Railways Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Blencathra. I can remember British Rail, but I do not think any of us want to go back to British Rail, we want to go to something altogether better. We need the railways to succeed. We can see that when people feel that they have a reliable, punctual and enjoyable railway available to them, they will use it. Look at the rail passenger journeys on the Elizabeth line, which is seeing something like a million passengers a day. Where we create a railway that people can rely on and use, we can succeed. We need that to happen.

On our Benches, on this side of the House, we have already arrived in these fascinating speeches at something of a consensus view, which is that we ought to have recreated the vertically integrated regional companies, but we did not. John Major may have been in favour of it, but he was Prime Minister when that was not what was put into the Railways Act 1993. It should have happened. If I remember correctly, before the 1992 manifesto, we were arguing for exactly that and the manifesto more or less reflected that, but it did not happen.

That did not mean that privatisation did not succeed. My noble friend Lord Grayling was absolutely right. Passenger numbers doubled. Investment in infrastructure went up by three or four times. Train miles increased by 30%. So there was a dramatic increase, but what was that essentially about? It is what my noble friend Lord Redwood was saying: privatisation led to substantial investment of private capital. The first question we must examine during the passage of this legislation is: where is that capital going to come from in future? Are we going to be able to sustain the investment that we need in the railway network for the future? The Bill does not tell us that. It tells us the processes, but not the outcome.

I had my days as a civil servant, and I express my appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Wilson. We will miss him here, but I am looking forward to seeing him in Cambridge. I hope that we will continue to have that pleasure. As a civil servant, I sat in a meeting where the investment programme of one potentially successful nationalised industry was rejected in order to provide an investment into a failing nationalised industry which had a political reason for investment.

Let us not kid ourselves. If this becomes a state-controlled industry, it will become subject to state control of investment, and that may mean state rationing of investment. The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, who introduced the Bill in an admirably concise but also very helpful way, will remember that when we examined the public ownership Bill, he very skilfully enabled the Government to reverse out of franchising into public ownership when the remaining franchises ended, but he did not tell us what the long-term structure was going to be. This Bill is about the long-term structure, who the single directing mind will be and how that single directing mind will be subject to checks, balances and challenges.

In my view, privatisation can work successfully in the long run only where it is subject to competition. In my experience, monopoly always offers short-term benefits, sometimes provides short-term benefits, but always leads to a lack of long-term investment, long-term innovation and long-term consumer benefit. So if, as my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead was stressing, quite rightly, we are going to get the consumer benefits, the innovation and the investment, we have to bring the private sector on board as well.

Some of the challenges to which I will devote my attention are, for example, in creating the regulatory structure that enables this to happen. First, the rail strategy at the moment is simply what the Secretary of State chooses it to be. There is no parliamentary scrutiny. There is not even any requirement for consultation, not even with the Office of Rail and Road, before the strategy is published. I think we are going to have to look very critically at this and look at the analogy of national policy statements, which in the energy sector, for example, are subject to examination in Parliament and to scrutiny, if not to a parliamentary veto.

Secondly, there is the rail freight target. There is a target: it is that it increase. The level of rail freight in this country has increased in the last decade but, lamentably, by only 1% per year, on average. If we are to reach the target of a 75% increase by 2050, it requires a 2.5% annual compound rate of rail freight growth. Perhaps that target should be set as not less than a 2% increase per annum; otherwise, how will the Government or, indeed, Great British Railways, be held to account?

Thirdly, on the Office of Rail and Road, I will not repeat what we heard from my noble friends Lady May and Lady Harding of Winscombe. My noble friend Lady Harding is right about ticketing. We need to press hard on that, but the issue of avoiding self-preferencing is not confined to ticketing. The Office of Rail and Road may have continued concurrent jurisdiction with the CMA in relation to the CMA’s own powers, but the Bill expressly removes the promotion of competition duty from the Office of Rail and Road in relation to such important things as access, infrastructure, timetabling and charging schemes. If we are going to avoid self-preferencing, we need to ensure that the competition duty is brought back on those as well.

Clearly, the open-access operators will not have confidence that they will be able to exploit the opportunities for private investment and private competition unless and until the Office of Rail and Road has those powers. The additional power it should have is that the appeal to the ORR should not be limited to judicial review grounds. There must be elements of those decisions made by GBR which should be appealed on their merits to the Office of Rail and Road. It will not surprise the Minister that I plan to test him on some of those competition-related issues—we have happily worked on that before.

My final point is on devolution. This carries forward the opportunity for services not to be designated and therefore to be available for the metro and passenger transport executives to be able to provide themselves. However, the relationship with local government in this Bill seems to be inadequate so far. Clause 85, for example, limits the relationship with local government to mayoral combined and strategic authorities, and clearly there are many more local authorities than those which are mayoral strategic authorities.

Railways Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th September 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, in the course of preparing for this Committee, I have had a number of meetings with the Minister and his officials, and I thank them for making themselves available for those meetings. I say that now because I shall almost certainly forget to say it at more appropriate times later on, but if I do it is not because I do not mean quite seriously how grateful I am for the contribution and effort that they have made.

We are here on the first day of the Committee to create a Soviet-style railway in the United Kingdom and to go back—and we now know explicitly that it is the Government’s and the Prime Minister’s intention—to the warm and fuzzy 1970s. The 1970s are now the paradigm of where our nation should be. Those of us who remember the 1970s—there may be a number of us in the Room—do not have such fond memories of the standard of public services then compared with what we have today. We do not today have bodies unburied, we do not have refuse piled high in the streets as a result of government folly and we have railways that run broadly on time compared to the—I see that the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, is not here to be annoyed by this—relative catastrophe of British Rail in its worst days as it trundled towards its final station. Now it is to be resuscitated. We are to get Great British Railways in place of British Rail and we are going to have it on a totally nationalised basis.

There are two separate things going on here. First, the Minister makes a case that the railways would operate more efficiently if, as he puts it, track and train were united. That argument can be debated. I do not wholly accept it, but it can be debated, but it is not necessary in order for track and train to be united that they should all be owned by the Government in a single company. We know that because the Williams review, which was warmly welcomed by the Minister when he was chairman of Network Rail and was supported by the Conservative Government at the time, gave an alternative way forward, so the decision to nationalise the whole thing is particularly spiteful. The only explanation for it—because it is not necessary for the purpose of achieving the Government’s stated objectives—is that it has been done to pay off the trades unions that made such generous contributions to Labour’s victory at the polls in 2024.

We know that privatisation has been a huge success on the railways and that passenger numbers increased enormously after privatisation. It would be astonishing if the Government nationalising the railways achieved anything like that increase in passenger numbers. New operators entered the market and competition stimulated improvements.

I have four amendments in this group, but one of them is consequential, so three that I intend to speak to. My Amendment 2 addresses a particularly vicious little clause in the Bill, which says, first of all, that the body designated as Great British Railways has to be owned wholly by the Crown. In other words, a future Minister would have to pass primary legislation to redesignate or designate a different body in the private sector to carry out Great British Railways’ activities. What is the need for that? It is simply to gratify the trades unions. A second part almost seems to impose a penalty of some sort on any Minister who makes even a suggestion that Great British Railways should be transferred to the private sector. My Amendment 2 deletes that part; it does not stop Great British Railways going ahead as a nationalised body but it allows a future Secretary of State without the need for primary legislation to redesignate a different body, not necessarily owned by the Crown, to carry out the role of Great British Railways.

Amendment 1 is addressed at sloppy drafting more than anything else. The Bill talks about a body corporate being designated as Great British Railways, whereas later, in the next clause, it is implicit that the body corporate should be a company constituted under the Companies Act. But the Bill does not actually say that the body corporate has to be constituted under the Companies Act; it only says that it has to be wholly owned by the Crown. Other bodies corporate could be designated, as long as they were wholly owned by the Crown. It is simply sloppy drafting not to say at this point that it is to be a body constituted under the Companies Act.

When I mentioned this to the Minister, he said, “Oh well, everybody knows it’s going to be a company constituted under the Companies Act”. Well, they do not, if they read the Act—it needs to be written into the Act by him that that is what the intention is. It should say quite explicitly that that is what he intends to do. We will come back to this when we discuss amendments later in Committee that relate to the board of this company. There are some from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, to which I have added my name, about the board of this company and how this corporate structure works, because the Bill is very silent on that. This needs to be done.

Finally, Amendment 8 probes Great British Railways’ organisational structure. To this day we still have no idea at all—and maybe the Minister has no idea at all—how Great British Railways is going to be structured. Let me give a couple of options. It could be that it will be structured geographically, roughly mapping the existing structures, so that one division deals roughly with the south-western main line, one division deals with the east coast main line, and so forth. It could be structured like that, but you could have a totally different structure. There might be an argument for saying that we should have one division that deals with operating the railways, one that deals with managing the major stations, another division that deals with the minor stations and another again for retail. You could have an organisation that was completely functionally based rather than geographically based. These are important questions, which I think Parliament should have a chance to have a say on, yet not only is the Bill silent about them but the Government are silent as well. The effect of Amendment 8 is to require the Government to publish their organisational structure before the Bill can come into effect.

That is enough for the moment—I understand that other noble Lords have things to say. I will just say in advance—and I hope that the noble Baroness will forgive me for pre-empting her—that I have taken note of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. They are not wholly aligned with my view of the role of the private sector and she will not therefore, I think, be surprised if I find myself not able to support them. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to join this first group in Committee. I am sitting to the left of the Liberal Democrats because that is where I now find myself; I always want to be sitting behind my noble friend on the Front Bench in Committee to back him up, but I cannot do that because there is no back row in this Room, so I cannot be self-effacing in the back row. Anyway, I look forward to Committee. I do not have the experience of railways that the Minister and my noble friend speaking for the Official Opposition do—I do not pretend to that intimate knowledge of the railways—but I hope to bring something of my interest in how competition should be applied in the delivery of public services to some of the issues that we will be debating.

I turn to this group. There are a number of amendments in my name which are just about trying to find out, as I was going through the Bill, whether it works in the way described or precisely what it means. Rather in line with what my noble friend was just saying, we need to be sure that we understand that the Bill is functionally correct in the way that it works. I have just two amendments in this group.

Amendment 3 relates to the question of what must be wholly owned. As my noble friend said, Clause 1 is constructed around the proposition that Great British Railways not only must be wholly owned by the Crown but cannot be anything else. That relates to GBR itself. The purpose of Amendment 3 is to test whether that also applies to GBR companies. We do not encounter GBR companies in Clause 1, but we do subsequently as a means by which GBR will undertake its activities. This is not surprising. As my noble friend said, we do not know how GBR will be corporately structured but, by way of example, we know how Network Rail is structured. It has a significant number of wholly owned subsidiaries and quite a number of joint venture subsidiaries, including through Platform4.

For example—and here I declare my interest as chair of the Cambridgeshire Development Forum and others—Platform4 is a Network Rail subsidiary company that has just recently, happily, entered into an agreement with partners to develop at Cambridge North station as part of the Government’s proposal to develop around stations, with 450 homes around the station. It is a joint venture company; it is not wholly owned by Network Rail. So my starting proposition is that this prohibition on companies not being wholly owned must apply to GBR itself but cannot apply to GBR companies. I want to be sure that that is the case. If it is not absolutely clear in the statute then it ought to be, which would be the purpose of my amendment.

That differentiates the amendment from those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to which we will no doubt turn in a minute, who wants precisely that to be the case. For the reasons I have just explained about the many joint ventures for things such as housing developments and commercial developments around stations through companies such as Platform4, if I may respectfully say so before she has put her case, I do not agree with the noble Baroness that all GBR companies should be—

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Who does?

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Recalling Questions earlier, just because we do not agree with the noble Baroness, that does not mean she cannot sometimes be right.

The other amendment in my name is Amendment 4, which relates to shadow directors. Clause 2 tells us that Ministers are not to be construed as shadow directors under the Companies Act when they make decisions. I think it is the case that, when officials act on behalf of Ministers, exactly the same provisions would apply to them. We need to be absolutely sure that this is the case, and that it applies to the officials of Scottish and Welsh Ministers as well as to those of the Secretary of State. I am looking for a bit of reassurance on that.

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Given what I said on all these amendments, I hope that noble Lords will find their way to withdraw them.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Before we conclude, and relevant to the point that my noble friend Lord Harper was making, I am sure that the Minister will want to look at the whole structure of Platform4 and its relationship to Great British Railways, but the Mayfield Partnership, which is involved in the regeneration around Manchester Piccadilly, has one-third Network Rail or Platform4 participation in that joint venture. So, at the moment, it is not just 50:50; it can be below 50%. It would be of interest, not least to noble Lords considering the future structure of GBR, to understand precisely how some of these large-scale and really important property development issues are to be managed by GBR. The directing mind for the railways is one thing, but the directing mind for development purposes is not necessarily the same thing.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. My experience of Network Rail’s property and Platform 4 is offset by increasing age and failure to remember the details. I will not only write to noble Lords about the 50:50 aspect, but about Mayfield, which I remember vaguely is of a different percentage, partially because much of the land is owned by somebody else rather than the railway. I will write on both those points, because I think they are germane. I appreciate the point that people need to understand how this will work in practice, particularly with those areas of activity of GBR that are not the provision of passenger railway services or the basic railway.

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These amendments were tabled in the Commons and debated in Committee there, but the issue was not addressed directly in the Minister’s reply. Members of the RMT’s parliamentary group wrote asking for a meeting on this and related matters, and that meeting has not taken place. The question I ask my noble friend Minister is a straightforward one: are the Government able to end the uncertainty facing rail workers and to confirm that it remains their intention, as set out in Labour’s plan for rail, that Great British Railways will be a new single employer? If that confirmation cannot be given today, will the Minister agree to meet to discuss the matter before Report?

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will principally refer to my Amendment 19 in this group. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that I am not really in a position to comment on the points he makes, but I think the discussion we had previously about the corporate and organisational structure of Great British Railways gives force to his points about how the employment of the railways will be structured in future, so I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on that.

I want to make a quick point on the amendment from my noble friend Lord Moylan about creating a purpose clause for the Bill. Generally speaking, I am in favour of purpose clauses where we are not principally legislating in order to change existing legislation where the purposes are already set out. This Bill will effectively get rid of the purpose set out at the front of the Railways Act 1993 and therefore I think it is a pity that there is no purpose clause at the front of this legislation to tell us what we are trying to achieve. In my view, that is distinct, as I think my noble friend was saying, from simply a description of what Great British Railways is going to do and what it should think about.

Paragraph 13 of the Explanatory Notes sets out the view that the purpose can be defined simply by what the functions of Great British Railways are and what it must have regard to under the general duties. But functions and duties are not in themselves sufficient to constitute purpose. For my money, I would have been in favour of drafting a purpose clause up front as Clause 1 that would have told us what we are trying to achieve. I think that makes for rather good drafting these days.

I will get down into the nitty-gritty now with Amendment 19 in my name. It relates to Clause 3 where, just as the functions have been set out for Great British Railways, there is an interesting moment where the functions are replaced by a little subsection that tells us what the “statutory functions” are to be. These are all the functions that we have just been told about and the ones that the Secretary of State might give Great British Railways at any time in the future, but not anything relating to service facilities or the supply of services under the 2016 regulations. That sent me off to look at the 2016 regulations to see what the service facilities and the supply of services are. I will minimise it for the purposes of this debate; essentially, on the one hand it is provision of access to freight and international traffic by an infrastructure manager under the access rights, and then supply of service facilities is essentially service providers giving, again, freight, other railway undertakings and international access to services—things from stations, depots and so on.

Interestingly, as far as I can see, those bits relating to access to the infrastructure and the provision of services in the 2016 regulations are intended to be substantially replaced by the access policies set out in Clause 59. But Regulations 5 and 6 and Schedule 2, I think, of the 2016 regulations are not to be repealed. The interesting thing is that Great British Railways will be expressly taken out of the definition of an infrastructure manager, so it will not have the requirements to provide access to infrastructure or to provide services implied by Regulations 5 and 6, even though they remain in place.

In a sense, this is a probing issue. Who will take the responsibility for the provision of infrastructure to freight and international if it is not Great British Railways? With supply of services, for things such as stations and depots, if it is not Great British Railways which has a responsibility for providing those services and the minimum access package specified in Regulation 6 of the 2016 regulations, whose responsibility is it? It is not set out in this Bill. All we know from this Bill, as a result of Clause 70, is that it is not Great British Railways. Then who is it? Who will do those things?

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome these probing amendments and look forward to the Minister’s response to some very important general issues. It is right that the staff in all the operating companies that will be affected by this should have an early idea from the Government about what is planned for their future employment.

I am one of those who welcome the idea that we want a well-paid profession serving on the railways, but for the sake of taxpayers, who are putting in substantial grant in aid and capital money, and of fare-paying passengers, who often have to pay very high fares, we need a system for negotiation between staff and Great British Railways which is more likely to achieve the increase in productivity that could justify the higher pay for staff without imposing an ever-higher charge on the taxpayer and fare-paying passengers. This is more than a detail that can be left open; we need to know who the employer will be, what the status of the current contracts is and how they will be put into transition to new contracts for the staff when their employment changes.

Is there anything the Government can tell us about how they might—they hope—have better relations with the unions in future so that we can look forward to a better experience in getting that balance of better pay for better delivery, smarter working, adopting work practices and being willing to operate new capital investment in a way that delivers higher productivity and higher quality of service?

I also welcome my noble friend Lord Moylan’s draft of what the purposes should and could be, which may not entirely match all the Government’s aims. It would be interesting to hear from the Government which of his suggestions are intended or implied in the current legislation, so that we can have some early indication of what the mission statement of the new railway might be.

I think taxpayers and railway users are expecting more services, not fewer. That has not been the early experience of the last two years. They are expecting better punctuality and timeliness, which would also be welcome. What the new railway will definitely require is more feel for where more passenger movements are required or possible. As in the early days of privatisation, surely the early days of full nationalisation might want to achieve a trend of rising passenger numbers, which privatisation achieved very well, and the ability of companies to develop timetables and services more suited to modern travel needs and therefore fuel the continuing progress of providing more growth in passengers and revenue.

If a new railway management—the controlling mind of GBR—knows how to do that, it will make everything a lot easier if the background of the completion of these arrangements is rising passenger use, rising revenues, greater flexibility over timetables and thinking about growth rather than cost cutting and the elimination of less profitable routes. That can easily get you into a spiral of downturn, as with the nationalised railway experience for most of its time post war, until privatisation reversed those difficult trends.

I hope that the Minister will not rule out one of the modest successes of recent years, which is the ability to have a competitive challenge to the monopolist. There are times when people outside will see ways of harnessing people, talent and capital to provide additional and better service using the existing track, and for that they will clearly need fair terms for access, and that will provide an innovative stimulus to the nationalised monopoly. However, I fear that the Government will not want to do that, and so I think they will find it that much more difficult to innovate and improve the timetables without that stimulus or spur from others generating such ideas and providing such a challenge and opportunity for the growth of the railway.

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Amendment 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would amend the definition of GBR’s functions in relation to service facilities. The Bill exempts the provision of service facilities for use by other train operators from GBR’s new access regime. These facilities will be things such as maintenance depots, freight terminals and sidings. They are provided in a wider market in which other suppliers may also participate. For that reason, access to these service facilities will continue to be governed by the existing ORR access regime rather than GBR’s new one so that GBR and other providers operate on a level playing field and third parties can gain fair access to these facilities. Consistent with that principle, Clause 3 makes it clear that the provision of these service facilities is not a statutory function of GBR. The Bill therefore already provides the parity of treatment that I believe this amendment is trying to achieve. However, I would be happy to meet the noble Lord if that would be helpful on this subject.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

That just begs the question of why in Clause 70—perhaps we can discuss it before we arrive at that point—Great British Railways has been taken out of the definition of being an infrastructure manager for the purposes of access rights under the 2000 regulations.

While I have the Committee’s attention for a moment, my noble friend was asking what functions Great British Railways can undertake. The clause makes it clear that the statutory functions are distinct from those things that Great British Railways can do as a company. Some of the things that we are discussing, such as property development, are things that it is doing as a company. However, we have to bear in mind, and the Minister will tell me if I am wrong about this, that we go on to hear about the Secretary of State giving directions and guidance to Great British Railways. That is in relation to its statutory functions, so, by definition, it will not extend to the actions that GBR undertakes as a company. We need to be aware that there is that territory called being a company, which is outside the scope of the Secretary of State’s directions and guidance.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

It is not very well drafted at all, is it?

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I did not add my name, but there is a limit to the number of names you can add. Many of us feel very supportive of the recommendations from my noble friend Lady Leaman in those two amendments.

I simply want to give some context to the reasons for the amendments such as those from the noble Lord, Lord Young, to be considered for the Bill, or something based on them being considered, to secure a genuinely fair and free market in the retail sales of train tickets. It is worth remembering how much difference the private operators made to the price you had to pay for many kinds of journey. We have been discussing it in theoretical terms, but there was a time when, if you wanted to travel from Edinburgh to Penzance on the cross-country train which made that journey, the cost was enormous. What changed it? It was split ticket operators demonstrating that they could get four or five different tickets—including, when I did it on one occasion, a West Yorkshire rover ticket that carried me one small piece of the journey—and that this accumulation of a handful of tickets would give you a price less than half the cost that you would have been quoted originally for that journey.

Not only did that cheapen tickets for a lot of people making difficult journeys, but it also changed the attitude of many of the operating companies. Certainly when I go to the station to buy a ticket, I am now always asked whether I want a cheaper ticket by getting the next train or the one before it. There is an alertness to the customer’s need to know what the options are for a reasonably priced ticket, which has been brought into the system by the private operators. I do not advocate these amendments because competition is a good Liberal value, but because experience has proved that to be the case.

All this has to exist in a world in which very rapid change will take place. At the moment, operators issue their own tickets. The result is that there is an invisible interaction between the person selling the ticket, the retailer, and the revenue protection officer on the train whose decision it is whether that ticket will be valid on that train. If you have missed one and are getting the next one, it may well not be; if you have chosen to change your journey pattern, it may well not be. The Minister may fondly believe—we have talked about this in a very helpful discussion—that all this will fall away, because when GBR is the only one providing the trains, there will not be these difficulties. I am not convinced of that; I think that old habits will die hard. If we are not very careful, we will still have a situation where the retailer gives you the impression that he is retailing a piece of paper or an email that will enable you to travel on one of several trains, when you are actually buying something limited by the policies and practice of the operator. It may be one operator in principle, but there will still be different regions under different regional management, so we need to have methods of ensuring that. I hope to return to that second point later in Committee, but we should understand the context and value of what we are discussing.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I do not have my name on these amendments, but I thoroughly agree with pretty much everything that has been said. I especially support what my noble friend Lady Harding said in introducing this group and am entirely in agreement with my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. I do not want to get into the question of appeals, because we will come on to how the appeal process should be structured later.

Amendment 47 in the name of my noble friend about the approved document is particularly important. I assume that the code of practice that we are promised, which the noble Baroness, Lady Alexander, was talking about, is the equivalent of the approved document or some part of it. At the moment, we have this ticketing and settlement agreement. We have to know how this is going to work in future. If we do not, we should expect—indeed, we should call for—the Competition and Markets Authority to step in. As things stand, the relevant aspects of the ticketing and settlement agreement constitute part of a block exemption against a Chapter 1 prohibition under the Competition Act. It is, on the face of it, potentially an anti-competitive agreement, but the block exemption exists. The question is whether the agreement satisfies the requirements of the block exemption. We have to look at the agreement to know whether that is the case, which is why Amendment 47 is right. We have to ask the Competition and Markets Authority whether the code of practice or the approved document under the Bill satisfies the requirements of the block exemption.

The fact is that GBR will be in a dominant position. Under the Competition Act, in addition to the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements there is a prohibition on abuse of a dominant position. Much of this debate is saying that, given that we know that GBR will be in a dominant position, we should be actively looking for the Office of Rail and Road, by way of market investigations in this area if necessary, or the Competition and Markets Authority to step in, as the current jurisdiction enables it to do, to counter any abuse. We know from Clause 2(1) that Great British Railways has no Crown immunity. Under Section 73 of the Competition Act, there is a Crown immunity from the constraints, remedies and directions of the Competition and Markets Authority, so GBR does not want to be in a position where the Competition and Markets Authority comes after it to prevent its abuse of a dominant position. For all those reasons, the Government would be well advised to put into the legislation measures that will prevent GBR being tempted to abuse its dominant position and to ensure that the approved document will satisfy the CMA’s requirements for a block exemption.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady Harding of Winscombe for her excellent opening of this group, the comprehensive way in which she did it and—I think this is a powerful point—her real experience of a similar process and what actually happens in practice. One of the values of this House is having not just theoretical debates but Members who have experience of how these things work in practice. It is no good just legislating for what we think might happen; it is about what will happen. That was particularly valuable.

In this area, unlike some of the areas in the Bill, there is broad consistency among everybody who has spoken so far. At Second Reading, in other fora and in writing, the Minister set out that the Government want a competitive retail landscape and recognise the benefits of that. So what we are debating here is not the principle but how best to achieve that shared goal in practice. I will try to add to this debate.

Practically, the suggestion in my noble friend Lord Holmes’s Amendment 182 of a functional separation —which the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, also raised—is the cleanest and most sensible solution. That means that GBR is not in a position where it is tempted to abuse a dominant market position. It has a separate retailing arm, the rules can operate in a transparent way, you avoid a lot of trouble and you do not have to set up a complicated mechanism to deal with that abuse. I understand that the Government have set their face against that, but I reinforce that that would be the best solution and would solve a lot of these problems.

If the Government do not want to do that, for whatever reason, we absolutely need to make sure, first, that there is transparency. If all this is hidden away, it is very difficult for whatever mechanisms are put in place, whether it is the CMA, the ORR or whatever legal processes the independent retailers have to do. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, they are not huge companies with bottomless pits of money to be able to do this. If you do not have transparency, people do not know what is going on.

I will make a slightly different argument, bringing in our friends from the Treasury, than the one my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham made. This is one where the Treasury should be on our side. One of the important things that the Treasury wants to achieve is to reduce the subsidy paid to the rail network because, post Covid, the rail network does not send money to the Treasury; it sucks money away from the Treasury. The only way that will change on the operating side is if there is innovation and more passengers use the rail network. The ticketing retailers are one of the ways, in the innovative way they retail tickets. Importantly, if leisure travel is to be a growth area, the partnerships that they strike with providers of leisure opportunities can then be combined with travel to produce innovative packages. If you are going to do all that, you need that thriving, competitive retailing operation, so the Treasury should want that to be successful.

The other thing the Treasury should want is that the operating cost of GBR’s own ticketing operation should be as low as possible. On the cost of running that operation, I challenge what my noble friend Lord Young said. We know what the third-party retailers get because we know what the percentage commission is. If GBR’s retailing operation is not able to run its services for less money than that, it should not be in business, frankly, because it is adding no value at all and should not be running it. My hunch is it that it will not be able to, which is why, when I was Secretary of State, I said it should not really get involved in this business at all because there were lots of competing providers that were much better at it and, frankly, it should just get those to do it.

However, for reasons I do not quite understand, Ministers want GBR to be involved in this process. So, it is critical that the accounting—I declare my interest here as a chartered accountant—should be absolutely transparent so that we can see what it costs. From the Treasury’s point of view, as I said, it wants to be sure that no subsidy is going into the ticketing operation from the rest of the thing, given that there are competitive operators that can deliver this, I suspect, more cost effectively. That is an argument for the Treasury supporting some of these amendments.

On the subsidy point, I believe there is a question that is not resolved, which the independent retailers are concerned about. I understand that, in written correspondence with the Independent Rail Retailers, the department has asserted that GBR’s online retailer will not be subject to the Subsidy Control Act 2022, arguing instead that it will be governed solely by the Public Service Obligations in Transport Regulations 2023. That approach is inconsistent with the legal framework and assurances given by Ministers during the passage of the Bill so far that GBR will remain subject to public law, competition and subsidy control requirements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 4 deals with relations with the devolved authorities in Scotland and Wales. I have a number of amendments here—five, in fact. They all appear in a sense to be relatively minor but they go to the heart of the devolution settlement. They raise the question of whether the Bill is in line with the new Prime Minister’s policy—I know he has not been elected to anything but he is the new Prime Minister—of making devolution a reality. I will run through the amendments fairly straightforwardly and leave it to others to debate them and the Minister to respond.

One of the things that can be done is that any combined authority or devolved authority has a right to request. I always find this slightly offensive, because we are a free country—everyone has a right to request something from the Minister—but apparently, this valued “right to request” is going to be given. You can go along and ask GBR if it will run a service local to you, which might even be branded your way, to which you might contribute some of the costs. That is the general idea. I can understand that in relation to English combined authorities but not the devolved Administrations.

For example, I do not understand at all why Scotland should be confined by statute to running that service using Great British Railways. If the path is available and the service can be run, why should Scotland not make its own choice about who the operator of that service should be? As I understand it, that would not be possible under the Bill; it would have to be a GBR service. I think that is a bit insulting to Scottish devolution. The same applies to Wales. My Amendment 21 would correct that and allow them to exercise railway functions through a body corporate other than Great British Railways.

Amendment 145 goes hand in hand with Amendment 146, because they relate to Scotland and Wales. They relate to the fact that, under the Bill, there will have to be a memorandum of understanding between Great British Railways and the Scottish and Welsh Governments. There is a great deal of reliance on memoranda of understanding in the Bill, but we never see them and have no entitlement to do so. I am not saying that they will not be published, but I am not sure that the Government are under an obligation to publish them. They are so much a part of this Bill, but their substance is being concealed from us in Parliament and wrapped up in documents that are ancillary to the main agreement. My Amendments 145 and 146 would require those memoranda to be laid before Parliament before they could come into effect.

Finally, I have the paired Amendments 294 and 295. Again, one relates to Scotland and one to Wales. Amendment 294 relates to Clause 82. There is something fantastically cheeky in Clause 82, which reads:

“Great British Railways must consult the Scottish Ministers before making a decision within subsection (2)”—


which would be a decision about cross-border services and additions to a part of the railway network operated by Great British Railways that is situated in Scotland—

“if it appears to Great British Railways that the decision will significantly affect the interests of Scotland’s economy or of persons living in, working in or visiting”

the area. I come back to a similar question I asked in the last group: what economic capacity would Great British Railways be employing to make disinterested decisions about whether something would have a significant effect on the interests of Scotland’s economy? Secondly, is it not more likely that the Scottish Government would be the appropriate body to make a decision about whether something will have a significant effect on the interests of the Scottish economy? My amendment would put that right by reversing it. Amendment 295 would do something similar for Wales.

There is a certain arrogance in the Bill, certainly with regard to local government in England, but the arrogance towards the Scottish and Welsh Governments is beyond the pale, given what the Prime Minister has been saying and what those Governments would accept. I hope that, when the Minister replies, he will say that the matters to which I have drawn attention are slips in the drafting that he will be happy to correct, either through my amendments or amendments that he will draft and submit to us on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I want to talk to my Amendment 22 in this group. Before I do that, I might just say so to my noble friend that I see the point he is driving at with Amendment 21, but I think it is a little more complicated. It seems to me that this is about the circumstances that apply where the Scottish or Welsh Ministers wish to use Great British Railways or a company jointly owned by themselves and Great British Railways. In effect, they are not subsidiaries of Great British Railways: we can already see in the Bill this distinction between GBR companies and a company that is jointly owned by Scottish and Welsh Ministers and GBR.

They can use that to provide services but, as far as I can see, they are not prevented from doing the following. If you look at subsequent clauses, we have seen the whole process of designation of passenger services, which those of us who did the public ownership Bill will remember. They have to designate passenger services with a public sector company, but the definition of a public sector company in a later clause is not the same. It could be a company wholly owned by Scottish Ministers or by Welsh Ministers; they are not required to use Great British Railways. They could even do the same thing that the Secretary of State can, which is exempt services from designation, and then do the same as the Secretary of State does with TfL but in Glasgow, Cardiff and so on. So I think it is a little more complicated.

In particular, I think putting “other body corporate” in here is not necessary. More to the point, if I may say so to my noble friend, is to re-enter the question of the scope of who might provide designated services, which I know he will do with further amendments at a later stage.

Amendment 22, on my part, is just to see whether there is really a problem. At the point at which Scottish and Welsh Ministers look to change arrangements that they have made with Great British Railways to provide some services, they are required to consult with the Secretary of State and Great British Railways. However, those arrangements will necessarily lead to issues that need to be governed by the regulatory functions of the Office of Rail and Road and relate to the licensing of those operators through the ORR. It seems to me perfectly reasonable to require that Scottish and Welsh Ministers, at the point of making or changing those arrangements, should also consult the Office of Rail and Road in order to ensure that there is not a difficulty associated with what they are asking GBR to do on their behalf. The purpose of Amendment 22 is to put in that consultation with the ORR.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, these are interesting amendments. I have had several representations from the rail sector in Wales and Scotland, and they are clearly quite concerned.

The first question I probably need answering is on who will be owning and operating the infrastructure in Wales and Scotland. At the moment, in Scotland, it is done by Transport Scotland, and in Wales, I cannot remember but think it is different. Of course, both those organisations may, and do, operate passenger train services. Given the scope of the Bill, which we have been discussing at length today, will Transport Scotland and the Welsh Assembly be able to let their own contracts with GBR or an independent operator to run trains? Who will be responsible for managing the infrastructure if it goes wrong or needs maintenance, and for the issue in the amendment, which is about co-ordinating with the rest of the UK? To me, it is not clear at the moment, and I would be grateful if my noble friend could clarify. I am probably being stupid, but there we are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can I just check that the rail strategy that the Secretary of State will produce will be a strategy for Great Britain, and that the memorandum of understanding will be about how that interacts? If the Secretary of State’s rail strategy is for England only, that does not make sense. What the Minister just said implies that the Secretary of State will produce a rail strategy for Great Britain, in which case there would not be any friction from ensuring that those documents were published together.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Before the Minister responds to that point, I add that I am slightly confused because Clause 15, “Rail strategy”, says that the Secretary of State “may not” include provision relating to the functions of the Scottish Ministers, so it may be a rail strategy for Great Britain, but it cannot deal with the functions of the Scottish Ministers.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I say in response to noble Lords that the long-term rail strategy is for the whole railway. The Scottish and Welsh Governments are being consulted, but Scotland will also have a strategy covering its own functions because that is the meaning of devolution. I hope that is clear.

Railways Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 10th September 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, had hoped to be here today but found himself with other commitments, and therefore asked me to move his Amendment 22A, which I also support. This is a probing amendment on whether the provision in the Bill which enables Great British Railways to enter into partnerships with mayors—we will debate whether it should be mayors or others later—could be strengthened. I would be keen to hear what the Minister has to say on that.

The Bill sets out a partnership structure that enables collaborative working, local funding commissioning and other benefits, but this wording change from “may” to “must” would really strengthen the requirement for a partnership with mayors. I hope the Minister agrees that Great British Railways must treat mayors—and others, as we will come to—as genuine partners, and that the Government will consider this amendment seriously.

I take this opportunity to speak to the other amendments in this group. I think it is a very important group and that is not just because my background, like many noble Lords’, is in local and regional government. I am very aware that, for example, Transport for Greater Manchester, Transport for London and others are concerned about the Bill as drafted because it does not treat them as real partners at the table; it feels like a consultation or tick-box exercise rather than a genuinely equal partnership.

I just remind noble Lords that, when responding to my amendment on rail devolution on Report of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill, on 6 November 2024, the Minister said:

“I can reaffirm to your Lordships’ House that the railways Bill will include a statutory role for devolved governments and mayoral combined authorities. They will be involved in governing, managing, planning and developing the railways”.—[Official Report, 6/11/24; col. 1543.]


Yet I believe—as do others here, hence all the amendments—that the Bill as drafted does not provide the statutory powers that mayoral and strategic authorities and others require. Since the Bill was introduced to Parliament, we have of course seen a new Prime Minister, one committed to devolution to mayoral and strategic authorities, so I really hope that some things will change.

I have already talked about the amendment that I am moving on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, which I hugely support as it strengthens the Bill. I hope the Government accept that. It would be useful if the Minister could set out how the Government see Clause 5 enabling Great British Railways and these authorities to develop local commissioning partnerships. I stress that this clause is particularly important for Greater Manchester, because the city region wants to take on a more meaningful role, similar to London’s, in shaping and commissioning rail services.

Many of the amendments in this group, which we will hear about, are trying in different ways to ensure that strong role for local and regional government. They include the sensible amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which seek to bring in the term “strategic authorities” from recent devolution legislation. I hope the Government will be sympathetic to many of those amendments. In many ways, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, is the simplest way to strengthen regional and local government’s hands.

The noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has Amendment 147, which allows for an authority to declare a service wholly within its area as a mayoral concession service, so it can be run rather like Transport for London is. I think that is interesting, as it feels like, to date, Transport for London and others have had to go with a begging bowl to government to take over metro railway services for their area. This would shift the balance, so I think it is an interesting proposal to discuss.

Amendment 159 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would expressly forbid the transfer of TfL services to Great British Railways. This again highlights the tension between national and regional services, and concerns about the powers of Great British Railways.

I look forward to the rest of the debate on this group and the Minister’s response. Given this new Government’s agenda around devolution, I hope that we start to see a shift and, potentially, some government amendments in this area. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I think it might fall to me to speak next, if my noble friend does not want to speak to his amendments at this stage.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I will speak at the end, if I may.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I have four amendments in this group: Amendments 26, 64, 304 and 333. They are all on the same point, which is that, in the Bill, the definition of a “relevant local government body” is expressed as mayoral combined authorities, mayoral combined county authorities and passenger transport executives. Those first two—mayoral combined authorities and mayoral county combined authorities—are, I think, based on the proposition from some months back that, over time, all the strategic authorities would move towards being mayoral strategic authorities.

Since the original drafting of this legislation, we have completed the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act. Those of us who worked on that legislation will recall that Section 1 defines strategic authorities, and it does not do so by reference to whether or not they have a mayor; they are, basically, single-foundation strategic authorities, combined-foundation strategic authorities or county combined strategic authorities. It seems to me that, for the purposes of this legislation, the relevant local government bodies with which Great British Railways, in particular, and the Secretary of State should work would be all the strategic authorities. Why would we exclude those that do not have mayors?

I say this because, whether it takes a year or two—or three or four—there will be some strategic authorities that may not have a mayor for a very long time. I do not say this because I want them not to have mayors; I am in favour of them having mayors. It is just that we are quite a long way from that happening. From my quick survey, looking across England, we probably have two long-term single-foundation strategic authorities: Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire. By my reckoning, at the moment, we have at least four, perhaps five, combined county authorities—Lancashire, Cornwall, Surrey, Devon and Torbay, and Norfolk and Suffolk—with no intention of having mayors. Interestingly, that includes Cornwall. The Minister will remember that, last week, when the Prime Minister was answering questions in the other place for a very long time, he referenced devolution in Cornwall and said

“with or without a mayor”.

Therefore, we are in a very simple position: we want devolution. We want GBR to have regard to the transport plans of strategic authorities. We want GBR to consult with strategic authorities, with the responsibilities that they have. We want statutory information sharing between GBR and strategic authorities. If we put “mayoral” in this legislation, we will restrict the availability of all the statutory consultation, information-sharing and advisory relationships between GBR and non-mayoral strategic authorities. I am sure that that is not anybody’s intention. The simplest thing to do would be to reference the definition of strategic authorities in Section 1 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act; that would be altogether simpler and better in the long run.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support what my noble friend Lord Lansley has said on his Amendment 26. I had some dealings on this when the Prime Minister was the Mayor of the Greater Manchester and when Andy Street was Mayor of the West Midlands. Both of them engaged with the department on their desire to integrate the national rail network into their plans locally. They wanted to have those conversations, which worked well. In those cases, obviously, they were both mayors.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Lansley. Given the announcement this week that local government reform and the bringing together of unitary authorities, which is, in many cases, a precursor to having mayors, have been held up and there have been legal challenges, it would be much more sensible, as my noble friend says, if we made sure that GBR could have those sensible conversations and had the powers to do that with all appropriate local authorities with a strategic transport function. We should not limit that to those authorities with a mayor.

As my noble friend said, although it was at least the preference of the Government led by Keir Starmer that there should be limits to what you could devolve if you did not have a mayor, it sounds like, from what the Prime Minister said in his answers to Cornish MPs, that he is open-minded about that. Therefore, we could have some significant local authorities with transport powers without a mayor. I know from my own experience that there are a number of proposals in the Cornish area, for example, for some rail infrastructure that would bring significant benefits to the Cornish economy. It would be perverse if the Cornish council could not have those conversations with GBR or if people had to work out weird ways of having to facilitate those conversations because we had not provided for that in this legislation.

I agree with my noble friend. The Minister would be wise either to accept his amendment or, if it needs to be worded differently or other changes need to be made, at least to take it away and come back on Report with a government amendment, or suite of amendments, to achieve the same function. That would improve the position and, in fact, get to a position that I think is the Government’s intention—certainly the current Government’s intention. It may not have been when the legislation was drafted but I think that it would more accurately reflect the position now.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we move on, I return briefly to a point raised in Committee on Tuesday on Amendment 146, regarding the long-term rail strategy and its relationship with devolved railway responsibilities. I was less than clear on this issue when we discussed it previously and thought it would be helpful to make a point of order to provide clarity and correct the record.

For clarity, the Government consider that Clause 15 is correctly drafted and accurately reflects the devolution settlement. The Secretary of State’s long-term rail strategy will cover Great Britain. It will cover all of England and Wales and will address the railway in Scotland with regard to reserved matters only. Reserved matters include issues such as cross-border services, technical standards and railway safety and security. Scottish Ministers have devolved responsibility for matters such as Scottish passenger services and Scottish funded infrastructure. Accordingly, Clause 15(3) prevents the long-term rail strategy making provisions about functions of the Scottish Ministers, who will cover those matters in their own strategy.

I hope that explanation is helpful. The key point is that there is no inconsistency between describing the strategy as Great Britain-wide and providing an appropriate carve-out for devolved Scottish functions. I also reassure noble Lords—

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I have a quick question. Why, then, is there not a similar provision saying that the rail strategy may not make provision about the functions of Welsh Ministers?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The answer is that the infrastructure arrangements in Wales are significantly different and Wales does not have its own settlement in that respect. I reassure noble Lords that engagement between the Government and Scottish and Welsh Ministers on both strategies is productive and will continue until their publication. I am grateful to noble Lords who raised this issue, providing an opportunity to place my clarification on the record.

In respect of the second point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, about an email from—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

On group 1, of course this matter is of significance to this Government, with a new Prime Minister, and I firmly believe that the Bill already empowers mayors in local areas. I am clear that Great British Railways will not work unless it works for and with mayors and local communities.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, who quoted me, I stand by what is said. This is absolutely not a tick-box exercise.

I turn to Amendment 22A in the name of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, has kindly spoken today. I absolutely agree with him and with the noble Baroness that the partnership approach that the Bill sets out must be effective. GBR must engage with partnership offers seriously, and the bar for GBR to reject a partnership must be exceptionally high. As we are aligned on the intent behind the amendment, which she described as the principal amendment in this group as it covers all circumstances, I commit to taking it away and I shall see what can be done after this debate.

I turn to Amendments 147 and 156. The Government absolutely support further rail devolution where it is in the interests of passengers and the wider rail network. That is why the Bill already provides a route for passenger rail services to be devolved through exemption from designation by the Secretary of State in Clause 28. Where services are devolved, mayors already have flexibility to choose their approach to securing passenger services and may secure them via a concession contract, including to the private sector, if they so wish. The Bill does not change that. TFL, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, describes, operates on precisely this basis. There is therefore no need to duplicate the existing devolution provision in the Bill, which already achieves that intent in full.

On Amendments 23 and 24, Clause 5 is already intended to support local commissioning arrangements: it enables mayors to contribute funding where they wish to secure services or improvements that reflect local priorities and go beyond the national railway offer. This gives local leaders a mechanism to invest in additional rail outcomes for their area where they choose to do so, providing the local input that we know is so important for enhancing our communities. The details of these arrangements, including revenue-sharing options, will be agreed separately from legislation via collaborative partnerships between GBR and mayors. Work on developing this model has already begun, using Greater Manchester as a pathfinder—I am going to meet the new mayor of Greater Manchester tomorrow.

The Government absolutely support greater local influence over rail services, but allowing mayors to run rail services is a financially significant decision, with safety and public interest impacts; that is why it is right that the current process in the Bill for devolving services to local leaders remains the route that is used for this. That route is well understood, familiar to industry and proven effective. Allowing mayors to run GBR services outside of the usual process is not necessary and does not better serve local communities.

I turn to Amendments 26, 64, 304 and 333. The Bill is focused on mayoral strategic authorities to reflect their growth across England and the role that mayors can play to convene local partners and tackle regional challenges. Mayors have the most far-reaching and flexible powers; therefore, this level of authority is of the appropriate scale and capability to integrate rail with wider public transport, enabling them to engage effectively with Great British Railways.

Furthermore, as outlined in the Cabinet statement Rewiring the State, published in July, the Government consider that mayors who are directly accountable to the residents who elect them can provide the best governance for their communities. As a result, the suite of powers available to areas with mayors will be commensurately greater, recognising the role that they play as leaders in their regions. However, this is not to say that other levels of local government will be excluded from engagement with Great British Railways, and I take the point that it is important that no local authority is left out, as indeed the Prime Minister said a few days ago. The plan is for all tiers of local government to benefit from local GBR business units, and some existing authorities have collaborated well with the existing structure, including Devon, with several new stations, and, recently, Cornwall, with the Mid Cornwall Metro.

Our approach does not intend to exclude anyone from working with the railway, but we think it is sensible to use mayors as a focal point for powers, responsibilities and representation in their local areas. That said, I am happy to see if there is anything we can do outside the Bill to reassure foundation authorities that their views will be properly considered, and I will reflect on that further.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his response to my amendments. To avoid us further returning to this issue, I should say that there are other amendments to exactly the same purpose that I did not notice had not been grouped together, in Clauses 16 and 83 and elsewhere in the Bill, so I hope we will treat this as the one debate about that issue.

The route ahead, if I may say so to the Minister, is a very straightforward one: relevant local government bodies—for the purpose of information sharing, taking advice and co-ordinating with transport strategies—should be England wide, and therefore it should be all strategic authorities. If the Minister and the Government, understandably, want to go further and have a category of strategic authorities with mayors which have the ability to go further in terms of working with GBR and taking responsibilities, the route would be to put in something for that purpose in relation to established mayoral strategic authorities, which clearly have the financial basis on which to do that. Distinguishing between those two would make this work much more effectively.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I am particularly grateful for his suggestion that we debate this only once. I have listened carefully to what he has just said and I will reflect on it, as I said I would do on the rest of the subject. I am grateful to him for that, and indeed the Hansard record is useful in being able to cross-reference it further to this Committee session.

I turn to the proposals on Transport for London. Amendment 27 seeks to provide all mayoral authorities with the same powers as TfL. Of course, the Government support rail devolution where it can deliver better outcomes for passengers and local communities, but those arrangements should reflect the circumstances, capabilities and aspirations of individual areas rather than applying a single model everywhere. The TfL model has a distinct legislative and governance framework developed over many years, and it would not be appropriate to automatically confer all existing or future TfL powers on every mayoral combined authority. The other point worth noting is that the geography of London includes several complete railway services, unlike much of the geography of the rest of the combined authorities in England.

The Government have already published guidance on applications for rail devolution and, as I have already said, the Bill includes a route to devolved rail services for those seeking that in Clause 28. Therefore, should mayoral authorities want to pursue full devolution of certain services, as TfL has, they are welcome to use those established routes to seek it. Devolution arrangements should be considered on their merits, taking account of local circumstances and the outcome sought for passengers. A one-size-fits-all approach will not serve all local communities.

On Amendments 28 to 30, Clause 6 of the Bill requires GBR and TfL to co-operate on railway matters, including co-ordinating passenger services and sharing relevant information to help to integrate rail with the wider London network. As the directing mind for the railway, GBR will be responsible for those operational matters and how they will be discharged when collaborating with TfL. I do not believe that expanding the Secretary of State’s role further would reflect that clear division of responsibilities, but I can reassure the noble Lord that, via amendments that the Government brought in on Report in the Commons, the Secretary of State is still enabled to enter into arrangements with TfL to support the future devolution of rail services where that is needed. The Government believe that this approach is sufficient to support TfL to integrate and co-operate with the wider rail network.

On Amendment 159, I reassure the noble Lord that the Government are supportive of the success TfL has made of rail devolution, and existing devolved arrangements will continue. To that end, existing exemption orders in relation to TfL concession services do not have an expiry date. The Bill also contains safeguards governing access decisions, including duties on GBR, a requirement to have regard to the Mayor of London’s transport strategy, a requirement for GBR and TfL to co-operate in relation to all services, and an independent route of appeal to the ORR.

Likewise, Amendment 25 seeks to enable mayors to appeal access decisions if they affect services in their area. Clauses 83 to 86 already allow GBR to request advice from mayoral authorities about services in their area, require it to consult them if a decision will significantly affect their area and, if a decision will affect the local area, GBR will work with local partners weighing up trade-offs between local and national network priorities. This enables issues to be resolved through collaboration rather than requiring relevant local government bodies to challenge GBR through the access appeals regime. Despite this, all local authorities are able to appeal an access decision they are aggrieved by, under provisions already in the Bill.

On Amendments 297 to 301, Clause 83 already requires GBR to consult mayoral authorities where a relevant decision would significantly affect their local area, including the interests of the local economy or of people living in, working in or visiting the area. The amendments would therefore add little practical benefit beyond further bureaucracy, slowing down decision-making, while mayors would have to review hundreds of decisions, often irrelevant to them, before any progress can be made.

On Amendments 298 to 301, I reassure my noble friend that the Bill is already clear, through Clause 83, that GBR will have to consult mayoral authorities on its access and charging decisions where these relate to a GBR railway passenger service in the area and would significantly affect the local region.

Alongside these legislative commitments, it is the Government’s clear intention for GBR to work in partnership with mayoral authorities. I am determined that GBR will absolutely be a proactive partner of those authorities, maximising the benefits that the Bill can bring to local areas. As a result, I hope noble Lords are reassured that the Government share their ambitions on local devolution and I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

32: Clause 7, page 5, line 29, leave out from “section” to “in” in line 30
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendment in the name of Lord Lansley to Clause 7, page 5, line 36, would remove the exclusion of issues including access to infrastructure, the infrastructure capacity plan, the working timetable, the charging scheme and performance scheme from the requirement to consult the Scottish or Welsh Ministers insofar as they have delegated their functions to GBR.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, there are two sets of issues in this group. Mine is terribly simple and it is by way of a question to the Minister, just to be clear.

I do not understand why, in Clause 7, at the point the Secretary of State may give directions to Great British Railways about the activities in Scotland and Wales, in each case the requirement to obtain consent from Scottish and Welsh Ministers is disapplied if those directions relate to what is in Chapter 1 of Part 3, which is access, charging and timetable capacity.

Timetabling and so on seem, on the face of it, to be tricky things where if these are directions to GBR which impact in Scotland and Wales, they should certainly require the consent of the Scottish Ministers—for reasons that we touched on earlier, a different requirement may rest in relation to Welsh Ministers. But I am surprised to see that the implication of Clause 7 is that the Secretary of State can issue directions to GBR impacting on, for example, the timetable in Scotland but does not require the consent of Scottish Ministers. Amendments 32 and 33 in my name are to probe why that seems to be the case. I beg to move Amendment 32.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 35 and 36, which are in the names of my noble friends Lord Grayling and Lord Moylan. Respectively, they deal with amending Clause 7, on the power to give directions, and Clause 9, on the power to give guidance to GBR. They specifically refer to some extra duties that would fall on Ministers if they were giving specific directions around fares and the fare structure. They set out that if Ministers are giving directions or guidance

“about the level or structure of fares”

they would have to set out

“the assumptions, criteria and objectives used … so decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability”.

I support both these amendments, for the following reasons.

One of the important decisions that Ministers have to take about the railways is to balance the cost of running them and how that cost is split between the fare payer—and of course not just that person who actually uses the railways but, when it comes to track access charges, the other users of the railway network—and the taxpayer. It is a very important decision, given that most people in the country either never use the railways or do not use them very often. A relatively small number of people use railways frequently, and it is important to get the balance of costs split correctly.

Ministers also have to make an important decision in their negotiations with the Treasury around the cost that falls on the department—the taxpayer subsidy piece. I think Ministers signed up to some quite challenging targets in the last spending review to reduce the taxpayer subsidy. There are two ways you can do that: either you cut services significantly or you have to grow passenger numbers. If Ministers are making directions or guidance about fares, it is important to understand which model they are using. What are their assumptions and what is the evidence base for the fare structure? What will that do to passenger numbers and, ultimately, to revenue? Then there is any knock-on impact on costs, what it effectively does to the GBR profit and loss account, and therefore the balance of costs that lands on fare payers versus the taxpayer. Having that level of transparency is helpful for the fare-paying public and for taxpayers.

It is also helpful for Ministers, because it would force a level of rigour in the modelling that is undertaken and, importantly, the assumptions that are made about how passenger numbers respond to fares. It will also enable us to have a grown-up conversation about how we grow passenger numbers, given some of the innovations and service changes that I suspect will be required, particularly in offering better services for leisure travellers, because that is where there is the potential for significant growth in passenger numbers and revenue and therefore for reducing the overall cost of the railway.

These two amendments have a very sensible underpinning. They are not just helpful for taxpayers and fare payers; in the end, they will be helpful for the department, because they would force, as I said, a level of rigour and transparency in its financial modelling. They should therefore also commend themselves to our friends in the Treasury, who I think like rigour and robustness in financial modelling, because this just gets it all above board. Everyone has to be clear about their assumptions.

The amendments would also allow us to challenge the assumptions and enable us to have a much better conversation publicly about how we can drive up the usage of our railways and the flexibilities that we will require to do so. That will then, perhaps, provoke some helpful conversations with the trade unions and about the flexibilities that will be necessary to making sure that we have a financially sustainable railway for the long term, which is, in effect, what we need to guarantee secure jobs on the railway. That is the only way in which we are going to do this in the long term, because I do not think that taxpayers are going to continue wanting to subsidise the railway to the level they do now for the foreseeable future, given that many of them do not use railways frequently. I commend these two amendments and look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I believe I did answer the noble Lord: the memoranda of understanding between Scottish Ministers and this Government, and between Welsh Ministers and this Government, set out the processes by which these things will be co-ordinated. Were there to be any real difficulty in the circumstances he is describing, we would not have been able to get as far as we did in drafting the MoUs, which we have done, and in the agreement of Scottish and Welsh Ministers to the provisions of it.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

We are grateful to the Minister for his explanations—for my part, on Amendments 32 and 33. The Minister explained why the Bill says that, for reason of reserve powers, the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers is not required. This is an opportunity to make it clear that, if we were in the exceptional situation of the Secretary of State issuing directions that impacted in Scotland or Wales, it might be reasonable that the Secretary of State would consult Scottish or Welsh Ministers. I did not hear the Minister say that such a consultation would not take place so, on that basis, I am happy to withdraw Amendment 32.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

My Lords, I should advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendments 39 or 40 for reasons of pre-emption.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. The purpose of Amendments 43 and 45 is to explore the circumstances in which the Secretary of State or the Office of Rail and Road grants a licence to a person other than Great British Railways to operate railway assets in Scotland or Wales. As the Bill is structured, under those circumstances there would be a requirement to undertake consultation with the Passengers’ Council if the licence is a passenger licence or a station licence. There is no other requirement for consultation.

Let us think of a practical example. I know that licensing is not about operating the railway; it gives one the licence to operate but it does not bestow any ownership over these things. Core Valley Lines in south Wales is a significant set of 57 stations. It is not owned by Network Rail or operated by Great British Railways. Presumably, it is therefore the subject of a licence. If such a licence were to be issued, or changed, in Wales, it seems to me inherent that one would want the granting of that licence to be subject to a consultation requirement with Welsh Ministers. At the moment, there is nothing in the legislation that would require that to happen. Amendment 45 would introduce such a requirement for consultation before those assets in Scotland or Wales were the subject of the granting of a licence to someone other than GBR.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to hear from noble Lords on this group, and it is a special pleasure to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Reay.

Amendments 38 and 39 would undermine one of the fundamental principles that the Bill seeks to establish. The Secretary of State will set the overall strategic direction for GBR, and the Bill provides her with the sole ability to issue GBR’s licence. This reflects that it is the Secretary of State, not the ORR or the passenger watchdog, who is ultimately accountable for GBR both to Parliament and to the wider public. This aligns with the wider programme of regulatory reform that this Government are undertaking, where Ministers set the strategic direction and regulators are empowered to enforce against that. Regulators should not be making key strategic or political decisions for fundamentally important sectors.

However, regardless of who issues the licence, the ORR will enforce GBR’s compliance with it exactly as it does today. It has strong enforcement powers to ensure that GBR does not contravene the terms of its licence, including mandatory, legally binding directions requiring GBR to change its behaviour. It would not be appropriate to provide the ORR or the passenger watchdog with the power to veto the licence. The Secretary of State will, however, consult both those bodies and consider their views before issuing the licence.

On Amendment 38 specifically, I reassure noble Lords that safety remains fundamental to the operation of our railways and that the Bill does not weaken or alter the existing railway safety regime, nor the ORR’s role within it. No licence will be issued that is not fully compliant with safety regulations and safety law. Furthermore, we expect that GBR will have a licence condition to support the continuity of the current industry safety and standards framework to preserve our world-leading culture of rail safety. The Secretary of State will consult the ORR on the licence precisely to ensure that these kinds of conditions are fit for purpose.

I turn to Amendments 41 to 46. Currently, the Secretary of State is the ultimate licensing authority for the railways under the Railways Act 1993, and the current Bill does not change that. As it does now, the ORR will continue to issue all non-GBR licences under the general authority given to it by the Secretary of State. Not only would removing the Secretary of State from the process or requiring the ORR to consent undermine continuity and stability for the industry but it would be superfluous in practice, as the ORR already issues these licences on behalf of the Secretary of State.

Let me also clarify that railway licensing is, and will remain, a reserved matter. Scottish and Welsh Ministers are not licensing authorities under the current system, and the Bill will not change this. However, that does not mean that Scottish and Welsh Ministers are prevented from making their views known. The ORR is required under the Bill to provide notice prior to any licence being issued and to consider any representations, including any by Scottish and Welsh Ministers. We therefore do not consider it necessary to create an additional consultation requirement specifically for Scottish and Welsh Ministers.

I also note that the Government have spent long and productive hours discussing the provisions of the Bill with Scottish and Welsh Ministers and, in both cases, they are content with the licensing provisions as drafted. In fact, Scotland has already published its legislative consent Motion. I therefore ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Can I ask the Minister why, if it is not necessary to create a statutory consultation requirement, it is necessary to have a consultation requirement in relation to the Passengers’ Council? Can it not respond to the consultation on a licence in the same way as Scottish or Welsh Ministers could?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am sure it could, but it is desirable to mention the Passengers’ Council, since we are setting it up and it is an important body. The distinction I am seeking to draw is leaving the Passengers’ Council as a consultee, rather than requiring its permission.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group: Amendments 65 and 73. Rather than the broader issues of funding, mine are much more nitty-gritty questions about the transparency of the business plan and how the funding processes for Great British Railways are to work.

Amendment 65 is to Schedule 2, which is that part of the Bill where Great British Railways shows us in its business plan how its money is received and allocated towards activities. If I remember correctly, we are in that bit where it has to set out various things. We are at line 27 on page 71:

“The plan must set out … the activities Great British Railways proposes … the costs of carrying on those activities, and how Great British Railways proposes to meet those costs”.


Strictly speaking, all the things that I am asking for in Amendment 65 might be comprised within that.

This is an opportunity for us to be clear about what Great British Railways should do. In a separate group I will come to another issue related to the relationship with local government bodies. In this particular instance, there would be important transparency in Great British Railways being required, when setting out its business plan, to show what contributions are received by GBR itself from GBR companies, presumably by way of profits or revenue remitted to GBR for this purpose, and vice versa: how much is being paid out through GBR companies and how much is being received. Amendment 65 is for that purpose: where the activity is carried out by a GBR company, the contributions received from or provided to GBR in relation to those activities. I hope that is a straightforward transparency issue when the business plan is being presented. A good plan would do that anyway; it is just a case of trying to be clear about that now.

This affords me the opportunity to say something to my noble friend Lord Moylan. We discussed on Tuesday the question of GBR companies, and he returned to this issue and chastised me, saying that I was inaccurate. I do not think I was as inaccurate as he might imagine.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I never chastised.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I would never dream of doing that. It is inconceivable that I should do that. I drew to my noble friend’s attention an email that I had received that said that he had made a mistake and that the Minister had also made a mistake. I gave no opinion myself on that. It was very well argued, and I shared it with the Minister and the noble Lord. In writing to the noble Lord—I hope he has received that by now—I explicitly said that I did not know whether it was right or wrong, but I wondered whether he wished to make a comment. Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, may wish to make a comment at any time he chooses, but not a comment, I hope, that is intended to be a rebuttal of any chastisement, or even a mild criticism, suggested by me.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that correction. He has shared the email with me. I think it is worth putting on the record the point, made in that email, that it is important to distinguish between joint ventures on the one hand and corporate activities of companies on the other. However, the point of the debate on Tuesday was that I was seeking to establish under the legislation that GBR companies do not have to be wholly owned. Hansard will show that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was seeking to establish that GBR companies are required to be wholly owned. That was the simple debate.

As I understand it, Clause 99 of the Bill makes it clear that GBR companies are a subsidiary of GBR, and a subsidiary under the Companies Act does not require to be wholly owned. If the Government had wanted GBR companies to be wholly-owned subsidiaries, they would have said so. So, as far as I am concerned, it is a subsidiary and, as we know, under the Companies Act, a subsidiary is a matter of control, not of complete ownership. As far as I am concerned, I got what I wanted out of that debate, which was my assurance that GBR companies are not required to be wholly owned.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, we are now redebating what was debated the other day. However, since there was an element of confusion, the noble Lord has accurately characterised the difference in position between himself and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but it was in the context of an important debate about whether GBR would be able to carry out partnership—I use the word loosely—arrangements with private sector developers for the development of land in which GBR had a stake, with a view to achieving things like more housing or whatever it might be. Of course a subsidiary does not have to be wholly owned, since it is a question of control, so there can easily come a point where a joint venture company might not be controlled by GBR, and the question then is whether those arrangements would still apply.

The fundamental issue in the debate as I saw it—I entirely understand what the noble Lord is saying—is whether the structure proposed by the Government in the Bill inhibits what we would all agree are desirable developments that could take place using GBR assets working with the private sector. I heard the Minister give assurance on that, and of course I accept that, but I was merely advancing this to him because the suggestion was that confusion had arisen about joint ventures, subsidiaries and wholly-owned control in the course of debate, and that the Minister had fallen into that confusion, along with others. Therefore, I was giving him the opportunity to say whether that was in fact the case, although I do not expect him to do so today because he has only just had the email.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I think that was an intervention. I can only speak for myself, but I do not think I am confused now. The Bill does not inhibit this from happening in future and that is a satisfactory position for us to have reached. That is relevant to this debate in that my Amendment 65 is about the relationship between GBR and its companies, and financial transactions—the resources provided to or the resources received from GBR companies—ought to be explicit in the business plan.

I turn to Amendment 73. Now we really are in a happy position. It is many years since I was responsible for the public expenditure of a government department. I do not mean as Secretary of State; I mean as the official responsible. Knowing what powers one is using in relation to spending money is important. Amendment 73 is a probing amendment but I have used the structure of saying that the same activity should not be funded out of both the powers in the Bill, where financial assistance can be provided by the Secretary of State to GBR, and Section 6 of the Railways Act 2005, which noble Lords who know these things better than I do will remember is a broad-ranging power to provide financial assistance to GBR. I want to establish at this point—we might return to it at a later stage to see whether it is a satisfactory position—which GBR activities will be in receipt of financial assistance from the Government under the Section 6 power that exists now under the 2005 Act, or the financial assistance to be provided under this legislation. We need to avoid the confusion of two different powers providing financial assistance to the same activity.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 54 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, and Amendment 55 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan. Obviously, I have not heard my noble friend’s exposition of the purpose of his amendment, which I look forward to listening to shortly, but I understand why these amendments have been tabled. I think that they are both intended to make it more difficult to change funding for railways, as opposed to other areas of public expenditure, but I am not sure that that is entirely a good thing. I completely understand why that would be a good thing if you were looking at it through the railway end of the telescope, but if you look at it from the point of view of a taxpayer or a citizen, I am not sure that tying the hands of Ministers in that way is entirely helpful.

I will take the two amendments in turn. In terms of background, it is worth saying that, if I have understood the Bill correctly, in part 1 of Schedule 2,

“Funding by the Secretary of State”,

the structure for setting the budgets in the first place is broadly the position now. The Government set out a plan for funding over a multiyear period, they notify various people of that funding and the funding is set out, as are the things that are expected to be delivered by the funding, so that it is all transparent for us to see what is going on. As far as I understand it, the Bill as drafted requires the Secretary of State purely to notify the ORR if they propose to vary the financial assistance—the Secretary of State has to tell the ORR in various circumstances. It is very clear that only notification is required; there is no requirement for the Minister to await the ORR doing anything before the Minister is able to proceed with the funding change. I am content with that set of circumstances, if I have understood them correctly.

My noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, which I understand is a probing amendment to test this, would make it very difficult for the Secretary of State to change that funding settlement, except in two cases: if the things they required GBR to do had changed and therefore the funding was different; or there was an emergency in the country at the level of what is set out in the Civil Contingencies Act. We do not have those very often, but there are lots of circumstances in which the Government have to make changes to public expenditure, for all sorts of reasons, without the country being in an emergency situation at the level defined in the Civil Contingencies Act. It is the proper role of Ministers to have that flexibility and the ability to set budgets, make funding decisions and even to choose within the departmental allocation that they have. Even if the Treasury is not changing anything in terms of the money that the department has, it is the job of Ministers to decide how that money is allocated between the different parts of the department’s expenditure, whether it is a—

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Amendments 57, 58 and 61 are about aligning the funding of designated passenger train services with the five-year funding cycle for infrastructure. There is absolutely no point in bringing track and train together if their funding cycles are over different periods of time. For this new organisation to succeed and run the joined-up railway that we are seeking, funding—both capital and revenue—the investment side and passenger services must be provided for in a five-year funding cycle.

Critical elements of the running of the railway are included in passenger services funding—for example, staffing at stations and rolling stock maintenance depots, and of course train crew, such as drivers, guards and conductors, as well as driver and staff training, which we know is a huge issue. If you do not get this bit right alongside the infrastructure, you will not benefit from what Great British Railways is supposed to deliver. So I hope the Minister can explain how this can be addressed, and I look forward to his response to my amendments.

Other amendments in this group probe aspects of the business plan, but most striking are the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, about ending or reducing taxpayer funding for the railway. As I said on day one of Committee, the railway will continue to need investment and subsidy, and I just do not think it is right for such clauses to be in the Bill. We heard about political direction, and it is for the Government of the day to deal with the budget as they see fit. But I hope we can look forward to having joined-up funding in five-year periods to make sure that Great British Railways is a success. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak on my two amendments in this group, Amendments 67 and 72. Amendment 67 is simply another opportunity, as there was in the last group, to explore and, I hope, again extract assurance from the Minister that the business plan and GBR’s statements in it will be sufficiently transparent such that we can see the financial relationship not only—as we said in the last group— between GBR and its companies but between GBR and any arrangement that it enters into with any local government bodies. So we should see what money is being paid to GBR for these purposes and how it is attributed to those activities.

I hope the Minister will say that that will definitely form part of the business plan. If he does, I would accept it, as it does not all need to be specified. In an earlier debate, my noble friend Lord Harper quite correctly referred to the dangers of specificity, which can come whenever one gets any kind of list. If there is no list at all, we all agitate as we do not know what will be in the business plan; if we try to specify too much, we start to create a statutory prohibition—or “inhibition” may be the more correct word—on what is put into the business plan. I have explained that amendment.

Amendment 72 is more interesting, in the sense that—in parentheses—I think the Minister slightly missed the point of my amendment in the last group. I was not saying that there should not be flexibility to provide for activities to be funded from different powers, in reference to Section 6 of the 2005 Act. My point is that the same activity should not be funded from two different statutory powers. There would be a particular problem if that were to occur.

Section 6 of the 2005 Act is very broad:

“The Secretary of State may provide, or agree to provide, financial assistance to any person … for the purpose of securing the provision, improvement or development of railway services or railway assets; or … for any other purpose relating to a railway or to railway services”.


While removing part of Section 6, the Government have kept the wider meaning of railway from this section, which is a pretty broad-based power.

It is interesting to contrast that power in the 2005 Act with paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 to this Bill. The power to provide financial assistance is

“for the purpose of activities … carried on in exercise of Great British Railways’ function under section 3(1)(a)”.

We recall that Clause 3(1)(a) is on the provision of infrastructure. Paragraph (b) is on the provision of railway passenger services and (c) is on determining fares, but I think we can probably ignore that, since the financial assistance is not to provide the fares but to determine them. However, I was quite interested because paragraph (f), on research and development and innovation, was also excluded.

This is a probing amendment, but I want to be clear: is it the Government’s intention with this Bill to provide financial assistance only for infrastructure and that there will be no financial assistance for the provision of passenger railway services and no money for research, development and innovation? Will all that be funded by the fare structure? The Government have given themselves a power in the Bill, through regulation, to add additional purposes for which financial assistance could be provided but, at the moment, it is just for infrastructure. If, at the moment, money needs to be provided to GBR for the provision of railway passenger services, that would have to come from the 2005 Act. I am just trying to follow the money. Where will it come from? If the Minister can tell us that it is only for infrastructure, I will stand down. At the very least, a specific power for the Government to support GBR for research, development and innovation is a power that we ought to retain.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about the subsidy, the consequence of what he is suggesting could happen is that GBR could subsidise a passenger service that was on the same route as, and in competition with, a private sector operator. To me, that would be quite difficult.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am not sure if that is a question to me, but let us assume it is. I am not sure that I am saying that. I am saying that, as things stand under this Bill, the Secretary of State is not providing money to GBR for the purpose of providing railway passenger services. The Secretary of State has the power to do it under the 2005 Act. Nothing I am saying determines how that money is to be used.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 314 in my name, supported by my noble friend Lord Moylan, enters the arcane world of Treasury theology—what is and what is not public expenditure. It would require the Secretary of State to report on the impact of the Bill on public finances. This is important because the Government constantly emphasise, rightly, their commitment to the fiscal rules to contain borrowing, build market confidence and reduce upward pressure on interest rates and taxes.

One of the fiscal rules is the investment rule: public sector net financial liabilities— sometimes known as PSNFL—which is a broad measure of national debt, must be falling as a share of the total economy by 2029-30. Another is the stability rule: the Government must forecast a surplus on day-to-day spending by 2029-30, meaning that regular public services are funded entirely through tax revenues rather than borrowing.

Clearly what GBR spends is public expenditure, but expenditure or borrowing by private companies can be classified as public expenditure if certain qualifications are met. Decisions on that are taken not by the Government but by the Office for National Statistics, and it operates according to international definitions. It does not allow for consideration of political or commercial significance when making its classification decisions; they are essentially statisticians.

The Minister may not have read “UK Economic Statistics Sector and Transaction Classifications: The Classification Process”—he may not even have heard of it—but it is relevant to Amendment 314. I shall summarise: the difference between the public and private sectors is determined by where control over the organisation lies rather than by “ownership” or whether the entity is financed from public funds. Control is the ability to determine general corporate policy. I will come on in a moment to the relevance of this to the rolling stock companies where, under the new scenario, GBR will be the principal customer, but there are two relevant instances where attempts by government to circumvent these rules have come unstuck, with consequences for the balance sheet.

One that will be familiar to the Minister was Network Rail. Network Rail was set up in 2002 as a private company limited by guarantee, primarily to keep its massive debt off the Government’s balance sheet. By structuring Network Rail as a private company limited by guarantee without shareholders, the Government could then borrow large sums of money for infrastructure upgrades without adding those billions to the official national public debt.

However, in 2014, ONS reclassified Network Rail as a central government body in the public sector, and this resulted in roughly £30 billion of debt moving on to the Government’s balance sheet. The Minister will have had direct experience of the consequences of that at Network Rail. We know because we have the Hendy report, which sets out the consequences for Network Rail of this reclassification. Debt was controlled, capital was rationed, assets were sold off and upgrades were postponed. I think the last thing the Minister wants to do is to write another Hendy report, mark 2, when rolling stock is classified as Network Rail is.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I already said that one thing the Secretary of State will do is to help the ONS with its understanding of both the recent past and what will happen as a consequence of the Bill. In the recent past, the Government have specified, to the most extraordinarily detailed degree, all the rolling stock used in all franchises for probably the past 10 or 12 years. They have also determined how long it runs for and how long it lasts. In those circumstances, we are very content to wait for the ONS to do its work when it chooses to do it.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I have a question pursuant to the debate about the powers to fund the GBR business plan. I understand from the Minister’s reply, and it is a reasonable proposition, that the Secretary of State should provide financial assistance in relation to activities set out by GBR in its business plan. Indeed, paragraph 3 says that the Secretary of State should do exactly that and say what financial assistance is expected to be provided. But would it not be logical, therefore, that the powers to provide financial assistance that are specified subsequently should extend to those activities within the business plan, rather than having only infrastructure being capable of being funded by the Secretary of State using the powers? We would end up with something much more visible: specific powers to provide financial assistance in relation to the business plan over this funding period.

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Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

59: Schedule 2, page 70, line 18, leave out “may” and insert “must”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives to include objectives as to the standards to be achieved in relation to railway services.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Amendment 59 looks at the statement of objectives that the Secretary of State sets out for GBR and what is intended to be achieved over the funding period. The objectives, as we can see in paragraph 2(2),

“may include objectives as to standards to be achieved when carrying on activities”

that are to be set out in the business plan. It is a simple proposition and one of those happy subjects that we always discuss in Committee: should the word be “may” or should it be “must”? The implication of “may” is that it may not be, and we are considering whether it would be acceptable for the statement of objectives not to include reference to the standards that are to be achieved in relation to these activities. One of these lists about which we are not supposed to be too specific follows, but standards to be achieved are not set out as such in that subsequent list. They tend to be objectives relating to other things.

However, my other amendment is intended to see how these things interact. Separately, in Clause 65, Great British Railways has the responsibility to consider whether it should have a performance scheme, which, as I understand it, is essentially about minimising disruption to the network and to passengers. The question is: where are the objectives in relation to minimising disruption to passengers? I do not see them in paragraph 2(3). You could argue that they arise from the carriage of passengers and goods, but I do not think it is sufficiently explicit. I am not sure whether it is included in objectives as to standards. Are those the same standards as in a performance scheme?

I see the two amendments being linked. We are looking to ensure that the objectives set out standards and are clear about what is required in terms of avoiding disruption and enabling passengers to be confident about the availability of services according to the timetable. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it may be helpful to the Committee, since I have such a large number of amendments in the group and no one else who is present has any, if I speak now, and then it will be easier for the noble Baroness to comment on the amendments I have moved.

I shall start with Amendment 63A. I have tabled it because in the last 24 hours I have been contemplating the wipe-out of 10% of the global population by artificial intelligence, which a whistleblower at Anthropic has said is a very likely prospect some time in the next 10 years. It is possible that these claims are somewhat overblown—I do not know—but it is astonishing that we have a Bill whose measures in all likelihood, as I say, will stay in place for 30 years but we are not having any debate about digital, artificial intelligence or the innovative future of the railway.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

May I just interrupt my noble friend? I think he has moved on to the next group. We are on the group led by Amendment 59, to which I just spoke.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

And today’s Committee is due to conclude with Amendment 63.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, let me turn to Amendments 94, 124, 125 and 291. I am pleased to say that I agree with many of the performance indicators set out in the noble Lord’s amendments, which will be important in GBR delivering the service the public expect. I also agree with the concept of an annual report. I reassure the Committee that, on both counts, such a thing already exists.

The Bill requires GBR to produce an annual business plan and we have already confirmed that this will include meaningful KPIs around performance. For example, the business plan will clearly have to include GBR’s progress towards reaching its statutory freight growth target and I happily confirm today that it will. The 2050 target is a long way out, but progress against it should be measured in the business plan in 2040 and in 2050. By keeping these KPIs in the business plan, we ensure that a reflection of GBR’s activities, the cost of those activities and its performance against those activities and costs are always transparent and available for scrutiny.

GBR will publish annual updates to this plan which can, and should be, scrutinised by Parliament in the usual way. GBR will need to consult with the ORR and the passenger watchdog when creating these updates, ensuring expert and independent advice. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, proposes, the ORR will monitor GBR’s performance against the KPIs in its business plan as part of its monitoring function. An important distinction, however, is that the ORR’s role under the Bill as drafted is not confined to looking backwards at whether a target has been met. The ORR can also recommend to the Secretary of State whether GBR’s commitment and performance measures are realistic and measurable—something not factored in to the amendment.

Linking KPIs to the long-term rail strategy, rather than the business plan, would undermine the purpose of the strategy. The rail strategy is designed to provide ministerial direction on the long-term trends that will affect the railways and, at a high level, what they expect GBR to do about them. But GBR must be independent enough to respond to the rail strategy with a self-developed, proactive and detailed activity plan covering the next five—

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Forgive me for interrupting. I cannot find where it is required that there be an annual business plan. I can see there is a provision for the business plan to be kept up to date, but nothing that says this has to be done at any specific time or on an annual basis.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

Let me come to that point. I believe that there is a provision, but before I say so, let me check.

The long-term rail strategy is designed to provide ministerial direction on the long-term trends that will affect the railways and, at a high level, what they expect GBR to do about them. The business plan is clearly the right place for short and medium-term targets to be included, which GBR should set for itself and which the ORR should review and comment on.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The long-term rail strategy will set out the Secretary of State’s expectations. The business plan will set out what GBR believes it can achieve to move towards the long-term rail strategy. The business plan has to be agreed with the Secretary of State, who might well disagree with some of its targets. In the end, GBR has to satisfy the Secretary of State about the progress that it proposes to make. I do not think that is much different, as the noble Lord will recall, to the Transport for London business plan, which translated the mayor’s transport strategy into targets related to the budget of the organisation and which were agreed by the mayor.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Surely there is, between the long-term rail strategy and the business plan, the statement of objectives. Surely the question, which I think my noble friend through his amendments has explored quite positively, is that the statement of objectives needs to be quite specific. Some of them need to be performance indicators in themselves, because the business plan is GBR explaining how it is proposing, through its activities and funding, to meet, or to contribute to meeting, what is set out in the statement of objectives.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I have to say to the noble Lord that I do not see the difference, in the sense that the long-term rail strategy must express the Secretary of State’s desire, for example, for a reliable railway in terms that enable the business plan to set out the measures that would be used to decide whether it is reliable. Indeed, in the recent past, one of the things that has had to be done since this Government took office was to agree, for the first time, what the measurements are and what the target should be for expressing the performance of the railway. I do not see that conflict in the way that the noble Lord does.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Forgive me, but I do not see it as a conflict at all. I am expressing, as I think the Minister has done on a previous occasion, that there is a difference between what is long term and what needs to happen this year, next year and indeed, for the purposes of the funding period, in the next five years. The statement of objectives is specifically about the next five years. The long-term rail strategy is on a different timeframe.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord is right, actually: I am beginning to confuse myself about this. There is a danger of getting into too great a specificity. He is right that the statement of objectives will include specific standards, but that translates into the business plan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I agree with the noble Lord that the supply chain is crucial. Actually, for much of the supply chain, what really makes a difference is the five-year periodic settlement. That highlights the need for this engagement to go on, both at the time when the five-year plan is formed and the rest of the time. I do not see any contradiction in those two things happening. The five-year settlement for infrastructure could not possibly be done properly without the involvement of the supply chain, but they do not go away for the next four years until the next one. The dialogue with them is constant—and so it should be. I had better make progress, if I may.

I turn to Amendment 82, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. I do not often completely disagree with the noble Baroness, but I do here, I am afraid, because her amendment would fundamentally blur accountability for the railway system and undermine the clear responsibilities in the Bill. I do not think that interposing another board between the Secretary of State and the board of GBR would be right. However, the Bill contains a number of provisions such that both the Office of Rail and Road and the passenger watchdog will have many opportunities to provide the Secretary of State with advice before she takes decisions. The reality is that she will most likely have taken advice from either, or both, of them before any performance matters should escalate to the point of requiring a direction.

On Amendment 84, as we discussed in earlier groups, the Government are dedicated to providing a steady drum beat of publications that will inform the House—and, indeed, this Committee—on progress in establishing GBR. I encourage the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, to look at the Government’s policy publication timetable on GOV.UK; indeed, I have just written to noble Lords about the publication of the draft access and use policy by Network Rail. Given the ambitious timeline that we are working to on this, it would not seem to make much sense to divert resources away from the business of establishing GBR in order to write progress reports that would largely duplicate existing information that the Government are already making available.

Given what I have said, I encourage noble Lords and the noble Baroness not to press their amendments.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this interesting debate. To my mind, we established one or two rather important propositions.

The first is that, when the Government are setting out their statement of objectives, in relation to which GBR writes its business plan, it would be helpful if it were as specific as possible about the performance indicators that are to be included in that; my noble friend made a lot of good points where that is concerned. I made, in effect, only one point: I accept that, on Amendment 62, relating it directly to the performance scheme may not be the way to do this, but, as with the question of how many trains arrive within 15 minutes of the timetable, there are standards that need to be included, and it is important that we have those standards in the statement of objectives.

The other thing that we have established is an interesting reflection on the relationship between the business plan and the funding arrangements. I draw noble Lords’ attention to paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 on funding. The ORR is setting a timetable, and we have four components to this. I do not envy the Office of Rail and Road’s process of trying to establish in precisely what relationship these four dates are, because it has to say to the Secretary of State, “You’ve got to tell us what your statement of objectives is”. Then it has to say to the Secretary of State, “You have to tell us what funding is available”, which is an interesting question because the answer might be “not much”. Thirdly, Great British Railways has to go off on a third element and give us the business plan. Lastly, the Secretary of State tells GBR and the ORR how much financial assistance is going to be provided.

I have two points to make. I am not at all sure why the fourth of those components is there in that form. There is nothing in the schedule saying that there is a requirement on the Secretary of State to provide such a notice. There is no notification requirement; it is simply that the power to provide financial assistance is there. So I would have thought that the Secretary of State might give notification of how much financial assistance there is, but looking across the whole funding period and having to notify them of what financial assistance is available seems a curious requirement to me.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

If I may intervene on the noble Lord, for once, I say to him: welcome to the five-year funding periods. We are now in control period 7, I think. The process that was described is complex, but it works remarkably well, which is why the industry and the Government are wholly aligned in wanting to carry on with it. I could discuss with him in more detail how it works, but it has generally been very effective. It relies on a lot of collaboration between the parties, which is why it has been successful.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I take that point, but, of course, that is if the financial assistance under this is restricted to infrastructure, which we debated a short while ago. If there is a requirement to notify of the financial assistance, I do not see it at the moment. The Minister might have a look at whether such a notification is required. That being the case, I have made my points.

Finally, I apologise in advance that I will not be here on Wednesday for the next day in Committee. I will endeavour to leave notes with colleagues about any amendments that are my responsibility; I will have the benefit of reading what is said. We might have the benefit of the presence of my noble friend Lord Grayling to speak to his amendments. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 59.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.