Armed Forces Commissioner Bill (Third sitting)

Luke Akehurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th December 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Francois]

For the convenience of the Committee, I will take amendments 9 and 10 in reverse order.

Essentially, amendment 10 is intended to ensure that the office of the commissioner is sufficiently well resourced to undertake its role effectively, independently of the Ministry of Defence. The explanatory notes to the Bill intimate that once the office is up and running, it will start off with a budget of approximately £5 million, as the Minister confirmed on Second Reading.

The Bill does not mandate a specific number of staff to assist the commissioner; it is not that prescriptive. Given that the role has a wider remit than that of the Service Complaints Ombudsman, it seems likely that more staff will be required to carry out the expanded function—not least because it will now include visits to service establishments, some of which the commissioner could be empowered to conduct on an unannounced basis, subject to certain safeguards, if they thought that the issues that they were examining merited it.

The purpose of amendment 10 is to reinforce the idea that the office should be adequately resourced by mandating the financial assistance provided by the Secretary of State, which is effectively the commissioner’s budget, should increase by at least real terms each year, defined using the consumer prices index measure of inflation, which is published by the Office for National Statistics. I hope that amendment 10 is relatively uncontroversial and that the Minister might even be tempted to accept it. We can but try.

Amendment 9 would mandate that at least one member of the commissioner’s staff be a King’s counsel.

[Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Would the right hon. Gentleman be able to give the Committee an idea of the annual cost of a King’s counsel, so that we can have an idea of what percentage of the proposed budget that would be? Why he is choosing to be prescriptive about the need for this particular element of staffing? That seems to contradict earlier pushes in amendments to safeguard the independence of the commissioner. If we are appointing a commissioner, surely we should trust them to determine the configuration of their staff.

[Mr Francois]

There are two questions there. On the first, the honest answer is that it depends on the KC. In my limited experience, different King’s counsels tend to charge different rates. One would hope that the commissioner would employ someone who was good at their job, so yes there would be a public expenditure cost.

If the hon. Gentleman will permit me, I am going to come in a moment to the exact rationale for why we have sought to mandate that at least one of the commissioner’s staff should be a qualified KC; he slightly pre-empts me. But I hope I can convince the Committee that there is a genuinely good reason for doing so and I am going to produce at least one real-world example. If that satisfies the hon. Gentleman, I will make some progress. Did the hon. Member for Portsmouth North, sitting next to him, also seek to intervene or have I inadvertently answered her question?

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill (Fourth sitting)

Luke Akehurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th December 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Francois]

I entirely take the hon. Lady’s point, for which I thank her. There are a number of wider issues—one of them is education, and particularly special educational needs—and I will touch on those in the clause stand part debate, if it pleases the Chair. The hon. Lady may recall that I gave the Minister a pretty fair heads-up about that on Tuesday. I tabled the amendment so that we could raise the specific issue of pensions, which is a concern for armed forces personnel, rather than discussing it under clause stand part.

To drive that point home before I conclude my remarks, Larisa Brown, the excellent defence editor of The Times, has just published an article online entitled, “Call to spare troops’ loved ones from inheritance tax trap.” Its subheading is: “Death in service payments for unmarried members of the armed forces who die off-duty will be subjected to the levy under plans announced in the budget”. In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, this is very much a live issue as of about 14 minutes ago.

[Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Francois]

I will try to be brief. This amendment in no way precludes the raising of any of the other issues that the hon. Lady mentioned. It does not say, for instance, that the commissioner can look only at pensions—not at all. However, it does specifically make it clear that the commissioner is empowered to look at pensions, because they kick in, by definition, when armed forces personnel leave the service. Some people might try to argue that pensions are not a general service welfare issue because personnel are no longer serving, but they very much are—not least because, as the Minister will know, they very much affect retention. They might also affect recruitment slightly, but pensions are certainly very important in retention. Sometimes they are the overwhelming reason that people stay in the service, depending on their personal financial circumstances.

I see the hon. Lady’s point, but all this is doing is making it very clear, beyond peradventure, that the Armed Forces Commissioner’s remit would extend to pensions. I admit that it also gave us an opportunity to raise this very important issue, which the Forces Pension Society raised with me a little while ago. When I met its representatives, they were genuinely worried about this, and my amendment was an opportunity to put the issue on the table and on the Government’s radar, as it were. That is what I was seeking to achieve.

[Luke Akehurst]

On one level, I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman for finding an opportunity to raise this issue in the context of the Bill Committee. It is one for which I have a huge amount of sympathy, as I represent a constituency with a large number of retired service personnel. On the other hand, it is a little cheeky to use a Bill Committee to raise a substantive policy issue that could have been raised on the Floor of the House—perhaps in Defence questions.

[Mr Francois]

Is this another brief intervention?

[Luke Akehurst]

I am sorry—I will be as brief as I can. I am getting used to being brief. What led the right hon. Gentleman to suspect that this issue might be in any way excluded? I hope the Minister will clarify that the Bill is designed to be permissive and broad, and to allow the commissioner to define what a general welfare issue might be. I do not think there is any attempt to exclude—

[Mr Francois]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his very pithy intervention. He pays me a back-handed compliment. How outrageous that His Majesty’s Opposition should try to raise a difficult issue in the middle of a Bill Committee; if I were to go back through the annals of Hansard down the centuries, I am sure there would be some precedent for that.

This was a timely opportunity, if I can put it like that, to table the issue. There is a consultation coming up, and I suspect, looking at his face, that the Minister was not really au fait with this issue—I am not being rude to him—but he is now, and I will be very interested to hear what he has to say.

The key point here is that death in service benefits have traditionally been payable if someone dies while in the armed forces or in the service of the Crown, whether or not they were on active service. A person who died back at home with their family would still qualify for the money. Under the armed forces pension scheme, they would still qualify if they had a regular partner. Under the Bill, however, because we are now dealing with the inheritance tax rules, unless the individual is married or in a civil partnership the exemptions do not apply. That is the critical point. I suspect the Ministry of Defence had not picked up on it. The Forces Pension Society, which exists for exactly this kind of eventuality, has done what it says on the tin and raised an issue that could materially affect armed forces pensions. In some ways, I am acting as their factotum this afternoon in tabling the issue.

[Mr Francois]

I think it is. Those who have left the service, are by definition no longer subject to service law; they are subject to the laws of the country like any other civilians, as that is what they have become, albeit they are civilians with the special status of being a veteran, which we should respect. But they are no longer serving in His Majesty’s armed forces. The amendment would allow the commissioner to expand their remit little bit in order to look at pension-related issues, which are something that armed forces personnel regard as part of their general service welfare. When they are taking that stick or twist decision, weighing up the pluses and minuses of whether to stay or leave—particularly if they have been in the service for some years and have accumulated a reasonable pension pot—that is definitely something that they will take into account.

[Luke Akehurst]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Francois]

In a moment. My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne is a former commanding officer of the Scots Guards, and he knows the challenge that all commanding officers face in retaining personnel, particularly experienced personnel. It is part of that stick or twist decision, which is why we believe that the Armed Forces Commissioner should be able to look at it. The amendment would remove any doubt that they had the ability to do that, while—to come back to the point made by hon. Member for Broxtowe—in no way precluding their being able to look at anything else.

[Luke Akehurst]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I will try to be more pithy this time. I thought there was a separate proposal for a veterans’ commissioner. Should not matters that affect former service personnel after the point when technically they have ceased to serve, or their families if they are deceased, sit in the purview of a veterans’ commissioner, not the Armed Forces Commissioner?

[Mr Francois]

The hon. Gentleman anticipates me, because if he looks down the list of amendments, he will see that new clause 2 talks specifically about veterans’ commissioners. Perhaps at that point he might want to intervene on me again, as long as it does not mean Mr Betts misses his train.

I hope that I have made my point. I shall be interested to hear what other Members in the Committee think, and particularly what the Minister’s view is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp]

Members of the Committee will be aware that line 35 on page 2 defines a general welfare matter using its own terms; it says that a general welfare matter is a matter to do with welfare. Thinking back to when we all did English GCSE—or O-level, in the case of some of us—we know that using terms to define themselves is a bit self-defeating, because they do not really define anything. I assume that is deliberate, and maybe the Minister will tell us so. The provision is incredibly broadly drawn and gives the commissioner very free reign as to what they consider a welfare matter to be, with one or two exclusions that the Minister mentioned earlier.

I think that is important, because I keep being told, and I have read in the explanatory notes, that this is all inspired by the German model. When I ask what is so great about the German model, I read that it is because German members of the armed forces are really happy with it. On Tuesday, General Gregory said that to do their job effectively, the armed forces commissioner needs a clear and deep view of defence outputs. People being happy with a part of the bureaucracy is not a defence output. The only one that trumps everything else is the ability to deliver legal, lethal force. In summary, the armed forces need to be able to kill lots of people.

[Luke Akehurst]

Would the hon. Gentleman not concede that morale is important to being able to deliver lethal force, and that this kind of system, which enables welfare issues to be addressed, might contribute to higher morale? In the event of combat, such morale could mean that troops perform better.

[Lincoln Jopp]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—it is almost as if he read my speech. I was going to stay on my German theme and say that one person who interpreted that general definition of welfare was another German: General Erwin Rommel. He said that the best form of welfare is better training, because more training means fewer widows.

Although the Bill and the Minister attempt to draw the line between operations abroad and welfare at home, those things rub up against each other. For example, the Ministry of Defence has targets for nights out of bed. How much time can personnel be expected to spend away without their service becoming too detrimental to their family life? Equally, it has these things that sound wonderful—I thought it was to do with hairspray—called harmony guidelines. In fact, they are to do with how long the armed forces can send people away for without a specified dwell time in between for them to recuperate.

From a welfare point of view, it is perfectly possible that the Armed Forces Commissioner could focus solely on whether a commanding officer, a unit, a brigade, a ship’s captain or whatever was meeting the nights out of bed guidelines or the harmony guidelines. But the captain of that ship or the commanding officer of that unit might well think, as Rommel did, that more training was better in the long run for the welfare of their personnel. I would be grateful for a response from the Minister on that point.

My other concern is much more strategic: by having an Armed Forces Commissioner with these extended powers and the ability to report to Parliament, we put a spotlight on one aspect of militarism, potentially to the detriment of other aspects of it, such as the defence output of killing lots of people. That is important because the Minister for the Armed Forces, as well as the defence board, will be making strategic balance-of-investment decisions between things such as buying a lot more jets and getting damp-proof courses for quarters.

Look at the figures in the House of Commons Defence Committee report into service accommodation, which was published yesterday. If the Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence were minded to rectify the parlous state of some parts of the defence estate, that alone would use up every single penny of the, I think, £2.6 billion extra that the Chancellor has found to increase the defence budget.

I alert the Minister to the fact that over time, the instigation of this parliamentary-level scrutiny of one aspect of the make-up of defence may well strategically shift us away from the defence output of lethality. It is a reductio argument, but we could have a fully manned armed forces with everyone giving 100% scores on the continuous attitude survey, great pensions and fantastic pay, but they cannot win a war. Clearly, that is not where we want to get to. We have to put in place measures and judgments that mean that the Armed Forces Commissioner, and the instigation and extension of their powers, does not undermine the military chain of command or the capacity to fight.

UK Air and Missile Defences

Luke Akehurst Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2024 Westminster Hall

[Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered UK air and missile defences.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I am pleased to have secured this debate to highlight a critical weakness in our national defences. I am sure it will come as no surprise to hon. Members that I say this, but I sincerely believe that outside this place, and even among many of our colleagues, it is not appreciated that the diversity of the threat we now face from air attack, and the lack of our defences against it, is at its most serious in decades.

This debate is about defences against conventional air and missile threats, not nuclear threats—for that we maintain our continuous at-sea strategic nuclear deterrent. The world is more unstable today than at any point since the cold war, but sadly, despite a changing threat environment, I fear our defences have not been adapted quickly enough to deter or protect against it. The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee’s report published in September, which analysed the lessons we can learn from Ukraine, laid out in stark terms the significant weaknesses in European defences. Key among them is the fact that our air and missile defences are, frankly, inadequate. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only brought conventional warfare back to mainland Europe, but has shown in stark terms the importance of credible and robust air and missile defences.

Nearly 12,000 missiles have been launched against Ukraine by Russia since February 2022. About 80% of them have been intercepted, thanks to different air defence systems protecting military and civilian infrastructure, but that still means that thousands of missiles have impacted, often to devastating effect. Earlier this month, over the course of just one week, Russia used more than 800 guided aerial bombs, about 460 attack drones and more than 20 missiles of various types against Ukraine.

During the cold war NATO’s air defences were a largely static system arrayed in belts around a unidirectional and well-defined threat of manned aircraft from the Soviet Union, but today’s environment is less predictable. The range of air and missile threats is larger and the threat can come from any direction. Indeed, according to reports from earlier this year, NATO states can provide less than 5% of the air defence capacity deemed necessary to protect allies in central and eastern Europe against a full-scale attack.

Unlike Ukraine, the UK has some obvious geographical protection from attacks by ground-based short-range missiles and drones, but two significant and concerning reports over recent days show once again that there is no cause for complacency. First, Russia is now prepared to use intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles against targets in Ukraine. This is the first successful use of that type of missile with conventional warheads in combat. They are harder to intercept and represent a significant escalation. The second concerning report in recent days relates to the presence of unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles around three RAF bases—Lakenheath, Mildenhall and Feltwell—between 20 and 22 November and overnight on 25 November. I do not expect the Minister to go into too much detail about that recent incident or about what counter-measures are in place at our bases, but both reports show that short-range and long-range threats to the UK are very real, very diverse, and we need to be able to defend ourselves against them.

If we look at events in the middle east, we can also see the diversity of short to long-range aerial threats. Israel has faced rocket, drone and ballistic missile attacks from Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. In October, Iran launched almost 200 ballistic missiles against Israel following its previous attack involving 300 missiles and drones in April, but, unlike the UK, Israel has a sophisticated and multi-layered air and missile defence system to counter wide-ranging aerial threats. The Iron Dome intercepts short-range rockets of the type fired by Hamas and Hezbollah. David’s Sling can intercept medium to long-range rockets, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, and Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 can intercept long-range ballistic missiles. Recently, we saw the deployment of US THAAD—terminal high altitude area defence—batteries to bolster defences against ballistic missile threats.

The UK’s current air defence capabilities against such threats are primarily made up of Sea Viper on Type 45 destroyers, utilising Aster missiles, Sky Sabre ground-based air defence, and quick reaction alert Typhoon fighter jets. Typhoons on quick reaction alert at Coningsby and Lossiemouth can intercept potential hostile airborne threats, including aircraft and UAVs. The Sky Sabre ground-based air defence system can intercept multiple cruise missiles, aircraft and UAVs up to 25 km away. However, there are only about six Sky Sabre systems in service with the British Army, and at least two are deployed overseas, to the Falkland Islands and Poland. Clearly, many more such systems would be needed to provide sufficient cover to a larger number of critical military and civilian national infrastructure sites across the UK.

I know the business case for more Sky Sabre launchers has been approved, but orders have not yet been made. Bizarrely, no business case has been made for ordering more missiles for Sky Sabre, despite such orders taking longer to fulfil. Crucially, Sky Sabre cannot defend against ballistic or hypersonic missile threats—it was not designed to do so. The only defence the UK currently has against ballistic missiles is Sea Viper, which utilises Aster 30 missiles on our six Type 45 destroyers. Sea Viper can currently track potential threats at ranges of up to 250 miles, and eliminate them within about 70 miles.

I know that Sea Viper is being upgraded over the next decade, with initial operation capability in 2028. That is very welcome, but given that we have only a few Type 45s in service at any one time, the coverage that they can provide in defence of homeland targets against ballistic missile threats is limited. To defend London against ballistic missile threats, a Type 45 destroyer would have to be permanently moored in the Thames estuary, which would mean that it could not do anything else. In particular, it would be unavailable for its primary role of protecting one of our aircraft carriers from air and missile threats. That alone makes the case that some form of new or upgraded ground-based air defence system that provides protection against threats, including ballistic and hypersonic missiles, is needed.

To consider only the military critical national infrastructure that would be vulnerable to air attack and would need adequate protection, we have the three main Royal Navy operating bases at Portsmouth, Devonport and Clyde; seven RAF bases, including Lossiemouth, Marham and Coningsby; and the major Army garrisons. We have radar sites, ammunition depots, and overseas sites, including the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which are in range of Iranian ballistic missiles, unlike sites in the UK. Major defence industrial sites would also presumably be at risk. Then there is a plethora of significant civilian infrastructure that could be targeted, including nuclear power stations, large transport hubs, industrial sites and Government buildings. We know tragically from the war in Ukraine that Russia has no compunction about hitting civilian targets such as hospitals, shopping centres or concentrations of housing, purely to terrorise the civilian population and degrade national morale.

The previous Government’s integrated and defence reviews slowly started to acknowledge the threat from air attack. The 2023 Defence Command Paper described the threat as being

“at its most acute for over thirty years”.

Clearly, the resources have not yet been put into upscaling equipment and filling the gaps in capability that we need to counter that.

Other European countries have been taking the issue seriously and placing orders. In the past decade, France and Italy have jointly developed the medium-range SAMP/T air defence system, which can intercept ballistic missiles, drones, fighter jets and other targets. In September, France ordered eight new SAMP/T NG systems, capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles. The first ones will enter service in 2026. Italy also ordered 10 of these new systems, which will utilise upgraded Aster 30 missiles.

Many European countries already utilise the American Patriot air defence system. To bolster that, existing operators Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Sweden are procuring 1,000 additional Patriot missiles between them. Poland has signed contracts worth £4 billion with UK industry to deliver the NAREW next-generation air defence system. Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France and Hungary are jointly buying around 1,500 Mistral short-range air defence—SHORAD—missiles. Latvia and Estonia are jointly procuring IRIS-T for medium-range interception, and Finland has ordered the David’s Sling system.

To fill capability gaps and ensure interoperability, we should be working with our European NATO partners on joint procurement. The Government have said that the UK is engaging with the European Sky Shield initiative, which seeks to establish a ground-based integrated European air defence system with anti-ballistic missile capability. There are clearly different views across Europe about which systems it should comprise to ensure not only interoperability but to develop and maintain Europe’s defence industrial base.

I am aware that the UK signed a letter of intent to launch the integrated air and missile DIAMOND initiative in October, alongside six allies: France, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Sweden. That is clearly welcome, as it shows the seriousness with which the threat is recognised, but there is no clear timetable of key milestones associated with the DIAMOND initiative. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide an update.

It is not just our ability to take down hostile airborne threats that we must consider; there is also our ability to detect them in the first place. It is no secret that we have only a limited number of fixed and mobile land-based radars on UK soil, which would probably be among the first targets vulnerable to air attack. The previous Government’s early retirement of E-3 Sentry left a capability gap in airborne early warning and control, which has only been compounded by delays in the E-7 Wedgetail programme.

Airborne early warning and control will be crucial in monitoring the western and south-western coasts of the UK, where ground-based radar is limited, to detect potential submarine-launched threats. We also need to take seriously the potential for radar evasion along the east coast, particularly by UAVs or projectiles passing through wind farms. The Government are actively working on deconflicting windfarms and existing air defence surveillance systems. I would be grateful if the Minister could speak briefly about that.

Ministers will be acutely aware of everything I have said but, as I said at the start of the debate, I do not think many of our colleagues, including across Government outside the Ministry of Defence, appreciate the scale or seriousness of the issue. The defence analyst Francis Tusa has compared the current situation with that found by General Frederick Pile in 1937 when he was appointed commander of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division. General Pile highlighted the severe lack of anti-aircraft batteries to defend civilian and military locations. His analysis led to an increase in personnel in anti-aircraft roles and the mass production of anti-aircraft artillery.

Our armed forces are among the best and most capable in the world but, unfortunately, the defence they can provide today against significant airborne threats to the homeland, such as missile attack, is very limited. We have highly capable equipment but not enough of it to protect the significant amount of critical infrastructure across the length and breadth of the country, and to defend troops deployed on operations overseas. Principally, that is because we spent most of the previous few decades focused on expeditionary overseas missions rather than active homeland defence. We have been too slow to adapt to the changing threat picture.

The lack of active homeland defence is fundamentally a strategic failure. I hope the ongoing strategic defence review will deem it such and outline how it can be urgently addressed. The first responsibility of our Government is to protect our people and defend our freedom. I fear that further delay in outlining the action we are going to take and, crucially, the budget to deliver it, brings only greater risk of catastrophic failure in fulfilling that fundamental responsibility.

Addressing that capability gap needs to be an urgent political, funding and industrial priority for Government. I hope the Minister feels that this debate helps her demonstrate the political support in Parliament for tackling it.

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

Order. I remind Members to bob if they wish to be called in the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Akehurst]

Actually, I think it is appropriate that the time has been used by the Minister, because getting those reassurances is extremely important. That is what we all wanted to hear. I am particularly pleased that she recognised that the purpose of the debate was to demonstrate the support across the House, as well as the knowledge of the set of threats. I welcome her saying that a key part of the SDR will be to look at preparedness against missile threats.

I reassure the shadow Secretary of State that he need have no concerns about support for the nuclear deterrent. A recurring theme of my entire political life has been getting stuck into the arguments for the sustaining and renewal of the nuclear deterrent. It is part of my political brand. I am sure we can have that debate another time.

I thank all hon. Members who contributed. There were important contributions from Members who have an industrial interest in their constituency. From Thales to MBDA, we have some excellent technologies around the country. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Chris McDonald) made an excellent contribution about the wider industrial concerns. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) made another insightful contribution, based on his service in the armed forces—

Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 10(6)).

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Luke Akehurst Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a great honour to speak in this debate, and I welcome the bipartisan tone and constructive approach taken by the Opposition parties in their contributions. It is fitting that we are debating this Bill for the first time so soon after the Remembrance events held over the last few weeks.

The members of our armed forces who put their life on the line for the safety and security of our country and our people give the greatest service it is possible to give. Over 5% of the adult population of my constituency of North Durham have served in our armed forces. As someone from a civilian background, I pay tribute to every one of our men and women in uniform, including the many hon. and gallant Members on both sides of this House who have served.

The Bill is a key part of renewing the nation’s contract with our armed forces because for too long, morale and satisfaction with service life among our armed forces have been falling. According to the latest armed forces continuous attitude survey, nearly six in 10 personnel rate their service morale as “low”, and this figure has sadly been increasing for the last few years. Just one in 10 personnel rate their service morale as “high” and a third of personnel do not feel valued. We know that service life impacts not just those in uniform but their families, too. Whether it relates to housing, employment or the effect on their children, military spouses often have a negative view of the impact that service life is having on them and their family. That is why it is so important that this Bill will create the first ever independent champion, not just for serving personnel but for their families.

The Bill is not only about the welfare of those who serve today; it is about making service life more attractive so that our rates of recruitment and retention in the armed forces improve. We currently have the Service Complaints Ombudsman, established by the Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Act 2015—but, as the Secretary of State said, their remit is too narrow and reactive. The ombudsman can investigate individual complaints only after the service complaints process has finished, and they do not have the remit to consider broader matters impacting the welfare of serving personnel. Replacing the ombudsman with a new Armed Forces Commissioner who can launch their own investigations and make broader recommendations is therefore a positive step forward. Indeed, that has been called for by successive Service Complaints Ombudsmen themselves. A new Armed Forces Commissioner will give service personnel and their families a direct contact to reach out to, in order to raise issues that impact service life, from equipment to accommodation and unacceptable behaviours.

I note that the Government expect the budget for the Armed Forces Commissioner to be between £4.5 million and £5.5 million a year. The German armed forces commissioner—the role on which the Secretary of State has said this new role is based—has 60 parliamentary staff to support them. I would be grateful if the Minister outlined how many staff he envisages the UK Armed Forces Commissioner having. The Defence Committee has raised questions about how we can ensure that the commissioner is truly independent from the Secretary of State, and I would welcome further clarity on that.

The Bill fulfils the commitment in our manifesto to introduce an Armed Forces Commissioner. It acknowledges the need for change to better support serving personnel, with new powers to carry out investigations, visit defence sites unannounced and report to Parliament. The role outlined in the Bill will clearly have a greater impact than the existing arrangements, to the benefit of service personnel and their families and ultimately, therefore, to the benefit of the morale and the retention rates of the armed forces and the defence of the country. It is another action towards fulfilling the Government’s commitment to renewing the nation’s contract with those who serve, and I therefore welcome the Bill.