Football Governance Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateStephanie Peacock
Main Page: Stephanie Peacock (Labour - Barnsley South)Department Debates - View all Stephanie Peacock's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. Starting with clause 15, one of the regulator’s main responsibilities will be to operate a licensing system for football clubs through which the majority of its regulation will be delivered. The licensing regime will cover all football clubs that have a team playing in any competition specified by the Secretary of State in regulations. It is proposed that it will cover the top five leagues of the English football pyramid, but that is subject to the Secretary of State’s discretion and parliamentary approval. I will use “specified competitions” as shorthand to denote those competitions covered by the regime. That means that football clubs will require a licensed, lawfully operated team in any of the specified competitions. A licensing system to enact regulation is not a new idea, with sectors such as communications, finance and healthcare all operating such a system.
The clause sets out the requirement for clubs to have a provisional or full operating licence, and the regulator’s power to grant those licences, subject to clubs passing the relevant tests, which are established in the following clauses. The licence will enable the regulator to regulate clubs through licence conditions set out later in the Bill. This will enable proportionate regulation tailored to clubs rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. An operating licence will specify which club the licence relates to, the team that the club is operating and any conditions attached to the licence.
I will move on to clause 16. The introduction of a football regulator into a previously unregulated sector will be a substantial change to the industry, but a necessary one to safeguard the future of English football. In order to provide for a graduate transition to being a fully licensed club, a club will initially apply to the regulator for a provisional operating licence. We see that as the natural first step to attaining a full operating licence. That will give clubs time to adapt to the regulatory system and make the necessary changes without being unfairly penalised for not being able to raise standards overnight.
The application for a provisional licence requires basic information on the club’s owner or owners, officers and senior management as well as a strategic business plan detailing things such as the estimated costs of the club and how they are expected to be funded. The regulator should look to make that process as simple and straightforward as possible, assisting clubs with their applications where necessary. It will be aware of the possible constraints on smaller clubs lower down the football pyramid. We envisage that the majority of clubs will meet the test for a provisional operating licence through the submission of basic information and documentation, and showing a readiness and willingness to work with the regulator to meet the mandatory licence conditions and free-standing duties.
Clause 17 outlines the granting of a provisional operating licence that will allow the club to operate for a time-limited period. That may be up to three years initially, although it could be shorter or extended depending on the circumstances. The provisional period will allow the regulator time to assess the current standing of the club and determine what steps it will need to take to obtain a full operating licence as well as giving the club time to take the necessary steps. The provisional licence will ensure that all clubs under the remit of the regulator meet basic fundamental requirements, in the mandatory conditions, that will help to safeguard the club’s sustainability and heritage.
There are three aspects of the test to grant a provisional operating licence. First, the club must operate a relevant team in a specified competition, which effectively means that the club must be in scope of the regulator. Secondly, the club will comply with the mandatory licensing conditions attached to the licence by the regulator. Full details of the mandatory licence conditions are in schedule 5 to the Bill, but they encompass a financial plan condition, a corporate governance statement, a fan consultation condition and an annual declaration condition. Thirdly, the club will comply with the duties on clubs as set out in part 5 of the Bill. If the regulator is not satisfied that the club passes all elements of the test, the clause gives a club the opportunity to engage with the regulator to rectify the issues identified. That collaborative approach will aim to ensure that clubs are given every opportunity to meet the requirements and gain a provisional operating licence.
Clause 18 states that in order to pass the test for a full licence, the regulator must be satisfied that a club is meeting the threshold requirements as set out in schedule 4 and that the club is complying and will continue to comply with the mandatory licensing conditions and free-standing duties on clubs set out in part 5. The regulator must also not have determined that any person who is an owner or officer of a club is unsuitable for the position they hold.
Clause 18 also details the power of the regulator to extend the provisional operating licence for a club. That will be done only if the regulator believes that the club does not meet the bar for a full licence at present, but will if given more time. As set out later in the Bill, the regulator will be able to sanction a club if it has to extend its provisional licence. Once a club has a full licence, it will not have to be periodically reviewed. Instead, the regulator would continue to monitor and supervise the club, and there will be an annual touchpoint in the form of the annual declaration, where the club will notify the regulator of any changes within the club over the past year that are relevant to the regulator. That is intended to minimise burdens while still ensuring that the club continues to adhere to the necessary requirements, including requirements that ensure that fans’ best interests are at the heart of the club’s decision-making process.
Clause 19 details the revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, as well as when the licence ceases to have an effect. For a provisional operating licence to be revoked, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should be engaging with the club throughout that period, and we expect that through constructive dialogue, a solution that avoids that drastic step can be found in all but the most serious cases. The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. To reduce as much as possible the regulator’s impact on ongoing sporting competitions, a revocation must not be before the end of the current season.
A licence will cease to have effect only if the club ceases to operate a relevant team. The most likely cause of cessation of an operating licence is that a club has been relegated from a specified competition and is therefore no longer in the scope of the regulator.
I understand the intention behind new clause 8, which would require the regulator to provide clubs with “reasonable and proportionate assistance” as they engage and comply with the licensing system. However, I can reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield South East that the Bill already achieves that in principle. It is already implicit that any good regulator should provide support and assistance to the regulated population as necessary, to aid their understanding and support compliance. But for the avoidance of any doubt, we have also explicitly codified that participative approach into the Bill through the regulatory principles. The regulatory principle in clause 8(b) encourages the regulator to
“so far as reasonably practicable, co-operate, and proactively and constructively engage, with…clubs”.
The regulatory principle in clause 8(c) encourages the regulator to be proportionate. Those two principles would encourage the regulator to provide clubs with assistance in engaging with the licensing system.
It is in everyone’s interest to maximise clubs’ compliance with the system and minimise burdens on them as much as possible. Indeed, ensuring a smooth transition and minimising burdens on clubs has been at the heart of our design of the licensing system. That is precisely why there is a two-step structure of provisional licences followed by full licences, with clubs given time and support to progress from one to the next.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Sharma. I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss the content of the operating licences that will make up the regulator’s regime. As the Minister has said, clauses 15 to 19 set out the process for applying and granting both provisional and full operating licences. I would like to welcome a few things about these clauses.
First, I welcome the ability for clubs to gain a provisional licence first, with the conditions in this licence providing the building blocks for the full-time licence. This process recognises the importance of the transition period, allowing clubs to take the necessary time to understand the new requirements and get themselves in order to meet them if needed.
I also welcome that clause 16 clarifies that any club can apply for a provisional licence, allowing those expecting promotion to the National League to be proactive. Further, I am pleased that the process will require a personnel statement to be provided. That will be crucial in ensuring that the regulator is able to hold the right people accountable for the proper fulfilment of the licence at any given club.
The clauses allow for an advocacy first approach, where the regulator will provide an encouraging and flexible pathway for clubs to gain their licences. Coupled with the enforcement power in clause 19 to ensure that the regulator has the teeth it needs in the event of non-compliance, the process in this part of the Bill seems to offer a fair and supportive approach to getting clubs up to speed with the full requirements.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right to highlight in new clause 8 that clubs should be supported in their transition to becoming fully regulated. That is especially important for those clubs in the National League and the lower tiers of the English Football League. In his evidence to this Committee, Steve Thompson, the managing director of Dagenham & Redbridge told us he was
“really worried that the extra reporting…will be more than a lot of them can manage without taking on extra staff.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 14 May 2024; c. 39, Q61.]
He also highlighted that most clubs at National League level operate on one or two full-time staff, with some working on volunteers alone.
I think the Bill has done a good job of ensuring regulation will be proportionate. Further, I believe reporting requirements have been minimised wherever possible and should in any case be balanced out by the benefits of good financial planning and governance. However, given the concerns of clubs, I understand why some may feel it is better to make it explicit that the regulator will support clubs that are or will be licensed.
I hope the Minister can use this as an opportunity to highlight some of the ways in which the Bill as it stands will adopt an advocacy first approach and offer clubs the assistance they need to keep up with the regime. I do not believe it is anyone’s intention for the regulator to have to use its enforcement powers on well-intentioned clubs that are genuinely struggling to comply.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Sharma. I thank the Minister for his positive comments on new clause 8, which are very much in line with what it is trying to achieve. I think the Minister said that the new clause is unnecessary because the essence and intention of it is already contained in other clauses, and the regulator would be expected to operate in providing assistance to clubs in line with the way described in new clause 8. I think I have got that right.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Sharma.
I welcome the line in the Bill that gives use the opportunity to secure the grounds. The Independent Football Regulator must grant approval for a disposal only when it is satisfied that the carrying on of the activity will not undermine the financial sustainability of the club. However, we would also like to see—certainly from the perspective of fans—a consultation of the supporters and the community.
I speak from experience: Liverpool supporters stopped the club relocating from Anfield to an out-of-town ground in Speke. That would have been utterly disastrous for the heritage of the club, as I mentioned to the English Football League chair, who was chair of Liverpool at the time. Also, Everton supporters stopped Everton moving from Goodison, again to an out-of-town stadium, in Kirkby, with a huge Tesco attached. Again, we are talking about something that would have been disastrous for the heritage of the football club, and we would not be seeing Bramley-Moore come into occurrence, potentially as one of the greatest stadiums in the world.
I am saying that to the Minister because that was football supporters changing the direction of travel. I warmly welcome that line on the Independent Football Regulator, but it would be fantastic if we could also consider what the amendment proposes, which is about ensuring that the community and supporters are talked to during any process about the movement of grounds.
Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements on clubs, which I will address before moving on to the amendments. The requirements cover sustainable resourcing—both financial and non-financial—and fan engagement. Before I address each of those areas in turn, I confirm that I welcome each of all the requirements as a whole.
The first condition is about financial resources. At this point, it is important to set out some context on football finances and regulation. As the Secretary of State said on Second Reading, clubs will not and should not be required to break even under the requirements. Ambition, investment and, indeed, a level of risk are fundamental to football and the pursuit of success. That is what makes the game so exciting and varied, something football fans never want to lose.
Owners Steve Parish and Tony Bloom emphasised that in their evidence to us, with Steve Parish saying of football,
“It is not a business with a profit principle…people’s desire to win will always trump their desire to make money.” ––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 14 May 2024; c. 59, Q94.]
The issues addressed in amendment 8 are paramount. FIFA is already talking about opening the door to games being played in another country, and the league seems to be making moves to play games in the USA. Unfortunately, that is the direction of travel that could come to our doorstep. Consultation with supporters and supporter bodies through the IFR will be hugely important if the Premier League decides that it wants to start playing games abroad, because that is a slippery slope for the heritage of football in this country.
I thank my hon. Friend for those comments; I am sure that the Minister was listening. I will come to the issue of playing games abroad in future Committee sittings, but I hope that the deterrent of the regulator’s enforcement, as well as the fact that the prohibition will apply whether or not a club is licensed, will be enough to dissuade clubs from making such plans anyway. A club that is willing to participate in a prohibited competition is a club that is willing to risk losing its licence, which would release it from the fan consultation requirements anyway.
The amendment is right to highlight that fans are not currently given a say in the Bill on changes to where their home matches are played. We will come to that point later, when we look at further amendments that give fans a say on stadiums.
On the point about playing games abroad, which we will come back to later, it is interesting that although clubs will have to consult their fans, if the competition organiser decides to move games abroad and requires the clubs to do so as part of the competition requirements, there is no requirement for the competition organiser to consult fans. That seems to be a hole in the provisions that we will have to address at some point.
I thank my hon. Friend for that comment, which I will talk about later. I am sure that the Minister also heard it and will respond if he feels able to. For now, I ask the Minister to set out his thinking on why fans are not consulted on the heritage implications of moving a home ground. Overall, I welcome schedule 4 but would welcome a strengthening of the fan engagement provisions.
Schedule 4 introduces the threshold requirements that clubs will have to meet to be granted a full operating licence. These are the three main areas of the regulator’s club licensing regime, which build on the freestanding duties and the mandatory conditions. Meeting the threshold requirements will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently and will be able to continue to operate sustainably in its financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas.
Although the threshold requirements are principles set in legislation, what each club must do to meet those requirements will not be the same. For example, what constitutes appropriate financial resources for a Premier League club will be very different from a League One club. A club might already meet the threshold requirements—for example, through naturally good operations or by complying with competition rules—in which case, the regulator will not need to intervene directly. If a club does not, the regulator can apply discretionary licence conditions to bring it up to the required threshold. That structure will allow for a proportionate system with requirements tailored to individual clubs, rather than the approach taken by the industry to date of blanket rules catering to the lowest denominator but applying to all.
The threshold requirement for financial resources means that clubs need an appropriate level of financial resources to support their long-term financial sustainability, accounting for their circumstances and risks. For example, that might include which competition the club competes in, its financial relationship with its owners, and the wider economic context in which it operates.
In particular, the regulator should take into account the club’s financial plan and its contingency plans for dealing with financial shocks. For non-financial resources, a similar requirement and process applies. “Non-financial resources” refers to things such as internal controls, systems and policies, as well as the information and people that the club has at its disposal. Although not financial in nature, those are important resources for any well-run club, so they need to be adequate. When assessing whether the resources are appropriate, the regulator might consider the skills and experience of the senior management and its corporate governance arrangements.
The threshold requirement for fan engagement requires that clubs adequately consult and consider the views of fans when making decisions relating to certain specified matters. As we heard from the FSA on Tuesday, this is the first time that there has ever been a requirement for fan engagement to this extent. The relevant matters are listed in the Bill and cover key off-pitch decisions, which the fan-led review highlighted as important to fans across the specified leagues. The threshold requirement is designed to work in tandem with the fan consultation mandatory licence condition. Through that condition, all clubs must regularly consult a representative group of supporters to discuss the relevant matters listed in the Bill, and that must be in place by the time a club receives a provisional licence.
Appropriate fan engagement will look different at every club and will partly be based on the size and complexity of the club’s fanbase. The threshold requirement has been designed to allow the regulator to recognise the inherent variation between clubs while ensuring that standards are raised where necessary.
We are all in agreement that one-size-fits-all is not appropriate, and that certainly was not the thinking behind the amendment. We certainly do not want to make measures more prescriptive; it is about ensuring that whatever means clubs choose to consult their fans are effective and focused on outcomes. We certainly do not want to rush the regulator; the text of the amendment says “within six months”. Although I am happy not to press amendment 16, I will push amendment 17 to a vote.
Amendment proposed: 17, in schedule 4, page 93, line 12, at end insert—
“(2A) The IFR must—
(1) consult the Football Supporters’ Association on defining what constitutes effective fan engagement and consultation by clubs and,
(2) issue guidance on measures to be taken by clubs to ensure effective fan engagement and consultation and lay a copy of that guidance before Parliament within six months of this Act coming into force.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point, which is why one of the mandatory conditions is good corporate governance. Some clubs do that extremely well, and he gives an example of one that may not be doing so well. For it to get a licence, the regulator would expect a minimum level of corporate governance.
Clause 20 and schedule 5 provide us with the building blocks of a licensing regime. The Minister set out the mandatory licence conditions that all clubs must comply with in order to obtain a provisional or full licence. That will ensure that base-level requirements are fulfilled on key areas such as finances, corporate governance and fan engagement. I will speak briefly to each area in turn, and then address the amendments.
The first condition relates to financial plans. I will not spend too much time on it as we have already discussed financial resources. However, I believe that the requirement to submit a financial plan would be fundamental for clubs wanting to exercise best practice.
The second requirement is on corporate governance. As we just discussed, good corporate governance can help to deliver better business outcomes, improve the efficiency of decision making and demonstrate to stakeholders that a club is well managed, to the benefit of both fans and investors. Furthermore, as the Government’s White Paper says, poor governance can exacerbate financial issues, allowing reckless decisions to be made without challenge or scrutiny. Many clubs already engage in good corporate governance, and for those that are not, the introduction of requirements should genuinely help to move them towards best practice.
However, I have some questions about the content of the corporate governance code of practice, which will be published by the regulator and reported against by clubs. In particular, Fair Game and Kick It Out have questioned whether issues such as equality, diversity and inclusion will be included in the code. Indeed, the Government chose not to pick up the recommendation of the fan-led review to mandate EDI action plans through the licence regime, pointing instead towards enhanced industry assessments in that area.
I understand the need to ensure that existing structures that are working well are not disrupted, and to give the regulator a well-defined scope. Given the explicit focus that the regulator will have on good governance, however, it seems slightly odd to divorce the concept from the issue of EDI. The fan-led review said:
“Aside from a clear moral case, improving diversity is also a key aspect of driving better business decisions by football clubs. Diverse companies perform better”.
A football that welcomes everyone, then, is a football in which clubs have the best possible chance of success. But change is needed at almost every level for that to happen.
Kick It Out’s reporting statistics from last season show that it received a record 1,007 reports of discriminatory behaviour across the professional game, including a 400% increase in reports of sexism and misogyny. Meanwhile, in 2019, the law firm Farrer & Co found that across all professional football clubs only 7% of board directors were female. Just one club met the 30% target set for other industries, and only 7% have a woman in a leadership position on the board. Work must be done to address the problem across the board. I am keen to hear from the Minister about how whether issues such as EDI will form part of the governance code will ultimately be decided, and whether he has a view on whether they should.
I have spoken about fan consultation in detail during our discussions on schedule 4, so I will save repeating how important it is. However, I would like to raise some further concerns. Namely, I am disappointed that the Bill makes no provisions regarding supporters’ trusts, as noted by my amendment 19 and amendment 7 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby.
At the time of the fan-led review, 73 clubs had a community benefit society in the form of a supporters’ trust. Community benefit societies are incorporated co-operatives that conduct business for the benefit of their community. They must follow certain rules, including operating on a democratic basis and ensuring that any profits gained by a trust can only be reinvested into the club or returned to the community. Those minimum standards mean that CBSs in the form of supporters’ trusts operate with a broad level of consistency and reliability. Many of them have a long legacy of connecting with the local area, liaising with their club and organising on behalf of fans. Many trusts should therefore be viewed as an asset to the community that clubs can learn from and engage with positively. We saw that at first hand in our evidence sessions, with the insight that Action for Albion, Supporters’ Trust At Reading and Arsenal Supporters’ Trust brought us in respect of their clubs and the view of their communities.
I understand why the Bill has sought to ensure that fan engagement measures are not a one-size-fits-all. However, where trusts are established, I believe that clubs should consider them when forming their consultation processes. Amendment 19 would ensure that where a club’s fans have established a legally registered supporters’ trust, that body is considered for representation in the club’s fan consultation process. Clubs would not be bound by any hard-and-fast rules, but would be encouraged to consider the benefits of engaging relevant existing trusts.
That brings me to the broader issue of how fans will be selected for consultation. Amendment 7 suggests that fans are given a democratic mandate if they are to be consulted by the club regularly. That way they would have the backing of fellow fans, helping to avoid scenarios in which the fans are seen as a mouthpiece for the club directed at fans, rather than the other way round. I am keen to hear how the Minister thinks we can ensure that fans are both selected and treated fairly. Will there be standards or guidance on that specific issue?
Finally, I am pleased to touch on the annual declaration condition. Given that there is no requirement for licences to be renewed, it is right that there is a touchpoint for clubs with the regulator to ensure that everything is in order, but I have one brief question. The schedule outlines that the annual declaration must contain a summary of any “material change” at the club over the year. That phrase is used 11 times throughout the Bill, but its definition is not clearly set out. Will the Minister provide a working definition today, or write to me with one?
Overall, I am broadly happy with the contents of the clause and schedule, albeit with a few questions that I would like answering on governance code and on supporter involvement.
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate on an important Bill. I would like clarification on a few points with regard to schedule 5, particularly—following the excellent remarks made by the shadow Minister, with which I wholeheartedly agree—paragraph 7(4), which states:
“Before publishing a code of practice or any alterations to the code, the IFR must consult…the Football Association, and…other such persons as appear to the IFR to be representative of persons likely to be affected by the code.”
Can I seek assurances from the Minister that fans and fans’ representative groups will be included as people who are likely to be affected by the code? They will take a deep interest in the corporate governance of their clubs, which is why we are here with this piece of legislation. Similarly, I would like to press for clarifications on reporting on equality and diversity and inclusion matters, which are a really important aspect of good corporate governance. Once again, I add my support to the remarks made by the shadow Minister.
This is in relation to the mandatory conditions that all clubs have to meet under the regulatory regime. If the regulator identifies that a club is not meeting one of the mandatory conditions set out in the Bill on the financial side, it can apply its own discretionary conditions. If the league proposes a solution to the problem and the regulator believes that it will work, it can then allow the league to apply that. However, if the regulator feels that the proposal put forward by the league would not get that club up to the standards required, it can then impose its own rule. I hope that makes sense.
Schedule 6 outlines the procedure for when the regulator is minded to accept a commitment given by a competition organiser, and covers requests to vary an existing commitment. The schedule therefore expands on clause 24. As I say, if it does not accept the commitment, the regulator can impose the original conditions. The intention is that commitments could provide a less burdensome solution for all parties that still addresses the risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for the interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator. Schedule 6 sets out that procedure in further detail. The notification processes and timings set out in the schedule allow clubs the opportunity to make representations before the regulator accepts a commitment or requested variation of an existing commitment from a competition organiser, and before the regulator releases a competition organiser from a commitment.
Finally, clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary non-financial discretionary licence conditions. Such conditions, set under the non-financial resources and fan engagement threshold requirements, will not be subject to the commitments procedure involving relevant leagues as outlined in the previous clauses. Instead, the procedure is that the regulator must notify only the club and give the club a period of no less than 14 days to make representations. As per previous clauses, this is an important safeguard to allow the club to make its case. However, the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious. If the regulator believes that giving the club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately, without prior notice.
I will start by briefly addressing the broad provisions around discretionary licence conditions in clauses 21, 22 and 23 together, before moving on to a discussion on commitments in lieu of licence conditions, covering clauses 24 and 25 and schedule 6.
Looking first at the discretionary licence conditions, clause 21 allows the regulator to attach licence conditions that are specific to a particular club. This allows the regulator a mechanism to put the principles of proportionality and consistency into practice: every club will be required to meet the threshold conditions for a full licence, providing us with consistency, but where a club falls short, the regulator’s response can be bespoke, allowing for proportionality.
Clause 22 provides strict limits as to what the discretionary licence conditions can cover, ensuring that they are focused on the areas in which they are most needed. Finally, clause 23 requires the Independent Football Regulator to notify a club, as well as the relevant competition organiser, about a proposed financial discretionary licence condition before attaching it to a licence. This is a sensible provision, which allows for a club and the regulator to remain in conversation unless there is an immediate risk that further delay would threaten the club’s financial sustainability.
I will move on to the idea of commitments in lieu of discretionary licence conditions. This requirement, which was not initially proposed as part of the fan-led review or the Government’s White Paper, says that the regulator must invite the relevant competition organiser to give a commitment to make a rule of its own instead of the proposed condition’s being attached to the particular club’s licence. I understand that the reasoning behind that provision is to ensure that competition impacts can be reduced, allowing a competition organiser to try to ensure that one club alone does not have to face a rule that other clubs do not. Further to that, it exists to offer competition organisers an opportunity to improve consistency across clubs in following good practice. However, despite that, a number of concerns about these clauses have been raised with me, so I hope that the Minister can provide some further context in answer to some of the following questions.
First, it would be good to have confirmation that this provision cannot be exploited to delay the regulator from imposing licence conditions. Consultation will be incredibly important as part of the regulator’s functions, but the regulator must have the teeth to make an executive decision where needed. In that vein, it would be good if the Minister could provide some insight on what these commitments might mean for rule primacy.
I understand that the regulator will have the final say on whether a commitment in lieu is accepted, and that the discretionary licence condition must be dropped while a commitment is in force, but it still remains the case that any accepted commitment will mean that both the regulator and competition organiser will have oversight and scope in the same area. That could see clubs paying twice for two sets of overlapping rules. Who has ultimate power in these cases?
Another area where clarification is needed is on the topic of commercial sensitivities. Although the Premier League is in many ways representative of clubs, it is also a competitor to clubs when it comes to gaining big sponsorship deals. Can the Minister confirm that the regulator will be alert to the ways in which discretionary licence conditions are discussed with competition organisers, so that sensitive information is not disclosed? Indeed, in cases involving such commercially sensitive information, it seems slightly odd to think that the competition organiser, which will not have the full picture, would be better placed to create a rule than the regulator itself, which will be privy to more of the financial details.
Finally, it is welcome that the relevant club will be consulted about a commitment in lieu beforehand, as per schedule 6, but, for the other clubs competing in a relevant competition, who will also be impacted by the commitment, there is no right to consultation. That might seem strange to clubs that have done what is required of them to meet the threshold requirements; they face being subject to further regulation due to the specific circumstances of another club’s finances, without a fair say in the matter. I should be grateful to the Minister, therefore, if he would set out how the Bill will ensure that clubs are not ignored in the engagement process when the commitment in lieu being proposed will directly apply to them.
The hon. Lady makes important points. The idea is that as we have a regulator on a statutory footing, which will improve standards, hopefully that will bring football along with those improved standards. However, she is right to highlight the point about sensitive information. The regulator will be on a statutory footing and will be able to look at that information.
That is why it is important for the regulator to allow the leagues and clubs to make representations. The leagues may be able to say, “We can offer a commitment in lieu that will address this and look at the detail of that,” but the regulator, having information from the club that may be sensitive and private, can work out that, “Actually, that commitment in lieu will not meet the objectives,” and therefore impose its own discretionary licence condition.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Part 4: overview and interpretation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Government’s White Paper laid out several failings of the existing owners and directors tests conducted by the football authorities. The tests are conducted on a self-declaration basis, and have allowed owners with long histories of business bankruptcies and owners later imprisoned for crimes including money laundering. To address such shortcomings, the Bill includes strong statutory owners and directors tests, a vital part of the new Independent Football Regulator’s regime.
Part 4 gives the regulator the power to test the suitability of prospective new owners and officers of regulated clubs. In certain circumstances, it also gives powers to test incumbent owners and officers. The clause provides an overview of part 4, and signposts the rest of the clauses in this part.
One element of the regulator’s tests is the fitness criteria for individual owners or officers. They will ensure that custodians have the necessary characteristics to run or own an important community asset. Subsections (7) and (8) of the clause specify the fitness criteria: having the requisite honesty and integrity; being financially sound; and, for officers only, having the requisite competence for their role at the club. Alongside other elements of the test, ensuring that owners and directors are suitably fit for their roles will better protect each club against unsuitable custodians, ensuring the sustainability of English football over the long term.
I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss the owners and directors tests. Football clubs are historical institutions with deep community ties; thus we must be careful to ensure that owners are people who view themselves as caretakers of an asset that has existed long before them, and we hope will continue to exist for years afterwards. As such, it is right that owners and directors are subject to fitness tests to ensure that the custodians of beloved football clubs meet certain standards.
At the moment, the tests are operated by different authorities depending on the league a club plays in. The Premier League, the EFL, and the FA on behalf of the National League all administer owner tests and have powers to disqualify unsuitable individuals. While those tests have been in place, many successful owners have been appointed, making selfless and sustainable investments in their clubs, which have brought about rewards on the pitch. However, not all owners have the same outlook, fortune, capacity or capability. Despite ownership tests, too many clubs and fans still have to deal with malicious, absent or incompetent ownership.
I commend what my hon. Friend is saying. She knows full well the issues of my local club, Reading, which sadly was bought by the current owner. He was disapplied from buying Hull City but went on to buy Reading, despite a history of being involved in two clubs that went out of business overseas. I hope the measures in the clause will address this and stop other football clubs around the country getting in a similar predicament; I would not wish that on anyone. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for speaking about the issue.
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments and his work with his local club. I have met its supporters, and that is one example, although not a lone one, because it has been confirmed, in another example, that both Bury FC’s owners, Stewart Day and Steve Dale, passed the EFL tests. The fan-led review took a number of such case studies into consideration, concluding that things needed to change.
Alongside other measures in the Bill, which will be vital in giving owners a better landscape in which to operate and invest, the review made some distinct suggestions regarding the owners and directors tests, such as: ensuring a consistent and independent approach across all men’s football; giving tests the backing of the regulator to enable access to information not otherwise available to competition organisers, such as that from the National Crime Agency; splitting the tests into two parts to recognise the difference in the obligations and duties of owners and directors; and strengthening the qualification criteria to ensure that prospective candidates have integrity and the intention of running a club sustainably. Overall, I think the clause and this part do a good job of achieving those aims and recommendations.
I have one brief question at this stage. The EFL has indicated that it will stop conducting its owners and directors tests once the regulator is running its tests. However, Richard Masters told the Committee that the Premier League would continue to run its tests alongside those of the regulator. Putting aside the issue of clubs paying twice for the same regulation and the lack of efficiency involved in duplicating structures, a dual system could pose a dilemma. If two tests yield different results, whose decision would ultimately be adhered to? That is difficult to tell from the Bill, and I hope that this is something that the Minister can confirm for us today, or that he will write to the Committee about.
I asked Richard Masters that question when he gave evidence to the Committee and he was clear then that it would require two green lights, as he put it: a person has to pass the Premier League’s own test as well as the test set by the regulator.
That clarity is welcome, but I would still be interested to hear the Minister’s comments. Nevertheless, I am pleased to welcome the clause and I look forward to discussing it in detail.
Everyone is obviously getting so excited that they are getting ahead of themselves. To be fair, I understand why. It is important to acknowledge what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said about the many people who put themselves forward to support their local football club to build and become competitive. They are hugely important to the local communities in which they are based. We should acknowledge that there are many who do that well and with the best of intentions—even those who make mistakes, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East said. Their intention is right.
We are focusing on ensuring that owners and directors tests get to the heart of the detail that we need. The test will be much stronger with the regulator, which will have access to information from statutory organisations such as the National Crime Agency, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East mentioned. She asked about the Premier League continuing with its own owners and directors test. It can continue with it if it wishes. I note that the EFL has made a different decision, because it recognises that the tests that the regulator will provide will get much more detail and information than the leagues may be able to. Because the tests will be statutory, they will take primacy.
I appreciate that clarity. I also appreciated the intervention from the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe. Richard Masters’s comments to the Committee about two green lights are welcome, but it is important that the Bill is clear on this point and that we are clear about it in Committee, so the Minister’s comments are welcome.
I thank the hon. Lady. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Duties to notify IFR of prospective new owner or officer
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I am happy to commit to writing to the hon. Gentleman. He is right that it is really the perimeter of the stadium, the car park and so on. I will happily give him further details.
When the regulator is testing the fitness of prospective new or incumbent owners of clubs, it must have regard to any action of a regulatory or disciplinary nature that is being or has been taken in relation to the individual. The regulator already has the power to consider that as part of an owner’s suitability termination. For those reasons, I cannot accept new clause 3, and I hope that the hon. Member for Sheffield South East will not press it.
This group of clauses begins to set out how the new tests for prospective owners and directors will work in practice. I broadly welcome the clauses and will begin—I am conscious of time—to speak to each of them in turn, addressing new clause 3 last.
Clause 27 will require prospective owners and officers, as well as the club, to notify the regulator. This is an important first step that will allow the regulator to start the work of conducting the test itself.
Clause 28 will ensure that a person cannot become an owner unless the regulator has decided that they are suitable. This decision is called a positive determination and will be given to a candidate based on their ability to meet three main standards.
First, the candidate must pass the ownership fitness criteria, which are based on the idea that an owner must have the requisite honesty and integrity and be financially sound. I understand that those criteria have been based on the work of the Financial Conduct Authority; I hope that there will be an opportunity to share learnings and best practice across regulatory organisations as the regulator finds its feet.
Secondly, a candidate must show that they have sufficient financial resources, judged on the basis of an application that must include proposals on running the club. As with the regulator’s enforcement of financial sustainability more broadly, it is important that this process does not deter investment or require clubs to break even. Rather, I trust that the test will seek to ensure that good practice and long-term planning are embedded in owners’ plans from the very beginning.
Finally, there must be no grounds to suspect that the candidate’s wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. That will prompt a welcome due diligence search on an owner’s wealth sources with the backing of institutions such as the National Crime Agency. Taken together, those standards will provide a comprehensive analysis of a potential owner.
For applications made by registered societies, the regulator will have a slightly different process, making a determination on the basis of sufficient financial resources alone. I am pleased that this recognised route to fan ownership will be treated with a tailored, yet proper, process.
Clause 29 covers officers. As I have mentioned, it is right that officers face a slightly different set of crafted criteria—