubs are historical institutions with deep community ties; thus we must be careful to ensure that owners are people who view themselves as caretakers of an asset that has existed long before them, and we hope will continue to exist for years afterwards. As such, it is right that owners and directors are subject to fitness tests to ensure that the custodians of beloved football clubs meet certain standards.
At the moment, the tests are operated by different authorities depending on the league a club plays in. The Premier League, the EFL, and the FA on behalf of the National League all administer owner tests and have powers to disqualify unsuitable individuals. While those tests have been in place, many successful owners have been appointed, making selfless and sustainable investments in their clubs, which have brought about rewards on the pitch. However, not all owners have the same outlook, fortune, capacity or capability. Despite ownership tests, too many clubs and fans still have to deal with malicious, absent or incompetent ownership.
Matt Rodda (Reading East) (Lab)
I commend what my hon. Friend is saying. She knows full well the issues of my local club, Reading, which sadly was bought by the current owner. He was disapplied from buying Hull City but went on to buy Reading, despite a history of being involved in two clubs that went out of business overseas. I hope the measures in the clause will address this and stop other football clubs around the country getting in a similar predicament; I would not wish that on anyone. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for speaking about the issue.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments and his work with his local club. I have met its supporters, and that is one example, although not a lone one, because it has been confirmed, in another example, that both Bury FC’s owners, Stewart Day and Steve Dale, passed the EFL tests. The fan-led review took a number of such case studies into consideration, concluding that things needed to change.
Alongside other measures in the Bill, which will be vital in giving owners a better landscape in which to operate and invest, the review made some distinct suggestions regarding the owners and directors tests, such as: ensuring a consistent and independent approach across all men’s football; giving tests the backing of the regulator to enable access to information not otherwise available to competition organisers, such as that from the National Crime Agency; splitting the tests into two parts to recognise the difference in the obligations and duties of owners and directors; and strengthening the qualification criteria to ensure that prospective candidates have integrity and the intention of running a club sustainably. Overall, I think the clause and this part do a good job of achieving those aims and recommendations.
I have one brief question at this stage. The EFL has indicated that it will stop conducting its owners and directors tests once the regulator is running its tests. However, Richard Masters told the Committee that the Premier League would continue to run its tests alongside those of the regulator. Putting aside the issue of clubs paying twice for the same regulation and the lack of efficiency involved in duplicating structures, a dual system could pose a dilemma. If two tests yield different results, whose decision would ultimately be adhered to? That is difficult to tell from the Bill, and I hope that this is something that the Minister can confirm for us today, or that he will write to the Committee about.
Damian Collins
I asked Richard Masters that question when he gave evidence to the Committee and he was clear then that it would require two green lights, as he put it: a person has to pass the Premier League’s own test as well as the test set by the regulator.
Stephanie Peacock
That clarity is welcome, but I would still be interested to hear the Minister’s comments. Nevertheless, I am pleased to welcome the clause and I look forward to discussing it in detail.
Dame Tracey Crouch
I rise to speak briefly about this particular part of the Bill, because although the fan-led review—and indeed the Bill, the explanatory notes and the evidence that we have heard from fans—have of course referred to some poor owners in the Football League over many years, it is really important that we also recognise that there are a large number of very good owners in football. I do not think that they necessarily get the credit they deserve, because we so often focus on those who have not done the game any favours.
Personally, I often think that, despite my love of football, I would not dream of wanting to be an owner, because at the end of the day someone can be a fantastic owner who cares passionately about the long-term financial stability of their club, but if they do not actually buy that left back during the summer transfer window and ultimately the club does not do as well as fans expect it to—I speak as a lifelong Spurs fan—expectations and reality are very different.
Being a club owner can really be very stressful. I do not think that running a football club, wherever that club is in the football pyramid, is a particularly easy thing to do. I also think that most people purchase a football club with the right intention for the club, its fans and the local community, but we have seen some poor examples of ownership in the past and that has really driven the Bill. I just wanted to place on the record my sincere thanks to all those custodians of football clubs who have not driven away their fans, who engage with others regularly, who do their very best to support the local community and who very much have the best intentions of their football club at heart.
Mr Betts
The hon. Lady is absolutely right—there are many good owners of clubs in football. I refer immediately to Milan Mandarić, who came into Sheffield Wednesday when we were virtually bust, put the club on a sound financial footing, wrote the debts off, took the club forward and got it promoted, with Paul Aldridge as chief executive. They worked together. Mandarić then sold the club on, because he believed that he could not take it any further at that time.
There are other owners who do not necessarily have bad intentions—I think the Bill exists to stop those who have bad intentions—but just make mistakes. This Bill will not make every club successful and it will not make every owner make the right decisions, and we should always remember that. The Bill is to stop people from deliberately doing things that undermine the future of their club.
Dame Tracey Crouch
The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. During the fan-led review, Mel Morris gave evidence to us. His is an example that illustrates the point that the hon. Gentleman just made. As a panel, we asked Mel Morris whether, if the Bill and the regulator had existed with real-time financial monitoring, he thought the same mistakes would have been made. He said that fundamentally he thought that if these interventions had been in place, Derby would never have got itself into the situation that it did.
Mr Betts
That is a really helpful point. The Bill is about stopping people from doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons, as opposed to stopping people from making mistakes because they are trying to do the right thing but get things wrong. We will never be able to stop that completely.
Damian Collins
I echo what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said. Part of the problem with the lack of oversight of spending, particularly in the Championship, is that club owners who go in with the best of intentions find themselves competing against other clubs that are spending over 100% of their annual revenue on salaries. They therefore make mistakes in trying to compete with someone else who is already trading in breach of the league’s rules.
Mr Betts
Absolutely. Trying to keep clubs in line with the league’s rules, so that others do not over-compete to match them, is vital. We will come on to parachute payments later, including how they can drive these processes.
We cannot go back and undo all the problems of the past. My concern about new clause 3 is about owners who, for whatever reason, have decided to separate the ownership of the club from that of the ground. I know that in future that will require proper consultation and approval from the regulator, but this is being done in some clubs. My own club, Sheffield Wednesday, is one. Derby County has done it, and I think Aston Villa and Charlton have as well—it has happened at quite a few clubs, for various reasons. For Sheffield Wednesday and Derby, it was a way to try to get round the financial restrictions on clubs. Wednesday just made a mess of theirs and got the timing wrong, so they got a points deduction anyway.
New clause 3 is an attempt to say that although we cannot go back and reverse that decision—we cannot force the owners to sell back the grounds to the same organisation that owns the club—we can say that if the club is to be sustainable, the owner has to demonstrate that the ground will be available. A club cannot play without a ground; if it does not have a ground, it is not sustainable. I hope that the Minister will take that point seriously. If he cannot accept the new clause, because there is some—
Anna Firth
I am very pleased that we have got to this important part of the Bill, which deals with owners and directors tests. I am conscious that we may be about to come on to the provisions that I am about to support. I would be grateful if I could say my piece now, and then not come back to it. Perhaps you could guide me, Mr Sharma.
Stuart Andrew
Everyone is obviously getting so excited that they are getting ahead of themselves. To be fair, I understand why. It is important to acknowledge what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said about the many people who put themselves forward to support their local football club to build and become competitive. They are hugely important to the local communities in which they are based. We should acknowledge that there are many who do that well and with the best of intentions—even those who make mistakes, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East said. Their intention is right.
We are focusing on ensuring that owners and directors tests get to the heart of the detail that we need. The test will be much stronger with the regulator, which will have access to information from statutory organisations such as the National Crime Agency, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East mentioned. She asked about the Premier League continuing with its own owners and directors test. It can continue with it if it wishes. I note that the EFL has made a different decision, because it recognises that the tests that the regulator will provide will get much more detail and information than the leagues may be able to. Because the tests will be statutory, they will take primacy.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate that clarity. I also appreciated the intervention from the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe. Richard Masters’s comments to the Committee about two green lights are welcome, but it is important that the Bill is clear on this point and that we are clear about it in Committee, so the Minister’s comments are welcome.
Stuart Andrew
I thank the hon. Lady. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Duties to notify IFR of prospective new owner or officer
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 28 to 31 stand part.
New clause 3—Owner’s commitment to future use of a club’s football ground—
“(1) A person may not become or continue to be an owner of a regulated club unless they provide to the IFR a commitment to maintain long-term use of the football club’s grounds as a mandatory licensing condition.
(2) The IFR must codify the commitment.
(3) The IFR may only determine a person to be or remain a suitable owner of a club if the person has made a commitment under subsection (1).”
This new clause introduces a new licensing condition requiring an owner to provide a commitment to the future ongoing use of a football ground by a club.
Stuart Andrew
Clearly we have got to the bit that everyone is itching to speak to. Ensuring that new owners and officers of clubs have passed the regulator’s owners and directors tests is a key tenet of the new regime, and is designed to prevent unsuitable custodians from running or owning clubs. The regulator therefore needs to know who a club’s prospective new owners and officers are before they buy or join the club, so that they can be tested for suitability.
Clause 27 will place duties on a person to notify the regulator where there is a reasonable prospect of that person’s becoming a new owner or officer of a regulated club. The clause will ensure that the regulator receives advance notice of an application from a prospective new owner or officer, and will help the regulator to prepare to act quickly when it receives the application. The clause will place the same duty on regulated clubs themselves, as another means of ensuring that the regulator will be notified.
The regulator needs to know a person’s role at the club so that it can prepare to assess whether they are suitable to be an owner or an officer of that club. That is why, where the notification relates to an officer, it must state their proposed job title or job description, as well as any senior management functions that they will carry out. Enforcement measures such as censure statements or financial penalties are also available to the regulator if it determines that this requirement has not been complied with without a reasonable excuse. This will deter those who do not wish to comply with the regime.
Clause 28 will prohibit a person from becoming a new owner of a club unless the regulator has determined beforehand that they are suitable to own that club. It requires prospective new owners to provide an application containing information about how they propose to run the club, the estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and where that funding comes from. This will better ensure that prospective new owners are clear from the outset about their plans for the club and how they will deliver the resources to fund those plans.
Once a complete application has been provided, the regulator can pass the individual owner only if they meet the individual ownership fitness criteria, as defined in clause 26; they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound; they have sufficient financial resources; and the regulator does not have grounds to suspect that the individual has any source of wealth that is connected to serious criminal conduct, which is defined in the Bill by reference to part 1 of schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007, which includes crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. This will mitigate illicit finance in the game.
Registered societies are one vehicle by which fans can collectively own clubs. They must be run in accordance with specific legal requirements regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Registered society owners are not assessed against the fitness criteria or the source of wealth test, but they still need to complete an application, including providing a plan for running and funding the club.
Dame Tracey Crouch
The Minister is setting out clearly the purpose of these clauses of the Bill. It is clear that the regulator has been designed to be as agile and as future-proof as possible. If a crime that we have not yet imagined is added to the Serious Crime Act, how will the regulator assess a potential owner who has committed that crime?
Stuart Andrew
My understanding is that if the 2007 Act is updated with a new crime, it will still be relevant to the Bill. However, I want to be absolutely sure, so I will write to my hon. Friend, and if I am wrong I will correct my homework.
By requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test, clause 28 will better mitigate harm to clubs by stopping unsuitable custodians.
Stuart Andrew
Well, the Bill identifies an individual as the owner, not a state, but we will come on to some of those points. I have heard some of these representations as we have been preparing the Bill. It would not be right for the regulator to be getting into foreign policy—I do not think any party would want a regulator of any sort to be setting the nation’s foreign policy—but I get that it is an area of interest, and we will come on to it later in our proceedings.
Football clubs hold unique importance to their fans and local communities, who are the ones who lose out when clubs are exploited or mismanaged by unsuitable officers. Clause 29 will prohibit individuals from becoming a new officer of a regulated club unless the regulator has determined beforehand that they are suitable to be an officer.
Once the prospective officer has provided a complete application to the regulator, it will assess them to ensure that they meet the individual officer fitness criteria, as defined in clause 26. They must possess the requisite honesty and integrity and the requisite competence and must be financially sound. If the regulator is satisfied that the individual meets these requirements, it must find them suitable to be an officer of the club; otherwise, it must find them unsuitable. When the regulator is making this determination, it will take into account the matters listed in clause 37. By requiring new officers to undergo the regulator’s tests, the clause will better mitigate harm to clubs by stopping unsuitable individuals from becoming officers.
The Bill requires prospective new owners and officers to pass the regulator’s owners and directors test before they join or buy a club. However, it is possible that someone might take up a position at a club without first having undergone those tests. This may be a blatant and deliberate breach of the requirement to undergo tests before joining the club. A prospective owner may act in bad faith, hoping that once they are in, the regulator will be more hesitant to fail them, but in some circumstances a person may fall into the definition inadvertently or have some other relatively innocent reason for the breach. This may occur, for example, if a person inherits significant equity in a football club or if a person disputes in good faith whether or not their actions bring them within the Bill’s definition of an owner.
Clause 30 will therefore provide the regulator with the powers that it needs to respond decisively but flexibly when a person has become a new owner or officer of a club without the regulator having first determined whether that person is suitable. When the regulator becomes aware that this has happened, it must either notify the new owner or officer that they are being treated as unsuitable automatically or require them to provide an application, treating them as though they were a prospective applicant. When deciding which option to take, we expect the regulator to assess the circumstances of each case carefully and consider whether the new owner or officer has an innocent explanation or whether they have deliberately breached the regime.
The regime cannot be allowed to be abused. The regulator must have the discretion and the teeth that it needs to address harm to the sector. Clause 30 is an important step towards achieving that aim.
When the regulator is minded to fail a new or prospective owner or officer, clause 31 will require the regulator to give that person and the relevant club an opportunity to make representations before the regulator makes its final decision. Affected persons can also require an internal review of the regulator’s decision and then can appeal the outcome of that review to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The purpose of clause 31 is to allow a new owner or officer, or the relevant club, an opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable, which will ensure that the regulator has all relevant information available to it, allowing it to make better decisions and ensuring the regime is more effective.
The Government recognise the intent behind new clause 3, which is to ensure that football continues to be played in a club’s home ground. The Bill takes account of a variety of ownership structures relating to home grounds that exist across the football pyramid. The new clause would capture only one type of ownership structure. Owners may not necessarily directly own the rights to the club’s ground; in fact, only about 40% of clubs own their stadium outright. The new clause would require owners to make a commitment about something over which they do not necessarily have complete control or influence.
Let me be clear: the intent of the new clause will already largely be achieved by the Bill as drafted. The Bill places duties on the club itself regarding selling the club’s home ground or relocating from it; clauses 46 and 48 will require clubs to obtain approval from the regulator before a home ground is sold or relocated. If that requirement is breached, the regulator can exercise its enforcement powers.
Mr Betts
The Minister refers to what the Bill will do in regard to future sale, but the new clause does not deal with future sale; it deals with something that has already happened. The Minister says that it does not cover all eventualities, which may be true, but surely there are eventualities that need to be covered. If the Minister does not think that the new clause goes far enough, is he prepared to table another new clause that goes further to ensure a sustainable future for a club with a ground to play on?
Stuart Andrew
The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. I will not commit to introducing a new clause, but I will commit to going away and having another look at the points that he has raised, if that will satisfy him.
The Bill also allows for senior managers to be held accountable if they are responsible for the club breaching the requirements. That means that enforcement action could be taken against an owner of a club who was also a senior manager of the club and responsible for the club failing to comply with clauses 46 and 48.
Matt Rodda
Further to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, in some cases there may also be an issue with training grounds being separated from the main organisation of the club. The current owner of Reading was trying to sell the training ground separately from the ground itself and from the club. Can the Minister write to me on that matter? It does not currently appear to be covered by the Bill, and I would be very grateful if he could reassure local fans.
Stuart Andrew
I am happy to commit to writing to the hon. Gentleman. He is right that it is really the perimeter of the stadium, the car park and so on. I will happily give him further details.
When the regulator is testing the fitness of prospective new or incumbent owners of clubs, it must have regard to any action of a regulatory or disciplinary nature that is being or has been taken in relation to the individual. The regulator already has the power to consider that as part of an owner’s suitability termination. For those reasons, I cannot accept new clause 3, and I hope that the hon. Member for Sheffield South East will not press it.
Stephanie Peacock
This group of clauses begins to set out how the new tests for prospective owners and directors will work in practice. I broadly welcome the clauses and will begin—I am conscious of time—to speak to each of them in turn, addressing new clause 3 last.
Clause 27 will require prospective owners and officers, as well as the club, to notify the regulator. This is an important first step that will allow the regulator to start the work of conducting the test itself.
Clause 28 will ensure that a person cannot become an owner unless the regulator has decided that they are suitable. This decision is called a positive determination and will be given to a candidate based on their ability to meet three main standards.
First, the candidate must pass the ownership fitness criteria, which are based on the idea that an owner must have the requisite honesty and integrity and be financially sound. I understand that those criteria have been based on the work of the Financial Conduct Authority; I hope that there will be an opportunity to share learnings and best practice across regulatory organisations as the regulator finds its feet.
Secondly, a candidate must show that they have sufficient financial resources, judged on the basis of an application that must include proposals on running the club. As with the regulator’s enforcement of financial sustainability more broadly, it is important that this process does not deter investment or require clubs to break even. Rather, I trust that the test will seek to ensure that good practice and long-term planning are embedded in owners’ plans from the very beginning.
Finally, there must be no grounds to suspect that the candidate’s wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. That will prompt a welcome due diligence search on an owner’s wealth sources with the backing of institutions such as the National Crime Agency. Taken together, those standards will provide a comprehensive analysis of a potential owner.
For applications made by registered societies, the regulator will have a slightly different process, making a determination on the basis of sufficient financial resources alone. I am pleased that this recognised route to fan ownership will be treated with a tailored, yet proper, process.
Clause 29 covers officers. As I have mentioned, it is right that officers face a slightly different set of crafted criteria—
Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 21st May 2024
(6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Football Governance Bill 2023-24 View all Football Governance Bill 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 21 May 2024 - (21 May 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are considering:
Clauses 28 to 31 stand part.
New clause 3—Owner’s commitment to future use of a club’s football ground—
“(1) A person may not become or continue to be an owner of a regulated club unless they provide to the IFR a commitment to maintain long-term use of the football club’s grounds as a mandatory licensing condition.
(2) The IFR must codify the commitment.
(3) The IFR may only determine a person to be or remain a suitable owner of a club if the person has made a commitment under subsection (1).”
This new clause introduces a new licensing condition requiring an owner to provide a commitment to the future ongoing use of a football ground by a club.
Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Nokes.
I will continue where I left off, looking at clause 29. I have a question for the Minister on behalf of the Football Supporters’ Association, which pointed out that fans are often privy to local information about owners and officers that might be relevant to a determination of the regulator. Does the Minister believe that the mechanisms in the clause are adequate for the regulator to take relevant input from fans and local communities when making determinations?
Clause 30 provides for cases in which a person becomes an owner or officer without the regulator having made a determination on their suitability. It is important that no loopholes allow owners to skip out of the new tests. Clause 31 gives clubs, and prospective owners and officers, the welcome opportunity to make representations to the regulator should it be minded to determine that someone is not suitable or has not passed the relevant test.
Finally, I am thankful to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for highlighting, through new clause 3, just how important it is that clubs have a guarantee about the future use of their ground. The Minister agreed to write to him about that, and I look forward to seeing the response.
Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)
I am speaking in the right place this time. I was pre-emptive in my comments before the break, but that has given the Minister an opportunity to go away and look at the wording that he will come forward with to improve new clause 3.
I take the Minister’s point about the complicated circumstances for many clubs with respect to who owns the ground and what form they own it in, and that is understood. I hope that we can find a way of ensuring that, whatever the complications, the owner cannot simply put the club and the ground into different organisations—different legal constructs—but that in all cases there can be an assurance that the club will have use of the ground going forward, because otherwise the club cannot be sustainable by anyone’s definition.
I thank the Minister for agreeing to go away to look at the issue. I accept that new clause 3 is probably imperfect, and I very much look forward to a perfect clause coming back from him in due course.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stuart Andrew)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Ms Nokes.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East thinks I can work that quickly, just in the time we had during the break, but I have committed to write to him. Work is going on among colleagues in the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, for example, but I will write to him with further details.
On the specific question of the hon. Member for Barnsley East about local information, she made an important point. Fans and other sources are able to provide information to the regulator about the suitability of their owners or officers should they wish to do so. It will of course be up to the regulator to determine the relevance and significance of any information provided to it, but the mechanism exists.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28 to 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Determinations under sections 28 and 29: time limits
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 32, page 24, line 2, at end insert—
“(2A) A determination period as specified in subsection (2) should have an end date which is as soon as is reasonably practicable.”
This amendment would ask the Secretary of State to propose a timely end date to a determination period.
Stephanie Peacock
I welcome the principle of the clause. I will discuss that first, before moving to the amendment.
That decisions on ownership should be taken within a reasonable timeframe is right. Allowing the Secretary of State to set maximum time limits, alongside allowing for extensions where a case is particularly complex, seems a sensible way to go about ensuring that decisions are made in good time. Indeed, although I hope that I have set out my belief that the owners and directors test should be comprehensive, the purchase of any club is likely to be time sensitive. Circumstances are subject to changing quickly on both ends of a deal, and in many cases the right takeover deal can be the difference between a club surviving and not.
Oldham Athletic was in trouble after a period of severe turbulence that saw assets sold, staff unpaid and its main stand unable to be used for certain games due to a lease dispute. After a successful takeover, its new owner, local man Rothwell, cleared Oldham’s debts. Birmingham City and Wigan Athletic also appear to have reversed their fortunes thanks to new ownership. Birmingham City is now one step closer to a new stadium as St Andrew’s falls into disrepair, a long-term project that owners have promised will not be affected by relegation this season. In Wigan’s case, local businessman Mike Danson has appeared to stabilise the club after a period of losses on and off the pitch. Those examples show just how crucial the timing of ownership change can be for clubs in financial distress.
I welcome what the clause is trying to achieve, but I wonder whether it could go one step further. It is of note that the time limits in the clause are not accompanied by a general duty on the regulator to make determinations as soon as is reasonably practicable. That is why I tabled amendment 12. As the English Football League has argued, it is crucial that owners are able to sell their clubs when needed, particularly in instances of financial distress. Protracted takeovers can impact a club’s finances further, and they are hardly an advert for potential investors in clubs.
Given the fear some have expressed about the unintended consequences of the Bill on investment, it is important that the clause is watertight in ensuring that the time limits are truly seen as a maximum, rather than as a target. That is of particular concern given that the clause says that if the regulator does not make a determination within the time limit, it is automatically to be treated as having determined that the prospective owner or officer has failed the test. Again, I understand why that measure is in place—it is dangerous to allow a takeover where a person cannot be approved by the criteria set by the regulator—but we must ensure that the provision is protected against misuse. A regulator working in good faith would surely not time-out a test just to ensure an owner or officer is prevented from being granted a positive determination.
Protections should be built in to the legislation to ensure that it cannot be exploited. Not only is it built into the principles of the regulator to work efficiently, but it is within its general duties to avoid any adverse effects on financial investment in English football. I hope that the Minister will carefully consider amendment 12, which would ensure that determinations are made as expeditiously as possible, and recognise it as in keeping with the underpinnings of the regulator.
Stuart Andrew
The Government recognise the intent behind amendment 12, which is to ensure that the determination period is set at the right level so that the regulator makes a timely decision. Clause 32, which I will turn to shortly, provides that the determination period will be set in secondary legislation by the Secretary of State, who will have to consult such persons as she thinks appropriate when setting the period.
The purpose of the determination period is to provide more certainty to the industry about how long the determination of a new owner or officer will take, to incentivise new owners and officers to promptly provide the information the regulator needs to assess whether they are suitable, and to keep the process efficient. It is important to get the length of the determination period right. If it is too long, it could result in a slow and bureaucratic process, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East said, which could have a negative impact on investment. However, if decisions had to be taken too quickly, there would be a risk of them being less rigorous, and investors might worry about being failed because the clock runs out before the regulator can gather all the relevant information to make a decision.
The Government do not believe that amendment 12 is necessary because the Secretary of State will already consider those trade-offs, as well as other matters, including existing deadlines for comparable tests in other industries and the views of appropriate stakeholders. For example, we expect that the regulator will likely be consulted when the determination period is being set in regulations. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to support the hon. Lady’s amendment, and I hope she will withdraw it.
With regard to clause 32, football is a fast-paced industry, where clubs operate within constraints such as league seasons and transfer windows. Timely decision making about the suitability of new owners and officers is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, with a decision unable to be reached.
The regulator will need to conduct thorough scrutiny of new owners and directors, but it will also need to make decisions in an appropriate timeframe to ensure that clubs are not unnecessarily impacted in this fast-paced industry. That is why it will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of prospective owners and officers. The determination period will start when a person provides a complete application to be a new owner or officer of a regulated club. By the end of the period, the regulator must find the applicant suitable or unsuitable.
As well as providing certainty to the industry, the deadline will incentivise new owners and officers to provide the information the regulator needs to assess suitability. If the regulator cannot decide before the initial deadline is met, it can extend the determination period. That will provide it with the necessary flexibility to gather more information to make a well-informed, but still timely, decision.
As I set out, the determination period, including the maximum amount of extra time, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. That will ensure that the regulator is bound by it but that there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in future. If the regulator cannot make a decision about a prospective new owner or officer before the period expires, the person will automatically be determined to be unsuitable. That means that only owners and officers that the regulator is confident are suitable will be allowed to get involved with clubs.
Stephanie Peacock
The amendment was simply intended to ensure that decisions on owners and directors are made with time sensitivity in mind. I appreciate the Minister’s comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33
Duties to notify IFR of change in circumstances relating to incumbent owner or officer
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
It is important for clubs’ sustainability that their incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable. That is why the Bill gives the regulator the power to test incumbents if it has grounds for concern about their suitability, to mitigate the risk of harm from individuals already in the system. To do so it needs to be aware of any material change in the circumstances of incumbent owners and officers that is relevant to their suitability.
The clause therefore places a duty on incumbent owners and officers, as well as regulated clubs, to notify the regulator when they consider there has been, or may have been, a material change in circumstances that is relevant to whether the individual is suitable to be an owner or officer of the club. For example, if an officer became subject to criminal or relevant civil proceedings that the regulator was not previously aware of, that would constitute a material change in circumstances.
The notification must include certain matters listed in subsection (3), including an explanation of the material change in circumstances and why it is relevant to whether the owner or officer in question is suitable. If that information gives the regulator grounds for concern about the incumbent’s suitability, it can test them using the powers in clauses 34 and 35. If they are determined to be unsuitable, the regulator has a strong suite of powers to remove them. By ensuring that the regulator is aware of relevant material changes, we will better enable it to ensure that incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause mirrors the notification requirements for prospective owners and officers, requiring incumbent owners and officers to go through the same process of notifying the regulator in the event of a material change that might affect their suitability. This is an important provision that will ensure that owners and directors cannot circumvent the standards set out in the tests after their appointment. I certainly think it is the intention that the tests should act as the beginning of an ongoing compliance with the standards by owners and clubs, rather than the end.
If an owner or officer becomes subject to criminal proceedings, or new information comes to light about a criminal source of their wealth, it is only right that their suitability should be reviewed by the regulator. For example, the owner and chairman of Fleetwood Town FC was recently found guilty of defrauding creditors, false representation and being concerned with the retention of criminal property. The multimillion-pound fraud operation, which duped firms into expensive energy contracts, earned him jail time amounting to 13 years. Of course, in that case, Mr Pilley resigned following his conviction.
Stuart Andrew
I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments and commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Incumbent owners
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners who are already in place at clubs. It limits the regulator to testing where there is concern about an owner’s suitability. That will allow the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable owners already in the industry, while recognising that there are suitable owners already in the system who do not need to be tested. If the regulator has information that gives it concern about the fitness of incumbent owners, those owners can be assessed to ensure that they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound to own a club.
If the regulator has information that gives it grounds for suspicion, incumbent owners can also be tested on their source of wealth to establish whether it is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. The regulator will not remove incumbent owners because of mere suspicion about their source of wealth; rather, an incumbent owner must be treated as unsuitable if the regulator is more sure than not that the source of wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test incumbent owners where a risk of harm arises. Clauses 39 to 44 provide the regulator with the powers needed to remove unsuitable owners, allowing the regulator to address such risks. That will help ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term, benefiting football now and into the future.
Clause 35 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent officers who are already in place at clubs. It limits the regulator to testing where there is concern about their suitability. That will allow the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable officers already in the industry, while recognising that there are suitable officers already in the system who do not need to be tested. Again, if the regulator has information that gives concern about their fitness, incumbent officers can be tested to ensure that they have the requisite honesty, integrity and competence and are financially sound enough to continue in their role. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test those incumbent officers, and clauses 39 to 42 provide the regulator with the powers needed to remove them if necessary. That will help ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term.
Finally, on clause 36, the regulator’s ability to test or re-test incumbent owners and officers will prevent unsuitable custodians from harming clubs over the long term, not just at the point of entry. The Government are aware that a finding that an incumbent owner or officer is unsuitable brings about significant consequences for that person and may cause concern for the club or fans. That is why, when the regulator is minded to fail an incumbent owner or officer, clause 36 requires it to give them and the relevant club an opportunity to make representations before making its final decision. That will allow an owner or officer an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable, ensuring that the regulator has all relevant information available to it and allowing it to make better decisions and ensure that the regime is more effective.
I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I have no major issues with the clauses, so in the interests of not repeating what the Minister outlined, I will simply welcome them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Matters relevant to determinations
Dame Tracey Crouch (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 37, page 27, line 30, leave out “must” and insert “may”.
Dame Tracey Crouch
This important clause will give comfort to many fans about the agility of the regulator. Of particular note overall is the reference to bankruptcy, which I know many fans will take a great deal of comfort from. My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West will speak on that part of the clause if she catches your eye, Ms Nokes.
I advised in my speech on Second Reading that I would table this amendment, if only to impress the importance of independence within the regulator. There has been much commentary on the independence of the independent regulator, and much of it has focused on the fact that it is a political appointment. To allay some of those concerns, I should say that there are more than 600 agencies in Government, of which the largest number sit within the responsibility of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. That is why the Minister always looks so exhausted: because of the number of stakeholders he must deal with. I have been there.
Some of the concern and criticism has focused on clause 37(2), which states that the regulator must
“have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives”
of the Government. Throughout the passage of the Bill, there has often been confusion about what certain things within it mean, and the wording of clause 37 has set hares running. The Sunday Times this weekend had an interview with the Premier League’s Richard Masters, in which the journalist—not Richard—made reference to the clause, saying that it
“raised questions as to whether it could be forced to give state-backed clubs such as Manchester City and Newcastle United soft treatment”.
The piece refers to whether the regulator would have any say on the outstanding charges and, if it were to have a say, whether, due to foreign policy, there would be a softer stance on that.
Although we on the Committee understand that the clause relates to ownership, the wider world has somehow got it into its head that it also relates to the administration of the league rules, which is beyond the remit of the regulator. However, the clause would relate to the purchase of the club and, as the Minister will know from his own never-ending media round, also often relates to the public investment fund takeover of Newcastle. As the Minister has outlined, the ownership tests are set out in the legislation and apply to all potential owners and directors, regardless of where they are from, as long as they are not from a country where sanctions are in place.
However, my concern about clause 37(2) is that it adds an element of uncertainty into the test because of the fluidity of our foreign trade policy. For example—I use this with complete poetic licence—Donald Trump decides to add to his golf course portfolio and wishes to buy Arsenal. Concerns about his integrity are well documented, and yet our foreign and trade policy determines that we consider the USA to be one of our key allies and an absolute must for investment and trade in the future. Therefore, do we automatically give the keys to the Emirates to the former, and possibly next, President? Can the Minister confirm that the foreign policy test is just one part of the test, and would not overrule others where there is evidence that other matters might disqualify a prospective owner?
I am also concerned that the clause is not applied fairly across industries. Ofcom does not need to take into account foreign or trade policy when adjudicating on a takeover of a newspaper, but the football regulator does for the takeover of a club. I am not saying that subsection (2) should be removed altogether, although I am not sure I understand the value it brings. Many will be acutely aware that most of our Premier League clubs, and an increasing number of clubs elsewhere in the pyramid, are foreign-owned or owned by British people living in other countries, so it is essential that we have complete transparency in the process, including on at what point subsection (2) is relevant.
However, I fundamentally believe that if we are to truly value the independence of the regulator’s day-to-day decisions from the Government, the subsection ought to be reworded from “must…have regard” to “may…have regard”. In this morning’s sitting, in response to a question from the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby, the Minister said that we do not want the regulator to be involved in foreign policy. But putting subsection (2) into clause 37 does exactly that. A minor tweak to the wording satisfies everyone, but most of all retains the spirit of independence and removes some of the confusion about who is deciding who owns our football clubs. I am very interested in what the Minister has to say in reply.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 37 has three main parts. It requires the regulator to have regard to determinations from competition organisers, requires the regulator to have regard to foreign policy and trade objectives, and provides the criteria for judging honesty, integrity and financial soundness. I will speak to each of those parts in turn and address amendment 1 with the second part.
On the regulator having regard to determinations from competition organisers, I have already raised the issue of conflicting outcomes and was reassured by the Minister’s explanation, so I will move on to the issue of the influence of Government policy objectives on the regulator.
The clause states that the regulator must have regard to the Government’s “foreign and trade policy objectives” when making determinations on ownership. That has caused concern across the board, including across football governance structures, which usually have a harder time finding consensus, and with fans. That almost unanimous voice tells us something important: everyone wants to see a regulator that is free from undue political interference. I agree. The Government should not be in a position where they can apply pressure to the regulator to make decisions on ownership just because they might be politically favourable. Club ownership must not be a tool used to reward those with which the Government have a positive relationship or penalise those with which they have a negative relationship. That is particularly so given that the Bill empowers the regulator to make decisions on incumbent owners and officers.
However, I understand that there may be circumstances in which national security and foreign policy objectives may be pertinent to the regulator’s decision making. The regulator should, and will want to, have an understanding of all relevant information when making a determination. That is part of the reason why the regulator was chosen as the location of the tests, due to its ability to access relevant information that would not otherwise be available. I therefore do not believe that the intention of the clause was to compromise the independence of the regulator, but to empower it where security or foreign policy objectives are concerned.
Whatever the intention may be, we must ensure that the clause is not open to abuse. I am therefore pleased to offer my support to amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford, which suggests that we change “must regard” to “may regard”. That amendment might help to provide some reassurance on the purpose of the clause and the independence of the regulator.
Some further clarification on how the measure will work in practice would also be helpful. In particular, there must be more guidance on how the regulator will be made aware of “foreign and trade policy objectives”. That is particularly important because transparency is a crucial tool for providing accountability, but may be difficult given that some information will naturally be confidential in line with national security considerations. Can the Minister provide any information on what good practice will look like in terms of striking the balance between accountability and security?
Anna Firth (Southend West) (Con)
Second time lucky, Ms Nokes! I am delighted to talk about this part of the Bill and the important owner and director test, and I want to support clause 37(3) and (4). The current Premier League and English Football League owners and directors test requires that any prospective owner must not have been subject to two or more bankruptcy events—so the current position is that someone could have been subject to one bankruptcy event, and in theory still own a football club. I am pleased to see that the clause removes any minimum number of events; obviously, that will place further emphasis on sustainable management and stewardship, and is much to be commended.
For context, I should say that Southend United Football Club in the National League has had 19 winding-up petitions in the last 25 years; the last one was last Wednesday. During the course of this Bill, the club was in court and was given a further six-week adjournment—hence my interest in making sure that no other clubs in future suffer the same fate as Southend United and its loyal fans.
Rachel Hopkins (Luton South) (Lab)
I want to carry on the debate about clause 37 and reflect on honesty and integrity as set out in subsection (3), on “matters relevant to determinations” of the “requisite honesty and integrity”, and subsection (3)(g), which talks about
“such other matters relating to honesty and integrity as may be specified”
by rules. I would be interested in a little clarity from the Minister about that. Some of the other prerequisites or matters to be considered, such as whether someone is financially sound, can involve hard evidence, and someone’s competence can be tested by qualifications; integrity, however, is a bit of a subjective matter. It is more about things that are not against the law but are certainly not in the spirit of the law, and it is often behavioural.
Does the Minister have any examples that he might want to see in those rules? Someone might have used poor employment practices, for example, as we have seen in other industries, some of which are regulated and some of which are not. The issue would not reach a tribunal so it would not be a piece of hard evidence, but it would bring into question why an owner or officers of a club, in a different business, deployed fire-and-rehire tactics, for example, that were detrimental to their workforce and local community. Similarly, in a positive sense, would there be any consideration of what high integrity might be: for example, owners and officers who championed equality and diversity—an issue that we have been speaking a lot about in this Bill? I would welcome the Minister’s comments.
Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
I will be interested in the Minister’s remarks about amendment 1. I understand the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford is making, in seeking to create a bit more flexibility for the regulator. We would all hope that the integrity checks against an individual owner could ultimately “trump”—if she does not mind my using the word—any positive trading relationship. If the person were not considered a good and proper owner, the fact that we had a good trading relationship with their country should make no difference: they should not be able to avoid the checks simply because they come from a trusted trader nation.
However, on the other hand, I can see that having “must” would be helpful for the regulator in two ways. One is that if a would-be owner of a club met all the criteria and therefore should be allowed to acquire the club, but the only block on them was that they were a sanctioned individual, the regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it could not let the deal go through. There would not be grounds for challenge, say, at the Court of Arbitration for Sport over whether an appropriate judgment had been made. There would be no question of the sanctioned person’s suitability on any other grounds. In that particular circumstance, the provision could be helpful.
I imagine that it would be reassuring for the regulator to know that, as was the case when Newcastle United was acquired, if another Premier League club was acquired by a country that was not sanctioned—we did not have a trade embargo with it—but was nevertheless controversial, the regulator would not have to consider that, whether people wanted it to or not, because no Government policy would be saying that we could not trade with or allow investment from that country. The regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it was acting purely within the confines of its role.
I appreciate the intention of the amendment and the reasons behind it, but perhaps the Minister could give us some guidance on whether “must” may be better than “may”.
Stuart Andrew
The Government absolutely recognise the intent behind the amendment to ensure the independence of the regulator. We have been extremely clear that the independence of the regulator is vital. That is why the regulator will be set up as a new public body to ensure its full operational independence.
Clause 37(2) does not diminish the regulator’s independence. It does not mean that the regulator needs to consult the Government about the suitability of an owner, nor can the Government interfere with the regulator’s decision. If the regulator determines that an individual does not have the requisite honesty and integrity, or is not financially sound, or that the individual has any source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct, that individual cannot be determined to be a suitable owner of a regulated club. Clause 37(2) does not override those fundamental requirements. Nor can any individual, fan, league, club or Government influence override them.
The purpose of clause 37(2) is to ensure that the regulator has to have regard to the UK’s foreign and trade policy objectives when it makes a determination about any new or incumbent owner. That will ensure that the regulator cannot make unilateral moral judgments on which countries it may consider unsuitable when it tests owners. We do not want to allow for a scenario where that happens and in effect a regulator, as I said this morning, sets the Government’s foreign policy.
The effect of the amendment would be to increase discretion for the regulator to decide when it will have regard to the UK’s foreign and trade policy objectives when making decisions about owners. The Government believe that their foreign and trade policy objectives are a relevant matter for the regulator to have regard to whenever it makes a determination about the suitability of any and all owners, not just some. Increased discretion for the regulator may risk it making unilateral judgments that stray into foreign policy.
To be clear, requiring that the regulator must have regard to the Government’s objectives does not mean that that must be a decisive factor. It might have limited relevance in a particular case and, if so, the regulator will not have to give that undue weight. The fundamental basis for a regulator’s determinations about owners will be honesty, integrity, financial soundness, source of wealth and, for new owners, sufficiency of financial resources.
I heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said and we will continue to reflect further, ahead of Report. But for the reasons that I have set out, I am not able to accept her amendment and I hope she will withdraw it.
Clause 37 lists the matters that the regulator must take into account when it conducts owners and directors tests, including what it must consider when determining whether an individual is financially sound and whether they have the requisite honesty and integrity and, for officers only, the competence needed to fulfil the role, and ultimately to determine whether they are sensible—sorry, suitable.
Stuart Andrew
Absolutely.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and the hon. Member for Luton South made important points. As a public body, the regulator must act fairly when it makes decisions. As set out in the White Paper, it will make an evidence-based objective judgment to assess whether an owner or a director is a suitable custodian of a club, and it will apply its tests consistently and fairly to every person.
The fitness element of the test will assess an individual’s honesty, integrity and financial soundness, as well as, for directors, competence. That draws on the fit and proper person test applied by other regulators, including the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Solicitors Regulation Authority. The regulator will set out in its rules and guidance further detail on how it will conduct its tests.
The factors I have outlined are specified because they have a real bearing on whether an owner or officer could have a significant detrimental impact on a club’s financial sustainability. Listing specific matters provides greater clarity to the industry about what will be tested. It also constrains the regulator. The matters listed in the clause are the only things that it will take into account when considering honesty, integrity, financial soundness or competence. To ensure that the fitness test remains effective in the future, the clause gives the regulator the power to use its rules to add further matters that it will need to take into account when considering someone’s honesty, integrity or financial soundness. Before using that power, the regulator must consult the leagues.
Dame Tracey Crouch
I have listened carefully to the Minister, as I always do, and I will withdraw the amendment. However, as I understand it, similar provisions do not apply to any other regulator, and other regulators are faced with very similar decisions on a day-to-day basis. We do not take unilateral moral decisions, as the Minister pointed out, but I am happy to discuss the matter further with him. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
Disqualification orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
The financial distress experienced by some of English football’s most historic clubs was partly down to unsuitable owners and directors. As discussed, the regulator will be able to conduct strengthened owners and directors tests to help to ensure that each club has suitable custodians.
Clause 38 ensures that when the regulator finds that someone is unsuitable to be an owner or officer of a particular club, it can disqualify that person from being an owner or an officer at any regulated club in future. In order to ensure sufficient protections, relevant parties will be allowed to express their views before the regulator makes its decision. Then, once the decision taking those views into account has been made, the regulator must publish a notice of the decision, including the rationale behind it. The process will help to ensure that key community assets have suitable custodians who run the club properly.
Clause 39 details the process that the regulator must begin to remove an owner from the club when it finds them to be unsuitable. In most cases, that will mean giving them a direction under the clause to take all reasonable steps to cease being an owner by a specified date. Those steps could include, for instance, selling their stake in the club. As I just mentioned, in order to ensure sufficient protections, the regulator must consult the unsuitable owner, the relevant club and the relevant league before issuing the direction.
Similarly, clause 40 ensures that when the regulator finds that someone is unsuitable to be an officer, it must either give the unsuitable officer a direction to take all reasonable steps to cease to be an officer of the club, give the relevant club a direction to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the unsuitable officer is no longer at the club, or both. Once more, to ensure that sufficient protections are in place, the regulator must consult the unsuitable officer, the relevant club and the league, as before.
Stephanie Peacock
It is incredibly important that if the regulator is going to take on responsibility for conducting the owners and directors tests, it is also given the teeth to enforce the outcome of those tests. I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss those powers.
I will speak to each clause in the group in turn, starting with clause 38, on disqualification orders. In some circumstances, a test may reveal that not only is the person in question unsuitable to be an owner or officer of a particular club, but their record is such that they should not be considered for such a role again. I agree with the principle of the clause, which is to ensure that tests are not unnecessarily duplicated and to protect multiple clubs from the same issue.
On clause 39, if the regulator has determined an owner of a club is not suitable, it is right that it is bound to give a direction requiring that person to take reasonable steps to cease being an owner. That binds the regulator to the outcome of its test, rather than giving it discretion over whether a negative determination results in the departure of an incumbent owner. I have a few questions about what that would mean in practice. I am curious to hear the Minister’s take on what taking “all reasonable steps” to cease ownership might involve. It surely implies that a person needs to sell their shares, but what if they are unable to find a buyer? Would they be required to give the club away if there was no willing purchaser? Furthermore, if there is a buyer but they offer a price below market value, or a value that would result in big losses for an owner, would the person still be forced to sell?
The answers to those questions, and a clear direction on the application of the clause, is important for two distinct reasons. First, it matters because this process may have a knock-on effect on people’s willingness to invest in football clubs. Secondly, it matters for the sustainability of the club and its fans. It is important that the club is in the right hands for the right price, or this entire part of the Bill on owners will be undermined. I hope the Minister can today, or in due course, provide some further information on how clause 39 will work in practice.
Clause 40 largely mirrors the removal directions for owners, but applies them to officers. How the clause will work in practice is less complex, as the removal of officers is less likely to hinge on the finances of an outside party. I am also satisfied that the alternative officer arrangements in clause 42, to appoint an interim officer, might mitigate any problems with an officer’s removal.
Clause 41 provides an important protection against unsuitable officers or owners carrying out activities that might negatively impact the club in the long term. When it comes to actions that have an impact on a club’s future, it is right that anyone who has been identified as a potential harm to a club can be limited in those areas if needed.
Finally, I welcome clause 43, which gives the regulator the ultimate power to ensure that a person ceases to be an owner when they have failed to comply with orders given under powers in this part. That power is complimented by the safeguards and notice provisions in clause 44.
Stuart Andrew
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments.
As I said, if the regulator deems that a current owner is unsuitable, it would first direct them to leave the club in the specified timeframe. During that period, the regulator will have available several powers to safeguard the club from further harm. However, as the hon. Lady rightly said, there is a risk that an unsuitable owner does not comply with the directions. For instance, they may refuse to leave the club or may continue to use their position as owner to damage the club. In those situations, the regulator will have the powers to directly remove the unsuitable owner from the club.
The hon. Lady makes a point about cases in which there is a failed incumbent owner but no new prospective buyer for the club. By conducting strong statutory tests on prospective owners, the regulator will ensure that clubs are run by suitable custodians and that unsuitable owners can be stopped at the point of entry. That will help to reduce the risk of unsuitable owners entering the industry.
The wider regulatory system of financial regulation and improved governance will further put clubs on a more sustainable footing, which should ensure that clubs are attractive as investments for prospective buyers. If an owner wishes to sell, or is required to sell by the regulator, the club should therefore be a much more attractive asset.
Mr Betts
The Minister is almost assuming that the regulatory regime is going to make a perfect world, and that there are not going to be failures. The question being asked is: what happens when there are? When there is an owner who is required to sell, what happens to the club in those circumstances?
Stuart Andrew
The hon. Gentleman is right. I am not saying that this is going to be the panacea for all football clubs; they are businesses, and businesses go under at times. When the regulator is ensuring that the club has to be sold, its powers will minimise the risk of a bad owner further damaging the club, which adds to the pressure of finding a good new owner to take over. By having those powers, we are not drumming that club into the ground, as we have seen in other instances; it remains a positive and attractive prospect for investment. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 39 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Duty not to operate a team in relation to a prohibited competition
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 22, in clause 45, page 37, line 12, after “competition” insert
“and the full impacts of such a decision”.
Amendment 13, in clause 45, page 37, line 15, at end insert—
“(aa) professional football players,”.
This amendment expands the list of those whom the IFR must consult.
Clause stand part.
Mr Betts
Amendment 21 is quite simple, and I am sure that the Minister can accept it without much consideration. It simply applies where a team is prevented from going into a prohibited competition, which I think is absolutely right. The outrage of the European Super League in some ways triggered recognition of the issue and the need to regulate football more appropriately. There are consequences for people who make their living from football, whether they are players or staff members of clubs.
Ben Wright from the PFA very appropriately spelt out the fact that the Bill quite rightly, in many cases, highlights the need to consult and involve fans, but players are not mentioned anywhere. As Ben Wright said, there are only two groups of people who really matter in football:
“those who play it and those who watch it.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 16 May 2024; c. 88, Q145.]
Without those two groups, football would not exist. I hope the Minister thinks about the amendment and comes to the conclusion that he could accept it without undermining the Bill in any way. I hope he might give careful consideration to that.
I am also happy to support amendment 13, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East. It is very much along the same lines as my amendment, and the Minister might rather choose her wording if he cannot support the wording that I have put forward. I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on the amendments.
On amendment 22, having
“the full impacts of such a decision”
taken into account seems a fairly obvious thing. The Minister will no doubt tell us that that is the intention of the Bill and that there is no need to add in the extra words, but I am sure he will agree that the extra words are not in any way in conflict with what the Bill is trying to achieve.
Stephanie Peacock
I am pleased that we are making good progress in moving on to discuss part 5 of the Bill and the free-standing duties on clubs, which apply to clubs separately to the licence conditions. They are set out by the Bill directly and, in many cases, apply to a club regardless of whether it is licensed.
Clause 45 sets out the duty not to operate within a prohibited competition. I will briefly set out some context before discussing amendments 21, 22 and 13. The clause is clearly designed to prevent a repeat of the European Super League, which rightly prompted immense backlash from fans, clubs and governance structures throughout the English football pyramid when it was first announced over three years ago.
There were many reasons why the project sparked such outrage, and it is important to name a few directly. First, the European Super League was designed, at least to some extent, to be a closed competition. For many of the richest clubs, qualification would have been an automatic right, rather than being meritocratic. It would have taken an axe to one of the most important features of football’s success: the idea that any one team can dream big and become a winner. With qualification based on merit taken out of the equation, the entire structure, purpose and sustainability of football’s existing competitions would have been undermined.
Secondly, the European Super League was launched—
The Chair
Order. I remind the shadow Minister that this debate is meant to be about the amendments, not the clause. There is a separate debate coming on the clause; she might wish to reserve those comments.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate your comments, Ms Nokes. I can skip forward to the amendments. I have some separate thoughts on clause 45. I do think that the background is quite important to the amendments, but am happy to move on directly to address them.
Amendments 13 and 21 are on player consultation. It seems like a missed opportunity that the views of players are not to be taken into account by the regulator. That is why I tabled amendment 13, which would expand consultation requirements to include them. Similarly, amendment 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, would require the regulator to seek the views of players and staff, so I will address both amendments together.
Players in both the clubs that tried to break away and the clubs that were left behind had an instrumental role in demonstrating against the ESL. For example, just 48 hours after the announcement, a group of high-profile Liverpool players issued a collective statement against the Super League. That clearly stated:
“We don’t like it and we don’t want it to happen.”
Meanwhile, Leeds players, while warming up for a game, wore shirts featuring slogans such as “Football is for the fans” and “Earn it.” Players in other clubs followed suit. It is clear from that that players feel passionately about the competitiveness and fairness of the competitions that they operate in, and have a view to share on these issues.
Dame Tracey Crouch
The shadow Minister is making a really interesting speech, but is she not actually making a speech against the amendment, because the players did that without there being a statutory requirement for them to do it?
Stephanie Peacock
That is a fair point, but I do not think we should have to rely on players having the bravery to make public statements. We are saying—this is a debate that we rehearsed earlier in Committee—that there should be an obligation on the regulator to consult them, and I will come on to make that argument.
Many players care about the fans and communities that they play for, and it is players who are likely to come under fire if they take part in competitions that fans oppose. At best, they will act as a vehicle for fans hoping to hold their clubs to account. At worst, when competing in closed competitions, players may become the face of the demise of the long tradition of the English football pyramid, without having had any say in the matter. At a time when there has been a particularly concerning rise in abuse of football players—albeit from a shameful minority of fans—that becomes even more concerning.
Robin Millar (Aberconwy) (Con)
We rehearsed this somewhat when the representative of the PFA came before us to give evidence. I made the point to him then that we had been told that it was an inability to control costs that was damaging football, but—this was the point I made—actually it is the inability to control wages that is damaging football. That is firmly within the control of players, so I am a little less sympathetic to the argument that the hon. Member is making.
Stephanie Peacock
I am not sure it is the case that the players control their own wages. When we look at this Bill, as other hon. Members have said—
Stephanie Peacock
Yes, that is true, and it is true for all of us and anyone who takes a wage, but I think it is a rather unfair expectation to put upon players. I am not sure that I accept the hon. Member’s argument, but obviously, if he has strong views on this issue, he can make a speech when I have concluded.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East set out, there are two main components in football, and they are the players and the fans. I think it is incredibly curious that this Bill does not mention players at any point. That is why I am making the case for these amendments.
I will draw my remarks to a close in a moment. I would just like to share a few other examples with the Committee. To give a troubling example, we will all remember that, following the penalty shoot-out at the Euro 2020 final, a wave of racist social media abuse was aimed at certain players. Ensuring a duty of care to protect players from abuse deserves its own conversation, but I think it is relevant to raise. It is not right that players are not given any say in relation to prohibited competitions, but could be told that they must compete in one—only to face the wrath of fans afterwards. Football is for the fans, of course, but it cannot exist without the players. I therefore encourage the Minister and members of the Committee to consider the benefit of player input on the regulator’s decision making in that area. Given that fans and the FA will already be consulted for their views, it would only require a simple change to the legislation. I hope that we can all get behind amendment 13 to strengthen the clause as much as possible.
Amendment 22, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, would strengthen the duty of the regulator to understand the view of fans, so that the full impacts of any particular competition are considered. As the European Super League attempt showed, the consequences of a closed competition, where qualification is not based on merit, are plenty. It is therefore important that the full range of impacts is considered. Is the Minister satisfied that the current wording will ensure that, or is amendment 22 needed to require the regulator to take everything into account when gathering the views of relevant stakeholders?
Stuart Andrew
Amendments 21 and 13 would require the regulator to determine and have regard to the views of club staff and players, placing them on equal footing with the club’s fans for the purposes of clause 45. I do not believe that the inclusion of players and club staff is necessary here. The Bill is designed to protect and promote the sustainability of clubs so that they continue to serve the interests of their fans in local communities, who have been around far longer than any owners and will be around long after those owners have moved on. That is why clause 45 requires the regulator to determine and consider the views of fans.
A decision to prohibit a competition may also impact a wide range of other stakeholders, which is why the clause already requires the regulator to
“consult such other persons as”
it
“considers appropriate.”
That allows for consultation with a broad range of potential stakeholders. If the regulator considers players and staff of regulated clubs to be an appropriate group, it must consult them. It is right that the regulator has the discretion to make the judgment.
Amendment 22 seeks to draw out that when the regulator is determining the views of fans about a competition being prohibited, it must include their views on the full impact of the competition being prohibited. Specifying that in the Bill is unnecessary as it is already implicit that fans would consider the potential impacts as part of reaching a view on a competition’s prohibition. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the amendment will be withdrawn.
Mr Betts
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 13, in clause 45, page 37, line 15, at end insert—
“(aa) professional football players,”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment expands the list of those whom the IFR must consult.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stuart Andrew
The proposed European Super League in 2021 posed an existential threat to the English football pyramid. It was an attempt by a small number of clubs to set up a closed-shop league to benefit themselves at the expense of all other clubs and against the wishes of fans. Ultimately, the European Super League was stopped by the sheer will of fans around the country and the Government’s promise to consider legislation. However, the risk of a similar breakaway competition rearing its head in the future remains. The clause will prevent a regulated club or a club that has been regulated in the previous 10 years from entering a team into a competition that the regulator has prohibited.
Stuart Andrew
I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. We have had this conversation several times on the replays, and I understand that point. As I have said before, not drawing on the merits of the decisions that have been made, I understand some of the challenges that those organisations have in terms of a very crowded field and in terms of competitions.
Ian Byrne (Liverpool, West Derby) (Lab)
It is always a very crowded field in the FA cup replays. I am sure that the Minister has seen the news, today I think, about Tottenham players getting on the plane to go to Australia for their end-of-season friendly. Is that not a smack right in the face of player welfare and ensuring that players are okay? That is why the FA cup replays were allegedly taken off the table.
Stuart Andrew
As the hon. Gentleman knows, the purpose of the Bill has been tightly focused to feature those particular issues. We have a fine balance to ensure that we do not upset or get into challenges with UEFA and FIFA, and it is for football to make some of the decisions that it has made, but I would expect that, as the provisions in the mandatory conditions say, clubs will consult their fans on decisions on match days.
The extension to clubs regulated in the past 10 years will stop them circumventing the rules by withdrawing from existing competitions in order to join a new breakaway competition. The regulator is expected to prohibit competitions on the basis of the predetermined, proportionate and transparent framework based on the prescribed factors set out in legislation. That will provide up-front clarity to the industry and means that new competitions will not just be prohibited outright. That is important to ensure that the regulator does not unduly stand in the way of innovation in the market—for example, like when the old First Division became the Premier League in 1992.
The clause requires the regulator, when deciding whether to prohibit a competition, to consider several factors, including whether the competition is merit based, operates on the basis of fair and open competition, jeopardises the sustainability of English football’s existing competitions or the clubs in those competitions or harms the heritage of English football. Of course, football belongs to its fans, so the regulator will also determine and consider the views of fans in England and Wales before prohibiting a competition. As the national governing body for football, the FA will be consulted before the regulator prohibits any competition, and the regulator will also consult anyone else it considers appropriate. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
Apart from my amendments, which I had hoped would strengthen clause 45, I am pleased to offer my support more generally for the clause. I will not repeat my remarks from previous debate, but given the fallout from the so-called Super League attempt, the Bill is absolutely right to make provisions around prohibited competitions.
However, I have three remaining questions on wording that I hope the Minister can clarify. The clause provides that a club will not be able to join a prohibited competition so long as it has been regulated in the last 10 years. However, that does not apply retrospectively, so if a club has never been regulated—as is the case now, before the Bill passes—the rules cannot be enforced. That has sparked concern that clubs might form a breakaway league before the Bill passes and the regulator will be left unable to enforce its own rules. Will the Minister confirm whether the regulator will have any power to act in such a situation?
Stuart Andrew
I thank the hon. Lady for her contribution. On the ruling that she mentioned, my understanding is that it will be considered, but I want to make sure I have that right, so if she does not mind I will write to her.
The regulator will not be able to take action until it is fully operational. It would be inappropriate to give it backdated powers in relation to competitions, as clubs cannot comply with preapproval requirements after an action has been taken, so I hope the hon. Lady understands the position we are in.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Duty not to dispose etc of home ground without approval
Ian Byrne
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 46, page 38, line 15, at end insert—
“(6A) Before the IFR grants an approval under subsection 6 it must—
(a) consult the supporters of the body in question, the relevant competition organisers and persons representing the local community with which the body is associated; and
(b) have regard to the views expressed by those consulted.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 29, in clause 48, page 39, line 20, at end insert—
“(4A) A regulated club must take reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales do not consider the arrangements to constitute significant harm to the heritage of the club under subsection 4(b).”
Clause 48 stand part.
Ian Byrne
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Nokes.
Clause 46 is welcome, but I have real concern because, although we are again talking about supporter engagement, there is no mention of a requirement or even a power for the independent football regulator to consult any other parties about the disposal of the ground—often a community asset. If the Minister is not prepared to accept the amendment, which would allow supporters, local stakeholders and competition organisers to be engaged before any such disposal takes place, will he explain why? What powers does he believe are available to the independent football regulator to ensure that supporters, local stakeholders and competition organisers have a voice in any decision made about ground disposal?
Stephanie Peacock
Football stadiums have immense value. First, they have value to fans, who have precious memories going back generations of standing in the same spot watching their club through the lowest lows and highest highs. In many ways, a stadium is one of the strongest ties a club has to the local community. A club’s staff, players and owners might change, but the pitch remains.
Secondly, grounds also have a financial and fundamental value. They are often among the club’s most valuable assets. In well-run clubs, that is positive, but where a club is already financially unstable, home grounds can become vulnerable to sale in a way that seriously undermines the club in the long term. In some cases, they are sold in a desperate attempt to make a return on losses, and in others they are sold by those purposefully wishing to strip a club of its assets before leaving it behind to collapse. Indeed, there are numerous examples of clubs in financial trouble selling their stadiums to give owners some collateral on their investments or to circumvent profit and sustainability rules. Troubled Sheffield Wednesday sold Hillsborough to its owner for a profit of more than £38 million, covering its pre-tax losses of £35 million. Both Reading and Derby sold their grounds in a similar fashion. But a stadium can be sold only once, and without a stadium in their possession, clubs risk not being able to play at all.
We are familiar with the story of Wimbledon FC, whose home was forcibly moved to Milton Keynes in 2003, resulting in the club being renamed. Finances aside, that decision was devastating for local fans, who felt their club had been stolen from them and their community, as we heard in the evidence session. Given that the regulator is a body specifically established to both ensure the financial sustainability and protect the heritage of English football, it is right that it should have a responsibility to ensure that stadium sales do not undermine a club’s future.
There are of course many circumstances in which a club’s selling its stadium and relocating is a sign of progress and positive investment. Tottenham fans, for example, are now enjoying the benefits of a brand-new state-of-the-art ground, while the club is widely considered one of the best in the country. That kind of investment should in no way be discouraged, let alone blocked. The regulator must therefore be equipped to tell the difference between two very different kinds of proposed transactions—those that propel a club forward and those that seriously undermine a club’s long-term financial sustainability or heritage.
With the expertise the regulator will have, I understand why the Government have decided that it is best placed to grant approval on stadium sales and moves. However, I also acknowledge the concern that the FSA and many fans have about their lack of voice in the decision-making processes in both clause 46 and clause 48.
Amendments 3 and 29, tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool, West Derby and for Sheffield South East, give us the opportunity to discuss the role that fans might play in understanding what a stadium change might mean in terms of the fans, heritage and local community. It is of course the fans who will suffer if their team no longer has anywhere to play, and it is fans who best understand the precious heritage and memory that grounds carry for them and their community.
Clause 48 seems to be based on an understanding of that point to some extent, given that the regulator is explicitly tasked with paying attention to whether a relocation of home games would cause “significant harm” to the heritage. However, as Fair Game points out, it would be curious if the regulator were able to understand the implications for heritage without consulting fans. Will the Minister explain how that might work? On what basis will the regulator make a judgment if it is not through understanding the impact on fans?
Combined with the lack of consultation rights in clause 46, the result is that fans are currently given absolutely no voice on matters to do with stadiums, even though they are the ones who will travel there, buy tickets and offer their support. I understand that the regulator is best placed to make a final decision, but it is unclear to me why fans cannot form one of the inputs that the regulator might consider.
The Government’s White Paper said that the regulator should
“have a remit to consider the implications for club heritage of any proposal, the views of fans and the club’s historical connection to its locality.”
Will the Minister share with us what has happened between the publication of the White Paper and the Bill to cause the Government to divorce the idea of heritage from fans? It must be clear why fans have not been given any say in this process. I hope the Minister will elaborate on that point today.
Finally, I want to examine whether the Bill will be able to prevent some home matches being played abroad if that damages heritage. This is not a purely theoretical proposition. Just a few weeks ago, Tim Howard wrote for a national newspaper about why Premier League games being played in the USA was “inevitable”. FIFA has also reportedly begun the process of allowing league matches to be played overseas. When Tim Payton of the Arsenal Supporters’ Trust gave evidence to the Committee, he warned that the movement of games abroad could be the next catastrophe the size of the Super League.
Clause 48 has the potential to provide assurances that this kind of action could only be taken by clubs with the approval of the regulator, should it be seen to damage heritage. However, the wording does seem to be geared more towards permanent relocation rather than the issue of clubs wishing to play single games, or a small subset, away from home.
Will the Minister confirm whether approval only needs to be sought by clubs wishing to play all of their home games elsewhere or whether it also applies to clubs wanting to play a handful of games elsewhere? In particular, will the regulator be able to have a say on league games being played abroad, and if so, would fans be given a say in the process? Given the salience of this issue with fans, it is important that we are clear on how the clause would apply.
Mr Betts
I rise to speak to amendment 29, which I tabled. We will move on to a debate on clause 49 shortly, to which it relates. It is interesting that fans will get a specific consultation, involvement and approval about changing the crests, shirt colours and names, as those are decisions that can be reversed quite easily. We know about the problems at Cardiff with shirt colours and at Hull with the name, but even if those mistakes are made by the owners, they can be changed the following year. A club cannot go back to playing on its old ground if it has been sold and is no longer an asset of the club. In some ways, the issue of where a club plays and its ground is more important for the heritage of the club, and it needs to take account of the interests and wishes of fans.
In clause 48, we have a regulator that will have to look at the significant harm done to the heritage of the club by moving ground. How does the regulator decide what is significant harm to the heritage of the club in isolation? The fans are the ones who understand that. They are the custodians of the club; they are the ones who go every week, whose families have gone to the club for years and whose children will go in the future for years. They are the ones who have a real stake in the heritage of the club, yet there is nothing in the wording that says they must be consulted.
All amendment 29 states is that in looking at the issue of significant harm to the heritage of the club, we should actually ask the fans what they think about it, so that they do not consider that the arrangements will constitute significant harm. I do not know how on earth the regulator will come to a view that is not a view derived from consulting the fans, so I hope that the Minister will give way on this amendment. At the heart of what we are doing here is ensuring that fans are listened to about the issues that are so important to them, and there is nothing more important for fans of a club than where their club plays, so I hope the Minister thinks that this amendment is in the spirit of the Bill and could be accepted.
Stuart Andrew
The Bill requires regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated in the past five years, which I shall simply refer to as clubs, to notify the regulator where there is a reasonable prospect of either the club selling or otherwise disposing of its home ground or using it as security for a loan or other liability. The proposed transaction can proceed only if the regulator grants approval. Clause 46, which the amendment seeks to change, deals with only the narrow issue of a home ground disposal or the use of the home ground as security. Those matters do not necessarily threaten the heritage of the club in the same way as forcing a relocation. Where currently regulated clubs propose to relocate in parallel, which may impact on the clubs’ heritage, that is subject to a separate approval from the regulator under clause 48.
Clause 48 sets out that the regulator can grant approval to a relocation only if it does not undermine the financial sustainability of the club and does not cause significant harm to its heritage. Given that clubs will be required to consult with fans on matters relating to home ground, we expect that the regulator would consider that in reaching its decision on whether to approve a relocation.
Mr Betts
The Minister is therefore saying that a club makes a proposal, consults with the fans and comes to a view, then the regulator must accept the view that the club has come to. Why does the regulator not have a responsibility to ensure that the fans are comfortable with any proposal in the way that amendment 29 suggests? Why is it simply left to a club, which may have a vested interest, to consult with fans and report at second hand to the regulator?
Stuart Andrew
The regulator will be able to see whether that consultation was done properly, and the mechanisms that we are setting up for fan engagement are much strengthened from what they may be at the moment. That gives confidence that what the clubs consult on will be done through a mechanism that is much stronger than some of the examples mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for Barnsley East. By doing that, because it is about the club’s heritage—it is its home ground, and the club is going to move—the club must demonstrate that it has properly consulted with the fans in the way described by the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
The heritage of the club will include its home ground. Of course that is part of the description of heritage, so it will come under that aspect. Just selling the club to get a loan, for example, will not move the stadium, but if it is going to relocate, that is a change to the club’s heritage, so that will come under the heritage aspect of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
As I said a moment ago, clause 48 sets out that a relocation can be granted approval only if it does not undermine the financial stability of the club or cause significant harm to its heritage. It will come under that.
Stuart Andrew
In schedule 4, paragraph 4(3)(a) on page 93, it says “the club’s home ground”. It is there.
The regulator will examine each transaction in the context of the regulated club’s individual financial circumstances. That should provide sufficient comfort for fans or other proposed stakeholders that the proposal does not adversely affect the financial sustainability of the club. The additional stakeholders to be consulted will not have a financial interest in the transaction. Amendment 3 would impose an additional level of bureaucracy and complexity to the process. It would also introduce a potential delay in completing a transaction, which is often time-sensitive, and it may have adverse implications, such as the buyer pulling out or renegotiating terms. That could undermine the sustainability of clubs. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendment.
Turning to clause 46, a home ground is often one of the most vital and valuable assets that a club can own. However, home grounds are sometimes used as collateral for debt or even sold off entirely to raise money. Although there can be sensible financial reasons for clubs to do that, both courses of action may result in a club’s financial position seriously deteriorating, or it having no ground to play at. Selling the home ground also potentially seriously weakens the club’s balance sheet. Likewise, using the home ground as collateral for a loan might make financial sense depending on the use of the cash raised, but it may also saddle the club with too much debt or high interest costs.
The clause therefore places a duty on clubs that own their home ground to obtain the approval of the regulator prior to any sale or use as security in a loan or liability. The regulator will consider the risk of the proposed transaction to the club’s financial sustainability and block any potentially financially damaging sale of a club’s home ground. The provision applies not only to regulated clubs, but we are also extending it further to capture clubs that are not currently regulated but have been within the last five years. The regulator must be satisfied that the club has taken reasonable steps to ensure that a team play their home matches at the ground prior to its sale or use in a loan—that is, that football club continues to be playing at the ground. That protects against potential bad actors who might otherwise choose to pull their team from the league and no longer be a regulated club so that they can asset-strip and sell off the ground to make money.
Turning to amendment 29, the Government believe that the safeguarding of club heritage and the voices of fans is vital. We expect the regulator to consider whether a club has adequately engaged with its fans in reaching its decision on whether to approve a relocation. However, there will be a number of additional factors for the regulator to consider when assessing whether a proposed home ground relocation will significantly harm club heritage. Those may include the history of the club, distance from the original home ground or the views of others in the local community. Although fan views will be an important consideration, the Government believe that the regulator should be able to take an holistic view of any proposal. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby withdraws his amendment.
Turning to clause 48, home grounds play an important role in the history of a club, and are often the club’s most valuable asset. Relocating home grounds permanently to areas that have no connection to the heritage and history of a club can have a significant impact on those supporters and the local area, as we saw when Wimbledon moved to Milton Keynes. This clause is aimed at stopping that from happening again.
However, the Government do not want to stifle development that brings value and aligns with the heritage of a club. The impact of a home ground relocation on both fans and the club is why we are legislating for the regulator to preapprove any proposal in this regard. As set out in subsection (4), the regulator must be satisfied that the proposed relocation would not undermine the financial sustainability of the club, or significantly harm its heritage. Clause 48 makes the important and necessary recognition of the vital role that home grounds can play in communities, and adds an extra layer of protection to them.
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stuart Andrew
The regulatory framework is not a zero-failure regime. Therefore, it is possible that football clubs may enter administration despite the best efforts of the regulator. We would of course, hope that this is rare. There already exists a legal framework for companies—and that includes football clubs—to enter into administration, which is detailed in the Insolvency Act 1986, and in many cases this existing framework has enabled clubs to go into administration and re-emerge as solvent clubs. It should be noted that those clubs often re-emerge in a lower league as a result of the sporting sanctions placed on them by the competition organisers.
Given that the existing administration regime seems to work well in relation to appointments initiated by creditors, it is not necessary for the regulator to cut across that process. However, there are occasions where the administration of a club is not initiated by creditors but by the club itself. A club can appoint administrators directly, and so does not require a court to sanction the appointment in advance. In those circumstances, there have been occasions in which some stakeholders have had cause to question the relationship between the insolvency practitioner appointed as administrator and the football club.
That is why, in those specific circumstances, the appointment of an administrator requires the regulator’s approval to ensure that the process is transparent and to avoid conflicts of interest. Such approval should give all stakeholders, particularly fans, more confidence in the system and more confidence that the outcome is the best available, in the circumstances, for the individual club.
The requirement to seek approval from the regulator for the appointment of an administrator applies to clubs that have a licence, and those that should have a licence but for whatever reason do not, as well as clubs that were formerly regulated within the previous five years. That is included to ensure that clubs are not deliberately run so that they are no longer in the leagues that the regulator has oversight of, to then take advantage of being an unregulated entity to appoint an administrator without approval of the regulator.
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause sets out that regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated at any point in the last 10 years must seek approval from the regulator before appointing an administrator. I understand that this measure is needed to offer protection against rushed insolvencies that end up having adverse effects. It is also needed so that club owners are not able to appoint firms or people they have connections to as administrators in an attempt to manipulate the administration. Although we hope that, with the regulator’s guidance, fewer clubs will face administration, it is important that, if the worst happens, proper administrators, without conflicting interests, are appointed to oversee the process. I therefore support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mr Betts
I will reflect on what the Minister said. I will perhaps do so at a future date, but I will not move it at this stage.
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
A club’s name, home shirt colours and crest are intrinsic parts of its heritage, and therefore the decision to materially change any of them requires considered thought and consultation. The clause requires a club to establish that a majority of domestic supporters approve any material changes to its badge or predominant home shirt colours. In practice, we expect that to take place through a formal survey of fan opinion, as happened last season when Bristol Rovers supporters opposed the final proposal put to them, resulting in the club halting the redesign of its crest.
The clause also requires clubs to get Football Association approval prior to changing the name their team plays under. The view of supporters is a significant factor in the FA’s final decision, but it may also need to balance wider considerations, such as the effects on other clubs in the pyramid, and the relationship between the club’s current name, the proposed name and the locality with which it is traditionally associated.
Ian Byrne
On the scope of the independent regulator, Liverpool football club tried to trademark the name “Liverpool”, which caused absolute outrage among Liverpool and Everton supporters and market traders. The local community fought back, and the supporters of both football clubs came together. Is something like that within the scope of the regulator’s ability to influence?
Stuart Andrew
That is a very good question, and I feel my officials thinking, “Not another letter!” If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, we will write to him. I apologise to my officials, who have enough on their plate, but I want to make sure I am not saying something that is not correct.
The existing FA rule has been used to prevent name changes that have been proposed in the past against the wishes of fans, as happened at Hull City, for example. Codifying that as a legal duty will mean that there are additional powers to ensure that clubs do not make changes without proper approvals and to respond to instances of non-compliance. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
Heritage assets are incredibly important to a football club and its fans. They carry the history of where the club is based, what its identity is and the journey fans have been on through the years, in victory and loss. It is therefore pleasing that, in the light of the fan-led review, the FA has updated its rules on changes to club heritage assets. Those rules, supported by the clause, will hopefully ensure that a majority of fans are in favour of a change.
It is not just fans who will benefit from owners not being able to make unilateral changes to heritage items. There have been cases of clubs changing badges and crests without consultation, only to find that fans dislike them and will not buy replica kits or merchandise. Avoiding such situations is beneficial for people on all sides.
I know that some fan groups and Fair Game are disappointed that fans will not have a direct say over changes to a club’s name, because that is done via the FA. However, the FA told us in evidence that it consults fans as part of the name change process, so it would be good if the Minister can confirm whether he thinks that that is adequate.
The clause offers the bare minimum of fan engagement. Clubs can and must build on it through the consultation requirements in other clauses, forging ongoing listening exercises with their supporters on relevant matters. In many ways, therefore, this measure should be seen as a backstop, ensuring that a club cannot be stripped of its identity against the wishes of fans. In that context, I am pleased to welcome it.
Stuart Andrew
I absolutely have confidence that the FA rules will apply.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
In order to regulate clubs effectively, the regulator will need the complete picture of each club. Complete transparency and timely updates will allow the regulator to stay abreast of any relevant changes. That is why clause 50 imposes a duty on all regulated clubs to notify the regulator of any material changes in circumstances relevant to the regulator’s functions as soon as reasonably practicable. For example, the club’s finances might have materially changed, or the club might no longer comply with the licence condition. The self-reporting will facilitate the regulator’s ongoing real-time monitoring of clubs.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 50 ensures that a club notifies the regulator if there is a relevant material change in circumstances affecting the club and, again, we must be clear what “material change” means. However, it is absolutely right that if a shift in a club’s nature, behaviour or external context might impact compliance with its duties under the regulator, the regulator should know about that as soon as possible. I have no issues to raise with clause 50.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Duty to publish a personnel statement
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stuart Andrew
The owners and officers who control and run football clubs are vital for clubs’ sustainability. The regulator therefore needs to know who is running a club behind the scenes, so that it can implement the regime. The Bill requires licensed clubs to prepare a personnel statement and submit it to the regulator for approval. A personnel statement must outline each of the club’s owners and the club’s ultimate owner; officers and the job description of each officer; and senior management and their roles at the club.
Once the statement has been submitted, the regulator will review it and decide whether to approve or modify it. Any modification must be made in consultation with the club to ensure that the statement is accurate. Once the statement is approved by the regulator, clubs must publish it online, increasing transparency and accountability in football. Subsequent statements must be submitted to the regulator if an old statement becomes out of date, such as after the departure or hiring of an officer.
Stephanie Peacock
During our discussion of clause 16, I spoke about the importance of clubs publishing personnel statements. By identifying exactly who holds key positions, including owners and officers, the regulator will be absolutely clear who must be held accountable for the proper fulfilment of licence conditions at each football club. With that in mind, I am pleased to support clause 51.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Duty to pay a levy
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 53 stand part.
Mr Betts
This is a fairly simple clarifying amendment. As we have heard, smaller clubs feel that regulation must be proportionate and that there should be more requirements on very wealthy clubs, because they have the staff and resources to deal with that. Smaller clubs may find the whole issue of regulation very challenging, so amendment 30 simply says that the levy they will have to pay should be a percentage of annual revenue; in other words, a proportionate basis for the levy should be written into the Bill. The Minister may say that that will happen anyway—that that it is what the regulator will do—but the issue is a concern for smaller clubs, and the amendment 30 is an attempt to highlight and deal with it.
Stephanie Peacock
When the fan-led review first proposed the creation of an independent regulator for football, it suggested that the most logical way to pay for it would be through a levy on those who would benefit from it: the clubs. I agree with that conclusion, and I am pleased that the Bill confirms that the regulator will be able to require licensed clubs to pay an annual levy.
However, even though clause 52 is relatively detailed, there is surprisingly little on how the levy will be split between the clubs themselves. That is something that amendment 30, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, has sought to rectify. If the regulator is given wide discretion to determine the extent of the levy, clubs further down the pyramid might be concerned that their payments will not be proportionate to their wealth and size. Of course, clause 52 states that the regulator should have regard to the financial resources of each club and the competition it operates in. That is promising, but it is worth clarifying today what that is expected to mean in practice. Will decisions be based on broadcast incomes, as per the fan-led review, or just on average total revenue, as per the White Paper?
There is broad agreement that the richest clubs should subsidise regulation for others. The majority of costs should, in this case, fall on Premier League clubs. The Government identified that these clubs could pay about 80% of the cost, with the six richest clubs taking on 50% of the total cost. The regulator will ultimately dictate the shape of the levy, but it should be under a clear direction to ensure that the levy is progressive and proportionate. It hardly makes sense for a regulator focused on financial sustainability to shackle struggling clubs to paying large fees. It is important that clubs do not fear the introduction of the new regime and view it as an opportunity, rather than being scared into thinking it will be a hindrance.
Clause 53 requires the regulator to consult before making the levy rules. That will include taking input on a draft version of the rules from the Secretary of State, the Treasury, regulated clubs and other appropriate persons. That welcome measure will hopefully shape the levy rules in a progressive way. It is also right that the regulator must publish information about the costs involved in calculating the levy charge before it starts charging in any given year. That transparency will be important, particularly for the clubs, which will want to understand exactly what they are paying for and why.
Overall, I welcome the levy and the method of payment, and I look forward to clarification on how the Minister expects the levy will be set.
Stuart Andrew
The Government understand that the intent behind the amendment is to create certainty about how the regulator’s levy charges will be distributed between clubs. The clause gives the regulator the necessary discretion to determine how the levy is calculated and the individual charges to be paid by clubs. The Government do not have the information or datasets required to determine the appropriate way to calculate levy payments, but those will be available to the regulator. Therefore, the regulator, rather than Government, will be best placed to determine how to distribute levy charges across clubs. Importantly, that reinforces the regulator’s operational independence.
I strongly support the objective that levy charges should be affordable to clubs, which is why there is already provision that should ensure that. However, requiring the regulator to be guided by a percentage of a club’s annual revenue in its levy calculations could undermine its ability to ensure that the charges are proportionate and affordable. In addition to revenue, the regulator should have the discretion to take into account clubs’ other financial resources when determining levy payments, which may be a more appropriate indicator of what a club’s charges should be. That could include resources such as owners’ funds, but also the offset of club expenditure.
Clause 52 already provides assurance that the regulator must take into account clubs’ differing financial circumstances. That includes clubs’ financial resources and the leagues that club teams play in, as that ultimately has a direct link to revenue. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendment from the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, so I hope he will withdraw it.
Robin Millar
On that point, I would be interested to know the Minister’s thoughts. As I understand it, the purpose of the levy is cost recovery rather than to be a redistributive mechanism. Is there a reason why a simple flat percentage should not be sufficient to achieve all that we described? It would offer certainty, but it would also make sure that those with broader shoulders pay more, and it would achieve the IFR’s objective of recovering its costs.
Stuart Andrew
The reality is that, to help it understand the specifics of club finances, the regulator will have at its disposal information that we do not have at the moment. If we set the levy by percentage, we may unintentionally cause a problem for some clubs and cause an unintended consequence. The regulator will be best placed to make sure that the levy is proportionate, which is why we want the regulator to determine it. My hon. Friend is right, in the sense that some clubs will pay more for a player than most clubs earn in a year, but we will make sure that the levy is proportionate. I understand the points the hon. Member for Sheffield South East made, and I have heard what some of the smaller clubs have been saying, but I am confident we will be able to achieve that aim.
Clause 52 will allow the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running costs, following the precedent of other regulators, such as the FCA and Ofcom. The cost of the regime will be paid for by licensed football clubs. By making football clubs more sustainable in the long term, the regulator will be providing a service to the industry. As the industry would benefit from regulation, it is logical that it, rather than taxpayers, should cover the cost.
The legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator, which will be limited to raising funds to meet its annual regulatory running costs. That includes the costs of ongoing regulatory activity, additional money for new activities, and costs associated with recouping set-up costs. In line with the principles of transparency and accountability, the regulator will be subject to “Managing Public Money” guidance, and its forecast running costs will be subject to review by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Treasury.
The clause also gives the regulator discretion regarding the method for calculating the levy and in setting the levy payment level for individual clubs. To ensure that the regulator takes into account clubs’ differing financial circumstances, and to prevent charges from being unaffordable for clubs, clause 52 requires the regulator to take into account a club’s financial resources and the league it plays in. Clause 53 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult regulated clubs and the Government on its levy rules.
The levy is an operational matter that should be determined independently by the regulator, and it would not be appropriate for the Government to make the assessment. As I say, running costs will be checked by both the DCMS and the Treasury.
Stuart Andrew
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 54, page 43, line 29, leave out “23” and insert “24”.
This amendment corrects a cross-reference in clause 54(1)(b).
Stuart Andrew
Amendment 23 will correct a cross-reference in the Bill, to ensure that clause 54(1)(b) correctly refers to section 24.
Clause 54 outlines the circumstances in which a relevant league must notify the regulator whether, for example, it believes or suspects that a club has breached one of the league’s own rules that is relevant to the regulator’s regime. The clause also requires that a relevant league consult the regulator when it is considering changing its own competition rules where a rule is relevant to the regulator’s regime. Just as the regulator is required to consult the industry in certain circumstances, these duties on relevant leagues will ensure appropriate notification and consultation in the other direction, too. If a relevant league has certain pertinent information, given its knowledge and understanding of the football industry, it must tell the regulator. Equally, if the relevant league is intending to take certain action that might impact on the regulator’s regime, it must engage with the regulator. That will allow for co-operative regulation whereby information is pooled and action can be co-ordinated. That should help both the regulator and the relevant leagues to deliver their respective regulations more effectively, and ultimately minimise the overall burden on clubs.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 54, with the correction made by amendment 23, is one of the only measures in the Bill that directly places duties on competition organisers. As I have made clear throughout these Committee proceedings, I believe it is extremely important that the regulator has a constructive relationship with existing football governance structures where possible, and that they work together to ensure a coherent regulatory regime. This clause will ensure that by placing a clear duty on competition organisers to keep the regulator updated on the enforcement of its own rules, as well as on areas where they might have information that overlaps with the regulator’s remit.
It is good to see, for example, that competition organisers will report to the regulator on any risk to financial resilience, as well as on any breach of specified competition rules and any subsequent sanctions they are placing on clubs. Competitions will also have to consult the regulator before adding to their own rules; this, again, is a positive step which will hopefully prevent any such rules from undermining the regulator.
However, I do think there needs to be further consideration for how the respective regimes will work when rules and regulation overlap. Ultimately, although the regulator will be consulted on new rules, competition organisers have the final say. The Government’s White Paper says:
“Where rules of industry bodies stray into the Regulator’s remit, the Regulator would have oversight to ensure that regulations are coherent and effective.”
I would like to ask the Minister, therefore, whether he thinks that the regulator has all the powers it needs to make sure that the landscape is coherent and effective when there is crossover. This is important for all of those who enforce rules in football, as well as for clubs.
Stuart Andrew
I can confirm that I am confident.
Question put and agreed to.
Amendment 23 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
PART 6: OVERVIEW AND INTERPRETATION
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 31, in clause 55, page 45, line 3, at end insert—
“unless the IFR specifies otherwise in rules.
(2A) The IFR can only make such rules if it can be satisfied that their inclusion furthers its objectives under section 6 by protecting and promoting—
(a) the financial soundness of regulated clubs, and
(b) the financial resilience of English football.
(2B) The IFR should also have regard when making any rules under section 7 to act in such a way that avoids any—
(a) effects on sporting competitiveness of any regulated club against another regulated club,
(b) adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, and
(c) adverse effects on financial investment in English football.”
Clause 55 stand part.
Mr Betts
Could I ask for a bit of advice, Ms Nokes? I have a selection list that says that new clause 4, which I also tabled, should be debated with amendment 27, but another selection list says that it should be debated under clause 56. There seems to be some discrepancy. It would be helpful if you could provide an explanation.
The Chair
The suggestion is that you are looking at a previous selection list. New clause 4 will be debated with clause 56.
Mr Betts
Thank you for that clarification—I am sorry for mixing myself up.
Let us get down to the issue of parachute payments, which almost everyone spoke about on Second Reading, and which the Minister seems to believe should be treated as a given in their current form, with no change. I think he has the support of the Premier League—or some clubs in the Premier League, because it is by no means certain that the Premier League speaks with one voice on these issues. But it clearly is a very important issue.
I am calling for the removal of clause 55(2)(b), which stops the regulator, as the backstop, being able to consider removing or changing parachute payments in their current form. Under the regulator’s remit, they have to be treated as a given.
Dame Tracey Crouch
Is the hon. Gentleman talking specifically about parachute payments from the Premier League into the Championship, or is he talking about the smoothing process of the parachute payments to clubs that are relegated from leagues in general, indeed most probably from the EFL into the National League?
Dame Tracey Crouch
It is important to place on the record that National League clubs get 100% and then 50% of an EFL deal for League Two upon relegation, and a Championship club once relegated gets one eighth of the Championship deal for one season, and a League One relegation gets one ninth. This is not the same solidarity payment. It is important to remember that, when clubs are relegated to the league below, there is some sort of parachute payment in order to smooth out the process of losing the revenue received from being in that upper league.
Mr Betts
The point I was going to go on to make was that I am not suggesting that parachute payments should never be allowed under any income redistribution. That is not the case. My amendment does not say, “No parachute payments”. It says that parachute payments can be considered as part of the overall distribution of finances within the game.
The Bill as drafted states that parachute payments are exempt from consideration at the backstop stage—full stop, end of story. Everything else, including media income, can be considered, but not parachute payments. That seems strange, given that the Minister has repeatedly said that the independence of the regulator needs to be preserved and recognised, and yet on this key issue its hands are being specifically and absolutely tied. That just does not chime as an appropriate situation for the Government to get themselves into compared with everything else that they have said about the Bill. The regulator needs to be independent and have discretion, but on this issue it is not allowed to have the freedom to look at the situation, particularly with regard to the state of the game report. If the regulator believes that it is necessary to revisit the issue of parachute payments in order for income in football to be distributed properly and appropriately, and for it to be sustainable not just for individual clubs but for the whole of the football pyramid, this proposal is a significant mistake.
We must recognise that 80% of what the Premier League gives to the EFL is in parachute payments to a handful of clubs. When the Premier League talks about its generosity to the game, it is talking about generosity to a handful of clubs that have just been in the Premier League. That is not a real position. When we look at the distribution of the media money overall, we find that 92% goes to 25 clubs—namely, the Premier League clubs and five others that have been in and out of the Premier League in the recent past. That is not sustainable, and if a reasonable and fair distribution of money should be agreed in the future, the regulator must have the power to take that into account.
I have also said to the Minister that we ought to look at not just the importance of parachute payments to the clubs that receive them. I do not think that anyone I have met who has talked about this issue has said, “You cannot have parachute payments.” They say that it must be looked at in terms of the totality of the game and the distribution of money. I would understand, very quickly, that a club going up into the Premier League faces an enormous difference between the wage bill it had before being promoted and the wage bill it will need once promoted, and it must have some reassurance on what happens if it gets relegated. That is an understandable situation, but we must also take into account the impact on the finances of clubs in the same division as the relegated clubs and their ability to compete.
It has been said over and over again that Championship clubs are getting completely overstretched, because the holy grail of promotion to the Premier League means that clubs try to extend their budgets beyond what is reasonable. Owners put in large sums of their own money, often beyond what is reasonable and sustainable, in order to compete with clubs with parachute payments, and the difference is enormous. Parachute payment clubs will come down with budgets three times the size of those of many other clubs in that league, so in order to compete clubs often do fairly stupid things to try to ensure that promotion becomes a possibility.
My amendment says that the regulator ought to take account of those issues. It is not reasonable to say to the regulator, “The only thing that matters is parachute payments to protect clubs that get relegated and you should have no regard to the impact on the clubs already in that league.” I hope that the Minister will consider this seriously. It is obviously a concern across the House, as was reflected on Second Reading.
I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East on the Front Bench has a slightly different way of addressing the issue, but the wording in her amendment 31 relates to what I have just said. Yes, parachute payments and the impact on the clubs that receive them must be taken into account, but the impact on other clubs that must compete with them must also be taken into account. The position under the Bill as drafted is that that cannot happen, because it is fixed as it is and cannot be changed by the regulator.
The Minister will probably say that the leagues themselves could come to an agreement and change it. What happens if they do not do that? There has not been much evidence of the leagues being able to reach an agreement for a long period of time now—that is why we are here debating this Bill. In the end, it is down to the backstop. That backstop, the regulator, needs to have the flexibility to address these very important measures.
Ian Byrne
Does the format of how parachute payments are directly paid not imperil the Independent Football Regulator’s key objectives, which are to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs and financial resilience? The imbalance in parachute payments is driving clubs into making decisions that they would not usually take.
Mr Betts
Absolutely. I just made the point about the enormous difference in budgets that Championship clubs now experience because of that. Of course, when we look at this season of the Championship, three out of the top four clubs have received parachute payments. Yes, other clubs, such as Ipswich, have done remarkably well without them, but clubs are always trying to compete with those clubs receiving the payments. Last year, two of the three clubs that came up had parachute payments, and it is now almost becoming a cycle of clubs getting parachute payments, going back up, then sometimes being relegated, and then getting another lot of parachute payments. That really is not a sustainable position for the clubs receiving those, for the clubs that are trying to compete with them, for the competitiveness of the game, or for the sustainability of the pyramid as a whole. I hope that the Minister will reconsider this because it is an issue that really needs addressing.
Stephanie Peacock
I am pleased to be able to discuss part 6 of the Bill, which provides a backstop power in the event that certain thresholds are met and football is unable to resolve the issue of financial distribution. Before I begin to explore this clause, it is important to set out that, in an ideal situation, these powers would never be used. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford set out during the evidence sessions, based on her experience with the fan-led review, a football-led solution to the issue of distribution has always been and remains the preference. I hope that can be kept in mind when discussing this part. Indeed, I welcome the powers but my hope is that their enforcement will not actually be necessary.
Clause 55 broadly sets out the process under this part but most importantly defines what might count as “relevant revenue”, which is money to which the backstop will apply. Relevant revenue is broadly defined as revenue received as a result of broadcasting rights, with the Minister given the flexibility to change that if broadcasting is no longer the predominant source of income. There are a couple of things to clarify. First, it would be good if the Minister could confirm whether such broadcast revenue is meant to cover domestic competitions only. Secondly, it would be appreciated if the Minister could clarify whether broadcasting revenue will still be considered relevant if the funding model changes so that it is paid directly to clubs, rather than through competition organisers. Broadly, though, I think this scope is generally accepted as being the right one.
Issues have, however, been identified with clause 55(2)(b), which is the part of the Bill that excludes parachute payments from the definition of relevant revenue. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East tabled amendment 27, and I will speak primarily to amendment 31 in my name. First, I would like to set some background to the issue, as it stems from the fact that there is an ever-growing gap between the Premier League and the EFL. Indeed, 30 years ago, EFL revenues were 75% of those of the Premier League; today they are just 6%. In real figures, that means that 30 years ago the gap was £11 million, and today it is £3 billion.
The Premier League’s approach to mitigating that gap is the so-called parachute payments to clubs relegated from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Those payments help to ensure competitiveness in the Premier League by providing clubs with the confidence to invest on promotion in the knowledge that they will be supported if they are relegated. For example, parachute payments might give the club the confidence to sign players on multi-year contracts, and that is incredibly important to consider. The Premier League’s competitiveness and the fact that any team, no matter their size or experience, can compete on any given day is what makes it the most beloved and exciting league in the world.
However, while they help to boost competitiveness in the Premier League, parachute payments—by the White Paper’s own admission—can distort competition in the Championship. In each of the last six seasons, two of the three clubs promoted from the Championship to the Premier League have been in receipt of parachute payments. The knock-on effect of that is that owners of clubs not in receipt of parachute payments are compelled to put ever greater levels of funding into their clubs to try to remain competitive. That overreliance on increasing owner funding has deeply exposed clubs when the funding does not materialise, as we have seen for Wigan, Bolton and Bury.
Further, the size of parachute payments has increased in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, they have risen from £30 million to £233 million. That is an eightfold increase in a period in which player wages have only doubled. That means that, of the total distributable revenue of the English and Welsh professional game, the top 25 clubs—those in the Premier League—and the five in receipt of parachute payments in the EFL received 92% last season. That is £3 billion for 25 clubs, and £245 million for the other 67 professional clubs. Given the scale of parachute payments, therefore, it is notable that the Bill has definitively excluded them from the definition of relevant revenue. That is why I have tabled amendment 31.
4.30 pm
I want to be absolutely clear that the amendment is not about abolishing parachute payments; I believe that they provide clubs with the confidence that they need to invest, and they are a crucial tool in ensuring the competitiveness of the best league in the world. The amendment would simply give the regulator discretion to decide that, if certain criteria are met, parachute payments need not be excluded from the revenue to be distributed under the backstop provision.
Certainly, there is no reason to single out parachute payments. Whether people are in favour of significant parachute payments or not, they agree that they have an impact on club finances. As such, they will have a significant impact on the regulator’s objectives of protecting and promoting the financial soundness of clubs and the resilience of English football. Given that that relates to the regulator’s core role, the regulator should have the ultimate say on whether parachute payments are considered as part of the backstop provision.
Further, solidarity payments are explicitly linked to parachute payments. Solidarity payments are worked out as a percentage of the value of a year-three parachute payment. Championship clubs receive 30%, League One clubs receive 4.5%, and League Two clubs receive 3% of the value. The regulator, therefore, might find it difficult to look at one without looking at the other.
I emphasise again that the amendment does not predetermine whether the regulator includes or excludes parachute payments. If the regulator has a case, based on its objective evidence base, that excluding parachute payments from relevant revenue is more likely to make clubs financially sound and promote the financial resilience of English football, they will remain excluded. The amendment simply recognises that it should be the regulator that makes the decision, independent from any vested interests.
When making that decision, the regulator will have to pay explicit regard to the fulfilment of its core objectives and its secondary purposes: financial sustainability, financial resilience, competitiveness and investment. Taken together, those are the principles that should decide whether parachute payments are included—not the leagues and not politicians. Only then will we ensure that the regulator can fulfil the purpose of the Bill.
Damian Collins
I will make a few points on parachute payments. It is fair to say that they are not part of the redistribution mechanism between the Premier League and the Football League. They can be set as an amount alongside the redistribution that takes place, but, of course, they are not fixed. They are a contractual arrangement that the Premier League enters into with clubs that are in the league or when they get promoted.
For reasons that hon. Members have rightly set out, if the income of a Premier League club drops by at least half after being relegated, even with parachute payments, that will be a severe challenge to its sustainability. It is anyway and it certainly would be if those payments did not exist. Of course, if a club is promoted straight back up, as Leicester City has been this year, the year-two and year-three parachute payments are not kept by the Football League—the money never goes to the Football League—but goes back to the Premier League. Therefore, in many ways, the payments have nothing to do with the Football League; they are made by the Premier League to its member clubs in the event that they go down.
The question is then whether the existence of parachute payments has such a market-distorting effect that the regulator would have to intervene. It is difficult to see why the regulator would need to intervene on the basis of the impact on the clubs that have been relegated; they clearly need that support. From all the evidence that we heard as a Committee—I have not heard anyone this afternoon say anything to the contrary—there needs to be some compensating mechanism for clubs that go down, otherwise the risks are too great.
It is not always about clubs that have gone up and come straight back down again; it is often about quite large clubs—it was Leicester and Southampton last year. Everton could easily have gone down last season and the impact of such a relegation would have been catastrophic. The regulator would therefore have to take a view as to whether the existence of those payments has a distorting effect on the Championship.
Given the remit of the regulator, I urge hon. Members tabling amendments to be careful what they wish for. The regulator may well take the view that its job is not to have an impact on the nature of competition in the Championship, or to make it easier for more clubs to get promoted. Its interest is to promote financial sustainability, so it could easily take the view that parachute payments should stay because they are necessary for the clubs that are relegated.
Alongside that, there must be effective financial controls on Championship clubs. The question of whether a Championship club feels the need to compete against parachute payments is not necessarily one for the regulator. The regulator’s role is to ensure the financial sustainability of the league, so it might say that it can do that through the checks that it can put in place now, and therefore ensure that the situation created before does not happen again.
One could ask whether it is fair for the Championship to be run such that Championship clubs must compete against Premier League clubs, and cannot cook the books or rely on director’s loans because the regulator will stop them. Of course, in some ways the Championship is not competing with the Premier League. It is a league of clubs seeking to get promoted to the Premier League, but it is also looking to develop its own talent. It can buy talent from the lower leagues and from Europe, as it effectively does already. The TV revenue for the Championship, as it stands today, is already greater than for the top division in the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium or Denmark, all of which are highly-competitive football nations whose pedigree in major international tournaments has been somewhat better than the home nations over the last few decades.
Mr Betts
Is it not one of the great strengths of the English pyramid that there is, or should be, the ability for clubs to move around? If there are massive differences in the financial capabilities of the clubs that come down from the Premier League with a view to going back up again very quickly and the other Championship clubs, that effectively removes the element of competition and removes the prospect of promotion from so many clubs that it changes the fundamental nature of the pyramid. Surely that goes against one of the objectives that the Bill is trying to achieve.
Damian Collins
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The strength of the pyramid is one of the most important parts of the English game. It is probably the reason why the Premier League is such a commercial success—there is real promotion, relegation and competitive matches between the leagues. Parachute payments have come in out of necessity because of the requirement for clubs to jump up into a competition in which players are paid so much more and then to come out of it again. The regulator, as we are setting it up, would view the sustainability of the clubs in the Championship as important.
It is difficult to say that Championship clubs in England cannot recruit talent from other major European leagues and cannot develop their own talent. My concern is that, if all we do is push more money into the Championship, we will see a very large inflation of Championship player salaries. There will not necessarily be an improvement in the quality of players in the Championship but those players will be paid a lot more. There would also be even greater calls for bigger solidarity payments between the Championship and League One.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, League One club owners already complain that unless a big club happens to have been relegated into League One—a league that it is not normally in—getting promoted and sustaining a place in the Championship is becoming increasingly difficult because the Championship has largely become a division of former Premier League clubs. There are one or two exceptions—such as Preston North End, which have never played in the Premier League—but they are increasingly rare.
If the amendment were made and parachute payments were to be considered by the regulator, that might lead the regulator to demand much greater payments from the Premier League to the Championship. The logical argument that the Football League is advancing is that it wants more money for the Championship, not that parachute payments should go.
A question that was raised in the evidence session would also come into play: would it be fair for the medium and smaller clubs in the Premier League if the only method of distribution was UK broadcasting revenue, which the Premier League clubs receive equally? As we heard in the evidence session, that would place a much greater financial burden on clubs such as Brighton, Crystal Palace, Nottingham Forest and Everton than it would on Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal, for whom that money is a smaller part of their total revenue. Unless European money, other prize money and commercial gate money could suddenly be considered along with parachute payments, we are picking winners. We are saying, “We are going to favour the Championship side at the expense of the teams that play in the lower half of the Premier League.”
This is a highly complex matter with lots of moving parts. As we have heard throughout the debate on the Bill, the different parts of the football pyramid have different demands and income streams, and would make different cases. It is therefore right that parachute payments are kept out of the Bill, because they are a matter for the Premier League and the clubs that are relegated. Of course, the regulator will still be free to take wider consideration of the sustainability of the whole pyramid, which is purely about redistribution and where the money is drawn from. My concern is that—to use the phrase that we have used throughout the Committee’s consideration of the Bill—the unintended consequence of the amendment would be to create different winners and losers. The regulator has the power to look at all those things in the round.
Mr Betts
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Premier League’s objective in having parachute payments protected in this way is to ensure they that continue, while the issue of the pyramid and more competition lower down is met by even more money from the Premier League to the EFL, irrespective of parachute payments? It seems to me that that is not its position; it actually wants to hang on to as much money as it can for Premier League clubs and to protect parachute payments too. I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the multitude of issues surrounding competition between clubs in different leagues, but the fact that we cannot solve everything with this amendment does not mean that we should not address one of the problems.
Damian Collins
One of the reasons why the Bill is important is that the biggest problem in the pyramid at the moment is the financial sustainability of Championship clubs. There are different pressures and the greatest financial risks are taken there; some of the biggest failures have been at that level. That is why it is important.
Parachute payments exist only because the Premier League wants a more competitive, more attractive league. It does not want a closed league where the same three clubs are going up and down all the time, and the clubs that come up are just cannon fodder for the teams that play in it regularly. It is incumbent on the regulator to take a view on the sustainability of the pyramid, but the Premier League would not wish for that outcome.
We can choose which seasons we want to pick, but I do not think it is proven that parachute payments are having that effect already. There is plenty of evidence of badly run clubs—Sunderland is a good example from not long ago—that have been relegated from the Championship while still in receipt of parachute payment money. A lot of clubs come down with players who are not worth what they are being paid, and are stuck with a Championship squad on Premier League money. That is a problem that many clubs face.
Many problems are about the poor decisions made by managers and owners in the Championship, and a lack of financial oversight. The regulator needs to fix that financial oversight first, alongside considering redistribution in the round. It is easier to do that if we do not confuse that with parachute payments, which as the hon. Gentleman says are a much bigger quantum than the amount of redistribution anyway. We need to get the financial oversight right and look at redistribution in that context. I am concerned that simply asking the regulator to recommend a transfer through the backstop of money from the Premier League to the EFL corporately without the right financial oversight will pour petrol on the fire and drive wage inflation in the Championship.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Gentleman is making a really comprehensive argument for parachute payments. I want to be clear that my amendment is not proposing to get rid of parachute payments; it simply says that they should not be ruled out. I appreciate that he is saying that we should get this right before we move on, but we are here now setting the regulation. Obviously, if they are excluded, they are excluded.
Damian Collins
I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I appreciate that—the hon. Member for Sheffield South East makes a similar argument—it is not an argument for the abolition of parachute payments. My concern is that if we take that step, we would have to bring into scope all football money, not just the money that the Premier League pays in redistribution to clubs in the lower leagues and through parachute payments. That would be a much wider step and would require further consideration. If such recommendations are to be made in future, that should be done after the regulator is established and we have the state of the game report.
Dame Tracey Crouch
I find part 6 to be one of the most infuriating parts of the Bill, not because it is a bad aspect of the Bill but because it should not exist. The truth is that if there had been a deal between the two parties—the Premier League and the EFL—part 6 would look very different. We made it clear in the fan-led review that distributions are an issue for football and they should be able to resolve that issue themselves, but that it was important for backstop powers to be there to intervene if no solution was found. That is what part 6 is, and it has become a more controversial part of the Bill than was perhaps ever envisaged. We had hoped back in November 2021, when we published the fan-led review, that there would be a deal.
Damian Collins
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a slight danger, if we go down the path suggested by the amendment, of creating an even bigger gap between the big six and everyone else? We would basically be saying to the rest of the clubs, “The parachute payments are not for us: they are for you—the other 14 clubs in the Premier League. If you want them, you can pay for them and pay for the solidarity payments for the football league as well”, because that is effectively what would happen.
Dame Tracey Crouch
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I always refer back to that point in the fan-led review, and we mulled over that issue at length. The truth is that we did not come to a conclusion ourselves, because it is so complex. We have made it clear in the chapter on financial distribution that we hope that there will be reform to the system, but this was back in 2021, for goodness’ sake. I want to bang everybody’s heads together and send them to bed without any tea, because we are dealing with the failure of the leagues to reach a solution, and I hope that the message they get from today’s sitting and the evidence sessions that we had last week is to go away and come up with another solution. The Bill sets out the process if there is no deal on that, and ultimately if there is no amendment to the Bill, let that be an inspiration to people to come together and find a solution.
Stuart Andrew
I must say that I almost want to stand up, say what other Members have said and sit down again. I agree with everybody else: I wish we were not at this stage and that there had been a deal between the parties concerned, because it is in the interests of football for them to come up with a deal. I hope that the mechanisms we are talking about will enable us to encourage that deal to happen sooner rather than later.
On amendments 27 and 31, although the parachute payments can have the distorting effects outlined, they play a pivotal role in protecting clubs at risk of relegation from going bankrupt, as others have said, and certainly give certainty to clubs competing for promotion. As I mentioned on Second Reading, in the past, relegation from the Premier League often meant financial ruin, as teams such as Bradford City failed to adjust to the huge drops in revenue. Given the important role that parachute payments play in helping to ensure the financial sustainability of relegated clubs, removing them entirely could have significant adverse effects on the game, and we do not want to create an opportunity through the Bill’s distribution mechanisms to get rid of parachute payments by the back door. Including parachute payments in the Bill’s scope, as amendment 27 proposes, could do just that. It could mean the regulator accepting a final proposal from one of the leagues that removes those payments, and if the mechanism allowed for that, it could create significant financial uncertainty for clubs that could not confidently invest in promotion. My hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford also mentioned the commercial agreements that are in place.
An exciting, competitive and sustainable pyramid is at the heart of what makes English football the asset that it is, and we should not put that at risk. We have excluded parachute payments from the backstop, because it needs to be targeted and simple to work effectively. Including parachute payments in the backstop means that the regulator could be presented with two entirely incomparable final proposals, which could render decision making almost impossible, but it is important to remember that the backstop may never be triggered, and is only ever intended as a last resort. We expect the leagues to reach a football-led solution themselves and will continue to press them to do so.
I recognise there are also concerns about the potentially distortive effects of parachute payments, and that is why the broader regulatory framework is designed to address it. If the regulator finds that parachute payments are causing a structural or systemic issue, it could attach discretionary licence conditions to parachute payment clubs to address that. We are creating a financial regulator, and it is entirely right that we solve issues like this through financial regulation wherever possible.
Mr Betts
It would help if the Minister was clear on what he was suggesting the regulator should do to deal with the massive gap between the clubs with parachute payments and those in the Championship without. Is he suggesting that the regulator should come in and tell clubs with parachute payments, “You have got them, but you cannot actually spend them, or not all of them, because that is distorting competition”? It seems a very odd way to try to deal with the problem.
Stuart Andrew
The whole point is that the regulator can look at financial controls and make discretionary licence conditions if it wants to try to minimise that impact. However, if the backstop ever gets triggered, if two very different bids are put in, the regulator is put in an incredibly difficult position; in contrast, if those backstop payments are there, the two sides will be able to adjust their bid to address it in another way, such as by improving the solidarity payments to other clubs as a proposal to reduce that cliff edge. That is the point we are trying to make. As I say, I cannot accept the amendment that the hon. Member tabled and I hope he will withdraw it.
Mr Betts
Could the Minister explain what he has just said? I still do not understand how it is going to work. On the regulator’s powers to deal with the problem created by parachute payments, which he accepts could be created, what exactly are those powers? How does he expect the regulator to use them?
Stuart Andrew
As I mentioned, it can introduce a discretionary licence condition. There will be a range of options that the regulator may consider, but it will have discretionary licence conditions that it could put on clubs in receipt of those payments that will manage the amount of money they are spending while helping to keep clubs financially solvent and sustainable. That is the point I am trying to make.
By way of background to clause 55, the Premier League earns significant revenues from selling its TV rights. It then determines how much of its broadcast revenue is distributed within its own league, and how much is distributed to the rest of the game, including the EFL and the National League. These backstop powers have been designed to incentivise reasonableness, encourage industry solutions and tackle any bargaining imbalance between the leagues. The clause sets out an overview of those backstop powers and defines some terms that are important for setting their scope.
One key term defined in the clause is relevant revenue. It expressly includes broadcast revenue, which is the predominant source of revenue for the relevant leagues and of any redistribution. The clause allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as relevant, which will future-proof the policy—for instance, if broadcast revenue is no longer the main source of income for the leagues. There are safeguards on the use of this power, as the Secretary of State must consult the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues, and can use the power only when there has been a material change in circumstances.
The exclusion of parachute payments in the clause is to ensure that the two final proposals can be easily compared. That is based on detailed analysis and advice on similar mechanisms. However, as mentioned, the regulator will still be able to consider parachute payments through the licensing regime.
The clause also sets out several other definitions, including the idea of a “qualifying football season”. The effect of this definition, together with the operative clauses in this part, is that the backstop can be triggered only in relation to the current season and the five subsequent seasons. That ensures that the backstop powers are used only in a reasonable timeframe and not for the remote future. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr Betts
I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments, I must say. I think that we will be giving further consideration to this, as I hope the Minister will, and that we will come back to this issue on another occasion. I just hope that, by the time we come back, the Minister might be able to better explain the powers of the regulator to smooth out the issues where there are problems for Championship clubs trying to compete with those clubs with parachute payments. I was not convinced about that point from his arguments, but we will consider that further at another stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 31, in clause 55, page 45, line 3, at end insert—
“unless the IFR specifies otherwise in rules.
(2A) The IFR can only make such rules if it can be satisfied that their inclusion furthers its objectives under section 6 by protecting and promoting—
(a) the financial soundness of regulated clubs, and
(b) the financial resilience of English football.
(2B) The IFR should also have regard when making any rules under section 7 to act in such a way that avoids any—
(a) effects on sporting competitiveness of any regulated club against another regulated club,
(b) adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, and
(c) adverse effects on financial investment in English football.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Finance (No. 2) Bill
Tuesday 21st May 2024
(6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Finance Act (No. 2) 2024 2023-24 View all Finance Act (No. 2) 2024 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 21 May 2024 - (21 May 2024)
The Chair
I remind Members that Hansard would be grateful if they emailed their speaking notes or handed them to a colleague in the room, and to please switch their phones to silent.
The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the clauses and the selected new clause have been grouped for debate. Matters grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate.
I call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 21 May) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 May;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 23 May;
(2) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 23 May. —(Nigel Huddleston.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Nigel Huddleston.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and will be circulated to Members by email.
Clause 5
Increase in thresholds to £60,000 and £80,000
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Nigel Huddleston)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham, and I thank all hon. Members for their participation in today’s debate. I also thank those who have submitted written evidence on a variety of the clauses we will discuss today, including the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group and others, and all those who have contributed to consultations as part of this Finance Bill process.
Clause 5 makes changes to the high income child benefit charge, or HICBC, as it is commonly called. It increases the threshold at which child benefit begins to be withdrawn, from £50,000 to £60,000. The Government are also increasing the threshold at which child benefit is fully withdrawn, from £60,000 to £80,000. That means that 1% is withdrawn for every £200 of income that exceeds £60,000; previously, the rate was 1% for every £100 of income that exceeded £50,000, and child benefit was fully removed once individuals earned £60,000 or above.
The HICBC is a tax charge and was introduced in January 2013 for recipients of child benefit payments, or their partners, on higher incomes. It applies where the highest earner has an adjusted net income—that is, their total taxable income, less certain reliefs, such as pension contributions—above the threshold, which is rising to £60,000. For individuals with incomes above the top of the taper, which is rising to £80,000, the tax charge is equal to the full amount of the child benefit payment.
The changes will ensure that the HICBC continues to withdraw child benefit from high-income families, as it was designed to, without unfairly penalising those on middle incomes. By halving the rate at which HICBC withdraws the child benefit gain, the Government are improving people’s incentives to continue working or to take up more hours. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that, as a result of both changes, those already working will increase their hours by a total equivalent to those of around 10,000 full-time individuals by 2028-29.
The changes made by clause 5 will have a positive impact for around 485,000 families, who will gain an average of £1,260 in 2024-25, which they can put towards the cost of raising their children. That includes around 170,000 individuals who will no longer be liable for HICBC, and 135,000 individuals currently paying the HICBC who will have it reduced. The remaining 180,000 are the families currently not claiming child benefit or families opting out of getting child benefit payments who are now eligible to receive payments without incurring a tax charge.
The increase in the HICBC’s adjusted net income threshold reaffirms the Government’s commitment to rewarding working families, by allowing them to keep as much of their hard-earned money as possible in a sustainable way. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
James Murray (Ealing North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee with you in the Chair, Mrs Latham. I am pleased to respond on behalf of the Opposition in the Public Bill Committee stage of the Finance (No. 2) Bill.
As we have heard from the Minister, clause 5 increases the adjusted net income threshold for the high income child benefit charge from £50,000 to £60,000, with effect from the 2024-25 tax year. The clause also amends the rate at which the high income child benefit charge applies to individuals with adjusted net incomes of between £60,000 to £80,000 in a tax year, and contains an administrative easement to prevent backdated child benefit payments from triggering a charge in 2023-24.
As we all know, due to high levels of inflation during the current Parliament, families across the country have felt the impact of threshold freezes, particularly in relation to income tax. Millions of people will be paying income tax for the first time or paying it at higher rates as a result of high inflation and the frozen thresholds. Similarly, the fixed nominal thresholds for the high income child benefit charge mean that more and more people will have been affected by the charge as a result of inflation. The adjustment to the thresholds in this clause will therefore be a welcome step for many families, and brings the number of individuals affected by the high income child benefit charge closer to what Parliament envisaged when the policy was introduced in the Finance Act 2012.
Although we support the measures in the clause and will not oppose them, we would appreciate some clarification from the Minister on one point. In particular, we understand that subsection (2) effectively halves the rate of clawback in the calculation of the charge, so the child benefit is fully withdrawn when the relevant adjusted net income reaches £20,000 above the initial threshold —that is, £80,000. I am grateful to the Chartered Institute of Taxation for pointing out that, because the clawback happens across a wider range of incomes, some individuals will be caught out by higher marginal rates of tax and will therefore likely need to file a self-assessment return. Is the Minister concerned that that will introduce more complexity into the tax system, and if so, what is he doing to communicate these changes so that taxpayers are not caught out?
Finally, we understand that the Government will be moving the assessment of the charge to a household basis from April 2026. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed when the Government will announce further details about the consultation on that change. Will he also set out the details of what he is doing to consult industry and professional bodies about it?
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham. We will not be opposing the clause, but I do want to make some comments about this paltry measure, which will help very few people in a cost of living crisis that the Conservative Government are trying to pretend is over and done with—in fact, they are saying that that is the case. That is not the reality for people in their homes across the nations of the UK.
The Minister said that the intention of this provision —I think I am quoting him correctly—was to allow people to “keep as much of their hard-earned money as possible.” That reflects incredibly badly on the way that this Government have conducted themselves by artificially boosting the cost of living through reckless actions such as Brexit and, of course, the mini-Budget. If they wanted to do something that was meaningful to help families, they could have copied the Scottish child payment in Scotland, which has lifted 100,000 children out of poverty. But no: they have decided to do this. They have also decided to keep the two-child limit on universal credit. That should be scrapped, and the Labour party should be joining in calls for that to be scrapped. The rape clause has no place in our society, and this measure will not go far enough to help families.
Nigel Huddleston
I thank my opposite numbers for their comments. I respectfully disagree with several of their points, and I will remind my opposite number, the hon. Member for Ealing North—as I do on almost every occasion—of the significant changes to the income tax threshold that the Conservative Government have brought in. It was £6,475 under Labour; it is now £12,570. That is a significant increase and it has taken many people out of paying income tax altogether, which is something we are very proud of.
The hon. Gentleman will be well aware that, as we have discussed on multiple occasions, the reason why taxes are higher than any of us would desire is the level of intervention required to support households and livelihoods during the pandemic and, more recently, the cost of living challenges since the invasion of Ukraine and the energy price shocks in particular. I would make a similar point to the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey, who also made those points. I remind him that we have made interventions in cost of living support to the tune of about £100 billion. With respect, half a million people will benefit from the changes that we are introducing. HICBC is not a small amount. It is a meaningful amount of money for a large number of people, and it comes on top of the many other support measures that we have introduced.
I thank the hon. Member for Ealing North for pointing out the easements and the fact that there will be automatic backdating. Hopefully, that will be a relief and good news, and be positive for many families. Child benefit is normally backdated by three months, but because of the timing of the implementation, some could overlap two tax years. We are trying to make that simple and bring it into one tax year.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the increase from £60,000 to £80,000 and the impact on marginal rates. The changes that were announced will reduce the total marginal effective tax rates, which includes income tax, employee national insurance contributions and HICBC, from about 64% to 53% for someone with, for example, two children. That is a good thing.
We recognise that high marginal rates introduce complexity to the tax system, but that needs to be weighed against other considerations when designing tax policy. The Government must ensure sure that they are committed to a fair tax system that supports strong public finances. Individuals will, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, still be required to submit a self-assessment tax return to declare and pay their HICBC liability. However, the Government announced in July last year that we are taking steps to allow newly liable taxpayers to pay the HICBC through their tax code without the need to register for self-assessment. Further details on this improvement will be shared in due course.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the consultation on moving to a household basis. We will announce further details of the consultation in due course and, as with all tax policy, any changes would be considered as part of future fiscal events. The Chancellor announced that the Government will be consulting on moving the HICBC to a system based on household incomes, and that change will be delivered by April 2026. If the hon. Gentleman is patient, we will announce further details on that consultation in due course.
A point was made about communication. There have already been significant communications on the changes to HICBC. There has been a lot of online and offline activity from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, various Government Departments and others. The campaign to raise awareness also includes working with, for example, parenting platforms such as Bounty and Emma’s Diary, and issuing emails through third party partners, including childcare providers. The hon. Gentleman raised an important point about not just making the changes, but ensuring that everybody is aware of them, so that everybody who is intended to benefit is able to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Reduction in higher CGT rate for residential property gains to 24%
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clauses 6 to 11 are related to the property tax measures in the Bill. I hope that Members will forgive me, but this is a slightly longer speech, as I will talk through each clause. Indeed, it is the longest speech that I plan on giving today, although it is not too long—please do not have a heart attack; I will not be reading every one of these pieces of paper.
Clause 6 cuts the higher rate of capital gains tax, or CGT, charged on residential property gains from 28% to 24% from 6 April 2024. CGT is of course charged on the disposals of buy-to-lets and second homes. Main homes are exempt through private residence relief, which means for that the majority of residential property sales no CGT is paid at all. Where a disposal is liable to CGT, gains are taxed at a lower rate of 18% for any gains that fall within an individual’s basic rate band and at a higher rate for any gains above that.
The 28% higher rate was deterring some sales of residential properties, so the Government announced a 4 percentage point cut to the higher rate at spring Budget 2024. That will encourage more landlords and second home owners to sell their residential properties, making more homes available to the market for a variety of purchasers, including first-time buyers. The OBR forecasts that there will be around 60,000 more residential property transactions over the next five years owing to the cut. As more homes are bought and sold, the Exchequer is expected to raise an additional £690 million in revenue over that period. There will be no change to the lower rate of 18% for private residence relief.
Clause 7 concerns multiple dwellings relief, or MDR, which is a bulk purchase relief in the stamp duty land tax regime. The clause abolishes multiple dwellings relief from 1 June 2024. Multiple dwellings relief allows anyone purchasing two or more dwellings in a single transaction or in linked transactions to calculate their stamp duty based on the average value of the properties purchased, as opposed to their aggregate value. Multiple dwellings relief was introduced in 2011 with the intention of promoting investment in the private rented sector, but a recent external evaluation found no strong evidence that it has done so, meaning that the relief is not cost-effective and is therefore not acting as intended.
His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has seen a high number of incorrect and abusive claims for the relief. Those have been driven by tax repayment agents, who often convince private individuals to make relief claims for the purchase of two dwellings when individuals have in fact only purchased one. One such example is somebody buying a large house with a separate indoor entertainment area, including a swimming pool and toilet, and that being counted as two properties when it is transparently one.
The changes made by clause 7 will abolish multiple dwellings relief for property transactions that complete on or after 1 June 2024. However, for contracts that were exchanged on or before 6 March 2024, relief will continue to apply regardless of when the contracts complete. The change will not impact those purchasing a single property. It will only increase the stamp duty payable by individuals or businesses purchasing two or more properties in a single transaction or as part of the same deal. Individuals or businesses purchasing six or more dwellings will continue to qualify for the non-residential rates of SDLT.
Clause 8 makes changes to ensure that first-time buyers’ relief from stamp duty land tax can be accessed by those purchasing new residential leases through a nominee or bare trustee, including victims of domestic abuse. A nominee is a person who holds the legal title of a property, while the beneficial ownership—the person who ultimately owns or controls the assets—is held by another person. A bare trust is a trust under which property is held by a person as trustee for another person who is fully entitled to all of the capital and income of the trust.
The measure also changes the definition of first-time buyers to ensure that individuals who use such arrangements cannot claim relief more than once. First-time buyers’ relief from SDLT is available where an individual who has not previously owned a dwelling purchases a home they intend to use as their only or main residence, but that is not currently available to individuals purchasing a new residential lease through a nominee or bare trustee.
The changes made by clause 8 will benefit certain first-time buyers of residential leasehold properties purchasing through a nominee or bare trustee, reducing the up-front cost of buying a home by allowing them to claim the relief they are entitled to. The changes bring those purchasers in line with purchases of residential freeholds and pre-existing leases using similar arrangements.
James Murray
Clause 6 applies to residential property gains by individuals, trustees and personal representatives. As the Minister set out, it reduces the higher rate of CGT that applies to such gains from 28% to 24%. The new rate will apply to disposals made on or after 6 April 2024. As we understand it, the lower rate is intended to remain at 18%, and the CGT rates that apply to carried interest gains remain unchanged.
The Government’s policy paper on this matter claims that the measure will be revenue positive for the Treasury and will generate more transactions in the property market, benefiting individuals who are looking to move home or get on to the property ladder. The Opposition will not oppose moves that reduce the rates of tax while also raising greater income. However, I would like to ask the Minister for more detail on the Exchequer impact of this measure. The Government’s policy paper reports expected spikes in revenue of an additional £310 million and £350 million in 2024-25 and 2025-26 respectively. That then falls significantly to an additional £45 million in 2026-27, and to just £5 million by the end of the forecast period in 2028-29. I would be grateful if the Minister set out his explanation for this pattern of expected income. Is he confident that there will be a permanently higher level of income as a result of this change after the end of the forecast period?
Clause 7 abolishes multiple dwellings relief—a relief from stamp duty land tax available on the purchase of two or more residential properties in a single transaction or linked transactions. The change will apply to purchasers of dwellings in England and Northern Ireland that have an effective date of transaction on or after 1 June 2024.
SDLT is a tax on the purchase of land or property, and ordinarily the amount of tax chargeable is calculated on the basis of the total amount paid for land or property. MDR, meanwhile, was introduced in 2011 with the intention of reducing a barrier to investment in residential property and to promote the private rented sector housing supply. We know that the Government evaluations have shown very little evidence that MDR achieved its original aims in a cost-effective way. We believe that clamping down on dubious claims and abusive tax reliefs is the right thing to do, so we will support the clause, but I have a few points of clarification to which I would be grateful for the Minister’s response.
First, I would like to ask the Minister about the reasoning behind the introduction of MDR in 2011. I understand that in September 2010, the coalition Government said in response to a consultation that
“the Government will not be taking these proposals forward at the present time”.
However, at the Budget of March 2011, a few months later, they announced that they would indeed introduce changes to the SDLT rules for bulk purchases of residential property. Does the Minister know why the Government at the time changed their mind?
Secondly, the Minister referred to abuse of the relief, so I would be grateful if he shared with us any figures or estimates of the cost of abuse of MDR since its introduction in 2011. Thirdly, we note that the Government said that they will engage with the agricultural industry to assess whether there are specific impacts of their changes to MDR that should be given further thought. Will the Minister let us know whether he is consulting with any other sectors?
Finally, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has indicated that for the domestic buyer in the build-to-rent sector, the divergence between the rates of SDLT applicable to residential property and those in the non-residential sector is large. There is a great deal of complexity in the system, so is the Minister aware of the potential for anomalies and for new behaviour to emerge around the acquisition and definition of property? I would welcome his assurance that he will work closely with relevant stakeholders to ensure there are no unintended consequences to the changes in the clause.
Clause 8 makes changes to the rules for claiming first-time buyer relief from stamp duty land tax in cases where the purchaser is buying a new lease via a trust or nominee. It applies to purchasers of dwellings in England and Northern Ireland, with an effective date on or after 6 March. We know there have been instances of first-time buyers using trusts or nominees to conceal their identities to protect themselves from behaviours such as domestic violence and stalking. The clause corrects issues arising over the eligibility of such claims. It provides an amendment to correct a defect in the relief in order to ensure that the underlying buyer, not the nominee, is eligible for SDLT, and we will not oppose it.
As we have heard, clause 9 amends out-of-date references and definitions used in legislation relating to the SDLT exemption for registered providers of social housing. As the explanatory notes make clear, that is to ensure that all registered providers of social housing that purchase property with the assistance of a public subsidy are not liable for SDLT. The measure seeks, first, to update outdated references following changes to social housing legislation; secondly, to extend the definition of public subsidy to include receipts from the disposal of social housing; and finally, to amend the definition of registered providers of social housing to confirm that certain entities such as English local authorities are eligible for the exemption, which removes an uncertainty.
The changes are set to apply to transactions on or after 6 March 2024, but we understand from stakeholder representations that there is some uncertainty relating to the “clarifications” set out in the measure. Can the Minister confirm whether purchases made before 6 March by local authorities will be treated as separate to this clause, or has any scope been given in the exemption for those purchases made before that date?
Clause 10 removes public bodies from the scope of the higher rate of SDLT of 15%. As the explanatory notes set out, that is consistent with the treatment of public bodies in relation to the annual tax on enveloped dwellings, which does not apply to public bodies. Given that this is a corrective measure, we will not oppose it, although the Chartered Institute of Taxation has pointed out that with the measure not being retrospective, there are concerns among stakeholders. We understand, again, that the measure will apply from 6 March, the date of the Budget when the measure was announced. Can the Minister clarify what the situation will be for a public body such as a local authority that may have incurred a 15% SDLT liability in the weeks immediately before this change was announced?
As the Minister set out, clause 11 restricts the scope of agricultural property relief and woodlands relief to property located in the UK. As the Government’s policy paper states, the former measure was put in place to ensure compatibility with EU law; it expanded the scope of agricultural property relief and woodlands relief to property located in the European economic area. Now that the UK has left the EU, this measure reverses those changes, so that property located in the EEA will again be treated the same as property located in the rest of the world. This is a technical measure, and we will not oppose it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
If I may respond briefly, I will answer the perfectly reasonable questions raised by the hon. Member for Ealing North in relation to several points in multiple areas. Regarding the overall impact, and if I may reference the change of the capital gains tax rate from 28% to 24%, the OBR estimates that this costing will have a positive impact beyond the current forecasting period and generate a small long-term yield, too. Of course, beyond the forecasting period, it is difficult to estimate the exact amount.
On the points that the hon. Gentleman raised about MDR and other measures, it is interesting that although there are examples of abuse, it is also the case that only 32% of businesses buying property to let said that this relief had an important influence on their purchase decision at all and only 45% were aware of multiple dwellings relief before making a purchase decision. That feeds into the overall picture of MDR not fulfilling the original intent and purpose, which of course was to support investment in the private rented sector. Again, it is building the picture that the relief is no longer cost-effective. The Government are continuing to engage with stakeholders in the build-to-rent sector and other sectors to ensure that we understand their concerns and we will continue to listen to representations made to highlight any exception or unforeseen impacts that the abolition of MDR could have in the future.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s welcoming of many of the other measures. He asked whether they would be applied before the April deadline. They will not be applied retrospectively—for example, the updates on the registered social landlord exemption will not be applied retrospectively.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the number of public bodies that have paid stamp duty at the 15% higher rate. The number of transactions—of those impacted previously —has been very small, and we therefore do not anticipate a huge impact.
Clauses 7 to 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Additional relief for low-budget films with specified UK connection
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clauses 14 and 15 make changes to better support the UK independent film industry. That is in recognition of the sector’s cultural importance and its role in growing and supporting UK talent. The Government have heard from several representatives of the British film industry, including the British Film Institute, about the specific challenges that the independent film industry faces. The Government also recognise the vital role that independent film plays in incubating UK talent.
The changes made by clauses 14 and 15 substantially increase the level of audio-visual expenditure credit available to smaller budget films from 34% to 53%. This increased rate for qualifying films is referred to as the UK independent film tax credit. The 53% tax credit will be applied on up to 80% of a film’s production costs, up to a cap of about £15 million. That translates into £31.80 back for every £100 spent, after accounting for corporation tax at 25%.
Films will also need to meet the criteria of a new British Film Institute test, with the expectation that films will have either a UK writer, a UK director or be certified as an official co-production. Clauses 14 to 15 set out the bulk of the measure, but further detail, including on the additional test, will be provided in a statutory instrument in due course.
Productions that start principal photography from 1 April 2024 will be eligible, and companies will be able to make claims from 1 April 2025 on expenditure incurred from 1 April 2024. The UK independent film tax credit is a transformational, generous, enhanced tax credit, which will boost the production of UK independent films and incubate UK film talent.
James Murray
As we have heard from the Minister, clause 14 introduces a higher rate of expenditure credit for independent films, defined as films below a maximum budget that have either a UK director or writer, or are an official international co-production. As the Government’s policy paper on this measure makes clear, the basic rate of credit under the audio-visual expenditure credit scheme is 34%. Independent films will now receive a rate of 53%, with the amount of credit capped to relevant global expenditure of £15 million. The Opposition strongly support the UK’s creative sector as one of the areas of the global economy in which Britain is world leading. As such, we will not oppose any measures that provide certainty and greater opportunities for growth in that critical sector.
Clause 15 provides the administrative framework for the previous clause and sets out that the higher rate will be available only on expenditure incurred from 1 April for films that commenced principal photography on or after that date. We understand that claims can in turn be made from 1 April 2025, so I would like to ask the Minister about the role of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, because we know that the new schemes will need to be properly explained through new guidance and may require new staff, as the Government’s policy paper makes clear. What is HMRC doing to ensure that the guidance remains timely and up to date for those wanting to make a claim? What will HMRC do to support those who want to apply for the credit so that they can understand how it operates? Similarly, what allocation of staff will be made to administer the measure?
Nigel Huddleston
I thank the Opposition for their support. I think there is agreement across the House on the vital role of the world-leading UK creative industries, and, in particular, our thriving film sector. In answer to the broad question put by the hon. Member for Ealing North, further information will provided by a statutory instrument that we will discuss in due course. His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will have a role in that, and the precise resource allocation is an operational decision for it. As the Minister who oversees HMRC, I will pay close attention to the issue and I will ensure that it is properly resourced. This is a very important policy area and we want to ensure that it is successful. Again, I am afraid that I will ask the hon. Gentleman to be a little patient and wait for the details in the statutory instrument, but we are consulting key stakeholders on that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Increase in theatre tax credit
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
We are powering through this— I have on my notes “tea break” by now, but it is not going to happen. That is no bad thing, and I appreciate the comments and input from hon. Members. I will repeat my thanks as well—a lot of work has gone into the measures that we are discussing today and many stakeholders have already contributed significant amounts, including through consultations.
One such area is what we are debating now: clauses 16 to 18 make changes to ensure that our world-leading theatres, orchestras and museums and galleries may continue to put on outstanding home-grown productions and attract inward investment. The orchestra, theatre, and museums and galleries exhibition tax reliefs have had rates of 45% for non-touring productions and 50% for touring productions and orchestral productions since October 2021, reflecting the unique challenges faced by those sectors during the covid-19 pandemic and the recovery period, which of course we are still in.
The rates were due to be reduced to 30% and 35% on 1 April 2025 and then return to their original levels of 20% and 25% on 1 April 2026. Clauses 16 and 17 change that so the tax reliefs will reduce to only 40% for non-touring productions and 45% for touring productions and orchestral productions on 1 April 2025, and will then remain at that level permanently. That was a key ask of the sector. Clause 18 removes the expiry date of the museums and galleries exhibition tax relief so that the relief similarly becomes permanent rather than ending on 1 April 2026.
The changes will benefit approximately 1,300 theatre companies, orchestra companies and museums and galleries that claim those tax reliefs on an annual basis. Our creative sector is vitally important to our national life and one of the fastest growing sectors in the UK economy. These clauses will bolster our theatres, orchestras and museums and galleries, ensuring that they remain among the best in the world. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
James Murray
As the Minister has set out, from 1 April 2025 the rates of theatre tax relief, orchestra tax relief, and museum and galleries exhibition tax relief will be set permanently at 40% for non-touring productions and 45% for touring productions and all orchestra productions. As we know, the so-called creative reliefs were previously set at 20% and 25% respectively. They were temporarily increased on 27 October 2021 to help the sector in its economic recovery from covid-19. As the Government’s policy paper notes, the rates were due to taper to 30% and 35% from April 2025. We welcome the fact that they will now be set permanently at 40% and 45% from next year.
We also note that, by way of these clauses, the Government are removing the 2026 sunset clause on the museums and galleries exhibition tax relief so that it becomes a permanent relief with no expiry date. In previous debates on earlier Finance Bills, I have asked the Minister to give clarity and certainty to the creative sectors, so I am pleased to say that that has been given to the UK’s world-leading theatres through these clauses. As I have said, we in the Opposition stand wholeheartedly behind the UK’s creative industries, and we will of course not oppose the measures set out today.
Drew Hendry
I briefly want to endorse the comments about these sectors requiring support. It is good to see some support for the sectors here, but we would like to see more in the future.
Nigel Huddleston
I do not have much more to add, other than to point out the strength of our creative industries in all four nations of the United Kingdom, which I am glad has been recognised across the Committee today. It is an incredible strength, and I am therefore pleased to hear today the very obvious cross-party agreement on continuing support for this vital sector.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 17 and 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Collective investment schemes: co-ownership schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury (Gareth Davies)
It is a great pleasure, as always, to see you in the Chair, Mrs Latham. Clause 20 begins the process of introducing legislation for a new type of investment fund—the reserved investor fund, which I will refer to from now on as the RIF. At Budget 2020, the Government announced a review of the UK’s funds regime, covering tax and relevant areas of regulation. The review had an overarching objective to make the UK a more attractive location to set up, manage and administer funds, as well as ensuring that UK investors can access a wide enough range of investment vehicles to suit their needs. In the years since, the Government have made a number of successful reforms. In order to build on these successes, the Government announced at spring Budget 2024 that we would be proceeding with the RIF.
The RIF will fill a gap in the UK’s existing fund offering by creating an onshore alternative to existing non-UK fund vehicles that are commonly used to hold UK real estate. Clause 20 provides a definition of the RIF and provides a power for the Treasury to make detailed tax rules through secondary legislation, consistent with the approach taken when introducing tax rules for other investment funds. A later statutory instrument will set out detailed tax rules for the RIF. The regulations will set out supplementary qualifying conditions for a RIF, entry and exit provisions, and rules that deal with breaches of one or more qualifying conditions.
The UK has a world-leading asset management sector. The RIF will play an important role in supporting that leadership by making the UK a more competitive destination for our fund management industry. Indeed, stakeholders from the financial services industry have already shown considerable support for the RIF. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham. I am pleased to respond to clauses 20 to 24 on behalf of the Opposition. Clause 20, as the Minister set out, introduces the necessary powers to set the scope and design of the tax regime and rules for the RIF. Labour welcomes the introduction of the RIF, as it will add to the investment products available here in the UK, particularly for the UK commercial real estate sector. However, the trade bodies representing investment managers and real estate fund managers, the Investment Association and the Association of Real Estate Funds, have raised some concerns that I would like to put to the Minister.
There was a widely held expectation across the sector that RIF would broadly mirror the conditions of the existing authorised contractual schemes, or ACSs, but offer less regulatory supervision, freeing the RIF to become a more flexible investment vehicle for a range of more experienced investors. Due, however, to the Government’s decision to categorise the RIF as an alternative investment fund instead of a special investment fund, the RIF and the ACS will now differ in two key aspects. First, the supply of fund management services will be standard-rated at 20% as opposed to being VAT-exempt, and secondly, an alternative investment fund comes with a requirement to raise capital from a number of investors with a view to investing it in accordance with the defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors. That makes sense for large-scale, open-ended funds with an ongoing investment strategy, but it clearly is not designed for funds that do not have a specified investment objective, such as funds of one, joint ventures, co-investment vehicles and acquisition vehicles, which instead were created for a particular purpose such as repackaging and selling existing assets to new markets. Since they do not exist to raise additional capital, the requirements associated with alternative investment funds risk being an unnecessary burden and disproportionate when applied to the RIF.
Gareth Davies
I am always grateful to see the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn in her place in opposition in these forums, and I appreciate her comments. I will first set out the background to the establishment of the RIF, which was based on significant consultation with industry to fill a specific gap for an unauthorised, contractual-based vehicle. As such, it was based on specific feedback from the industry. The hon. Lady asked a very reasonable question about classification of the fund, and I can tell her that that was considered to be part of the consultation, but in the end we decided to proceed with the structure that we have gone with in the legislation. However, we will of course keep that under review and continue to engage with stakeholders, and we will issue a report on the progress of the RIF in due course. Although we have not established it in the way that some may have wished us to, it is based on consultation and will be reviewed in due course.
Tulip Siddiq
I thank the Minister for his response. He said that he considered the options and decided to proceed with it as an alternative investment fund, but he did not actually set out the reasons why. Was there any reason why he decided that it made more sense to do that as opposed to a special investment fund, especially in line with the international comparisons that I gave?
Gareth Davies
This is designed specifically to fill a gap that was previously or currently filled by things such as Jersey property investment trusts. Where there are unauthorised, contractual-based schemes, we do not currently have a vehicle that fills that gap. What we are introducing with the RIF fills that gap and satisfies a vast amount of stakeholders who fed into the consultation, and we are proceeding with that today.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Economic crime (anti-money laundering) levy
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Gareth Davies
Clause 21 increases the economic anti-money laundering levy for very large firms, meaning firms regulated for anti-money laundering purposes and which have UK revenue greater than £1 billion per annum. The charge for very large firms increased from £250,000 to £500,000 with effect from 1 April 2024. There is no change to the charge for firms with revenue below £1 billion per annum. The levy was introduced in the 2022-23 tax year as a source of sustainable funding for measures to tackle economic crime and support the delivery of the Government’s commitments contained in the economic crime plan 2. The Government made it clear during the public consultation that levy charges may be adjusted periodically in response to new information, inflation or under-collection. The adjustment is made in response to receipts falling short of the levy’s stated £100 million revenue target.
The clause amends part 3 of the Finance Act 2022 to replace the current charge for very large firms with the new charge of £500,000 per annum. The change will impact an estimated 100 to 110 very large firms across the anti-money laundering regulated sector including, but not limited to, financial services, legal and accountancy firms.
No other aspects of the levy’s calculation or operation are changing and we therefore anticipate administrative impacts on affected firms to be negligible. This adjustment to the economic crime levy for the largest firms will put funding for measures to tackle economic crime on a sustainable footing, helping to protect UK citizens and make the UK a safer place to do business. Only the very largest firms will pay more and burdens will remain low. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
We support the measures in clause 21 to raise the funds needed to tackle money laundering, fraud and other types of economic crime, but I cannot ignore the fact that the Government’s efforts to tackle economic crime have been a complete failure. Fraud and scams, for example, have rocketed under this Government, with at least £7.3 billion stolen directly from consumer bank accounts in the UK through fraud last year alone.
Last year, the Government published their fraud strategy to widespread criticism from industry for largely rebadging old measures and re-announcing existing national teams, such as the re-announcement on the replacement of Action Fraud from 2022. The consensus from experts in the industry is that the measures in the strategy will not significantly move the dial, as they do not establish a regulatory framework for tech companies and telcos to participate in the fight against fraud, including through data-sharing with financial services firms and enforcement agencies to enhance detection and prevention measures.
UK Finance, for example, has stated that it is increasingly difficult to understand the imbalance between the financial services sector’s contribution through the levy and that of other sectors that do not contribute but are known to be introducing risk into the same system. We also know that most scams originate on social media or via telecommunications networks yet those sectors do not face the same obligations regarding contributions, nor do they compensate victims defrauded through their platforms. Does the Minister agree with UK Finance? Does he accept that until the Government find a way to bring the tech giants to the table, efforts to tackle fraud and scams will continue to fail?
UK Finance has also raised concerns about the transparency of the levy and reporting on economic crime. On reporting for anti-money laundering purposes, I have heard from numerous City firms that, despite frequent requests, they receive little granular feedback on the impact their reports make. Does the Minister agree that better feedback and wider publicity around successes could help AML-regulated firms to see the value and importance of work in this area more clearly, keeping it at the forefront of their minds? What are the Government doing to ensure that happens?
Drew Hendry
This is a welcome move in principle and in targeting economic crime, but I would agree with the comments we have just heard—this does not shift things in the way that they need to be shifted in order to deal with the issue. It does not seriously tackle online crime, which is relatively rampant, with people being conned and funds being taken illegally. It does not really do much for fraud and economic crime and fails to tackle issues such as money laundering. There has still not been enough action on limited partnerships, for example, which continue to allow unknown individuals to funnel money through those mechanisms. Why are the Government not taking this issue more seriously than through these minor actions in the Bill?
Gareth Davies
I am grateful for the comments from Opposition Members. I think we all agree that we want to tackle these issues in the most serious way possible, with the most force. I am comforted by the comments from the Financial Action Task Force, which previously said that the UK has one of the strongest regimes when it comes to tackling economic crime. The levy specifically seeks to fund the tackling of anti-money laundering rather than fraud or sanctions, which I will come on to in a second.
It is appropriate to stress that the levy is a targeted measure on the anti-money laundering regulated sector, therefore the proceeds go towards tackling anti-money laundering. That is in the context of the economic crime plan 2, which covers up to 2026 and is backed by £200 million from the levy plus £200 million of Government investment. We are taking broader action on fraud in the technology sector specifically, not least through the online fraud charter, the Online Safety Act 2023 and the telecommunications fraud sector charter.
The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey mentioned sanctions evasion. We are cracking down on kleptocracy and sanctions evasion through the economic crime plan 2. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation actively monitors sanctions evasion every single day.
On corruption, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office leads our efforts to support companies to tackle corruption and strengthen governance across the world. The Government are actively working with partners across the world to strengthen international standards, not least through the UN convention against corruption. In the UK, we also have the National Crime Agency’s international corruption unit. There is significant action to tackle fraud and corruption as well as sanctions evasion, but of course we can always do more and we are vigilant about that.
On the reporting and transparency of the levy, there was a reasonable question from the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn and from the sector. There will be a report on the levy this year and it will be reviewed in 2027. We will engage with stakeholders leading up to that review.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Transfers of assets abroad
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clause 22 makes changes to ensure that individuals cannot use a company as a device to bypass anti-avoidance legislation, known as the transfer of assets abroad provisions. Those provisions are designed to prevent individuals from transferring ownership of income-generating assets, such as real estate or stocks, to an overseas individual or entity while still benefiting from the income that the assets generate. The provisions prevent the moving of assets into offshore structures outside the scope of UK taxation being a simple tax avoidance route for UK residents.
The clause has been introduced following a Supreme Court decision. Prior to the decision, HMRC considered that shareholders and directors who controlled a company could transfer an asset and were therefore in scope of the transfer of assets abroad provisions. However, the Supreme Court decision means that a shareholder cannot be determined as a transferor, which therefore opens up a loophole that can be exploited by shareholders transferring assets abroad via a close company to avoid UK tax. A close company is a company with five or fewer participators, usually shareholders or directors, who have ownership or control over the business.
The changes made by the clause will introduce a provision that deems an individual as the transferor where they are participators in a close company that transfers an asset to a person abroad in order to avoid UK tax. The amendment also applies to transfers by non-resident companies that would be treated as a close company if they were UK resident. The changes will have an impact on transactions only where the purpose of the transfer is to avoid tax and will not have an impact on transfers that are genuine commercial transactions. The changes will apply to income that arises after 6 April 2024, regardless of when the transfer took place.
In situations where multiple shareholders are involved in the transfer of an asset, any resulting tax charge will be apportioned between those individuals in proportion to their respective shareholdings. Further details will be provided in HMRC guidance. The measure is expected to affect a small number of individuals a year and will raise about £15 million in tax revenue over the forecast period.
This change was anticipated by external groups and demonstrates that the Government are quick to crack down on tax avoidance loopholes. This clause prevents tax avoidance by ensuring that individuals cannot bypass anti-avoidance legislation by using a company to transfer assets abroad while still benefiting from the income they generate. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
We believe that individuals or companies generating wealth in the UK should pay their fair share, so we are in complete support of the aims of this clause. However, we have heard concerns raised by the Chartered Institute of Taxation about the effectiveness of the Government’s proposals and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on those concerns.
First, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has argued that the clause adds complexity to the tax system, because it uses income tax legislation to tackle perceived corporate tax avoidance. Clause 22 extends provision within the Income Tax Act 2007 to cover avoidance of any tax through transfer made by a closely held company. Could the Minister explain the thinking behind the Government’s decision to tackle corporate tax avoidance in this way, rather than through the corporate tax regime? Does he agree with the Chartered Institute of Taxation that it could add unnecessary complication to the tax system?
Secondly, the Chartered Institute of Taxation made the case that the Government’s position that any participator in a company is deemed to be involved in a company’s decision to move assets abroad is unfair. For example, a company may have several minority shareholders who have no participation in the running of the company. What is the Minister’s assessment of the case made by the Chartered Institute of Taxation that only major shareholders, directors and shadow directors should be assumed to be involved for the purposes of this legislation?
Thirdly, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has warned that these changes could damage the UK’s international competitiveness, because the test as set out in the legislation leaves too much discretion to HMRC, which compounds uncertainty for businesses. For example, a UK holding company that provides a loan to an offshore subsidiary that in turn generates profits could be caught by the changes, despite that being a routine transaction. The Chartered Institute of Taxation argues that that could lead to an increased number of inquiries and appeals to the tax tribunals and could seriously undermine the UK’s attractiveness for international headquarters.
What does the Minister make of those concerns? What steps will HMRC take to ensure that involvement and objection defences under the clause are not ambiguous or uncertain, and to ensure that those charges do not prove to be increased excessively for taxpayers?
My final point is that the changes introduced by clause 22 appear to be retrospective, as no date is specified whereafter transactions are affected; the clause says only that income arising after April 2024 is caught by the regime. Can the Minister confirm whether that is the case? Will commercial transactions that were carried out many years ago, but from which income arises after April 2024, still be caught?
Nigel Huddleston
I thank the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn for her comments. We very much appreciate the input that we have received from stakeholders and interested parties, including the Chartered Institute of Taxation. Some of those points are about broader issues around the TOAA regime, rather than specific to this legislation, but we do hear what they have to say.
I will respond to the hon. Lady’s points about the changes that apply to companies when the TOAA regime is primarily about individuals. The transfer of assets abroad legislation is an anti-avoidance provision aimed at preventing individuals from avoiding a tax charge by transferring an asset to a person overseas while still being able to enjoy the income of that asset in some way. It would be easy for an individual to sidestep the legislation by transferring such an asset to a company that they controlled before the company then made the transfer abroad. The legislative changes are aimed at preventing that situation and ensuring that the TOAA rules are applied as intended.
On the point about the legislation being broad, let us not forget that it is being brought in in response to the Supreme Court judgment; we are trying to make sure that it acts as intended throughout. The intention of the legislation is to put the situation involving transfers by companies back to how HMRC considered it operated before the Supreme Court decision. The transfer of assets abroad legislation aims to stop that tax avoidance.
It is also important to remember that the legislation does not bring a tax charge when the transfer is for genuine commercial reasons or when tax avoidance was not the purpose of the transfer. The new legislation gives individuals the opportunity to exclude themselves from the tax charge if certain conditions are met. We respectfully disagree with the CIOT on some of those conditions. We have outlined some of those, and HMRC will produce further guidance in due course.
On the retroactive criticism, the clause has retroactive effect because if it did not, it would have allowed individuals to abuse the loophole between the date of the Fisher judgment and the enactment of the legislation. Again, we do not believe that there will be a significant increase in complexity. The purpose behind the legislation is primarily to ensure that the regime acts as intended.
I will not go into the weeds on HMRC’s determination process—further guidance will be given—but HMRC will review the facts of a case to judge whether someone is directly or indirectly involved in the decision making of a company. It will accept evidence that shows whether someone is involved or not. However, any arrangements that are put in place purely to be used as evidence that an individual is not involved in the decision making of a company will be disregarded and a charge will be levied if the other conditions are met. As I said, HMRC will issue guidance on how it will approach the matter in due course. Decisions will be made based on the facts of each individual case.
I hope that I have given the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn some assurance. We appreciate the concerns that have raised by key stakeholders, and further information and guidance will be forthcoming.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Minor VAT amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clause 23 makes some minor, technical changes to VAT legislation relating to the DIY house builders’ scheme and VAT credit in the penalty reform regime, and allows for reform of the VAT terminal markets order. I will speak briefly about each measure in turn.
The DIY house builders’ scheme allows individuals building their own home, or converting a non-residential building to their own home, to recover VAT incurred on the cost. That puts individual house builders in the same position as property developers, who are able to sell new build residential property at a zero rate and recover the VAT they incur in the process of constructing new build properties. The scheme was simplified and made digital in December last year, which has significantly reduced the time taken for claims to be paid. Under the new process, only essential details are required on the claim form, eliminating the need for claimants to submit certain evidential documents up front. Based on the information provided on the claim form, HMRC can then request evidential documents to verify the claim.
Clause 23(1) will give HMRC a clear power under the DIY house builders’ scheme to require further evidential documentation, such as invoices, from the person who submitted a claim under the scheme. That will assist HMRC in verifying claims.
Clause 23(3) is a minor update to the existing powers that allow for reform of the VAT terminal markets order. The order reduces VAT administration burdens on commodities traded on specified markets, so the power will allow for simplifications to support businesses trading those commodities. The Government previously announced their intention to reform the order to reflect current market practices and to keep pace with market changes, such as trades in new products, including carbon credits. This clause takes that commitment forward.
Finally, subsections (4) and (5) make changes to ensure that VAT interest rules operate as intended. For most major taxes, the Finance Act 2009 requires HMRC to pay interest on amounts due from HMRC to taxpayers, and to charge interest on late payments to HMRC. Historically, that regime did not apply to VAT, which had its own interest rules. Harmonising the rules on interest was an important step in delivering the Government’s ambition to build a trusted, modern tax administration system. Changes made by the Finance Act 2021 brought VAT interest in line with taxes such as income tax from 1 January last year. In implementing the new interest rules for VAT, HMRC has discovered some minor defects in the legislation, which without correction would force it to act in a way that conflicts with policy intent.
Clause 23 will therefore make two changes to the interest rules. The first will address the situation in which interest ought to be repaid to HMRC because, following an assessment or amendment that reduces the amount of VAT credit, the repayment interest due is also reduced. It was always intended that HMRC could recover all these amounts through a simple automated process that does not add to burdens for taxpayers and HMRC alike. The IT system can already operate, but the legislation, mistakenly, does not always allow that automated recovery. The change will ensure that HMRC can do so in all cases instead of needing a different, onerous process for a minority of cases that the original legislation did not cover.
The second change will make sure that VAT-registered businesses are always protected by a provision that creates a fairer basis for the calculation of interest where they owed money to HMRC over the same time that HMRC owed money to them. The original legislation failed to extend that safeguard to all scenarios in which that could happen with VAT, undermining the fairness of the interest regime. To ensure that all VAT-registered businesses are treated equally, the changes will be given backdated effect to 1 January 2023, when the interest rules were introduced for VAT.
Clause 23 makes some small changes to ensure that policy works as intended and to further Government commitments on reforming the VAT terminal markets order. I commend it to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
The Opposition support the changes that will assist with compliance checks by making online applications equivalent to paper applications. Has the Minister considered adding the online application as a service to the agent services accounts so that an agent can prepare and submit the claim on behalf of their client?
We also support the provisions for modifying the application of VAT for terminal markets, as that will allow for further reforms such as bringing trades in carbon credits within the scope of the Value Added Tax (Terminal Markets) Order. We feel that is a vital and necessary step in developing this important market.
We support the changes to legislation that governs the interaction between late payment interest and repayment interest for VAT. Has the Minister given any thought to reinstating HMRC’s ability not to charge interest on VAT errors where the supplier did not charge VAT, with no loss to the Exchequer because the customer could claim in full?
Drew Hendry
On clause 23’s minor VAT amendments, there is very little to disagree with. VAT should be paid where it is due, and HMRC should pay interest where it should pay interest. That is to be welcomed.
However, on Second Reading I pointed out the paucity of thought and imagination that had gone into providing real help for people across the nations of the UK, and the kinds of thing that the Government could have done but have not. The clause title, “Minor VAT amendments”, just highlights the problem with the entire Bill. The Government could have taken some action to deal with the issues for people in hospitality by cutting VAT and doing something meaningful for tourism, but no: they have chosen to make these minor adjustments. They could have used VAT as a mechanism for helping our high streets to create economic zones that could boost life back into vital high streets and centres. Instead, they have taken to tinkering with the VAT rules.
My question to the Minister is why there is such a lack of ambition in his Government. Is it that this is a fag-end Government in a fag-end Parliament that has run out of ideas, or is it just that they do not care?
Nigel Huddleston
The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey has been charming until this point, and now he goes back to this. I know him very well; I am sure he does not mean it. First, he knows as well as anybody in this House that everybody who comes into Parliament cares: they care about their constituents and they care about the country. We are motivated to come here because we want to make the country a better place for our children and grandchildren.
I know that the hon. Gentleman occasionally gets rather vocal on some of these points, but I politely request that he be a little bit careful with some of his comments. I would never criticise the motivation, incentives or purposes of any colleague in this place. I may fundamentally disagree with some of their policies, but I will not disagree with their motivations. In saying things like “People don’t care” or “The Government don’t care,” I am afraid he is straightforwardly wrong.
Drew Hendry
I am very fond of the Minister, as he knows. We often have these back and forths, and I often have to rise to my feet to correct what he has said. I did not make any assertion about any individual; I was talking about his Government. I was very explicit about that. I just want to make that clear.
Nigel Huddleston
Yet again, I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s trying to clarify, but I am a member of the Government and therefore I am afraid that I do take offence, direct or indirect. But that is a side point to the matters under discussion.
The hon. Gentleman is making fair and valid points about the support that has been given, but I repeat that this Government, like every Government around the world, have had incredibly difficult circumstances to deal with. I do not think that there is any doubt whatever that the support measures that we have put in place to support lives and livelihoods have been incredible and stack up pretty well when compared internationally. That includes cost of living support, as I have mentioned.
I know that the hon. Gentleman is a huge supporter of the tourism, hospitality and leisure industry. We have spoken about that many times, and I know that it is particularly important to Scotland, where it is a disproportionately larger share of the economy than in England, for example, although it is important and large across every single constituency in the UK—and I do mean every single constituency. But the hon. Gentleman is being a little bit rich, because he knows as well as I do that there are other measures beyond VAT to support the hospitality and leisure industry. Of course, in England we have extended the 75% business rates reduction to the retail, hospitality and leisure sector, but that has not been done in Scotland, nor has it been done to its full extent in Wales.
Drew Hendry
I am grateful to the Minister for allowing a bit of back and forth on this. It is generous of him to do so. He fails to mention that in Scotland, 100,000 businesses are lifted out of business rates altogether through the small business bonus scheme. The record in Scotland shows that we are supporting businesses, and those businesses are very prevalent in the tourism sector.
Nigel Huddleston
I acknowledge the efforts made by the Scottish Government to support various sectors, but as I say, on that particular item, the hon. Gentleman will know as well as I do that it is a key ask of the industry in Scotland for the Scottish Government to follow suit with England and elsewhere.
The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn raised several points. Some were slightly out of the scope of the specific measures under discussion, including IT systems and other considerations, but I take on board what she says, as does HMRC, because there is a constant need to review and assess the scope of IT systems and so on. We do so on a regular basis; I spend a lot of time talking to HMRC about this, so I can assure the hon. Lady that the points that she raised are constantly under consideration. I will probably leave it at that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Collective money purchase arrangements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
Clause 24 makes further provision for collective money purchase arrangements. CMP arrangements are a new type of pension that have the benefit of pooling individuals’ pension pots to provide better incomes in retirement while limiting the liability of employers.
These changes will enable the Government to authorise the transfer of benefits to a member’s beneficiaries, such as their dependants, in the unlikely event that a member dies while a CMP arrangement is being wound up. That will ensure that such transfers do not incur an unauthorised payment charge of 55%, and it will deliver the Government’s commitment to provide the correct tax outcome for CMP arrangements.
The Pension Schemes Act 2021 introduced legislation to allow collective money purchase schemes to operate in the United Kingdom. This measure authorises the transfer of survivor benefits in collective money purchase pension schemes. This will ensure that Royal Mail Group, the first provider of a collective money purchase pension scheme, can launch its scheme as planned.
It is a complicated title, but with a simple purpose. As a result of these changes, an employee of Royal Mail will be able to sign on to a CMP, with all the benefits, without the risk of transferring survivor benefits being put through as unauthorised transactions. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Tulip Siddiq
This clause is so uncontroversial that we give it our full support. For the first time, I agree with everything the Minister has said, and the Committee will be happy to know that I have no further questions for him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Interpretation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
I will be very brief, because the clause is fairly straightforward. It provides for the use of abbreviations for a variety of Acts. For example, it provides for the use of “CTA 2009” as an abbreviation for the Corporation Tax Act 2009. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nigel Huddleston
The clause provides for the Bill to be known as the Finance (No. 2) Act 2024 upon Royal Assent. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill to the House.
Nigel Huddleston
We have moved forward very quickly today. I thank everybody for their participation: you, Mrs Latham, all the officials in the House, the Clerks, and all those who have been working on the Bill at HMRC, HMT and other Government Departments. I repeat my thanks to the external stakeholders for their comments and to all those who have been involved in consultations. In particular, I thank the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, and the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group for their contributions to this Committee, including in written form, and all those who have participated today.
I look forward to the Bill progressing smoothly through its final stages. I thank everybody involved.
James Murray
I add my thanks to my colleagues in the Opposition: my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Kilburn; the Opposition Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Gower; and, of course, the Back Benchers who have joined us for this lengthy Committee session. [Laughter.] I place on the record my thanks to all the House authorities and to third parties, particularly the Chartered Institute of Taxation, whose expertise is always greatly valued.
Drew Hendry
I, too, rise to pass on my thanks: to you, Mrs Latham, for chairing, and to all the staff and others who have been involved. Whether we agree or vehemently disagree—often, as we have seen today, there are big disagreements—we never forget those people who work hard to produce the documentation and supporting information in all the arms of Parliament, including the House of Commons Library. Thank you.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly to be reported, without amendment.