Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Seventh sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure once more to be in this delightful room doing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.

The clause repeals in full the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The Act, which requires that decision makers treat Rwanda as a safe third country for the purposes of removing individuals there, and disapplies sections of the Human Rights Act 1998, was passed by the previous Government in an attempt to facilitate removals to Rwanda under the migration and economic development partnership. Despite that, the Act has served no practical purpose since it became law: no decisions were made that were affected by its provisions, and, as we have stated repeatedly, only four individuals were ever relocated voluntarily. No enforced removals to Rwanda ever took place under the partnership.

The Government have been clear from the outset that we will not proceed with the partnership. There is no evidence that it was successful in deterring small boat arrivals, nor has it delivered value for money for the British taxpayer. On the contrary, nearly 84,000 people arrived on small boats between 14 April 2022, which was the date the partnership was announced by the former Government, and 5 July 2024, which was the day after this Government were elected.

The Government have been clear that we will not make further payments to Rwanda, saving £100 million in upcoming annual economic transformation and integration fund payments, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise have been liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without even considering the additional staffing and operational costs, which would have been substantial. We will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending the partnership. It is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act so that the legislation, which relies on the provisions of the treaty, will no longer be on the statute book. That is what clause 37 achieves.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 37 repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. In doing so, the Government are removing the only deterrent, and indeed the only place where we can send people who have arrived from a safe third country. It is well established that it is extremely difficult to return people to some countries. In addition, the lack of documentation can frustrate the process of removal to someone’s home country. That is why a third country deterrent is needed: if people cannot be removed to their home country, they can and will be removed to a third country.

The logical consequence of repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act is that a greater number of migrants will arrive from countries that are harder to return them to. Without some form of agreement to send the migrants to a safe country, they will continue to come and to stay. Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a list of safe countries, but the list is limited to countries that contribute very few illegal migrants, save for Albania. The last Conservative Government cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by over 90%, showing that our returns agreement with Albania worked. As the former director general of Border Force said:

“If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 41, Q43.]

Channel boat crossings are up 28% since the election, with more than 1,300 people crossing in the week commencing 1 March 2025. This Labour Government have smashed farmers, small business owners and pensioners, but it seems that the people-smuggling gangs are the only ones who are safe. The only thing that will stop the gangs is a strong deterrent that means that people do not board small boats because they know that they will be deported if they reach the UK, and they will not be allowed to stay.

The additional offences and powers in this Bill are welcome as far as they go, but, with the scrapping of the Conservatives’ deterrent—that if someone has no right to be in this country, they will not be able to stay—this Bill is just window dressing. It will not, and cannot, stop people crossing the channel in small boats. The Government know that, because their own impact assessment shows that only a handful of people each year would be imprisoned because of the new offences created by this Bill.

Since the announcement that our deterrent would be scrapped, there are almost 8,500 more people in asylum hotels. That is the Government’s failure.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

I was trying to count the number of times the hon. Member used the word “deterrent”, and I ran out of fingers. Could he please define what a deterrent is?

[Matt Vickers]

Does the hon. Gentleman want me to use my fingers to help him to count? The deterrent is preventing people from getting in those boats. If people know that they will be detained and removed when they arrive in this country, they will stop coming.

[Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the crossings have risen from 299 in 2018 to more than 150,000 since then, the majority of them on the Conservatives’ watch? Does he also acknowledge that deportations have increased by 24% under this Government?

[Matt Vickers]

Does the hon. Gentleman know what has happened with global migration? If we compare the movements that have been made in the last week, those into Europe and those into this country seem to be slightly misaligned. The number of people arriving in this country is up 28%. The number of people put into hotels in communities across this country is up 29%; that is 8,500 more people. The number of people who have arrived in this country illegally and been removed is down significantly since this Government came to office.

It is clear that a new approach is needed. The National Crime Agency said that stopping channel migrants is not possible without a Rwanda-style scheme. It was a terrible mistake for Labour to cancel our deterrent before it had even started. The Labour Government like to point out the cost of the Rwanda plan, but a deterrent that stops illegal migrants from making the crossing and settling in the country will save the state billions in lifetime costs.

As Karl Williams from the Centre for Policy Studies pointed out,

“the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer…estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000.”

Williams then pointed to

“analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that” ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 43, Q49.]

The evidence therefore suggests that if 35,000 people cross the channel a year—that is roughly where we were last year—at that sort of cost range, the lifetime costs will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion.

[Tom Hayes]

I ask the hon. Member to desist from referring to that report. In oral evidence, I asked two experts whether they thought it was possible to make such assessments on the basis of the available evidence, and they declined. In fact, the author of that report said that the available evidence was fairly lacking in robustness and integrity. When I asked him whether he had considered certain key counterfactuals, he admitted that he had not. Later, in response to my question about whether it was appropriate for MPs to brandish such research, Professor Brian Bell said that it would be “foolhardy” to do so because the report itself made “very brave” assumptions.

Will the hon. Member now desist from using that report, given that we are in a democracy, we are striving for accountability and truth, and we should not be using fake information?

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[Tom Hayes]

I apologise, Mr Stuart.

[Matt Vickers]

I will not desist from using those figures, but I would be happy to hear the hon. Member’s alternative figures when the time comes. I am sure this is not cost-neutral; I am sure it is very expensive.

As I was saying, that is why an effective removals and deterrent agreement is needed. I ask the Minister whether the Government are looking at a removals and deterrent agreement. If not, why are they repealing the UK’s only deterrent? How does she think we can control our borders without one, when it is clear that this Bill will not be effective in doing so? Does she agree with the National Crime Agency that a removals agreement is the only way to stop channel migrants, as happened with Operation Sovereign Borders in Australia?

The Government say that they are clearing the backlog and returning people who arrived on small boats. That is just not the case. The most recent immigration figures show that the asylum backlog is higher than when Labour came into office, and returns of small boat arrivals were down again in the most recent quarter, with only 4% of arrivals being removed. In fact, of the total returns between October and December 2024, only 16% were enforced; in the three months before, only 13% were. Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal immigrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent?

[Tom Hayes]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart, and I promise that I will be briefer. Does the hon. Member agree that the overwhelming trend under the last Conservative Government in the balance between enforced and voluntary returns was in favour of voluntary returns? In fact, in 2023, only 24% of returns were enforced, in 2022, 25% were and in 2021, 27% were. Does he not agree that the trend over the last years has been one of voluntary returns?

[Matt Vickers]

I would say that the big issue around deterrence is how many of those who arrive in small boats are removed. Despite the fact that the number of those arriving illegally is up 28%, the number who are being returned is down significantly. That is the big question at play here.

[Tom Hayes]

I thank the hon. Member for his patience. Does he agree that he is moving the goalposts slightly to manufacture a political argument that, as he knows, would not be supported by the evidence available? Furthermore, will he look back into history at the record of the last Labour Government? I invite him to comment on their success—I know that he will want to jump at that. In 2004, 85% of people reaching our country were removed through enforced returns; in 2005, 73% were. Where there was a trend of enforced returns, it was actually under the last Labour Government.

[Matt Vickers]

In terms of the political arguments, what people out there want to see is the number of people arriving illegally in this country going down. They are not seeing that; it is up 28%. They want to see the number of hotels in communities across the country going down. It is not, although it was. The number of people arriving was also going down, but it is now up 28%, and there are 8,500 more people in hotels. That is the reality of the situation.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. Of course, that is what Committee debates are meant to be about; it is easier to have a bit more to and fro in Committee than it often is on the Floor of the House, when we have two and a half minutes and we have had to rewrite our speech and discard most of what we were going to say.

Will the hon. Gentleman admit that the way in which the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act meant that nobody could be processed at all; they were just stuck, and there was a build-up in hotels of small boat arrivals and other asylum claimants who could not be processed? That meant that there was a big backlog, and we have had to restart decision making. That inevitably means that there will be a slowdown in sending back people who have arrived by small boat until we can get on top of the backlog that the Conservative Government created.

[Matt Vickers]

The principle at stake is that if someone arrives in this country illegally, they will be removed. We were not processing people who had arrived illegally and were meant to be removed, but we were returning more of them before the election than we are now. However, I will get through my comments, and there will be plenty of time then for debate—we have a full morning ahead of us.

Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal migrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent? At the moment, people know that if they come here on a small boat, they are 96% likely to be allowed to stay. That is a strong pull factor. The only way to remove that pull factor is to reinstate a strong deterrent. People need to know that if they arrive here on a small boat, they will not be able to stay. Can the Minister explain how she will increase the number of removals without a third country to which migrants can be sent? If it is not Rwanda, where will they go? Will it be Redcar? Will it be Romford? Will it be Richmond? Where will these people who cannot be removed to a safe country go?

As Alp Mehmet said,

“repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration… 240,000 people were declared to have entered”

the EU “illegally last year” and will likely end up coming to the UK. The Government have confirmed with this Bill and the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act that there is no deterrence, because once people arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. Mehmet also echoed the comments from the National Crime Agency, saying,

“the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 39-40, Q43.]

As he pointed out, there is not “anything in the Bill” that would suggest that people will be removed quickly. Why has a removals agreement not been included in the Bill? The EU is now looking at offshore processing and deportation centres. There is also a growing consensus in the EU that the 1951 refugee convention is not fit for purpose. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact of these changes on the UK? Why have the Government scrapped the Rwanda plan, leaving the UK as an outlier? We wish to oppose the repeal of the Act by way of a Division.

[Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

I welcome the opportunity to examine the failed Rwanda scheme. The Israeli scheme, which was set up more than a decade ago, provides stark evidence that the previous Government should have considered before recycling an idea that has cost taxpayers £700 million. In Israel, asylum seekers were given a stark choice: be sent home, go to a migrant detention facility or take $3,500 on a one-way flight to Rwanda. One such asylum seeker quickly found that he was not welcome on arrival. No sooner had he landed in Kigali than he was told he had to leave again for Uganda, and for a fee. He said that he quickly left for Greece on a small boat and then travelled over land to Switzerland, where he is now settled. Another used a $5,000 payment that he received to catch a flight to Amsterdam, where he then claimed asylum status.

The previous Conservative Government entered into the agreement with Rwanda with full knowledge of the previous failings there and offered individuals a personal payment of £3,000 to resettle their lives. Figures have been bandied about on how many asylum seekers Rwanda was willing to take, with the previous Government saying 1,000, and Rwanda saying between 100 and 200. It is not clear who was right, but a question that has often been repeated to me is: how can that be regarded as a deterrent? Indeed, our witnesses from the refugee support organisations made the point that people will continue to come and try their luck, and 84,000 took that risk. I welcome the fact that we have our common sense back and we are repealing the Act, but I despair at the waste of taxpayers’ money on pursuing a fantasy that had already failed elsewhere.

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On top of that, we have had to place sanctions on the Rwandan regime for its involvement in M23’s incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the displacement of nearly 1 million people in that area. I do not know whether, in the fantasy world that some Opposition Members seemingly still inhabit, every part of Rwanda will always be safe because at one point we asserted legislatively that Rwanda was a safe place. There are many flaws in the way that the legislation was conceived, enacted, put on the statute book and never operationalised, and events continuing to happen may well have impinged on it too.

[Matt Vickers]

I have asked this question a few times and never quite got to the bottom of it. We were sending people to Rwanda who could not be returned to their home country because it was not safe. Where will those people go now, if not Rwanda? Does the Minister fear that, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, the Government might end up coming back to this issue in a few years when they realise that things are continuing to go the wrong way?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

First things first: the hon. Gentleman was not going to send to Rwanda only those whom we could not return to their own country; in theory, he was going to deport to Rwanda absolutely everybody who arrived to claim asylum after March 2023—that was what we were told. In reality, those people all ended up in hotels, unable to be processed and growing in number, while the Conservative party indulged in its expensive gimmicks and fantasies of how the world should be.

As many Committee members have pointed out, the day job was not being done while that parallel universe policy was being developed. It took all the attention away from running what is a complex enough system as it is. Many resources were diverted to try to create that new reality, resulting in the neglect of the system, and huge backlogs were built into the system because of how the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act. That made it impossible to run the current system or to move to a new system that was remotely workable, thereby landing this country with a huge, dysfunctional series of backlogs, and a system that we have had to literally start up again from scratch to try to get working coherently.

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[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 38 repeals sections 1 to 6 and schedule 1, sections 7 to 11, sections 13 to 15 and schedule 2, sections 16 to 28, sections 30 to 5, sections 53 to 58, section 61 and section 66 of the Illegal Migration Act.

Section 2 of the Illegal Migration Act placed a duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements to remove persons to their home country or a safe third country who have entered or arrived in the UK illegally. Let me point out to those people who are concerned about genuine asylum seekers that section 2(4) of the IMA makes it clear that the provision does not apply if someone comes directly from a place of danger, which is consistent with article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention. However, people who come here directly from France, a safe country where no one is being persecuted and which has a perfectly well-functioning asylum system, should not illegally enter the United Kingdom.

I ask the Minister why the Government are repealing this duty. Is it because they do not think they are able to remove those who have arrived illegally? Is it because the Government think people who arrive in this country illegally should be allowed to remain?

Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act provides that asylum claims are automatically deemed inadmissible for those who have arrived illegally. One of Labour’s first actions in government was to allow illegal migrants to claim asylum. Can the Minister explain how allowing illegal migrants to claim asylum is providing any deterrent? Surely it will help the smuggling gangs, by providing a stronger incentive for people to make those dangerous crossings of the Channel in small boats.

[Tom Hayes]

The Illegal Migration Act, which we are discussing under this clause, was put on the statute book by the previous Government, but they did not commence much of it at all. Can the hon. Member explain why that was?

[Matt Vickers]

There is a lot to do in the way of commencement; the Bill is there and could be commenced at any time, if the Government felt it was of help. In fact, in a few years’ time, when they come back to the drawing board to try to find a deterrent, they might well want to do that.

Sections 31 and 32 of the Illegal Migration Act prevented people who have entered the country illegally from obtaining British citizenship. The Labour Government are repealing this provision. Their position is hardly surprising when the Prime Minister does not think that British citizenship is a pull factor, but that does not mean it is the right thing to do. Why are the Government repealing this clause, allowing illegal migrants to get British citizenship?

Do the Government not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? If so, why have the Government not included measures to stop illegal migrants obtaining British citizenship, and instead only issued guidance stating that

“applications made after 10 February 2025 that include illegal entry will ‘normally’ be refused citizenship, regardless of when the illegal entry occurred.”?

Section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act states:

“The Secretary of State may make regulations about the effect of a decision by a relevant person (“P”) not to consent to the use of a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment…where there are no reasonable grounds for P’s decision.”

This means that, if a migrant refused to undergo an age assessment, they would be considered an adult. Labour have removed age assessments for illegal migrants who claim to be under 18, resulting in the risk that grown men may end up in schools with teenage girls. In fact, the most recent data on age disputes shows that more than 50% of migrants claiming to be under 18 were actually adults. How do the Government therefore intend to ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in the Bill?

The SNP’s new clause 2 would repeal the Illegal Migration Act entirely, so the SNP must be agreeing with the Labour Government that illegal migrants should be able to get British citizenship and should not have to undergo age assessments. Therefore, I ask the same questions: does the SNP not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? How would the SNP ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in new clause 2?

By repealing the Illegal Migration Act in its entirety, the SNP want to stop the seizure of mobile phones from illegal migrants, something that helps to establish identities and obtain evidence of immigration offences. As Tony Smith said:

“Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]

The Liberal Democrats’ amendment 9 would have repealed section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, which requires the Secretary of State to remove people who have sought to use modern slavery protections in bad faith. Do the Liberal Democrats think that people using modern slavery protections fraudulently should be allowed to stay in the UK? If so, do they believe that people who make fraudulent immigration claims should be allowed to stay in the UK? We believe that the effect of repealing the majority of the IMA and the entirety of the Safety of Rwanda Act will be an increase in the number of people arriving in this country illegally and remaining.

I have therefore asked the Government whether they would be prepared to be transparent about the numbers. If they are convinced that the approach set out in the Bill will be successful, let us measure it. Will the Minister commit to publishing all the numbers, and the nationalities, of all those who might have been excluded from the UK asylum system on grounds of connection with a safe third country or a late claim, but have not been—with reasons why not—and to setting out the obstacles to returning them to their country of origin and what steps are being taken through international agreements to overcome that, as recommended by Tony Smith in evidence to this Committee? We will oppose the inclusion of this clause in the Bill by way of a Division.

[Pete Wishart]

I must say to the hon. Member for Stockton West that he really does not want to know my views on British citizenship, because they are likely to blow his head—but we will leave that one at that.

It is disappointing to note the absence of our Liberal colleagues. Back in the day—the good old days, Mr Stuart —when we had an effective, efficient, diligent and conscientious third party, there would always be someone present to ensure that the views of the third party were represented. I am sure that the Liberal Democrats have good excuses, but I hope they start to take a bit of interest in this important Bill, because it has been disappointing thus far.

I say to the Minister, “‘Useful clauses?’ Come on!” We are talking about sections 29, 12, 59, 60 and 62, some of the nastiest and most pernicious parts and aspects of the Illegal Migration Act. I cannot believe that this Government want to continue that horrible and heinous Tory set of proposals and clauses in this Bill. This was their great opportunity to wipe the slate clean of the previous Government’s hopeless and useless crackpot Rwanda scheme and their heinous and horrible Illegal Migration Act.

I will give the Minister a few quotes from some of her colleagues, some of which I wish I had come up with myself. The now Prime Minister said at the time that the Illegal Migration Bill would drive “a coach and horses” through protections for women trafficked to the UK as victims of modern slavery. The now Home Secretary said that that IMA does the “total opposite” of providing support for those who have been trafficked, and that it was nothing other than “a traffickers’ charter”. There are other prize quotes from the Home Secretary and various Ministers within the Home Office—absolutely and totally correct, right and true—about the horrible Illegal Migration Act. Now we have a Labour Government inconceivably standing by large swathes of an Act that they so rightly and widely rubbished and wanted rid of only a short while ago.

It would be different if the Government were maintaining some benign, useful or helpful parts of that Tory Act, but they are maintaining some real, pernicious nasties. Provisions that were damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under the Tories are just as damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under this new Labour Government. I remind the Minister what the then Home Secretary said on that Bill when introducing it:

“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.”

The previous Government could not care less about our obligations under international law or about human rights, and they were quite happy to set them aside. Now we have a Home Secretary who stands by certain provisions of that Act, with all its difficulties concerning its relationship with convention rights.

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The hon. Member for Stockton West should not go away from today’s debate thinking that we are not interested in scientific age assessments. That is not true, but the Illegal Migration Act’s scientific age assessment provisions related to the duty to remove, which is being repealed. We can come back to talking about using that kind of technology, but not in this context.

[Matt Vickers]

Is there any reason we cannot introduce provisions in this area as part of the Bill, and when can we expect to see them?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Work is going on in the Department to assess the accuracy of the various methods of age assessment, which ministerial predecessors from the hon. Gentleman’s party commenced, but which has not yet been finished. As soon as we have more idea about how reliable scientific age assessment can be, how expensive it is and all those things, I will either come to Parliament or make a statement about how we intend to proceed. The hon. Gentleman must not assume that because these sections have been repealed we are not interested in scientific age assessments and their potential per se. They were simply unworkable because they were attached to the duty to remove, which was such a feature of the Illegal Migration Act.

The six measures that the Government intend to retain, including where provisions are in force, have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. These powers are all ones that the Government see as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve wider priorities alongside the powerful measures set out in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire talked about section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. The public order disqualification under the Nationality and Borders Act is currently in operation. It enables decisions to disqualify certain individuals from support and protections afforded by the national referral mechanisms on grounds of public order and bad faith. Public order grounds include serious criminality and threats to national security. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, considering the individual’s vulnerabilities. That is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act that is being retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Disqualification will continue to be assessed on an individual basis.

Crime and Policing Bill

Matt Vickers Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 10th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I take this opportunity to thank our brave, hard-working police officers, PCSOs, police staff and volunteers for the huge sacrifices they make to keep our streets safe. I thank all hon. Members across the House for their considered and concise contributions.

The Bill covers a wide array of offences, and we all welcome that. Tackling criminality means equipping the police and enforcement agencies with the powers that they need to lock up dangerous perpetrators to make our streets safer. The Bill contains meaningful and impactful provisions, particularly in relation to knife crime, car theft, retail crime, the sharing of intimate images, child sexual abuse, drug testing and cuckooing among many others.

It is generous of the Government to hold the previous Conservative Government’s work in such high esteem: in fact, about two thirds of the measures in the Bill are copied straight from the previous Government. As was said—I think on several occasions—it is a copy-and-paste job that even the Chancellor would blush over. I thank my right hon. Friends the Members for Braintree (Mr Cleverly) and for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), alongside many other past and current Members of the House, for their significant work in ensuring that those offences are included in the scope of the Bill. That work will ultimately have a positive impact on the lives of all our constituents. Time does not allow me to talk through all the measures in the Bill [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] I know that hon. Members are disappointed, but I will focus on a few important provisions.

First, let me turn to retail crime. As hon. Members across this House may know, having served as the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the future of retail and as a former Woolies worker—no one ever questions whether I am old enough—I have been very involved in the campaign to protect our retail workers. I have joined the likes of the hon. Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris), Paul Gerrard from the Co-op, Helen Dickinson and the team at the British Retail Consortium, the Association of Convenience Stores, USDAW, numerous retailers and others who have worked to deliver more protection for our retail workers.

Back in 2021—during my slightly rebellious phase—I tabled an amendment that helped us to make an assault on a person providing a service to the public a statutory aggravating offence. More recently in April 2024, alongside a suite of measures designed to tackle retail crime, we saw the last Government agree to the creation of a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker. I am glad that that will be taken up by the incumbent Government and hope that it will have a real impact and improve the lives of these important key workers in high streets and stores across the country.

I have two concerns, however, about the Bill regarding retail crime. First, the previous Government’s plans had proposed to make it mandatory for the courts to impose at least a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic monitoring requirement on repeat offenders convicted of shoplifting or the new offence of assaulting a retail worker and sentenced to a community order or a suspended sentence. That had been welcomed by retailers, but the Bill does not include any provisions to this effect. I urge the Government to look again at this, to ensure that we are doing all we can to protect retail workers and avoid what appears to be the watering down of potential protections.

Secondly, on the plans to remove the £200 threshold for shoplifting, while the rhetoric sounds positive, it is untrue to say that theft under £200 was ever decriminalised. In fact, the Government’s own impact assessment tells us that 90% of charges for shoplifting relate to property worth less than £200. There is a fear that measures will lead to further delays to justice being done while not leading to tougher or longer sentences. Victims of retail crime deserve swift justice, not year-long delays while perpetrators continue to offend.

I turn now to further legislative steps that I hope Members across the House will find difficult to oppose. One hugely important measure is the introduction of a statutory aggravating factor, requiring sentencing courts to treat grooming behaviour as an aggravating factor when considering the seriousness of child sexual offences. The Opposition believe that the Government should go further and establish a national statutory inquiry, but it is right that they have brought forward this measure from the Criminal Justice Bill. It recognises the severity of the offence and ensures that third parties involved in the heinous practices of these rape gangs face justice and punishment. We must take every step possible to protect the most vulnerable and ensure that stronger laws are in place so that the terrible crimes of the past cannot be repeated.

Another key measure in the Bill, contained in clauses 96 to 100, expands the ability to conduct drug tests upon arrest. The expansion of the drug testing on arrival programme, introduced by the previous Conservative Government, has already demonstrated the sheer number of individuals found to be under the influence of substances when arrested. Between March 2022 and September 2024, police forces reported a total of 154,295 tests to the Home Office. Of these, 86,207, or 56%, were positive for cocaine, opiates or both. It is therefore right that we expand the drug testing programme to cover as wide a range of class B and C drugs as possible, allowing the police to access the information they need to manage offenders appropriately within the criminal justice system.

I also welcome the efforts to tackle off-road bikes. Having seen their impact on my constituents, I hope that during the passage of the Bill we might consider going even further, maybe even considering suggestions made by Government Back Benchers. We must use this opportunity to ensure that the police have the powers they need, and to examine where further powers are required to ensure that the law truly serves the victims of crime and provides a level of openness and transparency for our police forces so that people can have confidence in our justice system.

Additionally, we should all want to see the police doing what they do best: on the beat, preventing and investigating crime. Their time should not be wasted on matters that the public do not consider a priority. Time and again, we see reports of police officers being sent to respond to incidents that are not criminal in nature while serious offences on our streets go unchallenged. The measures in this Bill to tackle antisocial behaviour signal an understanding that removing crime from our streets must be a priority. However, we must consider whether more can be done legislatively to ensure that police time is used effectively.

I must stress that all the well-meaning measures contained in the Bill are meaningless without a well-funded police force. Forces are—[Interruption.] Forces—some led by Labour police and crime commissioners—are raising legitimate concerns about the level of funding they will receive from the Government. Any reduction in police numbers undermines every element of this Bill, weakening the police’s ability to tackle crime across the country. The head of the Metropolitan police has raised his concerns about potential job losses in our capital city—a city where 30% of England and Wales’s knife crime occurs.

I should note at this point that it is very welcome to see the Government reintroducing many of the measures on tackling knife crime put forward in the Criminal Justice Bill by the previous Conservative Government, including a power to retain and destroy bladed articles on private property and to increase the maximum penalty for the sale of dangerous weapons to under-18s. Given that the financial pressures faced by police forces amount to an estimated £118 million shortfall, there is a real concern that the Government’s actions will contribute to a decline in police numbers. The Government’s police funding increase masks the Chancellor’s national insurance hike on our police forces and their failure to build police pay awards into the baseline.

Moving forward, we will have ample opportunities as a House to scrutinise the legislation and consider potential improvements. Reading the impact assessments and economic notes accompanying the Bill reveals uncertainty about the effects of its various measures. Notably, there is a lack of clarity regarding the number of individuals expected to be imprisoned for certain offences, with significant variation in the estimates provided. The Government must back our police over the criminals and demonstrate the political will to do so. They must provide police with the resources and robust powers they need to keep officers on the beat, deliver swift justice for victims and, in turn, make our streets safer. This Bill is a step forward. Across the House, we all need to support our police officers to tackle the heinous crimes—

[Neil Coyle]

Will the shadow Minister give way?

[Matt Vickers]

Go for it.

[Hon. Members]

Hooray!

[Neil Coyle]

Thank you. On swift justice, will the Opposition Front Bench bring forward amendments regarding the shadow Home Secretary’s position on citizen’s arrest? How many amendments can we expect to see about how the police should respond to citizen’s arrests?

[Matt Vickers]

What the shadow Home Secretary was doing in office was putting more police on the country’s streets than ever before—149,679 police officers. We hope the Government will maintain that as we move forward, but there are lots of question marks around that.

We all need to support our police officers to tackle the heinous crimes that we have heard about in the debate. I hope the Government remain open to considering measures proposed by Opposition and Government Members who are committed to robustly tackling the very behaviours that this legislation seeks to prevent.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Stuart, for what will be a marathon session. Clause 19 provides definitions for the key expressions used in relation to the electronic devices measure. These definitions mean that the measure will focus the powers only on irregular entrants who are in possession of an electronic device that authorised officers have reasonable groups to suspect contains information relating to facilitation offences under the Immigration Act 1971.

Furthermore, clause 19 defines “authorised officer” as:

“an immigration officer, or…a constable of a police force maintained by a local policing body”.

The aim of the powers is to gain access to information held on such devices on the organised crime groups who help facilitate or plan migrants’ dangerous journey and, as a result, to save lives from being lost. The clause is integral in defining the key expressions relating to how the powers can be used.

Clause 20 enables immigration officers within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and police constables in England and Wales only to search an irregular entrant if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are in possession of an electronic device that contains information linked to a facilitation offence. That power enables the search of a person, property, premises, vehicle or container. That is to ensure that, in any circumstances in which it is necessary to obtain a device, the authorised officer can use the powers to conduct a search. The clause contains safeguards to ensure the powers are used appropriately. Clause 20 provides clarity over how searches must be conducted in accordance with these powers.

Finally, clause 26 defines any additional expressions referenced throughout clauses 19 to 23. That will ensure that it is clear to users of the powers what key expressions mean. It is important to be transparent about what is meant and to ensure that the public and authorised officers fully understand these expressions.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

We support clauses 19 to 26, but only in so far as they endorse powers that we think already exist to seize, extract and retain data from mobile devices. Clause 19 provides definitions of key terms in sections 20 and 21 relating to the provisions of those clauses to allow authorised officers to search for, seize and retain relevant articles. The definition of a “relevant article” is

“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971 is, or may be, stored in electronic form.”

Will the Minister provide some concrete examples of what the Government think such information might consist of?

Clause 20 gives relevant officers—either an immigration officer or a police constable—powers to search a relevant person, which is someone who has entered the UK without leave or in breach of a deportation order. Will the Minister explain why subsection (2) does not allow for any more than one search after the person in question has arrived in the UK? The clause gives officers the power to search for “relevant articles”, which are described in clause 19 as

“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission (whether in the past or future) of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971”.

That is quite a narrow definition, as it covers just electronic devices. Will the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary powers to search for non-electronic items exist elsewhere? In practice, we suspect the power will be used to gather information and evidence to identify smugglers for prosecution. We fully support that, but most mobile devices are destroyed during or prior to travelling across the channel. Will the Minister therefore explain whether she expects any of the evidence gathered using the powers in these clauses to be used to support decision making on immigration enforcement?

If the devices are seized, as the former director general of Border Force pointed out in his evidence, they may contain useful information about nationality, identity, age and travel history, and may provide valuable evidence when assessing asylum claims. Will the Minister explain how effective the new powers will be in supporting evidence gathering to remove those with no right to be here? Will information gathered using these powers be available to asylum screening teams? Will that evidence be used in decision making for immigration appeals? These clauses do not have extraterritorial reach, so can the Minister explain to what extent the Government envisage these additional powers will make a meaningful difference to smashing the gangs, when many of the perpetrators are located outside the UK?

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

These clauses create invasive new search, seizure and retention powers, along with the powers to access, copy and use information contained within an electronic device. The new powers can be applied to any person who arrives irregularly and has not yet been granted permission to enter or remain in the UK. They allow an immigration or police officer to fully search a person, including a search of that person’s mouth. I expect that the Minister will tell us exactly whether that particular qualification is required for these new powers.

This is not the plot and setting of some future dystopian film: it will be the UK sea border in the course of the next few months. These things will not be done to hardened criminals wandering the streets of the United Kingdom or those associated with violent crime. They are to be done to some of the most abandoned and traumatised people in the world. With these clauses we are starting, measuredly, to go into police state territory. They are essentially a hybrid form of stop-and-search powers, without the due qualifications and reassurances. I do not know if profiling will be a part of this—I will be interested in the Minister’s response—but it seems like only one profile will be included in all that, which is that of every asylum seeker. They may all be subject to these new powers.

For these powers to be exercised, there need only be reasonable grounds and suspicion that a relevant article appears to store some electronic information that relates or may relate to the future or past commission of a facilitation offence. That seems excessively broad. Practically any person who arrives irregularly to the UK may be subject to these powers. Any information received from these searches would be used for preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting facilitation offences. The property can be retained for as long as considered necessary to assess, examine or copy information for use in proceedings for an offence, before being returned or disposed of.

I trying to think why the Government want these clauses. I know they are going to tell us it is all about helping to disrupt organised crime and making sure they can find particular and specific information on electronic devices, but I think a lot of it has to do with the 2022 High Court ruling decreeing that the Home Office’s secret policy of blanket searching, seizing and returning mobile phones from individuals arriving by small boats was unlawful.

Just like the Tories before them, if any particular law that defends and protects people is seen or deemed to be a little bit unnecessary, the Government will just bring in a new one to override it completely, forgetting anything to do with the consequences and implications for people. These new offences clearly compromise a person’s right to a private and family life. Given the confidential, legally privileged, sensitive, private and personal nature of the messages, photographs, information, correspondence and data that may be on such mobile devices, we hold that that could only ever be the case. To be fair, the Government respect that and acknowledge it as fact, and the European convention on human rights memorandum suggests that the new powers could be distinguished and that phones will not be seized on a blanket basis when these powers come into force—well, thank goodness for that.

The memorandum says:

“The Home Office will issue non-statutory guidance about the use of the powers and training which will be required for authorised officers exercising those powers.”

We will have to see that happen pretty quickly, because we have no idea how any of these powers will be exercised. Again, I am entirely happy to take the Minister at her word on how the new law will be exercised as we go forward. However, there is no such guidance for parliamentary scrutiny during the passage of the Bill, so it remains entirely unclear how the Home Office proposes to use these wide and invasive new powers.

I am distinctly uncomfortable with the new powers, and I am disconcerted about how they may be applied and used. A number of agencies have serious misgivings about the type of individuals who will be subject to these new powers. The Minister has to explain just a little more how these powers will be used and what protections will be put in place, particularly for some of the most traumatised people whom we will be ever deal with in this country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 21 provides immigration officers in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and police constables in England and Wales, with the power to seize and retain electronic devices. Clause 21 provides a clear and detailed approach for authorised officers to ensure that the powers are correctly, efficiently and effectively used.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 21 gives authorised officers the power to seize any electronic device that has been found in a search under clause 20, or is not found on a search but appears to the officer to be, or to have been, in the possession of a relevant person. How would officers determine whether an article appears to be or to have been in the possession of a relevant person? What is the evidence threshold for that?

My question for the Minister about clause 21 is similar to my one about clause 20. Will the powers be used to gather evidence that can be used in immigration decision making and appeals? The Opposition support the powers in this clause, in so far as they go.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman supports the powers, but I emphasise to him again that clause 21 is very much in the context of the clauses that we have just agreed. It is a more limited—not a blanket—power. It exists within the parameters that I set out in the previous debate.

I emphasise again that none of the information seized in this context could be used in an asylum case; it is for the purposes of dealing with organised immigration crime. It is not for wider purposes, unless other criminality is found, in which case it becomes available and can be passed on. That will be dealt with in some clauses that are coming up. But these provisions are limited to collecting evidence and intelligence on organised immigration crime from people who have just entered the country illegally.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Duty to pass on items seized under section 21

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 22 will provide immigration officers using the powers with the duty to pass on electronic devices to other agencies, such as the police. The clause will be used if an electronic device seized contains information about a non-immigration offence—this is the case that I was hinting at earlier. Clause 22 provides the process to be used in these types of cases. We cannot seize an electronic device without that process in place, because we may discover information relating to a criminal offence, such as a counter-terrorism offence or an offence related to indecent and/or obscene material of a child—those kinds of offence. If we discover evidence of such activities on a phone, we must act, and to act we have to have the processes in place to enable items to be forwarded to police or any other agency that needs to take possession of the device for its investigation into the other criminality.

The clause provides for a robust step-by-step process to ensure that immigration officers know what actions to take to forward the device or if the agency to which we wish to forward the device refuses to accept it for an investigation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 22 gives authorised officers the duty to pass on seized items that have been found in a search under clause 21 where there is a reasonable belief that the article or information stored on it has been obtained in consequence of, or is evidence in relation to, an offence other than the relevant immigration offence. The immigration officer is under a duty to notify someone who has the functions to investigate the relevant offence. What might be the reasons why a person notified under the clause might not accept the article, and what would be an acceptable reason? If a relevant person refuses to accept the article, what are the next steps? We support the powers in the clause so far as they go.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a bit difficult to talk about specific circumstances in a generalised way. As the hon. Gentleman will perceive, there may be some material on a phone that police or immigration officers are worried breaks the criminal law—I talked about counter-terrorism and child sexual exploitation as potential examples. That information may be passed on and the relevant authorities might decide that it was not at a criminal level—that would be the kind of occasion that the hon. Gentleman was asking me about.

However, one would assume that, with the appropriate training, it would be fairly obvious whether something would be a worry for the purposes of counter-terrorism or child sexual abuse, and police forces could understand whether they have an obligation to try to prevent criminal activity of a category other than that for which the phone was originally seized. Once we begin to seize phones for narrow purposes, we have to make certain that passing on that information is lawful, and that is the purpose of the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Powers to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 23 gives authorised officers the power to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles that have been retained under powers detailed in clause 21, and authorises the use of any information retained under this clause relating to the prevention, detection and investigation, or prosecution of such an offence. We support the powers in the clause. However, it is important to bolster the utility of the powers in clauses 20, 21 and 23. It is for that reason that we have tabled new clause 22, picking up on the suggestion made by the former director general of Border Force in his written evidence to the Committee.

We have tabled the new clause because currently Border Force and immigration enforcement officers are not able to use mobile devices to track illegal migrants on bail. Although powers exist for electronic tagging, there are difficulties with using these powers and so they are not frequently used. At present, mobile devices can be used only for tracking people for serious offences. Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, an illegal entry into the UK does not count as a serious offence for these purposes.

Mobile devices are often used by migrants on bail to report by phone rather than in person, which minimises their risk of arrest and detention on reporting. Without access to location data about illegal migrants, they are able to stay at addresses not listed on their bail forms. If immigration officers were able to make use of location data from mobile devices, they would be better able to secure compliance with bail conditions and thus reduce the risk of absconding.

New clause 22 would allow law enforcement to access the mobile phone location data of people who enter the UK illegally. It would do so by adding illegal immigration to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as a serious offence that allows location data to be used. We would also amend the Immigration Act 2016 to allow a person’s mobile phone location data to be used as part of electronic monitoring for immigration enforcement.

Of course, migrants can change phones, but they are more likely to make use of them than electronic tags. In our view, the new clause would add a useful new power to immigration enforcement teams. I am very keen to hear the Minister’s view.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 22 proposes an amendment to section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. However, I do not think that this proposal is either necessary or appropriate.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides law enforcement and other relevant public authorities with the ability to acquire communications data covertly, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Members of the Committee should particularly focus on the seriousness of the powers conferred in the 2016 Act, including the ability to covertly acquire communications data where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

With new clause 22, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate to add immigration issues to that area of the law, and whether, with an immigration issue, it would be necessary and proportionate to start acquiring covertly communications in an immigration setting. It is important to consider whether that would unbalance the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and cause some issues that would probably weaken it.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is intentionally neutral on the specific types of crime for which the powers within it can be deployed. Instead, it sets a threshold for serious crime, to enable access to more intrusive powers. The threshold for the acquisition of communications data—the who, when, how and where of communication, but not the content—is set out in section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act. Events data, which includes details of where and when a specific communication took place, is available only for crimes that meet the serious crime threshold. The threshold at section 86(2A)(a) of that Act is a crime for which a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment can be handed down.

The proposed new clause does not define illegal immigration, but many of the immigration offences in section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, as recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act, will already meet the serious crime threshold. There is no real reason to put immigration crime in there; it is already implicitly included. If we start to add particular instances, that will unbalance the way that the Investigatory Powers Act works. That is a technical point, but it is about keeping our statute book coherent, rather than adding things in for effect. Essentially, since offences under section 24 of the 1971 Act are indictable, the serious crime threshold would already be met, so events data can already be acquired as part of the investigation. We do not need to go through the rigmarole in the new clause to emphasise what is already possible.

Where offences do not meet the serious crime threshold, it would not be proportionate to extend the use of events data to those crimes. The right to private and family life is set out in article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and it is important to uphold our obligations to the European convention on human rights. I know that is not always the most popular thing among Opposition Members, but as someone who voted for it in 1998, I am still quite proud of it. Defending our human rights and ensuring that such things are proper, proportionate and lawful is an important part of trying to pursue and deal with difficult cases with certain standards of behaviour.

Although article 8 is a qualified right, we must ensure that interference remains necessary and proportionate to the level of criminality. By introducing specific crime types that do not meet the sentencing threshold, we risk eroding the safeguards in the regime. By taking away the rights of people who may seem marginalised at the moment, I submit that we are putting at risk our own rights, and human rights in general. That is not something that I would want the Government to do.

New clause 22 would also unnecessarily amend schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016. Where a person is subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of their immigration bail, the Home Office can access their location details via the GPS tag or non-fitted device. There is no need to access mobile phone location data, because there are already powers to monitor the whereabouts of individuals at risk of absconding. I hope that, having had that debate, the hon. Member for Stockton West will realise that those things are already covered in the way that we currently do things. I hope that he will not press the new clause to a vote, but obviously we will not know until we get on to voting on it—some time in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Amendment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 24 and 25 deal with amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, extending those powers to other authorised officers and to key definitions in the clauses. Clause 24 includes amendments to the 2001 Act to extend powers of seizure where a device may contain legally privileged material, excluded material and special material. The 2001 Act also contains essential safeguards for the handling of such material. Extending its powers will ensure that the seizure of any device will not be prevented by claiming that it holds legally privileged, excluded or special material, which is often an excuse that is raised when such matters come up.

Furthermore, clause 24 will ensure that this data is protected, but that operationally, the information needed can still be taken for the purpose of these powers, and that seized electronic devices are returned as soon as reasonably possible.

Clause 25 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to extend the powers to other authorised officers, via secondary legislation, if they are required to support the disruption of organised immigration crime. The Government will ensure that any decisions on extending the powers to other authorised officers will be fully considered before action is taken.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 24 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 so that provisions relating to the protection of legally privileged material and excluded and special material apply when mobile devices are seized under clauses 20 to 23. Can the Minister explain how often the Government envisage that those provisions would need to be invoked?

Clause 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to extend the powers given to authorised officers in clauses 20 to 23, to be available to other people, including people designated by the Secretary of State. Why might these powers need to be extended to different categories of people? Who does the Minister have in mind? Why are those not included on the face of the Bill? Why was it judged appropriate that these powers are subject to the negative procedure?

Clause 26 defines key terms used in the preceding clauses, and we have no problem with those definitions.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Would all Members ensure that electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

Clause 18

Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 18, page 11, leave out lines 24 to 26 and insert—

“(c) the vessel in which the person travelled could not reasonably have been thought to be safe for the purposes of reaching the United Kingdom.”

This amendment would apply the new offence of endangering another during a sea crossing to the UK to any individual who tries to enter the UK illegally and makes their journey in an un-seaworthy vessel, removing the requirement for the individual to have done an act to cause or create a risk of death or serious injury.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 5, in clause 18, page 11, line 36, at end insert—

“(E1C) (a) For the purposes of subsections (E1A) and (E1B), a person cannot commit an offence if the person is an asylum seeker.

(b) For the purposes of this subsection, ‘asylum seeker’ means a person who intends to claim that to remove them from or require them to leave the United Kingdom would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under—

(i) the Refugee Convention (within the meaning given by section 167(1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999), or

(ii) the Human Rights Convention (within the meaning given by that 35 section).”

This amendment would specify that the offence created by clause 18 (“Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom”) cannot apply to asylum seekers.

Amendment 15, in clause 18, page 12, line 5, leave out “six” and insert “fourteen”.

This amendment would increase the maximum penalty for the offence of endangering lives at sea to fourteen years.

Amendment 16, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out “five” and insert “fourteen”.

This amendment would increase the maximum penalty for the offence of endangering lives at sea to fourteen years.

Clause stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. Clause 18 creates a new offence of endangering others’ lives during a sea crossing from France, Belgium or the Netherlands to the United Kingdom, which results in the commission of an existing offence under section 24 subsection (A1), (B1), (D1) or (E1) of the Immigration Act 1971. Proposed new subsection (6) to section 24 of the 1971 Act states that this offence

“applies to acts carried out inside or outside the United Kingdom.”

The provision is necessary for this offence. Can the Minister explain whether partner countries have comparable offences to this one that can be used to apprehend people in France, Belgium and the Netherlands?

The former director general of Border Force, in his evidence to the Committee, was clear that clause 18 would be more effective if operated by French enforcement agencies, rather than in the UK, as most of the offences occur in French territory. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that, in order to successfully prosecute these offences in the UK, UK Border Force will be able to gather evidence collected outside the UK? Can the Minister guarantee that French support in providing that evidence will be forthcoming? What guarantees has the Home Office been given?

In order to be prosecuted under clause 18 for offences committed in French territorial waters, people would need to be transported to this country if they are not already here, which would have the rather perverse outcome of more people coming and being able to claim asylum. As I have not been able to find any reference to that in the impact assessment, I would like the Minister to share with the Committee what the justice impact tests showed for this new offence. How many new prison places are going to be required at steady state? In other words, how effective does the Minister think the new offence will be?

The Opposition tabled amendment 17 as we suspect that the new offence is not going to be greatly used. Amendment 17 would apply the new offence of endangering another during a sea crossing to the UK to any individual who tries to enter the UK illegally and makes their journey in an unseaworthy vessel, removing the requirement for the individual to have done an act to cause or create a risk of death or serious injury. If a person has crossed to the UK in a small boat, they have by definition endangered both their lives and the lives of others at sea. Those boats are unseaworthy, overcrowded and everyone who gets on board is responsible for that position. It is not just the lives of people on those dangerous vessels that are placed in danger, but potentially the lives of those who rescue them.

We have tabled amendments 15 and 16 to increase the sentence for the offence to 14 years. Before the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 was passed, section 25 offences attracted a prison sentence of up to 14 years. The 2022 Act increased the penalty to life imprisonment in order to discourage unlawful facilitation of migrants to the UK, so why are the offences in this Bill for endangering lives at sea so much lower?

Since the Government have scrapped the Rwanda deterrent, we would like to help them to make this damp squib of a Bill a bit more of an effective deterrent to those considering making such a dangerous crossing from a safe third country. That is why we have tabled amendments 17, 15 and 16: to demonstrate that if an individual gets on an unsafe boat to cross the channel, thereby committing an immigration offence, they will be found guilty of endangering lives at sea. Then, as a foreign criminal, their deportation should be easier for the Home Office.

If the Minister is not going to accept our amendment, which would ensure that everyone arriving on a small boat should be found guilty of endangering lives at sea, I would like her to explain how people who cram themselves into overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels have not endangered themselves, others on that vessel and those who have to come to their rescue.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairpersonship today, Mr Stuart.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that on average we are seeing the number of people per boat increasing each year? He alluded to that earlier, and it means that more and more people are crowding into each small boat—he is nodding, so he seems to agree. Does he also agree that, because we are seeing more and more people crowded into these small boats, it is accounting for a rise in the number of people who are crossing the channel in small boats?

[Matt Vickers]

Yes—it is the case that more people are coming on fewer boats. Equally, however, there is also a rise in the number of boats that are coming across. I think that both those things are problematic. One thing that we know about these boats being filled with yet more people is that they become ever more dangerous, and we have seen some of the horrible consequences and fatalities as a result of that.

Amendment 5, tabled by the Scottish National party, specifies that the offence created by clause 18—endangering another during sea crossing to the United Kingdom—cannot apply to asylum seekers. Surely, that would render the new offence even more ineffective, as it will not be possible to charge people until their asylum claim has been determined. Someone is perfectly capable of endangering lives at sea, whether they are an asylum seeker or not.

[Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)]

I will respond to some of the points that the hon. Member for Stockton West has just made, starting with the point about the French. Under the last Government, we saw what amounted to Twitter diplomacy, continuous bashing of the French online and in the papers, and a breakdown of that relationship. Since we came into Government, we have seen that Keir and Yvette, who was out there in France recently, have looked to reset that relationship and rebuild it. I believe that recent visits that Yvette has made to France, including one that involved a meeting with the French Minister of the Interior, have been very productive. The French are looking at their laws and considering how they can improve things on their side—[Interruption.] I apologise, Mr Stuart. I mean the Home Secretary, not Yvette. The smaller Committee Rooms sometimes result in some informality.

As I was saying, the French are looking to readdress their laws, including things such as intercepting boats in shallow water, which to date has been neglected. That adult approach to politics and working with the French will help us to reduce the number of these boat crossings.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

In general, it is not expected that parents will be criminalised, but there is not a total ban on that. It will depend on what has happened and what the circumstances were. That will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is difficult to be more explicit about that, given that the nature of the offence represents a stricter law that is meant to deter people from making small boat crossings. It is a signal to smugglers and passengers that fatalities and injuries at sea are taken extremely seriously, so there may well be consequences for particular unacceptable behaviour of the sort that I have talked about. I would not want there to be an absolute exclusion, but I would not expect a large cohort of people to fall within the purview of the new offences.

[Matt Vickers]

I thank Members for their considered contributions. Effective international partnerships can be useful, but I would not want to deny anyone the right to scrutinise a partner on Twitter, particularly one to whom we pay so much money. The previous Government were right to toughen up on sentences for the worst offences. They were right to restrict prisoner release during the pandemic. That put pressure on the prison system, and that that is why the previous Government were also right to undertake the biggest prison building programme since the Victorian era. I realise that the Labour party did not agree, but it was right that the previous Government used the Nationality and Borders Act to increase the penalty for people smugglers to a life sentence.

[Tom Hayes]

I was going to allow that statement to go by, because lunch is near and I am quite hungry, but I am hungrier still for the truth. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept the validity of independent assessments of our prison system—the system that this Labour Government inherited—as near to collapse? For him to claim otherwise is farcical, and I hope he will withdraw that.

[Matt Vickers]

I repeat exactly what I said: the previous Government were right to toughen up those sentences and make those who are guilty of some of the worst offences stay longer in prison. They were right not to release people during the pandemic, and therefore they were right to have the biggest prison-building programme since the Victorian era; that is a fact. It was also right that the previous Government used the Nationality and Borders Act to create life sentences for people smugglers. The vile criminals who profit from the peril of others deserve nothing less. That is why it is right to increase the sentence for this offence, as set out in amendments 15 and 16, to deter people from engaging in this awful, vile and inhumane trade. I will press amendments 17, 15 and 16 to a vote—

[Tom Hayes]

Just before the hon. Gentleman does so, there was a question about why the proposed sentence length of 14 years was hit on. I wonder whether he might wish to illuminate us.

[Matt Vickers]

As I said in my opening remarks, that has to be a deterrent. This is a damp squib Bill. If people come to this country illegally—if they break in—there should be real consequences. If they put other people’s lives at risk, there should be real consequences. I think we have proposed the right sentence, and Committee Members can now have their say on it.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Antisocial Behaviour and Illegal Bikes

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Wednesday 5th March 2025 Westminster Hall

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I would like to thank you, Dr Murrison, for chairing today’s debate. I would also like to congratulate the hon. Member for Tipton and Wednesbury (Antonia Bance) on securing this important debate. I think the last time this debate was had might actually have been the time that I brought it as a Back Bencher. We were having the same debates then, but it is clear from the contributions that the challenges posed by the misuse of off-road bikes are having an increasing impact in areas right across the country.

In my own constituency of Stockton West, the nature of incidents and crimes involving the misuse of bikes varies, but in all instances they have huge consequences. I have heard stories of people looking to enjoy some of Stockton’s beautiful green spaces and parks, only to be intimidated and threatened by teenagers on off-road bikes, riding incredibly close at incredibly high speeds. I have heard from pensioners kept awake all night by the racket of balaclava-clad yobs flying around residential areas, creating fear and havoc with no regard for others.

[Shaun Davies (Telford) (Lab)]

In the last year that the Conservatives were in power, off-roads bike incidents went up by 60% in my Telford constituency. The pathetic spectacle of police officers having to issue warnings to these yobs was at the heart of it. Does the hon. Gentleman want to apologise now for not reforming the police system to remove that?

[Matt Vickers]

That will teach me to take an intervention. I think, actually, one of the big problems is that off-road bike incidents are not recorded in a way that allows us to properly measure what is going on, where they are and what the response is. I think the best thing that was done at the back end of the last Administration was putting more police on the streets than ever before. That was a good thing.

[Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Matt Vickers]

I will carry on; I want to make some progress.

Cycle lanes and footpaths running through residential areas of Stockton West have become a crime speedway, used by those dealing drugs and committing thefts and other such crimes to move quickly under cover. Efforts to tackle the issue have seen motorbike inhibitors put in place, police use of drones and community-derived intelligence to locate and confiscate bikes.

The examples that I referred to, both in and around the constituency, reflect a broader national problem. As I understand it, the police have the power, under section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, to seize vehicles, including off-road bikes that are used antisocially. That applies when a vehicle is used in a careless and inconsiderate manner, or in a way that causes alarm, distress or annoyance. A vehicle can also be seized under different provisions if it is being driven without insurance.

There are additional powers in other pieces of legislation. For example, anyone who rides a quad bike on a footpath, bridleway or restricted bridleway is guilty of an offence under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. In addition, provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1988 make it illegal to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle on land where permission has not been granted.

I welcome the changes coming forward in the Crime and Policing Bill, in an effort to make it easier for the police to remove vehicles without warnings. That appears to be a sensible measure. However it will be important to assess the impact of the legislation once implemented. Does the Minister intend to collect data on these offences to assess the policy’s effectiveness? Will she also give further consideration to some of the changes proposed by the hon. Members for Hartlepool (Mr Brash) and for North Durham (Luke Akehurst)?

We already have a range of laws prohibiting much of this activity, which is why allowing the quicker confiscation of these bikes is a logical step. However, much depends on how the police allocate their resources to tackle the issue. As the Minister will be aware, there is a wide array of methods used to police off-road bikes. Ironically these have included providing police with their own off-road vehicles, using similar bikes to the ones they work tirelessly to confiscate. Forces such as Greater Manchester have also attempted to use data and hotspot policing effectively, so as to be in the right place at the right time. Meanwhile, intelligence-led pre-emptive raids have also been conducted by police forces across the country.

I will not take up the House’s time by running through the results of each of those approaches, but they highlight the ability of local police forces to develop strategies best suited to their areas. However, as we routinely discuss, police funding plays a significant role in their effectiveness. As we know, at the time of the last election, there were more police on the streets than ever before. Police services now face a shortfall of almost £118 million, which will put a strain on officer numbers and undermines the ability of police to confiscate more of these vehicles.

Does the Minister believe police forces will have the resources and flexibility to direct investment into this issue? As we know, in many cases police forces confiscate bikes only to sell them back on to the market as a source of revenue. What are the Government doing to prevent those bikes from falling back into the hands of those who would once again use them illegally or antisocially?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Would everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on declarations of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament.

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

The Board

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 6 states:

“The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”

It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented?

Subsection (6) states:

“The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.”

Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him.

There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.

The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity. The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security.

The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander. However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally.

I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Delegation by the Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that

“The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.”

This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything.

There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 8 allows for an interim Border Security Commander to be designated. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that this is essentially a stopgap either because a Border Security Commander is going to step down without a replacement yet secured, or for reasons of temporary incapacity to carry out their functions.

Subsection (2) specifies that the interim Border Security Commander can be designated

for such period as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”

I would like the Minister to explain whether there is a limit to what could be regarded as appropriate. This is, on the face of it, a temporary measure, so what counts as temporary for these purposes? What are the safeguards against an interim appointment carrying on indefinitely?

Subsection (3) says that the temporary designation can last no

“longer than the period for which no Commander is designated or (as the case may be) the Commander is incapacitated or unavailable”,

but no time limit is set out in the Bill. Are there any minimum qualifications the Minister would expect an interim commander to have?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.

Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Supplying articles for use in immigration crime

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Will everyone please ensure that they have switched off any electronic devices or turned them to silent mode?

We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection grouping for today’s sitting is available in the room or on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. The purpose of the grouping is to limit, in so far as possible, the repetition of the same points in debate. The amendments appear on the amendment paper in the order in which they relate to the Bill.

A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. In the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called to speak first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments, new clauses or schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause to speak again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or the new clause or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendment in a group, including grouped clauses and new schedules, they need to let me know.

I hope that that brief explanation is helpful. I remind Members about the rules on declaring interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

Clause 1

The Border Security Commander

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out

“designate a civil servant as the”

and insert “appoint a”.

This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 1 and 2 stand part.

[Matt Vickers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The subject of this Bill is incredibly important to this country and its future. I hope that, during the next two weeks, the Committee will give us a constructive opportunity for the consideration and strengthening of the Bill.

Let me briefly outline our first amendment. Clause 1 creates the Border Security Commander as a statutory office holder, and requires that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander. As Tony Smith, former director general of the UK Border Force, said in evidence to the Committee:

“I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]

That is why we tabled amendment 10, which would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

The status of the Border Security Commander—as well as the commander’s functions and priorities, which I will come to in discussions on later amendments—is crucial if the role is to be in any way meaningful. As the Minister is aware, there are organisations that do not require civil servants to run them. Such a structure ensures their independence and reduces the internal day-to-day political struggles that can easily be imposed on them. Allowing recruitment from outside the civil service may also provide a wider talent pool and prevent the role from being relegated to that of yet another senior civil servant in the Department. We heard evidence about the wide array of roles in the Home Office already. The amendment would highlight the clear distinction between existing positions and the importance of securing our borders.

I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the following questions. Why have the Government decided that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant? What is the operational benefit of that decision? Why would the Border Security Commander not benefit from greater independence? What level of seniority will the Border Security Commander have? In evidence to the Committee, Tony Smith assumed that the post would likely be a director general. Is he correct? If so, why have the Government made that decision? Fundamentally, if Mr Smith is correct and the Border Security Commander cannot actually command anything—we will discuss that in detail when we come to later amendments—what is the point of the position?

Clause 2 sets out that the Border Security Commander must

“hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Commander’s designation,”

and that the

“terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

That is all the information we get. Will the Minister explain what the terms and conditions of a designation as commander will be? Let us compare the situation of the Border Security Commander, who is allegedly responsible for the security of our border, with that of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out that the commissioner has to be suitably qualified; will the Minister explain why no such requirement appears to exist in the legislation for the Border Security Commander? What would count as suitable qualifications for someone to take up the post of commander?

If the Secretary of State determines that a person’s designation as commander should be terminated, the Secretary of State must give the commander a written explanation of the reasons, give them an opportunity to make written representations and consider those before making a final decision. That seems sensible and in line with other positions, such as the Met Commissioner, that ought to be vaguely comparable in terms of responsibility.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you chairing our proceedings, Dr Murrison, and I look forward to many hours of that—as I am sure you do.

I will set out what clauses 1 and 2 do and hopefully persuade the Committee that amendment 10 is not required. The clauses set out the role of the Border Security Commander and detail the terms and conditions under which they hold the office. The purpose of the Opposition’s amendment 10 is to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander be a civil servant. The hon. Member for Stockton West—I will learn all Members’ constituencies by the time we get to the end—seemed to say that he thought there was operational benefit in complete independence. I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but there is also benefit in co-ordination and in being attached to a central strategic point. The Government believe that that attachment, rather than total independence for the sake of it, is more likely to be effective.

Amendment 10 implies that the Border Security Commander should not be a civil servant. The role of the commander is a civil service role and the Border Security Command is a directorate within the Home Office. In a future recruitment exercise, existing civil servants could be appointed or the role could be advertised externally. Under the arrangements in clause 1 there is no limit one way or the other on where the Border Security Commander might come from—they could be internal or external. I hope that is some reassurance.

The mechanism of appointment is a civil service recruitment campaign to ensure that the best candidate is selected on merit. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and leads the functions of a directorate in the Department, it is logical that the role would be a civil service role. The idea is to cohere, not to fragment the work that is done. I see it very much as ensuring that all the cogs across Government connect with one another, so that when we turn the wheel we get something out at the end, rather than having a load of cogs that do not connect, which would not lead to a more effective outcome.

Clause 1 sets out that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the commander and will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that resources are available to support them in exercising their functions. The Bill will place the Border Security Commander on a statutory footing, which will future-proof and solidify the role and ensure a clear direction and leadership for the UK’s border security system. Placing the Border Security Commander under this new legal framework is a clear signal of our determination to tackle organised immigration crime by going after the criminals who put lives at risk and undermine our border security.

Clause 2 details the commander’s terms and conditions and how they will hold, maintain and vacate the office. This clarity is necessary to ensure continuity in the role, and it underlines the Government’s commitment to making the Border Security Commander an enduring office.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. I want to take on a principled point that I have heard levelled by the hon. Member for Stockton West and other Conservative Members today and on Second Reading, which is that the Border Security Commander cannot command. It is really important to address that point.

From 2018 to 2023, we saw the number of small boat arrivals increase from 299 to 29,500. That is a hundredfold increase. As I understand it, some of the explanation given by the Conservatives is that the matter became very complicated, and we were seeing an increase in organised crime activity. To their credit, that was reinforced by the director general of the National Crime Agency, Rob Jones, who said

“The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants”.––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]

Those were just some of the things he highlighted.

If we acknowledge that the present Government face a more complicated situation, we should agree that it will involve a suite of tools. As Rob Jones said,

“There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems”. ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]

Sarah Dineley, the deputy chief Crown prosecutor, concurred with her colleagues and said:

“I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 30, Q28.]

Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for organised immigration crime, highlighted the same point.

If the situation is so complex and there is a need for the suite of tools that are being strengthened by this Bill, surely there is a need for greater co-ordination. Greater co-ordination will surely help to fix some of the strategic challenges that our immigration system and asylum system have faced in recent years. To co-ordinate is to command, and it is crucial we accept that point. If we do not, we will not be able to tackle the backlog we face, we will not be able to implement the measures in the Bill and we will not be able to secure our borders.

Amendments have been tabled in relation to aspects of the Border Security Commander role, but I am not entirely certain whether the Conservative party supports the role of Border Security Commander at all. On Second Reading, we heard colleagues asking what Martin Hewitt is doing with his time. I would welcome the hon. Member for Stockton West explaining whether the Conservative party does in fact support the role of Border Security Commander and Border Security Command. We heard clearly from those who gave oral testimony, who are operationally focused, experienced and expert in their field, about the necessity of such a command. Indeed, Enver Solomon, the chief executive of the Refugee Council, summed it up well when he said that

“the Border Security Command is an understandable response.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 5, Q1.]

[Matt Vickers]

We will discuss when we come to the next group of amendments the aims and objectives of this role, and the fact that if we are going to have a Border Security Commander, they should have a very meaningful role that can make a real difference. I would like to press on clause 2 of the Bill, which talks about

“The terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee what those terms and conditions of designation might be? As I mentioned, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out how the Met commissioner must be suitably qualified. What sort of qualifications could we expect to see in a commander and what will those terms and conditions be?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.

It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.

The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Functions of the Commander

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 29, at end insert—

“(1A) In exercising the Commander’s functions, the Commander must have full regard to the provisions of—

(a) the Human Rights Act 1998; and

(b) the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.”

This amendment would confirm that the Commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Action against Trafficking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

Police Scotland has a chief constable who is in charge, but in “Scot Squad”, Commissioner Miekelson is a chief commissioner. It is only right that we point out these distinctions; there is a significant difference between that mythical, fictional character and the reality of the role of chief constable, which is very efficiently and effectively looked after by the current inhabitant of that post.

I know you want me to get on to the particular amendment, Dr Murrison, so thank you for your forbearance and patience. My amendment confirms that the,

“Commander must have full regard to…the Human Rights Act 1998; and…the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking”.

The Minister is likely to tell me that none of that is necessary as human rights compliance is already implicit with Government operations. However, without these explicit legal mandates and safeguards, all of that can be overlooked. If the Minister is asking us to agree to 12 clauses at the outset of a Committee for an important Bill, relating to a job that is already being done, surely we can agree that one of these functions should be about the observance of our very important international obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.

I do not think anybody is opposed to the border commander; I know there are a few jokes about his comparison to Chief Miekelson, but all of us agree that the Minister is establishing a necessary and useful role. I do not think, even though she was trying to chide her Conservative colleagues, that there was much disagreement from anybody on whether this is a useful role that could help bring together quite a lot of the structure and infrastructure that is responsible for operating our border security. There is a discussion about a lot of his tasks being administrative. There is nothing wrong with that, but for something as important as this, everybody would like to think that where there is administration, it will be effective and put in place in a way that we could look at it.

However, we need further clarity on the roles, functions and responsibilities of the border commander. Clause 3 is supposed to be the place where we find all of those things, but the one thing that the clause does not do is outline fully, perfectly, roundly and coherently what the actual functions of the border commander will be. Even if we look very carefully in all the different subsections, it does not say much about what he is expected to do. It lists a number of administrative responsibilities he will have, which is fair and fine, but all of us discussing the role of the border commander in the Committee would like to understand what he will be doing—what are his jobs, what are his functions, what responsibilities will he have, how will these things be discharged, and how will he be open to the type of scrutiny that we, as Members of this House, require?

There are provisions that seem to speak about the functions without actually identifying any of them. The only place where we can find objectives in clause 3 is subsection (1), but they are only objectives to which the commander must have regard. That is important. It just says he must “have regard” to the particular responsibilities that are outlined in the subsections. Subsections (7) to (9) are particularly interesting because they seem to suggest that people smuggling and human trafficking to the UK are to be regard as threats to border security. That seems fair enough; most of the Bill is about the perceived threat—disrupting networks and tackling the gangs that operate their vile trade across the channel.

Here is the thing: the people who board these boats are subject to the constraints imposed by these gangs and are at their mercy. They are controlled and reliant. Those people are totally and utterly ignored in the subsections in clause 3. Their realities—their need and right to seek safety, reunite with family and escape situations of extreme deprivation—are ignored, even though they have everything to do with the responsibilities and functions of the commander. As a matter of principle, then, it is vital that the Bill should be amended so that the Border Security Commander has regard to objectives concerned with respecting human life and dignity, and that must include specific shared obligations to provide asylum to people fleeing persecution and to enable victims of human trafficking to have security and safety from their enslavement.

There are concerns that, if border enforcement strategies do not include these protections for vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery, trafficking victims will enter further cycles of exploitation. In prioritising enforcement over protection, as the Bill does almost exclusively, we risk wrongfully criminalising victims of trafficking and failing to identify those in need of urgent intervention—or, worst of all, sending them back to their exploiters. If we stand by our commitments under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, the Bill should ensure that the commander respects those obligations too.

As we have discussed, the commander is a civil servant. I have taken no great view on that, and I listened carefully to the exchanges about the civil service role, but I have a couple of concerns in relation to my amendment 1 that I would like the Minister to address. The civil service code does not give a clear, enforceable duty to respect the UK’s obligations under international law. I am pretty certain that the Minister will tell me that there is a general obligation to comply with the law and our international obligations, as that is expected and anticipated in everything that the Government do through all their responsibilities and actions.

However, I refer the Minister to the recent case in the High Court. That was, of course, R (on the application of FDA) v. Minister for the Cabinet Office and others. I think the Government actually won that court case, which meant that any of the civil servants who were involved in compiling regulations had to abide by the legislative context but did not have to oblige and comply with the international obligations. At best, it is unclear, so I ask the Minister to clarify: will the Border Security Commander, who will be a civil servant, always be obliged—totally and utterly—to fully respect all our international obligations, particularly those around the HRA and the ECAT?

Without those specific obligations in the Bill, the Border Security Commander will be presumed always to prioritise enforcement over vital legal protection, potentially leading to human rights violations. Although the commander is required to comply with instructions set by the Home Secretary, which again I think everybody would accept is right and appropriate, they are not explicitly required to comply with the UK’s human rights obligations. For me, that is totally wrong, and it completely skews the whole modus operandi of our Border Security Commander and features of the Bill. I will come back to that as the Bill progresses.

We need to see this change to the Bill. We have 12 clauses and various subsections dedicated to the role and the functions of the commander. Let us have one—just one—that says that he must be prepared and obliged always to act in line with all of our obligations on international responsibility, being a good international actor, being a place that is recognised for exemplary human rights requirements and being signed up to the HRA and to ECAT. Let us put that in the Bill.

[Matt Vickers]

I have not come across Chief Commissioner Miekelson before, but I will endeavour to catch up on Netflix or iPlayer.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are all going to be doing that.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 3 sets out the functions of the Border Security Commander. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), correctly pointed out on Second Reading that the new Border Security Commander

“cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report…the Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 69.]

According to the legislation, the functions of the commander

“must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security, for the purpose of minimising such threats, and…maximising the coordination of those activities for that purpose.”

That sounds suspiciously like a co-ordinator, rather than a commander. That is exactly what the legislation states: the commander does not appear to be empowered by the Bill to command anyone.

Subsection (5) defines a partner authority as a

“public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”,

but—in subsection (6)—

“not…the Security Service…the Secret Intelligence Service”

or “GCHQ”.

Will the Minister confirm what is meant by partner authorities? Does she have a list of likely organisations that the Border Security Commander should be able to direct co-operation with? How far does she think that the Border Security Commander will be able to have an impact on public authorities abroad? For example, what role might French law enforcement be expected to play in having regard to the commander’s strategic priority document?

The Opposition have tabled amendment 13, which would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities, specifically Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, police and crime commissioners and the National Crime Agency. Ideally, we would like the Border Security Commander to have a meaningful role and the ability to direct other agencies. As the Government seem unwilling to do that, however, we thought it might be possible for the Home Secretary to give the Border Security Commander a little support.

If the Minister does not want to accept amendment 13, I would like to understand why not. Why do the Government seem willing to allow the commander only to co-ordinate, rather than to command? Why could the Home Secretary not add some additional impetus?

The clause requires the Border Security Commander to issue a strategic priority document that sets out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the threats to the border identified by the commander. We have tabled amendment 12 to ensure that the strategic priority document supports the Home Office’s UK border strategy. We are attempting to ensure that the Border Security Commander is aligned with the rest of the Home Office’s work to secure the border. I am interested to understand why the Minister is not willing to accept that amendment.

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. Given the representations made by the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Weald of Kent, something seems strange and I would appreciate an explanation. The hon. Member for Stockton West is speaking to amendment 12 and the necessity of supporting the Home Office’s UK border strategy. Given the hon. Member’s comments about the Border Security Commander having a role within the civil service, why does he want the commander to adhere to the Home Office’s UK border strategy, which is headed up by a director general who is a civil servant?

[Matt Vickers]

If we are to have such a position, we want it to be effective and have the relevant powers, but we also want it to be aligned with the other priorities of the Home Office and the work going on there. I think that is clear.

Amendment 11 would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing the strategic priority document. We would like to understand the operational benefits of the Secretary of State having to sign off the strategic priority document, which again highlights the lack of a meaningful role for the Border Security Commander. Although the strategic policy document should set out what are, in the commander’s view, the principal threats to border security and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard, in reality the document is a diktat from the Secretary of State about the Secretary of State’s views, and that arguably exposes a lack of influence and gravitas in the Border Security Commander’s role.

Allowing the commander to issue a strategic priority document without seeking prior permission from the Secretary of State would provide a welcome level of independence for the role. The oversight and consultation of the board would ensure confidence in the Border Security Commander’s ability to take all necessary steps to stop the crossings. There may be occasions when the commander believes it is necessary to act swiftly and to implement changes without delay. Removing the requirement to have ministerial consent would allow them to act decisively. That approach, I am sure, could subsequently be supported by the Secretary of State.

[Chris Murray]

What, then, is the hon. Gentleman’s view of how UKBA functioned? In her testimony, Theresa May said that, where it had that kind of independence, it became “closed, secretive and defensive”, and she had to completely restructure UK border defence because the independence that the hon. Gentleman is talking about actually made it difficult for Ministers to have proper oversight.

[Matt Vickers]

When we talk about the Border Security Commander role, if we think it is going to “smash the gangs”, sort out all these problems and play a huge part in creating a secure border for this country, it is important that we allow it some element of independence and gravitas. We have talked about the commander being tied into the strategic priorities of the Home Office, but this amendment is about empowering them to make the difference that we want them to make. We want them to succeed.

As I was saying, removing that requirement would allow the Border Security Commander to act decisively. We must avoid unnecessary bureaucratic wrangling and ensure that, in this critical matter, they have the freedom they need to deliver results.

[Tom Hayes]

I have two quick points. First, the hon. Member talked about whether the Border Security Commander could somehow command or direct the activities of our international partners. I would highlight that this Government have strengthened and created the new international arrangements that have made it possible for us to start to secure and securitise our borders. It is important not to pretend that the history of what has happened did not happen; we should realise that we need to have close international ties.

Secondly, I am listening closely to the hon. Member’s suggestions for how the role could be improved. Is he proposing these amendments because the current office holder, Martin Hewitt, is not discharging the office in the way that he would like? Could he comment on whether he thinks that Martin Hewitt is doing a good job or a less-than-good job, and whether he thinks that the Border Security Commander role, as it is currently being discharged, is satisfactory?

[Matt Vickers]

At some point, Martin Hewitt will be superseded. We want to make sure that whoever is in this role is in the best possible position to do the best possible job. I do not think that these measures are necessarily about Martin Hewitt’s effectiveness or otherwise; they are about this post and its fundamental role—well, its apparent fundamental role—in delivering border security for this country.

[Tom Hayes]

It is not about Martin Hewitt’s professional competence or his ability as a person to do the role; it is about the role itself. Based on how the role has been configured, does the hon. Member believe that the present office holder is discharging the role well, with the responsibilities given, or is he proposing these measures because he believes that somehow the role is lacking?

[Matt Vickers]

I think there is an opportunity to strengthen this role so that it can provide that real fundamental change that we are apparently looking for in this Bill. I would not necessarily want to comment on the individual.

We have tabled new clause 21 to set out some clear and measurable objectives for the Border Security Commander, to attempt to give this co-ordinator some clear direction. New clause 21 would set out that, in exercising their functions, the commander

“must have regard to the objectives of…preventing the boarding of vessels, with the aim of entering the United Kingdom, by persons who require leave to enter the United Kingdom but are seeking to enter the United Kingdom…without leave to enter, or…with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception”.

In effect, we want it in black and white in the Bill that the commander will be given the objective of reducing illegal entry to the country, and that is what new clause 21 would achieve.

Since 2018, when the figures were first recorded, more than 150,000 people have arrived in small boats. As of 29 January, 1,098 people had crossed the channel since the start of 2025. In 2024 as a whole, 36,816 people were detected making the crossing. I would like to understand why the Government do not think it is worthwhile to give the Border Security Commander the direct objective of reducing or even ending those arrivals.

We also wish to ensure that those who arrive in this country illegally will not be able to stay. We know that effective returns agreements work as a deterrent. When in government, we cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by more than 90%, thanks to our returns agreement. In 2022, 12,658 Albanian illegal migrants arrived in the UK by small boat, but that fell to just 924 in 2023, following our landmark returns agreement with Albania.

We have therefore included in new clause 21 the objective for the Border Security Commander to ensure that a decision on a claim by a person who has arrived in the UK illegally is taken within six months of the person’s arrival, and for the commander to make arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of people who enter the UK illegally. It is up to the Government to put in place an effective deterrent to people crossing the channel in small boats.

[Mike Tapp]

I find it quite astounding that there are any claims of success from the Opposition, given that we saw 299 people cross in 2018 and then an exponential rise of over 130,000 on the Conservatives’ watch. The hon. Gentleman is talking about a deterrent, but four people went to Rwanda and over 80,000 people crossed when that scheme had been introduced.

Importantly, the whole system in the Home Office had completely ground to a halt. There is another deterrent that was overlooked by the Conservatives during their tenure, and that is having a process that actually functions. We now have record high deportations, and as that message cuts through to people who are looking to cross, it will start to serve as a deterrent.

[Matt Vickers]

I thought that we would get a bit further through the Bill before we got into records. In real terms, there has been a marked increase in the number of people coming here since this Government took office—small boat crossings are up by 28%. We now have 8,500 more people staying in hotels across the country—up by nearly 29%. We were closing hotels. The hon. Member talks about the number of people being deported, but they are voluntarily going back. In real terms, the number of people who have arrived on small boats being returned went down, and in the most recent figures, it has gone down again. We have not been sending back those people who have arrived in small boats since this Government took office—that is just not the case.

[Mike Tapp]

I thank the hon. Member for giving way again; I will not make a habit of it. It is important to realise that the processing of those who come into Western Jet Foil and then Manston takes time, but of course they will be deported, if they are not genuine refugees, once the system gets there.

It is also important to note something else. Being the Member of Parliament for Dover and Deal, I often look out across the sea, and I can tell when it is a good day to cross and when it is not. On those days when it is viable to cross, crossings have reduced. The Conservatives were relying only on the weather to bring down boat crossings.

[Matt Vickers]

I think, in the last week, we have found that the only thing that this Government are relying on is the weather, but I will carry on. I am sure we will come back to all these things in due course; it is good to be discussing them here instead of on a news channel somewhere.

As the Government are repealing the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 with this Bill, we want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is empowered to ensure that all relevant agencies are working towards taking timely decisions on any claims by illegal immigrants, and removing those who enter the UK illegally.

[Becky Gittins]

I applaud the hon. Gentleman’s comments about a timely turnaround in the processing of asylum claims—something that really concerns Government Members with regard to the IMA and the Rwanda Act. Could he tell me what proportion of asylum claims under the previous Government were processed within the six-month period stipulated in this new clause?

[Matt Vickers]

I could not, but I could tell the hon. Lady that the backlog is even bigger now than it was when this Government took office.

If the Government were serious about tackling illegal crossings and creating an effective deterrent, they would support new clause 21. We also want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is transparent with the public about how best to stop illegal and dangerous channel crossings, which is why this new clause includes a requirement for the commander to make an assessment of the most effective methods for deterring illegal entry into the UK, the most effective methods for reducing the number of sea crossings made by individuals without leave to enter the UK, and the most effective methods for arranging the removal, to the person’s own country or a safe third country, of a person who enters the UK illegally. Again, if the Government were serious about protecting borders, they would support the new clause.

Clause 9 specifies that the Border Security Commander must

“comply with directions given by the Secretary of State about the exercise of the Commander’s functions under this Chapter.”

Can the Minister explain what sort of guidance the Secretary of State is likely to want to give the commander? Can she explain how the Secretary of State wishes to exercise the powers in the clause?

The SNP’s amendment 1 would confirm that the commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Given that the commander’s role, as drafted by the Government, includes no real power or responsibility, I am not sure what that amendment would actually achieve.

[Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The Liberal Democrats would like to introduce new clause 7, because we want to strengthen cross-border co-operation and Britain’s role in that process. We also believe that we need to reverse some of the last Government’s roll-back of provisions to tackle gangs involved in modern slavery. The new clause would require the border commander to meet the executive director of Europol every three months, which would help to achieve those goals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I can certainly assure the hon. Lady that I recognise the import of what she is trying to do with the new clause. Often, such proposals are hooks to hang a debate on, so that there can be a little more information about the Government’s intent. I can assure her that having close operational and diplomatic liaison across all the different structures we have to work with to deal with cross-border immigration crime is absolutely at the centre of what the Border Security Commander will want to do. When we come to it, I hope she will not press her new clause to a vote.

[Matt Vickers]

The contrast is interesting. The Opposition want to see a Border Security Commander independently empowered to make meaningful changes to secure the border, rather than another civil servant muted by political oversight. There is a big contrast in perspective in terms of whether a Home Secretary should be signing off on anything anyone in this huge role—which will make a difference to our borders—will be able to say. Secondly, I would like to understand why the Government do not think it worth the Border Security Commander having the objective of reducing or even ending small boat crossings.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.

Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.

The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Does the shadow Minister wish to press any of his amendments to a vote?

[Matt Vickers]

If we are to have a Border Security Commander, we want an effective one who can publish a strategy without being subject to a political veto, who has priorities aligned to the UK border strategy, and whom Home Secretaries can direct agencies to follow. We wish to press the amendments to a Division.

Amendment proposed: 12, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—

“(2A) The strategic priority document issued under subsection (2) must support the Home Office’s UK Border Strategy.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This amendment would require that the Border Security Commander’s strategic priority document supports the UK Border Strategy.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

I will not detain the Committee for long. Amendment 2 covers the same sort of terrain as my amendment 1, which sought to ensure that the Border Security Commander takes cognisance of international obligations, most notably in relation to human rights and the provisions of the European convention on action against trafficking. Amendment 2 would require the commander, when making the annual report, to make reference to his compliance, in the work that he has done, with the Human Rights Act and with ECAT. That is all I am asking. There is no good reason why that cannot be included as part of the commander’s annual accounting to the House of Commons. That would give us an opportunity to understand how part of his work has been in ensuring that those obligations have been met, and I think it would be a worthy inclusion in his annual report. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 4 would give the Border Security Commander a duty to prepare annual reports, which must state how the commander has carried out their functions in that financial year and set out the commander’s view on the performance of the border security system that year, with particular reference to the commander’s strategic priorities. That all seems very vague, and a case of the Border Security Commander being allowed to mark their own homework.

Can the Minister explain what success would look like for the Border Security Commander? What are the measurable key performance indicators that the Home Secretary will consider? That is important because the Secretary of State, as set out in clause 2, can dismiss the commander. What would constitute poor enough performance for that to happen, and what would be a success?

To try to inject some objectivity and accountability into the process of annual reports, we have tabled amendment 14. We would like the Border Security Commander to report on the number of persons who have, since the later of the passing of the Bill or the last annual report, been charged or convicted of offences under clause 13, “Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”; clause 14, “Handling articles for use in immigration crime”; clause 18, “Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom”; or clause 43, “Articles for use in serious crime”. We want to know how effective the new offences will be in practice for achieving the Government’s aim of stopping illegal immigration.

The Government’s own impact assessment admits that very few people will go to prison as a result of the measures in the Bill. On the proposals to strengthen and improve the function of serious crime prevention orders, it says:

“It is estimated that between zero and three prison places, with a central estimate of one prison place will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

On introducing an interim serious crime prevention order, it says:

“It is estimated that between 0 and 1.54 prison places, with a central estimate of 0.2 prison place will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

On serious and organised crime articles, it says:

“It is estimated that between four and six prison places, with a central estimate of five prison places will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

On new offences to criminalise the making, adapting, importing, supplying, offering to supply and possession of articles for use in serious crime, it says:

“It is estimated that between four and six prison places, with a central estimate of five prison places will be required per year once the steady state is reached.”

It is important to report on the new offences relating to immigration crime, which the Government think will not send a meaningful number of people to prison, and also on the new offence of endangering lives at sea, for which the impact assessment includes no estimate. Can the Minister confirm how many people the Government expect each year to be arrested, convicted and imprisoned under the new offence of endangering lives at sea?

[Tom Hayes]

I am wondering about the intent behind that question. Is the hon. Member concerned about the availability of prison spaces?

[Matt Vickers]

We want to see how effective the offences will be. The Government have set that out in part, but not for the new offence of endangering lives at sea, which has great consequence.

Amendment 14 would also require the Border Security Commander to report on the number of people identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain; how many of them are detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation; and how many are deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen, or to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted. We believe it is important to have transparency about the role of the Border Security Commander in facilitating removals. If they are charged with minimising threats to the border, removing those who enter this country illegally with no reason to remain is a big part of successfully achieving that objective.

[Mike Tapp]

It is important to note that measures of success can change. Legislating for that might mean that, in a decade, we are wasting the time of the Border Security Command and its commander. My understanding of statistics and their collection is that that is for the Home Office and the Office for National Statistics. Of course, as those who are prosecuted go through the courts, we will all be able to see that.

There may also be a slight misunderstanding about what a prevention order is and what it aims to do. It is a disruptive measure that can be used before charge to stop the vile smuggling criminals from operating. If and when they go to prison, that means that they have breached that order. The fact that the estimate is low means that there is confidence in the prevention orders succeeding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats, which requires a whole of Government response and will be enabled by the clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partners across the system are working in lockstep to enhance border security, while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners beyond border security matters.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 5 provides that a partner authority has duties, so far as is “appropriate and reasonably practicable,” to co-operate with the commander in carrying out the commander’s functions. It would be helpful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by

“so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable”

and under what circumstances it might be justified for a partner authority not to co-operate. Does it mean, as per subsection (2), that the partner authority would co-operate only so far as the co-operation was compatible with the exercise of its other functions, or are there other circumstances where partner authorities might not have to co-operate?

Again, the clause exposes how powerless the Border Security Commander is. The commander cannot actually command any of these partner authorities to do anything at all. Subsection (3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have—

[The Chair]

Order.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We have until 2.40 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves briefly for the record?

Rob Jones: I am Rob Jones, the director general of operations for the National Crime Agency.

Sarah Dineley: My name is Sarah Dineley, and I am head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead on organised immigration crime.

Jim Pearce: Good afternoon. I am Assistant Chief Constable Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on organised immigration crime.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Q28 What is the single biggest thing the Government could be doing to drive down illegal arrivals, and what could we be doing to aid your agency in doing its job?

Rob Jones: There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems; you need a range of measures that concurrently bear down on them. The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants; and those who are closer, in near-Europe, who are involved in it. From an organised crime perspective, it is about concurrent pressure in a number of areas to make the incentives for being involved in organised immigration crime no longer viable.

Jim Pearce: From my perspective, you need to look at this at both ends of the scale. What we are probably thinking about at the moment is prosecution and putting people through the courts. Actually, we know that, in other thematic serious and organised crime, prevention and early intervention work just as effectively. We would call that disruption. Disrupting the patterns, and the ways of working that Rob just described, earlier would obviously prevent victims from becoming victims in the end. It is the 4P approach, which I am sure most of you have heard of. It is about working from neighbourhood policing, with a local factor, in order to gather intelligence, and putting that into the system all the way up through our regional crime units and into the National Crime Agency and high-end prosecution, international and online.

Sarah Dineley: I concur with my two colleagues. I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero. It is about having a suite of measures—whether they are prosecutorial or disruptive in nature—that taken together will allow the prosecution and law enforcement teams to work together to tackle the gangs. It is always important to remember that a criminal justice outcome is not necessarily the right outcome; there are other outcomes that can tackle organised immigration crime and gangs effectively.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there further specific measures to strengthen the hand of your agency that you would like to see in the Bill?

Sarah Dineley: From a prosecution point of view, I would say it is a matter for the legislators to decide what legislation they feel is appropriate. The Bill as drafted does add to the toolkit of measures we have available.

Rob Jones: From my perspective, the measures that make the most difference and are the most significant in tackling the organised crime element are on preparatory acts, in clauses 13 to 16. They give us the ability to be pre-emptive, proactive and very disruptive, giving us something we have not had before—the ability to act before people actually commit an offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, which is the facilitation offence. That is an important opportunity, because we are driven by trying to reduce the highest-risk crossings and trying to prevent crossings. We would not choose to react to crossings and then investigate; we want to act as quickly as we can. These measures create the ability to do that—to go much sooner, have more impact, and build momentum, so that the people who are behind these attempts really start to feel the pressure.

Jim Pearce: In addition, the Bill provides the opportunity to increase clarity and focus, with the ability to gain information and intelligence through the seizure of electronic devices, for example. I know this is controversial. Being able to do that with a very clear power to search, seize and then download, as opposed to potentially—I am not saying this has happened—misusing existing powers, will give clarity because you can say to an operational police officer, immigration officer, or a member of the National Crime Agency, “This is what you use in order to get that defined intelligence at the end.”

[Matt Vickers]

Q What concerns, if any, do you have about the Bill as drafted?

Jim Pearce: From a policing point of view, there would be insurance around safeguarding. For the electronic devices, for example, I understand the benefits that would come from the counter-terrorism-style powers to be able to seize electronic devices. I am confident that that is managed through the measures in place around reasonable suspicion and having to get the advice from a senior officer. It is about operationalising that, putting it into practice, and making sure that our staff understand through education and training. Any change in legislation requires training, finance and input. Those are the types of things that I would be thinking about.

Rob Jones: I agree. It is about the professional development and the guidance for officers who are using new tactics and new tools against this threat, and making sure that we are ready to go with very clear guidance on how officers should look to engage the new offences in the Bill.

Sarah Dineley: Clause 17 and one of the subsections of clause 18 create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offences, and it would be remiss of me not to highlight some of the challenges that that will bring. We have a system of judicial co-operation, something called mutual legal assistance, whereby we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level. We work very hard on building those relationships to collaborate.

To that end, the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world. Specifically, we have liaison prosecutors based in the major organised immigration crime countries—Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium—and two in France, one of whom is actually a dedicated organised immigration crime liaison prosecutor. We use them to foster and build those relationships so that we have that reciprocal exchange of information where required. That is not to say that is without its challenges. I flag that as something that we will continue to work on, but it has challenges.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Q Starting with Rob Jones, what do the witnesses think the Bill does for them operationally?

Rob Jones: It gives us the opportunity to make the most of the intelligence dividend that we have invested in tackling the threat. We have a good understanding of the people behind small boats crossings in particular, the supply of materials, the facilitation from near-Europe and further afield, but we want momentum and greater agility so that when we are aware that a crossing is being prepared—when materials are moving—we can act pre-emptively and proactively.

As I said earlier, we do not want to be investigating after thousands of people have arrived, and trying to put together very complex investigations that may involve months of covert surveillance and eavesdropping—a whole range of covert tactics—to get us over the line for a charging decision for a section 25 offence. The new offences give us the opportunity to act when we see that jigsaw puzzle coming together, to go to the CPS when we reach a tipping point and to go earlier than we can now. That means that we can pull more people through that system, deliver justice more quickly and be more disruptive in tackling the threat. That is a big step forward. That is lacking in the current toolbox to operationalise the intelligence we have.

Sarah Dineley: The endangerment offence potentially fills a gap between the current section 24 and 25 provisions. Each boat has a pilot—someone steering it across the channel—who, by the very nature and condition of those boats, the overcrowding, the lack of lifesaving equipment, and so on, puts everyone in that boat in danger of losing their life. We welcome that clause and will draft guidance on how it can be interpreted in terms of practical application.

Jim Pearce: Police officers mainly deal with the inland clandestine events as opposed to the small boats. From my point of view, it would be, correctly, common practice to use schedule 2(17) of the Immigration Act 1971 to detain migrants and then pass them into the immigration system. On searches after that, yes, there are powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 after that provision under section 32, but that is mainly to safeguard; it is not to seize evidence.

On Rob’s point about early intervention and intelligence gathering, the only way you gather intelligence is through what people tell you and what electronic devices give up. The Bill gives police officers the ability to gather intelligence through defined and clear powers in legislation, so that they are not misusing a PACE power, an operational procedure or anything else. That would be the biggest change for policing.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from the former director general of UK Border Force, from Migration Watch UK and from the Centre for Policy Studies. We have until 3.20 pm for this panel. Could witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Karl Williams: I am Karl Williams, the research director at the Centre for Policy Studies. I have written several reports on legal and illegal migration.

Tony Smith: Hello, my name is Tony Smith. I spent 40 years in the Home Office, between 1972 and 2013, from immigration officer right the way up to director general of UK Border Force.

Alp Mehmet: I am Alp Mehmet, chairman of Migration Watch. I am also a former diplomat and a former immigration officer.

[Matt Vickers]

Q A nice broad question: are there any provisions you would like to see added to this Bill to strengthen our ability to drive down illegal crossings?

Alp Mehmet: May I just make a few remarks? Would that be acceptable?

[The Chair]

We have a limited amount of time, so if you could answer the question, that would be great.

Alp Mehmet: I welcome the Bill in many respects. It is the sort of thing that needed to be done, and it is now happening. I welcome the co-ordination taking place across Government, and the potential co-operation with the EU and EU member states is also to be welcomed. The setting up of Border Security Command and the Border Security Commander will be helpful. My only gripe is that I strongly disagree with the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024—I think that is a mistake. I also think that repealing certain parts of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is a mistake. That is my personal view, and I am happy to explain why in a moment.

I wonder whether primary legislation was necessary to do a lot of what is happening, but we are where we are. If anything, I think repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration, or whatever we may call it, to some degree, which is unfortunate. A lot of people entering the EU—240,000 were declared to have entered illegally last year—will end up coming to us. There is no deterrence because, once they arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. I believe the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message. I do not think anything in the Bill suggests that is going to happen. That is broadly my view.

Tony Smith: Looking at the relevant clauses, the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.

I would like to see the Border Security Commander and his team have law enforcement powers so that they can arrest and detain, the same as officers in Border Force, the National Crime Agency and Immigration Enforcement. I think that whole governance structure needs attention. It needs someone to pull it all together. I am not sure we have pitched the post right in immigration law enforcement teams.

On the Border Security Commander’s reporting requirements under the Bill, I think he regularly needs to publish details of irregular arrivals by way of nationality and age, and provide regular updates on where they are in the process, so we can all see whether there are logjams in the process from arrival to either removal or grant. We can check the timelines. I think they already have a dashboard in the Home Office that does that, so I presume he will be able to take responsibility for that.

I would also like to follow up on the point that Alp Mehmet made about data on removals and the numbers of people who can currently be excluded under NABA because they have come from a safe third country. That is still there, but we do not know the data on how many of them are actually being removed on a case-by-case, so I would like to see a list of all the countries to which we can remove people: safe first countries, source countries and third countries.

We know the EU will not take third-country returns. In fact, other than Rwanda, I do not think there are any countries that will take third-country returns. There are countries that will take back their own nationals, but under this new system where we are doing away with SORA and most of the IMA, there does not seem to be a third-country outlet. Therefore, people who come here from Iran, Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan know that, from the other side of the channel, they need only get into British territorial waters and they will probably be allowed to stay in the UK. They might well get asylum, but even if they do not, it is impossible to return them for one reason or another.

I am really interested in that returns piece. I am keen on capturing data from mobile devices. Some of them keep their mobile phones. That data is being used for prosecution purposes only. I think it should be made available to officials who are considering their asylum claim. Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application. We need legislation to do that.

I would also use mobile devices to track people who are given bail so that we can use the tracker to know where they are in the event of an adverse decision from the Home Office, so that we are able to find them. At the moment, we do not have powers to do that because of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. I would like to see an amendment that enables that to happen. We know the tagging systems have not really worked. In the unlikely event that we keep SORA or the Rwanda plan—I do not expect the Government will—we really need to look at options for offshoring asylum claims from people who have arrived from a safe third country. If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you have anything to add on that, Karl?

Karl Williams: I have two brief points to reinforce what Tony was saying. It feels to me like the Bill focuses on disruption and the interdiction of routes for entering the country illegally. It does not do much on deterrence. As the impact assessment says, on pillar 3, the changes to measures for going after the gangs, it is very uncertain what the outcome will be. That is because there is no evidence base here. The only country that has succeeded in stopping small boats is Australia. There was some interdiction work with Indonesia, but it was primarily about the offshoring agreement, which was a major plank of its deterrence. I would like to see deterrence measures added, not just disruption.

Secondly, on the Border Security Command, to reinforce what Tony said, data information is really important. Migration policy, legal and illegal, has generally been bedevilled by very poor quality Government data. It seems the new Border Security Commander will have limited ability to take operational control. One thing I would like to see them have is power to access and pull together data, so that we can have a much better picture.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn at this point?

Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls.

This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Migration Watch’s website says that you are worried about population projections and a

“significant fall in the percentage of the indigenous (white British) population.”

Can you explain what your worry is, and could you define “indigenous white population”?

Alp Mehmet: First, I am a first-generation migrant. I came here as an eight-year-old. I have been here since the mid-’50s. The immigrant ethnic minority element of the population in those days was something like 4%. In the 1951 census, it was 3.9%, and it is now 25%. That has substantially happened over the last 30 years.

What worries me, if that is the right word, is the fact that people are being added to the population, and migration is the only driver of population increase at the moment. I know you have David Coleman coming up next. He will tell you a great deal more about the likely evolution of the population’s demographic mix. That is my concern. Having arrived here as a migrant, and accepted and joined this country and made it my own, I see it now changing very rapidly into something that the majority of people in this country do not want to happen.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Good afternoon. We will now hear evidence from David Coleman, emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. We have until 3.40 pm for this witness. Could you please introduce yourself briefly for the record?

David Coleman: Yes, of course. My name is David Coleman. I am emeritus professor of demography at the University of Oxford. I have been retired for over 10 years, and I interest myself in all sorts of aspects of demography—not just migration, but mortality, fertility and all the other things that we play with.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you have any particular concerns about the Bill as drafted, or any suggested ways in which it might be improved to achieve its ends?

David Coleman: The sad fact is that I do have reservations about the Bill, but I do not have any magical solutions to put that right, I am sorry to say. It is, after all, an intractable problem, this question of asylum and migration.

My concerns are that we have to, we are forced to, restart or intensify a war that we may not easily win. Rather like, as I suggested in my note, the war against drugs, it will be difficult—probably perpetual and probably indecisive. It will have some effect. It will consume a great deal of effort. It may involve unkindness to asylum seekers and possibly risk to those doing the investigations. It is, I think, very much second best to the idea of trying to deter migration for asylum claiming in the first place. That, of course, was dismissed by the present Government as being unfeasible, unworkable and unkind, so the Rwanda scheme was scrapped. However, although it sounds rather brutal, it seems to me that the only obvious way of deterring movement to Britain is by making the movement to Britain unattractive. The obvious way of doing that is to divert at least some of the claimants somewhere they will be safe but will not enjoy the benefits of being in a rich country.

There are four ways of dealing with the issue, are there not? One is to have open borders, so that everybody who wants to come can come. Then there are two ways of being nasty: one is being nasty to the smugglers themselves, which is, I suppose, what the Bill is primarily about, and the other is being rather nasty to people who wish to claim asylum, which the previous policy did. Alternatively, you could have special routes for selected people who can be investigated, possibly by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and then admitted. That has, as far as I can make out, been ruled out by the Government for the time being.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn?

David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Professor Coleman, are you a member of the Galton Institute?

David Coleman: Yes and no. The Galton Institute does not exist any more; it has changed its name to the Adelphi Genetics Forum.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Professor Brian Bell from King’s College London. We have until 4 pm for this panel. Could the witness please briefly introduce himself for the record?

Professor Brian Bell: I am Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think that the Bill will be effective in achieving its aims? How could it be made more effective?

Professor Brian Bell: I think it is fair to say that it is an open question whether it will be effective. The evidence from lots of previous experiences is that it is actually very hard to deter this kind of activity, but I suppose you have to try everything you can and see what works. If something does not work, you try something else.

In some sense, it is an unanswerable question at this point, and it may be unanswerable in the long run. Suppose that the Bill is passed and small boat numbers go up. That does not prove that the Bill failed, because we do not know what the counterfactual is of what would have happened without the Bill, and vice versa: if the numbers go down, it could just be that the number of people who wanted to come to France and then on to England had fallen. It is going to be very difficult to directly observe the effect. Whenever you think about these issues, you always have to think about both the deterrence and sanction effect, which is what the Bill is focused on, and then how you change the underlying incentives.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons that we are failing to learn from abroad?

Professor Brian Bell: I do not think so, in the sense that I do not think any country has experienced these issues and dealt with them particularly successfully. There are different approaches—obviously, Australia has taken a different approach—but I do not think that any country would claim that it has really succeeded in significantly addressing this kind of problem.

To me, it is very much the same kind of problem as any sort of criminal activity. You can change the sanctions and the effectiveness of the police, and that has some effect. The evidence tends to suggest on this sort of thing that it has a fairly small effect. The deterrence effect tends often to be quite small with these policies, so in the end the right response will almost certainly be about changing the incentives as well, in terms of both what is the attraction to come to the UK and whether there are ways we can encourage people to stay in France, in this case, instead of wanting to make those journeys.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Dame Angela Eagle MP, Minister for Border Security and Asylum, and Seema Malhotra MP, Minister for Migration and Citizenship at the Home Office. We will have until 4.20 pm for this panel.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Looking at the changing approach, particularly around the repeal of the Illegal Migration Act, repealing section 2 of the Act removes the obligation on the Government to remove people who arrive here illegally. What is the rationale behind that?

Dame Angela Eagle: The Illegal Migration Act was flawed legislation, which did not actually work. It was so flawed that the previous Government, even though they put it on to the statute book, did not actually commence much of it at all.

[Matt Vickers]

Q On the obligation to remove people who arrive here illegally, whether it is in that Act or in the Bill being brought forward, why are we removing that as a principle?

Dame Angela Eagle: The issue was that we did not think it was possible to make the suite of legislation, which involved the Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act, work together coherently. Its effect was essentially to allow people into the country but make it illegal to process them and leave them stuck in an ever-lengthening backlog and in limbo. The whole approach established by the interplay of those two Acts of Parliament, one of which was barely commenced even though it was on the statute book, had to be taken away so that we could bring some order to the chaos that we inherited from the previous Government, as a result of the practical outcomes of those two pieces of legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Q I understand that comment, but do you not think that, as part of that approach, it should be an obligation on the Government to remove people who come here illegally?

Dame Angela Eagle: No, we certainly have not said that. As soon as people’s asylum claims have been properly processed, and the appeals that they are allowed to make are finished, if they have failed, we will seek to remove those people—but not to a third country.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Further to that, the principle in the previous legislation was that if someone arrived in this country illegally, they could not become a British citizen. That was there in the legislation, but it will not be there when this Bill has gone through. What message does it send to the world if people who break into this country can then go on to gain citizenship?

Dame Angela Eagle: The Home Secretary has made it perfectly clear in the changes to the advice that if you come to this country illegally, we do not expect that you will be granted citizenship.

[Matt Vickers]

Q But we have taken that out.

Dame Angela Eagle: We have taken that out of primary legislation because it was connected with the duty to remove, which was about the interplay of the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act. As I have just said, it was flawed legislation that did not work in practice.

[Matt Vickers]

Q The Illegal Migration Act also made provisions, in sections 57 and 58, for scientific age verification. We are removing that as well. Why would we want to remove those powers from our agencies? We have seen the consequences for safeguarding and the impact that that could have on young people. Why would we not want to give the agencies all the powers that they could have?

Dame Angela Eagle: There are real issues about the accuracy of scientific age assessment. At the Home Office, we are in the middle of doing work to see whether we can get a system of scientific age assessment that is robust enough to use. We are certainly not ruling it out, but the effects in that legislation were all about the duty to remove—it was about trying to define children. You will remember that in the IMA, the duty to remove excluded children, which perhaps created a bigger incentive for people to claim that they were children when they were not. The scientific age assessment clauses in that Act were related to the duty to remove. Given that we are repealing the vast majority of the Illegal Migration Act in this Bill, we removed those clauses.

I would not, however, want to give the hon. Gentleman the false impression that we have completely abandoned the idea of doing scientific age assessment. Currently, we are trying to assess whether there are ways of doing it that not only are cost-effective, but can be relied on. It is not an easy thing to do; there are no very easy solutions to whether it is accurate. We are exploring those areas ahead of making any subsequent announcements about if—and how, if we do—we use scientific age assessment.

[Matt Vickers]

Q I am sure that we could spend all day arguing about the pros and cons of Rwanda, but specifically, we see the effectiveness of returns agreements where those are in place. For countries where we cannot return people, if those people are not going to Rwanda, where will the Government put them?

Dame Angela Eagle: First, we will always seek to return people if they fail the asylum system, and have had all their claims and appeals, as soon as it is safe to do so. That is the first thing to say, and we must never lose sight of that. Situations in particular countries change—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, as the hon. Gentleman knows. We never give up on that. Clearly, if people are here and have failed, we want them to leave, and we will facilitate them to leave.

[Martin Vickers]

Q What about where we do not have the ability to return—with countries where we cannot return those people? They were going to go to Rwanda; now, where are they going?

Dame Angela Eagle: With all due respect, I do not think they were ever going to go to Rwanda.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Yes, that is okay.

Daniel O’Malley: I am Daniel O’Malley, policy and public affairs specialist with the Scottish Refugee Council.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Q First, what are your views on the functions and objectives of the Border Security Command, as set out in the Bill?

Enver Solomon: I am happy to take that one. Our view is that this legislation is rightly seeking to disrupt the criminal gangs—the smuggling gangs. The trade is heinous; it is very damaging to people and it needs to be stopped. In that context, the Border Security Command is an understandable response. I think the issue that we have with it is that it is very difficult to simply rely on enforcement to tackle what is a complex and challenging situation.

The Bill is putting multiple eggs in the basket of enforcement, not just through the Border Security Command but by introducing a number of new offences. Our view, based on our frontline practice and work over many decades with people who have come to this country from war zones, having fled persecution or having been victims of modern slavery, is that that strategy will fundamentally fall short, because it is very difficult to change behaviour by adopting a primarily enforcement approach, which is primarily driven by further prosecution and creating new laws.

Essentially, new laws, such as the offences created in the Bill, are pretty much a blunt instrument to deal with behaviour that drives people to seek protection in other countries and to come here seeking asylum. I think that the evidence, from the offences created in previous legislation, demonstrates that they have not acted as a deterrent.

To sum up, enforcement is an understandable and legitimate approach, but it is only one approach, and it needs to be combined with other approaches that focus on international diplomacy and co-operation, and, critically, on additional legal routes. If you look at the evidence, particularly from the US under the previous Administration, the combination of those three can have a demonstrable impact on reducing irregular arrivals.

Despite the intention that this Bill has set out, our concern is that it will not deliver the outcome—the understandable and credible outcome—that the Government are trying to achieve, which is to stop the people smugglers and to stop people making dangerous crossings. It is focusing too much on an enforcement-driven agenda.

[Matt Vickers]

Q What provisions would you like to see in the Bill—you talked about a broader approach—that are not in there?

Enver Solomon: We would have liked to see more provisions that look at opening up targeted, additional humanitarian pathways, additional legal routes, and additional mechanisms for people to seek humanitarian protection and make applications for asylum without necessarily having to take dangerous journeys. We have advocated for a targeted humanitarian visa to be piloted for specific nationalities where there is a high grant rate.

We would also have preferred to see the full repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—not all provisions have been repealed. It is very positive that a significant number have been repealed, and that the Government have started to clear the backlog and essentially end the meltdown of the asylum system under the previous Administration, with the failed implementation of the Act. That is positive, but we think that retaining other provisions in the Act, particularly the provisions on inadmissibility, and not repealing the differential treatment provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, contribute to greater dysfunction in the system.

The Government’s laudable and correct intention to bring greater efficiency and competence to the system is absolutely right, but having multiple pieces of legislation that just create greater dysfunction will not ensure that you get an effective end-to-end system. You do that by ensuring that you have reliable, speedy decision making on asylum; that decisions are right first time; that if people are granted protection, they can move through the system effectively with appropriate support; and that if people are not granted protection, the right steps are in place to support them. The focus needs to be much more on getting the asylum system to function, with a clear vision of its purpose, than on layering more and more legislation on to an already incredibly complex legislative system, which actually just creates further dysfunction.

[The Chair]

Before I go to the Minister, can I just check with Mubeen that you can hear us okay?

Mubeen Bhutta: Sorry?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and from Migration Observatory. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 12.40 pm. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Zoe Bantleman: Good afternoon. I am Zoe Bantleman and I am the legal director of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association.

Dr Peter Walsh: Good afternoon. I am a senior researcher at the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think the new endangerment offence will make any difference to channel crossings?

Dr Peter Walsh: Evidence from academic research shows that the impacts of deterrence policies are fairly small. The main reason for that is that migrants often do not have accurate or detailed knowledge of policies in destination countries. Their understanding of those policies is often lacking in detail and wrong, and it is often influenced by what they are told by their smugglers or handlers, who have a vested interest, of course, in downplaying risks.

There is also some statistical evidence that looks more broadly at what drives unauthorised migration and asylum applications around the world. That has found that domestic policy is not statistically one of the more important factors. Instead, geopolitical developments, conflict—civil, ethnic or international conflict—ecological disaster and regime change are all statistically much stronger drivers of unauthorised migration and asylum applications in particular countries.

Finally, rounding out the picture, when an asylum seeker decides which destination country to move to, that calculus is influenced not just by policy—policy is one of the things that they take least account of—but by things like the presence of family members, members of the community, friends, language and in some cases, in the context of small boat arrivals, escaping the Dublin system. Individuals may have claimed asylum in other EU countries—maybe those claims are outstanding or have been refused—and they understand that if they move to the UK they cannot be returned to the EU, because we are no longer a part of the EU and of the Dublin system that facilitated that.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Dr Walsh, you have just argued that deterrence does not really work, yet one of the big arguments on Second Reading was that somehow by repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act and most of the Illegal Migration Act we had thrown away the only thing that would work. Would you care to comment on that?

Dr Peter Walsh: Because under the IMA the Government proposed not to process people’s claims, they would not have known whether returning those individuals to countries of origin would be safe or not. That is where Rwanda came in.

There were always questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy. For my part, whatever deterrent effect it would have had would have depended fundamentally on how many people were actually sent to Rwanda. You can imagine that if it was a large share of people arriving by small boat, that might make people think twice, but if it were a small share—only thousands a year when we have tens of thousands of small boat arrivals—that would imply that the chance of being sent to Rwanda was fairly small. You can imagine that the people then making the trip would view that risk as just one risk among many much greater risks—risking their lives, for example—so there were always real questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy and how many people would in fact have been sent there.

The last Government said that the scheme was uncapped, and the Rwandan Government said, “We can take as many people as you can send.” But there were logistical challenges there, not least among them where people would be detained. At that time we had about 1,800 people in immigration detention in the UK, with a capacity of 2,200. You would have to detain people if you were threatening to remove them to Rwanda, so that was a very big initial stumbling block, putting aside whatever the capacity of those Rwandan facilities would have been, and more broadly the capacity of the Rwandan asylum system to process large numbers of claims. Typically it processed only a few hundred a year, not 10,000 or 20,000, so there were real questions there.

The big risk was what to do with people who are neither deterred from arriving nor able to be removed to Rwanda. That would be a sub-population in the UK without legal status who would be here indefinitely, so they would for ever have no legal right to remain in the UK, but we would be required to provide them with asylum accommodation and support at great cost. That was the risk when it came to Rwanda and the IMA.

Oral Answers to Questions

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I agree that special constables can play an important role. Their numbers have dropped by around two thirds over the past 14 years. I think that is damaging, and we want to increase their numbers. We are working with police forces on how best to achieve that so that they can play their part, both on the streets in neighbourhood teams and in supporting other specialist aspects of the police’s work.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Greater Manchester has one of the highest crime rates in the country, with many suffering as a result of antisocial behaviour, but this weekend we saw police officers knocking on the door of a grandmother because she dared to criticise a Labour councillor for his role in the pensioner-hating WhatsApp scandal. Does the Home Secretary agree that is a waste of police time?

[Yvette Cooper]

The Government have been clear that the focus of policing must be on the neighbourhood crimes that blight our communities. That is why we are increasing neighbourhood policing, because the Conservative party slashed the number of neighbourhood police on the beat and we lost thousands of neighbourhood police in our communities. That is why we are also focusing the police on serious violence. The legislation to be introduced tomorrow will focus on tackling serious violence and dealing with the most serious crimes in our communities—something that the Conservative party, which presided over a 61% increase in shoplifting alone during its last two years in power, failed time and again to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister. I have to get through the questions.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Fiona from Bradford was failed numerous times by social services and local police after suffering horrific sexual abuse at the hands of gangs of men while in a care home. Bradford’s local authority has shamefully sought to block a local inquiry into the issue. In Fiona’s own words:

“The Government can’t just leave it down to the local councils to decide if they’re going to be investigated, they’re going to have to enforce it.”

Will the Home Secretary reconsider a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs? If not, how will she guarantee that cases like that can never be allowed to happen again?

[Jess Phillips]

I am working with victims across the country to ensure, as has already been announced, that cold cases like the one referred to by the shadow Minister can be reopened. The Government have invested an extra £2.5 million in the taskforce to ensure that can happen. We will be working with local authorities across the country to ensure that the failures of the past are not repeated.