Railways Bill

Baroness Pidgeon Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 10th September 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Pidgeon]

22A: Clause 5, page 4, line 5, leave out “may” and insert “must”

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, had hoped to be here today but found himself with other commitments, and therefore asked me to move his Amendment 22A, which I also support. This is a probing amendment on whether the provision in the Bill which enables Great British Railways to enter into partnerships with mayors—we will debate whether it should be mayors or others later—could be strengthened. I would be keen to hear what the Minister has to say on that.

The Bill sets out a partnership structure that enables collaborative working, local funding commissioning and other benefits, but this wording change from “may” to “must” would really strengthen the requirement for a partnership with mayors. I hope the Minister agrees that Great British Railways must treat mayors—and others, as we will come to—as genuine partners, and that the Government will consider this amendment seriously.

I take this opportunity to speak to the other amendments in this group. I think it is a very important group and that is not just because my background, like many noble Lords’, is in local and regional government. I am very aware that, for example, Transport for Greater Manchester, Transport for London and others are concerned about the Bill as drafted because it does not treat them as real partners at the table; it feels like a consultation or tick-box exercise rather than a genuinely equal partnership.

I just remind noble Lords that, when responding to my amendment on rail devolution on Report of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill, on 6 November 2024, the Minister said:

“I can reaffirm to your Lordships’ House that the railways Bill will include a statutory role for devolved governments and mayoral combined authorities. They will be involved in governing, managing, planning and developing the railways”.—[Official Report, 6/11/24; col. 1543.]


Yet I believe—as do others here, hence all the amendments—that the Bill as drafted does not provide the statutory powers that mayoral and strategic authorities and others require. Since the Bill was introduced to Parliament, we have of course seen a new Prime Minister, one committed to devolution to mayoral and strategic authorities, so I really hope that some things will change.

I have already talked about the amendment that I am moving on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, which I hugely support as it strengthens the Bill. I hope the Government accept that. It would be useful if the Minister could set out how the Government see Clause 5 enabling Great British Railways and these authorities to develop local commissioning partnerships. I stress that this clause is particularly important for Greater Manchester, because the city region wants to take on a more meaningful role, similar to London’s, in shaping and commissioning rail services.

Many of the amendments in this group, which we will hear about, are trying in different ways to ensure that strong role for local and regional government. They include the sensible amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which seek to bring in the term “strategic authorities” from recent devolution legislation. I hope the Government will be sympathetic to many of those amendments. In many ways, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, is the simplest way to strengthen regional and local government’s hands.

The noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has Amendment 147, which allows for an authority to declare a service wholly within its area as a mayoral concession service, so it can be run rather like Transport for London is. I think that is interesting, as it feels like, to date, Transport for London and others have had to go with a begging bowl to government to take over metro railway services for their area. This would shift the balance, so I think it is an interesting proposal to discuss.

Amendment 159 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would expressly forbid the transfer of TfL services to Great British Railways. This again highlights the tension between national and regional services, and concerns about the powers of Great British Railways.

I look forward to the rest of the debate on this group and the Minister’s response. Given this new Government’s agenda around devolution, I hope that we start to see a shift and, potentially, some government amendments in this area. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I think it might fall to me to speak next, if my noble friend does not want to speak to his amendments at this stage.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

I was really pleased to hear the Minister say how devolution is of such importance to the Government. We have had an interesting debate. I am glad he has committed to take this away and see what can be done with the proposal in Amendment 22A and reflect on the point about strategic authorities; I think they are both really relevant and will strengthen the Bill. On that basis, I agree to withdraw Amendment 22A.

Amendment 22A withdrawn.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 35 and 36, which are in the names of my noble friends Lord Grayling and Lord Moylan. Respectively, they deal with amending Clause 7, on the power to give directions, and Clause 9, on the power to give guidance to GBR. They specifically refer to some extra duties that would fall on Ministers if they were giving specific directions around fares and the fare structure. They set out that if Ministers are giving directions or guidance

“about the level or structure of fares”

they would have to set out

“the assumptions, criteria and objectives used … so decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability”.

I support both these amendments, for the following reasons.

One of the important decisions that Ministers have to take about the railways is to balance the cost of running them and how that cost is split between the fare payer—and of course not just that person who actually uses the railways but, when it comes to track access charges, the other users of the railway network—and the taxpayer. It is a very important decision, given that most people in the country either never use the railways or do not use them very often. A relatively small number of people use railways frequently, and it is important to get the balance of costs split correctly.

Ministers also have to make an important decision in their negotiations with the Treasury around the cost that falls on the department—the taxpayer subsidy piece. I think Ministers signed up to some quite challenging targets in the last spending review to reduce the taxpayer subsidy. There are two ways you can do that: either you cut services significantly or you have to grow passenger numbers. If Ministers are making directions or guidance about fares, it is important to understand which model they are using. What are their assumptions and what is the evidence base for the fare structure? What will that do to passenger numbers and, ultimately, to revenue? Then there is any knock-on impact on costs, what it effectively does to the GBR profit and loss account, and therefore the balance of costs that lands on fare payers versus the taxpayer. Having that level of transparency is helpful for the fare-paying public and for taxpayers.

It is also helpful for Ministers, because it would force a level of rigour in the modelling that is undertaken and, importantly, the assumptions that are made about how passenger numbers respond to fares. It will also enable us to have a grown-up conversation about how we grow passenger numbers, given some of the innovations and service changes that I suspect will be required, particularly in offering better services for leisure travellers, because that is where there is the potential for significant growth in passenger numbers and revenue and therefore for reducing the overall cost of the railway.

These two amendments have a very sensible underpinning. They are not just helpful for taxpayers and fare payers; in the end, they will be helpful for the department, because they would force, as I said, a level of rigour and transparency in its financial modelling. They should therefore also commend themselves to our friends in the Treasury, who I think like rigour and robustness in financial modelling, because this just gets it all above board. Everyone has to be clear about their assumptions.

The amendments would also allow us to challenge the assumptions and enable us to have a much better conversation publicly about how we can drive up the usage of our railways and the flexibilities that we will require to do so. That will then, perhaps, provoke some helpful conversations with the trade unions and about the flexibilities that will be necessary to making sure that we have a financially sustainable railway for the long term, which is, in effect, what we need to guarantee secure jobs on the railway. That is the only way in which we are going to do this in the long term, because I do not think that taxpayers are going to continue wanting to subsidise the railway to the level they do now for the foreseeable future, given that many of them do not use railways frequently. I commend these two amendments and look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments cover directions and guidance from the Secretary of State. They push for greater transparency around those, which is something that we really support. Information that has supported key decisions and directions should be placed in the public domain. It is really important that Great British Railways develops an open culture right from the start and that it is clear where and how decisions have been made and on the basis of what evidence. The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, focus in particular on any Secretary of State directions relating to the level and structure of fares, which are, I think, of great interest to everyone. Clarity on these points from the Minister would be helpful as we continue our scrutiny of the Bill.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 37 in my name, which is a probing amendment. It would limit the power of the Scottish Ministers to issue directions to GBR to circumstances where a KPI has been missed or performance has not been up to snuff.

I do not advance that because I think it is an appropriate thing to put in the Bill; it is a question of probing when the Government think the powers should be used, because it is not clear. We are meant to have a single directing mind—GBR is meant to be the single directing mind—but, as I said on Tuesday, we have several other directing minds here, too. One of them is the Secretary of State, who can issue directions—after all, directions are exactly what a directing mind would be expected to produce—but, now, we also have the Scottish Ministers issuing directions, and it is not absolutely clear that they cannot overturn the directions of the Secretary of State. I want to know what the powers can be used for, how clashes and contradictions can be avoided, and how all this is coherent with the Minister’s claim that he is creating a single directing mind in the shape of Great British Railways.

I wish to comment briefly on the other amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Grayling has tabled Amendments 34 to 36, to which I have added my name. It is an important constitutional principle that directions issued by the Secretary of State are not only published but laid before Parliament. The Minister will say, “You can’t possibly expect MPs to read these things. They haven’t got time. They might be full of railwayese. What is the possible advantage of putting them in front of MPs?”, but I think that MPs and Peers would value having these important directions put before them so that the Secretary of State can be held accountable for his or her actions in the management of the railways.

My noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendments 32 and 33 are also entirely reasonable. Where relevant functions have been delegated and the Secretary of State proposes to give GBR directions affecting infrastructure, capacity, timetables, charging or performance in Scotland or Wales, surely it is right that the Scottish or Welsh Ministers are consulted.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are about strengthening the requirements for Great British Railways before it is able to grant a licence and to strengthen the Passengers’ Council in areas such as safety and standards. They would also strengthen the role of the Office of Rail and Road, which is something I believe is on this Government’s agenda.

The concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Evans, about consultation-only powers, rather than real teeth, for the Passengers’ Council, and the query from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about ensuring that Scottish and Welsh Ministers are consulted on a licence, are both very relevant, and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification on these issues.

[Lord Reay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Evans of Guisborough, Lord Lansley and Lord Grayling for their amendments in this group. I will address Amendments 41, 42 and 44 first.

The Government have repeatedly emphasised the importance of independent regulation under the new system. They tell us that the ORR will remain an independent and expert regulator, while describing the new Passengers’ Council as a powerful new voice for passengers. These amendments ask how much power these bodies will actually have. Under the Bill, the Secretary of State may modify GBR’s licence after consulting the ORR and, where the changes concern its functions, the Passengers’ Council.

However, consultation is not agreement. The licence is fundamental to how GBR operates and to the conditions against which the ORR will ultimately regulate and enforce its performance. If the ORR is to be the robust and independent regulator that the Government say it will be, why can the Secretary of State alter that licence without its agreement?

The same question applies to the Passengers’ Council. The Government describe it as a powerful new voice, but the Bill requires only consultation. There is no express requirement in this provision for the Secretary of State to have regard to the council’s consultation response. The Secretary of State must subsequently consider representations or objections made during the formal notice period, but that is not the same as giving the passenger watchdog a meaningful role in agreeing changes that may directly affect passenger interests.

I turn to Amendment 46, tabled by my noble friend Lord Grayling. Under the Bill, the ORR may grant a licence to a non-GBR operator only if the Secretary of State consents or if the licence falls within a general authority previously given by the Secretary of State. As my noble friend Lord Harper asks, why is that ministerial veto necessary? If the ORR—the independent regulator that the Government repeatedly tell us will remain robust and expert—has considered an application and concluded that a non-GBR operator satisfies the relevant requirements, why should the Secretary of State have the final trump card?

If the Government genuinely want an independent regulator and less day-to-day political interference in the operation of the railway, surely licensing decisions of this kind should rest with the regulator. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain in what circumstances the Government envisage the Secretary of State refusing consent to a licence that the ORR considers should be granted and why that power remains necessary.

Amendment 45, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, seems entirely reasonable. Where a GBR licence concerns railway assets located in Scotland or Wales, I see no good reason why the relevant Scottish or Welsh Ministers should not be consulted.

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Moved by

[Baroness Pidgeon]

40: Schedule 1, page 64, line 11, after “Road” insert “, the London Transport Users’ Committee,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and others in the name of Baroness Pidgeon, seek to include the London Transport Users’ Committee in consultation requirements.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to move Amendment 40 and speak to the other amendments in this group, which are about London TravelWatch. For those of your Lordships who do not know—although, as we have joked before, I feel this Room is a reunion of those of us who were involved in London government—London TravelWatch, officially known as the London Transport Users’ Committee, is the independent transport watchdog set up under statute speaking up for the travelling public in and around London.

It was established in its current form under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, although its roots go back to the Transport Act 1947 and beyond. Its remit covers national rail issues within the London railway area. Those boundaries are defined under the Railways Act 2005 and go beyond what most of us think of as London. It also covers transport services under the responsibility of Transport for London, such as buses and the Tube, and Eurostar services, which is a service not just for those in London.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for these amendments. I should directly contradict the noble Lord, Lord Moylan: as the commissioner of transport for Transport for London, I found London TravelWatch a very constructive body. I enjoyed dealing with it; there were other people we dealt with who were far more difficult.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

Don’t look at me.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I shall not list them.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

Some of the board.

As the noble Baroness says, London TravelWatch plays a vital role as the statutory watchdog for London, championing the interests of people who travel across all modes of the city’s integrated transport network. That is precisely why the Bill will strengthen its rail powers to ensure there is consistent passenger advocacy across Great Britain.

However, the passenger watchdog will have a new role in the reformed railways which will be different to the role of London TravelWatch. It will go beyond being solely a watchdog and passenger champion. It will have a central role in holding rail operators, including GBR, to account by setting consumer standards for the industry and monitoring operator compliance with them. It would not be appropriate to have two different bodies setting standards, which is why the watchdog will work closely with London TravelWatch to ensure that standards applied across all operators reflect its expertise. That is why London TravelWatch is treated differently in the Bill and why GBR, the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road must consult only the watchdog on certain matters such as the licence, the long-term rail strategy and GBR’s business plan. London TravelWatch is not expected, for example, to have any role on the licence.

That said, I can reassure the noble Baroness that I absolutely agree that London TravelWatch must continue to have a voice on matters that impact the London transport network, and indeed the wider scope of London TravelWatch that she referred to. I understand that Transport Focus, the future passenger watchdog and London TravelWatch will update their existing collaboration agreement to reflect changes in roles. I expect this will include additional expectations around consultation and engagement where matters will affect London and the other services which London TravelWatch oversees. For these reasons, I urge her now to withdraw her amendment, though I am happy to discuss this with her further after Committee.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

I thank the Committee for this debate; I would say “short debate”, but I spoke quite extensively and maybe comprehensively on this matter. I understand what the Minister is saying, but it would be helpful, even if he has to define it differently, to put London TravelWatch, where appropriate, on the same footing as the Passengers’ Council for certain areas of consultation. A collaboration agreement between two organisations would be between them, but I would like to see something on the statute that makes it clear in which areas we would expect London TravelWatch to have a role. I would be happy to meet the Minister outside to see whether the Government can come up with some wording that would deliver that and ensure London’s voice is not lost in this. On that basis, I am happy at this moment to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 40 withdrawn.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s intervention. I had not yet started dealing with his amendment in detail—I was dealing with my noble friend Lord Moylan’s—but I listened carefully to what he said and will deal with it when I get to his amendment.

I am not sure that I agree with my noble friend Lord Moylan, although I understand that his amendment is probing. I would not want to tie the hands of Ministers in the way that he set out. I understand that it is of course desirable not to change funding for any public service once it has been set—one does not do that if one can avoid it—but there are occasions when that is necessary. If we are looking for the appropriate people to make those decisions, they should be Ministers.

The problem with ring-fencing certain parts of expenditure to make it more difficult to make changes is that, in effect, you are deciding that any changes to public expenditure have to fall in other areas. Those decisions should properly be taken by Ministers at the time that those changes are made, because they have to balance the consequences of making those expenditure changes and the changes that they will necessitate to public services, and they have to make the case about why they are doing that. Those decisions are properly for Ministers, rather than expenditure being arbitrarily ring-fenced in legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, tabled Amendment 54. I am concerned about this amendment, but I would be very happy if, when I finish my remarks, he comes back to say that I have misunderstood it. He referred to arbitrary changes. “Arbitrary” is a word that people usually use when they do not agree with the changes proposed by somebody else. Ministers may well bring forward changes, and they may be because the overall amount of money available to the Government has had to be changed for some reason or because of some event. It may be that Ministers have decided that expenditure needs to be spent in another area or that the Transport Secretary has decided that there is a higher priority elsewhere. Those are perfectly reasonable decisions that will have to be explained to Parliament, and Ministers will be subject to questioning by Members of both Houses in making those decisions, which are properly for Ministers.

I have a slight problem with this because it involves the Office of Rail and Road. I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, when he was setting it out and he, I think, suggested that that the Office of Rail and Road could come back with alternative propositions. It could come back by suggesting funding decisions balanced between rail and road, starting from his proposition that rail funding is better than road funding. I think the noble Lord was also talking about decisions on taxation or heavy goods vehicles. I humbly suggest that all those decisions are properly for Ministers.

I accept that the noble Lord was not suggesting that those decisions should be taken by the Office of Rail and Road, but he was suggesting that that office should take some time, produce a report and then make suggestions to Ministers. However, it is not the role of a regulator to get involved in making qualitative opinions about where public money should be spent. Those are not decisions for regulators; they are properly decisions for Ministers, who are accountable to Parliament. Unless I have misunderstood the noble Lord’s amendment, I do not think that getting regulators to come back, second-guess the decisions of Ministers and make alternative public spending propositions is good for the conduct of public policy.

The Bill is currently structured such that Ministers have to notify the ORR if they are going to make funding decisions, so that there are right and proper levels of transparency and people know what is going on. There is quite an important principle to maintain, which is that there are certain things that regulators should do and certain decisions that are properly for Ministers. I do not like to criticise the noble Lord, who I know takes a great interest in this area of policy, but I cannot support his amendment because it has those effects, which I think would be deleterious to public policy-making.

In the spirit of balance, the noble Lord will have noticed that I was also not entirely enthusiastic about the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan, which I know is a probing amendment. So I think that I have been quite even-handed in my non-approval of both amendments, which have a similar fault: tying the hands of Ministers in making public spending prioritisation decisions.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, what an absolute pleasure it is to hear from my railway expert noble friend Lord Bradshaw. It is such a delight that he has been able to join us in Committee in person today and to contribute to our debate, particularly after he had a significant birthday yesterday.

Funding certainty is absolutely crucial for the railway going forward. Being able to plan investment and work properly, and deliver it in a timely manner, is essential. My noble friend Lord Bradshaw’s amendments try to show the seriousness of changing mid-programme railway investment and putting in additional steps for any material change to an agreed funding settlement by involving the ORR for an independent assessment, which should be published. This would ensure transparency and expert assessment if funding for the railway is changed, particularly mid-year.

Amendment 65 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would require more transparency. That is welcome, as was the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. In fact, it is notable that he has spoken on every group apart from the one with solely my amendments on London TravelWatch. I will not take that personally, but I say, “Once a Secretary of State, always a Secretary of State”. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group: Amendments 55, 56, 70, 78 and 86. I start with Amendment 78. Paragraph 15 of Schedule 2 states:

“Financial assistance given to Great British Railways or a GBR company”


primarily to enable it to carry out its infrastructure functions under Clause 3(1)(a)—this is one of the general functions that we discussed on Tuesday—is not to be treated as

“a subsidy for the purposes of the Subsidy Control Act 2022”.

This is a probing amendment to find out the justification for that. I suspect that the justification is that it is not treated as a subsidy currently and, therefore, the Bill simply carries forward the existing situation. I wonder whether that is appropriate.

The Subsidy Control Act 2022 exists for a purpose and requires that public authorities should consider whether subsidies are proportionate and necessary, whether they distort competition or investment, and whether their benefits outweigh their adverse effects. I wonder why the management, renewal and operation of infrastructure on railways should be specifically exempt from those requirements. This exemption does not apply to the other general functions listed in Clause 3, but it applies to this one. I do not want to be hypercritical, because I know that these things are very difficult and there are often excuses, but why should this condition not apply to these functions—particularly when there is a general lack of confidence in these functions being carried out with great efficiency at the moment and when they always seem to be very expensive? Is there a reason other than simple inertia? I do not think that inertia is enough.

The Act also requires safeguards on transparency, the scrutiny of particularly significant subsidies by the Competition and Markets Authority, and ultimately the ability to challenge subsidies decisions via the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Noble Lords may say, “All of this is going to happen. It’ll be GBR doing stuff for GBR rail, so how does competition come into this?” But, as noble Lords know, a great deal of maintenance activity on the track is carried out by private companies contracted for that purpose; that may upset the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but there we are.

As far as I know, there is no indication in the Bill that that will change, and so I understand why the provision of subsidies might raise competition concerns. There is an appropriate authority here that can address them. That is my first question. It is a probing amendment, but I would like to know why these potentially very substantial sums should be outside the regular framework.

In Amendment 70 I am simply asking for the business plan to be published. I think it is important that people should be able to see it. It is possible the Minister will say that he has every intention of publishing the business plan; TfL publishes its business plan, and most other similar organisations publish their business plans. As far as I can see, there is no statutory obligation in the Bill—I may have missed it—to publish the business plan each year or period to which a new business plan would apply.

Amendments 55, 56 and 86 are about building financial discipline, both in the Government and elsewhere. Here, perhaps, I contest the comments made by my noble friend Lord Harper and will say something about the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw. There is a serious issue here and I do not think that the noble Lord has got it right. I do not actually think that my amendments have got it right, but this is the right place for us to talk about the general question of how the Government treat the railways in terms of funding and the provision of funds—not how much they give, but how they do it and what the process is.

The reason for that is as follows. I used to be in a local authority and very often we had to set a budget in March but did not know until Christmas—even after Christmas—what the subsidy from government would be. It is extremely difficult to put budgets together at short notice. With the railways, it is even more difficult. The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, has already said that significant changes require a great lead-time and planning to be delivered and just as long for them to be reversed.

Most of my amendments are trying not to fetter Ministers—I accept the comments from my noble friend Lord Harper that Ministers have to be accountable for public expenditure and that they have to make difficult decisions sometimes—but to build in a notice period. I have suggested two years so that, if changes are to be made, they would be lagged by that period, so that Great British Railways knew where they were going to be.

When the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, talked about timetables and so forth, he was discussing the operational side of the railway, but there is also the infrastructure investment side of the railway, which may extend to building a completely new railway. One of the problems we have—we all acknowledge this—is that it is impossible to build new infrastructure on a one-year settlement. We give long-term settlements to railway developers so that they know that they will have the money to carry the project through to the end. Should that change in funding not also be subject, if it is necessary, to some sort of notice period?

Further down the line from that, we have the supply chain. A colleague of mine recently visited a British train manufacturer. I will not say which one because I cannot remember. Maybe I can, but what I was going to say might be adverse—not about the manufacturer but about its situation—because it is down to using one manufacturing line at the moment, as the orders have effectively dried up.

We all know that the ideal situation is that British train manufacturers have access to a steady supply and a steady stream of demand, so that they maintain jobs and do not go from famine to feast. Where is the discipline going to come from, as a result of all these changes, to address that? What sort of lags and notice are necessary? As I said, I do not think I necessarily have the answer in these amendments, although they all point to this debate. We may not get further on this today, but the Government will have to talk seriously about this. When they create a wholly new structure to operate the railways—Great British Railways—funding has to be mentioned. An understanding of the approach to funding, not just for the operations but for the infrastructure, has to be addressed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Pidgeon]

57: Schedule 2, page 70, line 15, after “services” insert “, including passenger services,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and two others to Schedule 2 in the name of Baroness Pidgeon would align funding of designated passenger train services with the five-year funding cycle for infrastructure.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Amendments 57, 58 and 61 are about aligning the funding of designated passenger train services with the five-year funding cycle for infrastructure. There is absolutely no point in bringing track and train together if their funding cycles are over different periods of time. For this new organisation to succeed and run the joined-up railway that we are seeking, funding—both capital and revenue—the investment side and passenger services must be provided for in a five-year funding cycle.

Critical elements of the running of the railway are included in passenger services funding—for example, staffing at stations and rolling stock maintenance depots, and of course train crew, such as drivers, guards and conductors, as well as driver and staff training, which we know is a huge issue. If you do not get this bit right alongside the infrastructure, you will not benefit from what Great British Railways is supposed to deliver. So I hope the Minister can explain how this can be addressed, and I look forward to his response to my amendments.

Other amendments in this group probe aspects of the business plan, but most striking are the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, about ending or reducing taxpayer funding for the railway. As I said on day one of Committee, the railway will continue to need investment and subsidy, and I just do not think it is right for such clauses to be in the Bill. We heard about political direction, and it is for the Government of the day to deal with the budget as they see fit. But I hope we can look forward to having joined-up funding in five-year periods to make sure that Great British Railways is a success. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak on my two amendments in this group, Amendments 67 and 72. Amendment 67 is simply another opportunity, as there was in the last group, to explore and, I hope, again extract assurance from the Minister that the business plan and GBR’s statements in it will be sufficiently transparent such that we can see the financial relationship not only—as we said in the last group— between GBR and its companies but between GBR and any arrangement that it enters into with any local government bodies. So we should see what money is being paid to GBR for these purposes and how it is attributed to those activities.

I hope the Minister will say that that will definitely form part of the business plan. If he does, I would accept it, as it does not all need to be specified. In an earlier debate, my noble friend Lord Harper quite correctly referred to the dangers of specificity, which can come whenever one gets any kind of list. If there is no list at all, we all agitate as we do not know what will be in the business plan; if we try to specify too much, we start to create a statutory prohibition—or “inhibition” may be the more correct word—on what is put into the business plan. I have explained that amendment.

Amendment 72 is more interesting, in the sense that—in parentheses—I think the Minister slightly missed the point of my amendment in the last group. I was not saying that there should not be flexibility to provide for activities to be funded from different powers, in reference to Section 6 of the 2005 Act. My point is that the same activity should not be funded from two different statutory powers. There would be a particular problem if that were to occur.

Section 6 of the 2005 Act is very broad:

“The Secretary of State may provide, or agree to provide, financial assistance to any person … for the purpose of securing the provision, improvement or development of railway services or railway assets; or … for any other purpose relating to a railway or to railway services”.


While removing part of Section 6, the Government have kept the wider meaning of railway from this section, which is a pretty broad-based power.

It is interesting to contrast that power in the 2005 Act with paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 to this Bill. The power to provide financial assistance is

“for the purpose of activities … carried on in exercise of Great British Railways’ function under section 3(1)(a)”.

We recall that Clause 3(1)(a) is on the provision of infrastructure. Paragraph (b) is on the provision of railway passenger services and (c) is on determining fares, but I think we can probably ignore that, since the financial assistance is not to provide the fares but to determine them. However, I was quite interested because paragraph (f), on research and development and innovation, was also excluded.

This is a probing amendment, but I want to be clear: is it the Government’s intention with this Bill to provide financial assistance only for infrastructure and that there will be no financial assistance for the provision of passenger railway services and no money for research, development and innovation? Will all that be funded by the fare structure? The Government have given themselves a power in the Bill, through regulation, to add additional purposes for which financial assistance could be provided but, at the moment, it is just for infrastructure. If, at the moment, money needs to be provided to GBR for the provision of railway passenger services, that would have to come from the 2005 Act. I am just trying to follow the money. Where will it come from? If the Minister can tell us that it is only for infrastructure, I will stand down. At the very least, a specific power for the Government to support GBR for research, development and innovation is a power that we ought to retain.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. Since I managed in the end to have to correct myself after the last session on Tuesday, I would rather take some advice and write to him about this. I understand his point, but I am not sure I am capable of expressing an answer in language that will be clear enough for him, so I will drop him a line, if I may.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and the fact that, in principle, he supports my amendments in this group as a goal to work towards. It is reassuring that he pointed out—if I understood him—that, within this legislation, there is the potential for a statutory instrument to include passenger services in the future within the five-year settlement. I welcome that and, on that basis, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 57 withdrawn.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

It would, yes.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

I will speak to my Amendment 82 in this group, to which the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has added his name. It would create a new board of Great British Railways, and it provides detail of the composition of this board. The board would increase the transparency and accountability of the Secretary of State’s decisions, as it would create a vehicle for these to be properly discussed and would ensure that a wide range of expertise were at the table. If the Secretary of State decided to make a decision that was against the advice of the board, the reasons for that would need to be set out clearly and publicly.

The membership of the board would represent Great British Railways and other key stakeholders in the running of the railway, such as open access operators, freight operators, the Office of Rail and Road, the Passengers’ Council and organisations that represent passengers with accessibility requirements. It would comprise of at least six members. To make sure that there is a voice for other stakeholders, no more than half of the board’s membership would be employed by or otherwise represent Great British Railways.

This amendment would allow for any decision or direction from the Secretary of State concerning Great British Railways to be notified to the board prior to its being made. The board would then need to publish any decision or direction it had considered and whether it had approved it. If the board did not agree with the Secretary of State, it would still be free to go ahead with the decision, but it would need to publish a statement setting out its reasons for that. For us, this is a way to ensure that the Secretary of State uses the powers in this Bill wisely, with a proper sounding board for feedback from experts with different viewpoints in the field. I hope that the Minister will consider this proposal seriously.

The other amendments in this group are around clear objectives for Great British Railways. Amendment 64A from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would require consultation with the supply chain and railway service providers when preparing objectives for a funding period. That would appear to be a sensible way to ensure industry buy-in and prioritisation. Other amendments seek different ways to try to measure and assess the performance of Great British Railways. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide details of how the Secretary of State and Parliament will assess this going forward, and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I beg the Committee’s pardon: I got slightly muddled because of changes to the groupings.

I come to my Amendments 60, 64A, 83, 84, 87, 94, 124, 125 and 291. The central issue running through these amendments is accountability. We are creating an enormous, new, publicly owned organisation that will, in all likelihood, receive billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money and exercise extraordinary control over the railway. It therefore needs clear objectives, measurable performance indicators and consequences for when it fails to deliver.

Amendment 60 addresses the funding objectives. As drafted, the Bill says that the Secretary of State “may include” the specified objectives. My amendment would change that to “must include”.

Amendment 64A would require consultation with railway service providers and the rail supply chain when those funding objectives are prepared. GBR will continue to rely enormously on the private rail supply chain. These businesses invest in skills, equipment and capacity on the basis of decisions taken by the Government and GBR, so it is sensible that those decisions are informed by their expertise and knowledge, as well as the consequences for employment and profits in the private sector that would arise from those decisions being made. They should be consulted.

The remainder of my amendments address what might be called the problem of the missing key performance indicators. We have repeatedly been told that GBR will be held to robust performance measures, but what does “robust” actually mean? Amendment 124 would answer that question by establishing a proper, statutory KPI framework covering the things that passengers and taxpayers actually care about: reliability, safety, passenger experience, affordability and value for money, passenger growth, financial sustainability, productivity and efficiency, and freight performance. Of course, one can argue about what should be on the list; I would be willing to enter into discussions with the Minister about putting in something else or maybe adjusting something that I have proposed. However, we need to know what performance indicators are in the Bill—otherwise, we will be allowing GBR far too much unconstrained power and latitude, with little accountability.

Amendment 94 would ensure that the long-term rail strategy is geared towards enabling GBR to meet these KPIs. The Government may say that a long-term rail strategy should not be dictated by short-term measures, but we have to get from the short term to the long term. A 30-year aspiration is of little value if there is no way of measuring whether GBR is moving towards it year by year.

Amendment 125 would, therefore, require annual reporting and quarterly updates against those KPIs. Even I admit that quarterly updates might be a little onerous so, if the Minister objects, I will meet him half way and say, “Let’s have semi-annual updates”—I am a reasonable person and am open to suggestions—but something is needed if we are going to succeed. It is no good saying, as we did the other day, that the target is to achieve 75% growth in freight by 2050. Only the day before yesterday, the Government produced a statement saying that they have set an interim target. So they appreciate what I am saying, which is that there should be interim targets. However, the interim target is that freight should achieve 40% growth by 2040. None of us will be here. Nobody is asking, “What is the 2030 target?” There is no 2030 target; there is merely a 2040 target. That is not good enough. It is playing with achieving targets and would be simply laughable in the private sector. We need these targets; as I say, quarterly updates may be too onerous, but an update every decade or 15 years is just not good enough.

Amendment 291 would give the ORR the important, independent job of assessing whether GBR is actually achieving its targets. Surely GBR cannot be allowed to mark its own homework.

Amendment 84 would apply the same principle during the transition. This is a generational restructuring of the railways, involving employees, operators, freight, open access, local authorities, the supply chain and millions of passengers. A quarterly ministerial Statement—or even one once every six months—on progress towards GBR becoming fully operational would increase transparency, maintain focus and, importantly, prevent drift.

Lastly, Amendment 87 concerns consequences. When I have asked the Minister privately how the Secretary of State will exercise control over GBR, he has said—he said this in a meeting for all Peers the other day, so I think I can repeat it—“Of course, she can always sack the chairman”. I suppose she can, because she is the sole shareholder in the business, but there was nothing about sacking the chief executive. Of course, it is not the Secretary of State’s job, as I understand it—we are not vouchsafed of these arrangements—to appoint or sack the chief executive; that would be a decision for the board. I am trying to introduce some accountability for the chief executive. We are giving the Secretary of State the power—not a duty, obviously—to dismiss the executive head of GBR when the organisation is failing against the KPIs and has also failed to act on guidance issued by the Secretary of State. It is not enough just to sack the chairman. You will not get anybody of any quality applying for the job if they are the only person whose head can roll; the chief executive needs to have their neck on the block as well.

My noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 59 is obviously sound. The Secretary of State may

“include objectives as to the standards to be achieved in relation to railway services”,

but that “may” ought to be a “must”.

My noble friend Lord Grayling’s Amendment 66, to which I have added my name, would require GBR’s business plan to contain measurable performance indicators for its statutory duties. This is simply basic accountability. If Parliament gives GBR duties, its business plan should explain how its performance against them will actually be measured.