Crime and Policing Bill

Tonia Antoniazzi Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Commercial sexual exploitation—

“(1) A person (A) who gives, offers, or promises payment to a person (B) to engage in sexual activity with person (A) shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) A person (A) who gives, offers, or promises payment to a person (B) to engage in sexual activity with any other person (C) shall be guilty of an offence.

(3) For the purpose of subsections (1) and (2)—

(a) a ‘payment’ includes money, a benefit, or any other consideration;

(b) an activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—

(i) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or

(ii) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual;

(c) no offence is committed by a person (A) unless the sexual activity with the other person (B) involves—

(i) the person (A or C) being in the other person (B)’s presence, and

(ii) physical contact between the person (A or C) and the other person (B), or

(iii) the person (B) touching themselves for the sexual gratification of the other person (A or C);

(d) it is immaterial whether the payment is given, offered, or promised by a person (A) engaging in the sexual activity, or a third party.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1) or (2) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both), and a requirement to complete an offender behaviour programme at the offender’s expense;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).

(5) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under subsections (1) or (2) if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.”

This new clause makes it an offence to pay for, or attempt to, pay for sex either for themselves or on behalf of others.

New clause 4—Victims of Commercial sexual exploitation—

“(1) The Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.

(2) Omit Sections 1 and 2.”

This new clause decriminalises victims of commercial sexual exploitation by repealing the offence of “Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution” and relevant related parts of the Street Offences Act 1959.

New clause 5—Interpretation (Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling)—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 32 insert—

‘32A Interpretation of sections 27A to 32

(1) For the purposes of sections 27A to 32, “a cycle” includes but is not limited to—

(a) a pedal cycle,

(b) an electronically assisted pedal cycle,

(c) a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including—

(i) an electric scooter,

(ii) a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and

(iii) any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.’”

This new clause would define “a cycle” as including a pedal cycle, an e-bike, or a mechanically propelled personal transporter, for the purposes of cycling offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988, including the proposed new clauses tabled by the Government on dangerous, careless of inconsiderate cycling.

New clause 7—Abolition of non-crime hate incidents—

“(1) Non-crime hate incidents as a special category of incident to be recognised by police authorities are abolished. Reporting, recording and investigation of such incidents should occur only in the limited circumstances provided for in this section.

(2) For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR, section 35 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘the Act’) and Article 8 of the Law Enforcement Directive, the processing of relevant data by a police authority is unlawful.

(3) In this section, ‘relevant data’ means personal data relating to the conduct or alleged of a data subject which is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct and which has been perceived by another person to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards one or more persons who have or who are or have been perceived to have one or more relevant characteristics and with that hostility or prejudice arising due to that or the perception of those protected characteristics.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the following are relevant characteristics—

(a) race,

(b) religion,

(c) sexual orientation,

(d) disability,

(e) transgender identity.

(5) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the processing of relevant data—

(a) pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution,

(b) for the purposes of the internal administrative functions of the police authority.

(6) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the retention of a record (a ‘non-crime perception record’) of relevant data where a police officer (the ‘certifying officer’) of the rank of inspector or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.

(7) Where a certifying officer certifies the retention of a non-crime perception record pursuant to subsection (6)—

(a) the certifying officer must include in the record a description of the future criminal conduct they have in mind and the reasons they believe that the retention of the record may assist in its detection or prevention,

(b) the relevant data which may be retained as part of the record may be no more than the certifying officer believes is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct,

(c) a copy of the record must be expeditiously provided to the data subject unless an officer of the of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that—

(i) the provision of the record to the data subject may interfere in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct, or

(ii) the officer is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to provide a copy of the record to the data subject.

(8) If the data subject objects to the retention of the non-crime perception record, subsection (6) does not apply unless a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.

(9) No police authority or police officer can be held under any circumstances to be under any duty to undertake the retention of any relevant data.

(10) After subsection 113B(3) of the Police Act 1997 insert—

‘(3A) An enhanced criminal record certificate must not give the details of a relevant matter to the extent that doing so would result in the disclosure of relevant data as defined in section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’

(11) For subsection 39A(3) of the Police Act 1996 substitute—

‘(3) No part of any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing may be in a form which could be issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 60 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.’

(12) Section 60 the 2022 Act is to be amended as follows—

(a) the cross heading to be changed to ‘Non-crime perception records’,

(b) the section heading to be changed to ‘Code of practice relating to non-crime perception records’,

(c) in subsection (1) leave out from ‘by’ to the end of the subsection and insert ‘of relevant data’,

(d) omit subsection (2),

(e) in subsection (3)(a), leave out ‘personal data relating to a hate incident’ and insert ‘relevant data’,

(f) in subsections (3)(b), (c), (d) and (e), for ‘such personal data’ substitute ‘relevant data’,

(g) in subsection (4)(a), for ‘personal data’ substitute ‘relevant data’,

(h) in subsection (4)(b), leave out ‘personal data relating to the alleged perpetrator of a hate incident’ and insert ‘relevant data relating to the alleged perpetrator’,

(i) in subsection (7), at end, insert ‘relevant data’ has the meaning given by section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.

(13) Any code of practice previously issued under section 60 of the 2022 Act is deemed to be withdrawn.

(14) Within three months of the commencement of each calendar year, each police authority which is retaining non-crime perception records must—

(a) undertake a review of the relevant data by an independent person to ensure that any retention of such records is in compliance with the provisions of this section.

(b) publish a report in respect of the review prepared by the independent person including setting—

(i) the total number of non-crime perception records retained by the police authority;

(ii) the total number of data subject to which those records relate; and

(iii) the equivalent numbers of those records added in the previous year.

(15) In this section—

(a) ‘a police authority’ means—

(i) a person specified or described in paragraphs 5 to 17 of Schedule 7 of the Act,

(ii) a person acting under the authority of such a person,

(b) the terms ‘data subject’, ‘processing’ and ‘the UK GDPR’ have the same meanings as under section 3 of the Act,

(c) ‘the Law Enforcement Directive’ means the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament,

(d) ‘the 2022 Act’ means the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”

This new clause would amend legislation and guidance to remove the recording and retention of non-crime hate incidents, replacing that in some instances with non-crime perception records.

New clause 8—CCTV on railway network—

“(1) It is a legal requirement for CCTV cameras across the railway network in England and Wales to be capable of enabling immediate access by the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces.

(2) All footage retained by CCTV cameras on the railway network must remain accessible to the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces for the entirety of the retention period.

(3) The retention period specified in subsection (2) is 30 calendar days.

(4) Further to subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report, within three months of the passing of this Act, specifying a compatibility standard that will facilitate CCTV access for the British Transport Police and any Police Force in England and Wales.”

New clause 9—Training for those subject to a mandatory reporting duty—

“(1) Any person who is subject to the duty under section 66(1), must be trained to an appropriate standard to carry out their responsibilities under the duty.

(2) Such training shall be deemed appropriate only if it includes, but is not limited to, the following components—

(a) the recognised signs and indicators of child sexual abuse,

(b) what it means to suspect a child sexual offence may have been committed under the duty, as outlined in section 68—

(i) including understanding the different ways children may disclose abuse, and

(ii) the barriers to children disclosing abuse,

(c) how to respond to and support a child who they have been given reason to suspect is the victim of a child sexual offence, as set out in section 68,

(d) how to make notifications in accordance with section 66(2),

(e) how to judge whether making a notification would pose a risk to the life or safety of a relevant child, as set out in section 66(5), and

(f) how to understand, identify and apply the exemptions for consensual peer on peer activity, as set out in sections 69, 70 and 71.”

This new clause would ensure that those subject to the mandatory reporting duty for child sexual abuse are provided with appropriate training to equip them to fulfil these obligations.

New clause 10—Meaning of exploitation: modern slavery—

“(1) Section (3) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (meaning of exploitation) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (6)(b) insert—

‘Criminal Exploitation

(7) Something is done to or in respect of the person which involves the commission of an offence under section 38 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (child criminal exploitation).’”

This new clause seeks to ensure criminally exploited children are not prosecuted for offences committed as result of their exploitation.

New clause 11—Offences of verbal and physical abuse of public transport workers—

“(1) This section applies to a qualifying offence that is committed against a public transport worker acting in the exercise of functions as such a worker.

(2) In this section, a ‘qualifying offence’ is—

(a) an offence of common assault, or battery, under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, or

(b) an offence of harassment under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which involves the verbal abuse of the public transport worker.

(3) A person guilty of an offence to which this section applies is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine (or both).

(4) In subsections (1) and (2), ‘public transport worker’ means any person working on public transport, whether on public transport vehicles, or in public transport stations, or in any relevant setting where they are working in their capacity as a public transport worker.

(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether the employment or engagement is paid or unpaid.”

New clause 12—Definition of modern slavery exploitation: orphanage trafficking—

“(1) Section (3) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (6)(b) insert—

‘Orphanage trafficking

(7) The person is a child who has been recruited into a residential care institution overseas for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation.’”

This new clause would expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who have been recruited into residential care institutions that engage in orphanage trafficking.

New clause 13—Joint Enterprise—

“(1) The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanours), after ‘shall’ insert ‘, by making a significant contribution to its commission,’.”

New clause 14—Duty to review treatment of childhood convictions and cautions—

“(1) Within a year of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the management of childhood convictions and cautions.

(2) The report must look at—

(a) the prevention of automatic disclosure of childhood conditional cautions;

(b) the prevention of adult treatment of offences committed by individuals who were minors at the time of the offences, in question, taking place;

(c) the range of childhood convictions which are removed from standard and enhanced checks after five and a half years.

(3) In considering the areas outlined in subsection (2), the report must look at the policy merits for reform of the existing management of childhood convictions and cautions, and the legislative steps which would be required in each case for reform to take place.”

New clause 15—Unlicensed drivers: penalties—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 87, after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) The maximum penalty available to the Courts when sentencing an individual who has been convicted of driving without a license, and who has never held a license, shall be an unlimited fine, or a custodial sentence of six months (or both).’”

New clause 16—Failure to stop—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 170, after subsection (4) insert—

‘(4A) The maximum penalties available to the Courts when sentencing an individual who has been convicted of an offence under this section are as follows—

(a) an unlimited fine;

(b) a custodial sentence of one year; and

(c) disqualification from driving for a period of up to two years.

When considering its sentence, the Court may issue more than one of the maximum penalties listed above.’”

New clause 18—Definition of the criminal exploitation of children—

“For the purpose of defining the offence created in section 38 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (Child criminal exploitation), the criminal exploitation of children is a form of child abuse in which a child under the age of 18 is used for purposes that constitute, enable or facilitate an offence under the law in England and Wales, regardless of whether the activity appears to be consensual, or whether the activity occurs online, through the use of technology, or in person.”

This new clause would create a statutory definition of the criminal exploitation of children.

New clause 19—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions—

“(1) The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 92(1) after ‘same sex’ insert ‘, or for an offence committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959’.

(3) In section 92(2) after ‘A and B are met’ insert, ‘, or, for a conviction or caution for an offence committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959, B alone is met’.”

This new clause would mean that convictions or cautions for loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution become disregarded.

New clause 21—Prohibition of the use of live facial recognition technology by police forces—

“(1) The use of live facial recognition technology for real-time biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces by police forces is prohibited.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), facial recognition systems used for biometric verification, where the sole purpose is to confirm a person’s identity for the purpose of unlocking a device or having security access to premises, are not prohibited.”

New clause 22—Automated decision-making in the law enforcement context—

“(1) Where a significant decision taken by, or on behalf of, a controller in relation to a data subject in the law enforcement context is—

(a) based entirely or partly on personal data, and

(b) based solely on automated processing,

the controller must ensure that safeguards, which comply with subsection (2), for the data subject’s rights, freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.

(2) The safeguards must consist of, or include, measures which—

(a) provide the data subject with personalised information about any decisions described in subsection (1) that have been taken in relation to the data subject;

(b) enable the data subject to make representations about such decisions;

(c) enable the data subject to obtain human intervention from the controller in relation to such decisions;

(d) enable the data subject to contest such decisions;

(e) ensure human reviewers of algorithmic decisions have the necessary competence, training, time to consider, authority to challenge the decision, and analytical understanding of the data to rectify automated decisions; and

(f) require the publication of any algorithmic tools that have been used to process personal data on the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard.

(3) For the purpose of subsection (1), a decision based entirely or partly on personal data may not be made unless—

(a) the data subject has given explicit consent; or

(b) the decision is required or authorised by law.”

New clause 23—Restrictions on the delivery of pointed knives after agreements made by distance communication—

“(1) This section applies to any delivery of a pointed knife if the cutting edge of its blade exceeds 3 inches and,

(a) the delivery of the pointed knife is the result of an agreement made by distance communication; and

(b) either the delivery or the agreement for the delivery is made in the course of a business.

(2) For the purposes of this section an agreement is made by ‘distance communication’ if, at the time that the agreement is made, none of the parties to the agreement is within visual sight of the other.

(3) A party is not within visual sight of another if the only way that they can be seen is by use of an electronic, digital or other artificial means.

(4) A company or partnership is to be treated as being within visual sight of any other party if one or more of its employees or partners is within visual sight of the other parties.

(5) A means of distance communication may include, but not be limited to—

(a) electronic mail,

(b) unaddressed printed matter,

(c) telephone with human intervention,

(d) telephone without human intervention (including automatic calling machine, audiotext),

(e) videophone (telephone with screen),

(f) any form of social media,

(g) addressed printed matter,

(h) letter,

(i) press advertising with order form,

(j) catalogue,

(k) radio,

(l) videotext (microcomputer and television screen) with keyboard or touch screen,

(m) facsimile machine (fax), or

(n) television (teleshopping).

(6) A person in England or Wales is guilty of an offence if they knowingly or recklessly cause a pointed knife to be delivered or deliver any pointed knife to either—

(a) domestic premises; or

(b) a remote locker or collection point which is not supervised by a human being at the time when the pointed knife is collected

(7) For the purposes of this section domestic premises are defined as any premises which have not been assessed as liable for business rates and do not appear as such on the list maintained by the Valuation Agency Office.

(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine not exceeding Level 5 on the standard scale or both.

(9) Nothing in this section prevents the delivery of rounded knives without a point.”

This new clause would create an offence of delivering a lethal pointed knife to domestic premises or remote locker/collection point.

New clause 24—Prohibition of displays of pointed knives—

“(1) A person who in the course of a business displays any pointed knife, or causes any pointed knife to be displayed, in a place in England and Wales or Northern Ireland is guilty of an offence.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for the meaning of ‘place’ in this section.

(3) No offence is committed under this section if the display is a requested display to an individual aged 18 or over.

(4) Subsections (5) and (6) apply where a person (‘D’) is charged with an offence under this section in a case where the display is a requested display to an individual aged under 18.

(5) Where D is charged by reason of D having displayed the pointed knife it is a defence that—

(a) D believed that the individual was aged 18 or over, and

(b) either—

(i) D had taken all reasonable steps to establish the individual's age, or

(ii) from the individual's appearance nobody could reasonably have suspected that the individual was aged under 18.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), a person is treated as having taken all reasonable steps to establish an individual's age if—

(a) the person asked the individual for evidence of the individual’s age, and

(b) the evidence would have convinced a reasonable person.

(7) Where D is charged by reason of D having caused the display of a pointed knife it is a defence that D exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

(8) In this section ‘a requested display’ means a display to an individual following a particular request by the individual to purchase a pointed knife, or for information about a pointed knife.

(9) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine not exceeding Level 5 on the standard scale or both.

(10) Nothing in this section prevents the display of rounded knives without a point.”

This new clause would create an offence of displaying pointed knives in the course of a business.

New clause 25—Unauthorised Encampments—

“The amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 inserted by Part 4 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 are repealed.”

This new clause would repeal amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in respect of unauthorised encampments, including those on which the High Court has made a Declaration of Incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

New clause 26—Provision of information by the Secretary of State—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish, on a quarterly basis, data on the use of anti-social behaviour orders.

(2) The data published under subsection (1) must include—

(a) The number of civil orders issued;

(b) The purposes for which such orders were issued;

(c) Information about the number of occasions when stop and search powers were utilised by the police prior to issuing anti-social behaviour orders; and

(d) The protected characteristics of persons subjected to anti-social behaviour orders.”

This new clause requires the Home Office to publish quarterly data on the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders, including the number of occasions when stop and search has been used by the police prior to issuing anti-social behaviour orders and the protected characteristics of those who have been issued with orders.

New clause 27—Suspension of Police Force’s ability to use stop and search powers: ‘Engage’ monitoring stage—

“(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 7 insert—

‘7A Suspension of Police Force’s ability to use stop and search powers: ‘Engage’ monitoring stage

(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, vary the ability of Police Forces in England and Wales to use stop and search powers.

(2) The Secretary of State must, within a fortnight of being notified by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) that a police force in England and Wales has been moved to the ‘Engage’ stage of HMICFRS’s monitoring process, bring forward regulations under subsection (1) to suspend the respective Force’s ability to use stop and search powers.

(3) The Secretary of State may not bring forward regulations to re-instate a suspended Police Force’s stop and search powers until such a time as HMICFRS confirms that the Force is no longer subject to the ‘Engage’ monitoring process.’”

This new clause allows regulations to vary the ability of police forces to use stop and search, and requires the Government to suspend a police force’s stop and search powers if that force is subject to the ‘engage’ monitoring process by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.

New clause 28—Disapplication of time limit for offence of sharing intimate photograph or film—

“In section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film), after subsection (9) insert—

‘(9A) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for summary offences) does not apply to an offence under subsection (1).’”

This new clause allows the offence of sharing intimate photograph or film to be tried by a Magistrates’ Court at any time by disapplying the six-month time limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980.

New clause 30—Prohibition of Police use of technologies to predict offences based on automated decisions, profiling, etc—

“(1) Police Forces in England and Wales shall be prohibited from using any automated decision-making system, profiling or artificial intelligence system for the purpose of—

(a) Making risk assessments of natural persons or groups thereof in order to assess the risk of a natural person for offending or reoffending; or

(b) Predicting the occurrence or reoccurrence of an actual or potential criminal offence based on profiling of a natural person or on assessing personality traits and characteristics, including the person’s location, or past criminal behaviour of natural persons or groups of natural persons.

(2) ‘Profiling’ is profiling as defined by Article 4(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the UK GDPR’).

(3) Automated Decision Making means a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.

(4) Artificial Intelligence systems are computer systems designed to produce results, opinions or assessments, produced through modelling from datasets and other automated training methods.”

This new clause would prohibit Police Forces from using of certain forms of 'predictive' policing technologies, particularly those that rely on automated decision-making, profiling, and AI to assess the likelihood that individuals or groups will commit criminal offences.

New clause 41—Inspection of police force firearms licensing departments—

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 54 (appointment and functions of inspectors of constabulary), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) Any inspection conducted under subsection (2) shall include a review of the performance of the police force’s firearms licensing department.’”

This new clause would require HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMICFRS) to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness of police force’s firearms licensing departments as part of every police, efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy (PEEL) inspection.

New clause 42—Offences with a terrorism connection—

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 69, omit subsection (4).”

This new clause would raise the threshold of offences which can be considered as terrorism related offences back to the level provided for by the Sentencing Act 2020 as originally enacted.

New clause 43—Commencement of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act—

“(1) Section 4 of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 is amended as follows.

(2) Leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—

‘(3) Sections 1, 2 and 3 come into force on the day that the Crime and Policing Act 2025 receives Royal Assent’.”

This new clause automatically commences Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent, removing the need for regulations to bring the Act into force. The Act criminalises the public harassment of individuals where that harassment is based on an individual's sex.

New clause 44—Sentencing: “honour”-based offences:—

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 21, after paragraph 9(g) insert—‘(h) the fact that the offender inflicted “honour”- based abuse on the victim.’

(3) In Schedule 21, after paragraph 10(g) insert—‘(h) the fact that the offender was a victim of “honour”-based abuse perpetrated by the deceased.’”

This new clause would modify the Sentencing Act 2020 to recognise ‘”honour” as an aggravating factor under paragraph 9 and as a mitigating factor under paragraph 10.

New clause 45—Disclosure of convictions for child sexual offences—

“(1) This section applies where a police force is aware or notified of an individual within its jurisdiction who has been cautioned or convicted of a child sex offence.

(2) A police force must notify any organisation that has responsibilities for a child’s welfare where an individual identified under subsection (1) is employed by or volunteering for that organisation, or is seeking to do so.

(3) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to police forces on their duty under subsection (2) within six months of the passing of this Act.”

This new clause would require police forces to proactively notify an organisation of an individual working or volunteering for it, or seeking to do so, where that individual has been cautioned or convicted of a child sex offence.

New clause 46—Requirements on sellers of vehicle to provide specified information—

“(1) The Road Vehicle (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002 are amended as follows.

(2) After regulation 18, insert—

‘Requirements on sellers of vehicle to provide specified information

(1) Where a keeper sells a vehicle, the keeper must record relevant information in the registration document of the vehicle at, or before, the date on which the vehicle is sold to a new keeper.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant information is—

(a) where the keeper is an individual, the home address of the keeper,

(b) where the keeper is a company, information which the Secretary of State may specify, and

(c) where the keeper is the keeper of a fleet, information equivalent to that required in paragraphs (a) and (b) as relevant to the circumstances of the keeper.’

(3) The information the Secretary of State may specify under paragraph (2)(b) may include the company’s registered address and company number.

(4) A keeper who fails to record relevant information in accordance with this regulation commits an offence.

(5) A person who is guilty of an offence under this regulation is liable for a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(6) For the purposes of this regulation ‘company’ has such meaning as the Secretary of State may specify.”

This new clause would create a requirement for a person selling a vehicle to provide their address in the registration document of the vehicle.

New clause 47—Failure to disable stolen mobile devices: civil penalty—

“(1) An appropriate officer must provide the relevant service provider with a notification of a stolen mobile device.

(2) A notification under subsection (1) must—

(a) identify the stolen device or service provided to the device;

(b) require the service provider to disable the stolen device or take actions to prevent it from being re-registered;

(c) explain that the notification must be complied with before the end of a period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notification is given; and

(d) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notification.

(3) A service provider who is given a notification under subsection (1) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notification.

(4) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—

(a) the device to which the notification relates is insufficiently identified for the service provider to be able to take the action required by the notification; or

(b) the service provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant service to which the notification relates.

(5) If the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notification having been complied with or without a review request having been received, an appropriate officer may give a penalty notice requiring the service provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £10,000.

(6) Schedule 4 makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.

(7) In this section—

‘appropriate officer’ has the same meaning as in Schedule 13, paragraph 14

‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant mobile phone service.

(8) In Schedule 4, after all instances of ‘section 16’, insert ‘section (Failure to disable stolen mobile devices: civil penalty)’.”

This new clause would require the police to issue notifications to service providers requiring them to disable stolen mobile devices within 48 hours or be issued with a penalty.

New clause 48—Assault on a delivery worker—

“(1) A person who assaults a delivery person in connection with a delivery commits an offence under this section.

(2) ‘Delivery person’ means a person who—

(a) is logged into a delivery app,

(b) is travelling to a location to collect goods for delivery,

(c) is at a location waiting for, or taking possession of, goods for delivery,

(d) is travelling to deliver those goods to another location,

(e) is delivering those goods to another location,

(f) is within an hour of having delivered those goods to another location, or

(g) has commenced travel to another location.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(4) In subsection (3) ‘the maximum term for summary offences’ means — (a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales) comes into force, 6 months; (b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.

(5) In section 40(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (power to join in indictment count for common assault etc), after paragraph (ad) insert—

‘(ae) an offence under section (Assault on a delivery worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025;’”.

This new clause would create an offence of assault on a delivery worker.

New clause 49—Definition of serious disruption: amendment—

“(1) The Public Order Act 2023 is amended as follows.

(2) Omit Section 34.”

This new clause would restore the previous threshold for serious protest disruption by removing the wording in the Public Order Act which defines it to mean any obstruction that caused ‘more than minor hindrance’ to day to day activities.

New clause 50—Right to protest—

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In Part II (Processions and Assemblies) before section 11, insert—

‘10A The right to protest

(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.

(2) Public authorities have a duty to—

(a) respect the right to protest;

(b) protect the right to protest; and

(c) facilitate the right to protest.

(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect national security or public safety, prevent disorder or crime, protect public health or the rights and freedoms of others.

(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.’”

New clause 51—Causing death while driving unlicensed or uninsured—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 2A (meaning of dangerous driving), at the end of subsection (1)(b) insert ‘,or

(c) at the time when they were driving, the circumstances were such that they were committing an offence under section 87(1) of this Act (driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence), or section 143 of this Act (using motor vehicle while uninsured).’

(3) Omit section 3ZB.”

This new clause would mean that an individual who is driving without a licence and/or insurance and causes a death would be considered as causing death by dangerous driving.

New clause 83—Prevention of resale of stolen GPS products—

“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 1(2)(b), after ‘commercial activities’ insert, ‘including GPS equipment’.”

This new clause extends the Equipment Theft Act 2023 to specifically include the theft of GPS equipment.

New clause 84—Rural Crime Prevention Strategy—

“(1) A day after this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a rural crime prevention task force to develop proposals for tackling rural crime.

(2) The task force should be tasked with a remit that includes, but is not confined to, examining—

(a) The particular types of crime that occur in rural areas;

(b) Crime rates in rural communities across England and Wales;

(c) The current levels of police resources and funding in rural communities;

(d) Whether specific training in how to respond to rural crime call-outs should be undertaken by police control room operators;

(e) The operational case, and the funding implications, of appointing rural crime specialists in Police Forces across England and Wales which serve areas that include a significant rural population; and

(f) Whether a National Rural Crime Coordinator should be established

(3) The task force established under subsection (1) must submit a rural crime prevention strategy to the Secretary of State within six months of its appointment.

(4) The Secretary of State must, within a month of receiving the report made by the task force, lay before both Houses of Parliament a written response to the task force’s recommendations.

(5) The Secretary of State must, within a month of laying their response to the task force’s report, ensure that an amendable motion on the subject of the rural crime task force’s recommendations is laid, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime, makes provision for specific aspects of the task force’s remit, and requires the Secretary of State to bring forward a substantive motion before both Houses of Parliament on the task force’s recommendations.

New clause 85—Neighbourhood Policing: minimum levels—

“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament proposals on maintaining minimum levels of neighbourhood policing.

(2) The proposals must include—

(a) A requirement for every Police Force in England and Wales to maintain neighbourhood policing teams at a level necessary to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention;

(b) A plan to designate a proportion of funds, recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, for neighbourhood policing initiatives; and

(c) A plan for future Police Grant Reports to include a ring-fenced allocation of 20% of total funds to be allocated specifically for neighbourhood policing.”

New clause 86—Neighbourhood Policing—

“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including:

(a) High-visibility foot patrols;

(b) Community engagement and intelligence gathering;

(c) Crime prevention initiatives; and

(d) Solving crime.

(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.

(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing:

(a) The number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles;

(b) The total cost of maintaining the required levels; and

(c) The impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.

(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”

New clause 87—Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels—

“(1) A water or water and sewerage company (‘C’) commits an offence where C has—

(a) failed to meet its pollution performance commitment level for three consecutive years; or

(b) experienced an increase in serious pollution levels

for three consecutive years.

(2) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘water or water and sewerage company’ means companies which are responsible for the provision of water, or water and sewerage, services and which are regulated by Ofwat and the Environment Agency;

(b) ‘pollution performance commitment level’ means the level of performance on pollution that the company has committed to deliver, and which is reported against by Ofwat in its annual water company performance report; and

(c) ‘total pollution incidents per 10,000km2’ and ‘serious pollution incidents’ mean the relevant figures under those headings reported by the Environment Agency in its annual environmental performance report.

(3) If guilty of an offence under this section, C is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”

This new clause creates an offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels.

New clause 88—Senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels—

“(1) A person (‘P’) commits an offence where—

(a) P is a senior manager of a water or water and sewerage company (‘C’),

(b) C commits an offence under section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels], and

(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.

(2) For the purposes of this section—

‘senior manager’ means an individual who plays a significant role in—

(a) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or

(b) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities;

(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.

(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”

This new clause creates senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels.

New clause 89—Duty of candour—

“(1) Every police officer shall have a duty to act with candour and transparency in relation to—

(a) the investigation of criminal offences;

(b) the investigation of misconduct or complaints involving the police;

(c) participation in any public inquiry, inquest, disciplinary proceedings, or legal process arising from their duties;

(d) any engagement with bodies exercising oversight of policing or the criminal justice system.

(2) This duty shall apply regardless of whether the officer is directly the subject of the matter in question or is providing evidence as a witness.

(3) The duty includes an obligation to—

(a) disclose any information which the officer knows or reasonably believes to be relevant;

(b) disclose such information proactively and not solely in response to formal requests;

(c) refrain from withholding or distorting relevant facts, whether by act or omission.

(4) Failure to comply with the duty of candour shall—

(a) constitute misconduct for the purposes of police disciplinary procedures;

(b) amount to gross misconduct where the breach is intentional or demonstrates reckless disregard for the truth;

(c) be subject to mandatory referral to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

(5) The Secretary of State shall, within six months of this Act coming into force, issue statutory guidance on the implementation of the duty of candour.

(6) The College of Policing shall include the duty of candour within the Code of Ethics and ensure its incorporation into training programmes.

(7) The Independent Office for Police Conduct shall report annually to Parliament on the application, enforcement, and impact of this duty.

(8) For the purposes of this section, ‘police officer’ means—

(a) any constable or member of a police force in England and Wales;

(b) any special constable;

(c) any former officer where the conduct in question occurred during their service.”

New clause 90—Mandatory mental health training for police officers—

“(1) Every police force in England and Wales must ensure that all frontline police officers receive regular training in dealing with incidents involving individuals experiencing mental health crises.

(2) The training provided under subsection (1) must—

(a) be developed and delivered in consultation with NHS mental health trusts, clinical commissioning groups, and other relevant health and social care bodies;

(b) reflect the principles of the Right Care, Right Person (RCRP) approach;

(c) include instruction in de-escalation techniques, legal obligations under the Mental Health Act 1983, communication with vulnerable persons, and referral pathways to appropriate healthcare services; and

(d) be trauma-informed and culturally competent.

(3) Initial training must be completed within six months of an officer’s commencement of frontline duties.

(4) Refresher training must be undertaken at least once every two years.

(5) Each police force must publish an annual statement on compliance with this section, including the number of officers trained and steps taken to evaluate the effectiveness of the training.

(6) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—

(a) minimum standards for training content and delivery;

(b) procedures for monitoring and enforcement; and

(c) sanctions for non-compliance.

(7) Regulations under this section must be made by statutory instrument and are subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”

New clause 91—Right to protest: report on restrictions—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the restrictions which have been made to the right to protest over the last ten years.

(2) The Secretary of State must ensure that within a month of the report produced under subsection (1) being published, time is made available for a debate on a substantive motion in both Houses of Parliament.”

New clause 92—Safeguards for the use of facial recognition technology in public spaces—

“(1) The use of live facial recognition technology for real-time biometric identification, by any public or private authorities, shall be prohibited unless one or more of the following conditions are met—

(a) It is used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007;

(b) The deployment has received prior judicial authorization specifying the scope, duration, and purpose of its use;

(c) It is necessary and proportionate for preventing an imminent and substantial threat to public safety, such as a terrorist attack; and

(d) It is deployed for the purpose of locating missing persons or vulnerable individuals at risk.

(2) Any public authority deploying live facial recognition technology must:

(a) Conduct and publish a Data Protection Impact Assessment before deployment;

(b) Ensure that use is compliant with the principles of necessity and proportionality as outlined in the Human Rights Act 1998;

(c) Maintain clear and publicly available records of deployments, including justification for use and any safeguards implemented;

(d) Inform the public of deployments, unless exceptional circumstances apply; and

(e) Create, implement and follow nationwide statutory guidance for using the technology.

(3) The use of live facial recognition technology for mass surveillance, profiling, or automated decision-making without human oversight, is an offence.

(4) The Information Commissioner’s Office and an independent oversight body shall be responsible for monitoring compliance with the provisions of this clause, conducting audits, and investigating complaints.

(5) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must sure that a motion is tabled, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament to approve the appointment of the independent oversight body specified in subsection (5).

(6) A public authority or private entity guilty of an offence under this section will be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine

(7) A private individual found guilty of an offence under this section will be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or imprisonment (or both).

(8) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament an annual report detailing the use of live facial recognition technology, including instances of authorisation and compliance measures undertaken, and ensure that a motion is tabled, and moved, before both Houses to approve the report.

(9) The motion specified in subsection (9) must include proposals to strengthen the role of the Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner (OBSCC) in overseeing the impact of emerging technology such as facial recognition and its impact on civil liberties.”

New clause 93—Right to peaceful protest—

“(1) It is the duty of public authorities, including police forces, to respect and facilitate the exercise of the right to peaceful protest in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(2) A person’s presence at, or participation in, a peaceful protest—

(a) must not, of itself, be treated as grounds for arrest or the use of force; and

(b) must not be subject to unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions.

(3) In exercising powers under this Act or any other enactment, a constable must have regard to the importance of—

(a) enabling peaceful protest to take place; and

(b) minimising interference with the rights of those engaged in peaceful protest.

(4) This section does not prevent a constable from imposing conditions on a protest or taking enforcement action where necessary and proportionate to prevent—

(a) serious disruption to the life of the community;

(b) serious public disorder;

(c) serious damage to property; or

(d) the commission of serious crime.

(5) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on the application of this section within six months of the passing of this Act.”

New clause 95—Offence of stalking: review—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a review into the effectiveness of Sections 2A and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

(2) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within nine months of its establishment.

(3) Within a month of the review submitting its final report, the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and make time available in both Houses for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the report.”

This new clause would require the Government to establish a review into the effectiveness of the stalking provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, specifies the review's timeframe, and requires the Government to make time available in both Houses of Parliament for a substantive debate on the review’s report.

New clause 96—Stalking awareness guidelines: review—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a review into the effectiveness and adequacy of stalking awareness guidance provided by public bodies in England and Wales.

(2) The terms of reference for this review should include examining whether stalking awareness guidance should form part of the national curriculum in England.

(3) Within a month of the review submitting its final report, the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and make time available in both Houses for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the report.”

This new clause would require the Government to establish a review into the effectiveness of the stalking awareness guidance provided by public bodies, specifies that the review should examine making stalking awareness guidance mandatory under the national curriculum, and provides for a substantive debate in Parliament on the review's report.

New clause 97—Electronic searches under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000—

“(1) The Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 7, after paragraph 8 insert—

8A ‘(1) An examining officer may not search any electronic device under paragraph 8(1) without the prior authorisation of a judge, unless the examining officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the device contains information necessary to prevent—

(a) an emergency threatening the life of a person or persons, or

(b) an immediate threat to national security.

(2) An examining officer may seek the prior authorisation of a judge to engage in conduct which is for the purpose of obtaining data necessary for the purpose of determining whether the person falls within section 40(1).

(3) Authorised conduct may consist of an officer—

(a) scanning the information stored on the device using technology approved by the Secretary of State for the purpose of ascertaining whether someone falls within section 40(1),

(b) requiring the person to permit the scan, and

(c) requiring the person to take such steps as appear necessary to allow the scan to be performed.’”

This new clause places safeguards on the searches of electronic devices to ensure these are conducted only when necessary to determine whether the person is a relevant person for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000.

New clause 98—Use of Prevent data—

“In the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, after section 33 insert—

‘33A Duty to obtain authorisation for use of Prevent data

(1) This section applies where a specified authority uses information collected under the Prevent duty for criminal investigations, national security or any other purpose unrelated to compliance with the general duty under section 26.

(2) Where this section applies, a specified authority must seek the prior authorisation of a judge for the use of the information, except where doing so would prevent the authority from addressing—

(a) an emergency threatening the life of a person or persons, or

(b) an immediate threat to national security.

(3) A specified authority which uses information under paragraphs 2(a) or (b) must seek a review of its use from a judge at its earliest convenience and no later than a week after the use.

(4) A specified authority is a person or body listed in Schedule 6.’”

This new clause would require specified users to seek the approval of a judge prior to using data collected under the Prevent duty, except where there was an emergency or immediate threat. If data is used in urgent situations, a judge must review it within a week.

New clause 99—Universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct (England and Wales)—

“(1) The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 51(1)—

(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’

(b) After ‘war crime’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’

(3) Omit section 51(2).

(4) In section 52(1)—

(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’

(b) After ‘conduct’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’

(5) Omit section 52(4).”

This new clause would amend the ICC Act 2001 to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct, allowing authorities in England and Wales to prosecute persons suspected of these crimes without any requirement for a connection to the UK.

New clause 100—Universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct (Northern Ireland)—

“(1) The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 58(1)—

(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’

(b) After ‘war crime’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’

(3) Omit section 58(2).

(4) In section 59(1)—

(a) After ‘person’, insert ‘, whatever his or her nationality,’

(b) After ‘conduct’, insert ‘in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’

(5) Omit section 59(4).”

This new clause would amend the ICC Act 2001 to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct, allowing authorities in Northern Ireland to prosecute persons suspected of these crimes without any requirement for a connection to the UK.

New clause 101—Threshold for offences to be considered as terrorism-related: review—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a review into the effect of the raising of the threshold of offences which can be considered as terrorism related offences by the Counter Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.

(2) The review specified in subsection (1) must report within nine months of its establishment and its final report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and time made available for a debate on a substantive motion in both Houses of Parliament on the report’s conclusions, within a month of the report’s publication.”

New clause 102—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—

“(1) The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follow.

(2) In section 63 subsection (7) (possession of extreme pornographic images) after paragraph (a) insert—

(aa) an act of choking, suffocating or strangling another person.”

This amendment would extend the definition of extreme pornographic images to cover realistic and explicit pornographic depictions of acts of strangulation/choking.

New clause 103—Pornographic content: online harmful content—

“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.

(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.

(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).

(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.

(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”

This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

New clause 104—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—

“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.

(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”

This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.

New clause 105—Pornographic Content: Duty to verify age—

“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—

(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or

(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or

(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.

(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—

(a) the platform, or

(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.

(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.

(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).

(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—

(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).

(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.

(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”

This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.

New clause 107—Equality Impact Analyses of provisions of this Act—

“(1) The Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this Act.

(2) A report of the review under this section must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.

(3) A review under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of this Act on—

(a) households at different levels of income,

(b) people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),

(c) the Government’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and

(d) equality in the different nations of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.

(4) A review under this section must include a separate analysis of each section of the Act, and must also consider the cumulative impact of the Act as a whole.”

New clause 108—Extension of freedom of expression—

“For section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986 (protection of freedom of expression), substitute—

‘Nothing in—

(a) this Act;

(b) section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (offence of sending letters etc. with the intent to cause distress or anxiety); and

(c) section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 (improper use of public communications network)

shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.’”

This new clause would extend the protection of freedom of expression afforded to Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 to other areas of statute that create offences relating to speech or communication.

New clause 109—Review of compliance and enforcement mechanisms in relation to Police Forces—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must publish a proposal for approval by the House of Commons on the establishment of an independent commission to investigate the enforcement powers of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS).

(2) The proposal for an independent commission must include a terms of reference, which must include, but may not be limited to—

(a) a review of the powers available to other independent regulatory and investigative bodies, such as Ofqual, the Care Quality Commission, the Financial Conduct Authority, and Ofsted;

(b) the lessons learned from other regulatory bodies with stronger enforcement powers; and

(c) an examination of whether a statutory framework of coordination between HMICFRS, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and Police and Crime Commissioners, could enhance the enforcement powers available to all three sets of bodies and the accountability of policing in England and Wales.

(3) The proposal for an independent commission must set out a timetable for its work including that—

(a) the commission should conclude its deliberations within nine months of its establishment, and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament and ensure that time is made available, within a fortnight of the report being laid, in both Houses for a substantive debate on the report’s conclusions.”

This new clause would require the Government to publish a proposal for an independent commission for approval by the House of Commons to review the enforcement powers of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), including consideration of a statutory framework to enhance the collective enforcement powers of bodies supervising Police Forces in England and Wales.

New clause 110—Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks—

“(1) The Secretary of State must within 3 months of the passing of this Act publish proposals for approval by the House of Commons for the establishment of an inquiry, including the appointment of members of any such inquiry in accordance with section [Proposals for an inquiry: appointment of inquiry panel members].

(2) The terms of reference contained in the proposals referred to in subsection (1) must include, but may not be limited to—

(a) investigation of the nature and extent of sexual exploitation of children by organised networks, including—

(i) the experiences of victims and survivors of child sexual exploitation by organised networks,

(ii) the extent to which local authorities, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and other public authorities were aware of child sexual exploitation by organised networks in their areas,

(iii) the appropriateness and effectiveness of any responses of those public authorities to cases of child sexual exploitation, including the effectiveness of sentencing or sentences served for offences involving child sexual exploitation by organised networks,

(iv) the extent to which public authorities have cooperated with previous inquiries and investigations into cases of child sexual exploitation in their areas,

(v) any organisational or individual responsibilities for not responding effectively to cases of child sexual exploitation,

(vi) identification of common patterns of behaviour and offending between organised networks,

(vii) identification of the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by organised networks including the number of victims of those crimes,

(viii) identification of the ethnicity of members of organised networks, and

(b) recommendations about legislative, policy and institutional changes to prevent child sexual exploitation in the future.

(3) The Secretary of State’s proposals must stipulate that any inquiry should conclude within 18 months of the passing of this Act, and report to the Secretary of State within 3 months of concluding.

(4) The Secretary of State’s proposals may make provision for the issuing of such interim reports as the chair of any inquiry considers to be appropriate.

(5) The Secretary of State’s proposals may make provision for supplementing the terms of reference of any inquiry after consultation with the chair, but may not omit, modify, or otherwise adversely affect any of the terms of reference set out in subsection (2).”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals for setting up an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks for approval by the House of Commons.

New clause 111—Proposals for an inquiry: appointment of inquiry panel members—

“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for any inquiry to be overseen by a chair and inquiry panel appointed by the Secretary of State.

(2) The inquiry proposals must require the prospective chair to have senior experience of and expertise in the successful investigation of serious offences and that the person does not have a conflict of interest in the subject matter of the inquiry.

(3) The inquiry proposals must make provision for the chair to appoint one or more persons to act as assessors to assist the inquiry panel and may at any time terminate the appointment of an assessor.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under NC10 to make provision for the appointment of a chair and inquiry panel members.

New clause 112—Proposals for an inquiry: inquiry evidence and procedure—

“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for the procedure and conduct of any inquiry to be such as the chair may direct.

(2) The inquiry proposals must require the chair, in making any decision as to the procedure or conduct of any inquiry to act in a manner which is consistent with the terms of reference and—

(a) fairness,

(b) regard to the need for a detailed investigation of the issues before the inquiry,

(c) regard to the need to conclude the inquiry within the period set in the terms of reference, and

(d) regard to the need to avoid unnecessary cost (whether to public funds or to witnesses or others).”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks to require the chair to make provision for the procedure of that inquiry.

New clause 113—Proposals for an inquiry: requirement for public access to inquiry proceedings and information—

“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for the chair of any inquiry to take steps to secure that members of the public (including reporters) are able to—

(a) attend a hearing of the inquiry,

(b) see and hear a simultaneous transmission of proceedings at the inquiry, and

(c) obtain or to view a record of evidence and documents given, produced or provided to the inquiry or inquiry panel,

subject to any restrictions imposed by an order under section [Proposals for an inquiry: restrictions on public access etc].

(2) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for records (including transcripts of the proceedings) of any inquiry to be held for a period of 10 years, and to be made available on a website maintained by the Secretary of State, subject to any restriction imposed under section [Proposals for an inquiry: Inquiry restrictions on public access etc],”

This new clause would enable the chair of any inquiry proposed by the Secretary of State relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks to make provision for public access to that inquiry.

New clause 114—Proposals for an inquiry: inquiry restrictions on public access etc—

“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision on restrictions that may, in accordance with this section, be imposed on—

(a) attendance at any inquiry established following approval by the House of Commons, or at any particular part of the inquiry,

(b) the disclosure or publication of any, or part of, evidence or documents given, produced or provided to the inquiry (including the simultaneous transmission of proceedings at the inquiry), and

(c) disclosure or publication of the identity of any person.

(2) Restrictions made under subsection (1) may be imposed by being specified in an order (a ‘restriction order’) made by the chair during the course of the inquiry

(3) A restriction order must, having regard to the matters in subsection (4), specify only such restrictions required by any express statutory provision, assimilated enforcement obligation, or for national security purposes, or which otherwise protect—

(a) a victim or a whistle-blower,

(b) the identity of an individual authorised for the conduct or the use of a covert human intelligence source except where that person is accused of an offence and the chair considers it to be conducive to the inquiry in fulfilling its terms of reference, or

(c) a matter which the chair considers to be in the public interest provided that this does not affect the inquiry fulfilling its terms of reference.

(4) The matters referred to in subsection (3) are—

(a) the importance of public attendance at the inquiry and disclosure or publication of information to the allaying of public concern,

(b) any risk of harm to—

(i) a victim or survivor of child sexual exploitation,

(ii) a whistle-blower, or

(iii) the future operational practices or methods of law enforcement,

that could be avoided or materially reduced by any such restriction,

(c) any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired information which that person is to give, or has given, to the inquiry, and

(d) the extent to which not imposing any particular restriction would be likely to cause delay or to impair the efficiency or effectiveness of the inquiry or the fulfilment of the terms of reference.

(5) The Secretary of State may direct the chair to revoke any restriction order made under this section or require the chair to impose a restriction order if they consider it conducive to the fulfilment of the terms of reference of the inquiry and in the public interest having regard to the matters in subsection (4).

(6) The Secretary of State must, by a notice published within a month of the end of the inquiry—

(a) revoke a restriction order containing disclosure restrictions that are still in force, or

(b) vary such a restriction order so as to remove or relax any of the restrictions,

unless the Secretary of State considers it necessary, having regard to the matters in subsection (4), to retain any of the disclosure restrictions after the end of the inquiry.”

This new clause would enable the Secretary of State and the chair of any inquiry proposed by the Secretary of State on the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks, to make provision for restrictions on information provided to that inquiry.

New clause 115—Proposals for an inquiry: powers to require production of evidence etc.—

“(1) The inquiry proposals brought forward by the Secretary of State under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks] must make provision for powers to produce evidence in accordance with this section.

(2) The chair of any inquiry may require a person at a time and place stated by notice—

(a) to give evidence,

(b) to produce any documents in the custody or under the control of that person which relate to a matter in question at the inquiry, or

(c) to produce any other thing in the custody or under the control of that person for inspection, examination or testing by or on behalf of the inquiry panel.

(3) The Secretary of State must require a public authority that has control of audio or visual records of specified proceedings to provide those audio or visual records to the Secretary of State.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), the Secretary of State must, following the provision of audio or visual records under subsection (2), publish a transcription of those records on a website maintained by the Secretary of State for a period of 10 years.

(5) The Secretary of State may redact or omit any or all of the transcription where it is required by any express statutory provision, assimilated enforcement obligation, or for national security purposes, or which otherwise—

(a) protect a victim or a whistle-blower,

(b) protect the identity of an individual authorised for the conduct or the use of a covert human intelligence source except where that person is accused of an offence and the Secretary of State considers it to be conducive to do so, or

(c) avoid or remove any risk of harm to—

(i) a victim or survivor of child sexual exploitation, or

(ii) a whistle-blower, or

(iii) the future operational practices or methods of law enforcement, or

(d) adversely affect any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired information which that person has provided in the course of any specified proceedings.

(6) A person subject to subsection (2) cannot be required to give, produce or provide any evidence or document if that person could not be required to do so on the grounds of legal professional privilege if the proceedings of the inquiry were civil proceedings in a court in England and Wales.

(7) In this section, ‘specified proceedings’ means any previous inquiry or commission or criminal proceedings which is notified in writing to the Secretary of State by the chair of the inquiry.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks to enable the chair to require that attendance or evidence is provided to that inquiry and, would provide for a process requiring the publication of specified proceedings.

New clause 116—Inquiry offences—

“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].

(2) A person (‘P’) is guilty of an offence if during the course of the inquiry—

(a) P intentionally suppresses or conceals a document that is, and that P knows or believes to be, a relevant document, or

(b) P intentionally alters or destroys a relevant document.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) a document is a ‘relevant document’ if it is likely that the inquiry panel would (if aware of its existence) wish to be provided with it.

(4) A person who is guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks.”

This new clause would make it a criminal offence not to provide evidence to an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks if an inquiry was established under NC110.

New clause 117—Inquiry enforcement by High Court and contempt—

“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].

(2) Where a person—

(a) fails to comply with, or acts in breach of, a notice to provide evidence or an order made by the chair, or

(b) threatens to do so,

the chair may bring a case referring the matter to the High Court.

(3) The High Court, after hearing any evidence or representations on a matter brought to it under subsection (2), may make any order by way of enforcement or otherwise which it could have made if the matter had arisen in proceedings before it.”

This new clause would enable enforcement to be taken in relation to a person who breached a requirement to provide evidence or attend proceedings in connection with any inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks established under NC110.

New clause 118—Inquiry immunity from suit and legal challenges—

“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].

(2) No legal action may be brought against—

(a) a member of the inquiry panel,

(b) an assessor, counsel or solicitor to the inquiry,

(c) a person engaged to provide assistance to the inquiry, or

(d) the Secretary of State,

in respect of any act done or omission made in the execution of that person’s duty or power, or any act done or omission made in good faith in the purported execution of that person’s duty in the undertaking of the inquiry.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of any other enactment, a court or tribunal must not consider any claim or complaint (whether by way of judicial review or otherwise) which relates to the decision or conduct of—

(a) a member of the inquiry panel,

(b) an assessor, counsel or solicitor to the inquiry,

(c) a person engaged to provide assistance to the inquiry, or

(d) the Secretary of State,

in respect of any act done or omission made in the execution of that person’s duty or power as part of the inquiry, or any act done or omission made in good faith in the purported execution of this Act.

(4) An application which is not excluded under subsection (2) for judicial review of a decision made—

(a) by the Secretary of State in relation to the inquiry, or

(b) by a member of the inquiry panel,

must be brought promptly and, no later than 14 days after the day on which the applicant became aware of the decision, unless that time limit is extended by the court.”

This new clause would make provision relating to legal challenges in connection with any inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks established under NC110.

New clause 119—Duty of cooperation with inquiry—

“(1) This section applies if the House of Commons has approved the establishment of an inquiry relating to the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks under section [Requirement to bring forward proposals for an inquiry on the exploitation of children by organised networks].

(2) A public authority must not act in a manner which conflicts with or impedes the inquiry acting in accordance with its terms of reference and must otherwise cooperate with the members of the inquiry in the exercise of its functions.

(3) In this section, ‘public authority’ includes any person or body certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.”

This new clause would ensure there is a duty of cooperation in connection with any inquiry into the sexual exploitation of children by organised networks established under NC110.

New clause 120—Racial and religious hatred and hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation against an emergency worker—

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 18, after subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) The exemption in respect of a dwelling place in subsection (2) does not apply where the offence is committed against an emergency worker.

(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3) the term “emergency worker” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.’

(3) In section 29B, after subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) The exemption in respect of a dwelling place in subsection (2) does not apply where the offence is committed against an emergency worker.

(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a) the term “emergency worker” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.’”

This new clause would create an offence where racial or religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation is directed against an emergency worker, and the offence takes place in a private dwelling.

New clause 121—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—

“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—

‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breathe and constitutes battery of that person.’”

This amendment would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of nonfatal strangulation.

New clause 122—Aggravated offences against people because of their sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability—

“(1) An offence is to be considered aggravated on the basis of sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability if—

(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s—

(i) sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability (or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability), or;

(ii) association with an individual or group defined by reference to sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability (or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability); or

(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards people because of their sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability).

(2) In this section—

‘presumed’ means presumed by the offender.

‘disability’ has the same meaning as in the Sentencing Act 2020.

‘transgender identity’ has the same meaning as in the Sentencing Act 2020.

‘sexual orientation’ has the same meaning as in the Public Order Act 1986.

(3) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit—

(a) an offence under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (malicious wounding or grievous bodily harm);

(b) an offence under section 47 of that Act (actual bodily harm);

(c) an offence under section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (strangulation or suffocation); or

(d) common assault,

which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.

(4) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (3)(a), (b) or (c) above shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or to a fine, or to both.

(5) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (3)(d) above shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.

(6) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit an offence under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (destroying or damaging property belonging to another) which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or to a fine, or to both.

(8) For the purposes of this section, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if the person to whom the property belongs or is treated as belonging for the purposes of that Act were the victim of the offence.

(9) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit—

(a) an offence under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 (fear or provocation of violence);

(b) an offence under section 4A of that Act (intentional harassment, alarm or distress); or

(c) an offence under section 5 of that Act (harassment, alarm or distress),

which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.

(10) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (9)(a) or (b) above shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.

(11) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (9)(c) above shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.

(12) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence falling within subsection (9)(a) or (b) above, the jury find them not guilty of the offence charged, they may find them guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.

(13) For the purposes of subsection (9)(c), subsection (1)(a) above shall have effect as if the person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress were the victim of the offence.

(14) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if they commit—

(a) an offence under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (offences of harassment and stalking); or

(b) an offence under section 4 or 4A of that Act (putting people in fear of violence and stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress),

which is aggravated for the purposes of this section.

(15) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (13)(a) above shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.

(16) A person guilty of an offence falling within subsection (13)(b) above shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to a fine, or to both.

(17) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence falling within subsection (13)(a) above, the jury find them not guilty of the offence charged, they may find them guilty of either basic offence mentioned in that provision.

(18) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence falling within subsection (13)(b) above, the jury find them not guilty of the offence charged, they may find them guilty of an offence falling within subsection (13)(a) above.”

This new clause would create statutory aggravated offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof). The new clause would also protect people who are victims of hate crime because of their association with individuals based on their disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof).

New clause 123—Removal of parental responsibility for individuals convicted of sexual offences against children—

“(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert —

‘2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person (“P”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and

(b) P had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.

(2) P ceases to have parental responsibility for a child or all children—

(a) until the child, or children, turns 18, or

(b) until an application by P to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.’”

This new clause would terminate the parental rights of any individual convicted of child sex offences to any children the individual had at the time the crime was committed.

New clause 124—Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan—

“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for “have regard to” substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”

This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.

New clause 125—Amendment of the Police Act 1996—

“(1) Section 39A of the Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (7) insert—

‘(8) The Secretary of State may require that the College of Policing revises the whole or any part of a code of practice issued under this section or any other guidance or standards for policing the College of Policing may issue.

(9) The Secretary of State may require that the National Police Chiefs’ Council revises the whole or any part of policy, strategic plan, action plan, or any other document intended direct policing practices.’”

This new clause gives the Secretary of State the power to amend, or require the withdrawal of, any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing, or any document issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council intended to direct policing practices.

New clause 126—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—

“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or

(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”

This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.

New clause 127—Points on driving licence for fly tipping—

“(1) The Environmental Protection Act is amended as follows.

(2) In section 33, subsection 8(a) at end insert ‘and endorse their driving record with 3 penalty points;’”

This new clause would add penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of a fly-tipping offence.

New clause 128—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence—

“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.

(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘subsection (10)’ insert ‘and sections 208A’.

(3) After that section insert—

“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),

(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and

(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.

(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—

(a) a curfew requirement;

(b) an exclusion requirement;

(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—

(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, an

(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or

(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—

(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;

(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—

(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or

(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.

(5) In this section—

“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—

(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and

(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;

“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—

(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or

(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.

(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.

(7) Where—

(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),

(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and

(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”

(4) After section 292 insert—

“292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),

(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and

(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.

(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—

(a) a curfew requirement;

(b) an exclusion requirement;

(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—

(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and

(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or

(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—

(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;

(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).

(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.

(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.

(7) Where—

(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),

(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and

(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).’”

This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.

New clause 129—Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third assault of retail worker offence—

“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.

(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after ‘and sections 208B’ (inserted by section [Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third shoplifting offence] of this Act) insert ‘and 208B’.

(3) After sections 208B insert—

‘208B Community order: requirements for third or subsequent assault of retail worker offence

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person is convicted of an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of retail worker) (“the index offence”),

(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 committed when the offender was aged 18 or over, and

(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.

(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—

(a) a curfew requirement;

(b) an exclusion requirement;

(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—

(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and

(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or

(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—

(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;

(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.’

(4) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.

(5) After section 292A (inserted by section [Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third shoplifting offence] of this Act) insert—

‘292B Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent assault of retail worker offence

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person is convicted of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of retail worker) (“the index offence”),

(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of an offence under section (Assault of retail worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 committed when the offender was aged 18 or over, and

(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.

(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—

(a) a curfew requirement;

(b) an exclusion requirement;

(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—

(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and

(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or

(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—

(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;

(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.

(4) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.’”

This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of an offence under section 15, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.

New clause 130—Theft of tools: prevention of re-sale and prosecution of offences—

“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), subsection (2) at end insert ‘equal to—

(a) the replacement cost of the equipment,

(b) the cost of repairing any damage caused during the theft, and

(c) the trading losses incurred by the offended party.’

(3) In section 3 (Enforcement), after subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) An enforcement authority must put in place an enforcement plan to enforce regulations made under section 1 at temporary markets in their area.’

(4) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(5) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—

‘72A Theft of tools from tradesmen

(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of the Theft Act 1968.

(2) If the theft was of tools from a tradesman, the court—

(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”

New clause 131—Power to deport foreign nationals for possession of child sexual abuse images—

“(1) The Protection of Children Act 1978 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1 (Indecent photographs of children) after subsection (4) insert—

‘(4A) Where a person is a foreign national and is charged with—

(a) an offence under subsection (1), or

(b) is found to be carrying an electronic device storing child sexual abuse images under section 164B of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979,

the Secretary of State must make a deportation order in accordance with section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.’”

This new clause would make foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images subject to automatic deportation.

New clause 132—Annual report on police actions in areas with high levels of serious offences—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on police actions in areas with high levels of serious offences.

(2) Each such report must include data from police forces in England and Wales to identify areas with the highest rates of serious offences.

(3) For each area specified under subsection (2), each report must include data on—

(a) levels of police officers on duty;

(b) use of powers under section 1 (power of constable to stop and search persons, vehicles etc.) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; and

(c) use of live facial recognition technology.

(4) The first such report must be laid before Parliament within a period ending 6 months after the passing of this Act.

(5) Each subsequent report must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the publication of the last report under this section.

(6) For the purposes of this section, ‘serious offences’ has the same meaning as in Schedule 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2007.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish annual reports on police presence, use of stop and search, and live facial recognition technology in areas with the highest levels of serious crime.

New clause 133—Stop and search—

“(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 60(1)(a) and (aa) leave out ‘serious.’”

This new clause lowers the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence.”

New clause 134—Seizure of motor vehicles: driving licence penalties—

“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 59 (Vehicles used in a manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance), after subsection (6) insert—

‘(6A) A person who is convicted of repeat offences under subsection (6) will have their driving licence endorsed with penalty points up to and including the revocation of their driving licence.’”

This new clause would make a person guilty of repeat offences of using vehicles in a manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance liable to penalty points on their driving licence or the revocation of their licence.

New clause 135—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—

(a) the officer fails vetting, and

(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable time frame.

(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—

(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and

(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”

This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.

New clause 136—Theft from farms—

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—

‘(72A) Theft from farms

(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of The Theft Act 1968.

(2) If the theft was of high value farming equipment, the court—

(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

“high value farming equipment” is machinery and tools used in agricultural operations to enhance productivity and efficiency, with a value of at least £10,000.’”

This new clause makes theft of high value farming equipment an aggravating factor on sentencing.

New clause 137—Defence to criminal damage—

“(1) The Criminal Damage Act 1971 is amended as follows.

(2) Leave out subsection (5)(3) and insert—

‘(3) For the purposes of this section, a belief must be both honestly held and reasonable.’”

This new clause would change the defence to criminal damage in the Criminal Damage Act 1971 to specify that the belief that the owner of the property would have consented must be reasonable.

New clause 138—Meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community—

“(1) Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public processions) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—

‘(a) the cases in which a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—

(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),

(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or

(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,

(b) in considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—

(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and

(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and

(c) “community” in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the procession, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the procession.’

(3) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—

“access to any essential goods or any essential service” in particular, access to—

(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,

(b) a system of communication,

(c) a place of worship,

(d) a transport facility,

(e) an educational institution, or

(f) a service relating to health;

‘area’, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly;

‘relevant cumulative disruption’, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—

(a) the procession,

(b) any other public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1) in relation to that other procession), and

(c) any public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 14(1A) in relation to that assembly), and it does not matter whether or not the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) and any procession or assembly within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;

‘relevant disruption’, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—

(a) that may result from the procession, or

(b) that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion);”.’

(4) Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public assemblies) is amended as follows.

(5) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—

“(a) the cases in which a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—

(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),

(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or

(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,

(b) in considering whether a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—

(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and

(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and

(c) ‘community’ in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the assembly, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the assembly.’

(6) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—

“access to any essential goods or any essential service”, includes, in particular, access to—

(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,

(b) a system of communication,

(c) a place of worship,

(d) a transport facility,

(e) an educational institution, or

(f) a service relating to health;

‘area’, in relation to a public assembly or public procession, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the assembly or procession;

‘relevant cumulative disruption’, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—

(a) the assembly,

(b) any other public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1A) in relation to that other assembly), and

(c) any public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 12(1) in relation to that procession), and it does not matter whether or not the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) and any assembly or procession within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;

‘relevant disruption’, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—

(a) that may result from the assembly, or

(b) that may occur regardless of whether the assembly is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion).”

This new clause defines “serious disruption to the life of the community” so as to amend the effects of the Zeigler judgement.

New clause 139—Removal of prohibition on entering a private dwelling to confiscate an off-road bike and ensure their destruction—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 165A, after subsection (5)(c) insert—

‘(5A) In exercising their powers under subsection (5), a constable may enter a private dwelling house for the purposes of seizing an off-road bike’.

(3) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(4) In section 59(7), at end insert ‘, except where the intention is to seize an off-road bike.’

(5) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(6) In section 165B(2), at end insert—

‘; (g) where the seized motor vehicle is an off-road bike, to ensure its destruction by the police’.

(7) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(8) In section 60(2), at end insert—

‘; (g) where the seized motor vehicle is an off-road bike, to ensure its destruction by the police.’”

This new clause would remove the prohibition on the police entering a private dwelling to confiscate an off-road bike that is driven without a licence, uninsured, or being used illegally and would create a duty to destroy off-road bikes.

New clause 140—Police access to the UK tobacco track and trace system—

“The Secretary of State must, through regulations, make provision for the police to access the HMRC tobacco track and trace system for the purposes of determining the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers.”

This new clause would allow the police to access the UK Tobacco Track and Trace system for the purposes of determining whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally.

New clause 141—Soliciting Prostitution for Rent Offence—

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 52 (causing or inciting prostitution for gain) insert—

‘52A Soliciting prostitution for rent

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) they intentionally cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for accommodation;

(b) they intentionally cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for a reduction in money paid as rent for a property;

(c) they attempt to cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for accommodation; or

(d) they attempt to cause or incite a person to become a prostitute in exchange for a reduction in money paid as rent for a property.

These offences refer to both properties owned or resided in by the offender.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years; or

(c) to a “banning order” as defined in part 2, chapter 2 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.’”

This new clause would create a new offence of soliciting prostitution in exchange for rent and allow offenders to be banned from renting properties after the offence.

New clause 142—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation—

“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—

(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;

(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;

(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;

(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;

(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or

(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.

(3) This section does not apply to—

(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;

(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;

(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or

(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”

This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.

New clause 143—Individual preparation for mass casualty attack—

“(1) A person commits an offence, if, with the intention of—

(a) killing two or more people, or

(b) attempting to kill two or more people, they engage in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to their intention.

(2) A person found guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”

This new clause would allow the police to intervene early to prevent attacks, like in terrorism cases, without causing unintended consequences for wider counter-terrorism efforts. It gives effect to a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorist legislation following the Southport attack.

New clause 144—Requirement to bring forward proposals for a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, publish proposals for approval by the House of Commons for the setting up of a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.

(2) The Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry must include, but may not be limited to identification of—

(a) common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs;

(b) the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs;

(c) the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs;

(d) the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs;

(e) any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by—

(i) police,

(ii) local authorities,

(iii) prosecutors,

(iv) charities,

(v) political parties,

(vi) local and national government,

(vii) healthcare providers and health services, or

(viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming;

(f) such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future; and

(g) good practice in protecting children.

(3) The Secretary of State’s proposals for an inquiry must stipulate that the inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2).

(4) The Secretary of State’s proposals must make provision for the timetable of any inquiry, including that a report must be published within two years of its launch.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

‘gang’ means a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims;

‘grooming’ means—

(a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim;

(b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person;

(c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals on the setting up of a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs for approval by the House of Commons.

New clause 145—Annual statement on ethnicity of members of grooming gangs—

“The Secretary of State must make an annual statement to the House of Commons on the ethnicity of convicted members of grooming gangs.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make an annual statement to the House on ethnicity data of convicted members of grooming gangs.

New clause 146—Publication of sex offender’s ethnicity data—

“(1) The Secretary of State for the Home Office must publish—

(a) quarterly; and

(b) yearly; datasets containing all national data pertaining to the ethnicity of sex offenders.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘sex offender’ is anyone convicted of—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child 25 sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children),

(i) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(j) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(k) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(l) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),

(m) an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.”

This new clause would introduce a requirement that ethnicity data of sex offenders be published on a quarterly and a yearly basis.

New clause 147—Financial gain from child sexual exploitation and abuse—

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 70 insert—

‘70A Financial gain from child sexual exploitation

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offence; or

(b) the offence is aggravated by financial gain; and

(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by financial gain from a specified child sex offence or child sexual abuse material as an aggravating factor; and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) An offence is “aggravated by financial gain from a specified child sex offence or child sexual abuse material as an aggravating factor” if—

(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender financially profiting from a child sexual offence; or

(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender financially profiting from a child sex offence, and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that the said person was financially profiting from said child sex offence.

(4) In this section “specified child sex offence” means—

(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7); or

(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.

(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child);

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child);

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13);

(d) an offence under any of sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences);

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence);

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust);

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences); or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).

(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent);

(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder);

(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences); or

(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism), and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.

(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.

(8) For the purposes of this section “financially profiting” means receiving money, goods, or any other form of payment.’”

This new clause would create an aggravating factor when sentencing for any individual who has financially benefited from the creation, distribution, possession or publication of any specified child sexual abuse offence.

New clause 148—Annual statement on employment status of sexual offenders—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders at the time of their offence.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), ‘Sexual offenders’ means any person found guilty of an offence stipulated in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to release an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders.

New clause 149—Child Murder Sentencing Guidelines—

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 21, paragraph 2(2) omit (b) and (ba) and insert—

‘(zb) the murder of a child’.”

This new clause would make the starting punishment for child murder a whole life order. Currently a child murderer must have abducted, sexually abused or put substantial planning into the murder to receive a whole life order. Any child murderer should receive a whole life order.

New clause 150—Prohibition on sexual relationships between first cousins—

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 27 (family relationships), subsection (2)(a) after ‘uncle,’ insert ‘first cousin,’.

(3) In section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration), subsection (2) after ‘niece’ insert ‘or first cousin.’

(4) In subsection 64(3) at end insert—

‘(c) “first cousin” means the child of a parent’s sibling.’

(5) This section does not affect the continued sexual relationships between first cousins that had begun before the Crime and Policing Act 2025 received Royal Assent.”

This new clause would ban sexual relationships between first cousins after the passing of this Act.

New clause 151—Threshold for intentional harassment, alarm or distress—

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In sections 4A(1)(a) and (b) leave out ‘or insulting.’.”

New clause 152—Points on driving licence for littering out of a vehicle window—

“(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 87, subsection (5), at end insert—

‘(5A) Where a person is found guilty of an offence of littering committed under section 87(1) that occurs as a result of litter being thrown, dropped or otherwise deposited from a vehicle, they shall also be liable to an endorsement of 3 penalty points on their driving record.’”

This new clause would add penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of littering from a vehicle.

New clause 153—Access to public funds for organisations supporting criminal conduct—

“An organisation or group will not be eligible for public funding if there is evidence that it—

(a) actively promotes or supports criminal conduct, or

(b) seeks to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic institutions of the United Kingdom through violent or illegal means.”

This new clause would prevent organisations or groups which support criminal conduct or use violence to seek to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic functions of the UK from accessing public funds.

New clause 155—Report on an economic crime fighting fund—

“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the viability, and potential merits, of establishing an economic crime fighting fund based on the principle of reinvesting a proportion of receipts resulting from economic crime enforcement into a pooled fund for the purposes of providing multi-year resourcing for tackling economic crime.

(2) The assessment specified in subsection (1) must also examine whether such a fund could address how annularity rules can prevent some law enforcement agencies from benefiting from recovered assets under the asset recovery incentivisation scheme.

(3) In carrying out the assessment, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report on the outcome of the assessment by the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”

New clause 156—Filming and distributing violent acts: offence—

“(1) It is an offence for person (X) to film and distribute violent acts involving person (Y) where there was clear premeditation, and deliberately participate with intent, by X to humiliate and/or distress Y.

(2) It is also an offence under this section for any person, whether X or another individual, to have made the recording with the premeditated intention that it will be distributed, streamed or broadcast, with the intent to humiliate and/or distress Y.

(3) When sentencing an individual convicted of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) (or both), the courts are to treat the age and vulnerability of person Y as aggravating factors.

(4) An offence is not committed where the footage is used for public interest journalism or evidentiary purposes.”

New clause 157—Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision—

“(1) The Data Protection Act 2018 is amended as follows.

(2) After Section 40, insert—

‘40A Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision

(1) This section applies to a set of processing operations consisting of the preparation of a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision, the making of a charging decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, and the return of the case-file by the Crown Prosecution Service to the police service after a charging decision has been made.

(2) The police service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.

(3) The Crown Prosecution Service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in making a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service.

(4) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will not be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.

(5) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must return the case-file to the police service and take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.

(6) Where the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service and returns the case-file to the police service under subsection (5), the police service must comply with the first data protection principle and the third data protection principle in relation to any subsequent processing of the data contained in the case-file.

(7) For the purposes of this section—

(a) the police service means—

(i) constabulary maintained by virtue of an enactment, or

(ii) subject to section 126 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (prison staff not to be regarded as in police service), any other service whose members have the powers or privileges of a constable,

(b) the preparation of, or preparing, a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision includes the submission of the file,

(c) a case-file includes all information obtained by the police service for the purpose of preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.’”

This new clause adjusts Section 40 of the Data Protection Act 2018 to exempt the police service and the Crown Prosecution Service from the first and third data protection principles contained within the 2018 Act so that they can share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision.

New clause 158—Anti-social behaviour: definition and enforcement—

“(1) For the purposes of—

(a) section 2(1) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, and

(b) Part 1 of this Act,

conduct shall not be considered ‘anti-social behaviour’ solely on the basis that it involves—

(i) rough sleeping,

(ii) non-aggressive begging,

(iii) the use of public space for shelter, rest, or subsistence-related activity,

(iv) any conduct arising directly from homelessness, socio-economic need or vulnerability, or lack of access to housing or essential services.

(2) For conduct to meet the threshold of being ‘likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person’, it must—

(a) involve behaviour that is targeted, threatening, or persistently disruptive to others, and

(b) give rise to a genuine and ongoing risk of harm or serious nuisance beyond mere visibility or discomfort caused by socio-economic need or vulnerability.

(3) In assessing whether behaviour constitutes anti-social behaviour under either Act, the relevant authority or court must have regard to—

(a) whether the conduct reflects socio-economic need or vulnerability rather than intent to harm or harass,

(b) the individual’s housing status, mental and physical health, and access to support, and

(c) whether alternative, non-punitive interventions have been offered or exhausted.

(4) An order, injunction, or direction under either Act must not be imposed where the conduct arises from destitution or homelessness unless—

(a) the conduct poses a demonstrable and ongoing risk to the public, and

(b) enforcement is necessary and proportionate, and

(c) appropriate support, including housing or welfare assistance, has been actively sought and reasonably refused.

(5) Nothing in this section shall prevent proportionate enforcement action where conduct constitutes a demonstrable and ongoing threat to public safety or the rights and freedoms of others, and where such action is necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.”

This new clause would make clear that rough sleeping, passive begging, or visibly using public space for shelter or subsistence does not, on its own, amount to anti-social behaviour. It would place a legal duty on authorities to consider context, vulnerability, and proportionality when assessing whether behaviour constitutes anti-social behaviour.

New clause 159—Duty for church, faith groups and other bodies to report suspected child sex offences—

“(1) An individual must make a notification under this section if they are given reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed (at any time).

(2) A notification—

(a) must be made to a relevant police force or a relevant local authority (but may be made to both);

(b) must identify each person believed to have been involved in the suspected offence (so far as known) and explain why the notification is made;

(c) must be made as soon as practicable; and

(d) may be made orally or in writing.

(3) The duty under subsection (1) applies to—

(a) any person undertaking work on either a paid or voluntary basis, or holding a leadership position, within the Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim or Sikh faiths, or any other religion or faith, and

(b) any other belief system or cult.”

New clause 160—Removal of 12-Month Limitation Period for Historic Sexual Offences—

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 8, insert—

‘(8A) Removal of 12-Month Limitation Period for Historic Sexual Offences

(1) Proceedings may be instituted at any time for the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person aged 13 to 15 under section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, regardless of the time elapsed since the alleged offence.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to offences alleged to have been committed before 1 May 2004.’”

This new clause removes the 12-month limitation period for offences under section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 where the offence occurred before 1 May 2004.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I am proud to have stood on a manifesto pledge to halve violence against women and girls in a decade, and I know that colleagues on the Front Bench take that extremely seriously. There are significant measures in this Bill on intimate image abuse, stalking, spiking and the sexual exploitation of children. I know they mark only the beginning of the Government’s mission to tackle those shameful crimes. As a national inquiry into child sexual exploitation perpetrated by grooming gangs rightly gets under way, we must now also confront the adult sexual exploitation being perpetrated on an industrial scale by pimping websites and men who pay for sex, both of which currently enjoy near-total legal impunity.

Laws against the commercial sexual exploitation of adults in this country are outdated, unjust and totally ineffective. In fact, our current legal framework creates a conducive context for commercial sexual exploitation—a failing that overwhelmingly affects women. Pimping websites, which function as massive online brothels, operate openly and freely, supercharging the sex trafficking trade by making it easier and quicker for exploiters to advertise their victims. Those online mega-brothels make millions of pounds every year by advertising thousands of vulnerable women from across the world for prostitution in the UK. Sadly, our legislation allows that.

Men who pay for sex, so often left out of conversations on prostitution and sex trafficking but who are the beating heart of such a brutal trade, abuse with impunity. Their demand and their money drives the sex trafficking trade, yet we do very little to deter them. Let us therefore start that process today by making it crystal clear as a Parliament that it is not possible to buy sexual consent. Giving someone money, accommodation, goods or services in exchange for sex acts is sexual exploitation and abuse; it is never acceptable.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I commend the hon. Lady and her party for bringing this legislation forward. She is probably well aware that we in Northern Ireland, through Lord Morrow and the Assembly sometime back, brought in specific legislation on this, for the first time in the United Kingdom. Has she had an opportunity to look at that legislative change we had at Stormont? What she brings forward is even better than what we had originally tried to get at the Assembly. Does she feel, in all honesty, that women will be protected from sexual exploitation, as she has clearly said that they should?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

The hon. Member is right to say that there is excellent practice in Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, which I chair, is looking at that. He may be interested in that.

[Nadia Whittome (Nottingham East) (Lab)]

Why should we implement this model for sex work when the evidence from the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland shows that it has increased violence towards sex workers?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

My hon. Friend and I obviously do not look at this through the same lens. For me, it is prostitution and not sex work, and we need to see some more examples of that being used. We currently have a situation where sex buyers enjoy near-total impunity while the vulnerable women they exploit can face criminal sanctions if they solicit on the street. The state hands out fines to women in a self-defeating effort to stop them soliciting on the street, ignoring the question of where those women are most likely to earn the money to pay their fine. Sanctioning victims of sexual exploitation is counterproductive and a barrier to seeking help and exiting this ruthless trade.

That is why I have tabled amendments new clauses 2, 3 and 4. New clause 2 would make it a criminal offence to enable or profit from the prostitution of another person online and offline, thereby outlawing dangerous pimping websites that are fuelling demand and facilitating sex trafficking. New clauses 3 and 4 would together shift the burden of criminality off victims of sexual exploitation and on to perpetrators. New clause 3 would make it a criminal offence to pay for sex, sending a clear message to boys that that is not an acceptable way to treat women and an equally clear message to men who are considering paying for sex that they face prosecution. We know from research with UK sex buyers that this would be an effective deterrent. Over half of 1,200 sex buyers questioned in one study said that they would definitely, probably or possibly change their behaviour if a law were introduced that made it a crime to pay for sex.

New clause 4 would repeal sanctions against victims of sexual exploitation who solicit on the street to remove that barrier to women exiting prostitution and rebuilding their lives. It is also widely agreed that the expunging of criminal records of section 1 offences is necessary to end the unjust stigmatisation that these women continue to experience. That is why I have also tabled new clause 19 to introduce such a mechanism.

The Home Affairs Committee has recommended that

“the Home Office change existing legislation so that soliciting is no longer an offence”,

and

“legislate for the deletion of previous convictions and cautions for prostitution from the record of sex workers by amending the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act.”

For most of these women, their record of convictions is a record of their exploitation and abuse, and they live in fear of having to disclose that history when applying for jobs or volunteering. Decriminalising section 1 offences and allowing for the expunging of those historical convictions would allow those women to finally be free of the record of their abuse and the stigma they have endured for decades.

My amendments would usher in a legal framework that recognises that prostitution is violence against women, and the only way to end this violence is to deter the perpetrators and profiteers. I am delighted, then, that more than 50 hon. Members have signed new clauses 2 to 4. I particularly thank members of the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation, which I chair, for their support. The amendments are informed and supported by survivors and best practice frontline support services such as NIA, Kairos Women Working Together, and Women@TheWell.

I note that, unsurprisingly, some of my proposals are hated by pimping websites, one of which, Vivastreet, emailed its allies, urging them to mobilise against my amendments. A recent Sky News investigation found that over half of the 14,000 prostitution adverts on Vivastreet displayed a phone number linked to another advert on the site, which is a key red flag for organised sexual exploitation. I therefore find it reassuring that those prostitution pedlars are unnerved by my proposals.

I want to address a myth promoted by defenders of pimping websites that shutting down these sites will make no difference to the scale of sexual exploitation taking place and will, instead, simply drive it all into the dark web and make it harder to identify. That is patently nonsense, lacking in logic and evidence. The dark web carries major disadvantages for both traffickers and sex buyers. It would require significant technical expertise to post, as well as locate and access, prostitution adverts on the dark web, thereby substantially restricting the pool of exploiters able to engage in this crime. There is also no evidence that such a shift has taken place in jurisdictions that have outlawed pimping websites. The reality is that police simply cannot keep up with the scale of sexual exploitation taking place via pimping websites on the open web.

Another myth I want to address was all too visible in the written submissions opposing my amendments submitted to the Public Bill Committee. Every single one of the organisations who argued that pimping websites should be allowed to operate described prostitution as work—as “sex work”. The idea that paying someone to perform sex acts is an ordinary consumer activity—that ordering a woman online to perform a blow job is the equivalent of ordering a cappuccino—is a pernicious and harmful myth. Prostitution is violence against women.

Let us legislate to put pimps and traffickers out of business. We must protect individuals from exploitation today, but also address the historical criminalisation of victims and abuse. I thank Members on the Front Bench for their engagement on this issue and I look forward to working with them very closely.

[Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)]

I rise to speak to new clauses 12 and 123 in my name, new clause 43 in the name of the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) and new clause 121 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage).

New clause 43 seeks to commence the Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which was taken through the House as a private Member’s Bill by Greg Clark, the predecessor of the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. Greg did great work on this Bill. I was one of its supporters and a member of the Bill Committee. I spoke on Second Reading, Third Reading and in Committee. It is a simple Act, which had cross-party support—it was not in any way a controversial piece of legislation. It corrected an oversight in the law that had been missed out in a previous piece of legislation.

As so often happens, a private Member’s Bill requires a statutory instrument to commence it, and that statutory instrument has not yet been laid in this House. I am sure the Minister is well aware of that and is seeking to do so. This new clause would allow the Act to commence now, rather than requiring that statutory instrument, thereby saving her a little bit of time. I hope, therefore, that she might look favourably on it. As I say, this was an Act that was supported across the House. There was no Division on it; it was very much something that we all wanted to see, so I hope that the Government accept the new clause and that the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells can follow on in the footsteps of his predecessor in making sure that this Act of Parliament becomes live and real for the people who need it.

Let me turn now to new clause 121 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport. I was almost disappointed not to be able to table this new clause myself, because it fits with the work that I have done previously on these issues. I was Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport when the Digital Economy Act 2017 introduced age verification for pornography. Again, new clause 121 is a simple piece of legislation, which would make non-fatal strangulation a criminal act if in pornography. This does not impact on what people may wish to do in their private lives, but it does mean that those images would not then be available to be seen in pornographic films. It also means that there is protection for children who may be looking at this pornography—we do not want them to look at it, but we are realists and recognise that this happens—and that it does not normalise what is a really dangerous act, which should not be promoted in any way.

I know from experience that social media companies will remove content if it is illegal. They will not remove it if it is not. Therefore this simple change would mean that the depiction of non-fatal strangulation would become illegal content and social media companies would therefore be forced to act. I hope that this is something that can be supported across the House. Although I understand that we will be pushed to Division this evening, I do hope that the Minister can say something about the Government introducing something similar—perhaps in the other place—so that we can make sure that this inappropriate content is illegal and therefore not available to be seen by children.

Let me turn now to the new clauses in my name. I wish to start with new clause 123, because my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East (Saqib Bhatti), who has been such a champion of this legislation, has to go to a Delegated Legislation Committee at 2.30 pm. I also wish him a very happy birthday. He is choosing to spend his birthday in this Chamber and attending a DL Committee—what a hero! Again, I think that this new clause will have cross-party support. It concerns the removal of parental responsibility for individuals convicted of sexual offences against children. When I have talked about this to colleagues and asked them to consider supporting the new clause, they have been utterly amazed that anybody convicted of a sexual offence against a child may be allowed to have parental responsibility for their own child. That responsibility is stopped only if the offence is committed against their own child. That cannot be right.

How can it be that a convicted sex offender—somebody who has been convicted of a sexual offence against a child—is allowed to make parental decisions about their own children? My hon. Friend’s constituent has talked about this—I believe that they are known as “Bethan” in this situation—and has been a real champion on this issue. In this particular case, a man who was convicted of raping a relative who was a child still has parental responsibility for his own child. That cannot be acceptable. Again, this feels like a piece of legislation where, at some point, we just failed to address this one issue. I hope, therefore, that this can be seen as a defect in the legislation that we all agree should be corrected.

New clause 12 is a relatively simple amendment to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, but it reflects a phenomenon that we simply did not know about when we introduced the Act 10 years ago. As the Minister on the Bill, I remember going through many definitions of what constituted trafficking and exploitation, but, at the time, the phenomenon of orphanage trafficking was simply not known. That may be a shock to some in this Chamber, because there is such awareness of the issue in Australia and New Zealand but we simply do not know about it here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

No.

On new clauses 85 and 86 about neighbourhood policing, it is clear that this Government are starting to implement our neighbourhood policing guarantee.

On new clause 13, introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), the Government recognise the serious consequences that can result from joint enterprise convictions. However, joint enterprise ensures that those who act together in committing a crime are all held responsible. We saw that in the cases of Ben Kinsella and Garry Newlove, as well as many others. We are aware of the concerns raised by my hon. Friend and we will continue to look at that.

I apologise to right hon. and hon. Members for not being able to get through all 100 amendments that were tabled. I also need to leave time for the person whose new clause leads the group to respond.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

New clause 2, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 7

Abolition of non-crime hate incidents

“(1) Non-crime hate incidents as a special category of incident to be recognised by police authorities are abolished. Reporting, recording and investigation of such incidents should occur only in the limited circumstances provided for in this section.

(2) For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR, section 35 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the Act”) and Article 8 of the Law Enforcement Directive, the processing of relevant data by a police authority is unlawful.

(3) In this section, “relevant data” means personal data relating to the conduct or alleged of a data subject which is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct and which has been perceived by another person to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards one or more persons who have or who are or have been perceived to have one or more relevant characteristics and with that hostility or prejudice arising due to that or the perception of those protected characteristics.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the following are relevant characteristics—

(a) race,

(b) religion,

(c) sexual orientation,

(d) disability,

(e) transgender identity.

(5) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the processing of relevant data—

(a) pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution,

(b) for the purposes of the internal administrative functions of the police authority.

(6) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the retention of a record (a “non-crime perception record”) of relevant data where a police officer (the “certifying officer”) of the rank of inspector or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.

(7) Where a certifying officer certifies the retention of a non-crime perception record pursuant to subsection (6)—

(a) the certifying officer must include in the record a description of the future criminal conduct they have in mind and the reasons they believe that the retention of the record may assist in its detection or prevention,

(b) the relevant data which may be retained as part of the record may be no more than the certifying officer believes is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct,

(c) a copy of the record must be expeditiously provided to the data subject unless an officer of the of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that—

(i) the provision of the record to the data subject may interfere in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct, or

(ii) the officer is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to provide a copy of the record to the data subject.

(8) If the data subject objects to the retention of the non-crime perception record, subsection (6) does not apply unless a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.

(9) No police authority or police officer can be held under any circumstances to be under any duty to undertake the retention of any relevant data.

(10) After subsection 113B(3) of the Police Act 1997 insert—

“(3A) An enhanced criminal record certificate must not give the details of a relevant matter to the extent that doing so would result in the disclosure of relevant data as defined in section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.”

(11) For subsection 39A(3) of the Police Act 1996 substitute—

“(3) No part of any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing may be in a form which could be issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 60 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”

(12) Section 60 the 2022 Act is to be amended as follows—

(a) the cross heading to be changed to “Non-crime perception records”,

(b) the section heading to be changed to “Code of practice relating to non-crime perception records”,

(c) in subsection (1) leave out from “by” to the end of the subsection and insert “of relevant data”,

(d) omit subsection (2),

(e) in subsection (3)(a), leave out “personal data relating to a hate incident” and insert “relevant data”,

(f) in subsections (3)(b), (c), (d) and (e), for “such personal data” substitute “relevant data”,

(g) in subsection (4)(a), for “personal data” substitute “relevant data”,

(h) in subsection (4)(b), leave out “personal data relating to the alleged perpetrator of a hate incident” and insert “relevant data relating to the alleged perpetrator”,

(i) in subsection (7), at end, insert “relevant data” has the meaning given by section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025”.

(13) Any code of practice previously issued under section 60 of the 2022 Act is deemed to be withdrawn.

(14) Within three months of the commencement of each calendar year, each police authority which is retaining non-crime perception records must—

(a) undertake a review of the relevant data by an independent person to ensure that any retention of such records is in compliance with the provisions of this section.

(b) publish a report in respect of the review prepared by the independent person including setting—

(i) the total number of non-crime perception records retained by the police authority;

(ii) the total number of data subject to which those records relate; and

(iii) the equivalent numbers of those records added in the previous year.

(15) In this section—

(a) “a police authority” means—

(i) a person specified or described in paragraphs 5 to 17 of Schedule 7 of the Act,

(ii) a person acting under the authority of such a person,

(b) the terms “data subject”, “processing” and “the UK GDPR” have the same meanings as under section 3 of the Act,

(c) “the Law Enforcement Directive” means the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament,

(d) “the 2022 Act” means the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”—(Matt Vickers.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Crime and Policing Bill

Tonia Antoniazzi Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 20—Application of criminal law of England and Wales to abortion (No. 2)—

“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that the recommendations in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the CEDAW report are implemented in respect of England and Wales.

(2) Sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 are repealed under the law of England and Wales.

(3) The Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 is repealed.

(4) No investigation may be carried out, and no criminal proceedings may be brought or continued, in respect of an offence under those sections of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 or under the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 under the law of England and Wales (whenever committed).

(5) The Abortion Act 1967 is amended as follows.

(6) In section 6 remove, ‘sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861, and’.

(7) Notwithstanding the repeal of the criminal law relating to abortion, the provisions of sections 1 to 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 remain in place except that that section 1 is amended so as to remove the words ‘a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when’ and replaced with ‘a pregnancy can only be terminated when’.

(8) The Secretary of State must (subject to subsection (9)) by regulations make whatever other changes to the criminal law of England and Wales appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or appropriate for the purpose of complying with subsection (1).

(9) But the duty under subsection (8) must not be carried out so as to—

(a) amend this section,

(b) reduce access to abortion services for women in England and Wales in comparison with access when this section came into force, or

(c) amend section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (medical termination of pregnancy).

(10) The Secretary of State must carry out the duties imposed by this section expeditiously, recognising the importance of doing so for protecting the human rights of women in England and Wales.

(11) In carrying out the duties imposed by this section the Secretary of State must have regard in particular to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in considering what constitute the rights of women to sexual and reproductive health and to gender equality.

(12) The Secretary of State may (subject to subsection (9)) by regulations make any provision that appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate in view of subsection (2) or (3).

(13) For the purpose of this section—

(a) ‘the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ or ‘the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ means the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/180, 18 December 1979;

(b) ‘the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ means the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966; and

(c) ‘the CEDAW report’ means the Report of the Inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1) published on 6 March 2018.”

New clause 106—Abortion: requirement for in-person consultation—

“In section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967, omit ‘, by telephone or by electronic means’.”

This new clause would mean that a pregnant woman would need to have an in-person consultation before lawfully being prescribed medicine for the termination of a pregnancy.

Amendment 17, in clause 167, page 186, line 36, leave out “or 112” and insert—

“112 or [Application of criminal law of England and Wales to abortion Amendment 2]”.

Amendment 1, in clause 170, page 189, line 22, after subsection (2)(c) insert—

“(ca) section [Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion].”

This amendment is conditional on the introduction of NC1. It would bring the new law into force on the day the Act is passed.

Amendment 18, page 189, line 22, at end insert—

“(ca) [Application of criminal law of England and Wales to abortion No. 2];”.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

Nearly five years ago, having suffered a rare complication in her abortion treatment, Nicola Packer lay down in shock, having just delivered a foetus at home. Later arriving at hospital, bleeding and utterly traumatised, she had no idea that her ordeal was about to get profoundly worse and that her life would be torn apart. Recovering from surgery, Nicola was taken from her hospital bed by uniformed police officers in a police van and arrested for illegal abortion offences. In custody, her computers and phone were seized, and she was denied timely access to vital anti-clotting medication.

What followed was a four-and-a-half year pursuit by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service that completely overshadowed Nicola’s life, culminating in her being forced to endure the indignity and turmoil of a trial. She spent every penny she had funding her defence. The most private details of her life were publicly aired, and she had to relive the trauma in front of a jury—all that ultimately to be cleared and found not guilty.

Nicola’s story is deplorable, but there are many others. Laura, a young mother and university student, was criminalised for an abortion forced on her by an abusive partner. He coerced her into taking abortion pills bought illegally online, rather than going to a doctor. Laura describes his violent reaction to her pregnancy:

“he grabbed hold of me, pushed me against the wall, was just screaming in my face…pulling my hair and banging my head off the wall”.

Laura nearly died from blood loss as a result of the illicit medication he had coerced her into taking. When she was arrested, her partner threatened to kill her if she told anyone of his involvement. Laura was jailed for two years; the partner was never investigated by the police.

Another woman called an ambulance moments after giving birth prematurely, but instead of help, seven police officers arrived and searched her bins. Meanwhile, she tried to resuscitate her baby unassisted, who was still attached to her by the umbilical cord. While the baby was in intensive care, she was denied contact; she had to express breast milk and pass it through a door. She tested negative for abortion medication—she had never taken it. Rather, she had gone into spontaneous labour, as she had previously with her other children. She remained under investigation for a year.

One of my constituents discovered that she was pregnant at seven months—she had no symptoms. She was told that she was too late for an abortion. She had seen reports of women being investigated after miscarriages or stillbirths based on their having previously been to an abortion clinic. She spent the rest of her pregnancy terrified that she would lose the baby and be accused of breaking the law. When labour began, she even delayed seeking medical help out of fear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

Can the hon. Lady advise us whether there is any other area of law governing the taking of life in which the guardrails of the criminal law have been removed? That is what new clause 1 proposes when it comes to the voiceless child. Is there no thought of protection for them?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

The hon. and learned Member will know that the Abortion Act is not going to be amended. New clause 1 will only take women out of the criminal justice system because they are vulnerable and they need our help. I have said it before, and I will say it again: just what public interest is being served in the cases I have described? This is not justice; it is cruelty, and it has to end. Backed by 180 cross-party MPs and 50 organisations, and building on years of work by Dame Diana Johnson, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. I remind the hon. Member that she should not have referred to the Minister by name.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I do apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker. Every day is a school day.

My amendment, new clause 1, would disapply the criminal law related to abortion for women acting in relation to their own pregnancies. NC1 is a narrow, targeted measure that does not change how abortion services are provided, nor the rules set by the 1967 Abortion Act. The 24-week limit remains; abortions will still require the approval and signatures of two doctors; and women will still have to meet the grounds laid out in the Act.

[Jim Shannon]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

Not at the moment, but I will later. Healthcare professionals acting outside the law and abusive partners using violence or poisoning to end a pregnancy would still be criminalised, as they are now.

There has been a cacophony of misinformation regarding new clause 1, so let us be clear: if it passes, it would still be illegal for medical professionals to provide abortions after 24 weeks, but women would no longer face prosecution. Nearly 99% of abortions happen prior to 20 weeks, and those needing later care often face extreme circumstances such as abuse, trafficking or serious foetal anomalies. The reality is that no woman wakes up 24 or more weeks pregnant and suddenly decides to end her own pregnancy outside a hospital or clinic, with no medical support, but some women in desperate circumstances make choices that many of us would struggle to understand. New clause 1 is about recognising that such women need care and support, not criminalisation.

As Members will know, much of the work that I do is driven by the plight of highly vulnerable women and by sex-based rights, which is why I tabled new clause 1. I have profound concerns about new clause 106, tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), which would remove the ability of women to have a consultation either on the phone or via electronic means, rowing back on the progress made in 2022 and again requiring women to attend a face-to-face appointment before accessing care. Introduced in 2020, telemedical abortion care represented a revolution for women and access to abortion care in this country. We led the world: evidence gathered in the UK helped women in some of the most restrictive jurisdictions, including the United States, to access abortion remotely. Here, the largest study on abortion care in the world found that telemedicine was safe and effective, and reduced waiting times.

The fact is that half the women accessing abortion in England and Wales now use telemedical care. Given the increases in demand for care since the pandemic, there simply is not the capacity in the NHS or clinics to force these women to attend face-to-face consultations. New clause 106 would have a devastating effect on abortion access in this country, delaying or denying care for women with no clinical evidence to support it.

What concerns me most about the new clause, however, is the claim that making abortion harder to access will help women in abusive relationships. Let me quote from a briefing provided by anti-violence against women and girls groups including End Violence Against Women, Rape Crisis, Women’s Aid, Solace Women’s Aid and Karma Nirvana, which contacted Members before the vote in 2022. They said:

“the argument that telemedicine facilitates reproductive coercion originates with anti-abortion groups, not anti-VAWG groups. The priority for such groups is restricting abortion access, not addressing coercion and abuse. Forcing women to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term does not solve domestic abuse.”

I could not agree more.

My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), who tabled new clause 20, had a terrible experience today: she was unable to walk into Parliament because of the abuse that she was receiving outside and the pictures that were being shown. That was unforgivable, and I want to extend the hand of friendship to her and make it clear that we are not in this place to take such abuse.

While my hon. Friend and I share an interest in removing women from the criminal law relating to abortion, new clause 20 is much broader in terms of the scope of its proposed change to the well-established legal framework that underpins the provision of abortion services. While I entirely agree with her that abortion law needs wider reform, the sector has emphasised its concern about new clause 20 and the ramifications that it poses for the ongoing provision of abortion services in England and Wales. The current settlement, while complex, ensures that abortion is accessible to the vast majority of women and girls, and I think that those in the sector should be listened to, as experts who function within it to provide more than 250,000 abortions every year. More comprehensive reform of abortion law is needed, but the right way to do that is through a future Bill, with considerable collaboration between providers, medical bodies and parliamentarians working together to secure the changes that are needed. That is what a change of this magnitude would require.

[Simon Hoare]

My friend the hon. Lady—I hope she does not mind if I refer to her as a friend—is making a clear point. She has drawn attention to a great deal of confusion and misrepresentation in respect of what she is trying to achieve in her new clause, and she has shared some heartrending examples. However, she has just said something with which I think the whole House would agree. In recent years, we have seen our legislative approach to abortion effectively as placing ornaments on a legislative Christmas tree, tacking measures on to Bills in a very ad hoc way. I think she is actually right: this is a serious issue—I say this as a husband and as a father of three daughters—that requires serious consideration in a Public Bill Committee, with evidence from all sides and so on. Does she agree with me that, notwithstanding her laudable aims and heartfelt sincerity, it would be much better if these complex issues were dealt with in a free-standing Bill, rather than by amendment to a Crime and Policing Bill?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I thank my friend the hon. Member for his intervention, and I heard him make that point in an earlier intervention on the Minister. The fact is that new clause 1 would take women out of the criminal justice system, and that is what has to happen and has to change now. There is no way that these women should be facing what they are facing. Whether or not we agree on this issue, and this is why I have not supported new clause 20, a longer debate on this issue is needed. However, all that this new clause seeks to do is take women out of the criminal justice system now, and give them the support and help they need.

[Jim Shannon]

The hon. Lady and I have been friends for all the time we have been here. We had time last night to chat about these things, and we both know each other’s point of view. May I ask her to cast her mind back to telemedicine, if she does not mind? It is said that telemedicine is needed to protect vulnerable women who are unable to attend a clinical setting, but the risks are surely greater. Women may be coerced into abortions against their will with an abuser lurking in the background of a phone call, and pills can fall into the wrong hands, as we all know. Does she accept that, with all the protections she is putting forward to safeguard women, the one thing that does not seem to be part of this process is the unborn baby, and that concerns me greatly?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I thank the hon. Member for that contribution, and for the recognition that, while our voices and opinions differ across the House, we have respect for each other. I do not see this as a discussion about the Abortion Act or raising any issue relating to it, because this is the Crime and Policing Bill, and the new clause is only about ensuring that vulnerable women in those situations have the right help and support. That is the whole purpose of it; it is not about the issues that he would like to discuss now.

[Mr Perkins]

I absolutely recognise that my hon. Friend is coming from the right place on her amendment. I totally agree with her that a reform is needed, and she has raised some very powerful cases. She describes this as a very narrow change, but in actual fact she is asking us to ensure not just that in such cases the police should act differently, but that in every case ever no woman can ever be prosecuted. It is a hell of a leap for us to take, when this remains against the law, for her to say that these women, whatever the circumstances, must never be prosecuted. That is why I do not think I will be supporting the amendment, despite recognising that she is right that such a reform is needed. Can she say anything to explain why there must never be any prosecution ever?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

Yes. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, because the truth is that we have to flip this around. No woman, or anybody, is deterred. This is not a deterrent. The criminal law does not work as a deterrent. These women are desperate and they need help. They may be coerced, or it could be just a stillbirth—it could be—but prosecution is not going to help the woman at any point.

[Sam Rushworth (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

I agree with my hon. Friend that these women need help, but I cannot imagine a more lonely and difficult experience than being a woman who has an abortion under the circumstances she is outlining, and I think that is a problem with new clause 1. Would it not actually make abortion much more dangerous and much more lonely by simply decriminalising the woman, but not those who may be there to give support? I cannot think of any other time when someone might be more in need of support.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I do not know of any woman who has had an abortion, at any stage, and taken it lightly. Any abortion at any stage of your pregnancy is a life-changing experience. That is why I do not take this lightly. That is why, whether it is six weeks, 10 weeks, 15 weeks or whatever, and whether it is in term or out of term, that experience of child loss, whether it is planned or not, stays with a woman for the rest of her life. I do not take this easily, standing up here with the abuse we have had outside this Chamber. This is a serious issue and these are the women who need the help. They need that help and they need it now. We cannot continue in this way. This very simple amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill would take the women out of that situation, and that is what I am seeking to achieve.

[Mr Angus MacDonald (Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire) (LD)]

If a woman goes all the way through to full term and then decides it is an inconvenience, does the hon. Lady still think that she should be covered by this legal protection?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

Wow. I would like to know if the hon. Member actually knows of any woman who would put themselves in that situation if there was not coercion or control of some kind. Obviously, a lot of research and conversations have been going on for years on this issue. I understand that people across the House have deeply held religious views—indeed, I was brought up a Catholic. My issue, from what I have been told, is this: how would that woman go about it? If it was by taking abortion pills, she would have a baby. Painting a picture of killing an unborn child in that way does not help to serve what we are doing in this place. We need to protect the women. [Interruption.] I need to make progress.

In the meantime, doctors, nurses, midwives, medical bodies, abortion providers and parliamentarians have come together to try to end the criminal prosecution of women on suspicion of illegal abortion offences. This is a specific and urgent problem, and one that is simple to fix. New clause 1 is the only amendment that would protect women currently at risk of prosecution and protect abortion services. That is why it has the explicit backing of every abortion provider and every organisation that represents abortion providers in England and Wales. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Royal College of Nursing also endorse it. Numerous violence against women and girls groups, including the End Violence Against Women and Girls Coalition, Refuge, Southall Black Sisters, Rape Crisis England and Wales, Imkaan, and the Centre for Women’s Justice, are also behind new clause 1.

The public overwhelmingly support this change too. I implore colleagues not to lose sight of the moral imperative here: namely, vulnerable women being dragged from hospital bed to police cell on suspicion of ending their own pregnancies. This is urgent. We know that multiple women are still in the system awaiting a decision, accused of breaking this law. They cannot afford to wait.

We have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to put an end to this in a simple and secure manner. This is the right change at the right time, so I implore colleagues who want to protect women and abortion services to vote for new clause 1. Let us ensure that not a single desperate woman is ever again subject to traumatic criminal investigation at the worst moments of their lives. There must be no more Lauras. There must be no more Nicola Packers.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I rise to speak in support of new clause 106, which stands in my name, but first I will speak briefly to new clause 1, which we have been discussing so far. The hon. Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) spoke about some pretty harrowing cases, and said how the first lady was utterly traumatised by having had her abortion at home, which she received via telemedicine. My new clause seeks to make women safer by ensuring that they are seen and given the opportunity for proper medical consultation before they get to the stage where they are given inappropriate medication because of a misunderstanding, and then end up traumatised, delivering a relatively mature foetus unexpectedly at home.

The hon. Lady did not say during her speech whether she believes that a baby should be terminated right up to term, but I want to put on the record that I do not. I work as an NHS consultant paediatrician, and I have cared for and personally held babies in my hands from 21 weeks and six days’ gestation right through to term. I am very aware that babies from, say, 30 weeks upwards have a more than 98% chance of survival, so although I am supportive of women’s right to choose early in pregnancy, I am not supportive of similar rights in relation to healthy babies right up to term.

Until the pandemic, women had to attend abortion clinics, where they would see a professional and talk through their desire for an abortion and the reasons for it. At the clinic, it would be checked that the woman was pregnant and how far pregnant she was. The hon. Lady raised cases of women who believed they were so far pregnant, but who turned out to be much further pregnant, which are well known; sometimes it goes the other way. One of the key reasons for this confusion is that women often bleed in early pregnancy, and they may believe that those bleeding episodes represent a period; when a woman thinks that she is 10 weeks pregnant, therefore, she may actually be 14 weeks pregnant.

That consideration is important in the context of accessing an abortion because at-home abortions via telemedicine are allowed only up until 10 weeks. The reason for that is not to be difficult or awkward, or to make it more difficult for women to access abortions; instead, it is a safety issue, because we know that complications are greater later in pregnancy. What happens in the early stages is that the procedure essentially causes the foetus to be born. If that happens to a baby much later in pregnancy, the procedure will cause it to be born when it has a chance of survival, which can lead to a traumatic experience for the mother as they deliver a much larger foetus than expected. It can lead to bleeding and, in one case I am aware of, has led to the death of a mother who was given pills to take at home when she was much further along in her pregnant than she had expected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

I rise to speak for new clause 106 and against new clauses 1 and 20.

I am grateful for this opportunity to place on the record my grave concerns about this hurried attempt to significantly alter our nation’s abortion laws. It is my view that by doing so we risk creating a series of unintended consequences that could endanger women, rather than protect and empower them. We need more time.

This is not a pro-choice versus pro-life debate. We already have the most inclusive abortion laws in Europe: medical abortion is available up to 24 weeks, which is double the European average, and we have the option of full-term abortion on medical grounds. Instead, today’s debate is about ensuring that legislation as significant as this—seeking to introduce a wholesale change to abortion laws affecting England, Scotland and Wales—is not rushed through without the chance for significant scrutiny. Indeed, 90 minutes of Back-Bench debate does not cut it, in my opinion.

We should, of course, treat women seeking an abortion with compassion and dignity—that goes without saying. As a councillor on Plymouth city council, I chaired the commission on violence against women and girls. Defending the voiceless is my guiding principle in politics, and it is with those women and unborn babies in mind that I make this speech.

As over 1000 medical professionals said in an open letter cited in The Telegraph today,

“If offences that make it illegal for a woman to administer her own abortion at any gestation were repealed, such abortions would, de facto, become possible up to birth for any reason including abortions for sex-selective purposes, as women could, mistakenly, knowingly or under coercion, mislead abortion providers about their gestational age. If either of these amendments were to become law, it would also likely lead to serious risks to women’s health because of the dangers involved with self-administered late abortions.”

They continue,

“Quite aside from the increased number of viable babies’ lives being ended beyond the 24-week time limit, there would likely be a significant increase in such complications if”

new clause 1 or 20

“were to pass, as they would remove any legal deterrent against women administering their own abortions late in pregnancy. The current law permits flexibility and compassion where necessary but, for these reasons, we believe a legal deterrent remains important.”

Many supporters of new clauses 1 and 20 claim that the 24-week time limit for abortions would not change, but that is misleading. Any time limit is meaningless if abortions are legalised all the way up to birth, for any reason, without a legal deterrent. My concern is that, once decriminalisation has taken place, further steps will be taken to expand abortion time limits. Indeed, many of the campaigners mentioned this afternoon are on record saying as much. It is important that we are realistic about that.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

We are not here to amend the Abortion Act. This is not a Backbench Business debate. We are here to debate an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill. I hope that the hon. Lady stands corrected.

[Rebecca Smith]

I do not think it is a case of being corrected. I have significant concerns that, should the new clauses be passed, those are the next steps—it is a bit of a slippery slope. We may just have to disagree on that.

Public opinion and professional advice are clear. Polling undertaken by ComRes reveals that only 1% of the public support the introduction of abortion up to birth, 70% of women would like to see a reduction in the time limit from 24 weeks to 20 weeks or less—still well above that of many of our European neighbours—and 89% of the population oppose the sex-selective abortions that new clauses 1 and 20 would allow.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

I rise to speak against new clauses 1 and 20, which represent rushed changes to our abortion laws of profound consequence not only for the unborn child, but for women themselves. My fear is that, if passed, these new clauses would undermine the ability to prosecute abusive partners who force women into ending a pregnancy, inadvertently lead to more dangerous and highly distressing at-home abortions, and risk reducing the status of an unborn child to a legal non-entity.

I also wish to put on record my deep unease about the continued attempts to lasso unrelated legislation with amendments on abortion. Whether or not one supports liberalisation, we should all be able to agree that these amendments represent substantial change to the existing law.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I am afraid the hon. Member is not stating what my new clause would actually do. It takes women out of the criminal justice system, and this is the Crime and Policing Bill.

[Julia Lopez]

I was also expressing my concerns about other amendments that have been tabled, but I believe the hon. Member is none the less proposing a substantial change that deserves more than a two-hour debate among Back Benchers.

As MPs, we are not here simply to express our opinions of an ideal world or even to focus only on highly distressing cases; we are legislators, and no greater legislative duty exists than to make sure that what we do in this House does not lead to unintended consequences in the real world for the most vulnerable. In two hours of debate on a Tuesday afternoon, we are being asked to rewrite a profound boundary in British law that protects the unborn child. That is not responsible lawmaking; it is a procedural ambush. It is telling that not even the promoters of decriminalisation in this House can agree on the form it should take. That ought to make each one of us pause, because it speaks to the challenge of moving beyond principle to real-world application.

It is worth our recalling previous efforts to amend Bills in this way and their consequences. The temporary pills-by-post scheme brought in during the crisis of the pandemic was made permanent by an amendment hooked, with little notice, on to an unrelated Bill, and what have we seen since? We have seen women accessing pills under false names and gestational dates, and taking them far beyond the recommended 10-week limit, and viable babies have been lost after late-term abortions. That is not women’s healthcare; it is legal and medical failure.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tonia Antoniazzi Excerpts

Monday 31st March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I thank the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee for her questions. We are currently drawing up a strategy on violence against women and girls, which will be published before the summer recess and will set out the approach that we need to take and the need to reduce domestic abuse, sexual assaults and stalking—the crimes that are most prevalent and of which women are most likely to be the victims, but which we also need to reduce more broadly. We will set out details on the measures that we will be looking for as part of that strategy.

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

The accurate collection of sex-aggregated data by police forces is essential to addressing male violence against women and girls. What plans does my right hon. Friend have in place for her Department to implement the recently published Sullivan review?

[Yvette Cooper]

I can tell my hon. Friend that we take the Sullivan review extremely seriously. It is important to recognise the difference between biological sex and gender and to make sure that policing and the criminal justice system always have the accurate data that they need.

Crime and Policing Bill

Tonia Antoniazzi Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 10th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

This Labour Government have made the unprecedented commitment to halve violence against women and girls in a decade. I know that my colleagues on the Front Bench take it extremely seriously, and I agree with them that it will require a transformative approach. I welcome the measures in the Bill to tackle intimate image abuse, stalking, spiking and the sexual exploitation of children, which mark the beginning of the Government’s work to make good their ambition by giving victims the protections that they deserve and need.

In that spirit, I believe that the Bill presents an opportunity for the House to tackle commercial sexual exploitation—a key form and engine of violence against women and girls—in giving victims of the sex trade the measures and protections that they need, and I intend to table the appropriate amendments to reflect that. The majority of people exploited through the sex trade are women and girls, while the overwhelming majority of people who pay to exploit them sexually are men. Extensive evidence shows that most women exploited through this insidious trade were highly vulnerable before their involvement and suffer acute harms as a result, including a disproportionate risk of violence. I know that my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister, who chaired the Home Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, has done some excellent work in this area.

Sadly, the demand for sexual exploitation is not being deterred, and victims themselves face the threat of criminal sanctions. The Bill gives us an opportunity to change that: to end impunity for punters who pay to abuse women, to take concrete action against pimping websites, and to remove the threat of criminal sanctions from victims to offer those vulnerable women the support that they need. The Bill does much for victims of crime and abuse, and it is evidence of the Government treating violence against women and girls as the emergency that it is. I believe that by strengthening the response to commercial sexual exploitation we can make significant headway in halving that violence.

Speaking of highly vulnerable women—whose plight drives much of the work that I do—I want to say something about abortion. The law underpinning abortion dates back to 1861, before women even had the right to vote. Under that cruel and outdated law, about 100 women have been investigated by the police in the past five years alone, and another woman is set to go on trial in April. The women caught up in this law are very vulnerable and often desperate, but they are subject to the same laws that apply to violent partners who use physical abuse, coercion or poisoning to end a pregnancy without consent. The law should be a tool to protect those women, not to punish them for the effects of the abuse that they have suffered.

Westminster voted to repeal the laws criminalising women in Northern Ireland in 2019, but they remain in place in England and Wales. There should be parity in the law across the UK so that my constituents have the same rights as my colleagues’ constituents in Northern Ireland. Abortion remains a free vote issue, and I recognise that any changes in the law in this area must be led by Back Benchers. My right hon. Friend the Minister was committed to this change before the election last year, and Members on both sides of the House supported her amendment to remove these women from the criminal law. I hope that the Bill will give us an opportunity to revisit this issue in the same collegiate way.

International Women�s Day

Tonia Antoniazzi Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

Ahead of International Women�s Day, we must remember that violence against women and girls is not inevitable. Men who kill, men who rape, and men who abuse and sexually harass do so in the context of an entrenched sex discrimination that normalises male predatory behaviour and quickly blames victims, but with sufficient will and a change in that context, it can and must be ended. That is why the most welcome change since last year�s International Women�s Day is that we now have a Labour Government.

As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation, I have a particular interest in prostitution. The reports from the Femicide Census�whose authors, Clarrie and Karen, are here today�are harrowing but none the less groundbreaking. The latest report, published yesterday, looks in detail at 2,000 completed cases of women killed by men that are on the database. That is 2,000 too many. Forty-five of the women who had been killed were identified as being involved, or having been involved, in prostitution, but as women were only included in this cohort if their involvement in prostitution had been explicitly mentioned in either official documents or the media, that is likely to be a huge undercount. The researchers found that of this cohort, women killed by men in the UK who had been involved in prostitution tended to be younger and were less likely to have been born in the UK than any other women killed by men, and the data shows that women involved in prostitution are also the most vulnerable in society.

A Home Office report noted that approximately 50% of women involved in prostitution in the UK started being paid for sex acts before they were 18 years old, while up to 95% of women involved in street prostitution are believed to be problematic drug users. They are indeed the most vulnerable�and this not a job; this is not work.

Women involved in prostitution are disproportionately victims of violence, including fatal violence. In their deaths they are more likely to be subjected to sexual violence, and after death their bodies are more likely to be desecrated. That is not a coincidence. Prostitution is the oldest form of sexual exploitation�a form of violence against women and girls. It is another manifestation of sexual inequality.

[Dr Tidball]

Is it not a positive development that our Government announced this week that young girls would no longer be placed in young offender institutions?

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

That is fantastic, and it is at the heart of what our Ministers are doing to support women and girls.

All in all, women and girls matter, including those who are exploited in the sex trade, to whom I wish to dedicate my speech.

Commercial Sexual Exploitation

Tonia Antoniazzi Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

There have been huge advances in the battle for women’s equality in recent decades, but on some issues, we have gone backwards. Chief among them is commercial sexual exploitation. [Interruption.]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Siobhain McDonagh)]

Order. I ask that Members leave the Chamber quietly, out of respect for the Adjournment debate.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

Giving someone money, accommodation, food, a job or other services on the condition that they perform sex acts is sexual exploitation and abuse, yet the global trade in sexual exploitation—perpetrated primarily against women and girls—is bigger than ever before. Sex trafficking is the most profitable form of modern slavery in the world, while violent, misogynistic pornography is consumed on an unparalleled scale, mostly by men. This was not an accident, and it was not inevitable: we could and should have done so much more to protect women and girls. Instead, the past 14 years have been a veritable golden age for pimps and pornographers.

[Carolyn Harris (Neath and Swansea East) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that under the United Nations protocol on trafficking, a victim does not need to have travelled in a vehicle in order for a trafficking offence to have been committed, yet under the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015, they do? This means that exploiters who are not actually moving a victim in a vehicle from one place to another are not being prosecuted as traffickers. It would make a huge difference if there were parity between the two pieces of legislation, to make sure that trafficking is justly prosecuted.

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I know that the Minister is listening and will likely agree with her, as I do.

Multimillion-pound pimping websites have been allowed to operate freely. Men who drive demand for sex trafficking by paying for sex have been left to abuse with impunity, while the most popular pornography websites in the country have been free to peddle videos of rape and sexual abuse.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I commend the hon. Lady for bringing this debate forward. She was active on this subject when she was on the Opposition Benches, and I commend her for that. To be fair, so was the Minister in her place tonight, so I am quite sure that, whatever we ask for, the Minister will respond in a very positive fashion, and I am glad about that.

Does the hon. Lady not agree that we must be at pains to ensure that the open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic is not used as a trafficking channel? Would she join me in asking the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to meet the relevant Republic of Ireland Minister to discuss and agree how we can collectively ensure that this is not a back door to abuse and misuse?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tonia Antoniazzi]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution, because, having been a shadow Minister for Northern Ireland and from working with Women’s Aid in Northern Ireland, I know that this is a real problem. I welcome his offer to join him in meeting the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister to discuss this further, and I thank him very much for his intervention.

The previous Government stood by and let this happen, which was a shocking abdication of duty. Women and girls deserve so much better from the Government. I am looking forward to seeing this new Government stepping up and protecting women and girls from commercial sexual exploitation, and in this debate I will set out how.

First of all, let us be clear: prostitution is violence against women. Men who pay for sex are not regular consumers harmlessly availing “workers” of their services. Healthy, non-abusive sexual relationships require both parties to mutually and freely want to have sex. Offering somebody money, or food or a place to stay, in return for their performing sex acts is sexual coercion. It is simply not possible to commodify sexual consent. As the United Nations special rapporteur on violence against women and girls has stated,

“prostitution is intrinsically linked to different forms of violence against women and girls and constitutes a form of violence in and of itself.”

Most women exploited in prostitution were highly vulnerable before even entering the sex trade, and suffer severe consequences as a result. A Home Office report noted that approximately 50% of women in prostitution in the United Kingdom started being paid for sex acts before they were 18 years old, while up to 95% of women in street prostitution are believed to be problematic drug users. I and my hon. Friend the Member for Neath and Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) have met these women and seen the struggles that they have in Swansea city centre, and I know that they are there to fuel their drug use. They are pimped out, and it is heartbreaking.

This is how I use my politics: when I think about the most vulnerable people in society, I think about the women who were crying because they have had their children taken away from them permanently. They were not able to make ends meet, and they had to be taken out by their pimp to earn in order to feed themselves and to live their lives in a basic way. I really do believe that we should always think about those women when we talk about women in this House.

I want to read the words of Crystal, a survivor who has spoken out about her experience of prostitution. She said:

“I became involved in prostitution in my early twenties, courtesy of my then ‘boyfriend’; I now use the word pimp. My body always hurt from the constant rough sex. I’d get jaw ache from blow-job after blow-job. Group stuff was especially harrowing…I developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. I got flashbacks and nightmares, when I could sleep. The addiction and the prostitution went together—I sold myself to fund my habit, and I couldn’t do it sober. It was a vicious cycle.”

Too often in discussions about prostitution and sex trafficking, there is silence when it comes to the people who perpetrate this kind of abuse: men who pay for sex. So it is only right that I also read their words today. Here is what one man wrote in a forum for sex buyers about a woman he paid £100 to perform sex acts on him:

“This is a classic case of ‘the pretty ones don’t have to work hard’...She’s Polish, and her English is not good...I was reminded of The Smiths’ song ‘Girlfriend in a Coma’...All the while she seemed completely disinterested and mechanical...I finally decided to fuck her, in mish...All the while, she kept her face turned to one side.”

I apologise for the language, Madam Deputy Speaker.

As one of her first acts in government, I urge the Minister to recognise the violence that women such as Crystal endure and the harmful actions of sex buyers by adding prostitution to the Government’s tackling violence against women and girls strategy, just as the Scottish Government have done.

So what do we know about sex buyers? We know that 3.6% of men in the UK report having paid for sex in the previous five years, and we know that the level of demand for prostitution varies over time and place. That is because men who pay to sexually exploit women are not helplessly reacting to uncontrollable sexual urges; they are making a choice, and that choice is influenced by a range of factors, including the risk of criminal sanction.

Importantly, we also know that the harm perpetrated when a man pays for sex is not restricted to the individual woman he exploits. As the Home Affairs Committee concluded last year, sex buyers “fuel demand for trafficking”. The cohort of men who create demand for the prostitution trade is the same cohort that creates the demand driving the trafficking of women into that trade. So we have a group of men perpetrating a type of violence against women that financially incentivises further violence against women. That should prompt a robust legal response from Government that holds sex buyers accountable for the severity of their actions.

But that is not the legal response we have. In England and Wales there is a loose patchwork of laws relating to prostitution, with no consistent objective underpinning them. Third-party facilitation of prostitution is illegal in some circumstances yet permitted in others. Victims of sexual exploitation face criminal sanction for soliciting in a public place, while individuals who pay for sex face criminal sanctions only if they kerb-crawl or pay for sex with an individual “subjected to force”. Even then, the law is very rarely enforced.

The consequences of this legal fudge are all around us, hidden in plain sight. Across the country, vulnerable women are being advertised online and moved around networks of so-called pop-up brothels. Organised crime groups dominate this ruthless trade, exploiting predominantly non UK-national women.

Let me give a snapshot of what is happening. Over a 12-month period, Leicestershire police visited 156 brothels, encountering 421 women, of whom 86% were Romanian. In Bristol, the Police Foundation identified 65 brothels over a two-year period. Over three quarters of the brothels displayed links to organised crime groups, and 83% of the women in them were non-British nationals. In city after city, women are being trafficked and exploited, and for one overriding reason: there are men willing and able to pay to abuse them. This has to stop. It is just unbearable.

Mia de Faoite, a survivor of prostitution who now trains the police on how to combat commercial sexual exploitation, points to how we should do this. She says:

“Prostitution is what most people imagine it to be: violent and dangerous. In the six years that I was involved, I endured a gang rape and three separate rapes…The only countries in Europe who are making a substantial impact in the fight against modern day slavery are the ones who have acknowledged and faced the cause: the demand.”

Mia is right, and I urge the Minister to listen to her.

A growing number of countries and states are waking up to the fact that without demand from sex buyers, there would be no supply of women into prostitution and sex trafficking. By criminalising paying for sex and decriminalising victims of sexual exploitation, the Governments of Ireland, France, Sweden, Norway and Canada have shifted the burden of criminality off victims and on to perpetrators. England and Wales must be the next countries added to that list.

Sweden was the first nation to adopt demand reduction legislation in 1999, affording us more than two decades of evidence. The results are stark: demand has dropped, public attitudes have transformed and traffickers are being deterred. The most recent research found that 7.5% of men in Sweden had paid for sex. Just 0.8% of them had paid for sex in the previous 12 months—the smallest proportion recorded in two decades and the lowest level in Europe.

I have seen at first hand how agencies collaborate to implement Sweden’s sex purchase Act, having met police and support workers there tasked with holding sex buyers accountable and assisting victims. Co-ordinated multi-agency working, backed up by strong political leadership, have been key to translating the legislation into real change on the ground.

Those who want to preserve the right of men to pay for sex have claimed that outlawing this abusive practice would simply drive the prostitution trade underground, making it harder to identify victims. However, as a study commissioned by the European Commission concluded, there is a logical fallacy at the heart of that argument. Sex buying is largely opportunistic and relies on advertising. Sex buyers have got to be able to find women to sexually exploit, and the police can look at exactly the same adverts that they do. If sex buyers can find women being exploited, so can the police.

Solely going after sex buyers is not sufficient to stop sex trafficking, however. We also have to crack down on the pimping websites that enable and profit from this abhorrent trade. Pimping websites are commercial online platforms dedicated solely or partly to advertising women for prostitution. They function like mass online brothels, making it as easy to order a woman to exploit as it is to order a takeaway. Despite it being illegal to place a prostitution advert in a phone box, the same advert can be legally published for profit on a website. Our laws have not kept pace with technological change, and pimps have got rich as a result. As the Scottish Parliament’s cross-party group on commercial sexual exploitation found in its inquiry into pimping websites, a small number of highly lucrative websites dominates the market, centralising and concentrating demand online. The sites make it simple and fast for traffickers to advertise their victims and connect with their so-called customer base in towns and cities across the UK.

Shamefully, the previous Government not only failed to stop pimping websites from operating, but collaborated with them. Since 2018, Home Office officials have met 20 times with Vivastreet, one of the biggest websites advertising prostitution. What has been the result of that collaboration with mass prostitution rings? The Home Affairs Committee’s conclusion was:

“The threat posed by websites advertising prostitution, the continuing failure of their owners to implement even the most basic safeguards against pimping and trafficking, and the sheer scale of trafficking for sexual exploitation they facilitate, is at total odds with the National Crime Agency and Home Office’s decision to collaborate with them. We found this public partnership working inexplicable, particularly given the total absence of evidence that it has led to a reduction in the scale of trafficking facilitated by these websites—and the flagrant facilitation of trafficking enabled by, for instance, single individuals being allowed to advertise multiple women for prostitution.”

The Home Affairs Committee, the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation and the Scottish Parliament’s cross-party group on commercial sexual exploitation have been united in their conclusion that in order to bust the business model of sex trafficking we have to drag our anti-pimping laws into the 21st century by making it a criminal offence to enable or profit from the prostitution of another person, whether that takes place online or offline. Hand in hand with that anti-pimping law, we need a cross-Government strategy to help survivors exit sexual exploitation and rebuild their lives. That is because in order to stop sexual exploitation, we have to end impunity for pimps and punters, and provide support—not sanctions—for victims.

I turn to pornography and the action that we need to finally start tackling the rampant commercial sexual exploitation on pornography websites, as well as their wider harms. A groundbreaking inquiry into the pornography trade by the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation concluded that we cannot simply end the epidemic of male violence against women and girls without confronting the role that pornography plays in fuelling sexual objectification and sexual violence. The fact that Government have hitherto failed to tackle even the most egregious abuses perpetrated by this predatory industry is not because that has proved too difficult, but because there has not been sufficient political will. That has to change now.

The findings of the group’s inquiry were extensive and unequivocal. I urge the Minister to study them carefully. I will highlight just a few. First, pornography consumption fuels sexual violence. There is extensive evidence from experimental, non-experimental, longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of that. Research indicates that pornography influences viewers’ so-called sexual scripts, shaping their understanding, expectations and decisions in relation to sexual behaviour. Pornography also serves to dehumanise and sexually objectify women, fostering attitudes that underpin violence against women and girls.

Secondly, illegal content is freely accessible on mainstream pornography websites. Lawlessness characterises the online pornography trade, with films featuring child sexual abuse, rape and trafficking victims found on some of the UK’s most heavily visited sites. Thirdly, the inquiry concluded that sexual coercion is inherent in the commercial production of pornography. I will quote the words of Alia Dewees, a survivor of pornography and trafficking who now works to support other survivors. Alia was just 20 when she was first paid to perform in pornography. Giving evidence to the all-party group, she recalled,

“when I did not want to consent, when I was feeling uncomfortable, unsafe, or unwilling, I did not have the freedom to leave that shoot without repercussions. I didn’t have the freedom to leave and know that I wasn’t going to be sued for breach of contract.”

Alia experienced that immense pressure to participate in filmed sex acts because on a previous date she had signed a legal contract to do so. That is commercial sexual exploitation. Like too many other women, she was subjected to a horrifying level of sexual abuse in this so-called industry. She bravely spoke out.

There are simple, practical steps that Ministers can take now to rein in the lawless activities of pornography sites and implement basic safeguards. Such measures should include making the regulation of pornography consistent across the online and offline spheres, as recommended by the British Board of Film Classification, and requiring online platforms accessed from the UK to verify that every individual featured in pornographic content on their sites is an adult and gave permission for the content to be published there. Safeguards must include giving individuals who feature in pornographic material accessed from the UK the legal right to withdraw their consent to material in which they feature being published or distributed further. We have the power to make that burden a little lighter by giving individuals who feature on pornography websites the legal right to have that content taken down.

I would like to pay tribute to the Ministers on the Front Bench. Labour voted in support of the amendment tabled by the now Minister of State at the Home Department, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham (Dame Diana Johnson), but it was blocked by the Conservative Government. Now that Labour is in power, I hope that we will see vital safeguards in a Government Bill soon. In opposition, Labour could only use words in the fight against commercial sexual exploitation. Now we can use deeds. This Government must shift power out of the hands of punters, pimps and pornographers, and place it into the hands of women and girls.