Railways Bill

Lord Berkeley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 10th September 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support what my noble friend Lord Lansley has said on his Amendment 26. I had some dealings on this when the Prime Minister was the Mayor of the Greater Manchester and when Andy Street was Mayor of the West Midlands. Both of them engaged with the department on their desire to integrate the national rail network into their plans locally. They wanted to have those conversations, which worked well. In those cases, obviously, they were both mayors.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Lansley. Given the announcement this week that local government reform and the bringing together of unitary authorities, which is, in many cases, a precursor to having mayors, have been held up and there have been legal challenges, it would be much more sensible, as my noble friend says, if we made sure that GBR could have those sensible conversations and had the powers to do that with all appropriate local authorities with a strategic transport function. We should not limit that to those authorities with a mayor.

As my noble friend said, although it was at least the preference of the Government led by Keir Starmer that there should be limits to what you could devolve if you did not have a mayor, it sounds like, from what the Prime Minister said in his answers to Cornish MPs, that he is open-minded about that. Therefore, we could have some significant local authorities with transport powers without a mayor. I know from my own experience that there are a number of proposals in the Cornish area, for example, for some rail infrastructure that would bring significant benefits to the Cornish economy. It would be perverse if the Cornish council could not have those conversations with GBR or if people had to work out weird ways of having to facilitate those conversations because we had not provided for that in this legislation.

I agree with my noble friend. The Minister would be wise either to accept his amendment or, if it needs to be worded differently or other changes need to be made, at least to take it away and come back on Report with a government amendment, or suite of amendments, to achieve the same function. That would improve the position and, in fact, get to a position that I think is the Government’s intention—certainly the current Government’s intention. It may not have been when the legislation was drafted but I think that it would more accurately reflect the position now.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to the amendments in my name, Amendments 298, 299 and 300, which follow on from the amendments about which noble Lords have spoken. I want to double-check that there will be consultation with the relevant authorities—whether it is Scotland, Wales or other authorities—before any change is made to access charges, timetables or anything else.

Several noble Lords have spoken about Cornwall, where I live. It may be down as a mayoral authority but, knowing the politics of Cornwall, I think that it is highly unlikely that anything credible will come out of that. Whether that is good or bad, we can debate.

There is also the question of what improvement—or lack of improvement—is needed to the railway in Cornwall and, to some extent, in Devon. We have been debating for many years whether the line at Dawlish is at risk and by how much. I know that my noble friend the Minister has said that it is all going to be fine. Rock bolts are being put into the hillside to stop it falling down, which I am sure is a good solution, but we still only have one rail line going to most of south Devon and the whole of Cornwall. It would be nice to think that the local authorities—the south-west regional authority is already doing some work on this—are able to take some of that forward with a budget to look at the alternatives and make sure that the various authorities, whoever they may be at the time, are properly consulted, especially on access, charges and things like that.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I am particularly grateful for his suggestion that we debate this only once. I have listened carefully to what he has just said and I will reflect on it, as I said I would do on the rest of the subject. I am grateful to him for that, and indeed the Hansard record is useful in being able to cross-reference it further to this Committee session.

I turn to the proposals on Transport for London. Amendment 27 seeks to provide all mayoral authorities with the same powers as TfL. Of course, the Government support rail devolution where it can deliver better outcomes for passengers and local communities, but those arrangements should reflect the circumstances, capabilities and aspirations of individual areas rather than applying a single model everywhere. The TfL model has a distinct legislative and governance framework developed over many years, and it would not be appropriate to automatically confer all existing or future TfL powers on every mayoral combined authority. The other point worth noting is that the geography of London includes several complete railway services, unlike much of the geography of the rest of the combined authorities in England.

The Government have already published guidance on applications for rail devolution and, as I have already said, the Bill includes a route to devolved rail services for those seeking that in Clause 28. Therefore, should mayoral authorities want to pursue full devolution of certain services, as TfL has, they are welcome to use those established routes to seek it. Devolution arrangements should be considered on their merits, taking account of local circumstances and the outcome sought for passengers. A one-size-fits-all approach will not serve all local communities.

On Amendments 28 to 30, Clause 6 of the Bill requires GBR and TfL to co-operate on railway matters, including co-ordinating passenger services and sharing relevant information to help to integrate rail with the wider London network. As the directing mind for the railway, GBR will be responsible for those operational matters and how they will be discharged when collaborating with TfL. I do not believe that expanding the Secretary of State’s role further would reflect that clear division of responsibilities, but I can reassure the noble Lord that, via amendments that the Government brought in on Report in the Commons, the Secretary of State is still enabled to enter into arrangements with TfL to support the future devolution of rail services where that is needed. The Government believe that this approach is sufficient to support TfL to integrate and co-operate with the wider rail network.

On Amendment 159, I reassure the noble Lord that the Government are supportive of the success TfL has made of rail devolution, and existing devolved arrangements will continue. To that end, existing exemption orders in relation to TfL concession services do not have an expiry date. The Bill also contains safeguards governing access decisions, including duties on GBR, a requirement to have regard to the Mayor of London’s transport strategy, a requirement for GBR and TfL to co-operate in relation to all services, and an independent route of appeal to the ORR.

Likewise, Amendment 25 seeks to enable mayors to appeal access decisions if they affect services in their area. Clauses 83 to 86 already allow GBR to request advice from mayoral authorities about services in their area, require it to consult them if a decision will significantly affect their area and, if a decision will affect the local area, GBR will work with local partners weighing up trade-offs between local and national network priorities. This enables issues to be resolved through collaboration rather than requiring relevant local government bodies to challenge GBR through the access appeals regime. Despite this, all local authorities are able to appeal an access decision they are aggrieved by, under provisions already in the Bill.

On Amendments 297 to 301, Clause 83 already requires GBR to consult mayoral authorities where a relevant decision would significantly affect their local area, including the interests of the local economy or of people living in, working in or visiting the area. The amendments would therefore add little practical benefit beyond further bureaucracy, slowing down decision-making, while mayors would have to review hundreds of decisions, often irrelevant to them, before any progress can be made.

On Amendments 298 to 301, I reassure my noble friend that the Bill is already clear, through Clause 83, that GBR will have to consult mayoral authorities on its access and charging decisions where these relate to a GBR railway passenger service in the area and would significantly affect the local region.

Alongside these legislative commitments, it is the Government’s clear intention for GBR to work in partnership with mayoral authorities. I am determined that GBR will absolutely be a proactive partner of those authorities, maximising the benefits that the Bill can bring to local areas. As a result, I hope noble Lords are reassured that the Government share their ambitions on local devolution and I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I am very grateful for his response to my amendments, but on the relationships between local authorities and central government, we already have an example in the south-west—and, I think, in south Wales—where the train operators and the local authorities have come together and developed a new wifi system so that you can get wifi on the trains, which is quite important these days. They installed it in one train and it worked beautifully, and many of us have tried it. They asked the Department for Transport whether they, as the regional authority, could take over the procurement of improved wifi on all the trains on the GWR network and have it done more quickly. This was refused by the Department for Transport, which said that only it is capable of doing a procurement exercise on something as important as wifi on trains. Now, I hope that is just a one-off—my noble friend is aware of it—and that in the new GBR set-up, there will be more flexibility as to who does what.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

In quick answer to my noble friend, the only reason it should be procured centrally is because improved wifi is needed on every railway service in Britain. Therefore, the department is determined to deliver it on all those services, and fragmenting the procurement would lead only to increased cost and probably significant delay elsewhere. I have absolutely no intention of getting in the way of wifi for the south-west, I would just like it to be delivered in other parts of Britain at the same time.

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Amendment 86 addresses the other side of the equation: accountability for money once it has been spent. Amendment 86 would require GBR to publish an annual statement of its financial performance. It may be said that it is going to have to do this: as a company under the Companies Act, it will have to produce an annual report. But one of the issues we should be considering, given the scale of the public money likely to be going into Great British Railways, is whether an annual report, simply produced on a companies law basis, will be enough. Again, we are probing to hear what the Minister has to say about whether he intends to be more open with publishing figures on performance at the end of a financial period, rather than simply confining himself to the loopholes and dodges that are often available for those simply producing company accounts.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, briefly, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on producing a business plan are absolutely essential because, as he noted, the railways need long-term investment. It is not just trains which need to somehow be ordered 10 or 20 years before they are needed but things such as HS2, which we have no budget for at the moment. We have no real knowledge of how much is going to be spent each year and when it is going to open, so there needs to be much greater discipline on this. I fully support these probing amendments to see what my noble friend is able to tell us.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for this debate on group 5 and will echo the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon: it is a delight to see the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, in his place this afternoon. I am sure that the rest of the Grand Committee wishes him, as I do, a very happy significant birthday for yesterday. I have also read and heard what he has argued carefully and, as he is a man of huge experience in the railway, I will reflect on what he said.

The Committee will be relieved to know that I am not going to redebate the status of GBR companies and subsidiaries. I thought I would leave it to the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Moylan, to fight that out. I think I had the same clarity as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, at the end of that debate.

I think noble Lords’ amendments are, collectively seeking, first, that the Secretary of State considers GBR’s duties, her long-term rail strategy and the wider planning considerations when determining GBR’s funding settlement; secondly, that that funding settlement is transparent; and thirdly, that it is protected. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, seeks to ensure that it is in place two years before the next financial period.

I start by providing some explanation of the provisions. The Bill already establishes a comprehensive funding framework. Schedule 2 sets out that the Secretary of State must publish a statement of objectives for the railway. In doing so, she is absolutely bound to consider her duties and her own strategy, and she will, of course, consider wider planning and the impact of the network. Following the statement of objectives, the Secretary of State must then publish a statement of funds available, so that GBR can understand its funding parameters and produce a high-quality business plan.

Schedule 2 then provides that GBR must produce, publish and keep up to date the five-year integrated business plan across both infrastructure and passenger services. The Office of Rail and Road will advise the Secretary of State on the effectiveness of the business plan, including whether it represents good value for money. If it does, the Secretary of State will then approve the plan and issue a five-year settlement.

Under paragraph 7 of Schedule 2, as in the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, the Secretary of State is required to publish details of the five-year funding settlement she gives to GBR, including the funds agreed. She will absolutely ensure that that these published details are clear enough to allow stakeholders to understand the settlement, meeting the noble Lord’s request for transparency, while protecting key commercially sensitive information.

GBR’s business plan will also contain all its planned activities, costs and how it plans to meet those costs. This plan will be updated and published annually after the initial settlement. A clear summary of ORR’s advice through the funding process will also be published, as set out in paragraph 4(6), which means that the desires of the noble Lord for an annual report on GBR’s financial performance will be delivered. Other further reporting requirements are duplicative and unnecessary, and all this amendment would do is increase the time GBR spends on bureaucracy instead of getting on with its job of delivering.

On protecting the funding settlement, which the noble Lords, Lord Bradshaw and Lord Moylan, spoke about, I agree that when maintaining and renewing long-term railway assets, certainty of funding is critical. It provides a stable basis of planning, supports efficient delivery and helps build investor confidence throughout the supply chain. I repeat that the intention behind setting a five-year settlement is that it should endure for the full five-year period.

On the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, I can assure him that the Secretary of State must publish any updates to the settlement that are likely to have a material impact. If she wishes to make a material change to the settlement, she must also notify the ORR, which will advise on the likely impact on the railway, and that is one of its important and critical roles. This will ensure that there is transparency around any funding changes and that there will be scrutiny if material changes are proposed that will not support an effective railway.

On Amendment 55 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, I do not agree that the Secretary of State should be restricted to changing the funding settlement only in emergencies. As the noble Lord, Lord Harper, says, the Government have a lot of priorities to deliver across healthcare, housing, transport and public safety, which all require funding. While, of course, in my mind, the railway is absolutely the most important of those priorities, I recognise that the Government and Ministers need to be able to move money in response to changing circumstances, because choices about funding priorities are ultimately for the Government of the day.

On the details of Amendments 74 to 77 from the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, the first key point is the question of which funding changes the ORR should get involved in. The Bill already requires that the ORR is notified when changes to the funding settlement are material enough to affect delivery, but not in every circumstance. This approach is proportionate. There may well be some smaller accounting-type changes to funding needed, which will not affect delivery and do not require a true statutory formal change process. This could, for example, include GBR offering to return small underspends back to the Government where efficiencies have been found but, of course, material changes, as I have said, should be notified to the ORR. This process ensures that they will be.

The Bill currently requires that the Secretary of State notifies ORR before a material funding reduction is made to the five-year infrastructure settlement. This allows ORR to exercise its independent and expert judgement when it receives notice of a potential change. I can reassure noble Lords that the ORR would absolutely act if significant funding were taken out of the railways, including by advising the Secretary of State and publishing that advice. This approach is most practical, rather than requiring ORR to respond to each change in funding in a set way. To summarise this point, certainty is crucial for the railways, the Government and the wider supply chain, but it must be proportionate and balanced against the ability of Ministers to allocate public resources.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, raised the question of rolling stock manufacturers and the Government’s answer to this is to construct and publish in due course a rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, the first for more than 30 years, in order to give that part of this market the long-term certainty it craves and which will keep the production facilities and jobs going.

Finally, I agree that, given the amount of investment on the line, it is important that funding is in place in good time to allow GBR and industry to prepare for the next settlement. Although I do not think this should be in primary legislation, because requiring funding levels to be confirmed two years before the start of a funding period would reduce flexibility and risk settlements becoming outdated before they can even take effect, I reassure the noble Lord that details of the timing will be managed by the ORR, as they have been in successive control periods, to ensure that the financial settlement is never at risk.

Schedule 2 sets out that the statement of funds available must be published early in the process and created to timelines determined by the ORR. I can confirm that in practice, as seen under the periodic review process, this information will be published significantly in advance and has to be more than a year ahead of the final settlement to work. I understand that the ORR will ensure that the process concludes fully with time for industry to prepare. I hope this is a reassurance.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, that the Bill leaves flexibility to fund more of GBR’s activity through the five-year settlement, once this becomes once this becomes practical and Ministers are more comfortable funding an integrated entity. If Ministers fund passenger services through the five-year settlement using the route in the Bill, all the protections we just discussed would already apply.

Turning to a related issue, on Amendment 65, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that we are in agreement, and the outcome of Amendment 65 is already achieved by the Bill’s provisions. Under paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 2, GBR will be required through its business plan to set out its activities, the costs of those activities, and how it proposes that those costs are met. In practice, this means that the business plan must cover everything that GBR does, through its subsidiaries as well as the parent company, and must cover its revenue sources across all its subsidiaries.

I turn to Amendment 70—and once again I confirm for the Committee that the Bill already requires the full business plan to be published and kept up to date, in paragraph 4(7), and there is a commitment to update it in paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 2. However, the Bill contains slightly more discretion for GBR to redact sections of the business plan than this amendment proposes. This is because it is important that all types of sensitive data, not just commercially sensitive, are able to be protected. Personal data, security-sensitive information about stations and public places, or anything legally privileged are all examples of content which may need redaction from the final plan, and a flexible requirement can be better used to navigate these nuances. That flexibility is important, but I should be clear that GBR cannot withhold information simply to avoid scrutiny. The ORR will assess and advise the Secretary of State on the unredacted version of the business plan, and GBR’s public law duties and wider accountabilities framework will ensure that GBR will not be able to hide important information relevant to public scrutiny.

I understand that the intention of Amendment 73 is to prevent the Secretary of State circumventing the process as set out through the Bill, by restricting access to the broader funding powers in the Railways Act 2005. The purpose of paragraph 6(7) is to make it clear to Parliament that the Secretary of State can use her other funding power in the 2005 Act. This will be necessary when funding activity outside the five-year settlement, such as individual enhancement projects or one-off funding packages, are needed following a natural disaster, for example. I assure the noble Lord that this does not reduce transparency over GBR’s funded activities. GBR’s business plan, covering all GBR’s activity, will be costed, updated and published as GBR’s outputs change. The business plan will include enhancement projects and will show clearly where the funding for them has come from, therefore transparently identifying the use of the 2005 power for Parliament and others to scrutinise. I therefore hope that the noble Lord can see that the inclusion of paragraph 6(7), to allow the Secretary of State to use other funding powers, is purely practical.

Finally, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for Amendment 78. For clarity, relevant subsidy control law does not apply to infrastructure funding. However, it applies in full to passenger services funding, as we discussed in the ticket retailing debate on Tuesday. Railway infrastructure being exempted from subsidy control rules is something that happens on the current railway; railway infrastructure funding provided to Network Rail today is not subject to subsidy control law. The Bill does not change this principle but simply enshrines it for clarity and transparency.

Over many years, funding provided for the operation and management of the main national railway infrastructure has not been treated as subsidy as this market has been effectively closed for competition, because there are not multiple infrastructure managers operating on the same infrastructure. That position has underpinned the funding arrangements for Network Rail and continues to be appropriate for GBR as its successor. Removing this provision would not change the way that the railway is subsidised; it would just mean continuing to rely on previous legal interpretations, rather than the additional transparency provided by this clause.

Part 3 in Schedule 2 therefore provides clarity and legal certainty, and it makes sense for this stance to continue as there is no competitive market for the railway infrastructure that GBR will be responsible for, so there is no need to waste resources administering this funding as if there is. I therefore urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak on my two amendments in this group, Amendments 67 and 72. Amendment 67 is simply another opportunity, as there was in the last group, to explore and, I hope, again extract assurance from the Minister that the business plan and GBR’s statements in it will be sufficiently transparent such that we can see the financial relationship not only—as we said in the last group— between GBR and its companies but between GBR and any arrangement that it enters into with any local government bodies. So we should see what money is being paid to GBR for these purposes and how it is attributed to those activities.

I hope the Minister will say that that will definitely form part of the business plan. If he does, I would accept it, as it does not all need to be specified. In an earlier debate, my noble friend Lord Harper quite correctly referred to the dangers of specificity, which can come whenever one gets any kind of list. If there is no list at all, we all agitate as we do not know what will be in the business plan; if we try to specify too much, we start to create a statutory prohibition—or “inhibition” may be the more correct word—on what is put into the business plan. I have explained that amendment.

Amendment 72 is more interesting, in the sense that—in parentheses—I think the Minister slightly missed the point of my amendment in the last group. I was not saying that there should not be flexibility to provide for activities to be funded from different powers, in reference to Section 6 of the 2005 Act. My point is that the same activity should not be funded from two different statutory powers. There would be a particular problem if that were to occur.

Section 6 of the 2005 Act is very broad:

“The Secretary of State may provide, or agree to provide, financial assistance to any person … for the purpose of securing the provision, improvement or development of railway services or railway assets; or … for any other purpose relating to a railway or to railway services”.


While removing part of Section 6, the Government have kept the wider meaning of railway from this section, which is a pretty broad-based power.

It is interesting to contrast that power in the 2005 Act with paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 to this Bill. The power to provide financial assistance is

“for the purpose of activities … carried on in exercise of Great British Railways’ function under section 3(1)(a)”.

We recall that Clause 3(1)(a) is on the provision of infrastructure. Paragraph (b) is on the provision of railway passenger services and (c) is on determining fares, but I think we can probably ignore that, since the financial assistance is not to provide the fares but to determine them. However, I was quite interested because paragraph (f), on research and development and innovation, was also excluded.

This is a probing amendment, but I want to be clear: is it the Government’s intention with this Bill to provide financial assistance only for infrastructure and that there will be no financial assistance for the provision of passenger railway services and no money for research, development and innovation? Will all that be funded by the fare structure? The Government have given themselves a power in the Bill, through regulation, to add additional purposes for which financial assistance could be provided but, at the moment, it is just for infrastructure. If, at the moment, money needs to be provided to GBR for the provision of railway passenger services, that would have to come from the 2005 Act. I am just trying to follow the money. Where will it come from? If the Minister can tell us that it is only for infrastructure, I will stand down. At the very least, a specific power for the Government to support GBR for research, development and innovation is a power that we ought to retain.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about the subsidy, the consequence of what he is suggesting could happen is that GBR could subsidise a passenger service that was on the same route as, and in competition with, a private sector operator. To me, that would be quite difficult.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am not sure if that is a question to me, but let us assume it is. I am not sure that I am saying that. I am saying that, as things stand under this Bill, the Secretary of State is not providing money to GBR for the purpose of providing railway passenger services. The Secretary of State has the power to do it under the 2005 Act. Nothing I am saying determines how that money is to be used.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The noble Lord is right, actually: I am beginning to confuse myself about this. There is a danger of getting into too great a specificity. He is right that the statement of objectives will include specific standards, but that translates into the business plan.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, referring to the discussion we have had on KPIs, it occurs to me that there needs to be some differentiation between the list—whether it is the list produced by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, the list in the Bill or another one—of issues which are basically in the total control of Great British Railways and those which are not. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, mentioned freight. Freight is not in the control of GBR, in respect of how many trains run and how much money GBR makes from them directly. Of course it can fiddle around with the access, the signalling and everything else, but it is dependent upon many other people delivering the KPI, which I think is supposed to be the KPI of Great British Railways. It would be interesting to hear from my noble friend how the two different criteria are set when coming up with the calculation of who does the KPI and what it covers.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My noble friend is right that some of these KPIs relate to wider economic circumstances than the railway currently has, but we discussed on the first day in Committee the fact that the need for a long-term freight target is so that GBR focuses on its own part in growing freight. Clearly, it is much subject to what shippers want to send, how they want to send it, where they want to send it and so forth, but I do not see any conflict in GBR having a long-term freight target. It may have to take different action if the economy or the things which are transported by rail change over time. There has been no greater case of that than the case of coal and steel, which were once a significant part of railway freight but which today are virtually nothing. On the other hand, intermodal traffic and construction materials have vastly increased, and there is no doubt in my mind that the railway could contribute more than perhaps it has done in the recent past to growing those particular categories if it were minded to do so, and the freight target is designed to make it think about how it could do it.

I do not see any contradiction in that; it will be like running any other business. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, referred to his experience at Transport for London and it is, of course, exactly the same. It is a large organisation which is contributing to, but to some extent dependent on, the economy of London; that will be true of the railways as a whole. I agree with noble Lords that there should be KPIs for GBR, and it should be held to account for meeting them. The reason we are discussing these now is because there is no doubt that, in the end, they should be in its business plan, set next to the costs that they incur and the revenue it will derive from them.

I should go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said. Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 2 says that GBR must keep the business plan up to date. We are pretty clear that that means annually; it could be more often if circumstances change. It is not unknown for businesses of this scale to have to change their business plan if the economic circumstances dictate, but I think annual is reasonable. I would not expect the Secretary of State or the board of GBR to tolerate any circumstances where it did not propose an annual business plan.

If I may, I will try to find my place regarding Amendment 66. I am glad that the noble Lord agrees that GBR’s business plan is where its KPIs should sit. However, these need to evolve over time while, by contrast, GBR’s duties are unchanging—a core list of ambitions guiding GBR over the next decades. While GBR’s business plan is where it will show both how it will discharge its duties and set out its KPIs, there is an important distinction between them. Duties and KPIs are not the same thing. KPIs need to be driven by the specific, often numerical, outcomes sought by the Government, whereas duties are behavioural expectations. Some of the duties would be impractical to even turn into measurable KPIs. How would GBR measure whether it has provided businesses with certainty or acted in the public interest? I believe it is right that the two should not be statutorily linked.

Amendment 87 proposes action about the chief executive. I hope the noble Lord understands that, primarily, the powers of the Secretary of State rest with the right, in the end, to dismiss the chair if that chair fails to do the job that the Secretary of State expects of the chair and the board. That might well be the case if the Secretary of State believed that the chair failed to challenge the executive and chief executive effectively. The Secretary of State will also have the right, as we discussed this afternoon, to issue legally binding directions to GBR, and those could be where remedial action is required. The Secretary of State could also remove accounting officer status from the CEO, effectively taking financial management of the company into the department.