Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Mulholland (Leeds North West) (LD)]

I want first to speak to new clause 15 and to express my full support for it. After doing so, I will link that with new clause 14, which stands in my name, and the comments I made yesterday on amendment 10 and why it could and should have been dealt with separately.

In expressing my support for new clause 15, I remind the House of my early-day motion 667, tabled in September 2010, which called for humanist marriages to be allowed in England and Wales in exactly the same way as in Scotland. That is something I believe as a liberal, and also because I was extremely fortunate in having the honour of being best man at the wedding of two humanist friends, Derek and Louise, in September 2007. It was an honour to play a role in that ceremony. I was moved by what an appropriate, fitting and solemn ceremony it was. They were married exactly the way they wanted to be, according to their beliefs. They were equally happy to participate in my Catholic wedding a few years before.

As a liberal, I believe that each and every one of us has the right to marry according to our own beliefs. The problem with how the Bill is currently drafted is that we are allowing a situation to continue in which some religions—to be more precise, some sects of some religions—have access to a civil marriage ceremony while other religions, sects of religions and belief-based systems do not. To me, as a liberal, that is simply not justifiable. My opinion is simply that each and every citizen of this country, of all belief systems and religions and none, should have the same right to equal recognition of their relationship.

New clause 14 stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Charlotte Leslie), whose support and common-sense approach on this I appreciate. The simple reality is that if the Government had approached this matter in a more rational and common-sense way, the debate we are having now would be entirely unnecessary. Many Members on both sides of the House—interestingly, they include many who have concerns about the Bill and many who fully support it—believe that we should be making a proper separation of the belief-based recognition of a relationship, whether humanist or religious, from the state’s right to confer legal rights and legal recognition on individuals. The trouble is that the Bill, as drafted, conflates and confuses the two. Even worse, it enshrines the confusion we have heard about, such as the various marriage Acts replacing each other, and adds even more layers of complexity, which means legal confusion. At the same time, there is the absurd situation in which the Bill is having to specify in law that some Churches may not marry certain people and having to put in place protections for other Churches so that they do not have to do so. Of course, if we had a proper separation of civil and marriage, those things would simply not be necessary.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

I commend my hon. Friend for tabling new clause 14 and for advancing the argument that I hope to make later in relation to new clause 18, if you call me to speak, Mr Deputy Speaker. One of the Bill’s real failings is that it does not address the need to separate, for the purposes of marriage, the secular and the religious. Had we gone down that road, there would have been a much better resolution and many more people would have found it far less difficult to deal with this legislation.

[Greg Mulholland]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that pertinent contribution. I support his new clause 18 and the similar way in which he is trying to deal with this issue. It cannot be right that certain people of some religions and, in the case of humanism, belief systems, have the right to access a civil marriage ceremony according to their beliefs while others do not. The Bill, as drafted, will continue to allow that. I am afraid that, as with civil partnerships, it will enshrine the existing inequality in the law, and that cannot be right in something that is supposed to be about equality.

--- Later in debate ---

I continue to support the main purpose of the Bill. I ask hon. Members to be more accommodating in respect of all belief systems than they have been so far. Hon. Members who have Church-related objections to the Bill have strong objections to how I have voted and how I will continue to vote, but perhaps I am lucky, because none has been swivel-eyed and none has argued with pious prejudice. There have been measured objections. They wanted the protection clauses because they are concerned that their faith and their sense of the love of God will be the new love that dare not speak its name. That is what makes people worried and discomfited. I want hon. Members to give full equality, consideration and comfort to humanists, and full respect for their belief systems. I also want those things for all Christians.

[Simon Hughes]

I am happy to follow the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan). I agree with a huge number of his comments. He and I have voted similarly pretty well throughout the passage of the Bill.

I want to pick up on a comment the hon. Gentleman made towards the end of his speech. He and I voted for new clause 10 on the implementation of civil partnerships for straight couples. I voted for the new clause not because it was a wrecking amendment but because I believe in the principle. I signed it before the Government tabled their new clause proposing a review and before Labour tabled its amendment. If people look at my record, they will see that I have argued for that position over many years, yet it is suggested that I was trying to block the Bill. The hon. Gentleman has a similar view to mine.

[Stephen Williams]

I originally proposed a version of new clause 10 in Committee. I did not see it as an attempt to wreck the Bill; I genuinely felt it was an opportunity to close that loophole.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are obviously not going to reopen yesterday’s debate. We are discussing other amendments today.

[Simon Hughes]

The proposals appear to be linked, Mr Deputy Speaker. I thank my hon. Friend for that proposal and many others he has made, and for his much-respected work. We do not agree on every single item, but his record is one of which the Liberal Democrats and Parliament should be proud.

Let me put my position on the record. I believe, have believed and was brought up to believe that marriage is ordained by God. I believe that marriage is traditionally ordained by God to be between one man and one woman. I believe that marriage was set up by God for the creation of children. I believe that it was to link the biological needs of children with their biological parents. I believe that it was for biological complementarity. I believe that it was for gender complementarity, and that it was a gift of God in creation. That is why I have taken a traditional Christian and other-faith view on how marriage has traditionally been—for one man and one woman—which was the case long before we legislated for such things in this country and made them the law of the land.

[Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Simon Hughes]

I will give way, but I anticipate being able to deal with the hon. Lady’s intervention.

[Ms Abbott]

On the question of children, is the right hon. Gentleman arguing that couples who are infertile or couples who marry when the female partner is past the age of childbearing—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are not talking about infertile couples. Unfortunately, we are on the humanist part of the Bill, and that is what we will discuss. Fortunately or unfortunately—depending on which way we look at it—we must try to speak to the amendments if we can. I hope, Mr Hughes, that you are not going to tempt many others down another track.

[Simon Hughes]

I will not, but with respect I want to say a word about humanism and speak to my new clause 18, which is in this group, on the difference between the church and the state.

Let me say to the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) that of course marriage is never only for the production of children. Many people get married without that intention, and it might be impossible for some. That is not the argument. In the theological tradition, one purpose of marriage is to have children, and that is not possible, biologically, between two men or between two women. Some churches believe that marriage is a sacrament or holds another special position.

We move from that position of faith to one where we legislate. My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) intervened earlier to make it clear that Methodists, Quakers, Jews and the Free Churches had to fight for the right to perform marriages in their churches. Now, places that have nothing to do with churches or faiths are licensed to carry out marriages—civil marriages became possible. The position of registrar was set up and people are able to have entirely civil marriages in a registry office. That is still the case. Marriages can be held in a place that is entirely civil—in a state-authorised location—or in a place of worship, which can also include the legislative provisions that the state requires.

In all my time in the House, I have argued that we should try to separate those two things. New clause 18 suggests a way of doing that, just as new clause 14, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Greg Mulholland), does. I believe in the disestablishment of the Church of England. I am a member of the Church, but I believe in its disestablishment. Just as the Church in Wales has been disestablished, I have always believed that in England we should separate as much as possible the activities of the Church and the activities of the state. Marriage, therefore, between a man and a woman in a Christian or religious sense is different from marriages, partnerships or unions that are secular, or between people of the same sex.

I pray in aid the view, which has been quoted already, of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). It was referred to in the Public Bill Committee and goes back to what he said in 2004. When he was asked whether he agreed with the proposition about same-sex marriage, which is at the heart of the Bill, he answered:

“I do not support that; I believe that marriage is an institution that is ordained of God and should be celebrated between a man and a woman. However, I also believe that two men or two women can have a relationship that in many ways mirrors that between a man and a woman but is not identical. Therefore, I believe that we should have in law separate institutions that reflect that reality.”—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 21 October 2004; c. 68-70.]

That has always been my position too. We should give equal rights to gay and straight couples to form partnerships, unions or relationships that give the same pension rights and status, but are not the same as the traditional marriage between a man and a woman.

Colloquially, people talk of equal marriage, and I understand that. People who are in civil partnerships talk of being married, and of their husbands and wives. We are not going to be able to put the clock back, which is why new clause 18 talks about “civil marriage” and not civil union. Many of my Christian friends say that that is an unacceptable compromise, because the Christian view of marriage cannot be changed by calling it civil marriage. We have to wrestle with that issue and sort it out, because we could have civil marriage that is different from faith, Christian or religious marriage, and I think that people would reasonably understand the difference.

[Dr Huppert]

I respect my right hon. Friend on many things, but I disagree with quite a lot of what he is saying. Is he genuinely saying that he would deny faith groups, which believe marriage should truly be equal, the ability to do that, because of his personal belief? Is he refusing to allow them to call it a proper marriage or a faith marriage?

[Simon Hughes]

If my hon. Friend will bear with me, I do not believe that and I am not arguing that. They should of course be entitled to hold that view.

This group of amendments seeks to give humanists the right to have humanist weddings. I support that proposal. I understand the objection to the technical drafting, and perhaps that needs to be considered. However, the principle—my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) made the point—of allowing humanist weddings seems to me to be the right one. The hon. Member for Foyle argued that that is what happens over the border in Ireland. Humanists have a belief, and therefore they should be entitled to have weddings according to their belief. Constituents have argued for that, it happens already in Scotland, and, like other people, I too have been to a humanist ceremony—not a wedding, but a funeral.

As a light intervention, we should not be overly afraid of the word “pagan”. My dear late mother, who lived in a village in Herefordshire, in her latter years went to a pagan wedding in the orchard in Hampton Bishop. She said it was one of the most enjoyable weddings she ever attended. Of course, there was a civil ceremony beforehand. People should be allowed to have the practice they want, including humanist weddings.

[Susan Elan Jones]

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell me what his proposal would mean to a Nigerian couple on Old Kent road who want to get married in their large, African, black majority church? Would they have to have a separate civil wedding?

[Simon Hughes]

That is a good question. The hon. Lady, as a former Southwark councillor, knows well the communities I represent. The short answer is that we could do it one of two ways. We could either do what is done in many countries on the mainland of Europe, which is to require everybody to have a civic ceremony first. In France or Belgium, people go the town hall, have the civil ceremony and then go to their church, mosque, temple or synagogue and have their faith ceremony. Secondly, one could separate, in the place of worship—the black-led church on the Old Kent road, my own church or any other—the civic part of the ceremony from the faith part. That is not done in the same way at the moment. In my church in Bermondsey people do not see clearly the distinction between the two parts. The couple going to the church on the Old Kent road would believe they were being married in the eyes of God. They would also want to be married in the eyes of the law. It could be done in either of those ways.

What do I want new clause 18 to achieve? For heterosexual couples, I want us to allow a humanist wedding, a civil marriage or a civil union, and civil partnerships. For same-sex couples, I want full, equal civil rights as a married couple, to be called either a civil marriage or a civil union. I want them to have civil partnerships, too. I hope also that we will not allow the easy transfer between civil partnerships and civil marriage, going from one to the other by signing a form, which is the weakness of clause 9.

New clauses 18 and 14 seek to address an issue that the House has not so far wrestled with: would it not be better to seek to address the need to separate, for these purposes, the faith and belief of people of faith that marriage is ordained by God, and the civil responsibility of the state to provide a place where people can come together and perform a ceremony in the eyes of the law? It is pity that we have not addressed it. I will judge the mood of the House on whether to put that to a vote. I am sure it will be addressed in the other place. I hope we can give everybody equal status in the eyes of the law, and, coming back to the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), the right for each faith group to decide whether to regard heterosexual couples and same-sex couples as able to be married in the context of their faith, which we should allow to all faiths, as well as to those with no faith at all.

[Mr Iain McKenzie (Inverclyde) (Lab)]

I apologise, Mr Deputy Speaker, for having to leave the Chamber earlier.

On Second Reading, I was in a minority among Labour Members in voting against the Bill. I voted against it not because I did not want to see equality, but because, as some saw it, people’s faith and beliefs were being challenged. Again, today, I acknowledge the need to respect people’s faiths and beliefs, but I feel that that should extend to humanist beliefs and that humanists should have the option of a humanist marriage ceremony.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Miller]

I will make some progress, because we have another string of amendments to get through.

The effect of new clause 18 and amendments 58 and 59 would be to require all marriages not conducted through a religious ceremony to be called civil marriages. The intention seems to be to separate marriage conducted through civil and religious ceremonies into two distinct institutions. Let me be clear that there is one legal institution of marriage in England and Wales that couples —all couples, we hope, as a result of the Bill—can join through either a religious or a civil ceremony. The new clause would create a separate type of marriage without any consideration of the legal impact. The legal consequences of such a new distinction are completely unclear.

New clause 18 contains no reference to same-sex couples, so it does not seem to require that such couples should be limited to access to civil marriage only, which might be thought to have been the purpose of distinguishing between religious and civil marriage for legal purposes. That is simply not something the Government can support. We all want couples to be able to access the important and single institution of marriage, and that is what the Bill is about. The Bill has one clear and straightforward purpose: opening up the existing institution of marriage to same-sex couples. It is not designed for the sort of fundamental changes proposed in the new clause.

[Simon Hughes]

Does the Minister not accept, however, that there are many people who believe that the civil status of coming together in marriage should be open to straight and gay couples alike, but that people of faith and faith groups should be free to define what they understand as marriage? Some of them would permit same-sex marriage, but some of them take a different view and would not.

[Maria Miller]

I entirely agree with what my right hon. Friend says and think that is what the Bill delivers. It delivers the ability of civil marriage to accommodate same-sex couples and enables religious organisations that wish to opt into that to do so, but allows others not to if that is what they choose. That is an important and fundamental principle of the Bill that I think reflects what he has just said.

I believe that the changes proposed in the amendments are an unnecessary and potentially unhelpful diversion from the important objective we are trying to achieve: removing the unfairness that excludes same-sex couples from being able to marry. We must remain focused on that objective and not be sidelined into discussions on other issues at this point. I ask hon. Members not to press these amendments, so that we can proceed to discuss the next group.

Defamation Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Garnier]

She is shaking her head to say she did not, but I am not sure that is an answer to the question. The Government should come to the Dispatch Box and have a coherent case to make, but they do not.

Old and ill-tempered Members of Parliament, whether they represent Worthing or Harborough, must draw their remarks to a conclusion at some stage so I shall do that now. I do so, however, with acute disappointment, and I think the Government are letting themselves down.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) is clearly experienced in these matters, but he is not satisfied by the conclusion reached by the two Houses after a huge amount of consideration over a very long period, with attempts by everybody to achieve maximum consensus. I understand his point that Parliament works by doing a deal at the end of the day. A Government—any Government—have to get a Bill through both Houses of Parliament, and for a long time no single party has had a majority in the House of Lords. The House of Lords has often intervened to say that it does not like what the House of Commons is doing, and there have been one, two or three attempts at the end of the Session to see whether we can reach a point of conciliation. That is what has happened in this case.

My hon. and learned Friend and I might agree that we ought to have a system that always gives the final vote on Third Reading of a Bill to the elected House at the end of discussions. I hope I can persuade colleagues on the Procedure Committee to eventually come forward with such proposals, but that is for another day.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I do not suggest that what is being done today is unconstitutional; I say simply that it is incoherent and foolish.

[Simon Hughes]

I understood that and I will say why I think the measure is a reasonable last change that the House should support. I wish to pay tribute to several people, including Lord Lester of Herne Hill who introduced a private Member’s Bill to Parliament some years ago and in many ways triggered this reform of our defamation legislation. I also pay tribute to my noble Friend Lord McNally, who has steered a controversial Bill through many stages. He referred in his speech yesterday to the fact that it has been through the pre-legislative stage and the legislative stage. It has been considered by the Liberal Democrat party; there were conference debates and resolutions were passed on it, and there have also been many cross-party conversations.

I was a little troubled that the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) was slightly churlish about the point we have reached. His party and mine, as well as the Conservatives and Cross Benchers, have worked together on the threshold for dealing with corporate claims, and we have made progress on that. Therefore, today is progress along the lines that he wanted, and that he knows colleagues from all three parties wanted. He pretends to be naïve—which he is not—about the way these things work, whether or not there is a coalition Government. At the end of a political process in Parliament, negotiations take place in the public light and also behind the scenes. As he knows perfectly well, that has happened with all three parties to try to get to the most agreeable and consensual place. My party has been as much a part of that process as the Labour party and the Conservatives in arriving at this point.

The Minister rightly says that this is not about what is known as the Derbyshire principle. For those outside the House who have no clue what that is, in essence—I do not pretend to be legalistic about this—it is a principle enunciated by the courts in a case to do with a local authority, which effectively stated that local authorities cannot generally sue to protect their reputation because they are public authorities. However, as I think everybody has agreed in both Houses, common law will evolve, which does not stop it being dealt with by further judgments of the courts across the United Kingdom. In light of the Localism Act 2011, there may be further definitions of a public authority that seek to deal with the issue of a private body that does public authority work. That business remains unaltered by the Lords amendment.

The Lords amendment, which has returned to this House in a form I hope will be accepted, would provide one additional hurdle for people who are seeking as companies to use this country’s defamation legislation. It states:

“For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit—”

therefore not a body that makes no profit—

“is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss.”

I heard the previous speech and we can debate whether that is the perfect wording. It is, however, a clear statement that there must be “serious financial loss” before someone gets to a position from which they can win a defamation case. The Government rejected the idea of a pre-hearing. I understand that and think they were right because it would have meant going round the courts twice.

The Government have accepted that the bar for companies should be higher than that for individuals, which I am sure is right. That measure is meant to deal with the sort of cases that my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) alluded to where in the past individuals were clobbered by companies with huge resources and assets in a way regarded as totally unfair. As Lord McNally pointed out yesterday in the House of Lords, not only have we now, I hope, protected the little person in financial terms against the big corporate giant, we have also done things to protect academic reputations and academic dispute, and to allow that to go on without the threat of defamation. We have also, I hope, made the law clearer and brought it up to date.

The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South said that if the Labour party returns to government, it may wish to return to these matters, and I suppose any Government may want to do that. In this country, however, we understandably do not reform defamation law—generally a cross-party exercise—very frequently. This is a major piece of legislation and I hope that we have dealt with the last tricky issue in a way that provides greater protection for the individual against the big corporate. I think that is a job well done in both Houses of this Parliament.

[Sir Peter Bottomley]

I apologise for not being present at the start of the debate, and I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) for introducing my interest. I should declare that I have been successful in three major defamation actions, and I hope I shall not have to take another.

I want to tell the story of Richard Doll, who drank too much college beer when applying to study mathematics at Trinity college, Cambridge. He did not get chosen, so he went to St Thomas’ instead. He had an interest in asthma and lung diseases. In 1950, he did a quick study on whether motor fumes or tarmac caused lung cancer, as was suspected at the time. He and his colleague, Bradford Hill, discovered that the common factor was smoking. They did not show until 1955 beyond any doubt what had first been suspected by German scientists in the 1930s, namely that, if a person smokes 25 cigarettes a day, their chances of developing lung cancer or associated serious illnesses increased by 25 or 50 times—I forget the actual figure.

If the too-frequent current habit of commercial companies suing for damage had been prevalent when Richard Doll published his material, I suspect that the tobacco companies would have shut him down. When he later came out with the proposed link, which was proved, between asbestos and serious lung conditions, the same thing might have happened. One vital question is how we protect scientific speculation and the publishing of preliminary findings without the risk of action.

I believe we should accept the Lords amendments in lieu because they give conditions in which court authority is necessary if the action is to start. There is one condition by which the court “must” rule action out. I hope the courts realise that they “may” disqualify such action on other grounds. There is a “must”, but the measure leaves open the “may” option for disqualifying cases.

Oral Answers to Questions

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Thursday 18th April 2013 Commons Chamber

The Minister for Women and Equalities was asked—

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

1. What assessment she has made of the most recent statistics on differential earnings for women and men in the (a) public and (b) private sector.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Women and Equalities (Jo Swinson)]

The gender pay gap is falling and currently stands at 19% in the public sector and 26% in the private sector. The causes of the gender pay gap are varied: roughly a third can be attributed to education and the types of jobs women do; about a third can be attributed to work patterns and the need to take time out of the labour market, for example for caring; and the remaining third is unexplained, which could include discrimination. The Government are committed to tackling the gender pay gap and believe that we absolutely need to get it down.

[Simon Hughes]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her commitment on this issue. More than one in five of the lowest paid full-time women workers earn under £80 a week, and it is much worse for women in low pay than it is for men. Will she indicate that the Government have that in their sights and have a strategy for dealing with inequality across the wage range, particularly for those struggling at the very bottom end of the income scale?

[Jo Swinson]

My right hon. Friend is right to raise that issue. Figures from the Office for National Statistics show that the gender pay gap is lowest for those at the lowest end, with a 7% gap in the bottom 10%, compared with a 23% gap in the top 10%, but there is absolutely no room for complacency. This week, as he will know, we announced a 1.9% increase in the national minimum wage, which is set against a 0.8% increase in wages, according to the most recent ONS statistics. Of course, two thirds of the beneficiaries of that rise in the national minimum wage will be women.

Defamation Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Tuesday 16th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Grant]

As I intimated earlier, fixing the problem of fairness and creating the right balance between the claimant and defendant is not just about an early strike-out procedure. It is about a package of proposals that create fairness, are proportionate and allow for freedom of expression while protecting the reputations of individuals.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

Before my hon. Friend leaves this issue and following the intervention by our hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley), will she say whether the implication of what she said a few minutes ago is that she and the Government are willing to look at how we reflect the Lords amendment, but in a different way, to deal with corporate actions against vulnerable individuals, which is clearly a concern on both sides of the House?

[Mrs Grant]

In relation to serious financial harm—that aspect and that aspect alone at the moment.

I now turn to the second element of the Lords amendment. In the case of Derbyshire county council v. Times Newspapers, the House of Lords held that local authorities and government bodies were already prevented from bringing actions for defamation. The amendments seek to extend that principle and prevent claims by any non-natural person performing a public function. We do not consider that appropriate, as it would remove completely the right of a wide range of businesses and other organisations to protect their reputation. Although the provision focuses on criticisms in connection with the exercise of public functions, that criticism could of course have a wider impact on the reputation of the business more generally.

Our view is that a rigid, restrictive statutory provision that would remove the right to claim from a wide range of bodies does not represent a proportionate approach. We consider it much better to allow the courts to develop the Derbyshire principle, as they consider appropriate and necessary in the light of individual cases. The removal of the amendment will not affect the Derbyshire principle, which will continue under the common law as it does now. I hope that the House will therefore agree to reject Lords amendment 2.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sadiq Khan]

My hon. Friend will be pleased to know that I was going to thank them later in my speech, but I will do it now. I thank Lord Lester for beginning the process of his private Member’s Bill, which followed the working party; and I thank Lord Mawhinney who chaired the excellent Joint Committee. I thank, too, the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, ably chaired by another Conservative, the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale).

On the rules on a corporation’s ability to pursue defamation against an individual, however, the broad consensus breaks down. We were led to believe that this afternoon the Government would make concessions that would buy off the Liberal Democrats and us, but that did not happen. What the Minister has said is inadequate, and gives the lie to the word “concession”.

The Government, and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), seek the House’s support for the overturning of Lords amendment 2. The amendment would bring equality to an area of law that is currently characterised by a large degree of inequality and that has had a chilling effect. Corporations have used their financial and legal might to intimidate their critics, which in many cases has led to their silence.

Let me quote from the excellent report of the Joint Committee.

“It is unacceptable that corporations are able to silence critical reporting by threatening or starting libel claims which they know the publisher cannot afford to defend and where there is no realistic prospect of serious financial loss. However, we do not believe that corporations should lose the right to sue for defamation altogether ...we favour the approach which limits libel claims to situations where the corporation can prove the likelihood of ‘substantial financial loss’.”

Opposition Members support that statement.

If the Government are successful today, they will undo a key improvement that was made in the other place, and this House will send the message that it is acceptable for corporations and institutions to silence their critics by using the threat of defamation in a battle that is inherently unequal. The Bill, as amended, will not prevent corporations from pursuing defamation actions against individuals; it merely introduces an initial hurdle before that stage is reached. A court must be satisfied that the likelihood of substantial financial harm has been proved before the action can proceed. That last point is important, as it relates to the size of the company and thus takes into account the particular challenges facing smaller businesses.

The hon. Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) mentioned Dr Simon Singh, the science writer who led the libel reform campaign—a campaign for reform of our defamation law—after being sued for criticising the “bogus treatments” offered by some alternative medicine providers. He pointed out that if the Government were successful today, people such as him who made similar statements would still be given no protection. As Members may know, he was sued by the British Chiropractic Association, which is registered as a company.

Dr Simon Singh said today:

“My own case is not atypical. Lots of cases which people think are unfair and unreasonable have involved large companies suing individuals and corporations. The only clause in the Bill that would have helped me would have been if the British Chiropractic Association had had to demonstrate financial loss, because that would have been impossible for them. Corporations have huge influence on society and that’s why we need to tip the balance in favour of free speech.”

[Simon Hughes]

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I am very sympathetic to the point he is making, and I certainly agree that the case of Dr Singh exemplifies the wrong that we seek to redress. It is simply a matter of the tactics that we use to achieve the result that we want. The Minister has expressed her willingness to consider tabling another amendment, and it seems to me that, in procedural terms, the only way in which we can do that is by ensuring that the Commons disagrees with the Lords so that negotiation can take place in the other place over the next few days.

[Sadiq Khan]

I am terribly sorry, but the Minister did not say that. She alluded to the civil procedure rules and to the Civil Justice Council, but she did not say that she would go away and table an amendment in lieu of the previously amended clause 2. If she had agreed to table, next week, a new amendment containing subsections (1), (2), (3), but not (4)—for the reasons that she articulated—that would be an argument in the right hon. Gentleman’s favour.

This is the tactic. The right hon. Gentleman can vote with us. Members of his party, plus ours, defeat the Government, and we succeed in ensuring that the amended clause 2 is in the Bill.

Oral Answers to Questions

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Tuesday 19th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Gentleman is right. Early intervention is crucial and we want to make sure that it looks not just at criminal justice, but at family structures, education and health care. A whole range of different interests across Government must be represented in this exercise if we are truly to get to the bottom of the many problems and often chaotic background that some young people come from.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

May I commend to Ministers paragraph 21 of the youth justice report that has just been referred to and the proposal that the Government might legislate as soon as possible to erase out-of-court disposals and convictions from the record of very early, minor and non-persistent offenders at the age of 18? I have constituency cases in which people’s careers have been blighted by a minor infraction for which they got a telling off, but which appears on their criminal record.

[Jeremy Wright]

I have a good deal of sympathy for what the right hon. Gentleman says and we are considering the matter carefully for precisely the reasons he has given. We will look carefully at the issue of cautions in the round—not only how they are administered, but how long they last and in what circumstances—and report back.

Crime and Courts Bill [Lords]

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Just before I call the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes), I will just point out that there are four Members seeking to contribute. The Secretary of State will want briefly to wind up on the new clause, and the knife falls at 10.21 pm. I am sure all Members will wish to take account of that; it would be good to get them all in.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

I rise to thank the Secretary of State for introducing this group of new clauses and amendments, and to support them. They are in the name not just of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, the Home Secretary and the Leader of the Opposition, but the Deputy Prime Minister. They are the additional provisions on exemplary damages and costs agreed as a result of the labours of recent days. I have paid tribute to various people, but I just want to add my tribute to my hon. Friend the hon. Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax), who was more thoroughly engaged, and later into the night, than many of us throughout pretty much all of this process. He must be thanked, too.

I am relieved that agreement was reached, because otherwise it would have been my name leading on 10 amendments, new clauses and schedules, and I would have had to explain all the technical matters on exemplary damages, costs and so on, on behalf of the coalition and other parties, instead of the Secretary of State. I therefore thank those who came to the rescue and did the deal. I will make just a couple of simple points and follow your request, Mr Speaker, to make sure there will be time for the other Members who wish to speak.

As we have all done, I went back to what Lord Justice Leveson said on these matters in his report. He was clear, in paragraphs 66 to 70, about what he was seeking to do. He led into that in paragraph 57, in relation to the body he recommended. He stated that it should

“order appropriate redress while encouraging individual newspapers to embrace a more rigorous process for dealing with complaints internally…and provide a fair, quick and inexpensive arbitration service to deal with any civil law claims based upon its members’ publications.”

I agree absolutely with the deputy leader of the Labour party that an arbitration service is an indispensible part of the structure. I hear, of course, what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) said—that that does not necessarily produce a quick, speedy or cheap outcome—but to get something by agreement, rather than full-frontal litigation, is clearly a good thing.

Paragraphs 66 and 67 read:

“The need for incentives…has led me to recommend the provision of an arbitration service… Such a system…would then make it possible to provide an incentive in relation to the costs of civil litigation. The normal rule is that the loser pays the legal costs incurred by the winner but costs recovered are never all the costs incurred”—

everyone who has been to law knows about that—

“and litigation is expensive not only for the loser but frequently for the winner as well. If, by declining to be a part of a regulatory system, a publisher has deprived a claimant of access to a quick, fair, low cost arbitration of the type I have proposed, the Civil Procedure Rules (governing civil litigation) could permit the court to deprive that publisher of its costs of litigation in privacy, defamation and other media cases, even if it had been successful.”

Lord Justice Leveson then sets out how that would happen in relation to exemplary damages, and concludes in paragraph 69:

“Such a system would also work the other way round. If an extremely wealthy claimant wished to force a newspaper publisher that was a member of the regulatory body into litigation (in the hope that the financial risk would compel settlement), it would be open to the publisher to argue that having provided a recognised low cost arbitral route, that claimant, even if successful, should be deprived of costs, simply because there was another, reasonable and cheap route to justice which could have been followed.”

Then there is an easy-to-understand set of recommendations at the back of the Lord Justice Leveson’s introduction on the process for damages.

The really good thing is that, without anybody, including the Secretary of State, pretending that the drafting is perfect for all time, those of us who were involved in the discussions have sought to strike a balance: if a publisher is part of the system, the presumption—I use the word in a non-legalistic way—will be that it will not be subject to exemplary damages, but if it is outside the system, the presumption will be that it could be subject to them. It is not quite that straightforward, but that was the general idea—and it was a good idea. It is an incentive-disincentive system, which was what everybody was working towards, so I join others in calling on the press to join up. If they do, there will be a system ready for them to make. This is not a pre-made system. The starting point is the existing code, but it will be up to the press to make the system work, and we all encourage them to do that. I am glad, then, that we have a platform from which to proceed.

I want to make three final points. First, I understand that further amendments might be necessary. The House of Lords has that opportunity, and the Liberal Democrat team is certainly willing to collaborate with Conservative colleagues, Labour colleagues and colleagues from elsewhere to ensure that we get it right, if we need to make further, more technical amendments in the Lords. We have time to do it. Secondly, I join others in thanking Hacked Off, which became the assembly of people speaking on behalf of victims. It was hard work at times, as all of us who were in the negotiations know, but it had a justified case. Its job was to remind us why we went down this road and, rightfully, to hold our feet to the fire and ensure that we did not forget why we were doing this. It is about the lives of people not in the public gaze.

Finally, we have referred to people—the McCanns, the Dowlers and others have been cited—who suddenly find themselves unexpectedly in the public eye. The other people referred to by at least one colleague are those who become part of the public commentary simply by their association with somebody who is in the public eye. That is equally unacceptable. It is the children, the mother, the elderly parent, the former wife, husband or partner, the friend or the associate—those people often get dragged in completely unwittingly. Perhaps they happened to be in a photograph or were at the house when somebody knocked on the door. We have to have a system that understands that if there is due cause for complaint about a politician, a sports celebrity or a business person, that is fine, but that does not mean that anyone has a free rein to go after all the other people who are absolutely innocent appendages to their lives, which happen to be public lives.

[Richard Drax]

Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that if a journalist goes to someone’s door and there are other people in the house, the press should be stopped from commenting on them? If that is the case, who on earth is going to make those judgments, when so many stories we read involve other people? It is never just one person; there are always other people involved in a story.

[Simon Hughes]

I do not want to elaborate—I want to sit down and let others get in—but let me give an example. I refer my hon. Friend to Lord Justice Leveson’s inquiry—to the evidence he took and the commentary he made in his report. He made the case that people who are associated with others can get swept into the press’s undermining or attacks entirely unjustifiably. The example given by one of our hon. Friends was that of an elderly mother who is nothing to do with the individual concerned—she lives somewhere else, in another house—but is pursued by the press, who go after her, knock on her door, go up her drive, sit outside her house and have cameras focused on it, drilling her with questions and trying to get things out of her. We are talking about people who are totally ill-equipped and unprepared for that degree of exposure and who never asked for it. Obviously I am not seeking to stop the press if they knock on the door of my neighbour, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the deputy leader of the Labour party, at her home in my borough or at my home. That is fine, but it is not fine if they suddenly start pursuing all sorts of other people and giving them grief.

I think we now understand much better what the parameters are. We are hoping to protect the innocent who have been the victims, not to make the press have a more difficult job to do in pursuing proper inquiries into people who are properly the subject of public interest.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

There are other victims of this whole process, some of whom were revealed in the evidence to Leveson by the National Union of Journalists. They were the journalists who stood up and said, “I refuse to implement some of these strategies”—these tactics, manipulations or whatever we want to call them—and as a result lost their jobs, while others were victimised. The culture of bullying in some newsrooms was exposed in the NUJ’s evidence. That is why part of the union’s policy was to advocate a conscience clause.

I am grateful that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) said, there is a “brush past” in schedule 2 to the charter, with the reference to Leveson’s recommendation that:

“The industry generally and a regulatory body in particular should consider requiring its members to include in the employment or service contracts with journalists a clause to the effect that no disciplinary action would be taken against a journalist as a result of a refusal to act in a manner which is contrary to the code of practice.”

That would add to the architecture of protection and lift the standards of journalism in our country. That is why I welcome the important reference in schedule 2, which my right hon. and learned Friend shared with us. I regret the fact that it is a brush past, rather than something more specific, but I understand the negotiations that had to take place. We will need to return to this issue in the coming months. As the board of recognition panel is established, the regulator then applies for recognition. Consideration of whether the regulator has taken the recommendations into account is critical. One of this House’s roles will be to explore whether full consideration has been given to the conscience clause.

When the idea of a conscience clause was introduced into the debate by Leveson, there seemed to be cross-party support for it. Certainly the Deputy Prime Minister made a statement in support and the Prime Minister said he would consider the matter. Since then, the NUJ has been invited to go off and negotiate a conscience clause with individual employers. Unfortunately, that has not been taken seriously by a number of the employers. Negotiations have not proceeded and so far a conscience clause has not been inserted into a single contract. This is therefore an important factor to be taken into account by the recognition panel, and the regulator needs to put it firmly on the agenda for the future. A conscience clause would be an additional bulwark of support in establishing the point that we should not go through this cycle again and that there is a standard of journalism that we do not expect any journalist, editor or publisher to resile from. This will be beneficial in the long run. It will not impose onerous conditions on employers or publishers, and it should be welcomed as it will ensure a level playing field and a high standard of journalism right across the profession.

I am grateful for the reference in schedule 2 to Leveson’s recommendation 47, but I believe that the House needs to pay close attention to the roll-out of the process to ensure that it is considered by the regulator and that it forms part of the considerations of the recognition panel when the regulator is appointed.

Oral Answers to Questions

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

There are two reasons. First, we do not believe that the expertise exists on a localised basis to procure payment by results in an ambitious way—the kind we are proposing. Secondly, many probation trust management teams are enthusiastic about being part of the contracted-out world themselves, so I hope and expect that we will see some of them forming partnerships and creating new bodies that will take the service forward.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

4. When he last met the Joint Committee on Human Rights; and if he will make a statement.

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Grayling)]

I have not met the Joint Committee on Human Rights since I became Secretary of State for Justice. I was due to attend an evidence session before the Joint Committee on the Government’s human rights policy on 18 December 2012, but the meeting was postponed and will now take place on 12 February 2013.

[Simon Hughes]

I look forward to the Secretary of State’s visit. When we were debating the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, before he took over as Secretary of State, his Department gave a commitment to review legal aid, particularly in relation to immigration and asylum, a year later. The Committee is now addressing that issue in relation to unaccompanied minors. Will he look at the evidence being given, address that issue before he comes to meet the Committee and see whether we ought not to amend the legal aid arrangements so that vulnerable people with immigration or asylum issues get the proper legal support and advice they need?

[Chris Grayling]

I am very happy to give that commitment and to look at that issue before the evidence session, and I look forward to discussing these issues with my right hon. Friend and his colleagues.

Oral Answers to Questions

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Thursday 10th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Hugh Robertson]

Nobody would pretend that this issue is easy and we all know the economic conditions. As I said, London 2012 has given sport in this country a fantastic launch pad, and a city such a Liverpool—which the hon. Lady represents—is synonymous with sport. My advice would be that the most successful projects I have seen are a combination of local authority funding, private funding and grants from Sport England. If the hon. Lady has projects that she wishes to promote, she should look to Sport England and the Places People Play initiative and see what she can do. I wish her every good fortune in doing that.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

8. When the Government plan to announce what further steps they will take in response to the report of the Leveson inquiry.

[The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Maria Miller)]

Lord Justice Leveson’s report, which was welcomed by the Government, set out the need for independent self-regulation of the press. I believe the press will be setting out their new self-regulatory approach in line with Leveson later today. As all parties agree, the report did not provide a fully formed blueprint but rather an outline that requires further work and consideration. The Government are working on a cross-party basis and with interested groups, and I believe we are making progress.

[Simon Hughes]

I thank the Secretary of State for that positive reply. May I encourage her to ensure that the cross-party talks reach a conclusion before the end of this Session of Parliament, so that if we need to legislate not just on the difficult issue of statutory underpinning of press regulation but on clearing up the relationship between the police and the press, we can do so in the next Session?

[Maria Miller]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Making progress and ensuring we have momentum is vital for two reasons. First, we need to ensure that we do not see the unacceptable treatment of victims again in future. Secondly, all who have watched this lengthy process want it to come to a speedy conclusion. I can give him a clear undertaking today that that is exactly where we are.

Church of England (Women Bishops)

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw) for leading the debate so well and to the Backbench Business Committee for choosing it.

I will declare my interests. I was baptised into the Church of England and confirmed into the Church in Wales—the latter makes me much more comfortable, because I support disestablishment. I am chair of a Church primary school, nominated by my diocese, Southwark, a trustee of a Church secondary school in my constituency and a member of the Ecclesiastical Committee in Parliament.

Like everybody who spoke immediately after the Synod’s decision, I despaired at the folly of the Church of England in making a huge public mistake. After so long, everybody was clear about the view of the Church as a whole. We have heard that 42 of the 44 dioceses are in favour of women bishops, and we have heard the view of the leadership, including Archbishop Rowan Williams, who did everything he could to ensure that the change was delivered during his time as Archbishop, for which we thank him.

I come from the evangelical tradition, and many evangelicals support the ordination of women as both priests and bishops. The situation is not one category in favour and another against. In the church to which I belong, St James in Bermondsey, which would be classed as an evangelical church, I do not think there is a single person who does not support the ordination of women as bishops.

Evangelicals look back to the scriptures, as does everybody else who gets involved in this argument. Although I understand why people have come to the view that they cannot accept that there can be women priests or bishops, that has very little biblical foundation. Nothing in my New Testament says that Christ set up a structure by saying, “You will have churches, and you will have deacons, priests and bishops, and they will all be men.” I may have missed something, but I have read the whole New Testament at one stage or another and there is nothing that says that. Although a tradition of having men has built up, some of the early leaders of the Church right from the beginning, when Christ was executed and rose again, were women. Indeed, in the early days some Churches had women bishops, for heaven’s sake. I do not understand why we are having to revisit this issue after so long.

[Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)]

I find myself agreeing with the right hon. Gentleman. It has always surprised me that women seemed to have a good, established position in the early Church, right up until it was legalised and then became the state religion of Rome. That leads me to feel that we should overturn the centuries of discrimination against women in the Church, possibly by disestablishing it. Maybe, once it is disestablished, it will be able to see a proper route to incorporating women as a proper and fundamental part of the Christian family.

[Simon Hughes]

The hon. Lady and I are on the same wavelength on that. I understand the arguments for establishment, but I believe that a radical Church should not be part of the establishment. We should be outside the establishment campaigning for Christian values, but we have ended up being in the establishment by accident. That is a debate for another time, and we will not resolve it today.

One paradox is that the established Church of England has decided not to have women bishops when the head of the Church of England, the supreme governor, is a woman. The whole thing is inconsistent. There is another anomaly in the argument that, because of the relatively recent history of the Church, only men can be priests, and that people want to be under the pastoral responsibility of a male bishop. The Church has provided that option in relation to priests, and it works. Now it has come up with a similar proposal for those who want a male bishop. It seems to me that if the first worked, the second is likely to work. I ask people to be generous and less suspicious and untrusting. It is understood that some people have a different view, and everybody has tried hugely hard to accommodate it.

[Sir Peter Bottomley]

I remember my wife, as a female Secretary of State, taking the present Bishop of London to see the Queen to present the bishop, who would not ordain women, to be head of the Church of England.

The right hon. Gentleman said that the Church of England decided not to have women bishops. The fair way to put it is that the Church of England Synod decided by a very large majority to have women bishops, and it is now a question of how and when, rather than rejecting that.

[Simon Hughes]

I agree.

I am clear that, in theory, there is no objection to women priests according to the Bible and Christian teaching. I am not a theologian, but the theology seems clear to me. However, it also seems to me that the Anglican Church has accepted women bishops all around the world. According to the information that I have, there are five Anglican provinces that already have women bishops, one of which has a woman presiding bishop—New Zealand and Polynesia, Australia, Canada, southern Africa and the United States. There is also the diocese of Cuba, which is not in any province.

A further 12 provinces have agreed that they can have women bishops and they are not, as it were, the usual suspects—Bangladesh, Brazil, central America, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, north India, the Philippines, Scotland, Sudan and Uganda. If I may say so, for heaven’s sake, if all those places have dealt with the theological argument and concluded that this is possible, then the Church of England is far from leading the Anglican communion; rather, it is following behind. There is a remaining group of provinces that have not yet accepted that they can have women bishops, but which have women priests, so they are clearly on the way. It therefore seems that many people in the Anglican communion have addressed this issue both in theory and theology and in practice.

Let me repeat what has been said strongly by others. My experience is that the Church has benefited enormously from allowing women into the ministry of the priesthood in the last 20 years, not just through their life experience, pastoral, academic and intellectual qualities and preaching ability, but simply through the sheer numbers. The right hon. Member for Exeter, who opened the debate, referred to that. At the moment, 20% of ministers in the Anglican Church are women. Across the Christian denominations in the UK, 20% is the average—the Methodists have 40%, but the average is 20%. In 2010—the last full year—more women than men were ordained as Anglicans into the priesthood for the first time. There are now 50% more women in the Church of England in full-time parochial appointments than 10 years ago. One in five of the paid clergy are women. All the evidence is that people are saying—from evangelicals to those in other parts of the Church, from women to men, from old to young—that they believe there should be women bishops in the Church.

The Church desperately needs more people willing to be its priests, its bishops and its leaders, to get out there and do the job of preaching and teaching. To say that women cannot be allowed any further than the first two rungs of the ladder—that they cannot be in the leadership—is ridiculous. It is to deny a pent-up opportunity that all of us who have watched women at work in the Church have seen—and I would not be forgiven if I did not say that among them is my wonderful sister-in-law, who is currently a chaplain for a hospice in Essex and who has served in the Chelmsford diocese for many years as a wonderful priest and member of the Church.

Let me refer to what we do now, because that is the question. I do not think we should take over the role of the Church of England now, not just because I believe in disestablishment, but because I think it would be inappropriate. I share the view of the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr Field)—that we may however want to take control of what happens at the other end of this building in deciding who is admitted to represent the Church of England as bishops. It has long been anomalous that in the House of Lords—the Lords itself is anomalous—one bloc has to be all-male. That seems inappropriate.

Government and Parliament need to offer their best offices to the Church of England so that the new proposal—which the bishops mercifully have today announced they will make for Synod next year—can receive their support and technical advice and therefore pass both the Synod and this place. The bishops need to know in advance—I pay tribute to other colleagues on the Ecclesiastical Committee—that what they come up with will not be tripped up in Parliament, and we need to know in advance that it is compatible with our principles of equality, of which colleagues have spoken around the House.

The majority of people who go to church in this country are women. The leadership that the country calls for must include the majority of people in Britain, who are women. I hope the Church has learnt its lesson. I have every confidence in the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury-designate, who is coming to meet us tomorrow. I hope that by this time next year we will be celebrating not just the change in the Church’s rules, but the beginning of a transformation that will embolden the Church, improve it and increase the effectiveness of the ministry of the Church to proclaim the gospel to everybody, which is best done by everybody who is capable of doing it.

Defamation Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Wednesday 12th September 2012 Commons Chamber

The Joint Committee recommended that the Department should produce guidance that was clear and simple to use. There is no clarity on clause 5. There is no guidance, there are no regulations, and the Government are not taking a strategic approach. For all those reasons, we will press amendment 7 to a vote later this afternoon.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

Let me begin by welcoming my colleagues who have just joined the team—the new Under-Secretaries of State for Justice, my hon. Friends the Members for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) and for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant). I know my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald the better of the two, and have great confidence in her. If her colleague is as competent as she is, we shall be in good hands in the days ahead. I also welcome the new Secretary of State, who I expect will join us later. I have already had the welcome opportunity of holding a brief conversation with him about the Bill, and I look forward to a more general conversation with him about it after the completion of its House of Commons stages later today.

I have taken over responsibility for the Bill from my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), who has joined the Government as Deputy Leader of the House. I congratulate him on that. I shall be carrying out a holding operation today without other support, but we will bolster our troops when the Bill goes to the other place.

Our general position is that it is absolutely right to reform the law. These new clauses and amendments relate to a matter of great significance out there in the real world. As was pointed out by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), this is real live legislation for 2012 and beyond. Bills, and the drafting of Bills, may appear to be somewhat esoteric, but what is done with websites, how people are held to account for what is said, how the transmission of information is managed, and how inappropriately transmitted information is controlled are important issues.

The right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) also raised the general issue of appropriateness. Items can appear on websites overnight, for instance on Wikipedia, and catching up with them, correcting them and ensuring that information is accurate is an extraordinarily difficult job. It may be thought that people’s reputations are not hugely adversely affected by something that may be there one day and gone the next, but that is clearly not the reality of the world. A message that has appeared on Twitter can subsequently be removed, but by that stage—I am afraid that I cannot quote “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” accurately—it will, like Puck, have gone around the world before anyone has had a chance to do anything about it.

I welcome the Government new clause and the two new Government amendments. All the matters with which they deal were discussed in Committee. It was decided that new clause 1 was necessary, and it is a welcome proposed addition to the Bill. It may need to be tidied up further, and I am sure the Government do not pretend that this will definitely be the end of the conversation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Farrelly]

I entirely agree. I do not propose a return to the bad old regime, but I hope that the Government will give some thought to the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough. The situation is unbalanced now and we need to address that.

So often, if people do not sue, our media do not take them seriously. That simply increases the licence to libel. I know people who defend responsible journalism and investigative journalists who have had to take that course of action because newspapers with an agenda have been out to get them; if they did not threaten or take legal action, the situation would never change. I believe the culture of our media needs to be borne in mind, as we will be reminded when Lord Leveson reports next month.

[Simon Hughes]

I welcome back to our debates the former Solicitor-General, whom I thank for his work in that office. It was much appreciated and I wish him well in considering things from a non-Government and non-Law-Officer perspective.

I declare an interest that means that I will not vote on the new clause if it is pressed to a Division. I am the recent recipient of a conditional fee agreement in the well publicised series of actions against News International. Even though, like all my colleagues here, I am on a parliamentary salary of more than £60,000 a year, had I not been offered a conditional fee agreement the prospect of taking News International to court subject to the risks that, in theory, followed from that might well have dissuaded me from doing it. If those risks might have dissuaded me and anyone on a salary similar to mine, how much more would they have dissuaded people earning a lower salary, much less experienced than I in such matters—not a lawyer—and not used to dealing with the media? We have to be realistic about the relevance of the issue and be aware of the need to continue the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Simon Hughes]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 9, page 2, line 40, in clause 4, leave out from ‘statement’ to end of line 41 and insert—

‘the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case and those circumstances may include (among other things)—’.

Amendment 1, page 3, line 5, after ‘it’, insert—

‘or within or a reasonable amount of time following initial publication’.

Amendment 10, page 3, line 7, leave out paragraph (g).

Amendment 2, page 3, line 8, at end insert—

‘within a reasonable amount of time, allowing for the public and commercial interest in publication.’.

Amendment 11, page 3, line 9, leave out from ‘the’ to end of line and insert—

‘urgency of the matter; or’.

Amendment 3, page 3, line 10, at end insert—

(j) whether the defendant had made reasonable efforts to abide by the National Union of Journalists’ Code of Conduct.’.

Amendment 12, page 3, line 10, at end insert—

‘() the extent of the defendant’s compliance with any relevant code of conduct or other relevant guidelines’.

Amendment 4, page 3, line 21, at end insert—

‘(7) In determining public interest, the court shall have regard to whether the claimant is a person in public life, which should be taken to include (amongst others) politicians, public officials, celebrities and others whose influence, earnings or social status is dependent on a public image.’.

[Simon Hughes]

This debate is about how we deal with what is or is not a matter of public interest—which, in itself, is increasingly becoming a matter of public interest.

I had a few days off in August. I tried to escape the British media by going to Spain—in particular, to watch Barcelona play Real Madrid in the first half of the super cup, in that most fantastic of stadiums in Barcelona. I did not succeed entirely in having five days free from the British media, because even the Spanish media were reporting that The Sun was publishing photographs of Prince Harry, defending its actions on the basis that they were in the public interest. In that way, the debate starts to take over everything that people want to justify. However, in the light of the Prime Minister’s statement earlier and the comments across the House, I hope that The Sun understands today what is in the public interest and that that appears on the front page of tomorrow morning’s paper by way of an apology to the supporters of Liverpool who were killed or injured at Hillsborough 23 years ago.

I want to introduce the debate by tracing where we have got to in terms of legislation. My new clause 4 suggests an additional way of dealing with public interest matters, which I hope will commend itself to the House. I have had the benefit of a brief word with the new Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who will be responding to this debate, both of whom we welcome to their posts. It is not my intention to divide the House on my new clause today; we just need to flag up where the issues are. Also, given that the time we have been given since the Bill was in Committee has been foreshortened, I accept that the issue will need more consideration.

Until recently, the question of what was in the public interest was dealt with by the common law, as opposed to by statute. I can do no better than to quote a short excerpt from the excellent Library note on the Defamation Bill—research paper 12/30, published on 28 May—to explain what the position was then. The case of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers in 2007 established what has become known as the “Reynolds privilege”, which is a common-law defence that a publication is acceptable and therefore cannot be the subject of a successful libel action because it is in the public interest. That defence is of particular importance to the press and broadcasters, although it is available to anybody, publishing in any medium, who wishes to use it. There was then a further case in the House of Lords, called Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl. The commentary on those two cases, which followed one another pretty speedily, by the authoritative book on the subject, “Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy”, said that, in the case of Jameel,

“the House of Lords sent a strong signal that the direction of travel, post-Reynolds had not been sufficiently in favour of press freedom,”

and, as the Library paper sets out, highlighted:

“Lord Hoffman’s comment that the non-exhaustive list of ten factors that had been set out in Reynolds to consider whether the journalism employed had been responsible had been taken by some judges as a set of hurdles to be overcome by a defendant.”

Before the Reynolds case, it seems that

“it was clear that, although no generic privilege existed for fair publication in the press on a matter of public interest, there were some situations in which a qualified privilege would attach to publications to the general public,”

yet it was unclear quite how that would work.

The Bill we are considering today was preceded by a draft Bill, which was considered by a Joint Committee of both Houses. It concluded on the subject:

“The Reynolds defence of responsible journalism in the public interest should be replaced with a new statutory defence that makes the law clearer, more accessible and better able to protect the free speech of publishers. The Bill must make it clear that the existing common law defence will be repealed.”

Therefore, clause 4, which is entitled “Responsible publication on matter of public interest”, contains a proposal to replace the common law defence with a statutory defence. Subsection (6) states:

“The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is abolished.”

[Sir Peter Bottomley]

The right hon. Gentleman might prefer to leave this question to the Minister to answer. If that substitution becomes part of our law, does that mean that no other common law could be found by judges that would allow a defence against a claim for defamation?

[Simon Hughes]

My understanding of the situation is that, once we expressly repeal the common law defence and enact a statutory defence, that becomes the basis of all the decisions the courts will make subsequently. Of course, common law will build up as the new statute is interpreted, but it will be an end to the old case law and we will start again with this legislation. Therefore, if we are taking the opportunity—I think we all want to take it—to bring to Parliament the way we define these things, it is important to try to get it right. That is why I have proposed a new clause that would deal with some of the issues, which I hope colleagues in the House believe are appropriate ones to have in the legislation. I will return to that point in a moment.

The Government’s explanatory notes to the Bill state:

“The factors listed at subsection (2) are not intended to operate as a checklist or set of hurdles”.

Clause 4(2) provides a list—paragraphs (a) to (i)—setting out matters that are defined as follows:

“in determining for the purposes of this section whether a defendant acted responsibly in publishing a statement the matters to which the court may have regard include (amongst other matters)—

(a) the nature of the publication and its context”.

For example, is it a broadsheet newspaper with a national circulation, a paper published by three people, or whatever? The list continues. The Joint Committee had suggested:

“When deciding whether publication was responsible, the court should have regard to any reasonable editorial judgment of the publisher on the tone and timing of the publication.”

That suggestion did not find support with the Government, who responded:

“We have considered the need for a specific provision of this nature, but believe that this is unnecessary, as in practical terms in determining whether a publisher had acted responsibly in publishing the statement complained of, the court would in reality be considering whether the publisher had exercised its editorial judgment responsibly. There is also the need to ensure that the defence is clearly applicable in a wide range of circumstances beyond mainstream media cases, and focusing on editorial judgment in this way might cast doubt on that. Including a specific provision would therefore appear unnecessary and potentially confusing, and we consider that the clause already provides protection for responsible editorial judgment as it stands.”

That is how the Bill came to the House and to the Committee, and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald, who was a member of the Committee, and others then looked at those issues. I think that the debate hinged on two things. First, did the drafting of the statutory defence in fact take account of the law as it now is, because things had moved on? There had been a case called Flood, which had just been decided and was reported this year. The Government were asked whether they appropriately took that case into account as the latest interpretation of the Reynolds case. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) suggested that it did not look as though the Government had taken that case into account and therefore argued, with the support of the Libel Reform Campaign, that there had not been enough flexibility in trying to catch up with the position the judges had arrived at. Secondly, was that sufficient in any event anyway? The debate on the second point hinged around whether it should be for the claimant to prove that the publisher had acted irresponsibly and, therefore, what the balance of argument should be. Should there be more of an onus on the claimant or on the defendant? The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly)—I join others in thanking him for his collaboration and assistance when he was the Under-Secretary—said that it would “unfairly tilt the balance” against the defendant. At that stage, he therefore resisted a change. He made it clear that the Government were seeking to bring the Bill to Parliament to reflect case law as it had developed after the Reynolds case and in the light of the Flood case. Ministers, including the hon. Gentleman, were good in saying that they would consult further and hear further points. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and I subsequently went to see Lord McNally, to put the case for a broader definition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Farrelly]

I am fully aware of the provenance of the new clause and of the sterling work done by the Libel Reform Campaign, and I am very sympathetic to what the right hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve, but I want to ask him a question. Let us suppose that an innocent mistake is made, which may not be apparent to the newspaper. When a complainant writes to the newspaper saying “I want an apology”, the newspaper gives the standard response, “We stand by our story: it is true and in the public interest.” I fear that in those circumstances there will be no defence for responsible journalism, because under the new clause it falls away.

[Simon Hughes]

I accept that, and I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman’s work, which has been gleaned from his experience in his previous life as a journalist.

What we are trying to do between us is ensure that if we are to replace the common-law defence with a statutory defence, we not only deal with the general proposition that if something is in the public interest, that should be a defence, but find ways of giving the public a remedy—which they do not currently have, short of going to law—and ratchet up the probability that a public interest defence will be unsuccessful if the defendant has been malicious.

As the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out, the definition of “malice” in the new clause is not my own handiwork. Others have been working carefully to craft what they consider to be the right second-tier definition. The aim is to establish two tiers of consideration: there should be a general public interest defence, but the situation should be deemed to have gone beyond that when a publisher has flown in the face of the facts or the evidence. That would not apply to the example given by the hon. Gentleman, because if a newspaper could honestly argue that the statement that it had published was ignorant and innocent and that there had been every reason for believing that it was true, it would obviously have a much more complicated public interest defence case to argue. In the absence of my new clause, it would then have to rely on something like the clause that is currently in the Bill.

Let me make just two more substantive points. I am keen for us to end up with legislation that will give people a way out of the legal process when that is possible. Who knows what the Leveson inquiry will produce? I sense that one of its main recommendations will concern how we should deal with the public’s desire for inaccuracies to be corrected. I gave evidence before Lord Justice Leveson, as did others, and that was a major subject of debate. We may have to legislate if Lord Justice Leveson proposes legislation, and I hope that that would happen in the Session that will begin next May. It is therefore possible that we will return to this issue.

There is a debate about when the Leveson report will be ready, but if it appears as early as October, it may give us time to incorporate any proposals in this Bill. If it does not produce its recommendations until December, which now looks more likely, I sense we will have to come up with further legislation specifically to deal with the Leveson recommendations. Although we may not come up with a perfect solution in this Bill, however, both Government and Opposition parties have said they want to try to get this issue sorted now and get a better definition of public interest defence.

I want the House to agree to a measure that adds to the current clause 4, with a new defence available to publishers who are prepared to correct the record or publish a right-to-reply response promptly and prominently, thereby avoiding the use of lawyers. That answers the need in the internet age for a much speedier response—otherwise many readers are unlikely to see both the original content and the later clarification. It offers newspapers and other publishers a way of being responsible after the publication of the initial story, too, because they can be shown to have corrected what they have published. It will also serve not to permit the repetition of a defamatory allegation that has been promptly or prominently corrected or clarified. It would, therefore, take disputes out of the courts, thus saving people money, and it would speed up justice and make it more publicly accessible. It would not apply if the author were motivated by malice in its widest definition, which includes political or personal ill will or vendetta, rather than just the old honest opinion defence. The information must also be understandable to the public.

The Reynolds defence no longer works. Everybody accepts that we must move on from that common-law position for all sorts of reasons. We are in the age of the citizen-journalist, and we need to adapt the rules to accommodate that. We need something that will work for conventional newspaper groups and new media organisations. The Reynolds defence has outlived its time. It will no longer be sufficient to have a checklist of tests in every court case. Perhaps we ought to debate again whether to have early strike-out clauses in order to get other kinds of cases out of the courts, too. We need a measure that sorts out at the beginning of proceedings, rather than the end, whether there is a public interest component.

[Fiona Mactaggart (Slough) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman referred to strike-out clauses. He is probably aware of the case of my constituent Hardeep Singh, who was the subject of a lengthy and unfair—and extremely expensive, for him—case centring on a matter of religious dispute. The judge eventually clearly ruled that the matter should not be dealt with by the courts. A similar doctrinal dispute could arise in future, so if there is not an early strike-out opportunity someone else could suffer as Mr Singh did. What can be done to end this?

[Simon Hughes]

I know about that particular case; indeed, it has become something of a cause célèbre. I support having an early strike-out provision. We had a long debate on the subject in Committee, which is why Mr Speaker did not select an amendment on it for debate on Report. I hope we can persuade the Government that an appropriate public interest defence, plus a remedy for resolving disputes along the lines I have suggested, plus early strike-out is the right combination not just to address cases such as that of the hon. Lady’s constituent, but to prevent other kinds of unacceptable attack. I hope she will work with us. I am sure that she will. She also has relevant experience that I hope she can bring to the debates after today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Flello]

Clause 4 is an important, central part of the Bill, but some commentators believe that, as drafted, it does not represent an effective public interest defence. Others, as we have heard, believe that it should either be amended or improved by new clause 4.

Members will notice that my copy of the Joint Committee’s report is well-thumbed, and I draw their attention to what it has to say about the matter. I am sure that the Minister has already read it, but it would be worth her while to look again at what it says about what was clause 2, on responsible publication. It is important and relates to some of this afternoon’s amendments and comments. It will also elaborate on the Bill and inform views as the Bill makes its way through Parliament.

Today’s has been a good debate, as was the one in Committee, and I begin with a few observations on new clause 4. It was tabled by the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) but bears an uncanny resemblance to the new clause that I tabled in Committee.

[Simon Hughes]

Same parents.

[Robert Flello]

Indeed. As I was about to say, because we both know their provenance, we understand the reasons for that uncanny resemblance, so it would be hard for me not to support new clause 4, especially given that my new clause was withdrawn with the specific intention of fighting it another day.

You will be reassured, to know Madam Deputy Speaker, that I have no intention of rehearsing our discussion of clause 4. Instead, I invite the House to read in Hansard what was said. However, I was dissatisfied with the previous Minister’s assurances on the predecessor to new clause 4, and was not reassured that it encompassed Reynolds, as revised by Flood and Jameel. I hope, therefore, that the other place can pin down the Minister on this matter and get some better legislation out of this.

As I understood the observations of the right hon. Gentleman, new clause 4 is intended as an addition to the statutory version of Reynolds. The existing clause 4 defence would be available to publishers with deep enough pockets who did not wish to publish a clarification, contradiction or, where relevant, a correction. The new clause 4 defence would be available to publishers prepared to correct the record promptly and, if needs be, prominently, and to publish a right of reply promptly and prominently, avoiding the use of lawyers.

As Members on both sides of the House have said, in the internet age, a prompt and prominent clarification, contradiction or correction can be an adequate remedy for non-malicious public interest publication, particularly given that some readers might see an original posting but not a subsequent one. So publishing a correction straight away online is often a good way of doing it—perhaps we could call it a post-publication responsible publication. The Opposition are concerned that we end up with a clause 4 that does the job. As I said, I support the direction of travel in new clause 4, and look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments. I hope to hear something new, not what we heard in Committee, and something from which we can take reassurance.

On the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), my constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, pointed out that the Reynolds list was meant to be flexible, but that this had led to a catalogue of problems. I welcome his attempt to tidy up clause 4 while seeking to probe the Government’s thinking. It is important that the Minister gives us the reassurance and advice we seek.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington outlined the NUJ’s understandable interest. It will have concerns that good journalism will suffer because of the behaviour of bad journalists and the unfair pressure placed on good journalists by editors and owners not as concerned about good journalistic standards as they are about profits and getting the sensational headlines to generate them. I see where he is going with his amendments, and I understand the positive intentions behind them. I suspect that much of clause 4 will need to be revisited following the conclusion of Lord Leveson’s work. It is almost a great pity that the Bill has proceeded so quickly through the House. If it had been delayed, perhaps by a few months, we could have incorporated conclusions and findings from the Leveson inquiry and the inquiry into privilege. It should all be looked at as a package, rather than taking defamation as a stand-alone issue. This is an important subject and the law has not been amended since 1996. All the party manifestos wanted the law amended, but the undue haste of trying to get the Bill through Parliament—specifically clause 4 —means that the amended Bill with its additional new clauses does not currently pass the test of good and effective potential legislation. In the spirit of trying to get a good result, I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Grant]

I cannot comment on the details of individual cases, but if my hon. Friend writes to me, I will look at what he says.

In the light of the assurances I have given the House that the Government continue to look broadly at how a public interest defence might be framed, I hope hon. Members agree not to press their proposals to a Division.

[Simon Hughes]

I shall be brief in winding up this valuable debate. I am grateful to colleagues, who have expressed different views on how we should proceed. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr Garnier) said that it would be best to leave it to common law, but the problem with the common law argument, as he conceded, is that someone is required to go to court to take the law on and test the case. Libel and defamation cases are hugely expensive. I and many hon. Members are trying to ensure first that the law is clearer, and secondly that we protect our constituents from having to go to court to assert their rights.

The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) argued for a differential test for those in public life and those not in public life. Those of us in public life are much better equipped and able to go to law if we want to do so. If the bar were to be lower for people in public life, so the capacity to respond would also be easier. I do not necessarily accept that that is where we want to go, but that is another debate. The bulk of my constituents and the hon. Gentleman’s are not in a position readily to go to court to defend their interests, and nor could they get an adequate remedy. The new clause therefore seeks to find a remedy outside the courts.

I hear what my hon. Friend the new Minister says about the level of evidence needed to establish malice, and therefore understand that we need to have a debate on that. However, I am encouraged by the fact that she and her colleagues are willing to draw breath, as it were, and to look at the arguments as they have been presented and at the unanswered questions that both current and previous Ministers have said they will address.

There is one last thing to say before asking the House for leave to withdraw new clause 4. Will Ministers look at the big question of the timetable for the Bill, and particularly this part of it, in the light of the Leveson report? We need to ensure that we are seen to be legislating carefully, but we would perhaps make ourselves look foolish if we tried to legislate this year or a few months into the next year in the certain knowledge that we would need to return to the matter. The House and the Government should reserve a space to legislate in the light of Leveson. It would be unacceptable for anybody in the months ahead to put the argument that we cannot return to the matter because we have addressed it in the Bill.

[John McDonnell]

I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman and the parties that there should be a discussion on the process through the usual channels. I agree that the Bill could be completely abortive, and that we would look ridiculous if we returned to it so soon after it was passed. There is potential for an agreed discussion on the timetable between the parties.

[Simon Hughes]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

[Mr MacShane]

It is vital that the other place slows the Bill down because it is in lock-step with Leveson. There is complete and utter parallelity or parallelness between the two—[Laughter.] Hansard can sort that out. I strongly second what the right hon. Gentleman says.

[Simon Hughes]

I agree that there is complete and utter whatever-it-is between the two.

[Sir Peter Bottomley]

I disagree with the good people on the Opposition Benches. This Bill is about defamation. We know that there will be something on privacy, and we also know that Lord Leveson is likely to talk about the way in which the press and others operate. If this Bill, dealing with defamation, is held up to bring in something dealing with privacy in its own time, we will end up with the kind of confusion that we are trying to get away from.

[Simon Hughes]

We are hearing a quick last set of bids for how the Government should proceed. The point that will reconcile those views and mine is this. Although my noble Friend Lord McNally is keen that we should introduce reforms and have a modern law on defamation, the Ministry of Justice should none the less have a wider debate with colleagues in both Houses, particularly in this House, about how that should be achieved, while at the same time ensuring that we do not lose the opportunities to do what Lord Justice Leveson recommends. We need to have that debate. It would not preclude concluding the Defamation Bill, but whether it would include this part of the Bill, for example, or whether we would leave the issue to be addressed in the public interest debate post Leveson is a matter to be resolved. I hope that there is agreement that that sort of conversation could happen. I am sure that Ministers will want to be helpful, and I will certainly talk to my colleagues across Government in other Departments, including the Deputy Prime Minister, and say, “There is an issue here and Government collectively need to address it.” With those words, I beg to ask leave to withdraw new clause 4.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5

Operators of websites

Amendment proposed: 7, page 3, line 22, leave out clause 5.—(Robert Flello.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Simon Hughes]

I join hon. Members in thanking the outgoing ministerial team and the former Secretary of State for Justice for their collaboration and work; I congratulate them on that. I also congratulate the new team on their appointment, particularly the new Secretary of State, whom we very much welcome to his responsibilities. As the shadow Secretary of State said, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party went into the last election with a commitment to reform defamation and libel law. That commitment was satisfactorily reaffirmed in the coalition agreement. There is consensus that the one thing we must deliver this Session is reformed libel law along the lines of the Bill. We have made good progress, but there is general agreement that we are not completely there yet.

I share exactly the view expressed by the new Secretary of State on why we need the Bill. We need to uphold the rights of freedom of expression, in particular for journalism, and to encourage good journalism, including good investigative journalism, in the process. Journalists should not be afraid of exposing what they need to expose in the public interest. We also need to ensure that ordinary people are protected against poor and misrepresenting journalists, who ruin reputations in such a way that they cannot be recovered. That is the balance we need to strike.

After the election, my noble Friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill was pivotal in putting the matter on the agenda. Both Houses have worked hard through the Joint Committee to make progress, and the Government picked up many, but not all, of its suggestions. My party has twice in the last year looked at the matter at our conferences: to ensure that we have methods for resolving disputes—built into the legislation, if possible—so that if, for example, untrue defamatory statements are propagated, they can be withdrawn without everything having to go through the courts; and to ensure that we enhance our freedom in this country, not reduce it.

There are three matters left to look at, as part of the ongoing debate. One is whether the current processes in the law on early strike-out are sufficient. I heard what the Minister said, but that remains an issue. We want to be able to get rid of nonsense cases—our hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) made the case powerfully—to stop them clogging up the courts. We need to see whether we have adequate processes to do that. Secondly, we need to ensure that the public interest defence works appropriately. That is probably the most difficult and controversial area to get right. I am grateful that Ministers have said that they are willing to look broadly at the issues again. Lastly, there is the controversial question of whether the law should protect only individuals or also corporations, and, if so, how. I have no doubt that we shall return to that issue.

We now have some time after Third Reading before the Bill goes to the Lords. We will engage with people in the other place. We need to pause to ensure that when Lord Justice Leveson reports we do not confuse things in taking the Bill to the statute book, while at the same time picking up all the proposals he makes. Many people have helped us in the campaign to get libel law reformed, not least the Libel Reform Campaign. We thank them and look forward to continuing to work with them. The work is not completed, but a lot of good work has been done and there is general good will about ensuring that, for the first time in a generation, we bring the libel laws up to date for a modern Britain, in a modern world of communication, but where freedom of speech remains something of which we can be justifiably proud.