European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 11th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to wind up this Second Reading debate. I pay tribute at the outset to all those who have contributed to it. Sadly, it is not possible to recognise all the impressive contributions that have been made over the course of this two-day debate, but I would like to single out and congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (James Frith) on the birth of his son, and my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield) on her excellent maiden speech. She brought home to the House not only her love for her constituency, but how much it benefits from economic and cultural exchange with our partners in Europe.

A large number of contributors have stressed the historic nature of this debate, and they were right to do so. The Bill before us is one of the most constitutionally significant pieces of legislation in our country’s history and, in practical terms, will facilitate one of the largest legislative projects ever undertaken by Parliament. The maturity and seriousness of much of the debate that has taken place has rightly reflected the significance of the issues at stake.

The Opposition accept that the Brexit process requires legislation to disentangle the UK from the European Union’s legal structures and to ensure that we have a functioning statute book on the day we leave. Indeed, we acknowledge that this is an essential step if we are to avoid the most chaotic of departures, and as such the Secretary of State is absolutely right to argue that every hon. Member has a shared interest in getting the legislation right.

As many hon. Members have rightly argued, the Bill is not about whether Brexit will take place. As the Secretary of State made clear in his opening remarks last week, the Bill in itself will not determine whether we leave the European Union. That decision was taken on 23 June 2016 in the referendum and was given effect by the triggering of article 50, an act of notification that was itself only possible because this House, including Labour Members, overwhelming backed the Government’s European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill. What is at issue is how we leave, the role of Parliament in that process and the precedents we set. As the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) argued in a characteristically incisive speech on the first day, the question is not whether a Bill such as this is necessary but whether this particular form of the Bill is remotely acceptable. Quite simply, we do not believe it is.

Of the significant number of speakers in this debate, only the most cavalier have failed to remark upon the flawed nature of the Bill. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) so forensically exposed last week, those flaws are not just serious; they are fundamental. The deficiencies in our delegated legislation system have been remarked upon by many Members, not least in the powerful contributions by my hon. Friends the Members for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), for City of Durham (Dr Blackman-Woods) and for High Peak (Ruth George), but the delegated powers conferred on Ministers in clauses 7, 8 and 9 are extraordinary in their constitutional potency and scope. As several hon. Members have mentioned, clause 9 could theoretically be used to amend the Act itself, with only the most basic restrictions acting as safeguards against an overweening Executive. Given that clause 9 allows for the use of sweeping powers over the implementation of the withdrawal agreement, the Bill would allow all aspects of such an agreement, including the divorce bill, to be agreed by Ministers with the least possible scrutiny in this place.

Clause 17 is a power so extensive in its potential application that it could extend to every facet of our national life, and as a consequence opens up the possibility of changes to vast areas of law without full parliamentary process. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) put it in her passionate contribution, these are powers that would make a Tudor monarch proud.

To those who believe that we can merely correct those powers—that we can put through enhanced scrutiny in Committee and the Bill will be fixed—I say that the sweeping powers in the Bill are not its only weakness. Provisions in the Bill rule out a sensible transitional arrangement. Far from delivering clarity on the status and nature of EU-derived law, the Bill is riddled with ambiguities that will create deep uncertainty about how this body of law will apply after incorporation. In ruling out the charter of fundamental rights for purely ideological reasons, the Bill could mean that individuals and businesses cannot assert the rights that it elsewhere seeks to maintain. And in its treatment of the devolved institutions, the Bill risks further destabilising the Union between the four nations of the UK. In short, it is a fundamentally flawed Bill, and the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) was right to refer to it in his contribution as an “astonishing monstrosity”. As he put it in an article in the Evening Standard on Thursday, it

“seeks to confer powers on the Government to carry out Brexit in breach of our constitutional principles, in a manner that no sovereign Parliament should allow.”

The central questions before each Member are whether they truly believe the Government accept just how deficient the Bill is, whether they trust Ministers to co-operate in rectifying its many deficiencies and whether, as a consequence, they are confident that it can be made watertight in the eight days that the programme motion allocates for the Committee stage. In short, the question is whether hon. Members believe that it is feasible and probable that the breathtaking tapestry of sweeping delegated powers woven into the Bill can be unpicked and the Bill made good, or whether it is so deeply flawed that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) put it in a brilliant speech, the Government should go away and do their homework again.

We do not need to legislate in this fashion to achieve the necessary aims that lie behind the Bill, and if we are all honest, we will agree that the Government should not have put hon. Members on both sides of the House in this position. Ministers have known for a considerable time of the real and genuinely held concerns about the approach that the Bill takes. The Opposition raised concerns following the publication of the White Paper; we reiterated those concerns when the Bill was first published; and, in a letter to the Secretary of State at the start of the month, we called again for constructive engagement. While many Conservative Members will no doubt all too readily dismiss the concerns that we have raised, those concerns have been echoed for some time by voices from the Government Benches, as well as by parliamentary Committees and numerous non-parliamentary organisations.

In short, the Government have had ample time to make it clear that they are willing to correct the flaws in the Bill and to table amendments which show that they mean it, but only now are we being told that Ministers are in listening mode and are open to ideas for constructive improvements to the Bill. As many Members have noted, we are being asked, in a sense, to take it on trust that conversations will be held, and that we will have assurances down the line about how Ministers will use the powers in the Bill. Yet the Secretary of State, in his opening remarks, defended the wording of the Bill as it stands, and offered no concrete concessions that might reassure Members on both sides of the House. Given the Government’s track record, which a number of my hon. Friends have highlighted, we need proof of real movement. We need more than vague offers to talk during Committee stage.

Many of us remain utterly bewildered about why the Bill has been drafted in this form, and why Ministers felt it that it was wise to ignore the Exiting the European Union Committee’s call for the Bill to be published in draft so that its flaws could be addressed before we reached this point. The unique challenge of disentangling the UK from the EU’s legal structures and ensuring that we have a functioning statute book on the day we leave required a Bill that created consensus across this House, not one that undermines it. It required a Bill that restored power to the House of Commons, not one that concentrates unparalleled power in the hands of the Executive.

All of us—all Members, throughout the House—agree that a Bill of this kind is necessary, but that does not mean that Parliament should accept this fundamentally flawed Bill. It is for that reason, and that reason alone, that the Opposition will vote against it tonight.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dame Rosie Winterton in the Chair]

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

rose—

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

On a point of order, Dame Rosie. On the yesterday’s selection list—and, in part, today’s—there are some extremely helpful references to the page numbers of this enormous wodge of amendments. Would it be possible for the Clerks to be good enough to put the page numbers on the selection list for easy reference, because it is sometimes quite difficult to find the amendments at short notice?

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I will certainly bring that to the attention of the Public Bill Office and see what we can do to help.

New Clause 2

Retaining Enhanced Protection

“Regulations provided for by Acts of Parliament other than this Act may not be used by Ministers of the Crown to amend or modify retained EU law in the following areas—

(a) employment entitlement, rights and protections;

(b) equality entitlements, rights and protections;

(c) health and safety entitlement, rights and protections;

(d) fundamental rights as defined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)

This new clause would prevent delegated powers from other Acts being used to alter workplace protections, equality provisions, health and safety regulations or fundamental rights.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 15—Provisions relating to the EU or the EEA in respect of EU-derived domestic legislation—

“HM Government shall make arrangements to report to both Houses of Parliament whenever circumstances arising in section 2(2)(d) would otherwise have amended provisions or definitions in UK law had the UK remained a member of the EU or EEA beyond exit day.”

This new clause would ensure that Parliament is informed of changes in EU and EEA provisions that might have amended UK law if the UK had remained a member of those institutions beyond exit day.

New clause 25—Treatment of retained law—

“(1) Following the commencement of this Act, no modification may be made to retained EU law save by primary legislation, or by subordinate legislation made under this Act.

(2) By regulation, the Minister may establish a Schedule listing technical provisions of retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation.

(3) Regulations made under subsection (2) will be subject to an enhanced scrutiny procedure including consultation with the public and relevant stakeholders.

(4) Regulations may only be made under subsection (2) to the extent that they will have no detrimental impact on the UK environment.

(5) Delegated powers may only be used to modify provisions of retained EU law listed in any Schedule made under subsection (2) to the extent that such modification will not limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”

This new clause provides a mechanism for Ministers to establish a list of technical provisions of retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation outside of the time restrictions of the Bill.

New clause 50—Continuing validity in the United Kingdom of European Union law—

“(1) The European Communities Act 1972 shall continue to have effect in the United Kingdom after the date on which the United Kingdom leaves the European Union as if the United Kingdom continued to be bound by the Treaties.

(2) Accordingly all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies as provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall continue to be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to any primary legislation passed by Parliament coming into force after the date of exit from the European Union which includes a provision to the effect that that Act, or specified provisions of that Act, have effect notwithstanding the provisions of section (Continuing validity in the United Kingdom of European Union law)(1) and (2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2017.”

New clause 51—Duty of review of European Union law—

“(1) The Prime Minister must lay before Parliament within six months of the date of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, and at least once a year thereafter, a review of all European Union legislation and decisions still applicable to the United Kingdom, with proposals for re-enactment, replacement or repeal by the United Kingdom Parliament of any provisions of European Union law, with or without modification, as United Kingdom legislation.

(2) The House of Commons may appoint or designate one or more select committees to consider any report under subsection (1).”

New clause 55—Treatment of retained law (No. 2)—

“(1) Following the day on which this Act is passed, no modification may be made to retained EU law except by primary legislation, or by subordinate legislation made under this Act.

(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a schedule listing technical provisions of retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation.

(3) Subordinate legislation to which subsection (2) applies must be subject to an enhanced scrutiny procedure, to be established by regulations made by the Secretary of State after approval in draft by both Houses of Parliament, which must include consultation with the public and relevant stakeholders.

(4) Delegated powers may be used only to modify provisions of retained EU law listed in any Schedule made under subsection (2) to the extent that such modification will not limit the scope or weaken standards of equalities, environmental and employment protection, and consumer standards.”

This amendment would qualify the powers conferred to alter law by statutory instrument after exit day.

New clause 58—Retaining Enhanced Protection (No. 2)—

“Regulations provided for by Acts of Parliament other than this Act may not be used by Ministers of the Crown to amend, repeal or modify retained EU law in the following areas—

(a) employment entitlement, rights and protection;

(b) equality entitlements, rights and protection;

(c) health and safety entitlement, rights and protection;

(d) consumer standards; and

(e) environmental standards and protection.”

This new clause would ensure that after exit day, EU-derived employment rights, environmental protection, standards of equalities, health and safety standards and consumer standards can only be amended by primary legislation or subordinate legislation made under this Act.

Amendment 200, in clause 2, page 1, line 12, after “passed” insert “and commenced,”.

Amendment 87, page 1, line 19, at end insert

“or any enactment to which subsection (2A) applies.

‘(2A) This subsection applies to any enactment of the United Kingdom Parliament which—

(a) applies to Wales and does not relate to matters specified in Schedule 7A to the Government of Wales Act 2006,

(b) applies to Scotland and does not relate to matters specified in Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998,

(c) applies to Northern Ireland and does not relate to matters specified in Schedules 2 or 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998.’”

This amendment would alter the definition of EU retained law so as only to include reserved areas of legislation. This will allow the National Assembly for Wales and the other devolved administrations to legislate on areas of EU derived law which fall under devolved competency for themselves.

Amendment 201, page 1, line 19, at end insert—

“(2A) For the purposes of this Act, any EU-derived domestic legislation has effect in domestic law immediately before exit day if—

(a) in the case of anything which shall apply or be operative from a particular date, applies or is operative before exit day, or

(b) in any other case, it has been commenced and is in force immediately before exit day.”

Clause 2 stand part.

Amendment 217, in clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 13 to 22.

This amendment, along with Amendment 64 to Schedule 8 would exclude the European Economic Area agreement from the Bill, allowing the UK to remain in the EEA.

Amendment 356, page 2, line 22, at end insert—

“(2A) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations provide for prospective EU legislation to form part of domestic law as it has effect in EU law, from the time at which it begins to apply or from some later time.

(2B) In subsection (2A) “prospective EU legislation” means—

(a) an EU regulation which is adopted, notified or in force immediately before exit day, or

(b) EU tertiary legislation made under retained EU law, so far as it is not operative immediately before exit day.

(2C) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (2A) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

The amendment would allow Ministers, with parliamentary approval, to apply EU legislation which has been passed before exit day but does not take full effect until after that day, along with subordinate measures made for the purposes of EU legislation which is retained under the Bill and taking effect after exit day.

Clause 3 stand part.

New clause 29—Parliamentary vote on withdrawal from European Economic Area—

“The requirement of this section is that each House of Parliament has passed a resolution in the following terms—

That this House supports the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Economic Area.”

This new clause describes the requirement for each House of Parliament to agree to withdrawal from the European Economic Area and is linked to Amendment 128 which makes the exercise of the power to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement contingent on such agreement.

Amendment 128, in clause 9, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the requirement of section (Parliamentary vote on withdrawal from European Economic Area) have been met.”

This amendment makes the exercise of the power to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement contingent on the requirement for separate agreement on withdrawal from the European Economic Area of NC29.

New clause 22—EEA Agreement—

“(1) No Minister may, under this Act, notify the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EEA Agreement, whether under Article 127 of that Agreement or otherwise.

(2) Regulations under this Act may not make any provision that would constitute a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the EEA Agreement.

(3) Regulations under this Act may not amend or repeal subsection (1) or (2).”

New clause 9—European Economic Area—

“The United Kingdom shall, after exit day, remain a member of the European Economic Area as set out in the European Economic Area Act 1993, and the provisions in Part 2 of Schedule 8 relating to the United Kingdom‘s membership of the EEA shall not take effect until such time as Ministers have published a White Paper assessing the costs and benefits for the UK economy of remaining a member of the European Economic Area after exit day.”

This new Clause would ensure that the UK can remain a member of the European Economic Area until such time as Ministers publish a specific assessment in the form of a White Paper setting out the costs and benefits for the UK of remaining a member after exit day.

New clause 23—EFTA membership—

“The Secretary of State shall, no later than six months after this Act has gained Royal Assent, lay a report before Parliament setting out an assessment of whether it would be in the interests of the United Kingdom to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and, if so, whether it should remain a party to the EEA Agreement as a member of EFTA.”

New clause 45—European Economic Area (No. 2)—

“Nothing in this Act authorises the Prime Minister to give notice under Article 127 of the EEA Agreement of the United Kingdom’s intention to opt out of the EEA.”

Amendment 64, page 54, in schedule 8, leave out paragraphs 12 to 17.

This amendment would retain the provisions of the European Economic Area Act 1993 as part of domestic legislation beyond exit day.

[Matthew Pennycook]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Rosie.

I will speak to new clause 58. Clauses 2 to 4 provide for the preservation of EU and EU-related law post-exit day in a new category of law, retained EU law, which itself comprises three principal sub-categories. Clause 2 provides that existing domestic legislation that implements EU law obligations remains on the domestic statute book after exit day. This will be known as EU-derived domestic legislation and includes, for example, secondary legislation enacted under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 for the purpose of implementing EU directives.

Clause 3 converts direct EU legislation into domestic legislation at the point of exit. This covers EU law, such as EU regulations and decisions that have direct effect in the UK because the UK is an EU member state, but which would fall once the UK is no longer bound by the treaties. Clause 4 provides that any remaining EU rights and obligations that do not fall within clauses 2 and 3 continue to be recognised and available in domestic law after exit. This includes, for example, directly effective rights contained within EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional as to confer rights directly on individuals.

The purpose of new clause 58 is straightforward. It is to ensure that retained EU law, as preserved in clauses 2 to 4, in five key areas—employment, equality, health and safety, consumer and environment—is accorded a level of enhanced protection that it would otherwise not enjoy from delegated powers contained in Acts of Parliament other than the one before us today.

[Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind)]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to make an early intervention. For clarification for those of us who represent constituencies in Northern Ireland, is it intended by the Labour party that these amendments would extend to Northern Ireland? If so, what consultation has the Labour party had with any of the political parties in Northern Ireland about the content of the amendments?

[Matthew Pennycook]

With all due respect, that issue will be more prominently dealt with during the days of debate on devolution. I understand that EU retained law will apply across the United Kingdom.

In the respect that I set out, new clause 58 is broadly similar in its intent to new clauses 25 and 55, both of which have as their primary purpose the prevention of modification of retained EU law save by primary legislation or by subordinate legislation made under this Act. If pushed to a vote we would be minded to support either of those new clauses.

The array of rights, entitlements, protections and standards that we currently enjoy as a member of the European Union are underpinned by EU provisions. They either have direct effect as a result of the treaties or are protected in delegated legislation under the ECA. Either way, they currently enjoy a form of enhanced protection as a result of this underpinning. After the UK has left the EU, that enhanced protection will fall away. The Opposition have repeatedly emphasised that Brexit must not lead to any watering down or weakening of EU-derived rights, particularly rights and standards in the areas of employment, equality, health and safety, consumer and environment. Working in conjunction with our amendments relating to clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17 that seek to limit and constrain the sweeping Executive powers contained in this legislation, new clause 58 seeks to guarantee that rights, entitlements, protections and standards in these areas are not just transposed and maintained, but are effectively protected thereafter.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend is making some very important points. I, too, support new clause 58 and the provisions in new clauses 55 and 25. New clause 58 makes a clear point about the protection of equality rights. In the light of the wonderful news that came overnight from Australia about marriage equality, does he agree that it is crucial that we send out a signal to the LGBT+ community in the United Kingdom that we respect their rights and will retain them?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I could not agree more. That is exactly what new clause 58 would do; it would provide enhanced protection for equality, rights and protections after we have left the EU.

Taken at face value, clauses 2 to 4 appear relatively straightforward. But, as many hon. Members who spoke in yesterday’s debate made clear, the Bill as drafted creates a considerable degree of ambiguity and uncertainty as to the status of retained EU law. Currently the status of rights, protections and standards underpinned by EU law is distinct.

Treaty provisions and regulations that take effect through section 2(1) of the ECA are neither primary nor secondary legislation. The principle of the supremacy of EU law and the ECA means that, in practice, they have a particular constitutional status that enables them to take priority over primary legislation enacted by Parliament. Similarly, secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the ECA is distinct from other secondary legislation in that it could take priority over primary legislation because of the fact that it is giving effect to an EU law obligation. Primary legislation that gives effect to an EU law obligation could be amended by Parliament, but any removal of an underlying EU law could be challenged in the courts.

Post-exit, it is unclear what status—primary, secondary or something else entirely—retained EU law will have. From schedule 1, one might draw the inference that retained EU law has the characteristics of secondary, rather than primary, legislation. Yet paragraph 19 of schedule 8 provides that, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, direct EU legislation

“is to be treated as primary legislation”,

although this schedule does not cover those rights recognised and made available in domestic law after exit by means of clause 4.

Clauses 5 and 6 provide guidance as to how the courts should interpret retained EU law in the event of a conflict with an enactment passed after exit day, but it is not yet clear—as we debated at length yesterday—whether the courts will treat particular retained EU laws as constitutional legislation that is not susceptible to implied repeal.

The uncertainty that surrounds the status and interpretation of retained EU law is a real weakness of the legislation and it is crucial that it is clarified and addressed on the face of the Bill. But, irrespective of what status particular retained EU laws are eventually accorded, this new category of law—detached from the enhanced protection enjoyed as a result of being underwritten by our membership of the EU—will be vulnerable to amendment not just from the delegated powers contained in this Bill, but from subordinate legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful case. Does he agree that if we are to have the deep and special relationship that Ministers say they want with the rest of the EU, we have no choice but to continue to harmonise our standards on employment rights, equality, and health and safety? Even if they were not good things to do in their own right, which they are, it will be crucial to keep those standards at the same level as the EU or higher if we are to have that kind of trading relationship.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Lady makes a good point. Of course we will need to do that, and businesses will have to comply with those standards. That is why we need to ensure that the EU and EU-derived rights we have are underpinned by an enhanced status. We will then need to move on to the conversation—which we will have to have—about how to stay in some form of regulatory alignment, if we want the type of deep and comprehensive deal that I think both sides envisage.

[Michael Tomlinson (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (Con)]

I have been listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s speech. Does he accept that so many of these rights existed before we joined the EU and will still be there after we leave the EU? They are not, and need not be, dependent on the European Union. It is this place that will and can safeguard those rights.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman may have missed my point. I completely accept the fact that these rights will be brought into UK law, that they will not be underpinned by EU provisions and that many of them were there first and have been added to over the decades of our membership. What we are talking about here is ensuring that retained EU law cannot be chipped away at by secondary legislation—that it has an enhanced status and must be amended only by primary legislation debated in full in this Chamber.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is right. It is the curiosity of this legislation that laws that the public, if we were to raise these issues with them, would regard for the most part as being of very considerable importance are being brought to the lowest possible status on their return here, and without there really being an opportunity, for obvious reasons, to revisit this issue domestically in a way that might lead us to enact fresh legislation.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I could not have put it better myself. That is precisely the problem, and that is precisely what new clause 58 seeks to address.

The uncertainty that surrounds the status and interpretation of retained EU law is a real weakness, but irrespective of what happens, retained EU law, as defined in the Bill, is vulnerable to secondary legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament, which will have been drafted in a very different context—in the context of a country whose long-term future appeared to reside unambiguously in the European Union.

Perhaps the most potent example is the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. Part 1 provides for Ministers to introduce statutory instruments to remove burdens resulting from legislation, including primary legislation. A burden, for the purpose of that part of the Act, includes a financial cost or

“an obstacle to efficiency, productivity or profitability”.

That Act is a potent piece of legislation as it is, but it will be far more so as a result of this Bill if it can be used to alter a raft of EU rights and protections that are currently underpinned by EU provisions.

This is not just about the powers in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. Other examples come to mind, such as section 5 of the Localism Act 2011 and section 11 of the Public Bodies Act 2011. All contain wide powers to alter regulations, and all were passed in the constitutional context of our rights and protections being underpinned by our EU membership. All will become more powerful after exit today.

Retained EU law would also be vulnerable to recently proposed legislation and legislation currently making its way through this place. For example, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, which is currently in Committee in this House, contains proposed new clause 76A(6) to the Energy Act 2013, which provides that the delegated power in section 113(7) of the Energy Act can be used to make changes to retained EU law. Similarly, clause 2(6) of the recently published Trade Bill provides for regulations that can be used to modify primary legislation, including retained EU law. The same, we can only assume, is likely to be the case for the immigration, agriculture and other Bills we expect in the coming months as part of the process of legislating for Brexit.

New clause 58 would ensure that regulations of the kind provided for by those Bills could not be used to amend or repeal retained EU law in the five areas I have set out, thereby according them a level of enhanced protection. That is important because any future Government could easily use secondary legislation contained in a variety of past and future Acts of Parliament to chip away at rights, entitlements, protections and standards that the public enjoy and wish to retain.

In the interests of brevity, let me illustrate the risks posed if we do not pass new clause 58 or a similar new clause, by focusing on employment entitlement, rights and protection. As hon. Members will know, a substantial part of UK employment rights is derived from EU law, and an even larger body is guaranteed by EU law. As such, key workers’ rights enjoy a form of enhanced protection. Those include protections against discrimination owing to sex, pregnancy, race, disability, religion and belief, age, and sexual orientation; equal pay between men and women for work of equal value; health and safety protection for pregnant women, and their rights to maternity leave; a degree of equal treatment, in broad terms, for the growing number of fixed-term, part-time and agency workers; rights to protected terms and conditions, and rights not to be dismissed on the transfer of an undertaking; and almost all the law on working time, including paid annual leave and limits on daily and weekly working time.

Whether it is the working time regulations guaranteeing rights to holiday pay and protections from excessive working hours, which will be preserved via clause 2 of this Bill, or the right to equal pay contained in article 157 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, which will presumably be preserved via clause 4, these rights will not enjoy enhanced protection after exit day and will be at risk of amendment from regulations set out in other Acts of Parliament if this new clause or a similar one is not passed.

Now, it is true the Government have promised to ensure that workers’ rights are fully protected and maintained after the UK’s departure from the EU, but in the absence of stronger legal safeguards, there are good reasons to be sceptical about that commitment.

[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, given the political events of this year, it has become ever more uncertain who the Government might be in the future? Therefore, all of us have the job of protecting the process and the institutions of our democracy, because we never know what might happen in the future.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree with that, and I agree—I think this was also my hon. Friend’s point—that the public will expect these rights to continue to have the protection they have enjoyed while being underpinned by EU law. These rights should not have a reduced level of protection in the future.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

rose—

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will make a little more progress if that is all right.

Let me remind the House of the sentiments on the Government Benches when it comes to workers’ rights. Throughout the referendum, prominent leavers drew attention to what they claimed was the high cost of EU employment regulations, including those such as the working time directive and the temporary agency work directive. Prominent members of the Cabinet are on record as having called for workers’ rights to be removed. For example, the Foreign Secretary has written that we need

“to root out the nonsense of the social chapter—the working time directive and the atypical work directive and other job-destroying regulations.”

During the referendum, on 18 May 2016, the then Minister for Employment, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel), went so far as to call for the UK to

“halve the burdens of EU social and employment legislation”

in the event of Brexit. The newest member of the Brexit ministerial team—Lord Callanan—has openly called for the scrapping of the working time directive, the temporary agency work directive, the pregnant workers directive and

“all the other barriers to actually employing people.”

Just this week, the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) made a speech in London calling for, among other things, deregulation. It was retweeted and then hastily deleted, as we heard yesterday, by the Department for International Trade.

[Tom Brake]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman is about to quote Mr Dyson. When leave supporters wanted to quote a business, it was usually Mr Dyson’s or JCB. Now that Mr Dyson welcomes the fact that leaving the EU means he will be able to hire and fire people more easily, I wonder whether they will quote him quite so often.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Pennycook]

I was not going to quote Sir James Dyson, but the right hon. Gentleman has, happily, added to my remarks.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am flattered that the hon. Gentleman pays such close attention to my speeches. I was talking about regulation in the City of London, not employment regulation. I think there is now consensus across the political firmament that employment regulations will remain in place, which is one of the reasons why his new clause is not necessary.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am happy to be corrected on that point, but I would say to the hon. Gentleman that it is a bit rich to suggest that the many public pronouncements that have been made on employment rights over many years by so many Conservative Members have been forgotten entirely and that Conservative Members are suddenly the champions of enhanced workers’ rights. We do not believe that, which is why we need legal safeguards in the Bill.

[Chuka Umunna (Streatham) (Lab)]

rose—

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am going to make some progress.

It may be the case that pragmatism and electoral appeal trump ideology, but there is no guarantee, and that is the point. We should not take risks with rights, standards and protections that have been underpinned by EU law. Hard-won employment entitlements, along with entitlements relating to the environment, health and safety, equalities and consumer rights, should not be vulnerable to steady erosion by means of secondary legislation outside of the powers contained in this Bill. In future, Ministers should be able to change the workers’ rights and other rights that came from the EU only through primary legislation, with a full debate in Parliament. On that basis, I urge hon. Members on both sides of the House to support new clause 58.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Dame Rosie. Yesterday’s selection list meant that it was not possible to debate the amendments on the customs union or on the European agencies. I do not say this as a criticism of the Chair—obviously, a selection has to be made—but these are extremely important areas of European law, which, as the current schedule stands, we will not now have an opportunity to debate. However, the Government did say that they were prepared, if need be, for extra time to be given to the Committee stage in the House. How might we facilitate securing more time to debate these extremely important issues?

--- Later in debate ---

[Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)]

The Government say, “Trust us, workers’ rights are safe.” As someone who has fought for workers’ rights for 40 years, rising from being a lay member to ultimately being elected deputy general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, I have seen often implacable hostility from Tory Governments towards workers and their trade unions in every decade since we joined the EU, ranging from when we were described in the 1980s as the “enemy within” to, more recently, the Trade Union Bill 2015.

In the referendum campaign, what the wide-eyed Brexiteers now driving the Government would like to see in our country could not have been clearer. The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith) pledged to “whittle away” the regulation “burden” with its

“intrusions into the daily life of citizens.”

Lord Lawson called for a “massive” regulatory cull. The ex-International Development Secretary, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel), said:

“If we could just halve…the EU social and employment legislation we could deliver a £4.3 billion boost to the economy.”

Indeed, the previous Prime Minister talked about killing off the safety culture. Anyone who had stood outside Wembley stadium with 1,000 workers mourning the death of somebody who had just been crushed at work would not talk about killing off the safety culture. And the Foreign Secretary said during the Brexit campaign that the weight of employment legislation is now “back-breaking” and that his preferred model is to scrap the social charter.

I do not doubt for one moment that there are truly honourable Members on the Conservative Benches who mean it when they say that workers’ rights will be safe; the question is how we safeguard that in the next stages.

Let me tell just one story showing why this matters—why European Union law mattered to British workers, and, crucially, why it matters that we get it right to protect workers’ rights as we leave the EU. In 1977 the EU legislated for the acquired rights directive, and our Government had to introduce it into domestic law. Eventually it was introduced, with gritted teeth, in 1983, with William van Straubenzee saying in the House that he did so “with the utmost reluctance.” But the Tories then excluded the public sector; 10 million public servants were excluded for 10 years. The price that was paid, as we saw mass privatisation throughout the 1980s, was catastrophic for workers.

I remember the first example I dealt with, at the Fire Training College at Moreton-in-Marsh: 120 predominantly women housekeepers and catering workers had their pay cut by a third and the numbers employed cut by a half, holiday entitlement cut, and sickness entitlements cut. The only humorous side of an otherwise sad story was that the managing director of Grand Met Catering which won the contract was—I kid thee not—none other than a Mr Dick Turpin.

These situations went on for year after year. Let me give another example. My uncle Mick, God rest his soul, was a street-cleaner. He lived with me when I was a kid. He worked for Brent Council. I will never forget when Brent street-cleaners and refuse collectors were facing privatisation. During a meeting in their canteen one morning, the street-cleaners sat together, many of them disabled workers, in fear of what would happen because they knew that the bids coming in would result in a third of the workforce going, and they might be the most likely to go. I remember that my Uncle Mick’s good friend—a single man living alone—collapsed in tears afterwards at the thought of what loomed before him. There was 10 years of that throughout the 1980s.

I then took the case of the Eastbourne dustmen to the European Court of Justice and the European Commission, and we won. Thanks to EU law, our Government were forced to extend TUPE to cover 10 million public servants. It is vital in the next stages that there can never be any going back.

Time does not permit me to talk about other examples of implacable hostility: GCHQ, the refusal to sign the social charter, the national minimum wage, employment tribunal fees and the Trade Union Bill.

In conclusion, I stress again that I draw a distinction between the many Government Members who mean what they say and those who are in the driving seat, taking us ever closer to the cliff edge. When they say, “Trust us,” say no. That is why my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) was right to table new clauses that would safeguard workers’ rights as best we can. We cannot delegate to future Conservative Governments—if they still exist—the ability to change workers’ rights by way of Henry VIII powers, so that they can say, “Off with their heads.” On each and every occasion, as my hon. Friend argued, workers deserve the enhanced protection of any changes to their rights after we leave the European Union coming back to Parliament for debate, and changes being made only by an Act of Parliament. Is that ideal from my point of view? No, but it is at least a damn sight better than relying on Henry VIII powers in the hands of the Foreign Secretary—or who knows who?—at the next stage.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I know how many speakers have put in for the next debate, so I will be brief. It has been a good debate with many thoughtful contributions from both sides of the Committee, and I genuinely welcome the Solicitor General’s constructive tone. I also welcome the guarantee that, whether amendments are passed or not, we will have a Report stage. That suggests to me that, as we have long suspected, the Government draftsmen are busily at work.

However, on the central purpose of new clause 58—the need to secure enhanced protection for retained EU law from secondary legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament—the Minister offered no meaningful concessions. As such, I will test the will of the Committee on that matter when the time comes, but I will not press new clause 2 to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 25

Treatment of retained law

“(1) Following the commencement of this Act, no modification may be made to retained EU law save by primary legislation, or by subordinate legislation made under this Act.

(2) By regulation, the Minister may establish a Schedule listing technical provisions of retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation.

(3) Regulations made under subsection (2) will be subject to an enhanced scrutiny procedure including consultation with the public and relevant stakeholders.

(4) Regulations may only be made under subsection (2) to the extent that they will have no detrimental impact on the UK environment.

(5) Delegated powers may only be used to modify provisions of retained EU law listed in any Schedule made under subsection (2) to the extent that such modification will not limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”—(Kerry McCarthy.)

This new clause provides a mechanism for Ministers to establish a list of technical provisions of retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation outside of the time restrictions of the Bill.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Temporary Chair]

Order. Thirteen colleagues, and possibly more, have caught my eye with 130 minutes to go before we conclude at 10 o’clock. You can do the maths, and it is not that great. Please be mindful of others, and let us not have too many interventions. Let those who wish to speak, speak.

[Matthew Pennycook]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), and I welcome the fact that he thinks this is a debate about means not ends. The debate should continue in that constructive spirit. I am particularly interested in his ideas for an environment Bill, presumably to be introduced before exit day, and his ideas about governance, which we will be debating in Committee on a later day.

I rise to speak to new clause 67 because I have not been entirely convinced by the right hon. Gentleman. The aim of the clause is simple: to ensure that the environmental principles set out in article 191(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union—the precautionary principle, the principle that preventive action should be taken to avert environmental damage, the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and the polluter pays principle—continue to be recognised and applied after exit day, which is important. In that respect, new clause 67 is broadly similar in its intent to new clauses 60 and 28. If either of those new clauses is pressed to a vote, we would be minded to support them.

The environmental principles set out in article 191 of the TFEU form an essential component of environmental law; they are not unique to environmental law, but they are principles of environmental law in general. The principles are also found in a number of international environmental treaties to which the UK is a signatory, including the convention on biological diversity, the convention on climate change and the convention on the law of the sea. At present, the UK gives effect to those obligations through its membership of the EU, and particularly through the Lisbon treaty.

As the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and the right hon. Member for West Dorset said, the principles play three key roles: they are an aid to the interpretation of the law; they guide future decision making; and they are a basis for legal challenge in court.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion set out in great detail the wide range of areas in which the principles have led to tangible environment improvement benefits. As it stands, the Bill does not ensure that the environmental principles will be recognised and available in domestic law after exit, and as such does not retain those three key roles. The principles are not preserved by clause 4 because they do not confer directly effective rights on individuals. According to the legal advice that I have received, neither do they fall within the definition of the general principles of EU law that are to some extent preserved by the Bill, although the Minister may want to comment on that. Whereas the general principles apply across all EU law, by their very definition some environmental principles apply only to environmental law and policy.

If we are to retain the law we have, to be effective custodians of the environment and to be world leaders when it comes to environmental standards, it is imperative that we embed the principles in the way policy operates. To his credit, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has recognised that. However, the Government have argued that environmental principles are interpretive principles, and that as such they should not form part of the law itself. I argue that the environmental principles are not simply guidance; as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion mentioned, they have been given effect in EU law. Article 11 of the TFEU states:

“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.”

They are, therefore, a vital aid to understanding the role and function of existing legislation, as well as being an interpretative tool for decision makers and, if necessary, the courts.

For the principles to have equivalence on exit day, they must be placed in domestic legislation. I recognise that a consultation on this subject has been announced, but it will not report back before the Bill has progressed through this place. There is good reason to doubt that the direction of travel being signalled by the Government—namely, a reliance on UK case law, judicial review and some form of policy guidance—will do the job, even if all that operates alongside governance arrangements in the form of an as yet undefined watchdog, although the right hon. Member for West Dorset gave some valuable insight into what the Government are thinking in that respect.

UK case law is unlikely to retain and capture the effect of all the principles set out in article 191, as that would limit enforceability to where the principles already exist in case law. It is difficult to see how judicial review, which looks only at the legality of a decision or action rather than its scientific merits, will materially apply core environmental principles. Likewise, reliance on policy guidance—something explicitly referred to by the Secretary of State recently in evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee—is arguably an inadequate basis on which to proceed. As the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion noted, policy guidance is necessarily limited in scope, but there is a strong case for ensuring that environmental principles apply across Government, informing law as well as policy, to match the rigour of the treaty obligations.

Policy guidance also entails a weaker duty on public bodies: policy statements are only guidelines or material considerations for public bodies to consider, meaning that they are less likely to influence a decision than a strict duty to comply. Policy guidance is impermanent; it is prey to changes resulting from short-term political agendas—under different Ministers and different Governments—and so does not provide long-term certainty, and it lacks the binding character of statute. There should be a clear duty to comply with environmental principles in statute, to match the current strong legal obligation set out in the treaty, and the courts should be able to enforce such a duty.

[Luke Graham (Ochil and South Perthshire) (Con)]

With respect to compliance, does the hon. Gentleman recognise the importance of strong UK frameworks? Although we have different jurisdictions throughout the UK, we have to make sure that we have standards that maintain the integrity of our internal market and protect the UK and the Union that we all support.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree with that, and I would add that if the environmental principles are brought into UK law in the fashion that I am describing, they will of course inform the frameworks for the devolved legislatures.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

Has the hon. Gentleman given any consideration to what the words

“enforced, allowed, and followed accordingly”

are supposed to mean? I confess that, on reading clause 4 1(b), I found it very difficult to understand what the Government intended.

[Matthew Pennycook]

That point is very well made. I expect that other hon. Members will touch on that in more detail when they speak to amendments 93 to 95.

We support amendments 148 to 150 and new clause 34—the efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston to remedy deficiencies in the Bill with respect to the rights of children. Her amendments are designed to preserve in domestic law any rights or obligations arising from the UN convention on the rights of the child, to ensure that Ministers act in such a way as to comply with that convention, and to protect from the delegated powers in the Bill the rights and obligations that flow from the convention.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Dominic Raab)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of clause 4 and to respond to today’s second group of amendments. I also appreciate the constructive tone of the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook).

The two strategic objectives of the Bill are to take back democratic control over our laws, and to do so in a way that ensures a smooth Brexit. Clause 4 helps us to deliver on both aims. Before talking about the amendments and the application of that clause, it is worth briefly explaining the value of clause 4, which is a sweeper provision. Clause 2 retains UK implementing legislation deriving from EU instruments, and clause 3 incorporates direct EU legislation. Clause 4 picks up the other obligations, rights and remedies that would currently have the force of UK law under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972. In particular, it will ensure that we retain, on day one of exit, general principles of EU law and all directly effective rights. That means rights deriving from EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional that they do not require separate bespoke implementing legislation. Instead, to date, they are relied on as national law without reference to any separate implementing legislation.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I have steadfastly resisted for 21 years engaging in meaningless partisan debate, and I am not going to abandon a career’s worth of effort in that direction to answer that point. Animal sentience is built into English law in various ways already, but the new Bill will vastly strengthen the position compared with what it is today under European law. That is a huge advance for our nation, one that many people on both sides of the House can be happy with. As my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park was pointing out, there is an exact parallel with what we and the Government are seeking to do in relation to environmental regulation. I really believe that if we could lay aside both the inevitable divisions about Brexit itself and the inevitable play of party politics, and simply focus on what is going to do the best thing for our environment, we would see that the programme we have before us is a huge advance and one we should gratefully welcome.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Laing, and to follow the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). I rise to speak to new clauses 63 and 1, amendments 32 and 25, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and amendments 342, 333, 350, 334 and 33 to 41.

For the purposes of clarity, I intend to break my remarks down into three parts. I will first speak to those new clauses and amendments that relate to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 7. I will then turn to those that relate specifically to the clause 7 power to transfer functions from EU entities and agencies to UK competent authorities. I will finish by turning to new clauses and amendments that relate to the Government’s proposals about how Parliament will scrutinise and, where necessary, approve secondary legislation made under the powers provided for by not only clause 7, but clauses 8, 9 and 17.

I turn first to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 7. As I said when winding up for the Opposition in the debate on Second Reading, the delegated powers conferred on Ministers under clause 7, and clauses 8, 9 and 17, are extraordinary in their constitutional potency and scope. They are, to put it plainly, objectionable and their flaws must be addressed before Third Reading. As such, when it comes to the correcting powers provided for by clause 7, what we are debating is not whether there is a need to place limits on these powers—that, I hope, is beyond serious dispute. What is at issue today, and what I intend to cover in the first part of my remarks, is what limits should be placed on these powers and why.

Just as the Opposition accept that the Brexit process requires legislation to disentangle the UK from the European Union’s legal structures and to ensure that we have a functioning statute book on the day we leave, we also understand, in light of the legislative reality that must be confronted between now and exit day, that no Government could carry out this task by primary legislation alone. We therefore accept that relatively wide delegated powers to amend existing EU law and to legislate for new arrangements following Brexit where necessary are, and will be, an inevitable feature of the Bill. Given how much EU and EU-related law has been implemented through primary legislation, we also recognise that the Bill will have to contain Henry VIII clauses. We appreciate that there is a difficult balance to be struck between the urgency required to provide legal continuity and certainty after exit day and the equally important need for safeguards to ensure we maintain the constitutional balance of powers between the legislature and the Executive.

We also believe, however, that to the extent that relatively wide delegated powers are necessary, they should not be granted casually and where they are granted they should be limited, wherever possible, and practical. That is particularly important given how remarkable the correcting powers provided under clause 7 are in their potency and scope. On their potency, it is important to recognise that the Henry VIII powers contained in clause 7 are of the most expansive type. As has already been noted by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), clause 7(4) makes it clear that the power granted by subsection (1) can be used to enact regulations that make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament, and clauses 8(2) and 9(2) make equivalent provision in respect of the powers conferred by both those clauses.

These are extraordinary powers, for if it is possible for regulations made under clause 7(1) to make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament, that must extend logically to amending or repealing any kind of law, including provisions in other Acts, in the context of wide-ranging purpose of the clause: to remedy any deficiencies that arise in retained EU law. Furthermore, paragraph 1(2)(8) of schedule 7 explicitly confirms that the powers in clause 7 can be used to create powers “to legislate”. As the powers can be used to do anything that could be done by Act of Parliament by means of subsection (4), the Bill itself can be used to create further Henry VIII powers. As such, if this Bill is passed unamended, we face the prospect of Ministers—perhaps not this Minister or Ministers in this Government—having the ability to use the Henry VIII powers in this Bill to confer further such powers upon themselves or other UK institutions; we are talking about delegated legislation piled on top of delegated legislation. That is an outcome that no Member of this House should regard as an acceptable prospect, but it is possible using the powers conferred under clause 7, as drafted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

We might think that the most extreme legislation that would be on the statute book allowed for emergency powers. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 makes it absolutely clear that, when Henry VIII powers are to be used, the Minister must explain why they are important, why they are necessary and that they have met an appropriate level of proper jurisdiction beforehand, but none of that is available in the Bill. Is it not therefore important that we have measures such as amendment 17, which adds to the clause?

[Matthew Pennycook]

Absolutely. My hon. Friend spoke powerfully about this matter on Second Reading, and he is right in saying that the scope of the powers in this Bill is not narrow, as some Conservative Members have argued; these powers are extraordinarily wide and unprecedented in the post-war period. I struggle to find other examples of Acts that have drawn their powers this wide.

Secondly, and perhaps more concerning, clause 7(1) will allow Ministers to make such regulations as they consider appropriate for the purpose of preventing, remedying or mitigating

“(a) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or

(b) any other deficiency in retained EU law”

arising from exit. What is meant by the entirely subjective phrase “operate effectively” is left entirely open, a point rightly highlighted by amendment 15, which stands in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and others. What is meant by deficiencies is more precisely defined, but clause 7(2) still only provides a non-exhaustive set of examples of what is considered to fall within this category. As such, it leaves Ministers with considerable latitude in determining when retained EU law contains a deficiency. The explanatory notes to the Bill seek to reassure us that the power could not be used by a Minister just because he or she considered the law in question to be flawed prior to exit. Today’s Minister will no doubt repeat that it is not the Government’s intention to use this Bill to make major policy changes or to establish new frameworks in the UK beyond those which are necessary to ensure we have a functioning statute book on exit day. But in the absence of a definitive criteria of what constitutes a deficiency, or, indeed, restrictions on how deficiencies might be addressed in the Bill, there is still scope for the Executive to enact substantive changes to policies in areas that were previously underpinned by EU law, whether by lowering permissible air quality levels or modifying crucial employment protections.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank my hon. Friend for his excellent forensic examination of what is at fault in the Bill. Does he agree that there is deep suspicion and mistrust because we have heard speeches from Members who might seek to form the Government at some point—particularly the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and others—who have made it clear that they want a deregulated race-to-the-bottom economy and society? It is all very well to have assurances from the current team of Ministers, but what if others were in their place?

[Matthew Pennycook]

That is precisely our concern. We discussed that at length on day 2 in Committee, when we were talking about the need for enhanced protection for retained EU law because it will be stripped away from its underpinnings in EU law post-exit.

A further concern about the language in clause 7(1) is that, given how wide clauses 2, 3 and 4 are in respect of what will come under the umbrella of retained EU law, Acts of Parliament that are linked to EU law, such as the Equality Act 2010, will be susceptible to change by statutory instrument under the clause. That would be an entirely unacceptable situation. There are many different ways in which the constitutional potency and scope of the correcting powers provided under clause 7 can be circumscribed, and we support many of the amendments tabled to the clause that share that same basic underlying objective.

Amendments 32 and 25 are the means by which my right hon. and hon. Friends and I have attempted to limit those correcting powers. Amendment 32 would diminish the potency of the delegated powers in the clause by removing the ability to modify or amend the Act itself. I listened to what the Minister said about the schedules and how they dictate things, but I would argue that there seems to be a difference—if Members wish to direct their attention to it, this is on pages 39 and 43 of the Bill—between the process that applies to clause 7 and that which applies to clause 9, with respect to whether a vote in the House would be required for Ministers to amend the Act itself. Perhaps the Minister will elaborate further on that in his response.

Amendment 25 would reduce the scope of the powers by constraining their capacity to reduce rights and protections, while amendments 350 and 334 would buttress amendment 25 by putting specific limits on the powers in question by requiring Ministers to pay full regard to the animal welfare standards enshrined in article 13 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union and to guarantee that the air quality standards and protections that are currently underpinned by EU law are maintained in practice following our departure.

Given how widely drawn the powers in clause 7 are, coupled with their potency and scope and the inherent subjectivity of the language in subsection (1) in key respects, ministerial assurances and promises to go away and have a cosy chat, as we have had on other days, are not good enough in this instance. The powers entail a significant transfer of legislative competence from the legislature to the Executive and open up the real possibility of substantive changes being made in policy areas that previously were underpinned by EU law. Restrictions on the powers must be placed in the Bill, whether through amendment 32 or 25, or some other combination of amendments. I look forward to hearing from the Minister not only that the Government now accept as much but what they intend to do about it.

On the new clauses and amendments that relate specifically to the clause 7 power to transfer functions from EU entities and agencies to UK competent authorities, Ministers have been at pains to point out throughout this process that many of the corrections to retained EU law made under the correcting power in clause 7 will be mechanistic, textual or technical in nature. That will undoubtedly be the case, but many others will not be. As other Members have noted, the powers in clause 7 allow for not only the creation of new UK public authorities using the affirmative procedure but the transfer of EU regulatory functions to existing UK institutions using the negative procedure. However, in neither case does the clause 7 power as drafted ensure that retained EU law will be made operable in ways that replicate and maintain, in so far as is practical, all the existing powers and functions exercisable by EU entities. As a result, the clause does not guarantee that the powers and functions of entities such as the EU Commission or other EU agencies will continue to operate with equivalent scope, purpose and effect after exit day.

Amendment 342 would address the problem by making it clear in the Bill that regulations to which subsection (5) applies must, again in so far as is practical, ensure that the standards, rights and protections currently maintained by EU institutions, or other public authorities anywhere in the UK, continue to exist in practice after exit day and that the UK competent authorities that are overhauled or created for that purpose have the resources, expertise and independence required to carry out their task effectively. That they do so is crucial not only for legal certainty and continuity and to ensure continued confidence in UK products and services, but as a guarantor of stability and redress for citizens and civic bodies in key areas in which there is a clear risk that Brexit will leave a governance gap.

The need for such an amendment is particularly important when it comes to the environment. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for West Dorset that we discussed this matter in Committee at length on other days. Of course, it relates intimately to the environmental principles, although they are outside what is covered by clause 7. We have tabled new clause 63 to require the Government to establish new domestic governance arrangements, following consultation, for environmental standards and protections and, crucially, to ensure that the new arrangements provide robust enforcement mechanisms when environmental requirements and standards are not met.

The Government’s thinking about this policy area has clearly moved on from their early insistence that existing regulatory bodies, parliamentary scrutiny and the use of judicial review alone would be sufficient to provide oversight of Government and public body conduct. The pledge by the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to create a new environmental watchdog and to consult early in the new year on its scope, powers and functions is welcome, but as things stand we have no clear indication of the watchdog’s scope, powers and functions; no clarity on whether the Government are seeking agreement with the devolved Administrations with a view to implementing similar measures in their jurisdictions; and no sense of whether or not the watchdog will be able to levy credible sanctions or provide for effective enforcement of breaches.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on, I think what he says about the devolved authorities is incorrect. As I understand it, the Secretary of State made it perfectly clear that, if possible, he would like the devolved Administrations to come along with the process and share in the institutional framework. Of course, that is not a decision he can make; it is up to the devolved Administrations.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am happy to take that on board. I learn more about Government environmental policy from the right hon. Gentleman than I do from his Front-Bench colleagues, so I happily stand corrected.

[Mary Creagh]

What the Secretary of State announced to the Environmental Audit Committee on 1 November was the beginnings of an idea. During that evidence session, the one new environmental body morphed into four potential environmental bodies, which have yet to morph into a consultation, which has yet to be published. At the moment, we are chasing chimeras—I do not know whether I have pronounced that correctly. [Interruption.] I thank the genius of the group, my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), for helping me with my Greek pronunciation. What I have described stands in stark contrast to the hop, skip and jump on the animal sentience legislation that has been rushed out before Christmas—the triple jump on animal welfare legislation. The issues relating to devolution are further complicated by the promise to the Republic of Ireland on full regulatory alignment on agriculture, water and waste, which is now going to continue regardless.

[Matthew Pennycook]

My hon. Friend makes a series of good points. I do not take the Government’s commitment in this policy area lightly and I do not take issue with it. What is at issue is the scope and powers of the watchdog and the timing. I share the concerns expressed by my hon. Friend and by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) about whether the new watchdog will be up and running in time and whether it will have the powers necessary to carry out the same functions as the institutions and agencies that currently exist.

New clause 63 would ensure that robust new domestic governance arrangements for environmental standards and protections were in place before exit day. It would also ensure that the body tasked with filling the governance gap was established by primary legislation before that date and that its scope, powers, functions and institutional design were shaped by public consultation.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on, I am interested to understand whether the purpose of new clause 63 is a UK-wide set of policies that would apply in Scotland and Wales, which would therefore remove a competency on the application of environmental law from the Scottish Government to Westminster.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The scope of new clause 63 is for the environmental watchdog in England, as we have already said. There would have to be agreement between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government about whether they choose to take the same approach.

[Mary Creagh]

One point that my Committee has specifically made on the devolution settlement is that business does not want to deal with four regulators setting up four different sets of rules and regulations on waste, on water and on chemicals. It wants one set of regulations to deal with, and it has made it consistently clear that the set of rules that it would like to continue to abide by is that set by the European Union.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I absolutely agree. The devolved Administrations, as my hon. Friend has reminded me, agree that they want to take a UK-wide approach to this issue, but it would have to be an agreement.

Let me turn now to those new clauses and amendments that relate to the Government’s proposals about how Parliament will scrutinise and, where necessary, approve secondary legislation made under the powers set out in schedule 7(6). It is clear that the vast majority of hon. Members and the Government have accepted that the House’s current procedures for scrutinising negative and affirmative instruments are not acceptable. The hundreds of SIs that will flow from clauses 7 to 9 and 17 need something different. It is encouraging that Ministers have listened and have made it very clear that they intend to accept the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) and other members of the Procedure Committee. We welcome those amendments and the establishment, as our new clause 1 proposes, of a parliamentary Committee to sift or triage regulations, and we support their incorporation in the Bill. Frankly, it is better than nothing, but it is the minimum of what might be expected, and we do not believe that they go far enough.

Amendments 397 and 398 propose that every SI made only via the negative procedure will be sent to the new Commons committee for consideration, with the committee determining within a 10-day window which ones would be required to be made under the affirmative procedure. That is an improvement on the arrangements proposed in this Bill as it stands, because it provides for discretion beyond the very narrow category of regulations attracting the affirmative procedure currently set out in schedule 7, and it will ensure that Ministers will not have unfettered discretion to decide whether the affirmative or negative procedure should apply in cases where an exercise of powers does not fall within one of the categories set out in the Bill.

Ministers must justify why the new committee will not be tasked with looking at SIs made under the affirmative procedure, or with examining the justification for using the SI in question to remedy a particular deficiency in EU law. Importantly, they must justify why, in urgent cases, which I know is a phrase that is undefined, Ministers can simply bypass the committee. Lots of these matters will be dealt with under Standing Orders, but it is right that we press for some clarity today. I hope that the Minister will provide further clarification on the composition of the new committee, in particular whether, as proposed in our new clause 1, the chair will be elected by the whole House and will be, and will be seen to be, independent of the Government. Ministers must further explain why they do not believe that the new committee should have the powers to recommend revisions to individual SIs.

Amendments 397 and 398—here I stand to be corrected by the hon. Member for Broxbourne or others on the Committee—make no such provision for revision. In this respect, they differ in a crucial aspect from the proposals set out in the Procedure Committee’s interim report of 6 November, which, while not providing for a formal mechanism for revising secondary legislation, did suggest a process by which a request could be made to Ministers to revoke and remake any particular SI underpinned by the scrutiny reserve. Without provision for this House to request, in certain limited cases, that a particular SI be revised, hon. Members will face a Hobson’s choice—take it or leave it with regard to regulations that may entail highly significant policy choices and have potentially serious or far-reaching implications, with “leave it” in these circumstances meaning a hole in the statute book.

Our amendments 33 to 41 make it clear that any new sifting committee that is established must be given the means not only to determine the level of parliamentary scrutiny that each SI is accorded in proportion to their significance and policy implications, but to make recommendations as to how particular SIs might be improved by revision—if necessary if only by means of the committee in question recommending that an instrument either be withdrawn and re-laid in a more acceptable form or, if a negative, be revoked and remade.

I wish to touch on one last issue: when it comes to the effective scrutiny of secondary legislation, it is crucial, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has argued, that long-standing parliamentary conventions are adhered to. Even after the process of sifting undertaken by the new committee, SIs subject to the negative procedure can only be annulled if the Government of the day themselves allow time for the House to debate the matter and to have a vote on it. Yet, as my hon. Friend pointed out today and on Second Reading, the Government have consistently refused in recent years to honour that convention, just as they no longer honour the convention that Opposition day motions are voted on. We have a very recent example that illustrates how this Government have used delegated powers not just to avoid parliamentary scrutiny, but to legislate in open defiance of the will of the House in relation to the matter of tuition fees. The original Act in question with regard to that matter allowed any statutory instrument raising the tuition fee limit to be annulled by either House, and assurances were given by Ministers in both the previous Labour Government and the coalition Government that any such SI would be taken on the Floor of the House.

By contrast, this Government prevented any vote whatever on the matter, and then refused to accept the vote of the House against the regulations. When they tabled the regulations the day before the 2016 Christmas recess, the Opposition prayed against them on the first sitting day this year, but despite the conventions of the House, the Government dragged their feet for months until eventually conceding the point and scheduling a debate on 18 April. Then Parliament was dissolved for the election.

After the election, the Government stalled and it was left to my hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner) to secure parliamentary time using Standing Order No. 24. Eventually, we had to provide Opposition time on an Opposition motion to revoke the regulations, which the House agreed, only for the Government to refuse to accept the result, after telling Government Members to boycott the vote. Therefore, when Ministers say that Parliament still has a meaningful say on delegated legislation, there is a catch—and it is a Catch-22. They can refuse time for a vote within the 40 days, then say that it is too late for any vote to count once the deadline has passed.

This Bill includes powers that not only open up the very real possibility of substantive changes being made to policies in areas that were previously underpinned by EU law, but to amend primary legislation. If the Government are willing to ignore so flagrantly the conventions of this House when it comes to an issue as controversial and as important as university tuition fees, why on earth should this House assume that those conventions will be honoured when it comes to Brexit legislation?

[Stephen Doughty]

My hon. Friend has made an absolutely essential point. Fundamentally, does he agree that if this process is to be about taking back control, it must be about Parliament and the representatives of the people taking back control, not a Government, and certainly not a minority Government, taking back excessive powers?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. That is why strengthened scrutiny procedures for approving secondary legislation made under this Bill are so important, and it is also why long-standing conventions must be honoured, so that in the rare cases where the Committee might recommend an SI be subject to the negative procedure but the Opposition disagrees, there is a chance to bring the matter before Committee.

[John Redwood]

This debate is very important. As someone who wants this Parliament to take back control on behalf of the sovereign British people who voted in that way in the referendum, I can see that there is an irony in this debate. We hear that a number of Opposition Members are very worried that Ministers will have too much power as a result of this legislation, but by the very act of our having this debate, and in due course the votes, on how we should proceed, I think that we are demonstrating that, indeed, Parliament is taking back control. The purpose of these debates today and tomorrow and the subsequent votes will be for Parliament to set a very clear framework within which Ministers will have to operate.

We are, after all, debating how we translate a very large burden of existing European law into good United Kingdom law in order to ensure continuity and no change at the point when we exit the European Union. This is a task that unites people of all political persuasions, whether they were in favour of leave or remain, around the need for legal certainty. We all see the need to guarantee that all that good European law under which we currently live will still be there and effective after we have left.

We also agree something else: some of us do want to change some of those laws. I want to change the fishing law very substantially, because we could have a much better system for fishing in this country if we designed one for ourselves. We will probably need to amend our trade and customs laws, because as we become an advocate for and an architect of wider free trade agreements around the world, that is clearly going to necessitate changes, which we think will be positive. I think we all agree that where we want to change policy—to amend and improve—we should do so through primary legislation. As I understand it, Ministers have agreed with that. I am sure that this House is quite up to the task of guaranteeing that Ministers will indeed have to proceed in that way, so that we know that when they wish to change—amend, improve or even repeal—policy, they will need to come through the full process of asking for permission through primary legislation.

Today we are talking about the adjustments, many of which are technical, that need to be made to ensure the continuity of European law when it passes from European jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Parliament and courts. Ministers will obviously play up the fact that they think most of these matters will be very technical, such as taking out the fact that the UK is a member of the European Union when we exit and rewriting the legislation to point out that we are no longer a member of the European Union, or decreasing the number of members states by one from the current number if they are referred to in the regulation. More difficult will be the substitution of a UK-based body for a European body to ensure proper enforcement. Many of us see that as largely technical, although there may be wider issues. This Parliament is now properly debating how much scrutiny that kind of thing would require.

We have three possible models to ensure parliamentary sovereignty over any of these processes. The weakest is the negative resolution procedure, whereby Ministers will have to make a proposal for technical changes to the law, and Parliament will have to object and force a vote if it wishes to. The middle model is the affirmative resolution statutory instrument, whereby Parliament will have a debate and a vote; Ministers would make a proposal and we would have a vote. In some cases, we might even conclude that we need primary legislation, as it appears we are deciding with the issue of animal welfare. In that case, we wish not only to transfer the European law but to ensure that it is better in British law, so that will need primary legislation.

Today we are debating how to determine which of those processes are appropriate for each of the different matters that arise. A lot of items will definitely be in the technical area of rather minor changes just to ensure that things work smoothly, which is what I thought the Government were trying to capture in clause 7. We have heard from Opposition Members who think that the clause goes too far and will allow the Government to elide matters from the category of technical changes to the category where there are more substantial changes going on, and still leave us with the negative resolution procedure. I am not as worried as some Opposition Members. The power under the clause is a two-year power only, so it is clearly related to the translation and transition period, which I find reassuring. There are also clear restrictions in clause 7(6) on Ministers changing taxes, inventing criminal offences and all those kinds of things, because they would obviously require primary legislation. We need to continue our debate on whether those two lists—the list of permissive powers and the list of restrictions—are the right lists.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

The committee will be busy, and that is why I am so grateful for the fact that several hon. Members—presumably including the hon. Gentleman—seem to be volunteering to do the important duty of serving on it, which no one should take lightly. I say to my hon. Friend that we have been extremely clear that any major change will come through primary legislation, but I cannot say that there will be no policy changes at all, however minor. The reality is that if a function comes back to the UK and we have to make a choice about whether it is allocated to the PRA or the FCA, that could be described as a policy choice.

I want to be clear with the Committee. I cannot say that there will be no policy changes whatever, but I can say that the Bill is about certainty, continuity and control. It is about making sure that the law works the day after we exit in substantially the same way as it worked the day before, from the point of view of those who are subjected to it. I can see that my hon. Friend brings great insight to the matter.

[Matthew Pennycook]

On a related point about the new sifting committee, will the Minister outline the Government’s view—this is partly a matter for Standing Orders—on how the chair of that committee would be appointed and whether Parliament could have a role in the election of the chair, rather than the post being appointed by the Government?

[Mr Baker]

The hon. Gentleman has been generous enough to say that he appreciates that that is a matter for Standing Orders. I am very sensitive to the role and powers of Parliament, which we have discussed throughout proceedings on the Bill. As a Minister, I really do not want to stand at the Dispatch Box and trespass—in this debate, of all places—on Parliament’s right to set its own Standing Orders.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

The current situation is a sad contrast with all that in many ways. It comes at a time when there is the utmost confusion about what our policy is, as we seek whatever destination we are eventually going to take when we reach agreement. Either new clause 3 or amendment 7 is the absolute minimum the Committee should be passing at this stage, in order to make it clear that binding commitments that affect future generations, changing our law in substantial ways, can be made only with the proper approval of both Houses of Parliament, following the full procedures that are necessary for statutory law.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Rosie, just as it is to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), the Father of the House, who gave an informed and powerful speech that we would do well to take on board as we proceed in today’s debate.

I rise to speak to new clause 66 and amendments 30, 27 and 29, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also intend to speak to amendment 28 and to the wider question of whether clause 9 should stand part of the Bill. In its policy impact, clause 9 is arguably the most important in the Bill and, taken together, clauses 9 and 17 give rise to a very wide range of interlocking issues. For the purposes of clarity, I intend to speak first to amendments 30, 27 and 28, which relate to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 9 and whether it should stand part of the Bill. I will then turn to amendment 29, which relates to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17. I will finish by dealing with new clause 66 and the thorny issue of Parliament’s role in approving the final terms of the UK’s exit from the EU and any associated transitional arrangements that might be agreed.

I turn first to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 9. The Government have argued that the clause 9 power is necessary in order that they have sufficient flexibility to give effect to whatever is in the withdrawal agreement and to ensure that there are no holes in the statute book after exit day. The withdrawal agreement, it should be noted, is defined in clause 14 as an agreement, whether or not ratified, agreed with the EU under article 50, meaning that the powers in clause 9 could be used before a withdrawal agreement is ratified but not, as the clause makes clear, after exit day for the purposes of the Bill, because the power will expire at that point.

In the light of the Secretary of State’s announcement on 13 November that the Government intend to bring forward a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill in order to give the agreement and any agreed transitional arrangements domestic legal effect, an announcement, it should be noted, that was confirmed in writing in the joint UK-EU report published last Friday, it is entirely unclear why the Government still require the powers provided for by clause 9.

Let me set out why we believe that to be the case. In that announcement on 13 November, the Secretary of State made it clear that the major policies set out in the withdrawal agreement, including those reached last week on citizens’ rights, Northern Ireland and the financial settlement, along with any agreement on transitional arrangements, would be implemented by means of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill and not by secondary legislation provided for by the Bill before us. So barring some unforeseen delay in the concluding of a withdrawal agreement, if the Government are not to create significant legal uncertainty following our departure with regard to the major policies covered by such an agreement, the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will have to have come into force by 29 March 2019 at the latest. My hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) covered that point.

In legal terms, any transitional arrangements agreed to could not bridge a post-exit gap, because even if some elements of the withdrawal agreement come into effect at the end of any such period, an agreement on transition itself will have had to have been given legal effect in the UK by means of the very same primary legislation, namely the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. As such, unless the Government are proposing to begin the process of implementing the withdrawal agreement and any agreed transitional arrangements immediately after the final terms of such an agreement are reached, but pre-ratification, by means of secondary legislation in this Bill—a point made earlier by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald), who is not in his place—a course of action for which there is no justification, given that the phase 1 joint report published last week sets out in black and white the intention to provide a specified period to approve the agreement and transitional arrangements in accordance with our own constitutional procedures and to prepare the statute book in accordance with that agreement, there is simply no need for the powers provided for by clause 9, including the broad power under that clause to amend the Bill itself.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but is it really that unreasonable that the Government might need to avail themselves of these powers in clause 9 while the withdrawal and implementation Bill is proceeding through the House of Commons? If the timetable is compressed, that Bill would not be on the statute book and the powers there would not be available. So clause 9 is necessary for that purpose. Of course the withdrawal and implementation Bill could circumscribe the powers in clause 9 and indeed close them off once that Bill is on the statute book.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman has pre-empted a point I was going to come to. In the scenario he gives, there is no need for the timetable necessarily to be compressed. If it were squeezed, what would that say about the role that Parliament will have on the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill? In his scenario, there would also be no need for the secondary legislation in this Bill, which could be included in a similar form in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, when we would have a better idea about what it will be needed for and can more adequately circumscribe its scope. As for this idea that we have a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill making its way through this House at the same time as secondary legislation implementing elements of that agreement hang over this place, such an approach would create serious confusion.

[Anna Soubry]

Has it come to the hon. Gentleman’s attention that, were the Bill passed without either amendment 7 or amendment 4 being made, and were there then a change of Government to one who believe in a hard Brexit, we could leave the European Union on absolutely no agreement, with no deal and no recourse whatever to this Parliament to have any say in that, because the Bill is completely silent about what would happen in the event of no deal?

[Matthew Pennycook]

The right hon. Lady makes a very important point. Although I concede that amendment 7 provides for an additional check because it requires primary legislation, our new clause 66 highlights an important point: we would wish to bind the Government so that Parliament would get a say even in the event of a no-deal scenario. I shall return to that point later.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Matthew Pennycook]

I cannot resist.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman is concerned about the potential for a compressed timetable and the consequences of what may flow from that, but is that not actually following from the will and vote of Parliament? Parliament passed into law article 50, which it agreed to by bringing the Lisbon treaty into law, so this is the natural consequence of what Parliament itself has determined.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the article 50 notification gave effect to their own timetable. That is why it is so important that we have transitional arrangements on current terms that allow us flexibility to negotiate the final deal. I will return to this point later, but there is no way that, before we leave in March 2019, we will have agreed the future relationship. We will have agreed heads of terms at best.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Matthew Pennycook]

If it is all right, I am going to make a bit of progress because many Members wish to speak.

As I have said, I do not think there is a need for the powers in clause 9 because secondary legislation of a similar type could be included in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Why the need for such powers? We do not think there is any justification for them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for why the clause needs to stand part of the Bill but, unless amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is passed, the Opposition will vote for the clause to be struck from the Bill.

If clause 9 remains part of the Bill at the end of the parliamentary process, its constitutional potency and scope must be highly circumscribed. I do not intend to dwell extensively on what limits should be placed on the clause 9 power because, in general, the same arguments apply as those that I set out at length in the Committee’s deliberations on clause 7 yesterday. I will say, though, that amendment 27 to clause 9, similar to our amendment 25 to clause 7, would constrain the capacity of the powers in clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.

The powers in clause 9 are different from the powers in clause 7 in a particular way: namely, the extraordinarily wide power explicitly provided for by clause 9(2) gives Ministers the power by regulation to modify—a term that clause 14 makes clear covers amendment and repeal—the Bill itself once enacted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out on Second Reading, there is no example throughout the history of the 20th century of a Bill that has ever sought to do that—not in time of war and not in time of civil emergency. In fact—this is a point that my hon. Friend continues to make, and should—every single emergency powers Act has specified that there should not be a power in such legislation for Ministers to alter primary legislation. We do not believe the power is justified, and amendment 30 would limit the potency of the delegated powers in clause 9 by preventing them from being used to amend or repeal the Act itself.

Let me turn briefly to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17, which gives powers to Ministers to make any consequential provisions that they consider appropriate in consequence of the Act and to make any transitional provisions that might be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force. In contrast to our position on clause 9, we acknowledge that there is an established precedent with regard to consequential and transitional provisions, so we will not be voting against clause 17 standing part of the Bill, but it must be circumscribed.

A clause as widely drawn as clause 17—it is arguably the most widely drawn of all—set in the context of a Bill of such constitutional and legal significance that it covers almost every element of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, it could be argued, nearly every facet of our national life, means that the power to make consequential provisions under clause 17 is not as tightly limited as it might be in other pieces of legislation. As such, it inevitably throws up the possibility that the powers in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17 could be used to make changes to vast swathes of secondary and primary legislation, including legislation in this Session up to May 2019.

When he responds, the Minister will no doubt cite other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers, but having looked closely at a fair number of them, I am not convinced that any are so widely drawn as this one, and none are contained in legislation as constitutionally significant as this Bill. The Hansard Society was right to refer to clause 17 as a “legislative blank cheque” for the Government, and the power must be restricted. Amendment 29 would achieve that aim by removing subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17. If the Government believe that that is the wrong way to restrict the sweeping powers in the clause, they can of course come forward with their own suggestions, but the principle of circumscribing the powers in the clause must be accepted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

I just want to clarify whether the hon. Gentleman means what I think he means by what he just said. Does he mean that if the House did not approve a withdrawal agreement, his view is that the Government should have to ask for an indefinite extension of article 50 until the House has approved a set-up that it finds acceptable?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I do not think that is necessarily the case, for several reasons. First, there is no reason why a withdrawal agreement cannot be reached, perhaps even sooner than October 2018—

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

You told us it would take a long time.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think it will take a long time. The Minister can confirm this, but I assume the Government would be pleased to conclude the withdrawal agreement before October 2018, if possible. However, there are several things that might happen, one of which is that the Government go back to the negotiating table and try to improve on the deal. I cannot see what is unreasonable about filling in the gaps or asking for revisions, were that the expressed will of the House.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way yet again. I think that he has just confirmed not that it would necessarily follow that the Government would have to extend indefinitely, but that it would be possible that the Government, in his view, should have to extend indefinitely because this House had not agreed to the withdrawal agreement. In other words, he is saying, is he not, that, if this House does not approve the terms on which we leave, until and unless it approves the terms on which we leave, we should not leave. Is he saying that, or not?

[Matthew Pennycook]

What I am saying is that there is any number of options that might happen, but let us bear in mind there is a period after October 2018 for the Government to return to the negotiating table and seek to revise or improve the terms. It does not necessarily mean an extension of article 50—I know that the right hon. Gentleman is trying to draw me down that path.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Matthew Pennycook]

I wish to make a little progress.

That is why we tabled new clause 66, which would guarantee, by means of prescribing when exit day for the purposes of this Bill can be appointed, that both Houses have a meaningful vote on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, just as critically, a vote in the event that no such agreement is reached and the Government are determined to take us out of the EU without a deal—a catastrophic scenario that would result in legal chaos, significant damage to our economy, the erection of a hard border in Northern Ireland and serious harm to Britain’s standing in the world. We have consistently called for the Government to make it clear that no deal is not a viable outcome.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

In the event of a no deal, people are concerned about falling into World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs, but will my hon. Friend confirm that, of course, the WTO does not cover services, which are the majority—in fact, 80%—of our exports and which require intricate, detailed negotiations? In the case of a car, two thirds of it are now services and often parts of the car go across borders. Therefore, does he not accept that having no deal would not be a disaster—it would be a catastrophe?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree with my hon. Friend’s point about services. I say to all hon. Members who are happy to contemplate a scenario in which the Government walk away from the negotiations and this House is merely a spectator in that outcome, that that is not acceptable and this House should not accept it.

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will make some progress, I am afraid, because a number of hon. Members wish to speak. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) will do so.

New clause 66 would ensure that there is a vote on a motion, not just in the event of a withdrawal agreement being concluded, but, crucially, when no such deal has been concluded, should that be the case. That outcome appears less likely following the agreement the Government reached last week and the clarification that the default position in the event of no deal will be regulatory alignment, but it remains a possibility, and Parliament must have a say.

As I have said, there are many, many ways of ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful vote. Amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is very well drafted. I do not think that it is deficient. We would definitely support it and we would not press new clause 66 if he pressed it to a vote.

[Mr Grieve]

May I say now that that amendment either has to be accepted by my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, or it will be put to the vote?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am very, very pleased to hear that. We will support the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the amendment in that eventuality.

I will conclude by saying that, subject to the kind of constraint that would be put in place if amendment 7 were incorporated into the Bill, we remain of the view that the power to appoint an exit day for the purposes of the Bill should be placed in the hands of Parliament, not Ministers, and also that the flexibility inherent in clause 14 with regard to exit day should be retained, because it is essential to finalising in some scenarios a withdrawal agreement and any transitional arrangements that need to be agreed to. We need only look at the mess last week to justify the need for such flexibility. As such, we believe that amendments 381 and 382 tabled by the Government with the aim of putting a specified exit date, and indeed time, in the Bill are an ill-conceived and unnecessary gimmick and on that basis we intend to oppose them if they are pushed to a vote.

This whole debate is about whether right hon. and hon. Members are content for Parliament to be a spectator, a passive observer, of one of the most important decisions that has faced our country in generations. Parliament must have a grip on the process, which is why we have tabled our amendments and new clauses.

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to have the opportunity to participate in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook). I agreed with virtually every word that he said.

In speaking to amendment 7, in the name of my hon. Friends, myself and other hon. Members, I am conscious that it has taken on a life of its own. When the Committee stage of the Bill started, it was my intention—and I hope one that I have observed and honoured throughout—to try to approach the amendments that I tabled in the spirit in which they are intended, which is to try to improve difficult legislation while entirely recognising the many challenges that the Government face. Brexit is full of risk and full of complexity—legal and otherwise—and the Government are entitled to my support, wherever possible, to carry Brexit out as smoothly as they can and with the least impact on the well-being of the citizens of our country. That has been my aim throughout.

I very much regret that—as often tends to happen in these matters—while some sessions in Committee have led to sensible amendment and the Government considering matters, or going away to look again and making some helpful suggestions, in the case of amendment 7 we seem to have run out of road. What happens in those circumstances, I regret to say, is that all rational discourse starts to evaporate. The purpose of the amendment, the nature of it, is entirely lost in a confrontation in which it is suggested that the underlying purpose is the sabotage of the will of the people, which it most manifestly is not. That is then followed by a hurling of public abuse; large numbers of people telling one that one is a traitor; and, I regret to say, some of one’s hon. and right hon. Friends saying slightly startling things. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), for example, said that I am grandstanding, when I do not remember ever having suggested such a thing to him about the way that he has expressed his views on Europe at any time in his career—including, I might add, when I tried to be a loyal member of his team when he was leader of my own party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will not give way.

[Matthew Pennycook]

rose—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I will give way to the Opposition spokesman in a moment.

There therefore can arise circumstances in which the choice, in the end, is between accepting leaving with no deal and not accepting leaving. I continue to believe—it is important that there is honesty on this point—that Opposition Members are essentially arguing that this House should have the ability to derail the process.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I do not think that that is a fair characterisation of my argument. The right hon. Gentleman has said that there is a possibility, in certain circumstances, of sending the Government back to ask for the deal to be changed. It is possible that that might be turned down, so it is not certain, but it is possible. Does he think that that should be an option, and if so, if he votes against amendment 7, what other mechanism might we use to send the Government back to at least try to improve a deal that this House felt was sub-optimal?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am very happy to answer that question, and it will bring me neatly on to the point I want to make about the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. The answer, of course, lies in the combination of the proceedings on the resolution that will have to be agreed by this House, during which it will be perfectly possible for this House, both in debate and in the way it votes, to tell the Government, if there is time, to go back and try again; and of the proceedings on the withdrawal and implementation Bill, during which again, if there is time, the House could reject the proposition and ask the Government to go back.

We then come to the nub of what happens if there is no time anymore because the Government cannot get a renegotiation and cannot get an agreement—a further prolongation—of the kind that my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford describes. The question arises of whether Opposition Front Benchers are recommending, in those circumstances, that leaving without a deal is the possibility it needs to be for article 50 and the referendum to be respected. That is a crunch question that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich cannot avoid.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will be brief, and then leave it there, but I want to pick up on two of the right hon. Gentleman’s points. First, I think there will be time. Last week’s joint agreement makes it clear that there must be time, in accordance with our own procedures, to look at the withdrawal agreement and then ratify it.

The right hon. Gentleman said that there is a possibility, on the basis of the Government’s commitment to a motion, to send them back to renegotiate, but that is not what his Secretary of State says. The Secretary of State says of the motion it is an up/down deal, and that a no vote would be the end of it—leaving without an agreement; not going back to the negotiating table.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

There is no possibility of precluding Parliament from making such a resolution one way or the other. That is up to Parliament, and it is up to the Government of the day at that point to respond as they choose. No Government would sensibly respond in the way the hon. Gentleman describes, so I do not think that that is a realistic possibility.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. I should just say to my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury that I will come on to talk about the restraints on the exercise of clause 9 later. However, in relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s point, if we waited for the withdrawal agreement Bill not just to be introduced after the withdrawal agreement has been signed but to be fully enacted—if we waited for it to complete its full passage—we would not have time to deal with the volume of technical secondary legislation that we need to put through.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Six months.

[Dominic Raab]

No, that is not right. We would be required to wait for the withdrawal agreement Bill to be enacted, so that is not right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Desmond Swayne]

Swansea West. The hon. Member for Nottingham East said that he did not believe that people should not have an opportunity to revisit their decision, and that they have a perfect right to change their mind—I accept that. I am not in favour of some sort of African democracy of one man, one vote, once. People perfectly rightly have an opportunity to do that, but if there was one thing on which both sides in the referendum campaign were agreed it was on the importance of the vote that took place on 23 June 2016. He has every right to campaign for a second referendum, and I am glad that he has made it explicit this evening in advocating for his amendment that that is the real agenda. The purpose is to delay for long enough for something to turn up. An essential ingredient of giving time for something to turn up so that people will change their minds is delay, and that is what the process of all today’s amendments has, in essence, been about.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am not sure how to follow both of those contributions, but hon. Members may be relieved to know that I am going to make a brief one as I rise to speak to amendment 26, which seeks to change clause 8. I will focus on two specific points, the first being the purpose of clause 8 and the second being its scope.

The purpose of the clause, as set out in the Bill’s explanatory notes, is to give

“ministers of the Crown the power to make secondary legislation to enable continued compliance with the UK’s international obligations by preventing or remedying any breaches that might otherwise arise as a result of withdrawal.”

I say to the Minister gently that it is not entirely clear what breaches might require the clause 8 power. It is not clear to us that where breaches occur they could not, in most cases, be remedied by clause 7 or by powers contained in other legislation, for example the Trade Bill, which has already been published, or domestic legislation. I do not intend to discuss what my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) said in his comprehensive speech, in which he gave a set of examples about the types of international treaties and obligations the Government will have to deal with. However, it would be useful to hear some further examples from the Minister. To date, we have heard about only one international obligation, or perhaps a couple, where the Government believe the clause 8 power must be used. As the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted, the Government have not been explicit about the sort of obligations they have in mind for this clause.

On the scope of clause 8, we have many of the same concerns that we have about the scope of the powers in clauses 7, 9 and 17. Clause 8(3) contains some, although not all, of the explicit restrictions that apply in clause 7. In any case, we believe, just as we do with those clauses—that is why we tabled amendment 27 to clause 9 and amendment 25 to clause 7—that the scope of the delegated powers in clause 8 should be circumscribed so that they cannot be used to reduce rights or freedoms.

I know that many Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), wish to make speeches, so with that I draw my remarks to a close.

[Hannah Bardell]

The House has heard many technical and legalistic arguments focused on the economic, trade and legal impacts of our leaving the EU, but so far in the Brexit process and debate, the interests of children and their rights have been barely mentioned. That said, I was pleased to hear the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) about baby milk and the related regulations.

It is important to focus on children, their rights and the effect of Brexit on their future. In all of this, our children have had very little voice or decision-making opportunities for the future of the UK. All our children depend on UK, EU, international and UN provisions and treaties to protect them and to secure their future rights. It is sad and ironic that it was this Conservative Government who refused to let 16 and 17-year-olds participate in the EU referendum.

No one said it better than my former colleague and my dear friend, the previous Member for Gordon—I know all Members miss him as much as I do—who summed up the hokey-cokey politics of this Conservative Government by saying:

“The case for votes for 16 and 17-year-olds has been demonstrated by the Scottish referendum—not as some academic exercise but on the joyful and practical experience of a generation of Scotland’s young people…Claims that teenagers are disengaged with politics or incapable of understanding constitutional issues was blown apart by the great contribution by young people in Scotland during the campaign…It is a ludicrous situation and nothing better illustrates the total lack of imagination which typifies the Conservative Party at its worst and their headlong pursuit of self-interest…It encapsulates Tory arrogance and the insult to young people will neither be forgotten nor forgiven.”

That is an extremely good point.

I remember studying, not that long ago, politics at the University of Stirling, where I learned about further EU integration. It seems very sad that the students of the future will be studying this process, our performance and the decisions that were made. I wonder what the textbooks and political history books will say and how they will read. I think they will say that this has been a political catastrophe—a series of unfortunate events.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: Second Day: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Meaning of Withdrawal Agreement—

“It shall be the objective of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that the arrangements for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU which comprise the “withdrawal agreement” specified in subsection (1) of section 14 shall include full, comprehensive and sufficient detail as if it were a legal instrument capable of acceptance and deposit as an international trade agreement at the World Trade Organisation, with detailed agreements on the following aspects of the future relationship between the United Kingdom and European Union including—

(a) geographical scope of application,

(b) regulatory cooperation,

(c) national security,

(d) cross-border trade in services,

(e) market access,

(f) tariff arrangements,

(g) tariff rate quotas on all products,

(h) customs duties on imports,

(i) duties, taxes and charges on exports,

(j) fees and charges,

(k) import and export restrictions,

(l) provisions concerning anti-dumping and countervailing measures,

(m) transparency,

(n) sanitary and phytosanitary measures,

(o) trade conditions,

(p) customs valuation,

(q) subsidies,

(r) dispute settlement and mediation,

(s) establishment of investments,

(t) non-discriminatory treatment,

(u) expropriation,

(v) enforcement of awards,

(w) mutual recognition of professional qualifications,

(x) cross-border financial services,

(y) prudential regulatory alignment,

(z) maritime transport services,

(aa) telecommunications,

(bb) electronic commerce,

(cc) competition policy,

(dd) state enterprises and monopolies,

(ee) government procurement,

(ff) intellectual property,

(gg) trade and sustainable development and the environment,

(hh) trade and labour standards and employment conditions and

(ii) taxation.”

This new clause would make it the objective of HM Government that the withdrawal agreement sought prior to exit day should include proposals setting out the full details expected of a comprehensive international trade agreement.

New clause 3—Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland—

“(1) Nothing in the provisions made under section 8 or section 9 of this Act shall authorise any regulations which—

(a) breach any of the obligations of Her Majesty’s Government made under the Belfast Agreement implemented in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (which made new provision for the government of Northern Ireland for the purpose of implementing the agreement reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland), or

(b) create hard border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, or

(c) undermine the full alignment of the United Kingdom with the rules of the European Union Internal Market and the Customs Union which support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the Belfast Agreement.

(2) Subsection (1)(c) shall apply unless Her Majesty’s Government, the Government of the Republic of Ireland and the European Union agree alternative specific solutions which can continue to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland, the obligations of the Belfast Agreement and the avoidance of a hard border arrangement between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.”

This new clause would ensure that the aspects of the Phase 1 agreement between the UK and the EU regarding the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are brought into UK law.

New clause 4—Financial Settlement—

“The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall publish, within one month of Royal Assent of this Act, the full details of the methodology agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and the European Union as set out in the “Joint Report from the Negotiators on Progress During Phase 1” which was published on 8 December 2017.”

This new clause would ensure that the agreed methodology for calculating the financial settlement between the UK and the EU set out in the Joint Report from the Negotiators of 8 December 2017 are published and brought into the public domain.

New clause 5—Trade in Services—

“It shall be the objective of Her Majesty’s Government, in negotiating a withdrawal agreement, to secure the same rights, freedoms and access available to UK businesses trading in services as exists through the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, as if section 1 of this Act were not brought into effect.”

This new clause would ensure that the negotiating objectives of Ministers would be to secure the same benefits for service sector trading businesses after exit day as are available under the existing Single Market and Customs Union arrangements by virtue of membership of the European Union.

New clause 6—Alteration to the notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on the European Union—

“Her Majesty’s Government shall publish a summary of the legal advice it has received in respect of the ability of the United Kingdom to extend, alter or revoke the notification, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.”

This new clause would require Ministers to place in the public domain a summary of the legal advice they have received concerning the options available for the United Kingdom in respect of the notification made under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union.

New clause 10—Governance and institutional arrangements—

“(1) Before exit day a Minister of the Crown must make provision that all powers and functions relating to any right, freedom, or protection, that any person might reasonably expect to exercise, that were exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day, and which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement (“relevant powers and functions”) will—

(a) continue to be carried out by an EU entity or public authority;

(b) be carried out by an appropriate existing or newly established entity or public authority in the United Kingdom; or

(c) be carried out by an appropriate international entity or public authority.

(2) For the purposes of this section, relevant powers and functions relating to the UK exercisable by an EU entity or public authority include, but are not limited to—

(a) monitoring and measuring compliance with legal requirements;

(b) reviewing and reporting on compliance with legal requirements;

(c) enforcement of legal requirements;

(d) setting standards or targets;

(e) co-ordinating action;

(f) publicising information.

(3) Responsibility for any functions or obligations arising from retained EU law for which no specific provision has been made immediately after commencement of this Act will belong to the relevant Minister until such a time as specific provision for those functions or obligations has been made.”

This new clause would ensure that substantive rights and protections cannot be removed by the “back door”, and that the institutions and agencies that protect EU derived rights and protections are replaced to a sufficient standard so those rights and protections will still be enjoyed in practice.

New clause 11—Meaningful vote on deal or no deal—

“(1) The Prime Minister must publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament an assessment of the impact on the economy of the United Kingdom, and on each nation, province or region of the United Kingdom, of any unratified agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which sets out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.

(2) Any agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which sets out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU may not be ratified unless—

(a) subsection (1) has been complied with,

(b) the House of Lords has considered a motion relating to the unratified agreement,

(c) the House of Commons has approved the unratified agreement by resolution,

(d) the statute mentioned in section 9 (approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union) has been passed, and

(e) any other legislative provision to enable ratification has been passed or made.

(3) If no agreement has been reached by 31 December 2018 between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union setting out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, the Prime Minister must publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament within one month an assessment of the impact on the economy of the United Kingdom, and on each nation, province or region of the United Kingdom, of leaving the EU under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union without an agreement.

(4) If no agreement has been reached by 31 January 2019 between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union setting out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU,

(a) a Minister of the Crown must propose a motion in the House of Lords relating to the lack of an agreement, and

(b) a Minister of the Crown must propose a motion in the House of Commons approving the intention of the United Kingdom to leave the EU under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union without a withdrawal agreement.

(5) Unless the House of Commons approves by resolution after 31 January 2019 the intention of the United Kingdom to leave the EU under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union without a withdrawal agreement, the Prime Minister must either—

(a) reach an agreement before exit day between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which sets out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, or

(b) request the European Council for an extension of negotiation under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union, or

(c) rescind the notice of intention under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union to withdraw from the EU given in accordance with the European Union (Notice of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and request the European Council to accept that rescission.’

This New Clause would ensure that the Government assesses the impact of either an agreement or no deal on the UK economy and regions before a meaningful vote, and that if Parliament does not agree to the agreement or to no deal, then the Government must request a revocation or extension of Article 50.

New clause 12—Environmental protection after EU exit—

“(1) Before any exit day, the Secretary of State must publish a report detailing all EU environmental protections, powers and functions.

(2) The report pursuant to subsection (1) shall specify—

(a) all environmental legal protections which derive from EU law;

(b) the powers and functions relating to environmental protection or improvement exercised by EU institutions;

(c) the empowering provisions in EU law relating to those functions; and

(d) any loss of environmental protection, or the monitoring and enforcement of environmental protections, which may arise as a result of the UK’s exit from the EU.

(3) Before any exit day the Secretary of State must publish proposals for primary legislation (the “Draft Environmental Protection Bill”).

(4) The Draft Environmental Protection Bill must include provisions which would—

(a) ensure that the level of environmental protection provided by EU law on the day this Act receives Royal Assent is maintained or enhanced;

(b) make provision to remedy any loss of environmental protection, or the monitoring and enforcement of environmental protections, established in the report pursuant to subsection (1);

(c) create a statutory corporation (to be called “the Environmental Protection Agency”) with operational independence from Ministers of the Crown to monitor environmental targets previously set by EU law relating to environmental protection and other such environmental targets that may be set by Ministers of the Crown and international treaties to which the United Kingdom is party;

(d) require the statutory corporation in (4)(c) to report to Parliament every year on progress in meeting those targets and to make recommendations for remedial action where appropriate;

(e) allow the statutory corporation in (4)(c) to publish additional reports identifying action or omissions on the part of Ministers of the Crown that is likely to result in targets not being met; and

(f) extend to the whole of the United Kingdom.

(5) The Secretary of State must publish annual reports to Parliament on how environmental protections and the monitoring and enforcement of environmental protections have been affected by the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU.

(6) Before publishing a report pursuant to subsection (5) the Secretary of State must hold a public consultation on the effect of leaving the EU on environmental protection.

(7) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before each House of Parliament the first report pursuant to subsection (5) no later 29 March 2020 and each subsequent report must be published no later than the period of one year after the publication of the previous report.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to produce a report on the loss of environmental protection as a result of the UK’s exit from the EU, and to prepare an Environmental Protection Bill to make up for any loss of environmental protections, and the monitoring and enforcement of environmental protections. It would also require the Secretary of State to produce annual reports which make an assessment of the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on UK environmental protection.

New clause 14—Maintaining individual rights and protections—

“(1) When making any agreement under subsection (2), the Secretary of State shall take steps to ensure that UK citizens enjoy standards of rights and protections equivalent to those enjoyed by citizens of the EU under EU law.

(2) This section applies to—

(a) any agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU which prepares for, or implements, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU;

(b) any international trade agreement—

(i) between the UK and the EU, or

(ii) between the UK and another signatory which seeks to replicate in full or in part the provisions of an international trade agreement between the EU and the other signatory.

(3) In relation to any agreement under subsection (2), the Secretary of State will maintain the highest standards of transparency.”

This new clause creates a duty for the Government to ensure that individual rights and protections are maintained to a level equivalent to (although not necessarily the same as) those in the EU when making agreements with the EU or international trade agreements.

New clause 15—Non-regression of equality law—

“(1) Any EU withdrawal related legislation must be accompanied by a statement made by a Minister of the Crown certifying that in the Minister‘s opinion the legislation does not remove or reduce protection under or by virtue of the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010.

(2) In subsection (1) “EU withdrawal related legislation” means—

(a) any statutory instrument under this Act;

(b) any statutory instrument made by a Minister of the Crown wholly or partly in connection with the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU; and

(c) any Bill presented to Parliament by a Minister of the Crown which is wholly or partly connected to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.”

This new clause would ensure that legislation in connection with withdrawal from the EU does not reduce protections provided by equality law.

New clause 17—Effect of losing access to EU single market and customs union—

“(1) The Prime Minister must publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament an assessment of the impact on the economy of the United Kingdom, and on each nation, province or region of the United Kingdom, of any unratified agreement (“the Agreement”) between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which sets out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.

(2) The assessment in subsection (1) must so far as practicable analyse the expected difference in outcomes between the Agreement and continued participation in the EU single market and customs union.

(3) The assessment in subsection (1) must be prepared by the Treasury and must include separate analyses from the National Audit Office, the Office of Budget Responsibility, the Government Actuary’s Department, and the finance directorates of each of the devolved Administrations of the methodology and conclusions of the Treasury assessment.

(4) A statute of the kind mentioned in section 9 (approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union) may not come into effect until the Prime Minister’s assessment under subsection (1) has been—

(a) debated by each House of Parliament, and

(b) approved by resolution of the House of Commons.”

This purpose of this New Clause is to ensure that the alternative of remaining in the EU single market and customs union is formally considered by Parliament on the basis of an independently validated economic assessment before any statute approving the final terms of withdrawal takes effect.

New clause 18—Consultation on environmental governance and principles—

“(1) Within one month of Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must consult on and bring forward proposals to—

(a) provide that all powers and functions relating to the environment or environmental protection that were exercisable by EU entities or other public authorities anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day which do not cease to have effect as a result of the withdrawal agreement are fully carried out.

(b) introduce primary legislation to establish a new independent environmental regulator with the purpose of, responsibility for, and appropriate powers to oversee the implementation of, compliance with and enforcement of environmental law and principles by relevant public authorities.

(c) incorporate EU environmental principles in primary legislation as a basis for relevant decision-making by UK public bodies and public authorities.

(d) establish a process for the publication of a national environmental policy statement or statements describing how the environmental principles will be interpreted and applied.

(2) EU Environmental principles include but are not limited to—

(a) the precautionary principle;

(b) the principle that preventive action should be taken to avert environmental damage;

(c) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source;

(d) the polluter pays principle;

(e) the principle that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development;

(3) In carrying out a consultation under this section, the Government must—

(a) consult with the devolved authorities;

(b) be open to responses for at least two months; and

(c) consider the resources and legal powers that the proposed regulator under (1)(b) will need in order to properly carry out its functions.”

This new clause enshrines the Government’s stated intentions in respect of the environmental principles and the establishment of a new independent environmental regulator. It sets out the minimum standards for consultation on these matters.

New clause 20—Citizens’ Jury on Brexit Negotiations—

“(1) A citizens’ jury shall be established to enable UK citizens to be consulted on the progress of negotiations between the UK and the EU on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, and the approach outlined in UK Government White Papers.

(2) The citizens’ jury shall in total be composed of exactly 1501 persons.

(3) Members of the citizens’ jury shall be randomly selected by means of eligibility from UK citizens on the current electoral register as registered on the date of this Act receiving royal assent, with allocation across the 9 UK Government Regions, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland weighted by population, and a stratification plan, with the aim of securing a group of people who are broadly representative demographically of the UK electorate across characteristics including whether they voted Leave or Remain.

(4) The jury will be broken down into individual sittings for each of the 9 UK Government Regions in England, as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

(5) The sittings will be for no more than 72 hours at a time, facilitated by independent facilitators, and if required, by electing fore-people from within their number.

(6) Membership of the jury will be subject to the same regulations and exceptions as a regular jury, but membership can be declined without penalty.

(7) The citizens’ jury will be able to require Ministerial and official representatives of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations to give testimony to them to inform their work, and to have the power to invite other witnesses to give evidence as required.

(8) The citizens’ jury shall publish reports setting out their conclusions on the negotiations and UK Government White Papers.

(9) The first report from the citizens’ jury shall be published within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and subsequent reports shall be published at intervals of no more than two months.

(10) Costs incurred by the citizens’ jury shall be met by the Exchequer.”

New clause 21—Environmental protection and improvement: continuation of powers and functions—

“(1) The Secretary of State must establish and maintain a publicly accessible register of EU environmental powers and functions.

(2) The register produced pursuant to subsection (1) shall specify—

(a) the specific powers and functions relating to environmental protection or improvement exercised by EU institutions;

(b) the EU institution previously responsible for exercising those powers and functions; and

(c) the empowering provision in EU law relating to those powers and functions.

(3) The register produced pursuant to subsection (1) shall include the following functions—

(a) monitoring and measuring compliance with legal requirements;

(b) reviewing and reporting on compliance with legal requirements;

(c) enforcement of legal requirements;

(d) setting standards or targets;

(e) co-ordinating action; and

(f) publicising information including regarding compliance with environmental standards.

(4) Within one month of Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish and lay before Parliament a statement identifying those powers and functions identified in the public register established under subsection (1) that will continue to be exercised by EU institutions or, alternatively, the existing or proposed new public authorities to which these powers and functions will be transferred; and

(b) make Regulations containing provisions to ensure that all relevant powers and functions relating to environmental protection or improvement exercisable by EU institutions anywhere in the United Kingdom before exit day continue on and after exit day.”

This new clause would ensure oversight of the transfer of functions from EU institutions to domestic institutions, by requiring the Government to establish a publicly accessible register of environmental governance functions and powers exercised by EU institutions, and to make regulations that ensure that all relevant environmental powers and functions are continued.

New clause 22—Dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal – further provisions—

“(1) This section applies where there is a deficiency in retained EU law on and after exit day in respect of which regulations have not been made under section 7.

(2) A deficiency includes, but is not limited to, retained EU law which—

(a) contains anything which has no practical application in relation to the United Kingdom or any part of it or is otherwise redundant or substantially redundant;

(b) confers functions on, or in relation to, EU entities which no longer have functions in that respect under EU law in relation to the United Kingdom or any part of it;

(c) makes provision for, or in connection with, reciprocal arrangements between—

(i) the United Kingdom or any part of it or a public authority in the United Kingdom, and

(ii) the EU, an EU entity, a member State or a public authority in a member State,

which no longer exist or are no longer appropriate.

(d) makes provision for, or in connection with, other arrangements which—

(i) involve the EU, an EU entity, a member State or a public authority in a member State, or

(ii) are otherwise dependent upon the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU,

and which no longer exist or are no longer appropriate

(e) makes provision for, or in connection with, any reciprocal or other arrangements not falling within paragraph (c) or (d) which no longer exist, or are no longer appropriate, as a result of the United Kingdom ceasing to be a party to any of the EU Treaties,

(f) does not contain any functions or restrictions which—

(i) were in an EU directive and in force immediately before exit day (including any power to make EU tertiary legislation), and

(ii) it is appropriate to retain, or

(g) contains EU references which are no longer appropriate.

(3) A deficiency within the meaning of subsection (1) includes any failure or other deficiency arising from the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU together with the operation of any provision, or the interaction between any provisions, made by or under this Act, but does not include any modification of EU law which is adopted or notified, comes into force or applies only on or after exit day.

(4) Where this section applies, the retained EU law in respect of which the deficiency arises is to be interpreted in accordance with subsections (5) to (9).

(5) The retained EU law does not allow, prevent, require or otherwise apply to acts or omissions outside the United Kingdom.

(6) An EU reference is not to be treated, by reason of the UK having ceased to be a member State, as preventing or restricting the application of retained EU law within the United Kingdom or to persons or things associated with the United Kingdom.

(7) Functions conferred on the EU or an EU entity are to be treated as functions of the Secretary of State.

(8) Any provision which requires or would, apart from subsection (7), require a UK body to—

(a) consult, notify, co-operate with, or perform any other act in relation to an EU body, or

(b) take account of an EU interest,

is to be treated as empowering the UK body to do so in such manner and to such extent as it considers appropriate.

(9) In subsection (8)—

“a UK body” means the United Kingdom or a public authority in the United Kingdom;

“an EU body” means the EU, an EU entity (other than the European Court), a member State or a public authority in a member State;

“an EU interest” means an interest of an EU body or any other interest principally arising in or connected with the EU (including that of consistency between the United Kingdom and the EU);

“requires” includes reference to a pre-condition to the exercise of any power, right or function;

(10) This section ceases to have effect after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”

This new clause provides a scheme for interpretation as a backstop where the transposition necessary to avoid deficiencies has not been effected by regulations made under Clause 7.

Amendment 2, in clause 7, page 5, line 6, leave out subsections (1) to (6) and insert—

“(1) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers necessary to prevent, remedy or mitigate—

(a) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or

(b) any other deficiency in retained EU law,

arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.

(2) Deficiencies in retained EU law are where the Minister considers that retained EU law—

(a) contains anything which has no practical application in relation to the United Kingdom or any part of it or is otherwise redundant or substantially redundant,

(b) confers functions on, or in relation to, EU entities which no longer have functions in that respect under EU law in relation to the United Kingdom or any part of it,

(c) makes provision for, or in connection with, reciprocal arrangements between—

(i) the United Kingdom or any part of it or a public authority in the United Kingdom, and

(ii) the EU, an EU entity, a member State or a public authority in a member State, which no longer exist or are no longer appropriate,

(d) makes provision for, or in connection with, other arrangements which—

(i) involve the EU, an EU entity, a member State or a public authority in a member State, or

(ii) are otherwise dependent upon the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU, and which no longer exist or are no longer appropriate,

(e) makes provision for, or in connection with, any reciprocal or other arrangements not falling within paragraph (c) or (d) which no longer exist, or are no longer appropriate, as a result of the United Kingdom ceasing to be a party to any of the EU Treaties,

(f) does not contain any functions or restrictions which—

(i) were in an EU directive and in force immediately before exit day (including any power to make EU tertiary legislation), and

(ii) it is appropriate to retain, or

(g) contains EU references which are no longer appropriate.

(3) But retained EU law is not deficient merely because it does not contain any modification of EU law which is adopted or notified, comes into force or only applies on or after exit day.

(4) Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament.

(5) Regulations under this section may provide for—

(a) functions of EU entities or public authorities in member States (including making an instrument of a legislative character or providing funding) to be exercisable instead by a public authority (whether or not newly established or established for the purpose) in the United Kingdom,

(b) the establishment of public authorities in the United Kingdom to carry out functions provided for by regulations under this section.

(6) Regulations to which subsection (5) apply must ensure that the functions of such EU entities or public authorities are exercised with equivalent scope, purpose and effect by public authorities in the United Kingdom.

(7) But regulations under this section may not—

(a) impose or increase taxation,

(b) make retrospective provision,

(c) create a relevant criminal offence,

(d) be made to implement the withdrawal agreement,

(e) amend, repeal or revoke the Human Rights Act 1998 or any subordinate legislation made under it,

(f) amend or repeal the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (unless the regulations are made by virtue of paragraph 13(b) of Schedule 7 to this Act or are amending or repealing paragraph 38 of Schedule 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 or any provision of that Act which modifies another enactment),

(g) contain any provision the effect of which is that, in comparison with the position immediately before the exit date—

(i) any right conferred on a person by retained EU law is either removed or made less favourable,

(ii) any standard laid by retained EU law is lowered, or

(iii) any remedy, procedure or method of enforcement, in relation to any rights or standards conferred by retained EU law, is made less effective, or

(h) amend, repeal or revoke the Equality Act 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under that Act.”

This amendment restricts the Clause 7 powers so as to ensure they are only used as far is as necessary for the purposes of the Bill, that they do not abolish enforcement functions and that they do not reduce rights or protections.

Amendment 9, page 6, line 16, at end insert—

“(da) amend, repeal or revoke any retained EU law which implements a provision listed in Schedule [Exceptions for Directives etc.].”

This amendment, which is linked to NS1, would except EU Directives relating to workers’ rights from the power to make regulations to remedy deficiencies in retained EU law.

Amendment 56, page 6, line 23, at end insert—

“(6A) Within three months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and every three months thereafter, a report must be laid before each House of Parliament listing—

(a) all deficiencies which Ministers of the Crown have identified would arise in retained EU law after exit day but which they do not intend to prevent, remedy or mitigate in advance using the powers under subsection (1);

(b) the reasons for each decision not to prevent, remedy or mitigate such deficiencies, and

(c) an assessment of the consequences of that decision.”

This amendment (linked with Amendment 55 provides for Parliamentary scrutiny of any decision not to use clause 7 powers to save retained EU law from being unable to operate effectively.

Amendment 59, in clause 9, page 7, line 16, at end insert—

“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has signed an agreement with the European Union guaranteeing that the United Kingdom will remain a permanent member of the EU single market and customs union.”

This amendment would mean the UK would confirm its continued membership of the single market and customs union before Ministers of the Crown carry out any actions under Clause 9 of the Bill.

Amendment 10, in clause 14, page 10, line 40, leave out from “means” to the end of line 41 and insert

“the time specified by an Act of Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU;”.

This amendment would require exit day to be specified in a separate bill on the terms of withdrawal.

Amendment 39, page 11, line 37, at end insert

“and the arrangements for a status quo transitional period which encompasses—

(a) a “bridging period” to allow new agreements to be reached satisfactorily between the United Kingdom and the European Union lasting as long as necessary for a full trade agreement to be ratified, and

(b) an “adaptation period” to allow the phasing in of new requirements over time to provide for the implementation of changes to new agreements in an orderly and efficient manner.”

This amendment ensures that the meaning of “withdrawal agreement” is also taken to include a detailed transitional period with two distinct aspects, firstly allowing for a “bridging period” during which new agreements are concluded and secondly allowing for an “adaptation period” to give business and other organisations a period to adjust to those new arrangements.

Amendment 1, page 11, line 40, at end insert—

“(2A) Subsection (2B) applies if any “exit day” appointed in this Act is not in accordance with any transitional arrangements agreed under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union.

(2B) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations—

(a) amend the definition of “exit day” in the relevant sections to ensure that the day and time specified are in accordance with any transitional arrangements agreed under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union, and

(b) amend subsection (2) in consequence of any such amendment.

(2C) Regulations under subsection (2B) are subject to the affirmative procedure.”

This amendment ensures that the Bill can facilitate transitional arrangements within the single market and customs union.

New schedule 1—Exceptions for directives etc.—

[Matthew Pennycook]

I rise to speak to new clause 1 and amendments 2 and 1, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. As you are aware, Mr Speaker, this remaining group contains a significant number of important issues, and while I want to spend time talking to each of our three amendments, I am conscious that time is limited, so I will endeavour to keep my remarks as brief as possible.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) reminded the House yesterday, as far back as last March the Opposition set out six ways in which the Bill required improvement. The first was that it be drafted in such a way as to enable transitional arrangements after 29 March 2019 on the same basic terms as now—including being in a customs union with the EU and within the single market. The second was that the sweeping delegated powers in the Bill be circumscribed. The third was that it needed to contain clear and robust protection and enforcement mechanisms for all EU-derived rights, entitlements, protections and standards. Sadly, despite some small steps in the right direction, the Government have largely failed to respond in any meaningful way to the concerns we raised in relation to these three areas. The purpose of new clause 1 and amendments 2 and 1 is to press the Government once again to do something about each of them.

I turn first to new clause 1, the purpose of which is to ensure that retained EU law enjoys a form of enhanced protection from subordinate legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament. This is a highly technical matter but a crucial one for the rights and protections our constituents enjoy. Mr Speaker, you were not in the Chamber at the time, but hon. Members who were present will recall that the House debated clauses 2, 3 and 4 in great detail on day two of Committee, and I certainly do not intend to cover the same ground again today. As we heard again yesterday, however, there are very real problems that flow from the ambiguous and uncertain status of retained EU law—a problem to which we believe new clause 13, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), provides a pragmatic solution, or at the very least a sensible starting point for a conversation about how the status of this new category of law could be more clearly defined.

Leaving to one side the issues relating to the status of retained EU law—issues that I have no doubt the other place will return to at some length—there is another, related concern, and that is the vulnerability of this new category of law to subordinate legislation and what that means in practical terms for the rights, entitlements, protections and standards our constituents currently enjoy. I want to be very clear as to the argument I am making at this point, because when I first did so on day two of Committee, the debate was prone to veer off on to other related but distinct issues.

The concern I am highlighting does not relate to the issue of how Parliament is to scrutinise and, where necessary, approve the hundreds of statutory instruments that will flow from clause 7, as well as clauses 8, 9 and 17. We welcomed the Government’s acceptance of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) and other members of the Procedure Committee, although we still believe that they do not go far enough, particularly in relation to the new sifting committee’s inability to request that Ministers revoke and remake specific statutory instruments.

Nor does the argument that I am advancing concern how the powers contained in this Bill might be used to amend, modify or repeal retained EU law. The specific issue that I am highlighting, and what new clause 1 seeks to address, is our serious concern that the Bill as drafted leaves retained EU law vulnerable to amendment, modification or repeal by subordinate legislation contained in numerous other Acts of Parliament.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby) (Lab)]

Is it not the case that workers’ rights have no privileged status under the Bill? Once the Bill becomes an Act, those rights can be picked off by secondary legislation. If the Government wish to prevent workers from receiving proper holiday pay or to cap awards for discrimination, they will be easily able to do so.

[Matthew Pennycook]

That is absolutely true. The Government would be able to do that by using subordinate legislation in other Acts of Parliament. That applies not just to workers’ rights, but to other areas of law such as the environment and consumer rights. That category of law will lose its underpinnings following our departure from the EU.

Wrenched away from the enhanced protection enjoyed as a result of our EU membership, retained EU law—and we should bear in mind that that category of law might be with us for decades—will in many cases enjoy the lowest possible legislative status, and consequently the wide range of rights and protections that flow from it will be more vulnerable than they were before. The Opposition have repeatedly emphasised that Brexit must not lead to any watering down or weakening of EU-derived rights, particularly rights and standards in areas such as employment, equality, health and safety, consumers and the environment. That is why we tabled new clause 58 in Committee. Setting out the reasons why the Government were opposed to new clause 58, the Solicitor General argued that it would

“fetter powers across the statute book that Parliament has already delegated.”

Furthermore:

“Relying only on powers set out in this Bill to amend retained EU law would be insufficient”.—[Official Report, 15 November 2017; Vol. 631, c. 418.]

In keeping with the constructive approach that we have taken towards the Bill throughout this process, we have engaged seriously with the Solicitor General’s argument, and new clause 1 is the result. Like new clause 58, it seeks to give retained EU law a level of enhanced protection, thus avoiding a situation in which laws falling within the new category might enjoy the lowest possible legislative status. It also accepts the defence put forward by the Solicitor General, and provides a mechanism whereby a Minister may use regulations provided for in other Acts of Parliament to amend, repeal or modify retained EU law, but only in cases in which it is necessary to maintain or enhance rights and protections, and only after consultation. In short, it concedes that there are many instances in which the use of subordinate legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament might be necessary, but seeks to reconcile its use with a presumption of enhanced protection.

Since the referendum, Ministers have repeatedly stated that the Government do not wish to see any rights and protections diminished as a result of our departure from the EU. That is also what the public expect, but it requires a level of protection that the Bill as it stands does not provide. We hope that the Government will engage seriously with the new clause and accept it, but we intend to press it to a vote if they do not.

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

Is it not important for the public to be reassured about workers’ rights, given reports in the media of Cabinet discussions about scrapping the working time directive?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think most of our constituents assume that the guarantees that they currently enjoy will continue. They will not know that many of these rights flow from and are underpinned by EU law, but they would expect them to be transposed in a way that would provide the same level of protection rather than the lowest possible legislative status. This is an issue to which we shall have to return, and one that the other place will no doubt tackle.

Amendment 2 seeks to further circumscribe the correcting powers contained in clause 7. Throughout this process, we have been at pains to argue that, to the extent that relatively wide delegated powers in the Bill are necessary, they should not be granted casually, and that when they are granted they should be limited whenever that is possible and practical. It is clear from their tabling of amendments 14 and 15, and consequential amendments, that the Government accept that there are shortcomings in the drafting of clause 7. We welcome the fact that the deficiencies identified in clause 7(2) will now form an exhaustive rather than an illustrative list—with the caveat, I should add, that the further deficiencies can be added at a later date. In effect, the list as drafted will be exhaustive unless Ministers subsequently decide that it is not. That is not perfect, but it does represent some progress.

Nevertheless, even with the incorporation of Government amendments 14 and 15, the correcting powers provided for which clause 7 provides are still too potent and too widely drawn. Suggestions on day six of the Committee stage that the clause ought to stipulate that the correcting power should be used only when necessary have been ignored, as have concerns that the Bill as drafted does not guarantee that the powers and functions of entities such as the European Commission and other EU agencies will continue to operate with equivalent scope, purpose and effect after exit day. Concerns that the Bill as drafted could be used for a purpose other than that which was intended— specifically, that it has the potential to diminish rights and protections—have likewise been ignored.

On day six, the Government had the chance to justify the drafting of the clause in detail and to address each of those concerns, but they did not do so adequately. They were also given an enormous menu of options, in amendments tabled by Back Benchers in all parties, whereby the powers in the clause—and, indeed, similar powers elsewhere in the Bill—might be constrained. Amendments 14 and 15 represent the totality of their response. As I have said, they are a step in the right direction. but on their own they are not enough. That is why we tabled amendment 2, which addresses comprehensively the range of flaws contained in clause 7 so that the correcting power is reasonably and proportionately circumscribed. If the Government do not indicate that they have taken those concerns on board and are prepared to act on them, we will press the amendment to a vote.

Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that the Bill can facilitate transitional arrangements after 29 March 2019 on the same basic terms as now. The Opposition have argued for some time that we need a time-limited transitional period between our exit from the EU and the future relationship that we build with our European partners. We believe that, to provide maximum certainty and stability, that transitional period should be based on the same basic terms as now. That includes our being in a customs union with the EU and in the single market, both of which will entail the continued jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice for the period that is agreed. Our view is shared widely by businesses and trade unions, but for a long time it was considered to be anathema to the Prime Minister and senior members of her Cabinet.

[Melanie Onn]

I thank my hon. Friend for being so generous with his time. There are many cases, such as Marshalls Clay Products Ltd v. Caulfield and Gibson v. East Riding of Yorkshire Council, in which domestic courts have reached incorrect decisions on workers’ rights. If the European Court of Justice will no longer be the adjudicator after the transitional period, what will?

[Matthew Pennycook]

After the transitional period, the ECJ would not be the adjudicator. That would be dealt with as a matter of retained law. My hon. Friend has reinforced a point that I made earlier. We need a level of enhanced protection and the courts need clarity on how to interpret this new category of law, because if they do not have that clarity and certainty, they will be more vulnerable.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I hope shortly to be able to make a brief speech on that very subject, dealing with the question of whether or not there should be a power for the courts to disapply Acts of Parliament in relation to the matters to which the hon. Gentleman has referred.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am not sure that that warranted an intervention, but I await the hon. Gentleman’s contribution with bated breath.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

Further to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby (Melanie Onn), does my hon. Friend agree that either the institutions and agencies that currently enforce EU rights, privileges and protections should be maintained as EU agencies, or a transitional arrangement should involve agencies and institutions that will protect people’s rights in respect of, for instance, work, the environment and consumer issues?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I certainly believe that, when it is appropriate and when the country will derive benefit, we should continue to participate in EU agencies. The important point, however, is that when the functions and powers of EU agencies are transferred to either an existing or a new body, the purpose, scope and effect of the rights and protections that flow from those agencies should continue. That is one of the issues that clause 7 fails to address.

Returning to my earlier train of thought, all of this was why the Prime Minister’s Florence speech of last year was so welcome. It made it clear that Government policy was to seek, semantics about implementation versus transition aside, a time-limited period in which the UK and the EU would continue to have access to one another’s markets on current terms, and with Britain continuing to take part in existing security measures.

Crucially, the Prime Minister made it clear that this bridging arrangement would take place on the basis of

“the existing structure of EU rules and regulations.”

That quite clearly implied the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECJ, as confirmed by the Prime Minister in an answer to the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) in the weeks following the speech, when she stated:

“that may mean that we start off with the ECJ still governing the rules we are part of”. —[Official Report, 9 October 2017; Vol. 629, c. 53.]

It is also set out in black and white in the phase 1 agreement.

[Chuka Umunna (Streatham) (Lab)]

With regard to the issue of transition or implementation, as the Government call it, does my hon. Friend agree that while it is of course necessary in particular to give time for our businesses to prepare, transition or implementation is no safe harbour if this Government are determined to pursue the extreme break from our relationship with the EU which have set out with their red lines? That is no safe harbour to jumping off a cliff; it just delays it, in fact.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I absolutely agree; and the unpicking of, or wheeling back from, some of the progress we felt had been made in the Florence speech is one of our concerns.

The Bill before us was drafted before the Florence speech, but rather than amend the Bill to reflect the evolution of Government policy outlined by the Prime Minister in that speech, the Government chose instead to fashion a legislative straitjacket for themselves in the form of enshrining “exit day” for all purposes in the Bill as 11 pm on 29 March 2019. Let us be clear: bringing forward amendments to stipulate that exit day for all purposes of the Bill had nothing to do with leaving the EU. The article 50 notification made our departure from the EU on 29 March 2019 a legal certainty, so, for the purposes of the Bill, exit day could be left in the hands of Parliament.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman just used the phrase “legal certainty” in referring to our departure from the EU on 29 March 2019. Does that mean that he has seen legal advice that article 50 cannot be revoked? Is the Labour Front-Bench position that it is impossible, as opposed to politically inexpedient, to consider revoking article 50?

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me down an avenue that has nothing to do with the point I am making, which is that it remains unclear why the Government tabled three exit day amendments to their own Bill which have sown further confusion. We do not know why they did that—whether it was driven by Tory party management considerations or some other reason. The effect of those Government amendments would have been to end the jurisdiction of the ECJ on 29 March 2019, thereby preventing agreement on a transitional period on current terms.

The Government clearly soon realised their mistake and to save face enlisted the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), who is not in his place, to table amendments to loosen the legislative straitjacket they themselves had created. But his amendments, which the Government have accepted, only provide a limited form of flexibility. Ministers may now amend the definition of exit day in clause 14 for the purposes of the Bill if the date when the treaties cease to apply to the UK is different from 29 March 2019. However, there is good reason to argue that that power might not be sufficient to facilitate transitional arrangements after 29 March 2019 on the same basic terms as now. If it is not—this might end up being the most bizarre aspect of the Bill’s curious parliamentary process—the Government will find themselves in the ludicrous position of having to amend this Bill when they bring forward the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill later this year.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I think that is a virtual certainty in any event. On the basis of the Bill that the Government have promised the House for the end of this year, it seems to me that it will be a substitute for the arrangements under the existing European Communities Act, so I think that must be what is going to happen.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree, but what I would say—and why I would urge Members to support this amendment—is that it need not require the amendment of this Bill to allow the facilitation of transitional arrangements on the same terms in addition to the provisions that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is right to say will be needed in that further Act of Parliament.

We still believe that it should be Parliament, not Ministers, that decides exit day for the various purposes in the Bill. Our amendment 1 helpfully bolsters the position set out by the Prime Minister in the Florence speech by ensuring that this Bill can facilitate transitional arrangements on the same terms as now.

Given that this is, of course, Government policy, it is a wonder that the Government did not bring forward such an amendment themselves. They did not do so because they cannot agree on what the transition means. There can be no clearer evidence for that than the recent appointment of the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) to the Department for Exiting the European Union team, given her past form in seeking to actively undermine the policy position set out in the Florence speech by encouraging her colleagues to sign a European Research Group letter to the Prime Minister objecting to crucial aspects of it. It is ironic that those Tory MPs who voted for amendment 7 back in December are viewed by many as having betrayed the Government, while those who actively undermine stated Government policy appear to get promoted in quick succession.

Amendment 1 is simply an attempt to restore some common sense to the question of exit day for the purposes of this Bill. It would ensure that this Bill can facilitate any transitional arrangements agreed as part of the article 50 negotiations and that we avoid the ludicrous situation of potentially having to come back to amend this Bill in order to do so. It is in line with stated Government policy, and we therefore look forward to the Government not only accepting it, but welcoming it.

The Opposition have made it clear from the outset that a Bill of this kind is necessary to disentangle ourselves from the European Union’s legal structures and to ensure that we have a functioning statute book on the day we leave. But as we argued on Second Reading in September last year, this Bill is a fundamentally flawed piece of legislation. Sadly, despite the small number of welcome concessions, and the implications for the legislation of the defeat the Government suffered at the hands of amendment 7 and the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) on 12 December, it remains a fundamentally flawed Bill. Those flaws still need to be addressed either by this House today or in the other place, and on that basis I urge all hon. Members to support new clause 1 and amendments 2 and 1.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I am glad to see my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) in his place behind me, where I always welcome him. When I arrived, I inquired whether he had had a cup of coffee before today’s long proceedings, and I undertake to try to have no soporific effects on those Members who have survived to the eighth day of this Committee and Report stage.

I do not intend to follow entirely the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), although I listened to many of the points he made with considerable sympathy; I am quite sure that clause 7 will require more work when it gets to another place, and I also have considerable sympathy with what he said about the confusion now surrounding exit day and the ability to proceed to what I am sure is the obvious transition arrangement we are going to have to have for quite a long time, which will be on precisely the same terms that we have at the moment, so far as access to the market is concerned.

I will turn my attention, however, to the Bill’s impact on the economy, following from new clause 17, which is in this selection and strikes me as excellent, and several more of the same kind. In our eight days, the House has not had anything like adequate opportunities to consider this absolutely vital policy implication of what we are embarked upon as we seek to leave the EU. I do not share the view that the Bill needs to be treated in this House or the other place as a mere technical or necessary Bill of legal transition; we have the opportunity to put into the Bill some of the essential aspects of our future economic relationship and to allow the House to express a view and put into statute things that we wish, and instruct in line with our constitution, the Government of the day to follow.

There is undoubtedly going to be some economic cost to this country, regardless of the means by which we eventually leave the European Union. If we have a complete break with no deal, the implications could be very serious indeed. I am one of those who think it rather foolish to try to put precise figures on this. The Scottish National party earlier tried to make precise estimates of what would happen because a think-tank had put out a range of consequences, depending on which options were followed. It was rather reminiscent of the arguments put forward by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer when he tried to help the remain side during the referendum campaign. They were really rather fanciful figures.