Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting)

Tracey Crouch Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

I have no major issues with the clauses, so in the interests of not repeating what the Minister outlined, I will simply welcome them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Matters relevant to determinations

[Dame Tracey Crouch (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 37, page 27, line 30, leave out “must” and insert “may”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

This important clause will give comfort to many fans about the agility of the regulator. Of particular note overall is the reference to bankruptcy, which I know many fans will take a great deal of comfort from. My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West will speak on that part of the clause if she catches your eye, Ms Nokes.

I advised in my speech on Second Reading that I would table this amendment, if only to impress the importance of independence within the regulator. There has been much commentary on the independence of the independent regulator, and much of it has focused on the fact that it is a political appointment. To allay some of those concerns, I should say that there are more than 600 agencies in Government, of which the largest number sit within the responsibility of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. That is why the Minister always looks so exhausted: because of the number of stakeholders he must deal with. I have been there.

Some of the concern and criticism has focused on clause 37(2), which states that the regulator must

“have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives”

of the Government. Throughout the passage of the Bill, there has often been confusion about what certain things within it mean, and the wording of clause 37 has set hares running. The Sunday Times this weekend had an interview with the Premier League’s Richard Masters, in which the journalist—not Richard—made reference to the clause, saying that it

“raised questions as to whether it could be forced to give state-backed clubs such as Manchester City and Newcastle United soft treatment”.

The piece refers to whether the regulator would have any say on the outstanding charges and, if it were to have a say, whether, due to foreign policy, there would be a softer stance on that.

Although we on the Committee understand that the clause relates to ownership, the wider world has somehow got it into its head that it also relates to the administration of the league rules, which is beyond the remit of the regulator. However, the clause would relate to the purchase of the club and, as the Minister will know from his own never-ending media round, also often relates to the public investment fund takeover of Newcastle. As the Minister has outlined, the ownership tests are set out in the legislation and apply to all potential owners and directors, regardless of where they are from, as long as they are not from a country where sanctions are in place.

However, my concern about clause 37(2) is that it adds an element of uncertainty into the test because of the fluidity of our foreign trade policy. For example—I use this with complete poetic licence—Donald Trump decides to add to his golf course portfolio and wishes to buy Arsenal. Concerns about his integrity are well documented, and yet our foreign and trade policy determines that we consider the USA to be one of our key allies and an absolute must for investment and trade in the future. Therefore, do we automatically give the keys to the Emirates to the former, and possibly next, President? Can the Minister confirm that the foreign policy test is just one part of the test, and would not overrule others where there is evidence that other matters might disqualify a prospective owner?

I am also concerned that the clause is not applied fairly across industries. Ofcom does not need to take into account foreign or trade policy when adjudicating on a takeover of a newspaper, but the football regulator does for the takeover of a club. I am not saying that subsection (2) should be removed altogether, although I am not sure I understand the value it brings. Many will be acutely aware that most of our Premier League clubs, and an increasing number of clubs elsewhere in the pyramid, are foreign-owned or owned by British people living in other countries, so it is essential that we have complete transparency in the process, including on at what point subsection (2) is relevant.

However, I fundamentally believe that if we are to truly value the independence of the regulator’s day-to-day decisions from the Government, the subsection ought to be reworded from “must…have regard” to “may…have regard”. In this morning’s sitting, in response to a question from the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby, the Minister said that we do not want the regulator to be involved in foreign policy. But putting subsection (2) into clause 37 does exactly that. A minor tweak to the wording satisfies everyone, but most of all retains the spirit of independence and removes some of the confusion about who is deciding who owns our football clubs. I am very interested in what the Minister has to say in reply.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 37 has three main parts. It requires the regulator to have regard to determinations from competition organisers, requires the regulator to have regard to foreign policy and trade objectives, and provides the criteria for judging honesty, integrity and financial soundness. I will speak to each of those parts in turn and address amendment 1 with the second part.

On the regulator having regard to determinations from competition organisers, I have already raised the issue of conflicting outcomes and was reassured by the Minister’s explanation, so I will move on to the issue of the influence of Government policy objectives on the regulator.

The clause states that the regulator must have regard to the Government’s “foreign and trade policy objectives” when making determinations on ownership. That has caused concern across the board, including across football governance structures, which usually have a harder time finding consensus, and with fans. That almost unanimous voice tells us something important: everyone wants to see a regulator that is free from undue political interference. I agree. The Government should not be in a position where they can apply pressure to the regulator to make decisions on ownership just because they might be politically favourable. Club ownership must not be a tool used to reward those with which the Government have a positive relationship or penalise those with which they have a negative relationship. That is particularly so given that the Bill empowers the regulator to make decisions on incumbent owners and officers.

However, I understand that there may be circumstances in which national security and foreign policy objectives may be pertinent to the regulator’s decision making. The regulator should, and will want to, have an understanding of all relevant information when making a determination. That is part of the reason why the regulator was chosen as the location of the tests, due to its ability to access relevant information that would not otherwise be available. I therefore do not believe that the intention of the clause was to compromise the independence of the regulator, but to empower it where security or foreign policy objectives are concerned.

Whatever the intention may be, we must ensure that the clause is not open to abuse. I am therefore pleased to offer my support to amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford, which suggests that we change “must regard” to “may regard”. That amendment might help to provide some reassurance on the purpose of the clause and the independence of the regulator.

Some further clarification on how the measure will work in practice would also be helpful. In particular, there must be more guidance on how the regulator will be made aware of “foreign and trade policy objectives”. That is particularly important because transparency is a crucial tool for providing accountability, but may be difficult given that some information will naturally be confidential in line with national security considerations. Can the Minister provide any information on what good practice will look like in terms of striking the balance between accountability and security?

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[Stuart Andrew]

Absolutely.

My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and the hon. Member for Luton South made important points. As a public body, the regulator must act fairly when it makes decisions. As set out in the White Paper, it will make an evidence-based objective judgment to assess whether an owner or a director is a suitable custodian of a club, and it will apply its tests consistently and fairly to every person.

The fitness element of the test will assess an individual’s honesty, integrity and financial soundness, as well as, for directors, competence. That draws on the fit and proper person test applied by other regulators, including the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Solicitors Regulation Authority. The regulator will set out in its rules and guidance further detail on how it will conduct its tests.

The factors I have outlined are specified because they have a real bearing on whether an owner or officer could have a significant detrimental impact on a club’s financial sustainability. Listing specific matters provides greater clarity to the industry about what will be tested. It also constrains the regulator. The matters listed in the clause are the only things that it will take into account when considering honesty, integrity, financial soundness or competence. To ensure that the fitness test remains effective in the future, the clause gives the regulator the power to use its rules to add further matters that it will need to take into account when considering someone’s honesty, integrity or financial soundness. Before using that power, the regulator must consult the leagues.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

I have listened carefully to the Minister, as I always do, and I will withdraw the amendment. However, as I understand it, similar provisions do not apply to any other regulator, and other regulators are faced with very similar decisions on a day-to-day basis. We do not take unilateral moral decisions, as the Minister pointed out, but I am happy to discuss the matter further with him. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Disqualification orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 39 to 44 stand part.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate your comments, Ms Nokes. I can skip forward to the amendments. I have some separate thoughts on clause 45. I do think that the background is quite important to the amendments, but am happy to move on directly to address them.

Amendments 13 and 21 are on player consultation. It seems like a missed opportunity that the views of players are not to be taken into account by the regulator. That is why I tabled amendment 13, which would expand consultation requirements to include them. Similarly, amendment 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, would require the regulator to seek the views of players and staff, so I will address both amendments together.

Players in both the clubs that tried to break away and the clubs that were left behind had an instrumental role in demonstrating against the ESL. For example, just 48 hours after the announcement, a group of high-profile Liverpool players issued a collective statement against the Super League. That clearly stated:

“We don’t like it and we don’t want it to happen.”

Meanwhile, Leeds players, while warming up for a game, wore shirts featuring slogans such as “Football is for the fans” and “Earn it.” Players in other clubs followed suit. It is clear from that that players feel passionately about the competitiveness and fairness of the competitions that they operate in, and have a view to share on these issues.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

The shadow Minister is making a really interesting speech, but is she not actually making a speech against the amendment, because the players did that without there being a statutory requirement for them to do it?

[Stephanie Peacock]

That is a fair point, but I do not think we should have to rely on players having the bravery to make public statements. We are saying—this is a debate that we rehearsed earlier in Committee—that there should be an obligation on the regulator to consult them, and I will come on to make that argument.

Many players care about the fans and communities that they play for, and it is players who are likely to come under fire if they take part in competitions that fans oppose. At best, they will act as a vehicle for fans hoping to hold their clubs to account. At worst, when competing in closed competitions, players may become the face of the demise of the long tradition of the English football pyramid, without having had any say in the matter. At a time when there has been a particularly concerning rise in abuse of football players—albeit from a shameful minority of fans—that becomes even more concerning.

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[Mr Betts]

Thank you for that clarification—I am sorry for mixing myself up.

Let us get down to the issue of parachute payments, which almost everyone spoke about on Second Reading, and which the Minister seems to believe should be treated as a given in their current form, with no change. I think he has the support of the Premier League—or some clubs in the Premier League, because it is by no means certain that the Premier League speaks with one voice on these issues. But it clearly is a very important issue.

I am calling for the removal of clause 55(2)(b), which stops the regulator, as the backstop, being able to consider removing or changing parachute payments in their current form. Under the regulator’s remit, they have to be treated as a given.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

Is the hon. Gentleman talking specifically about parachute payments from the Premier League into the Championship, or is he talking about the smoothing process of the parachute payments to clubs that are relegated from leagues in general, indeed most probably from the EFL into the National League?

[Mr Betts]

I am talking about parachute payments that currently exist, which is what the Bill refers to—I do not think it refers to parachute payments that might exist in the future in some other arrangement.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

It is important to place on the record that National League clubs get 100% and then 50% of an EFL deal for League Two upon relegation, and a Championship club once relegated gets one eighth of the Championship deal for one season, and a League One relegation gets one ninth. This is not the same solidarity payment. It is important to remember that, when clubs are relegated to the league below, there is some sort of parachute payment in order to smooth out the process of losing the revenue received from being in that upper league.

[Mr Betts]

The point I was going to go on to make was that I am not suggesting that parachute payments should never be allowed under any income redistribution. That is not the case. My amendment does not say, “No parachute payments”. It says that parachute payments can be considered as part of the overall distribution of finances within the game.

The Bill as drafted states that parachute payments are exempt from consideration at the backstop stage—full stop, end of story. Everything else, including media income, can be considered, but not parachute payments. That seems strange, given that the Minister has repeatedly said that the independence of the regulator needs to be preserved and recognised, and yet on this key issue its hands are being specifically and absolutely tied. That just does not chime as an appropriate situation for the Government to get themselves into compared with everything else that they have said about the Bill. The regulator needs to be independent and have discretion, but on this issue it is not allowed to have the freedom to look at the situation, particularly with regard to the state of the game report. If the regulator believes that it is necessary to revisit the issue of parachute payments in order for income in football to be distributed properly and appropriately, and for it to be sustainable not just for individual clubs but for the whole of the football pyramid, this proposal is a significant mistake.

We must recognise that 80% of what the Premier League gives to the EFL is in parachute payments to a handful of clubs. When the Premier League talks about its generosity to the game, it is talking about generosity to a handful of clubs that have just been in the Premier League. That is not a real position. When we look at the distribution of the media money overall, we find that 92% goes to 25 clubs—namely, the Premier League clubs and five others that have been in and out of the Premier League in the recent past. That is not sustainable, and if a reasonable and fair distribution of money should be agreed in the future, the regulator must have the power to take that into account.

I have also said to the Minister that we ought to look at not just the importance of parachute payments to the clubs that receive them. I do not think that anyone I have met who has talked about this issue has said, “You cannot have parachute payments.” They say that it must be looked at in terms of the totality of the game and the distribution of money. I would understand, very quickly, that a club going up into the Premier League faces an enormous difference between the wage bill it had before being promoted and the wage bill it will need once promoted, and it must have some reassurance on what happens if it gets relegated. That is an understandable situation, but we must also take into account the impact on the finances of clubs in the same division as the relegated clubs and their ability to compete.

It has been said over and over again that Championship clubs are getting completely overstretched, because the holy grail of promotion to the Premier League means that clubs try to extend their budgets beyond what is reasonable. Owners put in large sums of their own money, often beyond what is reasonable and sustainable, in order to compete with clubs with parachute payments, and the difference is enormous. Parachute payment clubs will come down with budgets three times the size of those of many other clubs in that league, so in order to compete clubs often do fairly stupid things to try to ensure that promotion becomes a possibility.

My amendment says that the regulator ought to take account of those issues. It is not reasonable to say to the regulator, “The only thing that matters is parachute payments to protect clubs that get relegated and you should have no regard to the impact on the clubs already in that league.” I hope that the Minister will consider this seriously. It is obviously a concern across the House, as was reflected on Second Reading.

I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East on the Front Bench has a slightly different way of addressing the issue, but the wording in her amendment 31 relates to what I have just said. Yes, parachute payments and the impact on the clubs that receive them must be taken into account, but the impact on other clubs that must compete with them must also be taken into account. The position under the Bill as drafted is that that cannot happen, because it is fixed as it is and cannot be changed by the regulator.

The Minister will probably say that the leagues themselves could come to an agreement and change it. What happens if they do not do that? There has not been much evidence of the leagues being able to reach an agreement for a long period of time now—that is why we are here debating this Bill. In the end, it is down to the backstop. That backstop, the regulator, needs to have the flexibility to address these very important measures.

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[Damian Collins]

I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I appreciate that—the hon. Member for Sheffield South East makes a similar argument—it is not an argument for the abolition of parachute payments. My concern is that if we take that step, we would have to bring into scope all football money, not just the money that the Premier League pays in redistribution to clubs in the lower leagues and through parachute payments. That would be a much wider step and would require further consideration. If such recommendations are to be made in future, that should be done after the regulator is established and we have the state of the game report.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

I find part 6 to be one of the most infuriating parts of the Bill, not because it is a bad aspect of the Bill but because it should not exist. The truth is that if there had been a deal between the two parties—the Premier League and the EFL—part 6 would look very different. We made it clear in the fan-led review that distributions are an issue for football and they should be able to resolve that issue themselves, but that it was important for backstop powers to be there to intervene if no solution was found. That is what part 6 is, and it has become a more controversial part of the Bill than was perhaps ever envisaged. We had hoped back in November 2021, when we published the fan-led review, that there would be a deal.

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[Damian Collins]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a slight danger, if we go down the path suggested by the amendment, of creating an even bigger gap between the big six and everyone else? We would basically be saying to the rest of the clubs, “The parachute payments are not for us: they are for you—the other 14 clubs in the Premier League. If you want them, you can pay for them and pay for the solidarity payments for the football league as well”, because that is effectively what would happen.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I always refer back to that point in the fan-led review, and we mulled over that issue at length. The truth is that we did not come to a conclusion ourselves, because it is so complex. We have made it clear in the chapter on financial distribution that we hope that there will be reform to the system, but this was back in 2021, for goodness’ sake. I want to bang everybody’s heads together and send them to bed without any tea, because we are dealing with the failure of the leagues to reach a solution, and I hope that the message they get from today’s sitting and the evidence sessions that we had last week is to go away and come up with another solution. The Bill sets out the process if there is no deal on that, and ultimately if there is no amendment to the Bill, let that be an inspiration to people to come together and find a solution.

[Stuart Andrew]

I must say that I almost want to stand up, say what other Members have said and sit down again. I agree with everybody else: I wish we were not at this stage and that there had been a deal between the parties concerned, because it is in the interests of football for them to come up with a deal. I hope that the mechanisms we are talking about will enable us to encourage that deal to happen sooner rather than later.

On amendments 27 and 31, although the parachute payments can have the distorting effects outlined, they play a pivotal role in protecting clubs at risk of relegation from going bankrupt, as others have said, and certainly give certainty to clubs competing for promotion. As I mentioned on Second Reading, in the past, relegation from the Premier League often meant financial ruin, as teams such as Bradford City failed to adjust to the huge drops in revenue. Given the important role that parachute payments play in helping to ensure the financial sustainability of relegated clubs, removing them entirely could have significant adverse effects on the game, and we do not want to create an opportunity through the Bill’s distribution mechanisms to get rid of parachute payments by the back door. Including parachute payments in the Bill’s scope, as amendment 27 proposes, could do just that. It could mean the regulator accepting a final proposal from one of the leagues that removes those payments, and if the mechanism allowed for that, it could create significant financial uncertainty for clubs that could not confidently invest in promotion. My hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford also mentioned the commercial agreements that are in place.

An exciting, competitive and sustainable pyramid is at the heart of what makes English football the asset that it is, and we should not put that at risk. We have excluded parachute payments from the backstop, because it needs to be targeted and simple to work effectively. Including parachute payments in the backstop means that the regulator could be presented with two entirely incomparable final proposals, which could render decision making almost impossible, but it is important to remember that the backstop may never be triggered, and is only ever intended as a last resort. We expect the leagues to reach a football-led solution themselves and will continue to press them to do so.

I recognise there are also concerns about the potentially distortive effects of parachute payments, and that is why the broader regulatory framework is designed to address it. If the regulator finds that parachute payments are causing a structural or systemic issue, it could attach discretionary licence conditions to parachute payment clubs to address that. We are creating a financial regulator, and it is entirely right that we solve issues like this through financial regulation wherever possible.