Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting)

Clive Betts Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)]

I am speaking in the right place this time. I was pre-emptive in my comments before the break, but that has given the Minister an opportunity to go away and look at the wording that he will come forward with to improve new clause 3.

I take the Minister’s point about the complicated circumstances for many clubs with respect to who owns the ground and what form they own it in, and that is understood. I hope that we can find a way of ensuring that, whatever the complications, the owner cannot simply put the club and the ground into different organisations—different legal constructs—but that in all cases there can be an assurance that the club will have use of the ground going forward, because otherwise the club cannot be sustainable by anyone’s definition.

I thank the Minister for agreeing to go away to look at the issue. I accept that new clause 3 is probably imperfect, and I very much look forward to a perfect clause coming back from him in due course.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stuart Andrew)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Ms Nokes.

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East thinks I can work that quickly, just in the time we had during the break, but I have committed to write to him. Work is going on among colleagues in the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, for example, but I will write to him with further details.

On the specific question of the hon. Member for Barnsley East about local information, she made an important point. Fans and other sources are able to provide information to the regulator about the suitability of their owners or officers should they wish to do so. It will of course be up to the regulator to determine the relevance and significance of any information provided to it, but the mechanism exists.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 to 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Determinations under sections 28 and 29: time limits

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[Stuart Andrew]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments.

As I said, if the regulator deems that a current owner is unsuitable, it would first direct them to leave the club in the specified timeframe. During that period, the regulator will have available several powers to safeguard the club from further harm. However, as the hon. Lady rightly said, there is a risk that an unsuitable owner does not comply with the directions. For instance, they may refuse to leave the club or may continue to use their position as owner to damage the club. In those situations, the regulator will have the powers to directly remove the unsuitable owner from the club.

The hon. Lady makes a point about cases in which there is a failed incumbent owner but no new prospective buyer for the club. By conducting strong statutory tests on prospective owners, the regulator will ensure that clubs are run by suitable custodians and that unsuitable owners can be stopped at the point of entry. That will help to reduce the risk of unsuitable owners entering the industry.

The wider regulatory system of financial regulation and improved governance will further put clubs on a more sustainable footing, which should ensure that clubs are attractive as investments for prospective buyers. If an owner wishes to sell, or is required to sell by the regulator, the club should therefore be a much more attractive asset.

[Mr Betts]

The Minister is almost assuming that the regulatory regime is going to make a perfect world, and that there are not going to be failures. The question being asked is: what happens when there are? When there is an owner who is required to sell, what happens to the club in those circumstances?

[Stuart Andrew]

The hon. Gentleman is right. I am not saying that this is going to be the panacea for all football clubs; they are businesses, and businesses go under at times. When the regulator is ensuring that the club has to be sold, its powers will minimise the risk of a bad owner further damaging the club, which adds to the pressure of finding a good new owner to take over. By having those powers, we are not drumming that club into the ground, as we have seen in other instances; it remains a positive and attractive prospect for investment. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 39 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Duty not to operate a team in relation to a prohibited competition

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 45, page 37, line 11, leave out from “fans” to “about” in line 12 and insert

“players and staff of regulated clubs in England and Wales”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 22, in clause 45, page 37, line 12, after “competition” insert

“and the full impacts of such a decision”.

Amendment 13, in clause 45, page 37, line 15, at end insert—

“(aa) professional football players,”.

This amendment expands the list of those whom the IFR must consult.

Clause stand part.

[Mr Betts]

Amendment 21 is quite simple, and I am sure that the Minister can accept it without much consideration. It simply applies where a team is prevented from going into a prohibited competition, which I think is absolutely right. The outrage of the European Super League in some ways triggered recognition of the issue and the need to regulate football more appropriately. There are consequences for people who make their living from football, whether they are players or staff members of clubs.

Ben Wright from the PFA very appropriately spelt out the fact that the Bill quite rightly, in many cases, highlights the need to consult and involve fans, but players are not mentioned anywhere. As Ben Wright said, there are only two groups of people who really matter in football:

“those who play it and those who watch it.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 16 May 2024; c. 88, Q145.]

Without those two groups, football would not exist. I hope the Minister thinks about the amendment and comes to the conclusion that he could accept it without undermining the Bill in any way. I hope he might give careful consideration to that.

I am also happy to support amendment 13, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East. It is very much along the same lines as my amendment, and the Minister might rather choose her wording if he cannot support the wording that I have put forward. I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on the amendments.

On amendment 22, having

“the full impacts of such a decision”

taken into account seems a fairly obvious thing. The Minister will no doubt tell us that that is the intention of the Bill and that there is no need to add in the extra words, but I am sure he will agree that the extra words are not in any way in conflict with what the Bill is trying to achieve.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am pleased that we are making good progress in moving on to discuss part 5 of the Bill and the free-standing duties on clubs, which apply to clubs separately to the licence conditions. They are set out by the Bill directly and, in many cases, apply to a club regardless of whether it is licensed.

Clause 45 sets out the duty not to operate within a prohibited competition. I will briefly set out some context before discussing amendments 21, 22 and 13. The clause is clearly designed to prevent a repeat of the European Super League, which rightly prompted immense backlash from fans, clubs and governance structures throughout the English football pyramid when it was first announced over three years ago.

There were many reasons why the project sparked such outrage, and it is important to name a few directly. First, the European Super League was designed, at least to some extent, to be a closed competition. For many of the richest clubs, qualification would have been an automatic right, rather than being meritocratic. It would have taken an axe to one of the most important features of football’s success: the idea that any one team can dream big and become a winner. With qualification based on merit taken out of the equation, the entire structure, purpose and sustainability of football’s existing competitions would have been undermined.

Secondly, the European Super League was launched—

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[Stuart Andrew]

Amendments 21 and 13 would require the regulator to determine and have regard to the views of club staff and players, placing them on equal footing with the club’s fans for the purposes of clause 45. I do not believe that the inclusion of players and club staff is necessary here. The Bill is designed to protect and promote the sustainability of clubs so that they continue to serve the interests of their fans in local communities, who have been around far longer than any owners and will be around long after those owners have moved on. That is why clause 45 requires the regulator to determine and consider the views of fans.

A decision to prohibit a competition may also impact a wide range of other stakeholders, which is why the clause already requires the regulator to

“consult such other persons as”

it

“considers appropriate.”

That allows for consultation with a broad range of potential stakeholders. If the regulator considers players and staff of regulated clubs to be an appropriate group, it must consult them. It is right that the regulator has the discretion to make the judgment.

Amendment 22 seeks to draw out that when the regulator is determining the views of fans about a competition being prohibited, it must include their views on the full impact of the competition being prohibited. Specifying that in the Bill is unnecessary as it is already implicit that fans would consider the potential impacts as part of reaching a view on a competition’s prohibition. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the amendment will be withdrawn.

[Mr Betts]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 13, in clause 45, page 37, line 15, at end insert—

“(aa) professional football players,”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment expands the list of those whom the IFR must consult.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Mr Betts]

Why does the Bill give powers to the regulator to stop clubs entering into new competitions but no powers to stop fundamental changes to existing competitions, which fans might find just as unsuitable?

[Stuart Andrew]

I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. We have had this conversation several times on the replays, and I understand that point. As I have said before, not drawing on the merits of the decisions that have been made, I understand some of the challenges that those organisations have in terms of a very crowded field and in terms of competitions.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

Football stadiums have immense value. First, they have value to fans, who have precious memories going back generations of standing in the same spot watching their club through the lowest lows and highest highs. In many ways, a stadium is one of the strongest ties a club has to the local community. A club’s staff, players and owners might change, but the pitch remains.

Secondly, grounds also have a financial and fundamental value. They are often among the club’s most valuable assets. In well-run clubs, that is positive, but where a club is already financially unstable, home grounds can become vulnerable to sale in a way that seriously undermines the club in the long term. In some cases, they are sold in a desperate attempt to make a return on losses, and in others they are sold by those purposefully wishing to strip a club of its assets before leaving it behind to collapse. Indeed, there are numerous examples of clubs in financial trouble selling their stadiums to give owners some collateral on their investments or to circumvent profit and sustainability rules. Troubled Sheffield Wednesday sold Hillsborough to its owner for a profit of more than £38 million, covering its pre-tax losses of £35 million. Both Reading and Derby sold their grounds in a similar fashion. But a stadium can be sold only once, and without a stadium in their possession, clubs risk not being able to play at all.

We are familiar with the story of Wimbledon FC, whose home was forcibly moved to Milton Keynes in 2003, resulting in the club being renamed. Finances aside, that decision was devastating for local fans, who felt their club had been stolen from them and their community, as we heard in the evidence session. Given that the regulator is a body specifically established to both ensure the financial sustainability and protect the heritage of English football, it is right that it should have a responsibility to ensure that stadium sales do not undermine a club’s future.

There are of course many circumstances in which a club’s selling its stadium and relocating is a sign of progress and positive investment. Tottenham fans, for example, are now enjoying the benefits of a brand-new state-of-the-art ground, while the club is widely considered one of the best in the country. That kind of investment should in no way be discouraged, let alone blocked. The regulator must therefore be equipped to tell the difference between two very different kinds of proposed transactions—those that propel a club forward and those that seriously undermine a club’s long-term financial sustainability or heritage.

With the expertise the regulator will have, I understand why the Government have decided that it is best placed to grant approval on stadium sales and moves. However, I also acknowledge the concern that the FSA and many fans have about their lack of voice in the decision-making processes in both clause 46 and clause 48.

Amendments 3 and 29, tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool, West Derby and for Sheffield South East, give us the opportunity to discuss the role that fans might play in understanding what a stadium change might mean in terms of the fans, heritage and local community. It is of course the fans who will suffer if their team no longer has anywhere to play, and it is fans who best understand the precious heritage and memory that grounds carry for them and their community.

Clause 48 seems to be based on an understanding of that point to some extent, given that the regulator is explicitly tasked with paying attention to whether a relocation of home games would cause “significant harm” to the heritage. However, as Fair Game points out, it would be curious if the regulator were able to understand the implications for heritage without consulting fans. Will the Minister explain how that might work? On what basis will the regulator make a judgment if it is not through understanding the impact on fans?

Combined with the lack of consultation rights in clause 46, the result is that fans are currently given absolutely no voice on matters to do with stadiums, even though they are the ones who will travel there, buy tickets and offer their support. I understand that the regulator is best placed to make a final decision, but it is unclear to me why fans cannot form one of the inputs that the regulator might consider.

The Government’s White Paper said that the regulator should

“have a remit to consider the implications for club heritage of any proposal, the views of fans and the club’s historical connection to its locality.”

Will the Minister share with us what has happened between the publication of the White Paper and the Bill to cause the Government to divorce the idea of heritage from fans? It must be clear why fans have not been given any say in this process. I hope the Minister will elaborate on that point today.

Finally, I want to examine whether the Bill will be able to prevent some home matches being played abroad if that damages heritage. This is not a purely theoretical proposition. Just a few weeks ago, Tim Howard wrote for a national newspaper about why Premier League games being played in the USA was “inevitable”. FIFA has also reportedly begun the process of allowing league matches to be played overseas. When Tim Payton of the Arsenal Supporters’ Trust gave evidence to the Committee, he warned that the movement of games abroad could be the next catastrophe the size of the Super League.

Clause 48 has the potential to provide assurances that this kind of action could only be taken by clubs with the approval of the regulator, should it be seen to damage heritage. However, the wording does seem to be geared more towards permanent relocation rather than the issue of clubs wishing to play single games, or a small subset, away from home.

Will the Minister confirm whether approval only needs to be sought by clubs wishing to play all of their home games elsewhere or whether it also applies to clubs wanting to play a handful of games elsewhere? In particular, will the regulator be able to have a say on league games being played abroad, and if so, would fans be given a say in the process? Given the salience of this issue with fans, it is important that we are clear on how the clause would apply.

[Mr Betts]

I rise to speak to amendment 29, which I tabled. We will move on to a debate on clause 49 shortly, to which it relates. It is interesting that fans will get a specific consultation, involvement and approval about changing the crests, shirt colours and names, as those are decisions that can be reversed quite easily. We know about the problems at Cardiff with shirt colours and at Hull with the name, but even if those mistakes are made by the owners, they can be changed the following year. A club cannot go back to playing on its old ground if it has been sold and is no longer an asset of the club. In some ways, the issue of where a club plays and its ground is more important for the heritage of the club, and it needs to take account of the interests and wishes of fans.

In clause 48, we have a regulator that will have to look at the significant harm done to the heritage of the club by moving ground. How does the regulator decide what is significant harm to the heritage of the club in isolation? The fans are the ones who understand that. They are the custodians of the club; they are the ones who go every week, whose families have gone to the club for years and whose children will go in the future for years. They are the ones who have a real stake in the heritage of the club, yet there is nothing in the wording that says they must be consulted.

All amendment 29 states is that in looking at the issue of significant harm to the heritage of the club, we should actually ask the fans what they think about it, so that they do not consider that the arrangements will constitute significant harm. I do not know how on earth the regulator will come to a view that is not a view derived from consulting the fans, so I hope that the Minister will give way on this amendment. At the heart of what we are doing here is ensuring that fans are listened to about the issues that are so important to them, and there is nothing more important for fans of a club than where their club plays, so I hope the Minister thinks that this amendment is in the spirit of the Bill and could be accepted.

[Stuart Andrew]

The Bill requires regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated in the past five years, which I shall simply refer to as clubs, to notify the regulator where there is a reasonable prospect of either the club selling or otherwise disposing of its home ground or using it as security for a loan or other liability. The proposed transaction can proceed only if the regulator grants approval. Clause 46, which the amendment seeks to change, deals with only the narrow issue of a home ground disposal or the use of the home ground as security. Those matters do not necessarily threaten the heritage of the club in the same way as forcing a relocation. Where currently regulated clubs propose to relocate in parallel, which may impact on the clubs’ heritage, that is subject to a separate approval from the regulator under clause 48.

Clause 48 sets out that the regulator can grant approval to a relocation only if it does not undermine the financial sustainability of the club and does not cause significant harm to its heritage. Given that clubs will be required to consult with fans on matters relating to home ground, we expect that the regulator would consider that in reaching its decision on whether to approve a relocation.

[Mr Betts]

The Minister is therefore saying that a club makes a proposal, consults with the fans and comes to a view, then the regulator must accept the view that the club has come to. Why does the regulator not have a responsibility to ensure that the fans are comfortable with any proposal in the way that amendment 29 suggests? Why is it simply left to a club, which may have a vested interest, to consult with fans and report at second hand to the regulator?

[Stuart Andrew]

The regulator will be able to see whether that consultation was done properly, and the mechanisms that we are setting up for fan engagement are much strengthened from what they may be at the moment. That gives confidence that what the clubs consult on will be done through a mechanism that is much stronger than some of the examples mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for Barnsley East. By doing that, because it is about the club’s heritage—it is its home ground, and the club is going to move—the club must demonstrate that it has properly consulted with the fans in the way described by the Bill.

[Mr Betts]

Where does it say precisely that the club must consult on that? It must consult about shirt colours, names and crests, so where does it specifically say that about the ground?

[Stuart Andrew]

The heritage of the club will include its home ground. Of course that is part of the description of heritage, so it will come under that aspect. Just selling the club to get a loan, for example, will not move the stadium, but if it is going to relocate, that is a change to the club’s heritage, so that will come under the heritage aspect of the Bill.

[Mr Betts]

Which bit of the clause covers that? Can we have the word, please?

[Stuart Andrew]

As I said a moment ago, clause 48 sets out that a relocation can be granted approval only if it does not undermine the financial stability of the club or cause significant harm to its heritage. It will come under that.

[Mr Betts]

That is the IFR’s responsibility, but nowhere in the Bill does it say that fans have to be consulted. Neither the IFR nor the club has to consult on the matter, does it?

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[The Chair]

Mr Betts, do you wish to move amendment 29?

[Mr Betts]

I will reflect on what the Minister said. I will perhaps do so at a future date, but I will not move it at this stage.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart Andrew]

A club’s name, home shirt colours and crest are intrinsic parts of its heritage, and therefore the decision to materially change any of them requires considered thought and consultation. The clause requires a club to establish that a majority of domestic supporters approve any material changes to its badge or predominant home shirt colours. In practice, we expect that to take place through a formal survey of fan opinion, as happened last season when Bristol Rovers supporters opposed the final proposal put to them, resulting in the club halting the redesign of its crest.

The clause also requires clubs to get Football Association approval prior to changing the name their team plays under. The view of supporters is a significant factor in the FA’s final decision, but it may also need to balance wider considerations, such as the effects on other clubs in the pyramid, and the relationship between the club’s current name, the proposed name and the locality with which it is traditionally associated.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

During our discussion of clause 16, I spoke about the importance of clubs publishing personnel statements. By identifying exactly who holds key positions, including owners and officers, the regulator will be absolutely clear who must be held accountable for the proper fulfilment of licence conditions at each football club. With that in mind, I am pleased to support clause 51.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Duty to pay a levy

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 52, page 42, line 28, at end insert—

“(9A) The starting point for calculation of the levy payment under subsection (9) applicable to a particular club shall be a percentage of its annual revenue.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 53 stand part.

[Mr Betts]

This is a fairly simple clarifying amendment. As we have heard, smaller clubs feel that regulation must be proportionate and that there should be more requirements on very wealthy clubs, because they have the staff and resources to deal with that. Smaller clubs may find the whole issue of regulation very challenging, so amendment 30 simply says that the levy they will have to pay should be a percentage of annual revenue; in other words, a proportionate basis for the levy should be written into the Bill. The Minister may say that that will happen anyway—that that it is what the regulator will do—but the issue is a concern for smaller clubs, and the amendment 30 is an attempt to highlight and deal with it.

[Stephanie Peacock]

When the fan-led review first proposed the creation of an independent regulator for football, it suggested that the most logical way to pay for it would be through a levy on those who would benefit from it: the clubs. I agree with that conclusion, and I am pleased that the Bill confirms that the regulator will be able to require licensed clubs to pay an annual levy.

However, even though clause 52 is relatively detailed, there is surprisingly little on how the levy will be split between the clubs themselves. That is something that amendment 30, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, has sought to rectify. If the regulator is given wide discretion to determine the extent of the levy, clubs further down the pyramid might be concerned that their payments will not be proportionate to their wealth and size. Of course, clause 52 states that the regulator should have regard to the financial resources of each club and the competition it operates in. That is promising, but it is worth clarifying today what that is expected to mean in practice. Will decisions be based on broadcast incomes, as per the fan-led review, or just on average total revenue, as per the White Paper?

There is broad agreement that the richest clubs should subsidise regulation for others. The majority of costs should, in this case, fall on Premier League clubs. The Government identified that these clubs could pay about 80% of the cost, with the six richest clubs taking on 50% of the total cost. The regulator will ultimately dictate the shape of the levy, but it should be under a clear direction to ensure that the levy is progressive and proportionate. It hardly makes sense for a regulator focused on financial sustainability to shackle struggling clubs to paying large fees. It is important that clubs do not fear the introduction of the new regime and view it as an opportunity, rather than being scared into thinking it will be a hindrance.

Clause 53 requires the regulator to consult before making the levy rules. That will include taking input on a draft version of the rules from the Secretary of State, the Treasury, regulated clubs and other appropriate persons. That welcome measure will hopefully shape the levy rules in a progressive way. It is also right that the regulator must publish information about the costs involved in calculating the levy charge before it starts charging in any given year. That transparency will be important, particularly for the clubs, which will want to understand exactly what they are paying for and why.

Overall, I welcome the levy and the method of payment, and I look forward to clarification on how the Minister expects the levy will be set.

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[Stuart Andrew]

The reality is that, to help it understand the specifics of club finances, the regulator will have at its disposal information that we do not have at the moment. If we set the levy by percentage, we may unintentionally cause a problem for some clubs and cause an unintended consequence. The regulator will be best placed to make sure that the levy is proportionate, which is why we want the regulator to determine it. My hon. Friend is right, in the sense that some clubs will pay more for a player than most clubs earn in a year, but we will make sure that the levy is proportionate. I understand the points the hon. Member for Sheffield South East made, and I have heard what some of the smaller clubs have been saying, but I am confident we will be able to achieve that aim.

Clause 52 will allow the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running costs, following the precedent of other regulators, such as the FCA and Ofcom. The cost of the regime will be paid for by licensed football clubs. By making football clubs more sustainable in the long term, the regulator will be providing a service to the industry. As the industry would benefit from regulation, it is logical that it, rather than taxpayers, should cover the cost.

The legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator, which will be limited to raising funds to meet its annual regulatory running costs. That includes the costs of ongoing regulatory activity, additional money for new activities, and costs associated with recouping set-up costs. In line with the principles of transparency and accountability, the regulator will be subject to “Managing Public Money” guidance, and its forecast running costs will be subject to review by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Treasury.

The clause also gives the regulator discretion regarding the method for calculating the levy and in setting the levy payment level for individual clubs. To ensure that the regulator takes into account clubs’ differing financial circumstances, and to prevent charges from being unaffordable for clubs, clause 52 requires the regulator to take into account a club’s financial resources and the league it plays in. Clause 53 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult regulated clubs and the Government on its levy rules.

The levy is an operational matter that should be determined independently by the regulator, and it would not be appropriate for the Government to make the assessment. As I say, running costs will be checked by both the DCMS and the Treasury.

[Mr Betts]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Stuart Andrew]

I can confirm that I am confident.

Question put and agreed to.

Amendment 23 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55

PART 6: OVERVIEW AND INTERPRETATION

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 55, page 45, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment allows the regulator to consider the effect of “parachute” payments when assessing the distribution of revenue between competition organisers.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 31, in clause 55, page 45, line 3, at end insert—

“unless the IFR specifies otherwise in rules.

(2A) The IFR can only make such rules if it can be satisfied that their inclusion furthers its objectives under section 6 by protecting and promoting—

(a) the financial soundness of regulated clubs, and

(b) the financial resilience of English football.

(2B) The IFR should also have regard when making any rules under section 7 to act in such a way that avoids any—

(a) effects on sporting competitiveness of any regulated club against another regulated club,

(b) adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, and

(c) adverse effects on financial investment in English football.”

Clause 55 stand part.

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[Mr Betts]

Could I ask for a bit of advice, Ms Nokes? I have a selection list that says that new clause 4, which I also tabled, should be debated with amendment 27, but another selection list says that it should be debated under clause 56. There seems to be some discrepancy. It would be helpful if you could provide an explanation.

[The Chair]

The suggestion is that you are looking at a previous selection list. New clause 4 will be debated with clause 56.

[Mr Betts]

Thank you for that clarification—I am sorry for mixing myself up.

Let us get down to the issue of parachute payments, which almost everyone spoke about on Second Reading, and which the Minister seems to believe should be treated as a given in their current form, with no change. I think he has the support of the Premier League—or some clubs in the Premier League, because it is by no means certain that the Premier League speaks with one voice on these issues. But it clearly is a very important issue.

I am calling for the removal of clause 55(2)(b), which stops the regulator, as the backstop, being able to consider removing or changing parachute payments in their current form. Under the regulator’s remit, they have to be treated as a given.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

Is the hon. Gentleman talking specifically about parachute payments from the Premier League into the Championship, or is he talking about the smoothing process of the parachute payments to clubs that are relegated from leagues in general, indeed most probably from the EFL into the National League?

[Mr Betts]

I am talking about parachute payments that currently exist, which is what the Bill refers to—I do not think it refers to parachute payments that might exist in the future in some other arrangement.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

It is important to place on the record that National League clubs get 100% and then 50% of an EFL deal for League Two upon relegation, and a Championship club once relegated gets one eighth of the Championship deal for one season, and a League One relegation gets one ninth. This is not the same solidarity payment. It is important to remember that, when clubs are relegated to the league below, there is some sort of parachute payment in order to smooth out the process of losing the revenue received from being in that upper league.

[Mr Betts]

The point I was going to go on to make was that I am not suggesting that parachute payments should never be allowed under any income redistribution. That is not the case. My amendment does not say, “No parachute payments”. It says that parachute payments can be considered as part of the overall distribution of finances within the game.

The Bill as drafted states that parachute payments are exempt from consideration at the backstop stage—full stop, end of story. Everything else, including media income, can be considered, but not parachute payments. That seems strange, given that the Minister has repeatedly said that the independence of the regulator needs to be preserved and recognised, and yet on this key issue its hands are being specifically and absolutely tied. That just does not chime as an appropriate situation for the Government to get themselves into compared with everything else that they have said about the Bill. The regulator needs to be independent and have discretion, but on this issue it is not allowed to have the freedom to look at the situation, particularly with regard to the state of the game report. If the regulator believes that it is necessary to revisit the issue of parachute payments in order for income in football to be distributed properly and appropriately, and for it to be sustainable not just for individual clubs but for the whole of the football pyramid, this proposal is a significant mistake.

We must recognise that 80% of what the Premier League gives to the EFL is in parachute payments to a handful of clubs. When the Premier League talks about its generosity to the game, it is talking about generosity to a handful of clubs that have just been in the Premier League. That is not a real position. When we look at the distribution of the media money overall, we find that 92% goes to 25 clubs—namely, the Premier League clubs and five others that have been in and out of the Premier League in the recent past. That is not sustainable, and if a reasonable and fair distribution of money should be agreed in the future, the regulator must have the power to take that into account.

I have also said to the Minister that we ought to look at not just the importance of parachute payments to the clubs that receive them. I do not think that anyone I have met who has talked about this issue has said, “You cannot have parachute payments.” They say that it must be looked at in terms of the totality of the game and the distribution of money. I would understand, very quickly, that a club going up into the Premier League faces an enormous difference between the wage bill it had before being promoted and the wage bill it will need once promoted, and it must have some reassurance on what happens if it gets relegated. That is an understandable situation, but we must also take into account the impact on the finances of clubs in the same division as the relegated clubs and their ability to compete.

It has been said over and over again that Championship clubs are getting completely overstretched, because the holy grail of promotion to the Premier League means that clubs try to extend their budgets beyond what is reasonable. Owners put in large sums of their own money, often beyond what is reasonable and sustainable, in order to compete with clubs with parachute payments, and the difference is enormous. Parachute payment clubs will come down with budgets three times the size of those of many other clubs in that league, so in order to compete clubs often do fairly stupid things to try to ensure that promotion becomes a possibility.

My amendment says that the regulator ought to take account of those issues. It is not reasonable to say to the regulator, “The only thing that matters is parachute payments to protect clubs that get relegated and you should have no regard to the impact on the clubs already in that league.” I hope that the Minister will consider this seriously. It is obviously a concern across the House, as was reflected on Second Reading.

I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East on the Front Bench has a slightly different way of addressing the issue, but the wording in her amendment 31 relates to what I have just said. Yes, parachute payments and the impact on the clubs that receive them must be taken into account, but the impact on other clubs that must compete with them must also be taken into account. The position under the Bill as drafted is that that cannot happen, because it is fixed as it is and cannot be changed by the regulator.

The Minister will probably say that the leagues themselves could come to an agreement and change it. What happens if they do not do that? There has not been much evidence of the leagues being able to reach an agreement for a long period of time now—that is why we are here debating this Bill. In the end, it is down to the backstop. That backstop, the regulator, needs to have the flexibility to address these very important measures.

[Ian Byrne]

Does the format of how parachute payments are directly paid not imperil the Independent Football Regulator’s key objectives, which are to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs and financial resilience? The imbalance in parachute payments is driving clubs into making decisions that they would not usually take.

[Mr Betts]

Absolutely. I just made the point about the enormous difference in budgets that Championship clubs now experience because of that. Of course, when we look at this season of the Championship, three out of the top four clubs have received parachute payments. Yes, other clubs, such as Ipswich, have done remarkably well without them, but clubs are always trying to compete with those clubs receiving the payments. Last year, two of the three clubs that came up had parachute payments, and it is now almost becoming a cycle of clubs getting parachute payments, going back up, then sometimes being relegated, and then getting another lot of parachute payments. That really is not a sustainable position for the clubs receiving those, for the clubs that are trying to compete with them, for the competitiveness of the game, or for the sustainability of the pyramid as a whole. I hope that the Minister will reconsider this because it is an issue that really needs addressing.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am pleased to be able to discuss part 6 of the Bill, which provides a backstop power in the event that certain thresholds are met and football is unable to resolve the issue of financial distribution. Before I begin to explore this clause, it is important to set out that, in an ideal situation, these powers would never be used. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford set out during the evidence sessions, based on her experience with the fan-led review, a football-led solution to the issue of distribution has always been and remains the preference. I hope that can be kept in mind when discussing this part. Indeed, I welcome the powers but my hope is that their enforcement will not actually be necessary.

Clause 55 broadly sets out the process under this part but most importantly defines what might count as “relevant revenue”, which is money to which the backstop will apply. Relevant revenue is broadly defined as revenue received as a result of broadcasting rights, with the Minister given the flexibility to change that if broadcasting is no longer the predominant source of income. There are a couple of things to clarify. First, it would be good if the Minister could confirm whether such broadcast revenue is meant to cover domestic competitions only. Secondly, it would be appreciated if the Minister could clarify whether broadcasting revenue will still be considered relevant if the funding model changes so that it is paid directly to clubs, rather than through competition organisers. Broadly, though, I think this scope is generally accepted as being the right one.

Issues have, however, been identified with clause 55(2)(b), which is the part of the Bill that excludes parachute payments from the definition of relevant revenue. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East tabled amendment 27, and I will speak primarily to amendment 31 in my name. First, I would like to set some background to the issue, as it stems from the fact that there is an ever-growing gap between the Premier League and the EFL. Indeed, 30 years ago, EFL revenues were 75% of those of the Premier League; today they are just 6%. In real figures, that means that 30 years ago the gap was £11 million, and today it is £3 billion.

The Premier League’s approach to mitigating that gap is the so-called parachute payments to clubs relegated from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Those payments help to ensure competitiveness in the Premier League by providing clubs with the confidence to invest on promotion in the knowledge that they will be supported if they are relegated. For example, parachute payments might give the club the confidence to sign players on multi-year contracts, and that is incredibly important to consider. The Premier League’s competitiveness and the fact that any team, no matter their size or experience, can compete on any given day is what makes it the most beloved and exciting league in the world.

However, while they help to boost competitiveness in the Premier League, parachute payments—by the White Paper’s own admission—can distort competition in the Championship. In each of the last six seasons, two of the three clubs promoted from the Championship to the Premier League have been in receipt of parachute payments. The knock-on effect of that is that owners of clubs not in receipt of parachute payments are compelled to put ever greater levels of funding into their clubs to try to remain competitive. That overreliance on increasing owner funding has deeply exposed clubs when the funding does not materialise, as we have seen for Wigan, Bolton and Bury.

Further, the size of parachute payments has increased in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, they have risen from £30 million to £233 million. That is an eightfold increase in a period in which player wages have only doubled. That means that, of the total distributable revenue of the English and Welsh professional game, the top 25 clubs—those in the Premier League—and the five in receipt of parachute payments in the EFL received 92% last season. That is £3 billion for 25 clubs, and £245 million for the other 67 professional clubs. Given the scale of parachute payments, therefore, it is notable that the Bill has definitively excluded them from the definition of relevant revenue. That is why I have tabled amendment 31.

4.30 pm

I want to be absolutely clear that the amendment is not about abolishing parachute payments; I believe that they provide clubs with the confidence that they need to invest, and they are a crucial tool in ensuring the competitiveness of the best league in the world. The amendment would simply give the regulator discretion to decide that, if certain criteria are met, parachute payments need not be excluded from the revenue to be distributed under the backstop provision.

Certainly, there is no reason to single out parachute payments. Whether people are in favour of significant parachute payments or not, they agree that they have an impact on club finances. As such, they will have a significant impact on the regulator’s objectives of protecting and promoting the financial soundness of clubs and the resilience of English football. Given that that relates to the regulator’s core role, the regulator should have the ultimate say on whether parachute payments are considered as part of the backstop provision.

Further, solidarity payments are explicitly linked to parachute payments. Solidarity payments are worked out as a percentage of the value of a year-three parachute payment. Championship clubs receive 30%, League One clubs receive 4.5%, and League Two clubs receive 3% of the value. The regulator, therefore, might find it difficult to look at one without looking at the other.

I emphasise again that the amendment does not predetermine whether the regulator includes or excludes parachute payments. If the regulator has a case, based on its objective evidence base, that excluding parachute payments from relevant revenue is more likely to make clubs financially sound and promote the financial resilience of English football, they will remain excluded. The amendment simply recognises that it should be the regulator that makes the decision, independent from any vested interests.

When making that decision, the regulator will have to pay explicit regard to the fulfilment of its core objectives and its secondary purposes: financial sustainability, financial resilience, competitiveness and investment. Taken together, those are the principles that should decide whether parachute payments are included—not the leagues and not politicians. Only then will we ensure that the regulator can fulfil the purpose of the Bill.

[Damian Collins]

I will make a few points on parachute payments. It is fair to say that they are not part of the redistribution mechanism between the Premier League and the Football League. They can be set as an amount alongside the redistribution that takes place, but, of course, they are not fixed. They are a contractual arrangement that the Premier League enters into with clubs that are in the league or when they get promoted.

For reasons that hon. Members have rightly set out, if the income of a Premier League club drops by at least half after being relegated, even with parachute payments, that will be a severe challenge to its sustainability. It is anyway and it certainly would be if those payments did not exist. Of course, if a club is promoted straight back up, as Leicester City has been this year, the year-two and year-three parachute payments are not kept by the Football League—the money never goes to the Football League—but goes back to the Premier League. Therefore, in many ways, the payments have nothing to do with the Football League; they are made by the Premier League to its member clubs in the event that they go down.

The question is then whether the existence of parachute payments has such a market-distorting effect that the regulator would have to intervene. It is difficult to see why the regulator would need to intervene on the basis of the impact on the clubs that have been relegated; they clearly need that support. From all the evidence that we heard as a Committee—I have not heard anyone this afternoon say anything to the contrary—there needs to be some compensating mechanism for clubs that go down, otherwise the risks are too great.

It is not always about clubs that have gone up and come straight back down again; it is often about quite large clubs—it was Leicester and Southampton last year. Everton could easily have gone down last season and the impact of such a relegation would have been catastrophic. The regulator would therefore have to take a view as to whether the existence of those payments has a distorting effect on the Championship.

Given the remit of the regulator, I urge hon. Members tabling amendments to be careful what they wish for. The regulator may well take the view that its job is not to have an impact on the nature of competition in the Championship, or to make it easier for more clubs to get promoted. Its interest is to promote financial sustainability, so it could easily take the view that parachute payments should stay because they are necessary for the clubs that are relegated.

Alongside that, there must be effective financial controls on Championship clubs. The question of whether a Championship club feels the need to compete against parachute payments is not necessarily one for the regulator. The regulator’s role is to ensure the financial sustainability of the league, so it might say that it can do that through the checks that it can put in place now, and therefore ensure that the situation created before does not happen again.

One could ask whether it is fair for the Championship to be run such that Championship clubs must compete against Premier League clubs, and cannot cook the books or rely on director’s loans because the regulator will stop them. Of course, in some ways the Championship is not competing with the Premier League. It is a league of clubs seeking to get promoted to the Premier League, but it is also looking to develop its own talent. It can buy talent from the lower leagues and from Europe, as it effectively does already. The TV revenue for the Championship, as it stands today, is already greater than for the top division in the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium or Denmark, all of which are highly-competitive football nations whose pedigree in major international tournaments has been somewhat better than the home nations over the last few decades.

[Mr Betts]

Is it not one of the great strengths of the English pyramid that there is, or should be, the ability for clubs to move around? If there are massive differences in the financial capabilities of the clubs that come down from the Premier League with a view to going back up again very quickly and the other Championship clubs, that effectively removes the element of competition and removes the prospect of promotion from so many clubs that it changes the fundamental nature of the pyramid. Surely that goes against one of the objectives that the Bill is trying to achieve.

[Damian Collins]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The strength of the pyramid is one of the most important parts of the English game. It is probably the reason why the Premier League is such a commercial success—there is real promotion, relegation and competitive matches between the leagues. Parachute payments have come in out of necessity because of the requirement for clubs to jump up into a competition in which players are paid so much more and then to come out of it again. The regulator, as we are setting it up, would view the sustainability of the clubs in the Championship as important.

It is difficult to say that Championship clubs in England cannot recruit talent from other major European leagues and cannot develop their own talent. My concern is that, if all we do is push more money into the Championship, we will see a very large inflation of Championship player salaries. There will not necessarily be an improvement in the quality of players in the Championship but those players will be paid a lot more. There would also be even greater calls for bigger solidarity payments between the Championship and League One.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, League One club owners already complain that unless a big club happens to have been relegated into League One—a league that it is not normally in—getting promoted and sustaining a place in the Championship is becoming increasingly difficult because the Championship has largely become a division of former Premier League clubs. There are one or two exceptions—such as Preston North End, which have never played in the Premier League—but they are increasingly rare.

If the amendment were made and parachute payments were to be considered by the regulator, that might lead the regulator to demand much greater payments from the Premier League to the Championship. The logical argument that the Football League is advancing is that it wants more money for the Championship, not that parachute payments should go.

A question that was raised in the evidence session would also come into play: would it be fair for the medium and smaller clubs in the Premier League if the only method of distribution was UK broadcasting revenue, which the Premier League clubs receive equally? As we heard in the evidence session, that would place a much greater financial burden on clubs such as Brighton, Crystal Palace, Nottingham Forest and Everton than it would on Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal, for whom that money is a smaller part of their total revenue. Unless European money, other prize money and commercial gate money could suddenly be considered along with parachute payments, we are picking winners. We are saying, “We are going to favour the Championship side at the expense of the teams that play in the lower half of the Premier League.”

This is a highly complex matter with lots of moving parts. As we have heard throughout the debate on the Bill, the different parts of the football pyramid have different demands and income streams, and would make different cases. It is therefore right that parachute payments are kept out of the Bill, because they are a matter for the Premier League and the clubs that are relegated. Of course, the regulator will still be free to take wider consideration of the sustainability of the whole pyramid, which is purely about redistribution and where the money is drawn from. My concern is that—to use the phrase that we have used throughout the Committee’s consideration of the Bill—the unintended consequence of the amendment would be to create different winners and losers. The regulator has the power to look at all those things in the round.

[Mr Betts]

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Premier League’s objective in having parachute payments protected in this way is to ensure they that continue, while the issue of the pyramid and more competition lower down is met by even more money from the Premier League to the EFL, irrespective of parachute payments? It seems to me that that is not its position; it actually wants to hang on to as much money as it can for Premier League clubs and to protect parachute payments too. I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the multitude of issues surrounding competition between clubs in different leagues, but the fact that we cannot solve everything with this amendment does not mean that we should not address one of the problems.

[Damian Collins]

One of the reasons why the Bill is important is that the biggest problem in the pyramid at the moment is the financial sustainability of Championship clubs. There are different pressures and the greatest financial risks are taken there; some of the biggest failures have been at that level. That is why it is important.

Parachute payments exist only because the Premier League wants a more competitive, more attractive league. It does not want a closed league where the same three clubs are going up and down all the time, and the clubs that come up are just cannon fodder for the teams that play in it regularly. It is incumbent on the regulator to take a view on the sustainability of the pyramid, but the Premier League would not wish for that outcome.

We can choose which seasons we want to pick, but I do not think it is proven that parachute payments are having that effect already. There is plenty of evidence of badly run clubs—Sunderland is a good example from not long ago—that have been relegated from the Championship while still in receipt of parachute payment money. A lot of clubs come down with players who are not worth what they are being paid, and are stuck with a Championship squad on Premier League money. That is a problem that many clubs face.

Many problems are about the poor decisions made by managers and owners in the Championship, and a lack of financial oversight. The regulator needs to fix that financial oversight first, alongside considering redistribution in the round. It is easier to do that if we do not confuse that with parachute payments, which as the hon. Gentleman says are a much bigger quantum than the amount of redistribution anyway. We need to get the financial oversight right and look at redistribution in that context. I am concerned that simply asking the regulator to recommend a transfer through the backstop of money from the Premier League to the EFL corporately without the right financial oversight will pour petrol on the fire and drive wage inflation in the Championship.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

I must say that I almost want to stand up, say what other Members have said and sit down again. I agree with everybody else: I wish we were not at this stage and that there had been a deal between the parties concerned, because it is in the interests of football for them to come up with a deal. I hope that the mechanisms we are talking about will enable us to encourage that deal to happen sooner rather than later.

On amendments 27 and 31, although the parachute payments can have the distorting effects outlined, they play a pivotal role in protecting clubs at risk of relegation from going bankrupt, as others have said, and certainly give certainty to clubs competing for promotion. As I mentioned on Second Reading, in the past, relegation from the Premier League often meant financial ruin, as teams such as Bradford City failed to adjust to the huge drops in revenue. Given the important role that parachute payments play in helping to ensure the financial sustainability of relegated clubs, removing them entirely could have significant adverse effects on the game, and we do not want to create an opportunity through the Bill’s distribution mechanisms to get rid of parachute payments by the back door. Including parachute payments in the Bill’s scope, as amendment 27 proposes, could do just that. It could mean the regulator accepting a final proposal from one of the leagues that removes those payments, and if the mechanism allowed for that, it could create significant financial uncertainty for clubs that could not confidently invest in promotion. My hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford also mentioned the commercial agreements that are in place.

An exciting, competitive and sustainable pyramid is at the heart of what makes English football the asset that it is, and we should not put that at risk. We have excluded parachute payments from the backstop, because it needs to be targeted and simple to work effectively. Including parachute payments in the backstop means that the regulator could be presented with two entirely incomparable final proposals, which could render decision making almost impossible, but it is important to remember that the backstop may never be triggered, and is only ever intended as a last resort. We expect the leagues to reach a football-led solution themselves and will continue to press them to do so.

I recognise there are also concerns about the potentially distortive effects of parachute payments, and that is why the broader regulatory framework is designed to address it. If the regulator finds that parachute payments are causing a structural or systemic issue, it could attach discretionary licence conditions to parachute payment clubs to address that. We are creating a financial regulator, and it is entirely right that we solve issues like this through financial regulation wherever possible.

[Mr Betts]

It would help if the Minister was clear on what he was suggesting the regulator should do to deal with the massive gap between the clubs with parachute payments and those in the Championship without. Is he suggesting that the regulator should come in and tell clubs with parachute payments, “You have got them, but you cannot actually spend them, or not all of them, because that is distorting competition”? It seems a very odd way to try to deal with the problem.

[Stuart Andrew]

The whole point is that the regulator can look at financial controls and make discretionary licence conditions if it wants to try to minimise that impact. However, if the backstop ever gets triggered, if two very different bids are put in, the regulator is put in an incredibly difficult position; in contrast, if those backstop payments are there, the two sides will be able to adjust their bid to address it in another way, such as by improving the solidarity payments to other clubs as a proposal to reduce that cliff edge. That is the point we are trying to make. As I say, I cannot accept the amendment that the hon. Member tabled and I hope he will withdraw it.

[Mr Betts]

Could the Minister explain what he has just said? I still do not understand how it is going to work. On the regulator’s powers to deal with the problem created by parachute payments, which he accepts could be created, what exactly are those powers? How does he expect the regulator to use them?

[Stuart Andrew]

As I mentioned, it can introduce a discretionary licence condition. There will be a range of options that the regulator may consider, but it will have discretionary licence conditions that it could put on clubs in receipt of those payments that will manage the amount of money they are spending while helping to keep clubs financially solvent and sustainable. That is the point I am trying to make.

By way of background to clause 55, the Premier League earns significant revenues from selling its TV rights. It then determines how much of its broadcast revenue is distributed within its own league, and how much is distributed to the rest of the game, including the EFL and the National League. These backstop powers have been designed to incentivise reasonableness, encourage industry solutions and tackle any bargaining imbalance between the leagues. The clause sets out an overview of those backstop powers and defines some terms that are important for setting their scope.

One key term defined in the clause is relevant revenue. It expressly includes broadcast revenue, which is the predominant source of revenue for the relevant leagues and of any redistribution. The clause allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as relevant, which will future-proof the policy—for instance, if broadcast revenue is no longer the main source of income for the leagues. There are safeguards on the use of this power, as the Secretary of State must consult the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues, and can use the power only when there has been a material change in circumstances.

The exclusion of parachute payments in the clause is to ensure that the two final proposals can be easily compared. That is based on detailed analysis and advice on similar mechanisms. However, as mentioned, the regulator will still be able to consider parachute payments through the licensing regime.

The clause also sets out several other definitions, including the idea of a “qualifying football season”. The effect of this definition, together with the operative clauses in this part, is that the backstop can be triggered only in relation to the current season and the five subsequent seasons. That ensures that the backstop powers are used only in a reasonable timeframe and not for the remote future. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr Betts]

I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments, I must say. I think that we will be giving further consideration to this, as I hope the Minister will, and that we will come back to this issue on another occasion. I just hope that, by the time we come back, the Minister might be able to better explain the powers of the regulator to smooth out the issues where there are problems for Championship clubs trying to compete with those clubs with parachute payments. I was not convinced about that point from his arguments, but we will consider that further at another stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 31, in clause 55, page 45, line 3, at end insert—

“unless the IFR specifies otherwise in rules.

(2A) The IFR can only make such rules if it can be satisfied that their inclusion furthers its objectives under section 6 by protecting and promoting—

(a) the financial soundness of regulated clubs, and

(b) the financial resilience of English football.

(2B) The IFR should also have regard when making any rules under section 7 to act in such a way that avoids any—

(a) effects on sporting competitiveness of any regulated club against another regulated club,

(b) adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, and

(c) adverse effects on financial investment in English football.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.