Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDamian Collins
Main Page: Damian Collins (Conservative - Folkestone and Hythe)Department Debates - View all Damian Collins's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI want to carry on the debate about clause 37 and reflect on honesty and integrity as set out in subsection (3), on “matters relevant to determinations” of the “requisite honesty and integrity”, and subsection (3)(g), which talks about
“such other matters relating to honesty and integrity as may be specified”
by rules. I would be interested in a little clarity from the Minister about that. Some of the other prerequisites or matters to be considered, such as whether someone is financially sound, can involve hard evidence, and someone’s competence can be tested by qualifications; integrity, however, is a bit of a subjective matter. It is more about things that are not against the law but are certainly not in the spirit of the law, and it is often behavioural.
Does the Minister have any examples that he might want to see in those rules? Someone might have used poor employment practices, for example, as we have seen in other industries, some of which are regulated and some of which are not. The issue would not reach a tribunal so it would not be a piece of hard evidence, but it would bring into question why an owner or officers of a club, in a different business, deployed fire-and-rehire tactics, for example, that were detrimental to their workforce and local community. Similarly, in a positive sense, would there be any consideration of what high integrity might be: for example, owners and officers who championed equality and diversity—an issue that we have been speaking a lot about in this Bill? I would welcome the Minister’s comments.
I will be interested in the Minister’s remarks about amendment 1. I understand the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford is making, in seeking to create a bit more flexibility for the regulator. We would all hope that the integrity checks against an individual owner could ultimately “trump”—if she does not mind my using the word—any positive trading relationship. If the person were not considered a good and proper owner, the fact that we had a good trading relationship with their country should make no difference: they should not be able to avoid the checks simply because they come from a trusted trader nation.
However, on the other hand, I can see that having “must” would be helpful for the regulator in two ways. One is that if a would-be owner of a club met all the criteria and therefore should be allowed to acquire the club, but the only block on them was that they were a sanctioned individual, the regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it could not let the deal go through. There would not be grounds for challenge, say, at the Court of Arbitration for Sport over whether an appropriate judgment had been made. There would be no question of the sanctioned person’s suitability on any other grounds. In that particular circumstance, the provision could be helpful.
I imagine that it would be reassuring for the regulator to know that, as was the case when Newcastle United was acquired, if another Premier League club was acquired by a country that was not sanctioned—we did not have a trade embargo with it—but was nevertheless controversial, the regulator would not have to consider that, whether people wanted it to or not, because no Government policy would be saying that we could not trade with or allow investment from that country. The regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it was acting purely within the confines of its role.
I appreciate the intention of the amendment and the reasons behind it, but perhaps the Minister could give us some guidance on whether “must” may be better than “may”.
The Government absolutely recognise the intent behind the amendment to ensure the independence of the regulator. We have been extremely clear that the independence of the regulator is vital. That is why the regulator will be set up as a new public body to ensure its full operational independence.
Clause 37(2) does not diminish the regulator’s independence. It does not mean that the regulator needs to consult the Government about the suitability of an owner, nor can the Government interfere with the regulator’s decision. If the regulator determines that an individual does not have the requisite honesty and integrity, or is not financially sound, or that the individual has any source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct, that individual cannot be determined to be a suitable owner of a regulated club. Clause 37(2) does not override those fundamental requirements. Nor can any individual, fan, league, club or Government influence override them.
The purpose of clause 37(2) is to ensure that the regulator has to have regard to the UK’s foreign and trade policy objectives when it makes a determination about any new or incumbent owner. That will ensure that the regulator cannot make unilateral moral judgments on which countries it may consider unsuitable when it tests owners. We do not want to allow for a scenario where that happens and in effect a regulator, as I said this morning, sets the Government’s foreign policy.
The effect of the amendment would be to increase discretion for the regulator to decide when it will have regard to the UK’s foreign and trade policy objectives when making decisions about owners. The Government believe that their foreign and trade policy objectives are a relevant matter for the regulator to have regard to whenever it makes a determination about the suitability of any and all owners, not just some. Increased discretion for the regulator may risk it making unilateral judgments that stray into foreign policy.
To be clear, requiring that the regulator must have regard to the Government’s objectives does not mean that that must be a decisive factor. It might have limited relevance in a particular case and, if so, the regulator will not have to give that undue weight. The fundamental basis for a regulator’s determinations about owners will be honesty, integrity, financial soundness, source of wealth and, for new owners, sufficiency of financial resources.
I heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said and we will continue to reflect further, ahead of Report. But for the reasons that I have set out, I am not able to accept her amendment and I hope she will withdraw it.
Clause 37 lists the matters that the regulator must take into account when it conducts owners and directors tests, including what it must consider when determining whether an individual is financially sound and whether they have the requisite honesty and integrity and, for officers only, the competence needed to fulfil the role, and ultimately to determine whether they are sensible—sorry, suitable.
I am pleased to be able to discuss part 6 of the Bill, which provides a backstop power in the event that certain thresholds are met and football is unable to resolve the issue of financial distribution. Before I begin to explore this clause, it is important to set out that, in an ideal situation, these powers would never be used. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford set out during the evidence sessions, based on her experience with the fan-led review, a football-led solution to the issue of distribution has always been and remains the preference. I hope that can be kept in mind when discussing this part. Indeed, I welcome the powers but my hope is that their enforcement will not actually be necessary.
Clause 55 broadly sets out the process under this part but most importantly defines what might count as “relevant revenue”, which is money to which the backstop will apply. Relevant revenue is broadly defined as revenue received as a result of broadcasting rights, with the Minister given the flexibility to change that if broadcasting is no longer the predominant source of income. There are a couple of things to clarify. First, it would be good if the Minister could confirm whether such broadcast revenue is meant to cover domestic competitions only. Secondly, it would be appreciated if the Minister could clarify whether broadcasting revenue will still be considered relevant if the funding model changes so that it is paid directly to clubs, rather than through competition organisers. Broadly, though, I think this scope is generally accepted as being the right one.
Issues have, however, been identified with clause 55(2)(b), which is the part of the Bill that excludes parachute payments from the definition of relevant revenue. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East tabled amendment 27, and I will speak primarily to amendment 31 in my name. First, I would like to set some background to the issue, as it stems from the fact that there is an ever-growing gap between the Premier League and the EFL. Indeed, 30 years ago, EFL revenues were 75% of those of the Premier League; today they are just 6%. In real figures, that means that 30 years ago the gap was £11 million, and today it is £3 billion.
The Premier League’s approach to mitigating that gap is the so-called parachute payments to clubs relegated from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Those payments help to ensure competitiveness in the Premier League by providing clubs with the confidence to invest on promotion in the knowledge that they will be supported if they are relegated. For example, parachute payments might give the club the confidence to sign players on multi-year contracts, and that is incredibly important to consider. The Premier League’s competitiveness and the fact that any team, no matter their size or experience, can compete on any given day is what makes it the most beloved and exciting league in the world.
However, while they help to boost competitiveness in the Premier League, parachute payments—by the White Paper’s own admission—can distort competition in the Championship. In each of the last six seasons, two of the three clubs promoted from the Championship to the Premier League have been in receipt of parachute payments. The knock-on effect of that is that owners of clubs not in receipt of parachute payments are compelled to put ever greater levels of funding into their clubs to try to remain competitive. That overreliance on increasing owner funding has deeply exposed clubs when the funding does not materialise, as we have seen for Wigan, Bolton and Bury.
Further, the size of parachute payments has increased in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, they have risen from £30 million to £233 million. That is an eightfold increase in a period in which player wages have only doubled. That means that, of the total distributable revenue of the English and Welsh professional game, the top 25 clubs—those in the Premier League—and the five in receipt of parachute payments in the EFL received 92% last season. That is £3 billion for 25 clubs, and £245 million for the other 67 professional clubs. Given the scale of parachute payments, therefore, it is notable that the Bill has definitively excluded them from the definition of relevant revenue. That is why I have tabled amendment 31.
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I want to be absolutely clear that the amendment is not about abolishing parachute payments; I believe that they provide clubs with the confidence that they need to invest, and they are a crucial tool in ensuring the competitiveness of the best league in the world. The amendment would simply give the regulator discretion to decide that, if certain criteria are met, parachute payments need not be excluded from the revenue to be distributed under the backstop provision.
Certainly, there is no reason to single out parachute payments. Whether people are in favour of significant parachute payments or not, they agree that they have an impact on club finances. As such, they will have a significant impact on the regulator’s objectives of protecting and promoting the financial soundness of clubs and the resilience of English football. Given that that relates to the regulator’s core role, the regulator should have the ultimate say on whether parachute payments are considered as part of the backstop provision.
Further, solidarity payments are explicitly linked to parachute payments. Solidarity payments are worked out as a percentage of the value of a year-three parachute payment. Championship clubs receive 30%, League One clubs receive 4.5%, and League Two clubs receive 3% of the value. The regulator, therefore, might find it difficult to look at one without looking at the other.
I emphasise again that the amendment does not predetermine whether the regulator includes or excludes parachute payments. If the regulator has a case, based on its objective evidence base, that excluding parachute payments from relevant revenue is more likely to make clubs financially sound and promote the financial resilience of English football, they will remain excluded. The amendment simply recognises that it should be the regulator that makes the decision, independent from any vested interests.
When making that decision, the regulator will have to pay explicit regard to the fulfilment of its core objectives and its secondary purposes: financial sustainability, financial resilience, competitiveness and investment. Taken together, those are the principles that should decide whether parachute payments are included—not the leagues and not politicians. Only then will we ensure that the regulator can fulfil the purpose of the Bill.
I will make a few points on parachute payments. It is fair to say that they are not part of the redistribution mechanism between the Premier League and the Football League. They can be set as an amount alongside the redistribution that takes place, but, of course, they are not fixed. They are a contractual arrangement that the Premier League enters into with clubs that are in the league or when they get promoted.
For reasons that hon. Members have rightly set out, if the income of a Premier League club drops by at least half after being relegated, even with parachute payments, that will be a severe challenge to its sustainability. It is anyway and it certainly would be if those payments did not exist. Of course, if a club is promoted straight back up, as Leicester City has been this year, the year-two and year-three parachute payments are not kept by the Football League—the money never goes to the Football League—but goes back to the Premier League. Therefore, in many ways, the payments have nothing to do with the Football League; they are made by the Premier League to its member clubs in the event that they go down.
The question is then whether the existence of parachute payments has such a market-distorting effect that the regulator would have to intervene. It is difficult to see why the regulator would need to intervene on the basis of the impact on the clubs that have been relegated; they clearly need that support. From all the evidence that we heard as a Committee—I have not heard anyone this afternoon say anything to the contrary—there needs to be some compensating mechanism for clubs that go down, otherwise the risks are too great.
It is not always about clubs that have gone up and come straight back down again; it is often about quite large clubs—it was Leicester and Southampton last year. Everton could easily have gone down last season and the impact of such a relegation would have been catastrophic. The regulator would therefore have to take a view as to whether the existence of those payments has a distorting effect on the Championship.
Given the remit of the regulator, I urge hon. Members tabling amendments to be careful what they wish for. The regulator may well take the view that its job is not to have an impact on the nature of competition in the Championship, or to make it easier for more clubs to get promoted. Its interest is to promote financial sustainability, so it could easily take the view that parachute payments should stay because they are necessary for the clubs that are relegated.
Alongside that, there must be effective financial controls on Championship clubs. The question of whether a Championship club feels the need to compete against parachute payments is not necessarily one for the regulator. The regulator’s role is to ensure the financial sustainability of the league, so it might say that it can do that through the checks that it can put in place now, and therefore ensure that the situation created before does not happen again.
One could ask whether it is fair for the Championship to be run such that Championship clubs must compete against Premier League clubs, and cannot cook the books or rely on director’s loans because the regulator will stop them. Of course, in some ways the Championship is not competing with the Premier League. It is a league of clubs seeking to get promoted to the Premier League, but it is also looking to develop its own talent. It can buy talent from the lower leagues and from Europe, as it effectively does already. The TV revenue for the Championship, as it stands today, is already greater than for the top division in the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium or Denmark, all of which are highly-competitive football nations whose pedigree in major international tournaments has been somewhat better than the home nations over the last few decades.
Is it not one of the great strengths of the English pyramid that there is, or should be, the ability for clubs to move around? If there are massive differences in the financial capabilities of the clubs that come down from the Premier League with a view to going back up again very quickly and the other Championship clubs, that effectively removes the element of competition and removes the prospect of promotion from so many clubs that it changes the fundamental nature of the pyramid. Surely that goes against one of the objectives that the Bill is trying to achieve.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The strength of the pyramid is one of the most important parts of the English game. It is probably the reason why the Premier League is such a commercial success—there is real promotion, relegation and competitive matches between the leagues. Parachute payments have come in out of necessity because of the requirement for clubs to jump up into a competition in which players are paid so much more and then to come out of it again. The regulator, as we are setting it up, would view the sustainability of the clubs in the Championship as important.
It is difficult to say that Championship clubs in England cannot recruit talent from other major European leagues and cannot develop their own talent. My concern is that, if all we do is push more money into the Championship, we will see a very large inflation of Championship player salaries. There will not necessarily be an improvement in the quality of players in the Championship but those players will be paid a lot more. There would also be even greater calls for bigger solidarity payments between the Championship and League One.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, League One club owners already complain that unless a big club happens to have been relegated into League One—a league that it is not normally in—getting promoted and sustaining a place in the Championship is becoming increasingly difficult because the Championship has largely become a division of former Premier League clubs. There are one or two exceptions—such as Preston North End, which have never played in the Premier League—but they are increasingly rare.
If the amendment were made and parachute payments were to be considered by the regulator, that might lead the regulator to demand much greater payments from the Premier League to the Championship. The logical argument that the Football League is advancing is that it wants more money for the Championship, not that parachute payments should go.
A question that was raised in the evidence session would also come into play: would it be fair for the medium and smaller clubs in the Premier League if the only method of distribution was UK broadcasting revenue, which the Premier League clubs receive equally? As we heard in the evidence session, that would place a much greater financial burden on clubs such as Brighton, Crystal Palace, Nottingham Forest and Everton than it would on Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal, for whom that money is a smaller part of their total revenue. Unless European money, other prize money and commercial gate money could suddenly be considered along with parachute payments, we are picking winners. We are saying, “We are going to favour the Championship side at the expense of the teams that play in the lower half of the Premier League.”
This is a highly complex matter with lots of moving parts. As we have heard throughout the debate on the Bill, the different parts of the football pyramid have different demands and income streams, and would make different cases. It is therefore right that parachute payments are kept out of the Bill, because they are a matter for the Premier League and the clubs that are relegated. Of course, the regulator will still be free to take wider consideration of the sustainability of the whole pyramid, which is purely about redistribution and where the money is drawn from. My concern is that—to use the phrase that we have used throughout the Committee’s consideration of the Bill—the unintended consequence of the amendment would be to create different winners and losers. The regulator has the power to look at all those things in the round.
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Premier League’s objective in having parachute payments protected in this way is to ensure they that continue, while the issue of the pyramid and more competition lower down is met by even more money from the Premier League to the EFL, irrespective of parachute payments? It seems to me that that is not its position; it actually wants to hang on to as much money as it can for Premier League clubs and to protect parachute payments too. I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the multitude of issues surrounding competition between clubs in different leagues, but the fact that we cannot solve everything with this amendment does not mean that we should not address one of the problems.
One of the reasons why the Bill is important is that the biggest problem in the pyramid at the moment is the financial sustainability of Championship clubs. There are different pressures and the greatest financial risks are taken there; some of the biggest failures have been at that level. That is why it is important.
Parachute payments exist only because the Premier League wants a more competitive, more attractive league. It does not want a closed league where the same three clubs are going up and down all the time, and the clubs that come up are just cannon fodder for the teams that play in it regularly. It is incumbent on the regulator to take a view on the sustainability of the pyramid, but the Premier League would not wish for that outcome.
We can choose which seasons we want to pick, but I do not think it is proven that parachute payments are having that effect already. There is plenty of evidence of badly run clubs—Sunderland is a good example from not long ago—that have been relegated from the Championship while still in receipt of parachute payment money. A lot of clubs come down with players who are not worth what they are being paid, and are stuck with a Championship squad on Premier League money. That is a problem that many clubs face.
Many problems are about the poor decisions made by managers and owners in the Championship, and a lack of financial oversight. The regulator needs to fix that financial oversight first, alongside considering redistribution in the round. It is easier to do that if we do not confuse that with parachute payments, which as the hon. Gentleman says are a much bigger quantum than the amount of redistribution anyway. We need to get the financial oversight right and look at redistribution in that context. I am concerned that simply asking the regulator to recommend a transfer through the backstop of money from the Premier League to the EFL corporately without the right financial oversight will pour petrol on the fire and drive wage inflation in the Championship.
The hon. Gentleman is making a really comprehensive argument for parachute payments. I want to be clear that my amendment is not proposing to get rid of parachute payments; it simply says that they should not be ruled out. I appreciate that he is saying that we should get this right before we move on, but we are here now setting the regulation. Obviously, if they are excluded, they are excluded.
I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I appreciate that—the hon. Member for Sheffield South East makes a similar argument—it is not an argument for the abolition of parachute payments. My concern is that if we take that step, we would have to bring into scope all football money, not just the money that the Premier League pays in redistribution to clubs in the lower leagues and through parachute payments. That would be a much wider step and would require further consideration. If such recommendations are to be made in future, that should be done after the regulator is established and we have the state of the game report.
I find part 6 to be one of the most infuriating parts of the Bill, not because it is a bad aspect of the Bill but because it should not exist. The truth is that if there had been a deal between the two parties—the Premier League and the EFL—part 6 would look very different. We made it clear in the fan-led review that distributions are an issue for football and they should be able to resolve that issue themselves, but that it was important for backstop powers to be there to intervene if no solution was found. That is what part 6 is, and it has become a more controversial part of the Bill than was perhaps ever envisaged. We had hoped back in November 2021, when we published the fan-led review, that there would be a deal.
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a slight danger, if we go down the path suggested by the amendment, of creating an even bigger gap between the big six and everyone else? We would basically be saying to the rest of the clubs, “The parachute payments are not for us: they are for you—the other 14 clubs in the Premier League. If you want them, you can pay for them and pay for the solidarity payments for the football league as well”, because that is effectively what would happen.
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I always refer back to that point in the fan-led review, and we mulled over that issue at length. The truth is that we did not come to a conclusion ourselves, because it is so complex. We have made it clear in the chapter on financial distribution that we hope that there will be reform to the system, but this was back in 2021, for goodness’ sake. I want to bang everybody’s heads together and send them to bed without any tea, because we are dealing with the failure of the leagues to reach a solution, and I hope that the message they get from today’s sitting and the evidence sessions that we had last week is to go away and come up with another solution. The Bill sets out the process if there is no deal on that, and ultimately if there is no amendment to the Bill, let that be an inspiration to people to come together and find a solution.