Thursday 11th January 2024
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 View all Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 January 2024 - (11 Jan 2024)
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Angela. I hope to follow your instruction to be free-wheeling as far as I physically can.
As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), said on Second Reading, we support this legislation. This is likely to be the final chance during this Parliament for us to legislate in the area of crime, policing and criminality, and there is much to do. There are very many good things in this legislation, so the bulk of my contributions on the initial clauses, and my amendments more generally, seek clarity and will give the Minister a chance to put certain things on the record, rather than challenging the principle of the Bill.
As we start line-by-line consideration, it is important to recognise that the public expect more from the Government and this place on crime. Ninety per cent of crimes go unsolved and the charge rate has dropped by two thirds. That means that a person who commits a crime is less than half as likely to be caught as they were in 2010, and the public feel that very significant change. Of course, that is before we get to the woeful backlogs in the court system, and what they mean for victims and the likelihood of successful prosecution. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North will no doubt cover that issue in due course.
To that record is added low confidence in policing, the disastrous legacy that we still feel of the cut of 20,000 officers, 10,000 fewer police on the frontline, and the fact that 50% of the public—a number that has doubled—say they never see a uniformed presence in their community, so there is clearly much to do. Restoring policing and justice in this country must be a national priority. We welcome in most part what the legislation offers, and most of our discord lies with what is not in the Bill and the missed opportunities. We will seek to add those things in due course.
Clause 1 relates to articles for use in serious crime. Serious and organised crime is a growing menace in our country. Organised crime is often left out of the debate about community safety. The way crime is counted pushes organised crime, and particularly fraud, to the fringes of the debate, but it is a growing enterprise and it has to be tackled head on. By its nature, it is fast moving and shapeshifting. We are in the fourth industrial revolution—an era of significant technological change at breathtaking pace—and it is crucial that we seek to keep pace. Given the nature of law and legislation, that is hard, but we have to keep pace as best we can. We know that the tools that criminals, particularly violent criminals, use to conceal their work are ever changing, so we must change to meet that need.
Clause 1 criminalises the possession of items that can be used in serious crime, and my amendments relate to that. Without pre-empting the clause 2 stand part debate, the sorts of items we are talking about include 3D printer firearms templates, tablet presses and vehicle concealments. We heard in the evidence sessions that such items are being used by some of the most serious criminals in this country and those who facilitate their work, and it is right to address that.
I turn to amendment 51, which stands in my name. Clause 1(3) says:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with any serious offence.”
Basically, if the police arrest someone and want to charge them with possession of one of the items specified in clause 2, the person can say, “I didn’t know it was going to be used in this way.” My amendment would delete that provision. It is of a probing nature—I do not intend to put it to a Division—but I want to hear from the Minister why the clause has been written in such a way. It is not without precedent, but we would not routinely specify on the face of a Bill the defence that a person facing a criminal allegation could use; that would be a matter for them.
Crucially, the burden will be on the prosecutor to prove that a crime has been committed. We know from clause 1(1) that a successful conviction for the offence requires prosecutors to prove to a criminal standard that, first, the person facing the charge possessed the article in question and that, secondly, they did so in circumstances that could reasonably give rise to suspicion that it would be used to commit a serious offence. The burden is on the prosecutor to prove that, so I am keen to understand why we need to specify on the face of the Bill that a defendant could make the defence that they
“did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with any serious offence.”
Is subsection (3) not just subsection (1) turned inside out? On that basis, is it necessary? If subsection (1) describes the alleged crime, surely it is axiomatic that the defence would be the opposite. Does subsection (3) need to be on the face of the Bill? Could the Minister explain that? We are in danger of asking people to prove negatives, which is harder. Specifying that defence may well be relied on by authorities in the future, and if an individual struggles to prove intent, which can be quite hard, or a lack of intent, which, frankly, is even harder, it could be challenging for the justice process further on. I am keen to understand the Minister’s perspective.
Amendment 52 would have the same effect on clause 3(3) as amendment 51 would have on clause 1(3): it would remove clause 3(3). The arguments for doing so are the ones I have just made.
The final amendment I have tabled in this group is amendment 55 to clause 1. Clause 1(1) relates to possession, and subsection (4) explains what “possession” means in this context. It says that
“if it is proved that a relevant article—
(a) was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or
(b) was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which the accused habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public,
the court may assume that the accused possessed the relevant article”—
that is how possession is proven, and I would argue that is quite a broad definition—
“unless the accused shows that they did not know of its presence on the premises or that they had no control over it.”
That is what my amendment seeks to test, because I do not think the intention of the clause is to sweep up people for being in the presence of an article that was not theirs.
My concern relates particularly to shared accommodation. I lived in shared accommodation for a couple of years before I met my wife, and for a period of time it was with people I did not really know: I did not know what they did for a living; I did not know their personal characters; and, to be honest, I did not have an awful lot of engagement with them. Many came and went, and the communal areas were largely not used, but it would not have been out of the question for someone to leave work equipment around. It would not have been impossible for someone acting in bad faith to have one of the items detailed in clause 2 in a communal area, and then to have said that it was another person who was living there or that another person at some point had touched that item in order to move it and put something else next to it. Whose article it was—and therefore who is responsible and who may well have committed an offence under clause 1—could then become quite a challenging question. There needs to be more clarity that, in such circumstances, an individual would not have committed a crime.
That is what amendment 51 seeks to add. I do not intend to labour the point all the way to a Division, but I hope the Minister will put on the record that that is not how he sees the provisions working, and that he will give the Committee some degree of comfort on how such circumstances will be avoided.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a huge pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Dame Angela, as it will be in the Committee’s sittings in coming days.
I will not try to respond to the shadow Minister’s opening remarks in any detail, as we debated the wider issues on Second Reading, but I will observe in passing that we have record numbers of police officers, and overall crime, measured by the crime survey on a like-for-like basis, is 56% lower today than it was in 2010.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
That must be the only place where there are extra police.
Chris Philp
The fine city of Stockton.
I thank the shadow Minister for the thoughtful, reasonable tone that he adopted in discussing the amendments and in his opening remarks. I am sure that tone will characterise the exchanges throughout the Committee’s proceedings.
As the shadow Minister mentioned, clauses 1 to 4 criminalise the possession, importation, making, adaptation or supply of certain specified articles, where they can be used for serious criminal purposes, including items such as pill presses used to manufacture illegal pills and the templates for producing 3D firearms, about which the National Crime Agency and others are increasingly concerned.
As with strict liability offences, these offences entitle a prosecution to start with the assumption that the accused would have known what the articles were concerned with. I have mentioned a couple of those articles; there are very few, if any, legitimate uses for them.
The shadow Minister posed a reasonable question, asking why we have constructed the burden of proof in the way we have. Why say it is for the defendant to demonstrate that they had a legitimate purpose, rather than the other way round? The reason is because these articles have pretty much no legitimate uses other than for criminal purposes. Why would someone have a template to construct a 3D firearm other than for criminal purposes? There is no innocent use for that article that I can think of. The situation is similar for pill presses, unless it were a pharmaceutical company. To answer the shadow Minister’s fundamental and foundational question, that is why the burden of proof has been constructed as it has.
Amendments 51 and 52 would remove the ability for the defendant to expressly advance as a defence that they did not know about the purpose of the article, and did not know they were possessing it and so on. If the amendments were agreed to, those defences would not be available and the clause, as amended, would make these strict liability offences, with no defence that could be offered. The effect of the amendments would actually be to make the clause less favourable to the defendant.
Amendment 55 addresses items found on a premises. As the shadow Minister pointed out, at the end of clause 1(4), there is a defence that the person did not know about the item’s presence on the premises or they had no control over it; it can be one or the other, and does not have to be both. I will take the give example of shared accommodation, where people share a flat or a house. Clearly, if someone’s flatmate possessed one of these illegal articles and the flatmate did not know about it, or even if they knew about it but did not have control over it—it can be one or the other; it does not have to be both—that would then be a defence available to them. I can certainly give the assurance that he requested.
At the bottom of page 1, the clause provides that where flatmates are sharing accommodation, if one of the flatmates possessed the articles, and another flatmate had nothing to do with any offending and either did not know about the articles—or, even if they knew about them, had no control over them—that second flatmate would not be guilty of an offence, because the defence set out would be available to them. I hope that that gives the shadow Minister the assurance that he wanted.
Dame Angela, shall I save my wider remarks about the clauses for the stand part debate in the second group, or would you rather I addressed them now?
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for his full answer. I am deeply disappointed that I could not draw him on wider issues, but I suspect that on a long enough timeline, he will relent. The Minister must think about the fact that he is tempted to tell us that, on crime, we have never had it so good. That is something that we will test with the general public at some point this year, and he may be disappointed. We are ready on any day of his choosing—the sooner the better.
Alex Norris
That is a very reasonable correction.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, and in particular the comfort on amendments 51 and 52, which relate to clause 1(3) and clause 3(3). I am not 100% convinced that a defendant’s ability to say that an item was not theirs has been removed; they could say that routinely, as they frequently do to police up and down the country in relation to various matters. Nevertheless, we would not want to weaken the defence, and the Minister’s point about that is enough for me to withdraw the amendments.
I am also grateful for the assurance on subsection (4), which it is important to have on the record. This is an issue—perhaps this is not for the face of the Bill—that will have to be thought about in a policing sense. The way the clause draws possession is quite broad: being on the same premises as something that someone used habitually. For example, perhaps a small group of people use a social club routinely and are engaged in a joint endeavour of committing crime. That would be quite hard for the police to identify. Probably the most likely outcome is that all individuals get charged, but there will be challenges. Again, that is probably not for the face of the Bill, but it may be something that the Government need to come back when it comes to its operation as a practical measure. They will need to work with the police to ensure that it is a practical power, because we want it to be used. We do not want the police to think it is too complicated or too broad to use, because it is very important.
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, after “means” insert “—
(a) in England and Wales,”.
This amendment and amendments 15 to 18 extend the offence under this clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 15 to 17.
Government amendment 41.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 18 and 19.
Clause 2 stand part.
Government amendments 20 to 22.
Clauses 3 and 4 stand part.
Government amendment 40.
Government amendment 49.
Government amendment 44.
Chris Philp
As we have discussed, clauses 1 to 4 introduce new offences to criminalise the importation, manufacture, modification, supply, offer to supply and possession of particular articles used in serious and organised crime. They currently apply to England and Wales only, but after consultation with the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Government tabled amendments 14 to 22 and 41 to extend the criminal offences to the whole of the UK. This follows a request from the devolved Administrations, which we are happy to agree to.
Clause 2 contains a delegated power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of items covered by the clause. At the outset, we cover the templates for 3D-printed firearms, pill presses and concealed compartments. This creates a power, using an affirmative statutory instrument that is subject to full parliamentary scrutiny, to add additional items as we become aware of them. It is impossible for us sitting here to foresee or anticipate what items criminals may come up with in the future, so it is important to have this power to future-proof against criminal innovation.
The practical effect of amendments 40, 44 and 49 is to add these offences to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which means that when a person is found guilty of an offence, they will automatically be considered guilty of having a criminal lifestyle when the court is making a confiscation order. I am sure that the Committee will agree that when someone is involved in serious criminal activity, we would want the proceeds of that criminal activity, particularly if it is serious organised crime, to fall into the scope of the POCA regime. I have already mentioned the items included, which are listed in clause 2, and I have also referenced the affirmative statutory instrument process for adding additional items in the future.
On clause 3, it is important that we include measures on vehicle theft in the Bill. I am sure that all of us have been contacted by constituents who are concerned about their cars being stolen, particularly from their home address. Criminals do that using various forms of technology that enable them to either pick up the signal from a key fob, or hack into a vehicle’s control system, disable the immobiliser, and activate and unlock the vehicle. They then drive off. Unfortunately, that is relatively prevalent.
There are things that constituents can do, such as put their key fob into a so-called Faraday bag—a little bag with an iron mesh around it—but that could be stolen. More modern vehicles, particularly in the past two or three years, have better security measures. Nonetheless, we parliamentarians want to do everything we can to prevent this kind of technology falling into criminal hands. That is why we are providing for two new criminal offences relating to vehicle theft using electronic devices such as signal jammers, but there are others also. The first offence criminalises possession of those devices, and the second criminalises importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply those devices.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I might be showing my entire ignorance of signal jammers, but is there no other use for these bits of technology? I can see whether there is when it comes to stamping things on pills and plans to build a gun on a 3D printer, but my ignorance about signal jammers means that I do not know whether there is another use for them.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for that very good question. These two offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with vehicle theft. The judge or the jury, depending on whether we are talking about magistrates court or the Crown court, have to be satisfied there is a reasonable suspicion that that is what the device will be used for. It is important that the police have the powers to arrest and prosecute people involved in this kind of activity. The offences should help a great deal in stopping these electronic devices getting into criminal hands.
We have talked a little bit about the evidential burden of proof in clause 4, and I will not rehearse those points at great length, in the interests of Committee members’ patience and time. As many of the articles that we are talking about can be used only for criminal purposes, it is reasonable to construct the clause this way. Members of the Committee will recall that we took evidence on this issue from a number of people in law enforcement, including Graeme Biggar, the director general of the National Crime Agency. Law enforcement—both territorial policing and the NCA—strongly welcomes these measures as strengthening the police’s armoury in the fight against organised crime. Through this regulation-making power, Ministers and Parliament will be able to keep up with changes in technology, which is extremely important given how fast technology is moving these days.
Alex Norris
I will start with the Government’s amendments. It is good, in general, for Governments to amend their Bills; it shows that they are still looking at the legislation. We hope to see them show the same flexibility to our amendments in due course. I am grateful for the written explanation the Minister has furnished, although it is possible that my first emotion upon getting dozens of amendments in the week before Christmas may not have been gratitude; I think there might have been a bit of swearing when we got the other set earlier this week, too. Nevertheless, we appreciate the explainer.
As we have heard, Government amendments 14 to 17, 20 to 22 and 41 extend the provisions in clauses 1 to 4 to Scotland and Northern Ireland, which is welcome. A four-nations approach to tackling serious and organised crime is wise. We do not want such activity to be displaced to places that are not covered by legislation, or for areas or indeed countries to be seen as safe havens. That has to be the right thing to do. I hope that the Minister will say a little about the discussions he had with colleagues in Scotland and Northern Ireland to reach this conclusion, and what other work may be done to ensure that the legislation is used effectively.
Having listened to what the Minister said on Government amendments 40, 49 and 44 on proceeds of crime, we are similarly comfortable with the approach being taken with those. As the Minister said, we heard from Graeme Biggar and other witnesses about the importance of the proceeds of crime. These measures would tighten that regime, which is welcome.
I covered most of our views on clause 1 when speaking to my amendments, so I will not repeat them. I will just say that the clause is an important step forward, and something on which we are keen. Clause 2 defines what is meant by “relevant article”. The articles in scope today are 3D printer firearms templates, encapsulators, tablet presses and vehicle concealments. [Interruption.]
Chris Philp
I will briefly respond to one or two of the points the shadow Minister raised. We engaged with the devolved Administrations both at an official level and through correspondence. I am glad to say that they were pretty keen to ensure that the new offences applied in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As the shadow Minister said, it is very important to ensure that serious criminals have no part of the United Kingdom in which they can operate. I am glad to observe generally that despite political differences, particularly with the nationalists in Scotland, we have a relatively good relationship on law enforcement co-operation. Generally, we work quite constructively together in a non-confrontational, non-politicised way, as I guess our constituents, the public, and the whole House would expect.
On the affirmative regulation-making power, I am grateful to the shadow Minister for breaking his habit and supporting it. He is quite right to say that this is technically a Henry VIII power, in that it is a statutory instrument that can amend primary legislation—under clause 2(3), the statutory instrument can amend the clause—but it has very limited scope, because only this clause can be amended. The only purpose for which the power can be used is specifying additional types of technology, because that is all that the clause does. While this is a Henry VIII power, it has very limited and specific applicability.
As for adding future items, there is nothing immediately on the list. I expect us to stay very closely in touch with the law enforcement community, particularly the National Crime Agency, but also the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for serious and organised crime, and the regional organised crime units, who would rapidly identify new bits of technology used by criminals, so that we could very quickly add them. There is not a statutory duty to consult—other than, of course, with Scotland and Northern Ireland’s devolved Administrations—but we did consult on these provisions. It would be our intention, unless there was an emergency situation, to consult prior to adding any new items, lest there were unintended consequences. I hope that addresses the points raised, and I commend the four clauses to the Committee.
Amendment 14 agreed to.
Amendments made: 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, at end insert—
“(b) in Scotland, an offence specified or described in Part 1A of that Schedule;
(c) in Northern Ireland, an offence specified or described in Part 2 of that Schedule.”
See the statement for amendment 14.
Amendment 16, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”.
See the statement for amendment 14.
Amendment 17, in clause 1, page 2, line 5, at end insert—
“(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(ab) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”.—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 14.
Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Section 1: meaning of “relevant article”
Amendments made: 18, in clause 2, page 2, line 17, after “1968” insert
“or, in Northern Ireland, Article 2(2) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/702 (N.I. 3))”.
See the statement for amendment 14.
Amendment 19, in clause 2, page 2, line 30, leave out “subsection).” and insert
“subsection or subsection (4)).
(4) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Scottish Ministers, and
(b) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. —(Chris Philp.)
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult the Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making regulations under this clause.
Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Electronic devices for use in vehicle theft
Amendments made: 20, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
“(a) in England and Wales—
(i) an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 of theft of a conveyance (as defined by section 12 of that Act) or anything in a conveyance, or
(ii) an offence under section 12 of that Act (taking vehicle or other conveyance without authority);
(b) in Scotland—
(i) theft of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft constructed or adapted for use for transporting one or more persons or of anything in such a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or
(ii) an offence under section 178 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (taking motor vehicle without authority);
(c) in Northern Ireland—
(i) an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 of theft of a conveyance (as defined by section 12 of that Act) or anything in a conveyance, or
(ii) an offence under section 12 of that Act (taking vehicle or other conveyance without authority).”
This amendment and amendments 21 and 22 extend the offence under this clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Amendment 21, in clause 3, page 3, line 16, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”
See the statement for amendment 20.
Amendment 22, in clause 3, page 3, line 17, at end insert—
“(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(ab) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 20.
Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Possession of a SIM farm
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 6 and 7 stand part.
Government amendment 47.
Schedule 1.
Chris Philp
As Members will be aware, criminals often use telecommunications networks to target people to try and defraud them, for example with scam texts and scam calls. In fact, the secretary of my local residents association in Coulsdon, in my constituency of Croydon South, sent me a message just this morning with an example of a scam text that she had just received, purporting to come from the Royal Mail and inviting her to click on a link and fill in her details. This is clearly a problem.
I am sure that we have all heard such examples; indeed, we have probably received messages ourselves. Although most people can identify them as scams trying to elicit fraud, unfortunately some people who receive them are taken in, because the messages can often be quite realistic, and often they end up losing significant amounts of money.
Very often, these scam texts can be traced back to so-called “SIM farms”, which are electronic devices that sometimes hold hundreds of physical SIM cards that can be used to send out thousands and thousands of scam text messages in a matter of seconds. These devices are relatively easy to buy and—until this Bill passes into law—they are legal to buy online, enabling criminals to commit large-scale fraud by abusing our telecommunications network. In the fraud strategy, we committed to stopping that, which is why we are legislating.
We consulted on these proposals in May 2023 and received broad support for these measures. There were some concerns about the definitions being too broad, such that they would inadvertently criminalise some legitimate activity, but we have worked to develop the legislation in order to address those concerns.
Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)
On that particular point about possession of a SIM farm, the Bill says that a person charged with an offence under the clause must provide “good reason”. It goes on to state what the good reasons are, for example providing broadcasting services. However, I would have assumed that a broadcasting service would be already licensed; similarly, if a body is operating a genuine public transport service, it is probably a local authority. Could the Minister explain that “good reason” a bit more? It seems a bit woolly or wide to me. Somebody who is clever enough to run a SIM farm would be clever enough to find a way around that somehow. I want to support the Government in advancing their proposal, but is it possible to tighten it up a bit more?
Chris Philp
The hon. Member raises a concern that inventive criminals might exploit the defences we set out in clause 5(3), on lines 37 to 40 at the bottom of page 3, which he was quoting from. He is concerned that criminals might find a way of pretending or purporting to offer, for example, legitimate broadcasting services when in fact they do not. I think that a court would take a view on legitimate broadcasting services. If there was a prosecution and a criminal advanced that defence, it would be up to the jury to decide whether the broadcasting services really were legitimate.
Since the hon. Member has raised the point, I will happily take it away and see whether there are any concerns that the clause might inadvertently provide a loophole for ingenious or inventive criminals. I will seek to satisfy myself that that is not the case, but if he has identified a problem or potential loophole, I will happily come back to the Committee. I will take that away as a point to double check. We can probably rely on juries, or magistrates in a magistrates court trial, to apply common sense to those defences, but it is good that he raised the question and I will certainly look into it.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
On that point, it is possible for scammers to intercept texts that come from a credible bank, so they can slot in a text in the line of communication between a person and their credible bank. Have the Government given any thought as to how we can stop that happening? I feel it makes us even more vulnerable.
Chris Philp
That sort of interception and insertion is not addressed by this clause, which is about SIM farms and the almost industrial-scale transmission of thousands of messages. What the hon. Lady is describing is a little different. It can happen to emails as well. For example, if someone is about to buy a house, they may be corresponding with their solicitor. When the solicitor tells them to transfer the funds to X bank account, a criminal can insert themselves into the email chain, pretending to be the solicitor, and put in a message telling the client to send the funds to their own bank instead of the solicitor’s client account. Inserting messages into an email chain happens quite a bit, but that is not what this clause is designed to address. The Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), is very aware of the issue because it falls into his portfolio rather than mine. Perhaps I could ask his officials to write to the hon. Lady to update her on the work he is doing with law enforcement on that point, because this clause just does not address it.
Turning back to the group of clauses, it is worth saying that these offences will make it difficult—I hope impossible—for criminals to access and use SIM farms for the purposes of fraud, and the police will be given the tools that they need to disrupt them. Clauses 5 and 6 ban the possession and supply of a SIM farm. However, as I have already said in response to the hon. Member for Bootle, if a person has good reason or lawful authority, obviously that is not criminalised. We have talked a bit about the legitimate use issue already, and there are some examples provided in clause 5, as we have discussed.
I will turn to amendment 47 to schedule 1. Schedule 1 confers powers of entry, search and seizure in relation to these offences. There is an offence of intentionally obstructing a constable when they are carrying out a search—the search is to be unimpeded, obviously . That offence also needs to apply in the case of people who are exercising the power of a constable, such as designated National Crime Agency officers, who are not necessarily constables. Amendment 47 to schedule 1 is a technical amendment that makes sure that all the relevant people can exercise this power of search: not just constables, but any person who is exercising the power of a constable. It is a technical amendment, making sure that it applies to everybody undertaking those searches to hopefully find and prosecute criminals who are using SIM farms. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.
Alex Norris
Fraud is an everyday, large-scale fact of life in this country. According to the crime survey, there were 3.7 million instances of fraud in England and Wales in 2022. Fraud now represents 40% of all crimes. It is an everyday peril that all of us face and from which vulnerable people are clearly at risk.
Furthermore, the National Crime Agency estimates that 86% of fraud goes unreported. That means that victims are unsupported and vital evidence that could break some of the fraud rings goes uncollected. We have to do better and build confidence among the public that fraud is not just a fact of life but that, if they report it, something will happen.
We have to push back on the idea—I hope that the Minister will be very clear about this in his response—that, to some degree, fraud is a lesser crime. When citing the statistics on crime reduction that the Minister cited in his opening speech, about which people say, “Yes, but you have not counted fraud in that”, we have heard other Ministers say—although I do not think we have heard this Minister say it—“Well, fraud is not quite the same as those crimes. It is a lesser crime. It doesn’t feel quite as bad”. That is wrong, and I hope that the Minister will say, on the record, that that is not the view of the Government.
Alex Norris
If I were to open my social media accounts now, I think that I would find myself called an awful lot worse than Alex Cunningham, so I have no problem with that at all.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North is absolutely right, though. That sort of action can ruin lives. And it can destroy a business. I probably should not be relying on “Coronation Street” for my arguments, but there is a good storyline about that at the moment. It can ruin a business. We know that there is vulnerability there. For an individual, losing that sort of sum of money—£6,000—could ruin their life. It could jeopardise their housing situation, and it can jeopardise relationships, too—we have seen that happen in the past—so it is very serious. It knocks people’s confidence as well; it makes people not want to engage with others. This is just as important as other crimes, and it is really important that we send out that message.
Part of the reason for the success that criminals have is that they can do mass-scale phishing. That means that, while there are things that we all receive and think, “Well, that’s a pretty crude scam. Who is going to fall for that?”, we know that trying crude and rudimentary things over and over again on a mass scale can, on a long enough timeline, succeed.
That is before we get to the incredibly sophisticated methods that my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle mentioned, and I welcome the response that the Minister gave on that. There is a difference. The Minister mentioned his constituent and Royal Mail. Most of the time, I would look at the link and say, “Well, that’s not Royal Mail.” I would ignore it and move on. But, if I was expecting something from Royal Mail, I cannot tell you with 100% certainty that I would do that. That is the case not least because we always want what is coming: “Where is it? Come on, I’m ready for it.” I can easily see how that mistake can be made, and that mistake could have a profound and long-term impact on someone’s life. It is only possible to do that because of technology that allows relentless and repeated communication attempts, and we know that so-called SIM farms are the way that that is done.
We support the aim behind clause 5 of making an offence of the possession of a SIM farm. I have reservations about the utility of subsection (2), but we have probably tested that debate to destruction. The point that was made about “good reason” was really good. I am slightly uncomfortable with the Minister’s response that the court will set that; I think we could do that. There are legitimate, although deeply irritating, marketing purposes for that degree of communication—it is for others to say how effective it is. Even political parties engage in it sometimes, so bulk text messages are not without precedent. It feels like we can tighten up the clause to specify who can use these things and to what purpose. Again, there will be edge cases that fall between the marketing of a bad product and the marketing of a fraudulent product. There is a difference between those things. People have a right to advertise a product that is not very good. We would not want to consumer it, use it or buy it, but they can do that. That would be at the edge of the cases we are talking about here, so we need greater clarity, and perhaps the Government can tighten that up before Report.
Clause 7 introduces schedule 1, which is amended by Government amendment 47. The schedule relates to the offence of obstructing a person in their endeavours to investigate possible offences under clauses 5 and 6. The effect of the amendment is that a person cannot obstruct someone other than a constable as that search warrant is being executed. Again, we do not have a problem with that—people need to comply with the provisions of the law—but we need a bit more clarity. I do not say this to be smart; I just want to understand it. The Minister characterises this as a technical amendment, which is a term of art in this place. Was there a drafting error or does it genuinely not change the substance of this provision? I do not think the intention is for lots and lots of people to have the ability to exercise these powers. It is tightly defined, and those who are not constables who can do this will be accompanied by a constable, but we could do with a bit more clarity.
Finally on this topic, part of the challenge we face is that although some of these enterprises will be set up in this country, they can also be set up and executed from other nations that have weaker arrangements than we will have, assuming this legislation passes. Will the Minister tell us about the conversations the Government are having with European and global partners about this, and give us some information about where the hotspots are so that there is greater public awareness?
Chris Philp
Let me respond to one or two of the issues that the shadow Minister quite reasonably raised.
Fraud makes up about 40% of all criminal offences—the figure I have in my mind is 41%. The hon. Gentleman is right that it is incredibly serious, and I have certainly never suggested anything to the contrary. It can devastate people’s lives. People who have worked hard over a lifetime building up their life savings to fund their retirement or their children’s education can suddenly have them taken from them in very distressing circumstances, so there is no question but that fraud is an extremely serious crime. The Government take it extremely seriously, which is why there is a fraud action plan, backed with investment—we recently provided over £100 million of extra money.
I was one of the Ministers through whose hands the Online Safety Act 2023 passed during its extremely lengthy gestation. It will have a significant effect by requiring the large social media platforms to proactively take steps to prevent fraud. Some of them have already done that voluntarily, and there have been big reductions in the amount of online-originated fraud, so this is a huge priority.
The simple reason we do not include fraud when comparing the overall crime figures to 2010 is that it got picked up by the crime survey for England and Wales, alongside computer misuse, only in about 2016. If the figures going back to 2010 existed, we would obviously include them. When we talk about a 56% reduction in crime since 2010 to on a like-for-like basis, which I am sure I will be referring to once or twice in the next year, it excludes fraud and computer misuse only because they were not in that series of figures.
Chris Philp
I will in a moment. When we compare the crime figures since 2016, we see that overall crime has fallen. For example, overall crime including fraud and computer misuse has fallen by 10% in the last year, which I am sure the shadow Minister is about to stand up and welcome.
Alex Norris
I gently say that, in their attempts to create a picture of community safety—which is not what people feel—there is a problem in Government Ministers relying on statistics that they know to be incomplete. There should be some reflection on the numbers cited. I understand the like-for-like point—that is true—but it is problematic to tell the public how much safer they are if that argument relies on excluding a significant and growing type of crime. That must be wrong.
Chris Philp
It is not reliant on that. It is simply that the data does not exist. The chief inspector of constabulary Andy Cooke said in his state of policing report last June that we are arguably safer than we have ever been before. If we look at the crime types for which we do have continuous data going back to 2010 and before—such as burglary, robbery, the vehicle theft figures that the shadow Minister himself quoted recently, violent and seriously violent crime—we see that all of those individual crime types have fallen dramatically.
Chris Philp
In a moment. Bicycle theft is down by 39%, vehicle crime by about 50%, and violent crime by around 50%. It is not the case that some sort of artifice going on and that if we added fraud, that would paint a different picture. Whichever crime type we look at, we see that it is going down according to the crime survey. We all know why police reported crime sometimes shows different trends. It is because the police are being driven by—we are getting a bit off topic here, so I am probably going to get told off in a minute.
Chris Philp
Yes. There is probably another time to debate this point, and perhaps now is a good moment to give way to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.
Jess Phillips
I think I am at risk of offending you in the Chair, Dame Angela, but may I have the data for whether rape, child abuse or domestic violence have gone up or down?
Chris Philp
Thank you, Dame Angela; you were extremely tolerant, but I could sense the frostiness beginning to build without even looking at you.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, asked two more questions on this group, which I will answer very briefly. He asked for assurance that this technical amendment was not a smokescreen for some nefarious Government plot. The wording of Government amendment 47 is very clear, in that it just inserts the words,
“a person who has the powers of a constable”.
Therefore, it extends the powers of search only where that person has the powers of a constable, which of course is set out in legislation. I gave as an example certain employees of the National Crime Agency. This is not an open-ended provision—it is very specific and precisely defined in law as someone who already has the powers as a constable. We are not creating any new powers in the Bill, other than that those people who have the powers of a constable can conduct these searches.
The shadow Minister also asked about international co-operation, which is extremely important. My colleague the Security Minister works very closely with international partners—in fact, he is almost constantly travelling. There will be an international summit chaired by the Home Secretary later this year on the very topic of combating fraud, working closely with the Five Eyes and engaging bilaterally with the European Union and other key countries. There are various jurisdictions that tend to originate more of this fraud—Russia, for example—and the Security Minister in particular and the Home Secretary are working very closely on that. In order to avoid any further disapproval, Dame Angela, I think I have answered the questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Possession or supply of Sim farms: powers of entry etc
Amendment made: 47, in schedule 1, page 75, line 15, after “includes” insert “—
(a) a person who has the powers of a constable;
(b)”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment provides that the offence in this paragraph applies in respect of persons who have the powers of a constable.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8
Fraud facilitated by electronic communications: possession or supply of other
articles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We have already discussed that technological change can be very rapid, and that criminals, including fraudsters, are quite technologically literate and very often embrace emerging tech capabilities to attempt to defraud the public. Just as we previously discussed in relation to articles used for serious and organised crime, so here, in clause 8, we are proposing to create a power by regulations for the Secretary of State to make a list of new items that might be prohibited where they can be used for the purposes of committing crime by way of electronic communications.
As the shadow Minister has said, one has to be a little cautious about conferring regulation-making powers too freely, so there are constraints on this. For example, the offences created using these regulation-making powers can only create summary offences of possessing or supplying technology to be used in connection with fraud facilitated by electronic communication. It is very specific and very narrow.
The shadow Minister previously asked about consultation. I said that there was no statutory requirement to consult on those extensions—outside of the devolved Administrations, of course—but that the broad intention was to do so, unless there was a very good reason otherwise, such as an emergency. Here, however, we do have a statutory duty to consult. Members will find it in clause 8(5), which states that
“the Secretary of State must consult such persons appearing…to be likely to be affected by the regulations”.
There is therefore a statutory obligation to consult here, which I hope provides the shadow Minister with the assurance that he is probably about to ask for.
Alex Norris
I am afraid that clause 8 deeply frustrates me. I do not think it is in any way the same as clause 2(3). That provision allows the Secretary of State to add items to and remove them from an established list concerning an offence that is established in law on the face of the Bill. This is slightly different. Clause 8(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations create a summary offence of possessing or supplying an article specified in the regulations.”
That is making a law, not monitoring a list. This is an example of a Henry VIII power used badly. The provision should be in the Bill, and if the nature of the networks is likely to change over time, there should be a mirroring power, similar to that in clause 2(3), that enables us to change the list. We would have supported that. This puts us in an invidious position. Of course, we want this to be in legislation and we want there to be regulation and control over electronic communications networks or services being used in a dangerous way. However, we are being asked to jump into the abyss and to choose between either voting against including in the Bill something that we think is broadly a good idea, or allowing the Government to do an incomplete job and leave a placeholder. Even as I stand here, I am not sure which is the right answer.
I welcome the fact that consultation is on the face of the Bill. That gives us some degree of safeguard. However, accepting the clause would mean accepting that a significant offence would be created and decided upstairs, rather than in the white heat of the legislative process. I do not think that is right. I am not sure if the Minister is able to say anything that will give me slightly greater comfort. If we were able to see what the offence looked like between different stages of a Committee, that would probably be enough to salve my pain. I do not think that will happen, but I will listen to what the Minister says.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his question. I point to the way the clause is constructed. Clause 8(2) is narrowly defined, in that is says:
“An article may be specified only if the Secretary of State considers that there is a significant risk of the article being used for a purpose connected with fraud that is perpetrated by means of—
(a) an electronic communication network, or
(b) an electronic communication service.”
Clearly the Secretary of State’s decision would be amenable to judicial review if it were unreasonably exercised. The scope of the ability to create a new criminal offence is highly circumscribed and it has to fit within that narrow box in the Bill.
Alex Norris
I accept that that is circumscribed; it is not narrow. However, electronic communication networks constitute an exceptionally broad area of British life, touching us every minute of every day, and that does not feel very narrow at all.
Chris Philp
That is only part of the circumscription, because prior to that the clause says,
“being used for a purpose connected with fraud”.
If we think about that as a Venn diagram, the shadow Minister is right to say that electronic communication networks and services represent an enormous field. However, that is not where the power is created. It is created in the intersection between that bit of the Venn diagram and the bit where the article or technology is being used for a purpose connected with fraud, and that intersection is a lot smaller.
I do not think that any member of this Committee or any Member of Parliament, of either party, would object to criminalising technology being used for a particular fraudulent purpose. In addition to the protection afforded by the statutory obligation to consult, there is also the fact that this can only be a summary offence, which severely limits the maximum penalty that may be applied.
Alex Norris
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is being very generous. I completely agree that there is not a person in this building—including, I suspect, the mice on the Terrace—who think that it is a bad idea to have powers that restrict fraudulent use of electronic communications. The problem is that in the previous debate the test for that was good reason and then we would rely on the court. In the eyes of Government, therefore, it is clearly not black and white whether it is fraud and they may well rely on others to define that. In order to get through the blockage, perhaps the Minister could think about that in the context of the assurances he gave on good reason to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. That would probably be enough for me at this point.
Chris Philp
I can certainly confirm that where someone possesses technology for a good and legitimate reason, by definition it would not be getting used for a purpose connected with fraud. I can also confirm that where someone possesses communications technology for a legitimate purpose and not for use in connection with fraud, we would not expect that to ever be criminalised, either through offences created via this clause or in any other way. I hope that assures the shadow Minister.
Subsection 4 says:
“The regulations may—
(a) contain exceptions or defences”
of exactly the kind that we have created in clauses 1 to 4 already.
I hope that the assurance I have given, which will be in Hansard, combined with the narrow nature of this, the narrow scope of the ability to create offences, the statutory duty to consult, and the fact that it is a summary offence, meaning that the maximum term is six months at the moment—all those things taken together—will give the shadow Minister assurance on the questions that he is raising.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Possession of weapon with intent to use unlawful violence etc
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 53 in clause 9, page 6, line 24, at end insert—“(c) a sword.”
This amendment would make clear that the bladed articles in scope include swords.
Alex Norris
Clause 9 introduces a new offence of possessing an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent to use unlawful violence. Knife crime is a scourge in this country. It devastates communities and families. It feels that we have a steady drumbeat of tragic cases, which, as I say, have a devastating effect, and it is right that we are taking action to do something about it. We should want to take action. This is not new; it feels to some degree that we have been spinning our wheels on action, but we are here now, so let us take that on its face.
The Government consulted in April last year on restricting the possession of so-called zombie knives and have announced on multiple occasions that they plan to enact such restrictions. I hope the Minister will give some clarity but, from the explanatory notes, I think that this is an attempt to make good on that. Paragraph 45 of the explanatory notes says:
“Following the closure of the consultation in June 2023, the Government published its response in August 2023. In that response, the Government committed to implementing all the proposals.”
Those are the proposals relating to restrictions on so-called zombie knives.
“Clauses 18, 10 and 9 give effect to those requiring primary legislation”.
I hope the Minister will be able to say whether this is the final stage of the ban’s implementation. Previously, we have been expecting secondary legislation in this regard.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for that commitment. Currently, it is an offence to carry an article with a blade or point of over three inches, with the exception of a pocket-knife, in a public place. It is also an offence to threaten somebody with an offensive weapon and to carry in public any article intended to be used as an offensive weapon. As we understand it, the introduction of this new offence bridges the gap between threatening someone with a bladed article and being in possession of such an article.
Again, we support the intention to close the gap and ensure that we crack down on this scourge. Sharp instruments or knives are currently responsible for 41% of homicides, so clearly the police need stronger powers to deal with that. However, we think that the Government could go further and be clearer about what blades or weapons should be covered by the new offence. That is the effect of my amendment 53. Secondary legislation may be the place for that, rather than the Bill, but I do not want to miss the substance of amendment 53.
In recent years, there has been progress on banning certain weapons used in violent attacks. We have debated measures, for example, on adding knuckledusters, sword-sticks and now zombie knives to the list of offensive weapons. That progress is welcome, but again it does not go far enough because with increasing frequency supposedly decorative blades, such as ninja swords, are being used in violent knife attacks. It is vital that we update legislation again to include blades such as those.
The impact of my amendment would be to add swords to the list. I am perfectly aware that the Bill may not be the most elegant place for it, but what I am trying to get from the Minister is a commitment to extend the ban to swords. Recently, I met the family of Ronan Kanda and their Member of Parliament, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). They told me their story and about their campaign for justice. Ronan, a beloved son and brother, was just 16 years old when he was walking back to his home in Wolverhampton after picking up a PlayStation controller from a friend’s house. Just a few yards from his front door, Ronan was attacked from behind by two 16-year-olds carrying a machete and a ninja sword. Ronan was stabbed twice, suffering wounds to his back and chest. Tragically, he died at the scene.
It was later revealed that the perpetrators of this heinous act had mistaken Ronan for someone else and that he was not the intended target. The weapons used in the attack had been bought online by the perpetrators—just 16 years old themselves at the time—using another person’s ID, and had been collected from a local post office by them on the day of the attack. In July this year, they were sentenced to 18 and 16 years in prison for their crime.
When I met Ronan’s family recently, it was clear that what happened had shaken them to their core. It has had a devastating impact on their lives. I commend their unspeakable bravery in campaigning to try to create change as a result. I felt very guilty—this will happen with many others, too—that they had to tell their story yet again when I met them; there is that process of telling the story all over again in the pursuit of change. The family campaign now for ninja swords, the type used in Ronan’s murder, to be taken off the streets so that other families do not suffer such a loss. I again commend their extraordinary bravery.
The test that I will apply to the Government’s changes on zombie knives, and on broader knife crime, is whether they would take off the streets a weapon like the one that killed Ronan; if not, the changes will fall short. Existing legislation does not cover ninja swords, and nor does the Bill. From the Government’s response to the consultation on knife crime, I understand that they intend to stop short of ninja swords. I believe that to be a mistake, which will be compounded by other restrictions.
Leaving the ninja swords loophole in place will push sales and marketing towards ninja swords—if people cannot buy a zombie knife but can buy a ninja sword, that will displace activity and make the swords more likely to be carried. That risks more lives being lost, due to the lesser consequences for carrying.
Amendment 53 would add ninja swords explicitly to the Bill. We think the clause is good and important, but the amendment would enhance it. I know that an issue has been raised about ninja swords for decorative purposes, but I do not think that it is beyond us to have arrangements for when that can be managed. Again, the clause is not about possession—it is narrower: about the intent to cause unlawful violence—so I do not think that issue should be a concern, although there could be some sort of licensing scheme to address it.
I am very much looking forward to what the Minister says. This is not a criticism, but I just do not understand why in his plan he stopped short of ninja swords. I hope to get that clarity. Even if not today, the Government need to move on this. I hope to hear that that process is starting.
Chris Philp
It may be helpful to clarify the two different kinds of provisions that apply; the shadow Minister was conflating the two slightly. The first area, the one that we are debating, is to do with the existing offence of possessing any bladed article in a public place without good reason. That can include a legal kitchen knife. That carrying is a criminal offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998. That applies to every bladed article, even ones that are legal, such as a kitchen knife or anything else. It also applies to swords, including ninja swords, because they are bladed articles with a sharp point.
At the moment, the possession of any such knives, including so-called legal knives, carries a maximum sentence of up to two years if someone is caught in possession. For a second possession offence, the mandatory minimum is six months in prison, absent exceptional circumstances—we tightened that up in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That is the law for possessing blades in public.
The clause states that when someone possesses any bladed article—including a legal kitchen knife—with intent to cause damage, the maximum sentence will not be two years, as currently, but four years, if that person intends to cause harm. For example, they might put a video on TikTok saying, “I’m going to stab X”. If there is intention to cause harm, that doubles the maximum sentence. That is what the clause does. The amendment to include swords is not necessary, because every bladed article, including swords, is already included.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North was actually talking about a different set of provisions, which were included in our consultation and our response: banning certain kinds of knives. When a knife is banned, it cannot be sold, imported or possessed even in private. Something such as a zombie knife was covered in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, where it has threatening writing on the blade. Such knives cannot even be held in someone’s home. Having banned knives at home or selling them to anyone is an offence; a kitchen knife can of course be sold and had at home, but even a kitchen knife cannot be carried down the street without a good reason.
In our consultation, we were talking about the knives that people cannot even possess privately at home; they cannot be sold or imported, and they are completely prohibited. The measures we announced in the Bill will simply increase the list of things on the completely prohibited list. For example, a loophole in the 2019 Act meant that threatening words on the blade were required for the zombie knife to be illegal. We are removing that provision, so that any zombie knife, even with nothing on the blade, will still be illegal—common sense, really.
Those changes—widening the range of knives that will be completely illegal—will be made not through the Bill, but through secondary legislation that will be laid before the House in the near future, by which I mean a small number of weeks. I do not wish to provoke the ire of the Chair, so I should say that the place to debate what should be in and out of that list is probably in the Delegated Legislation Committee that will come soon, in a small number of weeks.
I thank the shadow Minister for mentioning the case raised by his right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). I have also met Ronan’s family, who were brought into Parliament by the right hon. Member. We obviously both heard the same account of their story. It was extremely moving and tragic that such a young life was lost. I think it was a case of mistaken identity—as the shadow Minister said, Ronan was attacked from behind. I add my tribute to the family, and to Ronan’s mum and sister in particular, who have recounted the terrible, traumatic event to try to improve law enforcement in this area. We are mindful of that case, and I look forward to debating what is on and off the list when we come to it.
For complete clarity, I repeat the point that the possession of any bladed article, including swords and even kitchen knives, in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of two years. When a knife is possessed with intent, as in the attack on Ronan—the two youths obviously intended to go and kill someone, although it was someone else—the clause increases the maximum sentence from two years to four years. In that case the youths clearly committed homicide, which obviously has life as a maximum sentence.
I hope that I have provided clarity about the purpose of the clause and explained why the change is necessary, because it is included already, and that in secondary legislation we are altering the law on completely prohibited weapons. That will happen in a small number of weeks. I hope that addresses both the hon. Gentleman’s amendment and the substantive provisions in clause 9.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the clarity on what will be covered under the provision. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment. I must say that I am a bit frustrated: it was not clear from the explanatory notes whether this was the full ban. Clearly, from the answer that I have been given, it is not. However, it is a shame that the change will come in secondary legislation, because we are here now—we have legislation in front of us—and we cannot amend secondary legislation.
There will be a big debate in the Delegated Legislation Committee on the point about swords. We will be put in an invidious position, because of course we will not vote against the secondary legislation, but we will not be able to get the change that we really want and we will continue to miss out. The Government’s approach is slightly frustrating. The commitment that the secondary legislation is coming shortly is good, but I hope that the Minister will use the time to reflect on my point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question accordingly agreed to.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)