Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central has been trying to put a definition around this. That needs to happen. If it is not to be in the Bill, the Minister needs to put on the record exactly what his expectations are, because I can see this being challenged in court. Courts are very good at looking back at what is said and what is actually meant in Parliament, so it is quite important.

There are certain categories that no one has any problems with: open Companies House registers are available to anybody, for example, and so is the open electoral register. But how will the closed electoral register be dealt with? I would argue that people who want to be on the closed register would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that data would not be shared. We know that it is, but somebody might challenge that.

Likewise, there are telephone directories. I am not sure whether they are produced any more. Perhaps I am old-fashioned—I am showing my age now. [Interruption.] Well, I am sure they still exist in a digital format. Those who are old enough to remember will know that there was an ex-directory option for people who did not want their name published; someone could make a conscious decision that they did not want their private phone number to be in the public record. Now it must be all online, but how will that be dealt with? With a directory on which everyone’s number is publicly available, I would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that was public data; I think everyone would assume that. Where they are ex-directory, however, I think most people would reasonably expect their data not to be shared with anybody.

“No expectation of privacy” is very clear—it means things that are publicly available—but “no reasonable expectation” is a dance on the head of a pin. People’s interpretations of what is reasonable will be different. I am reassured that the agencies have protocols for dealing with that, and I am not suggesting for one minute that they will be on fishing expeditions, but we need some clarity on what it all means.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made a point about Facebook and other types of social media. For those who are interested, my “North Durham morning” posts are on Instagram, Facebook and Twitter, or X. I have been doing them for many years.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

Very nice they are, too.

[Mr Jones]

I have no reasonable expectation that those posts are private. I am not suggesting that the security services will want to look at North Durham mornings, but those posts are something that I have put in the public domain. That is fine, but it is different from what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East was talking about. We might share a photograph or information on a small Facebook group, but do we expect everyone to have access to it? I am not sure that we do. Where does that fit into the definition of “reasonable expectation”? Would the individual think that it was available? That is the point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd]

This is as good a time as any to raise this point. If we are going to give the powers to the security services, which nobody objects to with the appropriate oversight, and ask them to do more assessments, more dataset investigations and so on, does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister should give us assurances on resources? Given that we are asking the services to take on additional tasks in one fashion or another, does he agree that we have to set aside the resources? Perhaps, during his meeting with the Minister, he could tease that out a little bit more, because I do not want these powers and responsibilities to be given to the services without them having the appropriate resources— financial and staffing—to do their job.

[Mr Jones]

Their budget was cut yesterday.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Dan Jarvis]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. I join the Minister in warmly extending my thanks on behalf of Labour to all members of the Public Bill Committee and all the officials, both in the Department and in the House, who have done a sterling job in getting us to this point. I am grateful to the Minister for his collegiate approach, which I very much hope we will be able to maintain during the further passage of the Bill. Thank you, Mrs Cummins.

[Peter Dowd]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. May I say a particular thanks to you for chairing this Committee today in such a fantastic and eloquent way?

[Sir John Hayes]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. Since we are having further points of order, I want to say to the Minister, and the shadow Minister, how grateful I think most of the Committee are for the way this Bill has been conducted. This is a really good example of how a measure can be considered in Committee in a way that is not nakedly partisan or, worse, spiteful. I simply say to the Minister that I do regard the original Act as my child, and I see him as its foster parent, so he had better do a good job.

Bill, as amended, to be reported to the House.

Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Metcalfe]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 16

Complicity in joint enterprise cases

In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanors) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert—

“, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.—(Peter Dowd.)

This new clause would clarify the definition of ‘joint enterprise’ (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mrs Latham.

New clause 16 mirrors the Joint Enterprise (Significant Contribution) Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson) in attempting to amend the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. It clarifies that a person must make a significant contribution to a crime to be guilty of it. The private Member’s Bill, which has cross-party support, will have a Second Reading debate on Friday 2 February. The 1861 Act states that those

“who aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of ”—

an offence—

“…shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.”

However, the doctrine of secondary liability or joint enterprise, as it is more commonly known, is still older. Through common law, developed by the Court, “aid” or “abet” has now shifted to “assist” or “encourage” for establishing secondary liability. In many situations, this test is entirely reasonable. Most people would agree that an armed robber at a bank heist gone wrong, for example, can be deemed as culpable as their partner who actually shot a person, because they make a significant contribution to the crime by carrying or supplying a gun and threatening the cashier, for example. The problem, according to many legal experts, is that joint enterprise laws are sometimes used in a much wider way, often to convict people who have made no significant contribution to the crime at all. Campaigners have long warned that these laws can be used as a racist dragnet to maximise convictions.

Recent Crown Prosecution Service data, recorded and released as a result of legal action by Liberty and the campaign group Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, suggest that black people are 16 times more likely than white people to be prosecuted for homicide or attempted homicide under joint enterprise laws, yet no assessment of the reasons for this shocking statistic—and it is shocking—has been made by the Crown Prosecution Service, or, as I understand it, by the Government.

In 2016, the Supreme Court, in the case of R v. Jogee, said that the law on joint enterprise had taken a “wrong turn” for more than 30 years. It restored the proper law of intentions so that those who intended to commit or assist a crime, rather than those who only might have foreseen it, could be properly convicted. That was, as the BBC said, a moment of “genuine legal history”. Research by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies identifies that the judgment has had little to no effect from joint enterprise changes, charges or convictions, and the Court of Appeal has decided that prisoners whose juries had only been directed to consider foresight, rather than intention, should not have a retrial. The situation is gravely unjust for many prisoners, and my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman) tried to address it in his Criminal Appeal (Amendment) Bill.

It is a myth that the Supreme Court fixed joint enterprise in 2016. It left under-addressed what constitutes “assist” or “encourage”. There is currently no threshold or test for whether someone made a significant contribution to a crime to be convicted of it. That flexibility gives rise to uncertainties and injustice. For example, joint enterprise laws are being used to convict young people who are seen fighting, but not with the victim; young people who are not present at the scene; women who have no control over their boyfriends’ conduct; and young people who listen to certain kinds of music, where trials focus on character and culture rather than on contribution to a crime. In the recent case of Fiaz, the Court of Appeal suggested that a jury need not be specifically directed by the judge to consider the legal significance of a defendant’s contribution towards an offence. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined to hear that case, so it falls to Parliament to enact safer legal frameworks.

What would the new clause do? It would simply add weight to the words of the 1861 Act, inserting:

“by making a significant contribution to its commission”

and thereby enshrining in statute a common-sense safeguard against inappropriate or over-zealous prosecutions. That is an important principle in a fair and effective justice system. By clarifying that someone must make a “significant contribution” to an offence in order to be criminally liable, the new clause seeks to restore Parliament’s original meaning and to correct a second wrong turn by the court with respect to joint enterprise. That would help to ensure that persons who make no significant contribution to a crime are never again convicted of being complicit in that crime.

Of course, that would not prevent the use of alternative charges in cases involving multiple accused persons, nor would it prevent the prosecution of multiple persons for a crime in which they all made a significant contribution. It would not help anyone who is already convicted under this doctrine—I referred to the Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield—but it would be an important step in preventing the unfair and unjust use of joint enterprise laws against innocent people in the future. I understand that there may be some objections; as far as I am aware, the Government have not made any formal response to the proposed change but have let it be known that they are potentially resistant to the idea. I hope that the Minister's response to the Committee will clarify any of those objections.

In my view, it would be hard to object to the new clause on the grounds of unintended consequences as to do so would be an acknowledgement of the belief that some people deserve to be found guilty of offences—sometimes very serious offences, such as murder—despite making no significant contribution to the commission of those offences. As such, Ministers may claim that the amendment is unnecessary on the grounds that our current laws—whether “aid” or “abet” in statute or “assist” or “encourage” in common law—already imply a significant contribution or that the current flexibility of the law is part of its strength, as it means that it is for the jury to weigh up and decide on the facts of a particular case.

That is not the case according to Dr Felicity Gerry KC, who was lead counsel in the Jogee case. She described the following generic examples, all of which are based on real cases: a boy, cycling to and from an incident, who has no contact with the victim; a driver who drops friends off to collect drugs, and a fight happens outside the car; a passenger in a taxi, where others get out of the taxi and go to an area where a stabbing occurs, but that passenger has no contact with the victim; schoolchildren who gather for a fight and one of them dies, but they are all prosecuted even when they have had no contact with the victim and have no weapon, putting them all in risk of being convicted, without separating those who contribute and those who do not contribute; autistic children who find it difficult to assess what others will do; children exploited to sell drugs who get caught up in the actions of others; a woman whose violent boyfriend gets angry with some people and runs after them around a corner—she follows a short while later and pulls another person’s hair when she thinks he is being attacked; and a woman looking for her shoes during violent disorder.

All those scenarios describe circumstances in which people can be convicted of serious crimes, despite making no significant contribution to that crime, so it is not correct to claim that “significant contribution” is already implied by law—it is not.

[Jess Phillips]

In a case that I have come across, a woman who was a victim of domestic abuse was charged under the crime of joint enterprise and received a longer sentence—because she pleaded not guilty—than the person who abused her and killed somebody by pulling the trigger of a gun. Is my hon. Friend concerned that in some cases of joint enterprise, those who have not had it proven that they had a significant part to play get longer sentences than those who did?

[Peter Dowd]

My hon. Friend gets right to the nub of this matter, and she is absolutely right. I agree with her point. Dr Gerry points out that the case of Fiaz, in which she was lead counsel, highlights the need for legal clarity. Judges are currently required to direct juries to consider the significance of a defendant’s contribution to an offence, and that is leading to numerous miscarriages of justice. Only Parliament can fix that.

I have a number of questions for the Minister. If the new clause is unnecessary, as may be claimed, can the Minister explain why when schoolchildren spontaneously gather for a fight and one of them unfortunately dies, they are sometimes all prosecuted even when they have had no contact with the victim and no weapon? That is one of the many such examples provided by Dr Gerry, who, as I said, was the lead counsel in the landmark Jogee case.

Is the Minister be willing to meet Dr Gerry and other experts in this field who can explain why this change of law is so badly needed? Can the Minister explain why the Crown Prosecution Service’s own database suggests that black people, as I indicated earlier, are 16 times more likely than white people to be prosecuted for homicide or attempted homicide under joint enterprise laws? What assessment have the Government made of the reasons behind that remarkable statistic? It is shocking. Is it not obvious why campaigners say that joint enterprise is too often used as a racist dragnet? Finally, will the Minister agree that it is not in the public interest to prosecute those who have not made a significant contribution to a crime?

[Alex Cunningham]

I begin by paying tribute to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle on the new clause, and the ongoing work of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), who we have already heard has introduced a private Member’s Bill to the House on the same issue. I am sure that Members across the Committee will share my admiration and respect for the campaigners from JENGbA, who have been tirelessly working on challenging injustices in joint enterprise convictions for well over a decade.

As we have just heard, the new clause mirrors the Joint Enterprise (Significant Contribution) Bill, which we hope will receive its Second Reading on Friday 2 February. I would prefer to see the Government making commitments on this matter, as it is a complex area of law and practice and any reforms will need careful consideration and monitoring to ensure that they are working, especially after the unexpected absence of change following the Jogee decision in 2016, which I will come back to later.

I am glad that the new clause has been tabled to enable a discussion in Committee, because the issue deserves more parliamentary time. Even though we have had many criminal justice Bills before this House in the past 10 years, all while alarms have been raised about continuing problems with joint enterprise law, Parliament has not engaged substantially with the issue for some time. During my tenure as shadow Justice Minister, I met the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and the PCS, among others, and heard about ongoing challenges with joint enterprise convictions, despite the decision in Jogee and the very active collaboration between campaigners, legal practitioners and academics over the last decade. So I will be very interested to hear from the Minister about the work her Department has been doing in this area and, indeed, about any ongoing engagement it has had with campaigners, experts and practitioners who are collaborating on reform in this area.

The processes of prosecution and conviction in our criminal justice system should be fair, transparent and accountable, but joint enterprise law can be vague and confusing, and it can lead to apparently unjust outcomes. Some examples of individuals who are potentially at risk of being prosecuted under joint enterprise have been provided by Dr Felicity Gerry KC, who was the lead counsel in the case of Jogee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bootle has already outlined them to the Committee.

In 2016, when the Supreme Court ruled that the law of joint enterprise had taken a “wrong turn” for over 30 years, it restored the proper law of intention so that those who intended to commit or assist a crime, rather than those who might have foreseen it, could be properly convicted under joint enterprise law. These are all based on real cases, and as I have said, my hon. Friend has given the example of the taxi passenger getting out and becoming involved in a stabbing, or the woman who pulled somebody’s hair while trying to defend her boyfriend who may well have carried out a serious offence. Those individuals were charged under joint enterprise law, and they were at risk of extremely lengthy sentences, as if they were the primary offender, even when it is very difficult to discern how they contributed to the crime in question. Joint enterprise law has been used to convict young people who have not been present at the scene of the crime, and young people who listen to certain kinds of music, and there is a risk that such a trial focuses on character and culture, not contribution to a crime. My hon. Friend spoke about that in some detail. It is clear that joint enterprise law needs to be reformed in some way.

Last September, the CPS finally recorded and published a set of pilot data about joint enterprise cases, as a result of legal action by Liberty and JENGbA. While the results were shocking, they were, sadly, not surprising, as they confirmed much of what has been said by joint enterprise reformers for years. The data revealed that over half of those involved were aged under 25. Some 30% of the defendants in the cases were black, compared with the 4% of black people in the wider population, and black 18 to 24-year-olds were the largest demographic group identified in the pilot data. The data illustrated what we already knew about joint enterprise, which is that there is a serious racial disproportionality in its use.

The CPS pilot data suggests that black people are 16 times—I repeat, 16 times—more likely than white people to be prosecuted for homicide or attempted homicide under joint enterprise laws, which is a very significant divergence. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister the results of the data analysis, particularly about what she believes are the reasons behind the shocking disparities, given that the CPS has said that no conclusions about its decision making can be drawn from the pilot data. At the very least, we have to ask questions about the possibility that this level of divergence is at least in part caused by discriminatory practices in our criminal justice system. Looking at those figures, is the Minister confident that the framework for joint enterprise prosecutions is fit for purpose?

It has taken a number of years for the CPS to finally publish data on this important issue, but now that we have it, we must ensure that the Ministry of Justice is using that data to explore how it can best improve practice. I would also be grateful if the Minister could share any other plans for data collection and analysis in relation to the application of joint enterprise law, and anything she is aware of in the Ministry of Justice, the CPS or other Government body that is happening to progress this.

I was personally quite surprised at the scale of joint enterprise prosecutions, with the CPS data showing 680 defendants in 190 cases of homicide or attempted homicide across six of 14 CPS areas in just six months. That number is considerably higher than I would ever have anticipated. If the Minister has any thoughts on the number of prosecutions, I ask her to share them with the Committee. The high level of joint enterprise prosecutions demonstrates that at the very least it is an issue deserving of considerably more active consideration by parliamentarians and the Government.

Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could speak to any discussions that she has had in her Department about the recent Fiaz case, in which the Court of Appeal suggested that a jury need not be specifically directed by the judge to consider the legal significance of a defendant’s contribution towards an offence. Dr Gerry has argued that the case highlights the need for additional legal clarity, as judges do not always direct juries to consider the significance of a defendant’s contribution toward an offence. Does the Minister also recognise the need for additional clarity in that area, and has her Department considered any means by which that may be achieved? It is an area with substantial cross-party recognition that more needs to be done to increase the fairness, transparency and accountability of prosecutions, and I look forward to hearing the Department’s position on the matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd]

I take the Minister’s points in good faith. Nothing that I say today—nothing whatever—condones any attempted criminality, but the question of proportionality, which we have discussed several times, is key. The Minister gave the example of a young man breaking into a care home, who was able to prove that he assisted the person. In that case, he was having to prove that he was not guilty. A fundamental element of British law is that someone is innocent until proven guilty, not the other way round. I see the perplexed look on the Minister’s face, but the young man in that case had to prove that he was not guilty. This was not about the prosecution proving that he was guilty.

I do not want to go into the detail of these cases; I am just trying to make the point that the Jogee case went so far, but it still did not deal with the question of proportionality. One defence solicitor said:

“They don’t need to prove that you did anything. If you’re part of a gang, it doesn’t matter, because the actus reus”—

that is, being there—

“and the mens rea”,

the state of mind,

“is being in the gang”.

That could be applied in so many different cases. It could apply in boardrooms, and right across the piece: “You were there. You are guilty.” That is almost what it is saying, and that is what lawyers and Dr Gerry are trying to get the Government to consider.

Let us have the debate and have the discussion with the experts. The whole point of British justice is that when issues are raised and potential injustice arises, we think it through and work it out, instead of just closing the door. The danger in this situation is that the Government are closing the door and effectively saying that the Jogee case is the final say on this matter. I do not think it is.

However, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside, who has done sterling work, will be addressing the issue in the debate on Friday 2 February. On that basis, I will withdraw the new clause, but I ask the Minister to give careful consideration to what I have said. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17

Offence of failing to remain at the scene of a traffic collision

“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—

‘(4A) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) is liable—

(a) If a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a fatal injury—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.

(b) If a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a serious non-fatal injury—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

(c) In any other case—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’”—(Peter Dowd.)

This new clause would expand the existing offence of failing to stop after a road collision to create more serious penalties for failing to stop after collisions which result in death or serious injury.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Peter Dowd]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 18—Time to report road collision—

“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, omit subsection (6) and insert—

‘(6) In complying with a duty under this section to report an accident or to produce such a certificate of insurance or other evidence, as is mentioned in section 165(2)(a) of this Act, it is an offence for a driver—

(a) not to do so at a police station or to a constable as soon as is reasonably practicable, and

(b) not to do so within two hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to reporting an accident, or within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to the production of a certificate of insurance or other evidence.’”

This amendment would amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to reduce the time within which a driver must report a road collision in which they were involved from twenty-four hours to two hours, and make it an offence not to report an accident.

New clause 49—Amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1988—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In each of the sections listed below, after ‘a road or other public place’ insert ‘, or a private place adjacent to a road,’—

section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving);

section 1A (causing serious injury by dangerous driving);

section 2 (dangerous driving);

section 2B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);

section 2C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);

section 3 (careless, and inconsiderate, driving).”

This new clause would extend the Road Traffic Act 1988 so that a range of driving offences can be committed in private places adjacent to roads as well as on public roads or in public places.

[Peter Dowd]

New clauses 17 and 18 relate to the offence of failing to remain at the scene of a traffic collision. My new clause 17 is clear and unambiguous. As Members will see from the explanatory statement, it would expand the existing offence of failing to stop after a road collision and would create a more serious penalty for failing to stop after a collision that results in the death or serious injury of the person hit by the vehicle. I emphasise the element that refers to victims of serious injury or death.

I put on the record the support provided to me by RoadPeace, particularly by Lucy Harrison. I want to mention Pauline Fielding, who died last year; her son was killed in an accident several decades ago, and she was a sterling advocate and campaigner on the issue in the north-west. I put on record my thanks for the work that Pauline did. I also thank Cycling UK, particularly Roger Geffen; Amy Aeron-Thomas at Action Vision Zero, who has worked on the issue; and a number of other organisations that have campaigned for many years. However, everything I say today is my responsibility and not that of others.

Why have these measures not been put on the statute book before? Promises to review the law have been made in the past and, to be fair, have been partly fulfilled, but there remains a great deal to do. It has been 10 years since the Government said that they would undertake a full review and consultation on traffic offences. Regrettably, as we discuss these issues, no full review has taken place. It seems to me that there is an irrefutable case for introducing these amendments, or a variation of them, on potential penalties. I am not servile to the wording of the new clauses; there can be variations on a theme. I recognise the legislative pressures on the Government and the workloads within Departments, but sometimes there are issues that have to be faced up to. In my view, this is one of them.

Let me set the context for these proposals. Every 16 minutes, someone is killed or seriously injured on a road in the United Kingdom. That is quite a stark figure, as I am sure hon. Members will agree; it is an official figure based on the average over the 10-year period from 2013 to 2022. To put it into an annual context, it means that 31,000 men, women and children were killed or seriously injured in collisions, out of a total of about 135,000 casualties right across the piece, including very minor collisions. In a year, 1,766 people killed were killed—1,711 in Britain and 55 in Northern Ireland—and 28,941 seriously injured: 28,031 in Britain and 910 in Northern Ireland. Road deaths have increased by 10% since 2021 and are close to pre-pandemic levels. Serious injuries are up 8% since 2021. I stand to be corrected, but on average, if I have my figures right, 85 people are killed or seriously injured every year in each of our constituencies. That is seven every month. The lives of our constituents are lost or irreparably damaged or changed.

Meanwhile, many drivers simply leave the scene of the collision—as many as 17,000, according to figures from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. Not all of those are related to serious injury or fatality, which this clause deals with, but many families are left bereft and victims are left to carry on with their lives while perhaps very physically or neurologically damaged, not to mention the ongoing psychological impact of not knowing who was responsible and of not being able to settle. Let us say that families approached us in our constituency surgery having found out that some of the drivers involved in collisions had fled the scene—in other words, they had hit and run—and had avoided potentially more serious consequences as a result. What would we say to our constituents?

In preparing this speech, I pondered whether to give case examples of lives destroyed and families left shattered. I decided not to. Members have had so much to take in already—we have heard that today—that I do not think that adding to that with more tragic narratives would be appropriate, but I will challenge them in a different way. For the purposes of the debate, I will set aside the emotional effect on the victim’s family, knowing that their daughter, son, brother, sister, mother, father or other relative has been left on the road or the side of the road to die by a fleeing driver because the driver decided not to stop, or, having stopped, got back into the car and drove off.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

My hon. Friend is correct, but that would be a civil action for negligence, for which remedies would be available. We treat private land separately, but I think the was saying something rather different, about where private land becomes public land. When the index offence takes place, it relates to a motor vehicle on public land; we are not dealing with particularly difficult definitional issues. I undertake to take that point away; I had not understood it from the motion and the explanation of the hon. Member for Swansea East, so it might require some further thought. I hope conversations are happening in the Department for Transport, but I will ensure that that point is included in the Department’s thinking.

I point out, in the interest of completeness, that there is a broad definition of land that is defined as “private”. Some complications may exist around the classifications of private land, such as that used for military, commercial or other official purposes or land that is exempt from legal proceedings for offences committed there. There is a legal framework in place. Accidents on private land are covered by civil law and compensation—I talked about negligence in relation to a quad bike. In extreme cases such as gross negligence manslaughter or breaches of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the criminal law may be engaged too. With all that in mind, I urge hon. Members to withdraw the motion.

[Peter Dowd]

I hear what the Minister says, and I will withdraw the motion. It was a probing amendment in an attempt to give consideration to this issue, which affects so many people—our constituents—day in, day out; I gave the figures. As I said, I recuse myself from giving examples, because they are dreadfully distressing for people and I do not want to distress Members any more than I need to. I recused myself from giving examples, of which there are so many, but I hope the Minister hears the spirit of what I tried to say. It is not about people wanting vengeance; it is about getting an element of justice. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to these matters, because at some point they will come back.

I acknowledge and accept that this is not a transport Committee, but my proposals are within the scope of the Bill, so the Government have the power to pursue them if they wish. I ask the Ministers to take them away and think about them. I will be in touch with the Department for Transport, although, as I mentioned earlier, Departments are often packed out with work. None the less, this issue is of such import—it impacts on the lives of our constituents day in, day out—and we and the Government must consider it very carefully as early as practically possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 19

Use of another person’s dwelling place for criminal purposes: cuckooing

“(1) A person ‘P’ commits an offence if—

(a) P makes regular use of or takes up residence in a residential building lawfully occupied by another person ‘R’,

(b) P uses the residential building as a base for criminal activities including but not limited to—

(i) dealing, storing or taking unlawfully held controlled drugs,

(ii) facilitating sex work,

(iii) taking up residence without a lawful agreement with R in circumstances where R is under duress or otherwise being coerced or controlled, or

(iv) financially abusing R.

(2) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘building’ includes any structure or part of a structure (including a temporary or moveable structure), and

(b) a building is ‘residential’ if it is designed or adapted, before the time of entry, for use as a place to live.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause would make cuckooing an offence. Cuckooing is where the home of a vulnerable person is taken over by a criminal in order to use it to deal, store or take drugs, facilitate sex work, as a place for them to live, or to financially abuse the occupier.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would make cuckooing a specific offence. I believe that action on what should be a clearly defined crime has support across the House—including, I understand, from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and the hon. Members for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez), for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), among others.

I have also received support from the Police Superintendents’ Association for the new clause. The PSA states:

“There is clear need for legislation of this kind, with evidence showing that cuckooing is a widely used tactic in many serious offences, including those linked to serious and organised crime, such as county lines drug supply and human trafficking. Vulnerable people are often targeted and exploited to facilitate long-term criminal operations, through the use of their property. These amendments would provide police and partners with an effective means of tackling this and better safeguarding those at risk.”

It goes on:

“Any legislation would need to ensure that evidence thresholds are clear and that exact wording around offences is robust, so that vulnerable people can be appropriately safeguarded. Vulnerability must be reflected in this legislation, with clear reference to those victims who consent to criminal activity under duress or who are unaware of the activity being carried out.”

The PSA raises other points that it believes should be considered:

“Inclusion of reference to evidence of a written legal agreement or clear proof which must be provided by a suspect, to show compliance on the part of any individual suspected of being subjected to cuckooing; Including local authorities as interested parties, with reference to ‘R’, as properties owned by local authorities or housing associations are typically used in the committing of these offences; Wider legislation for repeat offenders that move on to additional victims/properties.”

The National Crime Agency explains that cuckooing occurs when drug dealers or other criminals

“take over a local property, normally belonging to a vulnerable person”

and use it as a base from which to run their criminal activities, with the person still living in the property. I hope that, working across the Benches, we can ensure that those who prey on such people are properly held to account. Cuckooing is often associated with county lines drug supply, in which illegal drugs are transported from one area to another, often by children or vulnerable people who are coerced into doing so by organised criminal groups. It cannot be stressed enough that it can also be an independent venture, with one or more people preying on individuals by taking over their homes and controlling their lives. As well as having to live with what is effectively a drugs—or other crime—den in their own home, the victims may see their home being used for accommodating sex work, or be financially abused by the criminals.

Cuckooing is a terrifying experience for the vulnerable adults who are targeted by these criminals. I do not think that any of us can comprehend what it would mean to have our home taken over in such a way. I suspect that there is not a member of this Committee who does not have a vulnerable adult in their constituency or know someone who lives alone and could be targeted by such unscrupulous criminals. Everyone should feel safe in their home.

Police work with local authorities to deliver a safeguarding response for victims of cuckooing. For example, the Metropolitan Police Service has dedicated cuckooing officers, who work with partners to safeguard victims and divert them from the criminal justice system. However, cuckooing is not defined in legislation and is not a specific offence, and data on cuckooing is limited. An article in Inside Housing in November 2023 showed that only seven police forces recorded cases of cuckooing, and many local authorities do not record cases either, as analysis by the London Assembly Labour group last year showed. I do not know why we do not have more records of this kind of behaviour. I suspect that it goes on across the country, particularly in areas of deprivation and areas where vulnerable people do not have the support that some of us would hope for and expect. Perhaps the Minister could outline any plans she may have to require crimes of this nature to be reported.

Because of the sensitive nature of the crime and the vulnerability of the victims, it is difficult to illustrate it in any detail. One example that has come to light involves a vulnerable man in Leytonstone whose mother died two years ago. His life effectively fell apart, and he had difficulty coping. His house was taken over by a criminal—or perhaps criminals—who has been using it for drug dealing, possibly prostitution and other criminal activities. I am told that the takeover of this vulnerable person’s home happened in what is considered a nice residential street, so as one can imagine it has been a massive shock for all the neighbours.

As it stands, the law does not provide sufficient authority to enable the police and local authority to address the situation properly. If our new clause had already existed, there could have been an earlier and therefore more effective intervention to protect this man, whose life in his own home has been made hell. I hope, for that reason alone, that the Committee and Government will support our new clause. The Ministers and Government Members can feel entirely comfortable in doing so, as it is Conservative policy—or, at least, it was until late last year.

Criminal Justice Bill (Seventh sitting)

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

As we have heard, clauses 15 to 17 expand police powers to test for drugs in suspects who have been arrested and are in police detention. Drug testing on arrest was originally introduced as a police power under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, which inserted sections 63B and 63C into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That legislation gave the police the power to drug test those arrested if aged 18 and over, or charged if aged 14 and over, for the presence of specified class A drugs if arrested or charged either for a trigger offence or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has reasonable grounds to suspect that specified class A drug use has caused or contributed to the offence and authorises the test. Trigger offences include theft, handling stolen goods, going equipped for stealing and possession of a controlled drug if committed in respect of a specified class A drug. We know that such offences have a significant link to substance misuse. Clause 15 expands police powers to test not just specified class A drugs but any specified controlled drug.

We were very keen on such measures 23 years ago in relation to class A drugs, and we support their expansion to include any specified controlled drug; my anxiety stems from the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned, we heard in the evidence session and we know from engagement with our local police forces that there is not likely to be the capacity to do this effectively.

The Minister said that there are record police numbers, but he knows that there are 10,000 fewer police in neighbourhood settings. His pushback to that in previous debates has been to classify response police as neighbourhood police, but they would certainly not be able to do this type of activity. The burden of proof is on the Minister and the Department to show where the capacity will come from. We have real doubts, although we hope the measure will work.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the measure seems to be in contradiction to the position that many police forces are in? Because they lack resource capacity, they are withdrawing from dealing with issues relating to mental health and are saying, “We don’t have the capacity to do it.” Does my hon. Friend agree that this measure will put more pressure on police forces at a time when they are having to withdraw from some operational interventions?

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Routinely or in extremis, demand pressures can push officers to do just the basics—keeping people safe and putting people in detention—rather than dealing with the broader issues, as we want them to. That problem creates further issues, and that is a challenge for us all.

[Alex Norris]

The evidence from Humberside was strong and gave us encouragement to expand the scheme nationally; the challenge will be whether we see the same level of thought in its implementation across the country as we saw in Humberside. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle said, the risk is that forces will apply the scheme by simply not responding or turning their phone off, and displacing the activity. Humberside is a really good example of something done thoughtfully and well, but we should not assume that we will see that nationwide.

[Peter Dowd]

On the point that the Minister made in his intervention, does my hon. Friend agree that the issue is circuitous? The reason why the police were involved in mental health interventions in the past, although they are pulling away from them, was that there were such strains and stresses on the health service and local government that they had to fill the gap. Does my hon. Friend agree that this is getting to the farcical stage, with gaps in resources left, right and centre?

[Alex Norris]

Sadly, it has been a defining feature of the past nearly 14 years that we have been left dealing with significant issues such as substance misuse at the latest and most expensive stage, and that is particularly pertinent in policing. We deal with mental health issues, to the degree that we do deal with them—certainly for children and adolescents, that is definitely not the case universally—at the point of crisis. We do not have earlier interventions.

My amendment 133 seeks to add a little bit of that back in. It is a point of agreement across parties that, if individuals are in custody for crimes that they are alleged to have committed and they test positive for substances in their system, then that support is necessary—it is critical—to stop their drug use and hopefully change their life. My amendment refers to that, and I will get to that in a second. Currently, under the Drugs Act 2005, an individual who tests positive for a class A drug may be required to attend an individual assessment relating to their drug use and possibly a follow-up assessment. I think that we can go a little further than that, as my amendment does.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(8) A constable may search a specified premises for specified items without obtaining authorisation under subsection (1) if the constable believes that the search is necessary for the effective identification of stolen goods.

(9) If a constable conducts a search by virtue of subsection (8), they shall inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector that they have made the search as soon as practicable after the completion of the search.

(10) An officer who is informed of a search under subsection (9) shall make a record in writing—

(a) of the grounds for the search;

(b) of the nature of the items sought;

(c) confirming that the officer would have given their authorisation under subsection (2) had the constable sought it.”

This amendment aligns the power given under Clause 19 with that in section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and enables a police constable to undertake a search for stolen goods without a warrant without obtaining authorisation from a superior officer.

Clause 19 is one of the more significant clauses. It introduces very significant new powers of entry, search and seizure without a warrant. That is not without controversy, as I think we will cover in the next three debates. Amendment 2, which proposed to leave out clause 19, has not been selected for debate, but it is worth noting that it received quite a lot of signatures spanning a very broad range of parliamentarians across the Conservatives, the Lib Dems and the Democratic Unionist party. Clearly, a significant range of colleagues with significantly different world views are discomforted by these provisions. That is always an interesting and important sign that we should get something right.

Again, I subject this to what my constituents think and the conversations that I have had with them in the past. So many items are now fitted with a GPS or geolocation tracker, but it is a matter of considerable frustration and no little confusion that the fact that we know where an item is does not provide appropriate grounds for a constable to retrieve it. That is deeply frustrating and, as we have seen in the explanatory notes and heard in the evidence sessions, is a problem that the clause seeks to solve.

The clause inserts into the Theft Act 1968 proposed new section 26A, which confers power on a police officer to enter and search any premises for stolen goods without a warrant. Under the current provisions in the Theft Act, a warrant would have to be issued by a magistrate before such a search could take place. Given the nature of the enterprises that pinch digital technology or expensive bikes, or that may even be stealing cars to order, we know that that delay involved could mean that our response is far too late and that the moment for retrieval, for detection and perhaps for breaking up an organised group of criminals has been missed.

Clause 19 goes on to state the parameters for the new power whereby the need for a warrant can be bypassed—namely, that a police officer of at least inspector level must authorise a constable to enter premises and search for the specified items, in this case stolen goods. It also sets out the conditions—namely, that the police officer of at least inspector level must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the items have been stolen, that they are on the premises and that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant without frustrating or prejudicing the search—and that authorisation can be oral or written. Again, this process seems reasonable, given that the crime that it is concerned with often involves the rightful owner having that degree of tracking information and being able to provide it to the police, showing the precise location of the stolen goods, but at present the police cannot do anything about it.

There are certain checks and oversights. A uniformed constable must conduct the search; it must happen within 24 hours of authorisation, although I suspect that such searches will take place much more quickly than that; and it must be done at a reasonable hour. Again, in principle we support these measures; without wanting to prejudge the stand part debate, I need to establish that context before I can turn to my amendment.

The current process for obtaining warrants to search properties for stolen goods with tracking information can be an inefficient use of police and magistrates’ time. It hampers investigations and allows criminal enterprises to benefit from their activities, using the slowness of the authorities to do things much more quickly, and obviously we know that that can have a knock-on effect for further crimes as well.

An interesting point was well made in the evidence session when we heard from Superintendent Nick Smart of the Police Superintendents’ Association. He challenged the Committee about why the Bill appeared to sit differently from existing powers set out in section 18 of PACE. Amendment 61, which I have tabled, sets out to probe that issue.

Section 18 of PACE allows entry and search without the prior authorisation of a more senior officer, provided that it is after an arrest and the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that there is evidence on the premises being searched relating to the offence that has been committed, or to a connected offence. Therefore, there is precedent in current legislation for entry and search without a warrant or prior authorisation, and section 18 of PACE allows for consent to be sought afterwards, with a senior officer at the rank of inspector or above having to sign off on that, saying that they would have authorised the search if they had been there in that moment. That is also an important caveat.

Amendment 61 merely seeks to align the powers in clause 19 with similar powers in section 18 of PACE. The reason I think that would be quite helpful is that it would be more consistent from an officer’s point of view. I do not think that we would want officers to think, “Ah, am I using section 19 of the Criminal Justice Act or section 18 of PACE?” and therefore asking, “Can I, or can’t I?” The possibility for error is quite clear there.

More importantly, however, I think there would be some clarity for the public, too, because, once again, just as it would be challenging but not unreasonable to ask for officers to be very conscious of the different sections of the powers that they are using—of course they need to know that, although there are times in the heat of the moment when mistakes could happen—I do not think it is reasonable to expect members of the public to hold such things in their minds.

Therefore, consistency in the regime used is important; I think that was the point that Superintendent Smart was making, which is probably a good one. I want to press the Minister as to why that approach was not taken and why his approach is better.

[Peter Dowd]

Amendments 61, 58 and 59 are linked, but I will speak first to amendment 61, a thoughtful amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North.

I want to address an issue relating to the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European convention on human rights into UK law, with particular reference to section 6, “Acts of public authorities”, which came into force in October 2000. I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am concerned, for the purposes of the amendment, the right to respect for private and family life informs the relevant police powers and sets them in context.

Article 8 of the convention states:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

As paragraph 2 above sets out, it is unlawful under the Act for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with the convention right, unless it is compelled or permitted by statute to do otherwise. There is an excellent lecture by Robert Walker entitled “The English Law of Privacy: an Evolving Human Right”, which is well worth a perusal. I am sure that everyone in this room agrees, notwithstanding the current debate among some Government Members in relation to the ECHR more broadly, that article 8 is pretty uncontentious. What is perhaps more contentious is where it is breached. It is important that we keep that in mind.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd]

My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North has laid out the context for amendments 58 and 59 with thoughtfulness and with consideration, as he did for amendment 61. I agree with him that seeking a review within two years or thereabouts of the application of the powers is really important. It is important to ensure that when we give additional powers to the police, we ensure that the operation, implementation and use of those powers are subject to review. I think we would all agree that it would be beneficial on various levels, including operationally and in policy terms, to step back after a period of time and take a look at the implementation of the powers.

Notwithstanding the fact that my hon. Friend has described the powers as narrow, people will not be used to them. Let us say that in the first five or six months of last year, there were about 50 or 60 bike thefts in my constituency and that half of those bikes had a locator on them. Although they may have a “stolen” bike in their home, people are not used to the police just turning up, going into the shed and getting the bike, so we must explain why we are doing that. It is important to have a review after a couple of years to ensure that my constituents know that they will not be on the receiving end of a disproportionate intervention by the authorities. I have no reason to believe that the powers will be used indiscriminately or outside the spirit of our discussions today, but we live in a democracy and we want to live in a cohesive society, so it is important that we have checks and balances. A review after a couple of years, to ensure consistency, is important.

I agree with amendment 59, which would require the College of Policing to produce a code of practice in relation to the use of the powers. The College of Policing often talks about using

“evidence-based knowledge in everything we develop”.

That is crucial, so I am sure that it would welcome my hon. Friend’s proposal. It is important that the modus operandi of the police officer or constable be guided by authorised professional practice guidelines, which the College of Policing has, to ensure that their interventions are as appropriate as possible. That is all the more important in the light of the challenging circumstances in which some powers will be used. As I have indicated, the College of Policing is already well versed in the production of codes of practice, including—to name just a couple—those on the use of the police national computer and the law enforcement data service and on armed policing and the use of less lethal weapons.

I hope that the Minister will give careful consideration to the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and I have made about the amendments. As my hon. Friend says, if the Minister will not accept the amendments, we ask him for an assurance that the spirit of them, if not the letter, will be included in the Bill. I know that the Minister is always equitable in these matters, and I am sure he will give careful consideration to the well-thought-out and considered views expressed by my hon. Friend.

[Chris Philp]

Let me respond briefly on amendments 58 and 59. Amendment 58 asks for review. Members of the Committee will know that review and scrutiny of statutory powers happens on a regular basis. The Home Office collects and publishes more data on the use of police powers than it ever has before. There are plenty of opportunities for Members to scrutinise the use of powers both via written questions, oral questions, the Select Committee, and so on and so forth, but critically the normal post-legislative review of the Act will happen three to five years after Royal Assent, as is usual. The scrutiny of how this works in practice will happen through those mechanisms, particularly through the post-legislative review that always happens three to five years after Royal Assent. A range of scrutiny mechanisms exist beyond that. The police are not under-scrutinised.

On amendment 59, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee, particularly the shadow Minister, that we intend to update PACE code B, which covers police powers of entry, search and seizure, to give a clear statutory guide—even stronger than the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice—on how best these powers should be used. Under section 66 of PACE, there is a requirement for us to do that. We are of course happy to do it, but we do not actually have any choice; it is a statutory requirement under section 66. That will include the new powers covered in clause 19 of the Bill. We will work with the college to ensure that any supplementary guidance it issues on these new powers reflects the wording of updated code B, but updating code B is compulsory; we have to do it. It is statutory, and I can confirm that we will comply with our statutory obligations. I hope that addresses the issues raised by amendments 58 and 59.

Criminal Justice Bill (Sixth sitting)

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris]

I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley for offering a powerful dose of reality about what is happening and the risks. We know that abusers will find every possible gap and try to use them to perpetrate their abuse and these heinous crimes. We must follow them and close those gaps the best we can—or, even better, get ahead.

Clauses 11 and 12 make good the recommendations of the Law Commission in its 2021 “Modernising Communications Offences” report. The Minister described that as important and I echo her comments. The clauses also finish what was started during consideration of the Online Safety Bill. We supported it at that point, and the Bill was well scrutinised, so I will not rehash that debate.

The Government amendments extend the provisions to Northern Ireland. I wonder whether there is a different story about Scotland, because most of the Government amendments expand provisions to Scotland as well as to Northern Ireland. I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on that.

I will finish on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about institutions. Throughout my time in Parliament, the issue of conversion therapies has been at the forefront. We wish that we were getting on with banning them today—goodness knows how much longer we will have to wait—but we know that very harmful self-harm practices can be part of those therapies. Will the Minister say, in responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, how accountability will fall in cases like that? That is important; if there is a gap for a certain organisation, perhaps we need to return to this. It might be that we will be assisted by the provision in clause 14 that, where a significant senior person in an organisation commits a crime, the organisation can be held accountable. Perhaps that is the way to close the gap—I do not know. I will be interested in the Minister’s view.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

My hon. Friends the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Minister have made excellent points. Once we go into this, we start to find that there are areas we need to think out a bit more clearly. We may have to come back to this in due course, potentially in future legislation.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley prompted me to think about the headteacher who committed suicide following an Ofsted inspection. The coroner’s court directly attributed that—partly, at the very least—to the institutional impact that that organisation had on her. Does my hon. Friend the shadow Minister agree that these are very important matters that we have to think through? Once we have let this issue out of the bag, so to speak, we have to very carefully consider the implications further down the line in terms of institutional abuse, because that is what it amounts to.

[Alex Norris]

I am really grateful for my hon. Friend’s contribution. I think that is exactly right. We will hear from the Minister in her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley where the Government settle on that point. Certainly on the face of the Bill, institutions are left out. I do wonder whether clause 14 would give us the opportunity to reconnect institutions. I suspect that is not the motivation behind that clause, but it may work in that way. Those are pertinent questions that I am sure the Minister is about to address.

Criminal Justice Bill (Fifth sitting)

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Philp]

As Members will be aware, criminals often use telecommunications networks to target people to try and defraud them, for example with scam texts and scam calls. In fact, the secretary of my local residents association in Coulsdon, in my constituency of Croydon South, sent me a message just this morning with an example of a scam text that she had just received, purporting to come from the Royal Mail and inviting her to click on a link and fill in her details. This is clearly a problem.

I am sure that we have all heard such examples; indeed, we have probably received messages ourselves. Although most people can identify them as scams trying to elicit fraud, unfortunately some people who receive them are taken in, because the messages can often be quite realistic, and often they end up losing significant amounts of money.

Very often, these scam texts can be traced back to so-called “SIM farms”, which are electronic devices that sometimes hold hundreds of physical SIM cards that can be used to send out thousands and thousands of scam text messages in a matter of seconds. These devices are relatively easy to buy and—until this Bill passes into law—they are legal to buy online, enabling criminals to commit large-scale fraud by abusing our telecommunications network. In the fraud strategy, we committed to stopping that, which is why we are legislating.

We consulted on these proposals in May 2023 and received broad support for these measures. There were some concerns about the definitions being too broad, such that they would inadvertently criminalise some legitimate activity, but we have worked to develop the legislation in order to address those concerns.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

On that particular point about possession of a SIM farm, the Bill says that a person charged with an offence under the clause must provide “good reason”. It goes on to state what the good reasons are, for example providing broadcasting services. However, I would have assumed that a broadcasting service would be already licensed; similarly, if a body is operating a genuine public transport service, it is probably a local authority. Could the Minister explain that “good reason” a bit more? It seems a bit woolly or wide to me. Somebody who is clever enough to run a SIM farm would be clever enough to find a way around that somehow. I want to support the Government in advancing their proposal, but is it possible to tighten it up a bit more?

Oral Answers to Questions

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Monday 22nd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)]

2. What steps her Department is taking to help tackle antisocial behaviour.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

17. What steps her Department is taking to help tackle antisocial behaviour.

[Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)]

19. What steps she is taking to reduce antisocial behaviour.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd]

According to a joint letter I received from the Home Secretary and the Levelling Up Secretary on 27 March 2023:

“Tackling antisocial behaviour is an absolute priority for this Government.”

In the real world, how can 450 fewer police officers in Merseyside since 2010, and 69p per person invested in the immediate justice pilot, be classed as anything approaching tackling antisocial behaviour?

[Suella Braverman]

I am pleased that, thanks to this Government’s commitment, Merseyside has received millions of pounds of increased funding compared with previous years, but, most importantly, there have been seven rounds of safer streets fund projects in Merseyside, with 2.9 million in total provided over four rounds. I am glad that Merseyside has been chosen as one of our pilot areas for our immediate justice scheme, which is one way we will kick antisocial behaviour.

HM Passport Office Backlogs

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Kevin Foster]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments. We have increased the capacity of the counter service, which is similarly seeing much-increased demand. We certainly accept the point that there need to be significant improvements in the performance of the advice line and the MPs’ line, and we are already engaging with Home Office teams about how we can get more resources in so that people can have their queries answered, particularly when Members of Parliament raise issues on behalf of those with compelling and compassionate reasons for travel and therefore need their application to be expedited.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

I have a passport office in my constituency; may I say gently to the Minister that his rather transactional and at times nonchalant approach will not go down well with constituents throughout the country? I have had queries from all over the country because of this situation, and delays have been reported for months on end. Will the Minister confirm whether the backlog is reducing or increasing and how significant that might be? Will he consider compensating those who may have lost holidays outside the times allowed, or the people who have even lost jobs as a result of the problems at the Passport Office?

[Kevin Foster]

I am disappointed to hear the hon. Gentleman’s comments and the tone of them. We have not been nonchalant. Although others have not shown too much interest until now, the teams—including those in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency—have been working hard. In some cases, they have been working extra hours over weekends—for which I pay tribute to them—to produce a record output that is far above any other Passport Office output on record.

What the hon. Gentleman says sounds rather odd when we are recruiting extra staff and making sure that cases can still be expedited if there are urgent demands. We were clear last year that we put the service standard at 10 weeks to make sure people knew that they may need to allow extra time. Last year, we sent 4.7 million texts to those who had not renewed their passport to try to encourage more people to get their passport applications in. Far from our being nonchalant or uninterested, a lot of work has been done. It is a shame that the passport teams working hard in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency are perhaps not getting some of the credit they deserve.

Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill

Peter Dowd Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

The Bill is a first step, but the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. It should not have taken the tragic and brutal invasion of Ukraine to see Government action on economic crime. For too many years, we have heard only warm words from the Conservatives. Our British overseas territories are often at the centre of these networks of dodgy financial flows, depriving citizens everywhere through tax avoidance and evasion. We have become the No. 1 safe harbour for criminals and kleptocrats the world over, and that is a shameful record. Despite this, part 1 of the Bill, on the registration of overseas entities, has sat on the statute book in draft form since 2018. Why? Indeed, only a couple of weeks ago, the Government had pulled their economic crime Bill from the legislative calendar altogether.

Because they have avoided this matter for years, the Government are now forced to rush this complex legislation through in a day. Over that same period, Labour Members have repeatedly requested for today’s register to be introduced, along with several other corporate transparency measures proposed in our tax transparency enforcement programme. We have also called repeatedly for the introduction and strengthening of Magnitsky provisions. No one knows quite what has influenced the Government’s dither and delay on economic crime. Coincidentally, lawyers at the Good Law Project surveyed Russian donors to the Conservative party at the weekend and found that not a single one has been included on the sanctions list. Perhaps that is pure chance, but perhaps not.

The register is crucial to demonstrating how UK property is still used to stash illicit wealth. Transparency International has identified that £1.5 billion-worth of property in the UK has been bought by Russians accused of corruption. The glaring hole in part 1 of the Bill was the 18-month transition period for the full register, which has been reduced to six months. Nevertheless, six months is plenty of time for people to dispose of assets through their army of lawyers—we have called for 28 days. Does the Minister accept that six months is untenable?

A coalition of organisations including two all-party parliamentary groups, Transparency International and Tax Justice UK suggest amending the money-laundering regulations to strengthen due diligence on property transactions in the interim. This is one way of limiting the obvious get-out offered by a six-month compliance timeframe.

The sanctions for failing to comply with the register are not sufficient either, given the plentiful resources of those who wish to avoid the spotlight. The Government have again sought to address this via amendment. One wonders why they sought to introduce such a lax framework in the first place.

Clause 18 gives wide powers to the Secretary of State to exempt individuals from the register. In particular, the exemption

“in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom”

seems pretty dubious. Can the Minister give examples of circumstances in which such exemptions will be applied? After all, many of the people who will hopefully be targeted are ostensibly in this country because it is in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK. What has changed?

Clause 4 allows for a statement to be provided to the register that does not identify the beneficial owner of an entity. Why? Little guidance is given in the schedules on the circumstances in which such a move would be appropriate. I cannot think of many such circumstances, so will the Minister enlighten the House? Allowing lawyers to submit excuses in place of a beneficial owner will surely be a major stay-out-of-jail-free card, almost literally, for anyone hoping to maintain their secrecy. This provision should be removed or much more narrowly defined.

Finally, there is the matter of our Crown dependencies and overseas territories. While serving as shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury, I was among the many calling for public country-by-country reporting by multinational companies, to ensure they are not engaging in tax avoidance. Public reporting has still not been brought forward by the Government, despite the clear support of this House. We cannot allow the Crown dependencies and overseas territories to be used to undermine stronger rules on beneficial ownership in Britain.

I hope hon. Members think hard about this, and that this has not just been a Damascene conversion at the last moment. This awful war shows that the Conservative party can no longer dither and delay. The time for half measures has long passed. We must now act fully and decisively to end the UK’s reputation as a sanctuary for economic criminals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

I am thinking of the word bailiwick rather than bivouac, but I hope the hon. Lady will agree that our being able to reflect on that legislation and align it with the broader reforms of Companies House that we have subsequently announced has enabled the broader legislation to work together and be more effective. That has been absolutely essential in ensuring that the new requirements are workable and proportionate and the register strikes the right balance between improving transparency and minimising burdens on legitimate commercial activity.

[Peter Dowd]

On Second Reading of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the Prime Minister, who was then Foreign Secretary, said:

“The aim of the Bill is to grant Her Majesty’s Government full power over British sanctions policy after we leave the EU and, in a memorable phrase, to take back control.”—[Official Report, 20 February 2018; Vol. 636, c. 77.]

Does the Minister think we have used the full power in the fullest way to take sanctions against those we think are a threat to us in economic terms?

[Paul Scully]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that because the now shadow Chancellor boasted afterwards how she managed to weaken the Government’s approach during the passage of that Bill. I believe we have gone as far as we can, but we need more measures, which is what today is all about. This is the first half of those measures to make sure we can introduce the remaining economic crime Bill, which includes Companies House reform.

We have tabled an amendment to reduce the transition period from 18 months to six months, but I will outline a little further how we can make this work effectively to ensure that people cannot just move money out of this country.

Delivering Justice for Victims

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Thursday 9th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. We had a good debate on Tuesday evening, at the end of business, on these matters, and I look forward to meeting him to discuss this in greater detail. One key issue that I raised in responding on Tuesday night is that there are always needs that we need to look at. It is important that these matters are considered on a cross-government basis and that the support in place for individuals in the many different circumstances they find themselves in, particularly the mental health support, is kept under constant review. I encourage him to take part in the consultation and makes his views known.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

I welcome the Minister’s statement today and I hope that we are able to deliver more justice for victims, because being a victim is for life. It is important to bring personal circumstances to the House, in order for people to understand the situation. In my case, the person who was responsible for the death of my daughter in a hit-and-run accident was sentenced to prison, and so got a custodial sentence, but of course they are eligible for home detention curfew. So this is not just about what happens before and after; it is about what happens throughout the whole process. We got a phone call from the probation service about this home detention curfew process, but it was transactional. I am not criticising the people involved or the system per se, but it was a transactional process. We got no guarantee that we would be listened to, as we were in relation to a victim statement—we got no guarantees that we would be taken into account at all. So it is important that that point is incorporated in this: that victims do have the formal right to be heard even after the actual court process itself.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing his personal experiences to the House this afternoon. That must have been incredibly difficult to talk about, and I can only imagine the impact that that whole experience has had on him and his family—it is truly heartbreaking. I wonder whether he might be willing to meet me to discuss this in greater detail. The point I would make is that I always expect the criminal justice agencies to be engaging with people in an incredibly sympathetic and understanding manner. I would appreciate the opportunity to understand a little more about his experience, so that we can try to make sure that that never happens again and that any issues are dealt with properly. I look forward to meeting him to discuss it.