Railways Bill

Lord Harper Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th September 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Sorry, I did not mean that.

What I am trying to do with these five amendments is to make sure that public ownership of our railways really means public ownership. The Bill, as it currently stands, could allow companies within Great British Railways to have private shareholders. The Bill is, or should be, about bringing our railways back into public ownership, and we therefore should not be creating a back door that allows private ownership to creep in.

This is the worry that the Association of British Commuters, We Own It and Bring Back British Rail have brought to us. They and the others are asking a very simple question: what exactly do we mean when we say that Great British Railways will be publicly owned? At the moment, the answer is not clear in the Bill. The Government made a welcome commitment that all the shares in the parent company of Great British Railways would be publicly owned, but does that extend to the companies sitting beneath it?

The Bill defines a GBR company as a subsidiary within the meaning of the Companies Act 2006. A subsidiary does not have to be wholly publicly owned; it can be partly owned by private investors, provided that the parent company retains control. We could have a railway where the parent company is entirely publicly owned but where companies carrying out important railway functions have private shareholders. Does that not fundamentally change what public ownership means? The Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 used a much clearer definition: a public sector company had to be wholly publicly owned. The Companies Act itself provides the Government with the wording they could have used if they intended to require wholly owned subsidiaries. I think we have to ask this: why was that stronger definition not used here?

This is not helped by the Government not being clear about exactly which functions GBR companies will carry out, as the Bill gives these companies the ability to carry out potentially any GBR function. That could include train operations and infrastructure management, which leaves the door open to a very different railway in the future. In a worst-case scenario, the new definition of GBR companies as subsidiaries could even lead to the part-privatisation of rail infrastructure management—a direction of travel thought impossible in the UK since the days of Railtrack.

Railway privatisation has been a disaster: it fragmented the railways, drove up costs and put private profit ahead of passengers. We should not be creating a structure today that would enable a future Government to say, “Well, the legislation already allows private investment and we’re simply making use of the powers that Parliament has already given us”. These amendments would stop that happening. I should also say that I have not yet had the delight of meeting with the Minister, but I am sure that that is in progress.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to a number of the amendments in this group. First, I strongly support what my noble friend Lord Moylan said at the beginning about ownership. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, just said that this Bill is about public ownership, but actually it is not. That was the other Bill to which she referred; this Bill is about setting up GBR as the guiding mind, bringing track and train together—however one wants to characterise it. It is not essential to the core purpose of the Bill; the ownership structure is not core to delivering the services. My noble friend Lord Moylan was right to make those points in his opening remarks.

Of the specific amendments, Amendment 2 is very pertinent. My noble friend Lord Moylan focused on the “owned by the Crown” piece, but Clause 1(3) talks about Great British Railways being

“wholly owned by the Crown”.

Even if we accept that GBR should largely be owned by the Minister—in effect, on behalf of the public—who is able to direct things, I am not sure that we should be in favour of it being “wholly owned”. There is a very good argument for having some private capital. It might be that you want to get that capital involved in the company. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, referred to infrastructure, and we may wish to use it for that and people could have a shareholding. It may be, as my noble friend Lord Lansley said, that we would wish to have some joint ventures. I will give two examples.

One of the countries whose railways people generally admire is Japan. Interestingly, people involved in the railways in Japan largely admire how we do them, as well. There is an enormous amount of cross-fertilisation between experts from both countries. They have very successfully defrayed some of the costs of running their railway by using the value of the property in which the railway system operates—on top of, below or alongside —to generate some effective retail operations and other things that generate a significant amount of money. This keeps down the cost to the taxpayer from running the railway.

Network Rail does some of those sorts of joint ventures already in developing property and that seems perfectly reasonable. Even if we accepted that running the railway piece should be publicly owned—and I do not—it would seem perfectly reasonable if Network Rail, which will now become part of GBR, wished to have some joint ventures with people who develop property and people who help to maximise the returns for the taxpayer on the assets owned by GBR. The state is frankly not very good at doing those things, which are important not just to raise revenue to defray costs but to develop and energise the economy in some of our towns and cities up and down the country. Core railway assets are often where you could develop housing and other things to redevelop areas.

To give a specific example, there was a Written Answer from the Minister recently—forgive me, but I cannot remember whether it was answered yesterday or in the previous few days—about how the Government will develop Euston station. Originally, that was going to be done by HS2, but, when I was Secretary of State, we came to the conclusion that HS2 was probably not going to make a good fist of that. At that time, the Minister was the chairman of the Euston Partnership, which brought together representatives of the Mayor of London, local authorities and private sector companies involved in developing the station. We came to the conclusion that a development-led approach would be better, in order to develop a significant amount of housing for that part of London as well as private sector office and business space, as we had done around King’s Cross and St Pancras, which has had a huge impact on the economy. But that involves working in partnership with the private sector.

I do not know how in the end the Government will structure that approach, but it seems to me that it would be sensible at least to keep open the option that, at the very least, a subsidiary of GBR could potentially own a joint venture or part of the entity involved in delivering the development, either to help to run it or to share in some of the capital gain. You may or may not wish to do that, but ruling out the ability to do that does not seem to me sensible. Therefore, my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, which probes that issue, is sensible and has a lot of merit.

On the issue of private shareholders, I will make the argument just briefly, since this Bill is not about nationalisation, about where the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, misunderstands the point about private companies. As my noble friend Lord Moylan said, from the point of view of the consumer and the delivery of services, privatisation was for most of its life a massive success. It brought into the railways an enormous amount of private capital, new rolling stock, new services and a hugely greater number of people using the railways than had been the case under British Rail, under which passenger numbers had, frankly, been declining since the Second World War. It was a huge success.

Now, it is absolutely true that the passenger franchise model had some issues and, in fact, was effectively destroyed by the pandemic. I am not suggesting that we necessarily would have wanted to carry on with that model, but there are other models involving the private sector. For example, the way that TfL operates in London is that TfL specifies the services but, in a number of cases, it contracts with companies to run those. also, as the then Mayor of Greater Manchester, the Prime Minister set up the bus services that he wished to procure, but it was the private sector that delivered those. Those models seem to me perfectly sensible. If you set them up properly, the company makes money only if it delivers services that passengers require. That seems to me a very sensible model. I know that the noble Baroness does not agree with it, but I just wanted to set out how it actually works, as opposed to her characterisation of it.

The last point that I want to make is on Amendment 8, also tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan, which talks about the organisational structure of GBR. The reason why that is important—I think we will come on to this in some of our later debates—is that it is, in effect, how you set up the organisation and, therefore, how it takes decisions and who takes the decisions within the structure.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their amendments, and the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Berkeley, for their contributions.

I will begin with Amendments 1 and 6, which would specify that the company designated as Great British Railways must be established under existing company law. I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that, as is the case with Network Rail and the train operating companies, GBR will be a private limited company under the Companies Act 2006. It will have its own articles of association. The Bill is constructed around this assumption. For example, Clause 3(6) makes it clear that GBR can carry out business activities by virtue of being a limited company under existing company law. If it were not a Companies Act company, this and other provisions of the Bill would not be appropriate. The alternative to a Companies Act company would be something like a royal charter corporation, such as the BBC, or a statutory corporation, such as the Advanced Research and Invention Agency. GBR is clearly neither of these, given that the Bill does not establish it as such. Body corporate is a general term under UK law, meaning an incorporated organisation, which is what GBR will be. Combined with the drafting in Clause 3(6), the Bill is clear that GBR will be a Companies Act company.

I turn to Amendments 2 and 3. Amendment 2 would remove from the Bill the requirement that GBR be wholly owned by the Crown. As the noble Lord will be aware, this Government were elected with a clear mandate to nationalise the railways, and that is exactly what we are doing. We are ensuring that GBR is owned by the British people and run in their interests—not in the interests of private profit. Public ownership is key to creating a more efficient railway and a better passenger experience. It shifts the focus from profit to passengers and freight, and begins to put an end to the fragmentation and waste of the franchising system, allowing the whole industry to work together in the interests of the passenger. This approach will save the taxpayer hundreds of millions of pounds in fees and allow taxpayers’ money to be spent on things that will benefit the passenger instead.

The requirement in the Bill that GBR must be publicly owned will ensure that any future Government wanting to privatise the railways would have to seek the consent of Parliament to do so. This will put the system on exactly the same footing as it was under privatisation since—as I am sure the noble Lord will acknowledge, given that he is trying to repeal it—an Act of Parliament was required to bring passenger rail services back into public hands. The latest YouGov poll shows that 76% of the public think that railways should be in the public sector and only 13% think they should be in the private sector. As the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, put it so well, previous Governments could have done something about it but they did not. The railway is an asset with significant financial, economic and safety implications, so it is right that Parliament scrutinises every major change to it.

Amendment 3 would ensure that GBR’s subsidiaries do not need to be wholly owned by the Crown. I will speak more about the Government’s policy on this in a moment when I address the amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but I am pleased to confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that the drafting of Clause 1 already facilitates what he seeks to achieve. The requirement to be wholly owned by the Crown applies only to the parent company that is designated as GBR, not to any of its subsidiaries. For clarity, GBR subsidiaries come within the term “GBR companies”, as defined in the Bill. GBR companies are not subject to the “wholly owned” requirement, so I hope the noble Lord will see that his amendment is unnecessary.

Speaking of GBR’s subsidiaries, I will now address Amendments 5, 334, 335, 337 and 345 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. She has said that she is a passionate supporter of public ownership, as we are. Her amendments would mean that GBR must wholly own all its subsidiaries for them to be considered GBR companies. As I have said before, we are committed to the private sector continuing to play a key role in the future rail sector, and this includes within GBR where appropriate. After all, the private sector can bring advantages that the public sector cannot, including greater risk appetite and additional investment that reduces the burden on the taxpayer. GBR will therefore leverage the best of both the public and the private sectors, working in close partnership with private companies, from freight and rolling stock to ticket retailing and the rail supply chain, to unlock benefits and drive growth.

The advantages of this approach were referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and can already be seen in Network Rail’s successful joint ventures with the private sector, including through Platform4, a subsidiary of Network Rail which uses private sector investment to support community regeneration projects and is expected to deliver up to 40,000 new homes in the next decade through public/private joint ventures. For example, Platform4’s joint venture with Bloc Group has already secured 2,000 new rental homes near major city transport links. These types of investment would simply not be possible were I to accept the noble Baroness’s amendments. In addition, the amendments would prevent GBR from pursuing joint ventures with the devolved Governments, which I hope she agrees would not be the right outcome.

However, I can reassure the noble Baroness that, although the existing Companies Act definition of a subsidiary enables these public/private partnerships, importantly, it does not enable private sector control. Any private sector interest in a GBR company must be a minority shareholding, to ensure that the railway remains owned, controlled and operated by the public. The Government are also clear that certain aspects of the Bill, such as GBR’s access decision-making process and its ticket retailer, passenger services and vital cross-industry functions, will all remain part of the wholly publicly owned and controlled part of the business. This recognises that, while private sector investment is a great enabler of infrastructure development opportunities that can support our communities, it is not always suited to railway functions that must be run in the public interest.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Before the Minister moves on, this might sound a very picky point, but it is quite important. On his point about joint ventures, he talked about the Government always having a majority stake and having control. Is a 50-50 joint venture possible? If you are a private company making an investment, there is a big difference between having a 50-50 equal partnership versus one where you are a minority shareholder. Would that be possible under the model that he set out and which is structured in the Bill?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. I will write to him on that rather than say something I might regret.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will start by referring to the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, talked to, because it just so happened that, as I was travelling to London yesterday, a car struck a bridge at Burnham. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, is nodding; perhaps he was on the same train. The reason why it is important is that, although there was, I think, no significant damage to the bridge, the train was significantly late, which meant that every single person on it was entitled under the Delay Repay scheme to a significant refund of their fare. It was not the only train affected; lots of trains were. The cost to the taxpayer of that single incident was probably very significant, and it does not seem unreasonable that the insurance company of the person who struck the bridge should have to reimburse the taxpayer for the cost of that significant damage. Having had that experience yesterday, I am instinctively supportive of that amendment.

Before I talk about the other amendments in this group, I will make a teensy defence of the Sunak Administration, given what my noble friend Lord Moylan said, and since I was a member of it; I will not make an extensive one because that is not the purpose for which we are here. On this specific issue, we got the Williams review, which my noble friend referred to, and then we set in train the work that has, in effect, come to fruition with this Bill, in starting the process of setting up GBR. A lot of the preparatory work took place when we were in government, and there is a lot of agreement, I think, between how we would have done it and how the Minister is doing it today. The big difference, of course, is on the ownership of the companies but, in terms of bringing together a guiding mind—however one wishes to describe it—and a more seamless operation of track and train, that is certainly something that we intended to do and we started the process. That is my bit of a defence of what we did when we were in government.

Let me now address the amendments, starting with Amendment 7, and Clause 3. The problem with purpose clauses and a list of functions is the danger of what parliamentary draftsmen call undue specificity: as soon as you have a list, you then have a question about whether you are allowed to do the things that are not on the list. In his list, my noble friend Lord Moylan has things that are not in the Government’s list of functions, such as

“providing value for money for passengers and taxpayers”.

But in neither of the lists is what we have talked about: the work that Network Rail currently does, and GBR will continue to do, not just on operating passenger services or facilitating freight services but on maximising the benefit of its property portfolio—not only to generate revenue to offset the cost of providing rail services but to generate a significant amount of economic development and growth in significant parts of the country, as my noble friend Lord Lansley mentioned. The Government are woefully behind their housebuilding targets, but one of their priorities is developing housing around railway stations, and some of that land will be owned by Network Rail and, in due course, GBR. In relation to the amendment, I ask the Minister whether the functions set out in the Bill are sufficiently extensive to give GBR the powers it needs to do its work.

I also want to speak to Amendment 12, and the linked Amendments 80 and 81, on fair and non-discriminatory decisions, which it is important to put in the legislation. GBR will now make important decisions about access for private freight companies to the network, open access operators and—I will not labour this point here, because we will come to it in the next group—ticketing. Unlike the ORR, which did not have any skin in the game, GBR will be making decisions on, for example, freight access or open access, so it will be both a decision-maker and a provider of services, which are in competition. That is also true for ticket retailing. When it makes those decisions, it should have a legal duty to do so in a fair and non-discriminatory way, which is why I support the amendment. It would have two effects: it would govern how GBR operates and it would provide the opportunity for others to challenge it if it does not behave in that way.

Amendments 80 and 81 are linked, because they are about the charges that GBR can make for services where it is a monopoly supplier and, therefore, people do not have any choices. Amendment 81 would provide an appeal mechanism if it charges in a way that people do not think is reasonable. Both amendments would be very sensible to ensure that it behaves in a reasonable way.

There are two other amendments I want to comment on. Amendment 15, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, set out, sounds sensible on the face of it, but I will just flag three issues with it. First, when you move employers, there are potentially pension implications. I understand that the company that provides pensions to rail workers has flagged the time that will be required to do the pensions transition in a sensible way. We have seen in other areas of the public sector that, if you get that wrong, it can cause significant issues.

The second issue is one that we have seen, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, touched on in his remarks. I suspect that, at the moment, because these are all separate companies, there will be a range of pay structures. We have already seen this—as have the Government, to their own cost—in what they are doing with NHS England. They originally said that they wanted to bring NHS England and all its staff into the Department of Health and Social Care. As they set out on that process, because people in NHS England are in many cases paid significantly more than people in the Department of Health and Social Care, they have discovered either that they cannot do it or that doing it would be very expensive or require the Secretary of State or the Chief Secretary to the Treasury to sign off the move of every single employee above a certain pay band. They have discovered that it is all very complicated, and they are effectively having to do the NHS England/DHSC change in a different way. If you stick everyone in a single company and you have to equalise all their pay and conditions, my concern is that if you do it in a downwards direction, it would clearly not be advantageous to those employees who lose out, but if you do it in an upwards direction then it is clearly damaging for the taxpayer, who has to pay all this increased cost without getting any productivity.

I want to flag one final thing, but will not go into it at length because we have a later group some way down where we will cover it in more detail. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, slightly gave the game away when he referred to a letter from the RMT’s parliamentary group: the point of this is to have a single national rail employer so that the trade unions can increase their power and once again be able to deliver national rail strikes, closing down the entire railway network, which they have not been able to do with different rail operating companies, as you could not have a strike in one of them in response to a dispute at another. People should be very clear: if there is a single employer—I have some amendments to test this—we will be back in the days where we have national rail strikes and increase the bargaining power of those trade unions. The experience over history is that that power is not used for the benefit of the passenger and customer but to extract money from the taxpayer. That would be a very damaging thing. I flag that now, but will not go into it in any more detail as I will come back to it later.

Finally, very briefly, I am attracted to Amendment 20 from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. The only point I would make to her, as I think I said at Second Reading, is that the reason why, when I was Secretary of State, I set up a freight target—there is reference to a freight target in the Bill—was to try to balance the fact that all the conversations we have about railways are always about passengers. The reason for the freight target was to slightly rebalance the conversation and have more of a level playing field. My worry is that, if you put the passenger target in the Bill, you reweight it back towards being all about passengers again. I absolutely agree with her that we want to increase the number of passengers and reduce the taxpayer subsidy, but the reason for having the freight target was to slightly rebalance and have more of a level playing field.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendments 20 and 110 would require Great British Railways to increase passengers on the railways and to set a passenger target, rather like the freight target, which has just been referred to. One could easily argue that this is not necessary, as any Government will want the railway to grow and passengers and freight to increase. Yet that is not necessarily the case. The Bill currently does not create a clear statutory duty to grow passenger use or to set measurable targets. The reform of the railway should not simply be to stabilise the current system as it is; it should be to actively grow demand and ensure access to the network to support the shift to sustainable modes of transport.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I do not have my name on these amendments, but I thoroughly agree with pretty much everything that has been said. I especially support what my noble friend Lady Harding said in introducing this group and am entirely in agreement with my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. I do not want to get into the question of appeals, because we will come on to how the appeal process should be structured later.

Amendment 47 in the name of my noble friend about the approved document is particularly important. I assume that the code of practice that we are promised, which the noble Baroness, Lady Alexander, was talking about, is the equivalent of the approved document or some part of it. At the moment, we have this ticketing and settlement agreement. We have to know how this is going to work in future. If we do not, we should expect—indeed, we should call for—the Competition and Markets Authority to step in. As things stand, the relevant aspects of the ticketing and settlement agreement constitute part of a block exemption against a Chapter 1 prohibition under the Competition Act. It is, on the face of it, potentially an anti-competitive agreement, but the block exemption exists. The question is whether the agreement satisfies the requirements of the block exemption. We have to look at the agreement to know whether that is the case, which is why Amendment 47 is right. We have to ask the Competition and Markets Authority whether the code of practice or the approved document under the Bill satisfies the requirements of the block exemption.

The fact is that GBR will be in a dominant position. Under the Competition Act, in addition to the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements there is a prohibition on abuse of a dominant position. Much of this debate is saying that, given that we know that GBR will be in a dominant position, we should be actively looking for the Office of Rail and Road, by way of market investigations in this area if necessary, or the Competition and Markets Authority to step in, as the current jurisdiction enables it to do, to counter any abuse. We know from Clause 2(1) that Great British Railways has no Crown immunity. Under Section 73 of the Competition Act, there is a Crown immunity from the constraints, remedies and directions of the Competition and Markets Authority, so GBR does not want to be in a position where the Competition and Markets Authority comes after it to prevent its abuse of a dominant position. For all those reasons, the Government would be well advised to put into the legislation measures that will prevent GBR being tempted to abuse its dominant position and to ensure that the approved document will satisfy the CMA’s requirements for a block exemption.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady Harding of Winscombe for her excellent opening of this group, the comprehensive way in which she did it and—I think this is a powerful point—her real experience of a similar process and what actually happens in practice. One of the values of this House is having not just theoretical debates but Members who have experience of how these things work in practice. It is no good just legislating for what we think might happen; it is about what will happen. That was particularly valuable.

In this area, unlike some of the areas in the Bill, there is broad consistency among everybody who has spoken so far. At Second Reading, in other fora and in writing, the Minister set out that the Government want a competitive retail landscape and recognise the benefits of that. So what we are debating here is not the principle but how best to achieve that shared goal in practice. I will try to add to this debate.

Practically, the suggestion in my noble friend Lord Holmes’s Amendment 182 of a functional separation —which the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, also raised—is the cleanest and most sensible solution. That means that GBR is not in a position where it is tempted to abuse a dominant market position. It has a separate retailing arm, the rules can operate in a transparent way, you avoid a lot of trouble and you do not have to set up a complicated mechanism to deal with that abuse. I understand that the Government have set their face against that, but I reinforce that that would be the best solution and would solve a lot of these problems.

If the Government do not want to do that, for whatever reason, we absolutely need to make sure, first, that there is transparency. If all this is hidden away, it is very difficult for whatever mechanisms are put in place, whether it is the CMA, the ORR or whatever legal processes the independent retailers have to do. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, they are not huge companies with bottomless pits of money to be able to do this. If you do not have transparency, people do not know what is going on.

I will make a slightly different argument, bringing in our friends from the Treasury, than the one my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham made. This is one where the Treasury should be on our side. One of the important things that the Treasury wants to achieve is to reduce the subsidy paid to the rail network because, post Covid, the rail network does not send money to the Treasury; it sucks money away from the Treasury. The only way that will change on the operating side is if there is innovation and more passengers use the rail network. The ticketing retailers are one of the ways, in the innovative way they retail tickets. Importantly, if leisure travel is to be a growth area, the partnerships that they strike with providers of leisure opportunities can then be combined with travel to produce innovative packages. If you are going to do all that, you need that thriving, competitive retailing operation, so the Treasury should want that to be successful.

The other thing the Treasury should want is that the operating cost of GBR’s own ticketing operation should be as low as possible. On the cost of running that operation, I challenge what my noble friend Lord Young said. We know what the third-party retailers get because we know what the percentage commission is. If GBR’s retailing operation is not able to run its services for less money than that, it should not be in business, frankly, because it is adding no value at all and should not be running it. My hunch is it that it will not be able to, which is why, when I was Secretary of State, I said it should not really get involved in this business at all because there were lots of competing providers that were much better at it and, frankly, it should just get those to do it.

However, for reasons I do not quite understand, Ministers want GBR to be involved in this process. So, it is critical that the accounting—I declare my interest here as a chartered accountant—should be absolutely transparent so that we can see what it costs. From the Treasury’s point of view, as I said, it wants to be sure that no subsidy is going into the ticketing operation from the rest of the thing, given that there are competitive operators that can deliver this, I suspect, more cost effectively. That is an argument for the Treasury supporting some of these amendments.

On the subsidy point, I believe there is a question that is not resolved, which the independent retailers are concerned about. I understand that, in written correspondence with the Independent Rail Retailers, the department has asserted that GBR’s online retailer will not be subject to the Subsidy Control Act 2022, arguing instead that it will be governed solely by the Public Service Obligations in Transport Regulations 2023. That approach is inconsistent with the legal framework and assurances given by Ministers during the passage of the Bill so far that GBR will remain subject to public law, competition and subsidy control requirements.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am about to get there. In turning to Amendments 49 and 181 concerning cross-subsidisation and subsidy control, I can offer further reassurance. The advantage of interventions is that you make your point; the disadvantage is that you stop hearing. As a public body, GBR is required to comply with Managing Public Money principles and relevant subsidy control legislation. The Public Service Obligations in Transport Regulations is the relevant subsidy control legislation that applies to retail specifically.

GBR’s passenger services business will therefore operate within a clear financial framework, ensuring that public funding is used appropriately and fairly. GBR will be required through its business plan to set out its activities, such as its broad retailing function, the costs of these activities and how it proposes that these costs are met. The business plan must cover everything that GBR does, so there should be no concern about transparency.

It is important to note that GBR will be operating a transport service of which retailing is a part. It will have to use all available channels to serve passengers, however they buy their tickets. If it is allocated more funding for retail than would be needed for a simple online retail platform, it is simply because it also has an obligation to provide physical ticket sales—I listed those activities before—including for people who pay cash. They are far more costly to provide, and other retailers are most unlikely to provide them.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Young, it will not be possible for GBR to subsidise retail from infrastructure budgets, for example, as ticket offices are not classed as infrastructure. GBR will not be overcompensated to deliver retail functions in a way that distorts the market. Funding will be allocated based on the costs of delivering those services to passengers.

It will also be subject to the oversight of the ORR as the sector specialist competition regulator, alongside the Competition and Markets Authority. In that role, the ORR will be able to take enforcement steps against GBR, should it suspect that GBR is using public funds to act in an anti-competitive way.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Before the Minister moves on, can I press him on two of the things that he has said? In his opening summary, he set out the Government’s view. The problem is that if the retailers do not buy it—they do not, at the moment—whatever he thinks, they are not going to be investing, innovating and developing because they will not be able to justify that to their shareholders. Part of the problem is the need to take some steps to persuade retailers that they will be treated fairly.

Secondly, I think the Minister inadvertently made this point about accounting. I know about the ticketing and settlement agreement to my cost and about some of the ways that retailing has to be done. If GBR is, in effect, doing different things—if it has an online operation but has to do all this other stuff—it will be even more important that there is clear accounting and transparency about where the money is going. Otherwise, it will be impossible to work out whether it is subsidising its online operations, which are competing with third party retailers, by bringing in more money for its other services.

Frankly, it is really important for the taxpayer that we know how much it costs to retail through ticket offices and how cost effective that is because, at some point, Ministers will have to grasp the issue—I started to grasp it but had to ungrasp in the end—that providing things through ticket offices when hardly anyone buys tickets that way will have to change at some point in the future. There has to be some clear and transparent cost information to enable the right decisions to be taken.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I simply say to the noble Lord, first, that there will have to be 100% transparency because, apart from anything else, GBR will have to put all the costs into its business plan. My other point about his first point is that there has been a lot of investment already, with very little protection. Part of what we are doing is to give greater protection for retailers in the future, which they need because they have invested. That is a valid point.

Amendments 47, 51, 52, 53, 136 and 139 concern oversight. The retail code of practice will, as I said, be administered and enforced by the ORR. It is the appropriate body to assess complaints and determine whether GBR has complied with its obligations, but GBR will also be fully subject to competition law, alongside the existing oversight of the Competition and Markets Authority. Nothing in the Bill prevents the CMA from acting on competition challenges in rail, and nothing prevents retailers from referring issues to the CMA—either competition issues relating to the code of practice or wider competition issues. So a second opinion is always available and, of course, if they wanted to appeal to the courts, they could judicially review those decisions further.

Currently, at least, additional approval requirements and further statutory appeal routes simply duplicate the existing regulatory arrangements without providing meaningful additional protections, and transparency, as I have referred to, is already baked into this framework. It is a core regulatory principle for the ORR, which has historically publicised the launching, and formal outcome, of railway licence investigations, and I would expect it to continue to do so. The Bill retains the requirement for the ORR to give notice for any decision not to issue an enforcement order following a licence breach, providing a legislative backstop for this transparency.

I move to Amendments 136 and 139. It would not be appropriate for the ORR’s general duty to promote competition to apply to rail retailing wholesale. If it did, the competition duty would conflict with the ORR’s role in fairly and objectively enforcing the safeguards that the Government have charged it to deliver via the code. Enforcement of the code should be fair and evidence-based, determined simply by whether GBR has complied with the code of practice or not. It should not be subject to other goals, which might cause the ORR to judge operators’ compliance unfairly. This is usual practice for enforcement provisions.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, that the competition duty will absolutely apply to the ORR when it is writing the code of practice, so the code itself will have competition principles embedded within it. My officials wrote to her on that subject. The noble Baroness put to the Committee a number of clear propositions that I will consider carefully as a consequence of what she said. I believe I have answered many of them, but I will look at what she said further, and of course the publication of the draft code of practice will help considerably. I will also consider what the noble Lord, Lord Young, the noble Baroness, Lady Alexander, and other noble Lords said. As I said, we expect the CMA to respond to the consultation, so we will see what it says.

On Amendment 17, the Government fully agree that appropriate oversight and scrutiny of public spending is important. However, the amendment is unnecessary. The government policy has long been that GBR will retail tickets online through a high-quality website and app, as the train operating companies do now and have done for many years, without fees to passengers.

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[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, these are interesting amendments. I have had several representations from the rail sector in Wales and Scotland, and they are clearly quite concerned.

The first question I probably need answering is on who will be owning and operating the infrastructure in Wales and Scotland. At the moment, in Scotland, it is done by Transport Scotland, and in Wales, I cannot remember but think it is different. Of course, both those organisations may, and do, operate passenger train services. Given the scope of the Bill, which we have been discussing at length today, will Transport Scotland and the Welsh Assembly be able to let their own contracts with GBR or an independent operator to run trains? Who will be responsible for managing the infrastructure if it goes wrong or needs maintenance, and for the issue in the amendment, which is about co-ordinating with the rest of the UK? To me, it is not clear at the moment, and I would be grateful if my noble friend could clarify. I am probably being stupid, but there we are.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I just want to speak briefly about three groups of amendments within this group. Amendment 145 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan has quite a lot to recommend it. The Bill, as set out, sensibly says that the UK Government and the Scottish Government should have a memorandum of understanding about how cross-border rail services should work. That is very sensible, but it seems to me that you would want to have the documents published at the same time; you want them on the same timeline because you want a GB rail strategy to be produced, given the way the rail network works. The whole point about GBR bringing together track and train and having some consistency means it seems very sensible that, if you are to have this memorandum of understanding between UK Ministers and Scottish and Welsh Ministers, you want them on the same timeline. Then what you publish is, in effect, a GB rail strategy with a level of consistency.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, the first thing I should say about this group is that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have been intensely involved in drafting the Bill, and both Governments are very supportive of it.

I turn to Amendment 21. Clause 4 enables Scottish and Welsh Ministers to make arrangements for their functions to be exercised by GBR, a GBR subsidiary or a company jointly owned. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, spotted that correctly; he is absolutely right. It is an enabling power designed to support integration where that is considered beneficial. It does not prevent devolved Ministers from continuing to exercise their functions themselves, nor is it intended to provide a general power to delegate functions to any body corporate.

Indeed, under Clause 27, Welsh Ministers will continue to designate Wales-only services and Welsh components of cross-border services. Under Clause 31, Welsh Ministers may either provide those services themselves or secure their provision through the award of public service contracts. Similar powers exist for Scottish Ministers under Clauses 26 and 31. Of course, Scottish Ministers can decide to run their services through GBR or through their own operator. The Government therefore believe that the Bill strikes an appropriate balance between preserving devolved responsibilities and enabling closer integration with GBR, where that is desired by Scottish or Welsh Ministers.

Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would require the ORR to be consulted. Clause 4 already requires consultation with both the Secretary of State and GBR before such arrangements are made, varied or revoked. That is because GBR is the body that may be responsible for carrying out the function, while the Secretary of State has an interest in the wider operation and integration of the railway system, and because GBR will be operating devolved functions alongside reserved ones. They are therefore the parties best placed to provide input on these arrangements. Although the ORR plays an important role as the railway’s independent regulator, these arrangements concern the exercise of devolved functions and national versus devolved governance, rather than regulatory matters. We therefore do not consider an additional statutory consultation requirement to be necessary.

On Amendments 145 and 146, the Government fully support transparency and effective parliamentary scrutiny. That is precisely why we have already published the agreed memorandum of understanding with Welsh Ministers and a framework for the memorandum of understanding with Scottish Ministers. That has enabled Parliament to consider the proposed arrangements alongside the Bill. The memoranda of understanding are intended to provide a basis for joint working between UK Ministers and Scottish and Welsh Ministers on matters relating to rail services and funding. They are not legislative instruments but practical agreements to support effective intergovernmental working.

The amendments would require the MoUs to be published at the same time as the rail strategy and would impose a two-month period before they could come into force. However, the rail strategy and the MoUs serve distinct and seperate purposes. The rail strategy sets out long-term priorities and objectives for the railway, while the MoU supports collaborative working between the UK and Welsh or Scottish Governments. Requiring the two documents to be published at the same time would create unnecessary friction and delay. Similarly, requiring a two-month waiting period before an MoU could take effect would add process without materially improving oversight or outcomes.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can I just check that the rail strategy that the Secretary of State will produce will be a strategy for Great Britain, and that the memorandum of understanding will be about how that interacts? If the Secretary of State’s rail strategy is for England only, that does not make sense. What the Minister just said implies that the Secretary of State will produce a rail strategy for Great Britain, in which case there would not be any friction from ensuring that those documents were published together.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Before the Minister responds to that point, I add that I am slightly confused because Clause 15, “Rail strategy”, says that the Secretary of State “may not” include provision relating to the functions of the Scottish Ministers, so it may be a rail strategy for Great Britain, but it cannot deal with the functions of the Scottish Ministers.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I say in response to noble Lords that the long-term rail strategy is for the whole railway. The Scottish and Welsh Governments are being consulted, but Scotland will also have a strategy covering its own functions because that is the meaning of devolution. I hope that is clear.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I do not want to overly labour this point, but that is not very clear. The way it works at the moment is that the Scottish Ministers have a role in helping to shape—

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

As I was just saying before we resumed, the advantage of a break is that I had a chance to slightly firm up my question. Before we broke for the Division, I was saying that I thought that not synchronising the rail strategy publication and the memorandum of understanding potentially meant not having a clear, joined-up strategy for Great Britain. I was asking the Minister whether the strategy that the Secretary of State had to produce was for Great Britain and, if so, whether it would not make sense to synchronise that with the memorandum of understanding.

Having had a chance to look at Clause 15, it is indeed the case that the Secretary of State is producing a strategy for the rail network in Great Britain—that includes Wales and Scotland—but it specifically must not contain provisions about functions of the Scottish Ministers, because that is clearly what the memorandum of understanding is going to do. In this case, I think the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan are very sensible. Otherwise, you will publish a rail strategy for Great Britain that has quite important functions for Scottish Ministers because they make the call on what Network Rail does on infrastructure in Scotland, for example. It does not make sense to not have that joined up.

I am very happy for the Minister take this away, because it will obviously have consequences, but synchronising those two events will drive very sensible and good behaviour in the way the department interacts with the Scottish and Welsh Governments and will be an improvement in having a better rail strategy for the whole of Great Britain.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, and I, too, have done a little bit of homework while we had the Division. The important thing he draws our attention to is Clause 15(3). Because

“The rail strategy may not contain provision about functions of the Scottish Ministers”,


in effect, it is the rail strategy for England and Wales. Because the rail strategy for Scotland is the function of Scottish Ministers, they will publish a strategy to cover Scotland. It will reflect the devolution funding arrangements and the responsibility for the railway in each country. We are working very closely with Scotland, and GBR will have to work very closely with Scotland, as will the Secretary of State, to ensure that the strategies make sense and, therefore, that the GBR business plan makes sense.

Having said all that, I am still not sure that I can see the connection between the MoUs and the strategies. Indeed, we have been able to strike a memorandum of understanding and publish it with Welsh Ministers—and we have a framework for that in Scotland—without a long-term rail strategy. They are intended to provide a basis for joint working between UK Ministers and Scottish and Welsh Ministers on matters related to rail services and funding, but they are not the same as a strategy, which sets out what the intentions of those Governments are and will form the basis on which GBR will write a business plan.

I think my contention is the same. The rail strategy sets out long-term priorities and objectives for the railway, and the MoUs support collaborative working between the respective UK and Welsh and Scottish Governments. I see the difference between those two instruments—the strategies and the MoUs—but I do not see the need for a waiting period between them taking effect or for them to be co-ordinated. As I have said, we have published the MoU with Wales already and the outline of that for Scotland too.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Here is my final point—as the Minister will be pleased to know. He has just, perhaps inadvertently, flagged that the drafting of the Bill in Clause 15 is not correct. The Secretary of State will not be producing a long-term strategy for the development and use of the rail network in Great Britain and the railway services that she wishes to see in Great Britain. She will be doing those things for England and Wales. The Bill should really reflect that because it is inaccurate. Again, I am happy for him to take it away, but I think he has let on at the Dispatch Box that the Bill is not correctly drafted.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord draws my attention to something which, having read it to him, I concluded myself. This is the purpose of Committee, of course: to discover things that you have not thought about. I am as willing as the next Minister, perhaps, to decide what to do. We will take that away, and I am grateful to the noble Lord. For the avoidance of doubt, I still do not accept the contention about the connections between the MoU and the strategies, but I accept the points that the respective boundaries of the strategies could be much better placed than they are.

Amendment 146 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, goes further on the provisions on the allocation of ticket revenue from cross-border services operated by Transport for Wales. We do not think that is appropriate. Such operational and commercial matters are more appropriately dealt with through established industry arrangements such as public service contracts and the Wales and borders agreements rather than through an intergovernmental co-operation agreement, which is fundamentally about the governance of GBR, so I urge the noble Lord not to press the amendment.

I turn to Amendments 294 and 295 on consultation. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that Scottish and Welsh Ministers are consulted on decisions that have a significant impact on their nations. That is precisely why the Bill already places a duty on GBR to consult them before making such decisions. The amendment would go further by requiring devolved Ministers to determine whether consultation was required. That would add significant delay for no practical benefit, as Scottish and Welsh Ministers would be required to review decisions that would often be irrelevant to them before steps can be taken. The approach could create uncertainty about when decisions can proceed and risk shifting the focus from effective engagement to procedural questions about whether consultation is required. Scottish and Welsh Ministers will also continue to have important mechanisms through which they can influence the railway, including their respective rail and transport strategies, their powers, which are strong, and guidance. The Government therefore consider these amendments unnecessary.

Finally, Amendment 296 from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, specifies that GBR should consult on access decisions where they impact Welsh Ministers. Clause 82 already requires that GBR consults Wales on issues affecting it. That requirement would also extend to access decisions. Therefore, I can reassure the noble Lord that his intent has already been achieved by the Bill but, bearing in mind what he said in support of his amendment, I will write to him, and copy it to other noble Lords, about the ownership and control of infrastructure in Scotland and Wales now and in the future so that he and other noble Lords—though I see the noble Lord is not in his place—can be clear about the present and future arrangements, since I think what he said expressed a degree of confusion about them.

I finish by saying again, as I started with, that Scotland and Wales have been intensely involved in the drafting of the Bill and that both Governments are very supportive of it. Therefore, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.