Tuesday 8th September 2026
(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeRailways Bill 2024-26 View all Railways Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 25-II Second marshalled list for Grand Committee - (8 Sep 2026)
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and his officials for numerous meetings with me and many of my colleagues over the last few months; they have been very helpful for discussing how we can improve the Bill before us.
The dislike for this Bill was very apparent in the opening words from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. The previous Government could have implemented the concession model that has been mentioned several times—it would be our preferred option—but they did not. The picture that we had painted by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, of the privatised railway does not reflect many passengers’ experience in recent years. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Harper, that I think the service started to decline before the pandemic, but the pandemic accelerated the fact that this model was not working.
The Government have a mandate for public ownership. In fact, two years ago, we debated the Act on it. I hope that we can focus in these seven days on getting the structure right and delivering for passengers, rather than revisiting the ideology behind what the Government are doing.
The amendments in this group are quite technical in some ways, and they are about the structure rather than focused on passengers. But it is important that we hear from the Government exactly why they have chosen the model that they have. The noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley, in their amendments are seeking some clarity on the exact set up of Great British Railways and why this model has been chosen. It is really important to get some clarity over the status of Great British Railways’ companies, set out very clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, in some of those examples. How will these partnerships work in practice? There is also the point around civil servants and their role. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, wants clarity on the subsidiaries of Great British Railways and their potential future ownership. Whatever happens in this Bill, there will still be a huge amount of private sector involvement, because the rolling stock will still be owned by private companies and there is no plan to change that. Even if everything else is fully publicly owned, there will still be a huge amount of private sector involvement through the rolling stock.
There are many ways that you could look at structuring Great British Railways. One could have been a co-operative model. An understanding from the Minister on why this was felt to be the best way to deliver the quality of the railway service that we all want to see would be helpful. I look forward to the Minister’s response and clarification on these structural amendments.
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their amendments, and the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Berkeley, for their contributions.
I will begin with Amendments 1 and 6, which would specify that the company designated as Great British Railways must be established under existing company law. I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that, as is the case with Network Rail and the train operating companies, GBR will be a private limited company under the Companies Act 2006. It will have its own articles of association. The Bill is constructed around this assumption. For example, Clause 3(6) makes it clear that GBR can carry out business activities by virtue of being a limited company under existing company law. If it were not a Companies Act company, this and other provisions of the Bill would not be appropriate. The alternative to a Companies Act company would be something like a royal charter corporation, such as the BBC, or a statutory corporation, such as the Advanced Research and Invention Agency. GBR is clearly neither of these, given that the Bill does not establish it as such. Body corporate is a general term under UK law, meaning an incorporated organisation, which is what GBR will be. Combined with the drafting in Clause 3(6), the Bill is clear that GBR will be a Companies Act company.
I turn to Amendments 2 and 3. Amendment 2 would remove from the Bill the requirement that GBR be wholly owned by the Crown. As the noble Lord will be aware, this Government were elected with a clear mandate to nationalise the railways, and that is exactly what we are doing. We are ensuring that GBR is owned by the British people and run in their interests—not in the interests of private profit. Public ownership is key to creating a more efficient railway and a better passenger experience. It shifts the focus from profit to passengers and freight, and begins to put an end to the fragmentation and waste of the franchising system, allowing the whole industry to work together in the interests of the passenger. This approach will save the taxpayer hundreds of millions of pounds in fees and allow taxpayers’ money to be spent on things that will benefit the passenger instead.
The requirement in the Bill that GBR must be publicly owned will ensure that any future Government wanting to privatise the railways would have to seek the consent of Parliament to do so. This will put the system on exactly the same footing as it was under privatisation since—as I am sure the noble Lord will acknowledge, given that he is trying to repeal it—an Act of Parliament was required to bring passenger rail services back into public hands. The latest YouGov poll shows that 76% of the public think that railways should be in the public sector and only 13% think they should be in the private sector. As the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, put it so well, previous Governments could have done something about it but they did not. The railway is an asset with significant financial, economic and safety implications, so it is right that Parliament scrutinises every major change to it.
Amendment 3 would ensure that GBR’s subsidiaries do not need to be wholly owned by the Crown. I will speak more about the Government’s policy on this in a moment when I address the amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but I am pleased to confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that the drafting of Clause 1 already facilitates what he seeks to achieve. The requirement to be wholly owned by the Crown applies only to the parent company that is designated as GBR, not to any of its subsidiaries. For clarity, GBR subsidiaries come within the term “GBR companies”, as defined in the Bill. GBR companies are not subject to the “wholly owned” requirement, so I hope the noble Lord will see that his amendment is unnecessary.
Speaking of GBR’s subsidiaries, I will now address Amendments 5, 334, 335, 337 and 345 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. She has said that she is a passionate supporter of public ownership, as we are. Her amendments would mean that GBR must wholly own all its subsidiaries for them to be considered GBR companies. As I have said before, we are committed to the private sector continuing to play a key role in the future rail sector, and this includes within GBR where appropriate. After all, the private sector can bring advantages that the public sector cannot, including greater risk appetite and additional investment that reduces the burden on the taxpayer. GBR will therefore leverage the best of both the public and the private sectors, working in close partnership with private companies, from freight and rolling stock to ticket retailing and the rail supply chain, to unlock benefits and drive growth.
The advantages of this approach were referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and can already be seen in Network Rail’s successful joint ventures with the private sector, including through Platform4, a subsidiary of Network Rail which uses private sector investment to support community regeneration projects and is expected to deliver up to 40,000 new homes in the next decade through public/private joint ventures. For example, Platform4’s joint venture with Bloc Group has already secured 2,000 new rental homes near major city transport links. These types of investment would simply not be possible were I to accept the noble Baroness’s amendments. In addition, the amendments would prevent GBR from pursuing joint ventures with the devolved Governments, which I hope she agrees would not be the right outcome.
However, I can reassure the noble Baroness that, although the existing Companies Act definition of a subsidiary enables these public/private partnerships, importantly, it does not enable private sector control. Any private sector interest in a GBR company must be a minority shareholding, to ensure that the railway remains owned, controlled and operated by the public. The Government are also clear that certain aspects of the Bill, such as GBR’s access decision-making process and its ticket retailer, passenger services and vital cross-industry functions, will all remain part of the wholly publicly owned and controlled part of the business. This recognises that, while private sector investment is a great enabler of infrastructure development opportunities that can support our communities, it is not always suited to railway functions that must be run in the public interest.
Lord Harper (Con)
Before the Minister moves on, this might sound a very picky point, but it is quite important. On his point about joint ventures, he talked about the Government always having a majority stake and having control. Is a 50-50 joint venture possible? If you are a private company making an investment, there is a big difference between having a 50-50 equal partnership versus one where you are a minority shareholder. Would that be possible under the model that he set out and which is structured in the Bill?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. I will write to him on that rather than say something I might regret.
Lord Lansley (Con)
Before we conclude, and relevant to the point that my noble friend Lord Harper was making, I am sure that the Minister will want to look at the whole structure of Platform4 and its relationship to Great British Railways, but the Mayfield Partnership, which is involved in the regeneration around Manchester Piccadilly, has one-third Network Rail or Platform4 participation in that joint venture. So, at the moment, it is not just 50:50; it can be below 50%. It would be of interest, not least to noble Lords considering the future structure of GBR, to understand precisely how some of these large-scale and really important property development issues are to be managed by GBR. The directing mind for the railways is one thing, but the directing mind for development purposes is not necessarily the same thing.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord. My experience of Network Rail’s property and Platform 4 is offset by increasing age and failure to remember the details. I will not only write to noble Lords about the 50:50 aspect, but about Mayfield, which I remember vaguely is of a different percentage, partially because much of the land is owned by somebody else rather than the railway. I will write on both those points, because I think they are germane. I appreciate the point that people need to understand how this will work in practice, particularly with those areas of activity of GBR that are not the provision of passenger railway services or the basic railway.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, before I start, may I add to the comment made by my noble friend Lord Lansley? My example is not a Network Rail example, but a TfL one, with which the Minister will be very familiar: the Earl’s Court development. The essential structure is that the initial ownership of the joint venture was based on the value of the land that each party was contributing, but that the TfL structure would fall well below 50% over the course of time, as more investment was added by the private sector partner. Structures such as that would simply not be possible for Great British Railways land under this Bill, because you could not go below the 50%. So, a site such as Earl’s Court, if it were a national Network Rail site— pari passu, mutatis mutandis—would of course remain undeveloped until the Government found the money to develop it. The Government will never find the money to develop these things.
Turning to the debate that we have just had, I must say that, whenever I speak in Committee, I always seem unwittingly and unintentionally to attract the disappointment of the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. I am surprised about this, because the only reference I made to her in the course of my speech was to say something complimentary about amendments that she has tabled, which we will debate later in Committee and to which I have added my name. Obviously, I am at fault in some way, in that I am constantly giving her cause for complaint.
On the question of organisational structure, the Minister has read out some words about how Network Rail will be organised, but they do not provide a level of assurance or satisfaction that people are looking for. They are very woolly, but I will leave that and grant him that for the moment; he can stick with that level of woolliness. However, let us switch focus slightly and think about timing. When I spoke on the then passenger railway services Bill when it was in your Lordships’ House, I said that the Government were embarking on a very long multi-year transformation process. Here we are, two years later, and we still have not completed that. We are at least six months away, I should guess, from seeing the enactment of this necessary legislation. That is two and a half years on.
Transforming an organisation as complex as Network Rail and all the companies being brought into this group is something that is going to take years. So let me change the question: is the Minister able to say, before we conclude this debate, at what time he expects that structure to be in place, which he has described to us even in woolly terms?
Just to develop that a little further, it is said throughout the industry, although it is acknowledged that nobody has written this down, that the intended designation date for Great British Railways is October 2027, which is 12 months from now—say, six months after the enactment of the Bill, if it goes through in its current form, according to its current plans. Is that date valid? Does the Minister believe that the structure that he has described in whatever woolly terms will be in place in time for that designation date, or is it all going to muddle on for years afterwards, being put in place?
Finally, on the second important point that we have discussed in this short debate, I express my gratitude to—I am going to say this correctly now—the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Kudos! But do not minute that in Hansard. I am very grateful to her because she put her finger on one of the key issues in this group, which is the question of the justification for private ownership. She has said, effectively, that it is party policy, in her case, and she is going to stick to it, for that reason if not for others as well. But we did not get a clear answer from the Minister to my question: what is his justification for wholesale nationalisation for the purpose of achieving his objectives, which could have been achieved by a Williams report approach? It is wholly irrelevant whether the last Government did anything about it, for heaven’s sake—what is the point of making a comment like that? The last Government were all over the place; that is why they lost the election. Is that the standard that the Minister is setting for the Government, that they are just about better than Sunak? Is that it? Is that the point of making that remark?
The Minister has one further opportunity to give us a clear explanation. The only explanation that he has given is that it is in the manifesto. If that is the sole explanation, that is very helpful to us, because knowing that there is no rational basis for the decision makes it very much easier for an incoming Government to advance the argument that the necessary measures should be taken at pace to reverse it.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, first, the operative date for Great British Railways will be sometime in 2027, but of course it depends on the passage of this Bill. Secondly, I can give a very sound explanation for being in favour of public ownership, which is that progressively, as we have taken recent train operating companies into public ownership, we have been able to put both the track and infrastructure and the operations into the management of the same person. That is delivering results that no previous arrangement for over 30 years has been able—
Lord Moylan (Con)
Why, if that is such a good thing, are there fewer and fewer services?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I shall continue with what I was saying. It has not been possible, in any previous iteration of the railways since the early 1990s, to have both under the same control. There was such an arrangement with South Western Railway in the 2010s, and it collapsed, because the commercial arrangements were incompatible. We are making steady progress in improving the railway in some pretty difficult circumstances, in companies that had not been particularly well managed, as a consequence of being able to manage them together. To my mind, that is a very good reason for public ownership.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, before we proceed, under the chairmanship now of the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, it probably behoves me to say that this is the first group in the first of seven days in Committee. There were six minutes’ worth of summation, and I point out to all Members of the Committee that the Companion is very clear about brevity being the quality we are looking for when Members who have lead amendments are summing up, whether they are pressing or whatever else. I urge Committee Members to bear that in mind for future groups.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for these amendments and the noble Lords, Lord Redwood and Lord Harper, for their contributions.
I start with Amendment 7, which would introduce a purpose for GBR into the Bill. The Bill already provides a purpose for GBR, just as we promised the Liberal Democrats it would during the passage of the public ownership Act. The Bill’s purpose is set out through its functions and duties. The functions tell us what GBR must do, and the duties tell us what GBR must consider and achieve while doing it. Much like the noble Lord’s amendment, the duties provide a list of objectives for GBR, which it must bear in mind when undertaking every decision and its railway activity.
I hope the noble Lord can see that the duties are in fact similar to the breadth of outcomes his amendment is seeking. The duties already require GBR to prioritise the needs of passengers and disabled passengers; to consider value for money, high standards of performance including reliability, social and economic benefits, and the environment; to grow freight; and to advance the public interest. We do not need a new purpose clause to provide GBR with these objectives: the Bill already does so.
Unlike the proposed purpose clause, the functions and duties are supported by the Secretary of State’s long-term rail strategy, which will also provide clear long-term objectives. That strategy is how Ministers will communicate to GBR what it should consider while planning, expanding and improving the network over the next 30 years, and GBR will develop its own pipeline of projects in response to that. Rather than a static requirement in the Bill which is not set in the context of wider priorities or funding expectations, we have a system that might actually work better to make our railway better. Instead of setting out a clear purpose, the proposed new clause duplicates many of the provisions already in the Bill, making outcomes less clear and, overall, less likely to be deliverable.
Amendment 9 is seeking clarification of what “general” means. A general function is an umbrella term for an activity which a body can undertake by doing lots of different things. For example, running passenger services involves a large number of intermediate actions such as procuring and operating rolling stock, employing train drivers and other staff, and selling tickets. The Bill requires GBR to run passenger services as a general function, and it therefore does not prescribe exactly what actions it should take in which order to do that.
In comparison, a specific function would be an individual action that the Bill requires GBR to do at a certain point or in a certain way. An example of this would be the requirement on GBR to draft and issue the access and use policy in Clause 59. This is a specific requirement to kick off the access process and not a general function.
The term “general” is therefore helpful in distinguishing between a specific activity that GBR is required to perform and the continuing business of GBR in running the railways. I assure the noble Lord that functions are a standard drafting approach, used also, for example, in the Communications Act 2009, the Climate Change Act and others. I hope that this explanation provides the clarity that the noble Lord seeks and that he can withdraw his amendment.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, if the Minister would be so good, this really is very important. I did not think he would adopt that approach, but it is one of the two approaches I offered him, and he has chosen to adopt that which says that this is essentially hierarchical, so that the general functions set out in the Bill subsume a whole load of subsidiary and ancillary functions. I am still not clear whether these functions are powers or duties. Does GBR have some choice over whether to carry out these functions—in which case, they would be akin to powers—or is it obliged to do so?
My key question, now that we have established that, is this: to carry out a general function, there are a whole load of subsidiary and ancillary functions you may have to carry out. I understand that completely, and the Minister did not have to give examples, but he did very helpfully. Is the functionality, so to speak, of Great British Railways therefore limited to the functions set out in this clause? In other words, can it do anything else or is it limited to doing the things that are general functions here? Does it have the power to carry out any other activity? These are really important questions, which may end up being tested in court. I know he has quoted some examples but, because generally unfamiliar language is being used, it is unclear to me whether we are talking about the general functions being the full scope of GBR’s activities or not.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for that. I am at least clear about this. The functions are more like powers; the duties are the things that GBR must do when doing the functions, but it is not limited to those general functions. Indeed, we have already discussed quite extensively what it might do, for example, in property development and with third parties, which, because it is a Companies Act company, it can do. I think that is reasonably clear. I would be happy to discuss this with the noble Lord in more detail, because I think we are getting tied up in nomenclature. I think it is reasonably clear what GBR’s functions are, which are described in Clause 3; it describes running the railways. It is also clear that, in the process of running the railway and because of its activity, it is able to do a number of other things.
Let me carry on to Amendment 12, if I may. Amendment 12 would require GBR’s functions to facilitate the provision and use of railway services to be carried out in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. I absolutely agree that GBR should act fairly; however, the duties in the Bill already require GBR to act in the interest of the public, taxpayers, passengers and freight customers. GBR will act fairly in accordance with its duties, not only when exercising this function but across the full range of its statutory functions. We will no doubt discuss this more when we discuss ticket retailing and access. For now, suffice it to say, there are already protections in the Bill—and indeed in wider statutes, such as public law principles and the Competition Act, which applies in full to Great British Railways—that will require GBR to act in a manner that is fair, non-discriminatory and not anti-competitive. This additional requirement would duplicate only the Competition Act requirements, adding uncertainty and administrative burden without increasing protection for non-GBR operators.
Amendments 13 and 14 relate to the publishing of advice and standards for the railways. I thank the noble Lord for this probing amendment, and I reassure him that the ORR is the sole safety regulator for the railway. The Bill does not transfer the ORR’s safety regulatory functions to GBR, nor does it change the current railway safety regime at all. The ORR will continue to exercise its independent safety, regulatory and enforcement functions, including its ability to ensure that GBR and other operators comply fully with all safety legislation requirements.
Comparatively, GBR’s function to publish standards is a reference to technical standards, which GBR would publish and share with industry as a method of promoting best practice. This is similar to today; at present, Network Rail and the train operating companies develop and publish technical standards covering many aspects of their operation. These standards include operation and maintenance protocols, design specifications and engineering guidelines. This does not in any way prevent it adhering to the ORR’s safety regime, which it is required by law to comply with. This also does not give GBR any remit over safety regulation. The standards are non-binding and designed simply to support shared learning across the industry.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend is talking about standards created by GBR. Can he explain the relationship between what GBR does and the Rail Safety and Standards Board?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I thank my noble friend. I think I can. The RSSB, the Rail Safety and Standards Board, creates standards applicable across the railway generally on some subjects, whereas there are a number of more technical standards—for example, for pieces of machinery, trains and railway infrastructure—which GBR, as a successor to Network Rail, would publish. These are not subject to discussion at the RSSB. Train operating companies also do this with specific fleets of trains, so I think there is a difference. My noble friend is right to draw attention to the RSSB’s function to do that as well, but that does not exclude the current activities of Network Rail and train operating companies, which will translate into Great British Railways.
These standards include operation and maintenance protocols, design specifications and engineering guidelines. This does not in any way prevent it adhering to the ORR safety regime, which it is required by law to comply with. It also does not give GBR any remit over safety regulation. The standards are non-binding and designed simply to support shared learning across the industry.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I refute that comment, for the avoidance of doubt and for the record.
The noble Lord is correct. It is an important distinction. As I said, let me meet him on that. He referred to Clause 70. I am not equipped to go into that just now, as he will appreciate, so I will talk to him further about it.
Amendment 18 removes the delegated power to add to the list of functions for GBR. While the functions listed in Clause 3 cover the breadth of activities that we expect GBR to undertake as the directing mind for the railways, it is sensible to provide the flexibility to add functions should the railways change significantly enough to warrant a new function being added—for example, due to technological development, such as in the artificial intelligence space.
This power is not expected to be used frequently, if at all, but it future-proofs the Bill in the event that new activities need to be brought within the scope of the functions. Bringing an activity within the functions in the Bill has several benefits, including that the function then becomes subject to GBR’s duties and ORR’s monitoring. This legislation is expected to govern the railways for a long time, as the 1993 Act did, so this is a responsible and sensible power. This power was also reviewed by the Delegated Powers Committee, which deemed it acceptable and did not draw it to the attention of the House in its report on the Bill—I welcome the report and look forward to responding to it formally in due course. The power cannot be used to change or remove functions and is subject to the affirmative resolution. It is also not unprecedented: the National Health Service Act 2006 allows functions to be added to special health authorities via regulations. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will feel able not to press this amendment.
Amendments 20 and 110 from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, relate to passenger growth. I very much agree with her that growing passenger numbers on the railways is vital. It supports economic growth, jobs and homes, encourages modal shift and can reduce the level of taxpayer subsidy required for the railways. However, GBR’s general duties in Clause 18 already include a duty to promote not only the interests of passengers but potential passengers. This already requires GBR to consider how best to encourage new users on to the railways. GBR’s business plan will also reflect the Government’s ambitions for passenger growth, including measurable outcomes against which GBR can be held to account.
GBR’s other duties, including promoting high performance, such as reliability and punctuality, will also contribute to making the railways more appealing to passengers. Transport Focus recently found reliability to be the single most important issue for passengers. GBR will be able to improve reliability by making better, whole-system decisions on issues such as the choreography of maintenance works.
As a commercially minded organisation, GBR will also be naturally incentivised to attract more people to travel by rail, because increasing passenger numbers will increase its own revenue. By contrast, there is no intrinsic motivation for GBR to increase rail freight when there is limited network capacity and freight services are in the clear minority of services. That is why the Bill already includes a freight duty and a freight target, to ensure that freight is given equal weight to passengers in a system where passengers may have naturally taken priority otherwise. A stronger or additional passenger equivalent duty or target could actually undermine our ambitions on freight. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness will agree that that would not be the right outcome.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
Before the noble Lord moves on, he has not really addressed the point that I made, which is that in Clause 18 there is a perverse incentive that somebody coming in with a different mindset from many of us in this Room could reduce the frequency of trains and hike up fares and still meet what is in this legislation. Even if the noble Lord does not agree with my amendment about a passenger target, and I accept the debate on that, can the Government agree to look at whether some other wording could be put in to strengthen this and make sure that this legislation does what we all want, which is to see more passengers on the railway?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
The obligations placed on GBR by the long-term rail strategy, and the consequent approval by the Secretary of State of the business plan, should adequately deter Great British Railways from seeking to achieve that by diminishing services. Indeed, there was an example in the franchising era of the Government being loose with their definition of train services, only to discover that the franchisee had, remarkably, reduced the subsidy by withdrawing a number of services on rural branch lines. That clearly would not be possible with a decent long-term rail strategy and a consequent business plan to which a Government should agree.
Amendments 80 and 81 relate to the Clause 13 provision allowing GBR to charge for its functions. I agree that GBR must act reasonably while setting charges, and I assure the noble Lord that there are already safeguards in the Bill to ensure that charges are reasonable. GBR has a duty to ensure that railway service providers, such as other operators, can plan, invest and make decisions about their own businesses, so GBR must set charges that are consistent with this and do not undermine other people’s ability to run viable and successful businesses.
Competition law will apply to GBR, ensuring that charges it sets are not anti-competitive. In this context, an additional reasonableness test is duplicative without delivering any material additional protection. It is also important that GBR can recover appropriate costs from those who access and benefit from the services it provides. If it were prevented from doing so, the burden would ultimately fall on the taxpayer and passengers.
Amendment 81 would provide an appeal route. All I say to the noble Lord is that an appeal route to the ORR across every possible charge that GBR could levy is disproportionate. I have already mentioned the safeguards in existing law to ensure that those charges are fair.
On the private sector growth target referred to in Amendment 114, nothing in the Bill seeks to exclude or marginalise the contribution of the private sector, but I do not agree that a statutory target is the right approach. The Bill is absolutely an opportunity for the supply chain, but in that case, we have to let the market determine its contribution.
On Amendment 305 from my noble friend Lord Berkeley, I assure him that existing legal rules already allow railway operators to seek recovery of costs and other losses through civil law. A substantial amount of cost recovery is achieved already, and the limit to it is to do not with legal powers but with the identification of perpetrators who drive off. Given what I have set out, I encourage noble Lords and noble Baronesses not to press their amendments.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I begin with a craven apology to my noble friend Lord Harper for my comments about the Sunak Government. For the avoidance of doubt, had the last general election been fought solely on the question of his conduct of the office of Secretary of State for Transport, I am sure the result would have been very different and more favourable to the Conservative cause.
I will not refer here at any length to the question of functions, except to say that it is a mess. At the end of this debate, everybody in the Room who has thought about it can probably see that it is a mess. However, the Minister kindly offered me a meeting to discuss this, and I think my noble friend Lord Lansley is now very much included in that invitation, and possibly other noble Lords. I ask that that meeting takes place reasonably promptly as these issues will return at later stages in Committee rather than being left to the end of Committee and rushed through just ahead of Report. A sensible meeting on that could be very valuable.
I will comment about the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. I do not agree that there should be a single employer as such, although I think there will be one because I think the unions will get their way. My noble friend Lord Harper explained the danger to the public of going down that route. I fully expected—and was disappointed—that the noble Lord, given his background, would refer to the difficulty with pensions, particularly the fact that all these organisations currently have individual pension schemes within the Railway Pensions Scheme. Is the Minister satisfied that it will be possible, in the timescale he is working towards—namely, the designation of GBR in the second half of next year—for the Railway Pension Scheme trustees and Railpen to achieve a smooth and lawful transition of pension arrangements in that time? He may not be able to answer that question now, but we must find some way of coming back and discussing this because pensions are a very important aspect of the remuneration of the employees.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a very powerful debate. I am grateful to all noble Lords who tabled amendments and for the contributions of noble Baroness, Lady Alexander, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. About the only thing that I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, on is that this is not railway related. I think it is, it is about selling railway travel, but I have huge respect for her experience of other markets, as I have for the noble Lord, Lord Holmes.
I reassure noble Lords that we are absolutely aligned with the intentions of these amendments. We want an open and competitive retail market, and we completely support the benefits that independent retailers can bring. I may not have time to answer the points that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has just made, but if I do not do so now, I will later because there are other ways in which the railway can derive data about its customers. I do not think the acquisition of data is sufficient justification for only the railway to sell its product, but I must have a railway that is able to sell its own product because I want its staff, managers and directors to care about its income and its passengers.
Once GBR is established, it will have a retail function, as provided for by Clause 3. Crucially, this will be accessible via all channels—through station ticket offices, ticket vending machines, onboard trains, access through gates, ticket inspectors and online—ensuring that it serves passengers however they buy their tickets. GBR’s future online retailer, its website and app will operate in a fair, open and competitive market. To be clear, independent retailers help drive innovation, improve passenger experience and increase choice for customers purchasing rail tickets.
We realise that the dual role as a retailer and the provider of certain cross-industry systems and services could create potential conflict of interest risks. That is why we have announced a robust package of safeguards specifically designed to address these concerns. In response to the CMA report in 2025, mentioned by noble Lords in the debate, we are proposing an industry retail code of practice owned by the Office of Rail and Road and backed with the force of a GBR licence condition ensuring that the ORR will enforce GBR’s compliance with it. For the record, paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 is the place where the ORR is required to create the code and enforce it.
I can confirm today that the draft code will require GBR to adhere to a range of principles. These include ensuring access to products, providing services and data on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms and supporting new market entrants. We are determined that all retailers can sell all tickets. The draft code will also require safeguards around our decision to separate decision-making between GBR’s retail activity and its cross-industry systems and services, supported by appropriate information protections. This provides more protection for third-party retailers than exist today when competing with myriad train operators.
If GBR does not comply with the code, the ORR can employ enforcement measures up to and including a legally binding mandatory order for GBR to change its actions. These enforcement measures can be employed in response to a third party raising an issue with the regulator or where ORR identifies an issue through its routine monitoring. The full draft code will be published when the ORR launches its consultation before the end the next recess. This follows extensive engagement it has already undertaken with industry. It will consider feedback from the consultation informing the final draft of the code of practice in 2027. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, we are expecting the CMA to respond to the consultation that the ORR will launch.
As noble Lords have suggested, we want the ORR to be adequately resourced to carry out these functions. Noble Lords who came to the session we had last week, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Young, will have heard reassurance from the senior leadership of the ORR that they intend to do this and are prepared to do so.
I should also be clear that GBR will be required to comply with competition law. The ORR and the Competition and Markets Authority will continue to oversee the market, and both already have powers to act where anti-competitive behaviour is identified. Alongside that existing framework, the code will create a framework that represents a more extensive form of regulatory assurance than is currently found in most comparable European rail markets. The Government therefore believe that the objectives of these amendments are already being delivered. The code will provide meaningful protection for independent retailers and can adapt as the market develops.
Amendments 49 and 181 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and concern cross-subsidisation—
Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. Before he moves on, I may have misunderstood, but I do not think he addressed whether GBR would be subject to the Subsidy Control Act.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I am about to get there. In turning to Amendments 49 and 181 concerning cross-subsidisation and subsidy control, I can offer further reassurance. The advantage of interventions is that you make your point; the disadvantage is that you stop hearing. As a public body, GBR is required to comply with Managing Public Money principles and relevant subsidy control legislation. The Public Service Obligations in Transport Regulations is the relevant subsidy control legislation that applies to retail specifically.
GBR’s passenger services business will therefore operate within a clear financial framework, ensuring that public funding is used appropriately and fairly. GBR will be required through its business plan to set out its activities, such as its broad retailing function, the costs of these activities and how it proposes that these costs are met. The business plan must cover everything that GBR does, so there should be no concern about transparency.
It is important to note that GBR will be operating a transport service of which retailing is a part. It will have to use all available channels to serve passengers, however they buy their tickets. If it is allocated more funding for retail than would be needed for a simple online retail platform, it is simply because it also has an obligation to provide physical ticket sales—I listed those activities before—including for people who pay cash. They are far more costly to provide, and other retailers are most unlikely to provide them.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Young, it will not be possible for GBR to subsidise retail from infrastructure budgets, for example, as ticket offices are not classed as infrastructure. GBR will not be overcompensated to deliver retail functions in a way that distorts the market. Funding will be allocated based on the costs of delivering those services to passengers.
It will also be subject to the oversight of the ORR as the sector specialist competition regulator, alongside the Competition and Markets Authority. In that role, the ORR will be able to take enforcement steps against GBR, should it suspect that GBR is using public funds to act in an anti-competitive way.
Lord Harper (Con)
Before the Minister moves on, can I press him on two of the things that he has said? In his opening summary, he set out the Government’s view. The problem is that if the retailers do not buy it—they do not, at the moment—whatever he thinks, they are not going to be investing, innovating and developing because they will not be able to justify that to their shareholders. Part of the problem is the need to take some steps to persuade retailers that they will be treated fairly.
Secondly, I think the Minister inadvertently made this point about accounting. I know about the ticketing and settlement agreement to my cost and about some of the ways that retailing has to be done. If GBR is, in effect, doing different things—if it has an online operation but has to do all this other stuff—it will be even more important that there is clear accounting and transparency about where the money is going. Otherwise, it will be impossible to work out whether it is subsidising its online operations, which are competing with third party retailers, by bringing in more money for its other services.
Frankly, it is really important for the taxpayer that we know how much it costs to retail through ticket offices and how cost effective that is because, at some point, Ministers will have to grasp the issue—I started to grasp it but had to ungrasp in the end—that providing things through ticket offices when hardly anyone buys tickets that way will have to change at some point in the future. There has to be some clear and transparent cost information to enable the right decisions to be taken.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I simply say to the noble Lord, first, that there will have to be 100% transparency because, apart from anything else, GBR will have to put all the costs into its business plan. My other point about his first point is that there has been a lot of investment already, with very little protection. Part of what we are doing is to give greater protection for retailers in the future, which they need because they have invested. That is a valid point.
Amendments 47, 51, 52, 53, 136 and 139 concern oversight. The retail code of practice will, as I said, be administered and enforced by the ORR. It is the appropriate body to assess complaints and determine whether GBR has complied with its obligations, but GBR will also be fully subject to competition law, alongside the existing oversight of the Competition and Markets Authority. Nothing in the Bill prevents the CMA from acting on competition challenges in rail, and nothing prevents retailers from referring issues to the CMA—either competition issues relating to the code of practice or wider competition issues. So a second opinion is always available and, of course, if they wanted to appeal to the courts, they could judicially review those decisions further.
Currently, at least, additional approval requirements and further statutory appeal routes simply duplicate the existing regulatory arrangements without providing meaningful additional protections, and transparency, as I have referred to, is already baked into this framework. It is a core regulatory principle for the ORR, which has historically publicised the launching, and formal outcome, of railway licence investigations, and I would expect it to continue to do so. The Bill retains the requirement for the ORR to give notice for any decision not to issue an enforcement order following a licence breach, providing a legislative backstop for this transparency.
I move to Amendments 136 and 139. It would not be appropriate for the ORR’s general duty to promote competition to apply to rail retailing wholesale. If it did, the competition duty would conflict with the ORR’s role in fairly and objectively enforcing the safeguards that the Government have charged it to deliver via the code. Enforcement of the code should be fair and evidence-based, determined simply by whether GBR has complied with the code of practice or not. It should not be subject to other goals, which might cause the ORR to judge operators’ compliance unfairly. This is usual practice for enforcement provisions.
However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, that the competition duty will absolutely apply to the ORR when it is writing the code of practice, so the code itself will have competition principles embedded within it. My officials wrote to her on that subject. The noble Baroness put to the Committee a number of clear propositions that I will consider carefully as a consequence of what she said. I believe I have answered many of them, but I will look at what she said further, and of course the publication of the draft code of practice will help considerably. I will also consider what the noble Lord, Lord Young, the noble Baroness, Lady Alexander, and other noble Lords said. As I said, we expect the CMA to respond to the consultation, so we will see what it says.
On Amendment 17, the Government fully agree that appropriate oversight and scrutiny of public spending is important. However, the amendment is unnecessary. The government policy has long been that GBR will retail tickets online through a high-quality website and app, as the train operating companies do now and have done for many years, without fees to passengers.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, these amendments look to ensure a fairness between Great British Railways operations and open access and freight operators in terms of charges and access to the track, and concern the change to the current role of the Office of Rail and Road. Since the publication of the Bill, there has been a big debate in the sector about this over the past 18 months or more. Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, seeks to change Great British Railways’ functions so that decisions about access to and the use of railway infrastructure would instead be carried out by the Office of Rail and Road, as is the case now, as he said. On the other hand, Amendment 221 approaches this differently, with a subsequent right of appeal to the ORR after going through the dispute resolution process set out in the Bill. It would leave the function with GBR but bring in more of an appeals function.
The Bill is a real change to open access operations on the railway and it is right that we scrutinise how it will work in practice. As we have heard, a number of innovative open access operators are running good services with competitive fares. With the vast majority of passenger services being in public ownership, there needs to be confidence that Great British Railways is operating in a clear and transparent way, with an appropriate mechanism for challenge set at the right bar. There is concern that removing the current function of the Office of Rail and Road with regards to access will mean that Great British Railways will always prioritise its own services and may choose to not continue open access operations in the future—some of which are very successful, but there is a fear out there.
We have some concerns over this shift in power between the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road. We want to see the publication of decisions and any evidence that has supported decisions, as well as real engagement with passengers and representative bodies as timetables are developed and services are changed. Of course, freight comes in here too. Freight will be critical to help move lorries off our roads and grow our regional economies, so freight access is equally important. We need transparency and openness between Great British Railways and the other parties in this space in terms of track charges and access. I hope that the Minister will provide the assurance that industry would like to hear on this important change in legislation.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for Amendment 16 and for this short debate. In the groupings for Committee, there are some very substantial numbers of amendments about access in groups 26 to 31, so I will answer these amendments very briefly because I am sure we will have very detailed debate subsequently. Indeed, I will leave some of the points that noble Lords have made this evening in order to come back to them when we get to groups 26 and 31.
I want to be very clear that the existing access framework is, in our view, not fit for purpose. It is built on 30 years of complex legislation, regulations, contracts and codes. It requires Network Rail and the ORR to take decisions using inconsistent criteria, based on differing duties and objectives, with no common vision. Fundamentally, no single party is responsible for planning the best overall use of the network and ensuring that access decisions deliver that plan. The current system has too often been characterised by fragmentation and delay, and it is clear that nobody is in overall charge. That has led to inefficient use of capacity and decisions that serve neither passengers nor freight well.
There are clear examples of the consequences. The May 2018 timetable failure—the original catalyst for rail reform—saw punctuality and reliability plummet across large parts of the network. Keith Williams’ review highlighted how this was the result of a complex, fragmented system with no single person in charge. Timetables are often built by trying to piece together layers of past decisions and contractual rights. On the east coast main line, the current system resulted in years of decision-making paralysis, with neither Network Rail, the ORR or operators able to agree a timetable. Service improvements that were supposed to result from £4 billion-worth of taxpayers’ investment were delayed by several years. The only way this could be resolved in the end was by me, as Rail Minister, stepping in to make the decision that no one else wanted to, which is clearly not an acceptable outcome at all.
Noble Lords will recall last December, when the ORR ruled that the 0700 from Manchester Piccadilly to Euston would have to run fully staffed but with no passengers on it, against the wishes of both the operator and the network provider, which agreed that it should run. The ORR itself acknowledged that it did not have all the facts when it took that decision.
The current system has failed to unlock meaningful freight growth. Too often, the needs of freight operators and their customers have been put to the back of the queue. Paths labelled as “strategic freight” are not strategically planned at all and may not even join up, as they are often just a mixed bag of surrendered paths and leftovers.
In the current system there is no overarching strategy—no overall plan for how to make best use of the network—and where no single body has end-to-end authority, critical information can be missed, escalation is unclear and blurred accountability leads to capacity being used in ways that increase disruption, letting down both passengers and freight customers.
An integrated railway under GBR’s leadership is the only way to fix this. As the single directing mind for the railway, GBR will proactively plan how to make best use of the network. It will be empowered to ensure that access decisions take proper account of that plan, implementing an achievable and reliable timetable that makes the very best use of the limited capacity available. Better co-ordination of the timetable will minimise delays, improve reliability and reduce costs—and may well open space for new routes and services. For freight operators, the new system will provide much greater certainty about the capacity available for them to grow their services, with GBR enabled and empowered to protect that capacity. The truth is that, if we leave it as it is, the system will never change.
I will deal with the crucial distinction between Clause 60 and 63 when we get to the detailed debates, but in the meantime I do not accept Amendment 16, which would fundamentally undermine the purpose of these reforms. It is unacceptable and I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Amendment 221 would require the access and use policy to set out not only a process for dealing with disputes but a right of appeal. Of course I agree that GBR’s strong leadership under the new system must be accompanied by strong accountability. That is why the ORR will act as a robust and independent appeals body for access, capacity allocation and charging decisions made by GBR on its network. The ORR’s appeals function will provide a clear, credible and accessible route to challenge those decisions.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
I understand that we will be having a separate debate on this, but is the Minister able to give the assurance that I asked for that the abstraction rates will not be changed?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his question. I will not give it now but will come back to that in the debate. I should also say for the benefit of the Committee that Network Rail is publishing the access and use policy consultation tomorrow, which will apparently address the noble Lord’s questions on abstraction. I am sure we can debate his points further when we get to the detailed debate.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, it will not wash. The noble Lord did not give any explanation of why there should be an appeals system which cannot look at the merits of the case and cannot bind GBR. He says that we are going to come back and discuss this again. I am sure we will and I hope we will. We should be discussing it several times in Committee, and we will certainly be discussing it on Report. At the moment, I beg to withdraw my amendment, but I am absolutely clear that this will not wash.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, these amendments rightly question the impact of this legislation on Scotland and Wales and the role of Scottish and Welsh Ministers in decisions, including cross-border ones. The discussion we have had is about what devolution really means in this context and the democratic accountability. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on these important points raised by noble Lords.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, the first thing I should say about this group is that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have been intensely involved in drafting the Bill, and both Governments are very supportive of it.
I turn to Amendment 21. Clause 4 enables Scottish and Welsh Ministers to make arrangements for their functions to be exercised by GBR, a GBR subsidiary or a company jointly owned. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, spotted that correctly; he is absolutely right. It is an enabling power designed to support integration where that is considered beneficial. It does not prevent devolved Ministers from continuing to exercise their functions themselves, nor is it intended to provide a general power to delegate functions to any body corporate.
Indeed, under Clause 27, Welsh Ministers will continue to designate Wales-only services and Welsh components of cross-border services. Under Clause 31, Welsh Ministers may either provide those services themselves or secure their provision through the award of public service contracts. Similar powers exist for Scottish Ministers under Clauses 26 and 31. Of course, Scottish Ministers can decide to run their services through GBR or through their own operator. The Government therefore believe that the Bill strikes an appropriate balance between preserving devolved responsibilities and enabling closer integration with GBR, where that is desired by Scottish or Welsh Ministers.
Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would require the ORR to be consulted. Clause 4 already requires consultation with both the Secretary of State and GBR before such arrangements are made, varied or revoked. That is because GBR is the body that may be responsible for carrying out the function, while the Secretary of State has an interest in the wider operation and integration of the railway system, and because GBR will be operating devolved functions alongside reserved ones. They are therefore the parties best placed to provide input on these arrangements. Although the ORR plays an important role as the railway’s independent regulator, these arrangements concern the exercise of devolved functions and national versus devolved governance, rather than regulatory matters. We therefore do not consider an additional statutory consultation requirement to be necessary.
On Amendments 145 and 146, the Government fully support transparency and effective parliamentary scrutiny. That is precisely why we have already published the agreed memorandum of understanding with Welsh Ministers and a framework for the memorandum of understanding with Scottish Ministers. That has enabled Parliament to consider the proposed arrangements alongside the Bill. The memoranda of understanding are intended to provide a basis for joint working between UK Ministers and Scottish and Welsh Ministers on matters relating to rail services and funding. They are not legislative instruments but practical agreements to support effective intergovernmental working.
The amendments would require the MoUs to be published at the same time as the rail strategy and would impose a two-month period before they could come into force. However, the rail strategy and the MoUs serve distinct and seperate purposes. The rail strategy sets out long-term priorities and objectives for the railway, while the MoU supports collaborative working between the UK and Welsh or Scottish Governments. Requiring the two documents to be published at the same time would create unnecessary friction and delay. Similarly, requiring a two-month waiting period before an MoU could take effect would add process without materially improving oversight or outcomes.
Lord Harper (Con)
Can I just check that the rail strategy that the Secretary of State will produce will be a strategy for Great Britain, and that the memorandum of understanding will be about how that interacts? If the Secretary of State’s rail strategy is for England only, that does not make sense. What the Minister just said implies that the Secretary of State will produce a rail strategy for Great Britain, in which case there would not be any friction from ensuring that those documents were published together.
Lord Lansley (Con)
Before the Minister responds to that point, I add that I am slightly confused because Clause 15, “Rail strategy”, says that the Secretary of State “may not” include provision relating to the functions of the Scottish Ministers, so it may be a rail strategy for Great Britain, but it cannot deal with the functions of the Scottish Ministers.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I say in response to noble Lords that the long-term rail strategy is for the whole railway. The Scottish and Welsh Governments are being consulted, but Scotland will also have a strategy covering its own functions because that is the meaning of devolution. I hope that is clear.
Lord Harper (Con)
I do not want to overly labour this point, but that is not very clear. The way it works at the moment is that the Scottish Ministers have a role in helping to shape—
Lord Harper (Con)
As I was just saying before we resumed, the advantage of a break is that I had a chance to slightly firm up my question. Before we broke for the Division, I was saying that I thought that not synchronising the rail strategy publication and the memorandum of understanding potentially meant not having a clear, joined-up strategy for Great Britain. I was asking the Minister whether the strategy that the Secretary of State had to produce was for Great Britain and, if so, whether it would not make sense to synchronise that with the memorandum of understanding.
Having had a chance to look at Clause 15, it is indeed the case that the Secretary of State is producing a strategy for the rail network in Great Britain—that includes Wales and Scotland—but it specifically must not contain provisions about functions of the Scottish Ministers, because that is clearly what the memorandum of understanding is going to do. In this case, I think the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan are very sensible. Otherwise, you will publish a rail strategy for Great Britain that has quite important functions for Scottish Ministers because they make the call on what Network Rail does on infrastructure in Scotland, for example. It does not make sense to not have that joined up.
I am very happy for the Minister take this away, because it will obviously have consequences, but synchronising those two events will drive very sensible and good behaviour in the way the department interacts with the Scottish and Welsh Governments and will be an improvement in having a better rail strategy for the whole of Great Britain.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, and I, too, have done a little bit of homework while we had the Division. The important thing he draws our attention to is Clause 15(3). Because
“The rail strategy may not contain provision about functions of the Scottish Ministers”,
in effect, it is the rail strategy for England and Wales. Because the rail strategy for Scotland is the function of Scottish Ministers, they will publish a strategy to cover Scotland. It will reflect the devolution funding arrangements and the responsibility for the railway in each country. We are working very closely with Scotland, and GBR will have to work very closely with Scotland, as will the Secretary of State, to ensure that the strategies make sense and, therefore, that the GBR business plan makes sense.
Having said all that, I am still not sure that I can see the connection between the MoUs and the strategies. Indeed, we have been able to strike a memorandum of understanding and publish it with Welsh Ministers—and we have a framework for that in Scotland—without a long-term rail strategy. They are intended to provide a basis for joint working between UK Ministers and Scottish and Welsh Ministers on matters related to rail services and funding, but they are not the same as a strategy, which sets out what the intentions of those Governments are and will form the basis on which GBR will write a business plan.
I think my contention is the same. The rail strategy sets out long-term priorities and objectives for the railway, and the MoUs support collaborative working between the respective UK and Welsh and Scottish Governments. I see the difference between those two instruments—the strategies and the MoUs—but I do not see the need for a waiting period between them taking effect or for them to be co-ordinated. As I have said, we have published the MoU with Wales already and the outline of that for Scotland too.
Lord Harper (Con)
Here is my final point—as the Minister will be pleased to know. He has just, perhaps inadvertently, flagged that the drafting of the Bill in Clause 15 is not correct. The Secretary of State will not be producing a long-term strategy for the development and use of the rail network in Great Britain and the railway services that she wishes to see in Great Britain. She will be doing those things for England and Wales. The Bill should really reflect that because it is inaccurate. Again, I am happy for him to take it away, but I think he has let on at the Dispatch Box that the Bill is not correctly drafted.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
The noble Lord draws my attention to something which, having read it to him, I concluded myself. This is the purpose of Committee, of course: to discover things that you have not thought about. I am as willing as the next Minister, perhaps, to decide what to do. We will take that away, and I am grateful to the noble Lord. For the avoidance of doubt, I still do not accept the contention about the connections between the MoU and the strategies, but I accept the points that the respective boundaries of the strategies could be much better placed than they are.
Amendment 146 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, goes further on the provisions on the allocation of ticket revenue from cross-border services operated by Transport for Wales. We do not think that is appropriate. Such operational and commercial matters are more appropriately dealt with through established industry arrangements such as public service contracts and the Wales and borders agreements rather than through an intergovernmental co-operation agreement, which is fundamentally about the governance of GBR, so I urge the noble Lord not to press the amendment.
I turn to Amendments 294 and 295 on consultation. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that Scottish and Welsh Ministers are consulted on decisions that have a significant impact on their nations. That is precisely why the Bill already places a duty on GBR to consult them before making such decisions. The amendment would go further by requiring devolved Ministers to determine whether consultation was required. That would add significant delay for no practical benefit, as Scottish and Welsh Ministers would be required to review decisions that would often be irrelevant to them before steps can be taken. The approach could create uncertainty about when decisions can proceed and risk shifting the focus from effective engagement to procedural questions about whether consultation is required. Scottish and Welsh Ministers will also continue to have important mechanisms through which they can influence the railway, including their respective rail and transport strategies, their powers, which are strong, and guidance. The Government therefore consider these amendments unnecessary.
Finally, Amendment 296 from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, specifies that GBR should consult on access decisions where they impact Welsh Ministers. Clause 82 already requires that GBR consults Wales on issues affecting it. That requirement would also extend to access decisions. Therefore, I can reassure the noble Lord that his intent has already been achieved by the Bill but, bearing in mind what he said in support of his amendment, I will write to him, and copy it to other noble Lords, about the ownership and control of infrastructure in Scotland and Wales now and in the future so that he and other noble Lords—though I see the noble Lord is not in his place—can be clear about the present and future arrangements, since I think what he said expressed a degree of confusion about them.
I finish by saying again, as I started with, that Scotland and Wales have been intensely involved in the drafting of the Bill and that both Governments are very supportive of it. Therefore, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, we see a pattern—there is always an argument as to why the bear in the front room should be able to make the decisions without constraint, and here we go with Scotland and Wales. If the Minister tells me that Scottish and Welsh Ministers are happy that Great British Railways, a largely unaccountable body that is largely concerned with English railways, should make a determination as to what is of economic significance to Scotland and Wales, and that they have had that question put to them, considered it squarely and come back and said “Yes”, then of course that is what the Bill should say. It strikes me as odd and not consistent with the general approach that the Scottish and Welsh Governments would take to these things. Beyond that, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Harper on drawing out various points. I feel a swathe of government amendments coming on Report.
Lord Moylan (Con)
I think there will have to be others as well. None the less, for the moment, I have done my best to defend the devolution settlement, keep up the policy of the Prime Minister and give Scotland and Wales a say over the future of their own economies in so far as they are affected by public transport. Having done that, I will subside and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.