Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I add my welcome and thanks to the Minister for her introduction to the Bill. I also thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for setting out the Liberal Democrat stall so cogently both on policing more generally and on this Bill. On these Benches, we recognise the imperative to make our streets safer and to equip the police with the tools necessary to address modern crime. We support the elements of the Bill that tackle knife crime, combat online child exploitation and pursue criminal proceeds.

However, the foundation of our approach to public safety is our demand that new laws should be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures that risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. A core priority for me and my party is ensuring that our legal framework is modernised and future-proofed against evolving digital and online threats, as my noble friend emphasised. We support the new measures concerning the online supply chain of offensive weapons. We welcome the introduction of civil penalties aimed at strengthening accountability for businesses and online platforms involved in the advertising or selling of unlawful weapons. To enhance police intervention capability, we will, however, propose an amendment mandating a proactive real-time system for reporting under the new duty to report to the police bulk or suspicious sales of bladed articles.

The current cybersecurity landscape is badly hampered by outdated legislation. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is now 34 years old, stemming from a time before widespread internet access. It inadvertently criminalises legitimate cybersecurity activities such as vulnerability research, which are essential for national security. We call for the introduction of a statutory public interest defence within that Act to decriminalise the vital work of cybersecurity professionals and provide clearer legal protections.

Furthermore, to combat organised crime and address widespread online fraud, we want to see the creation of a specific criminal offence for digital identity theft. This new offence must target the unauthorised obtaining of personal or sensitive information, such as passwords or biometric data, with the clear intent to impersonate an individual for unauthorised activities.

We support new online child protection offences targeting AI-generated child sexual abuse material and enhanced Border Force powers to compel device unlocking for CSAM searches. On extreme pornography, we will strongly support amendments to be tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, following her review, extending the online definition to explicitly cover incest, pornography, and material depicting adults acting as or depicting children.

We want robust safeguards against the inappropriate use of intrusive technology. We oppose police use of live facial recognition—surveillance in public spaces without a statutory framework—given concerns regarding privacy and algorithmic bias. Deployment of LFR should be explicitly authorised by a judicial warrant and governed by a statutory code of practice, complete with an independent oversight body.

For antisocial behaviour measures, accountability and fairness are crucial. New respect orders must be subject to rigorous democratic scrutiny. Applications need to undergo full public consultation and should be approved by the relevant full council or its executive or cabinet before implementation.

We oppose the punitive increase in fixed penalty notices for breaches of public spaces protection orders and community protection notices from £100 to £500. This sharp increase risks intensifying abuses and arbitrary enforcement against the most vulnerable individuals. We will continue to protect the fundamental right to peaceful protest.

On these Benches, we will seek to amend the Bill to ensure that it is rooted, online and offline, in accountability, proportionality and the protection of civil liberties. We must ensure that this legislation is fair, effective and fit for the future.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by an independent person appointed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review current anti-social behaviour powers within six months of the Bill becoming law, before the new measures proposed in the Bill take effect.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to other amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey.

I welcome the start of Committee and the opportunity to engage in detail with Part 1 of the Bill concerning anti-social behaviour. We on these Benches recognise the imperative to make our streets safer, and we support measures designed to tackle genuinely persistent and disruptive anti-social behaviour. However, the Liberal Democrat approach to public safety demands that new laws be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures which risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. This debate on respect orders goes directly to that principle.

Clause 1 introduces the respect order for adults, which partly replaces the old anti-social behaviour injunction. The fundamental difference is severe. While breach of an ASBI was treated as a civil contempt, breach of a respect order is explicitly categorised as a criminal offence that can lead to an unlimited fine or up to two years’ imprisonment. If the state intends to use a civil tool granted merely on the balance of probabilities to impose prohibitions whose breach results in criminal sanctions, that tool must be subject to the most rigorous safeguards. Unfortunately, respect orders currently risk replicating and arguably worsening the problems and abuses associated with past anti-social behaviour regimes.

The Manifesto Club—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—highlights several fundamental flaws in the previous regime under the 2014 Act, which civil liberties advocates argue must be addressed before new anti-social behaviour powers such as respect orders are introduced.

The core legal powers underpinning PSPOs and CPNs are inherently flawed due to their low legal threshold and vague scope. PSPOs can be implemented if activities are deemed to be having a detrimental effect on the quality of life in a defined public area. The Manifesto Club notes that this is an unprecedentedly low legal test for criminal intervention and argues that there is often no requirement to show substantial evidence of this effect. PSPOs are vague and subjective restrictions and are often drafted broadly, which leads to them functioning more as a tool applied at the discretion of officers than as a precise law, and this has resulted in what the Manifesto Club calls

“absurd, stigmatising and authoritarian orders”

that ban diverse and sometimes anodyne non-criminal activities.

A major criticism centres on the weak governance and poor assessment of these powers. Manifesto Club research found that nearly half of all PSPOs issued by local authorities in one year were signed off by a single council officer, without passing through scrutiny procedures within the council, such as approval by cabinet or full council. Despite legal requirements for consultation, the Manifesto Club points out that the legislation requires consultation only with the police chief, the landowner and whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult, meaning that there is no requirement for any public consultation or minimum standards for one.

There is a significant lack of official data collection and central government scrutiny on the use and effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers such as CPNs and PSPOs. The broad and unchecked nature of the powers creates inconsistency of enforcement across the country, leading to postcode lotteries for victims, where enforcement depends on location rather than circumstances.

PSPOs and dispersal powers are often unfairly imposed on or enforced against homeless people, including bans on rough sleeping and begging. Homeless individuals report being moved on by police multiple times a day and feeling that the system is set against them. Examples of arbitrary and overzealous enforcement include fines issued to an 82 year-old man for cycling his bike in a town centre, for the feeding of stray cats, for the flying of model aircraft, for keeping a wheelbarrow behind a garden shed and for using foul language. Community protection notices have been issued with restrictions on how people conduct themselves in their own home, sometimes based on weak evidence reliant on hearsay.

There is increasing commercialisation of enforcement of anti-social behaviour powers. Many councils outsource the issuance of fixed penalty notices for PSPOs and CPNs to private companies. The most common contractual arrangement involves companies receiving a percentage of FPN—fixed penalty notice—income, which directly incentivises officers to issue as many penalties as possible.

This practice is explicitly stated to contradict statutory guidance, which notes that enforcement should in no circumstances be used as a means to raise revenue. Private officers employed under this system have been accused of setting daily targets, hiding badges, intimidating people and ticketing minor offences or non-offences. This intensification of busybody offences and penalties risks increasing injustice, particularly for vulnerable people.

Amendment 1, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would require the implementation of respect orders to be delayed until a comprehensive review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the anti-social behaviour Act 2014 is conducted and completed by an independent person within six months of Royal Assent.

Before we introduce a new measure, we should assess whether the myriad existing tools—ASBIs, community protection notices and public space protection orders—are truly fit for purpose. The process of anti-social behaviour governance is already widely criticised as confusing, inconsistent and prone to arbitrary enforcement.

Without undertaking this vital review, we risk merely layering a new, complex civil order onto a system that is already confusing, ineffective and unjust, leading to overlapping powers and making enforcement decisions more difficult. Additional support for this delay, and an independent review, comes from key stakeholders, including Justice and the Victims’ Commissioner. We must pause, review what we have and then legislate effectively.

The core legal test for imposing a respect order is dangerously permissive. It rests on two conditions: the civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities that the individual has engaged in anti-social behaviour—and the judicial belief that it is merely just and convenient to make the order. This is an alarmingly low threshold for an order that can severely restrict an individual’s liberty and lead to imprisonment. We must insist on a higher standard.

Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, proposes to replace the vague phrase “just and convenient” with the essential standard of “necessary and proportionate”. This change is essential to ensure that the restrictions imposed align strictly with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensuring that the conditions are tailored and appropriate to the specific case.

Amendment 4, also in my noble friend’s name, probes the wording that allows an order to be made if a person “threatens to engage in” anti-social behaviour. This vague phrasing gives excessive scope for judicial speculation, allowing the state to impose serious orders based on future suspicion rather than concrete, proven past behaviour.

Amendment 7, also in my noble friend’s name, seeks to specify a maximum length of time for an order, challenging the Bill’s proposals that a respect order can be imposed for an indefinite period. An indefinite order, based on a civil standard of proof, is inconsistent with the framework of other behaviour control orders. We propose a maximum duration, such as two years, to align respect orders with other established orders and requiring judicial review for any extension.

We must ensure that these powers cannot be weaponised against those struggling with homelessness or mental health issues, as seen with past anti-social behaviour powers targeting people for begging, sleeping rough or feeding the birds. Amendment 12—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for signing it—seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home. This power, introduced in new Section C1, is disproportionate; exclusion from one’s home is an extremely severe sanction. While the Bill limits this to cases involving violence or a significant risk of harm, such threats should be handled exclusively through the criminal justice system or specific protection orders to ensure that the necessary safeguards and standards of proof are met. We on these Benches are particularly concerned about the risk of this power being used inappropriately against victims of domestic abuse, potentially leading to their eviction instead of the perpetrator’s detention.

Amendment 18 would remove the provision creating interim respect orders. Interim orders lack proper procedural safeguards and carry the inherent risk of disproportionate interference with liberty, particularly when they are made without notice to the respondent. If a situation is so urgent that it requires immediate prohibition, a more specific or criminal intervention is warranted. Anti-social and behaviour measures must possess strong democratic and public accountability to counter the risk of arbitrary local restriction.

Amendment 9 in my name requires respect orders to pass through full council and be subject to a full public consultation before the relevant authority makes an application to the court. This would ensure that elected representatives approve decisions that directly impact civil liberties, which would mitigate the democratic deficit seen in the implementation of other local orders such as PSPOs.

Amendment 21, in my name and signed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mandates that the Secretary of State must conduct a full public consultation exercise prior to issuing any statutory guidance on respect orders. This guidance must be informed by groups including the police, victims’ interests groups, housing providers and, crucially, homeless persons and legal practitioners. This would prevent guidance aimed at curbing behaviour being developed in a vacuum and ensure that it is practical and trauma-informed, especially when dealing with those struggling with addiction or homelessness.

In conclusion, these amendments collectively seek to address the historical weaknesses of the ASBI regime —weak judicial thresholds, arbitrary enforcement, indefinite application and a lack of accountability—before they are codified in a new measure that carries the full weight of the criminal law. If respect orders are to succeed where previous civil orders failed, they must be founded on evidence, necessity and transparency. I urge the Minister to recognise the fundamental importance of these safeguards. I beg to move.

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That was a long climb, and I am still only about 10 feet up Everest, but I hope that those comments help the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This has been a useful discussion, but I hope that we can reach a conclusion on those matters now.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.

I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.

The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.

We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible amendment to his proposal.

I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Just briefly, because this is a very important aspect of the enforcement of respect orders, I ask whether the Minister is saying that all that is needed is that it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, or does one go back to the original decision on the civil balance of probabilities—the reasons for the respect order? Is it purely that you have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, in which case it is still a civil balance of probabilities requirement for the original respect order to be enforced?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There is a determination, and I believe the legislation before us today is clear on that matter. We will debate this still further, undoubtedly, but there is essentially a respect order where the court will consider the potential breach and will make a judgment on it, and having examined that, it will determine the issue in relation to that breach. The noble Lord raises that issue now, but as regards Amendment 19 before us today, which is the point I am making now, limiting the scope of where an interim respect order can be issued risks further harm for communities as a whole.

I will just focus on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned. She covered in the last series of amendments the same issue, in a sense, about capacity, which is important. It will be a matter for discretion of the applicant and the court to determine what requirements will be most suitable in line with the resources and options that are available in a given area. So, again, that discretion is there at a local level to determine; for example, if an alcohol awareness course is required, then self-evidently an alcohol awareness course has to be available for the individual to take up that course. Those judgments will be made at a local level by the local individuals who are determining these matters.

Again, I refer noble Lords to the economic impact assessment that we have published. The ASB package is expected to lead to

“an overall reduction in prison places”.

The respect order replaces the civil injunction, and we are not expecting additional cases per se. Once in a steady state, annual prison places for respect orders will stay more or less the same, and we expect respect orders to have a neutral impact on prison places, given that they are replacing civil injunction powers. So I hope that that again reassures the noble Baroness in relation to the resource question of the additional impact of these matters. With those comments, I respectfully request the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned in his remarks on the first group that there are over a million instances of anti-social behaviour in the United Kingdom, and he is seeking broad new powers in the early part of the Bill. Can he give the House any guidance as to what sort of effect, if the House were to give the Government these powers, will be seen in terms of a projected reduction in anti-social behaviour as a result?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will seize the opportunity to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, while the going is good and before I have to disagree with him on future groupings. I entirely agreed with what he had to say, as indeed I did with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

This stand part debate goes to what might be called the heart of legislative utility. Why do we need a new tool if the old tools are sufficient? We must ask: does Clause 1 solve a problem or does it merely create complexity and risk? The Bill, as we have heard, introduces respect orders, but it also retains anti-social behaviour injunctions. Many of us already feel that the new respect orders, as we debated in the first group, are unnecessary and largely either replicate powers already available under the 2014 Act, or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made very clear, add undesirable elements to those powers.

We have seen with ASBIs that there have been some proposals to include positive requirements tailored to underlying causes of behaviour. If the goal of the Government is to better address the underlying causes of persistent anti-social behaviour, we could be strengthening the existing injunction framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, focusing resources on effective enforcement and mandating psychological or therapeutic interventions, rather than introducing a confusing, duplicated power.

Our preference on these Benches is very clear. We should focus on accountability, review and proportionality to ensure that the existing framework works effectively, rather than adding a potentially flawed new tool that invites mission creep and targets the vulnerable.

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Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

23: Clause 4, page 12, line 8, leave out subsections (3) and (4)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the subsections increasing the level of fines attached to FPNs, aiming to address concerns that existing notices and orders are being imposed in inappropriate circumstances.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 23 would remove subsections that increase the maximum level of fines attached to fixed penalty notices for breach of public space protection orders and community protection notices. The core proposal of Clause 4 is to increase the maximum FPN for these breaches from £100 to a punitive £500. This represents a 400% increase in the penalty for infractions often issued without judicial oversight.

The Manifesto Club—a body which I mentioned previously and with which I have engaged extensively on these powers—rightly labels this increase as a

“grossly out-of-proportion penalty”.

We must look at the nature of the offences that these fines target. The Home Office claims that this increase shows a “zero-tolerance approach” to anti-social behaviour, but that ignores the actual activities being punished. Manifesto Club research, relying on freedom of information data, shows that the vast majority of penalties are issued for innocuous actions that fall far outside anyone’s definition of serious anti-social behaviour. This is leading to what the Manifesto Club calls

“the hyper-regulation of public spaces”.

For instance, in 2023, Hillingdon Council issued PSPO penalties largely for idling—leaving a car engine running for more than two minutes. This affected 2,335 people, including a man waiting to collect his wife from a doctor’s surgery. Other commonly banned activities that face this grossly increased penalty include loitering, swearing, begging, wild swimming, busking and feeding birds.

The Manifesto Club has documented community protection notices that target non-harmful behaviours, which are also subject to the increased fine. Orders have been issued banning two people from closing their front door too loudly, prohibiting a man from storing his wheelbarrow behind his shed and banning an 82 year-old from wearing a bikini in her own garden. The increase in fines to £500 for these so-called busybody offences appears to be simply a form of message sending, rather than a proportionate penalty designed to resolve community harm.

The second, and perhaps most corrosive, effect of Clause 4 is that it will spark a boom in the enforcement industry and intensify the practice of fining for profit. The Manifesto Club found that 75% of PSPO penalties in 2023 were issued by private enforcement companies. These companies are typically paid per fine issued, which creates an overt financial incentive to pursue volume regardless of genuine harm or proportionality. They target easy infractions rather than the most serious offenders.

Increasing the financial reward fivefold heightens this perverse incentive to issue as many FPNs as possible for anodyne activities. Crucially, while Defra has published guidance stating that environmental enforcement should never be a means to raise revenue, the Home Office has not prohibited fining for profit for anti-social behaviour offences such as PSPO and CPN breaches, nor even formally acknowledged the issue. I have raised this many times in the House.

Rather than authorising this increase in fines, we should be prohibiting incentivised enforcement for all ASB penalties in primary legislation or statutory guidance. The system of FPNs is already heavily criticised for undermining due process. They are issued solely based on the decision of an official and do not involve the production of evidence in court. This lack of judicial scrutiny means that, when innocent people are fined for innocuous actions, they often feel completely helpless, lacking the means to appeal a decision made by incentive-driven officers.

If we are serious about addressing serious anti-social behaviour, the enforcement should focus on serious criminality and nuisance, not extracting revenue from arbitrary restrictions. We must resist measures that intensify arbitrary law enforcement and injustice. This increase in penalties must be abandoned. I therefore urge the Government to support Amendment 23 and reject subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 4. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 24 and 25. In some aspects, I take a slightly different view from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I approve of the increased £500 penalty, provided it is for real anti-social behaviour. I accept the noble Lord’s point that there seem to have been quite a few ASBOs granted for “busybody offences”, and that is not right.

However, my concern here is making sure that the fines are properly paid. If we give the rise to £500, what will be the punishment if criminals do not pay it? Imprisonment is not important. In the words of the great capitalist Del Boy, it is “cushty”, and most criminals, from the smallest to the greatest, regard a term of imprisonment as factored into the crime. What about fines? No problem, they will simply not pay them, and with sufficient sob stories to the court, they will probably get away with a ridiculously low payment plan. Then, when they go outside and drive away in their BMW while texting on their new iPhone, that is great.

Only one thing works as proper punishment—they hate it—and gives the state and victims proper recompense: that is the confiscation of their ill-gotten gains or of any part of their property, which will cover the amount of any unpaid penalty. Of course, there are compensation orders, which can be made for most crimes, but, again, the convict will probably not pay up and nothing more will be done about it.

We must expand confiscation orders to all crimes where a penalty has not been paid, and my amendments are, I would suggest, a tiny but good example. We seem to go out of our way to make compensation orders as difficult as possible to obtain and deliver. Confiscation orders in the UK can be issued for any crime that involves financial gain, not just specific offences. They are used to take away profits from criminal activity, with the court determining the amount of the order based on the defendant’s benefit from their criminal conduct. The common crimes involve fraud, drug trafficking, theft and organised crime, but any offence where a financial element is present can trigger an order.

How do confiscation orders work? First of all, a conviction is required. Even I would agree with that. A confiscation order can be made only after the defendant is convicted of a crime. The Crown Court decides whether to issue an order after gathering information from both the prosecution and defence. The court’s goal is to recover the benefit—they stress “benefit”—the defendant gained from the criminal conduct. The court considers whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which can be established by their conduct over time. The ultimate aim is to disrupt criminal activity by making the crime unprofitable and preventing future offences.

Why on earth stop with that tight confiscation concept about ill-gotten gains? If someone has committed a crime and gets a financial penalty or a fine and he does not pay up, he has benefited from that crime. He has made a financial gain in that he has saved the money he should have spent on a fine. In those circumstances, it is only just and right that the court’s bailiff can confiscate all and any property of the convict to recover the fine he has refused to pay or says that he cannot pay.

In this case, we are looking at confiscation of his goods and property up to a value of £500 plus a small administration fee. My amendment advocates automaticity, and that is essential. We do not need all the evidence of ill-gotten gains that prosecutors have to go through to prove that the superyacht, Bentleys and five homes all over the world came from drug running or ripping off a pension fund, since we would be collecting only on a known fine imposed by a court.

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I recognise where the noble Lord is coming from. He shakes his head in slight unhappiness at my response, but I think this is a reasonable approach, and the Government’s intention is that, when fines are levied, they are paid. That is the key point on which we share common ground. With that, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lord, I thank the Minister for his reply, disappointing though it is, but that is probably a pattern that will continue as the Bill carries on.

I did not even get an acknowledgement from the Minister that there are flaws in the existing PSPO/CPN system; often, it is just busybody offences that receive fixed penalty notices. He just recited a number, at perhaps the outer edge of anti-social behaviour, which of course should attract fixed penalty notices. He also prayed in aid the fact that environmental offences can have fixed penalty notices at a higher level, but we have heard quite a lot of anecdotal evidence about those being misused. The chances are that these new higher penalties will be misused as well.

I also did not seem to get any acknowledgement that the fining-for-profit aspect of this by local government is a problem. I do not know whether the new statutory guidance the Minister mentioned will include something along those lines. I very much hope so, and that he can reassure us that there will be a reaffirmation of the need for proper democratic oversight of PSPOs and CPNs. The current guidance recommends that councils, either in full council or in cabinet, approve these orders but that appears not to be the case currently, with all the consequences that the Baroness, Lady Fox, has outlined.

I hope that, if we are going to learn from the experience of the current anti-social behaviour powers, the Government take on board some of this debate and the points made in previous groups. We will probably return to this on Report, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 23.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 relates to Clause 5. Clause 5 is very short and is titled “Closure of premises by registered social housing provider”. It says that Schedule 2 amends various parts of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014

“so as to enable registered social housing providers to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder”.

My amendment says:

“An RSH provider may issue a closure notice in respect of an individual flat within a housing block for which they are responsible”.


I apologise to the Committee and to the Minister if my amendment is already included in the definition of “premises”. However, the only definition I can find is in Clause 92 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and that says

“‘premises’ includes … any land or other place (whether enclosed or not) … any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”.

Thus, it would seem to me, as a non-lawyer, that a person could argue that an individual flat in an RSH housing block was technically not “premises” within the definition of the 2014 Act or Schedule 2 to this Bill.

I tabled this amendment because I am aware of a serious problem in a block of flats next to mine and only about 400 yards away from here. Over a period of about two years, residents complained of blatant drug dealing in a flat owned by the L&Q social landlords. Addicts were threatening other householders to let them in to buy drugs from the flat. Children in other flats were scared to come home from school in case they met violent druggies in the corridor. The police were involved but could not sit there 24/7, waiting to catch drug dealing in practice. The Westminster City Council anti-social behaviour unit and the local MP got involved, demanding action, but L&Q refused to do anything. It even lied that it had applied for an ASBO, and it took two years before that tenant was finally evicted. Of course, the Bill and my amendment cannot force a negligent RSH, such as L&Q, to issue a closure notice, but it might help those who do care about their tenants.

Just for the record, I have named that company because my noble friend Lord Gove, then the Housing Minister, called in the chief executive after writing to him, stating:

“You have failed your residents”.


He did that after a devastating ombudsman’s report uncovered a prolonged period of decline in L&Q’s repairs and complaint handling.

I do not need to say any more. If the Minister tells me that “premises” includes individual flats within the definition and we will be covered with this, I will not come back to this on Report. But if I have a valid point, I hope the Government will make a little tweak and amend the Bill accordingly. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.

Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.

My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, these are powerful amendments and it is hard to see how they can be argued against. We have all heard of cases where victims have had a very tough time demonstrating the persecution that they have experienced, and they often get challenged in court, unreasonably, I think. These amendments are excellent and we should encourage the noble Lord to push them to a vote later.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group, so well introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones, focuses on putting the victim first, a principle that we wholeheartedly support.

Clause 6 aims to strengthen the anti-social behaviour case review, and we support the package of amendments to the clause tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Hampton. We support the objective of establishing a statutory threshold for convening a review that explicitly considers the victim’s vulnerability. This is crucial, as it would remove the discretion for authorities to apply additional caveats and ensure that the severity of the impact on the individual is prioritised over mere persistence of the behaviour.

We back the proposal in Amendment 29 to ensure that the review is chaired by an independent person who has not previously been involved in the case. Independence is essential to restore trust and ensure objectivity when agencies review their own failures. We also strongly agree with the demand in Amendment 30 that authorities must publish the reasons for determining that the threshold for a review has not been met. This is a simple but powerful measure to increase accountability and transparency in the decision-making process. Amendment 27, which would require police officers to undertake an ASB impact assessment when the threshold is met, is a common-sense measure to ensure that victims experiencing high levels of harm receive appropriate support.

These amendments demonstrate how we can collectively strengthen the system to deliver genuine justice for victims of persistent anti-social behaviour, ensuring that their trauma and vulnerability are fully recognised. I very much hope that the Government will take them on board.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are technical amendments that affect provisions in the Bill containing data-sharing provisions. Within the relevant clauses and schedule, there are general provisions that bar the disclosure of data if such disclosures would contravene data-protection legislation. These protections against data-protection overrides are now no longer needed within the Bill, as a general provision to the same effect is now made by Section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. That Act came into effect on 20 August and, now that the general provision is in force, the amendments remove the redundant duplicative provisions from the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the amendments are matters of purely technical housekeeping, because they remove provisions that are no longer needed, and that this is caused by the insertion of Section 183A into the Data Protection Act 2018 by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. I must confess, having spent time in the salt mines of the then Data (Use and Access) Bill, that this did not come to my attention at the time, but I am sure it is a valuable piece of legislation.

This creates an overarching safeguard, ensuring that new enactments such as this Bill do not automatically override core data protection requirements. However, I must say that the fact that the Government’s intentions are technically sound in this respect does not remove the need for clarification and specific statutory safeguards in certain highly sensitive policy areas, which we will be debating in due course. I thought I would put the Minister on notice that we will be calling for the adoption of additional safeguards ensuring that new powers in the Bill are fair and proportionate: for instance, the DVLA access and facial recognition provisions in Clause 138, which grant powers for regulations concerning police access to DVLA driver licensing information. We remain deeply concerned that the power granted by Clause 138 could be used to create a vast police facial recognition database, and we will be looking for additional safeguards.

On Clauses 192 to 194, concerning international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, the cross-border transfer of data inherent in such agreements presents significant civil liberties concerns, so we will be calling for mandatory privacy impact assessments. That is just a taster.

In conclusion, while the Government’s amendments are technical in nature, we will in due course be using the opportunity to embed specific, robust statutory safeguards for a number of new powers in the Bill.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 17th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The House will be relieved to know I will be mercifully brief on this occasion. Until 1968 the Met and other police forces used CID officers to do SOCO work—that is, collecting forensic evidence at the scenes of crimes. For many it was not their speciality and they often damaged vital evidence. Police forces realised that teams of dedicated civilians who specialise in gathering evidence at crime scenes could do a better job. Naturally, the Police Federation opposed any civilians being brought in to do it. Now, civilians do command and dispatch—which used to be done by serving officers—investigation support, and crime analysis. Over the years the police service has had to recognise, reluctantly in my opinion, that a constable of whatever rank may not be the best-qualified person to undertake increasingly complex tasks. We see credit card fraud going through the roof because there is practically no one in any police force capable of investigating it. Goodness knows who could do it —forensic accountants, perhaps.

All I am seeking here is an assurance from the Minister that this important co-ordinating role will not go to an inspector or a superintendent unless he or she is an absolute expert on the internet and online sales. This requires a switched-on internet geek, and not necessarily a uniformed bobby. Can the Minister assure me that the police will recruit for this role the best-qualified person, from wherever that person comes from, provided that he or she passes all the integrity tests, and that the guidance envisaged in the clause will say so? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I must say, I admire the range of interventions made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I do not want him to fall back on his seat, but on this occasion, we have some sympathy with the two amendments he has put forward. This group addresses the establishment of the new civil penalty regime for online advertising, a measure which we on these Benches support for its goal of strengthening accountability for online platforms. The introduction of civil penalties in this part of the Bill is intended to tackle the online grey market that facilitates the sale of illegal weapons, enabling earlier intervention and prevention of offensive weapon crimes. We must ensure that the framework we establish is not only robust legally but operationally effective in the digital age.

Amendment 55B tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, concerning Clause 13, focuses specifically on the essential role of the co-ordinating officer. Clause 13 mandates that the Secretary of State designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the co-ordinating officer for this chapter. The amendment proposes that:

“The coordinating officer need not be a constable but must be someone versed in the internet and online sales and purchases”.


We on these Benches recognise that 21st-century crime fighting is no longer solely about boots on the ground. It relies heavily on specialised digital expertise to effectively police online marketplaces and hold search services and user-to-user services accountable. The designated officer must possess deep knowledge of digital platform sales techniques and online advertising mechanisms, as the noble Lord indicated. By explicitly allowing this officer to be a non-constable professional and expert, we would ensure that law enforcement can deploy the most qualified individuals to secure content removal notices and apply civil penalties. In our view, this pragmatic approach would ensure efficiency and maximum efficacy against technologically sophisticated platforms.

Amendment 55F in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relates to Clause 24, which governs the guidance issued by the Secretary of State regarding the operation of this new regime. All new intrusive powers, especially those concerning online services, require clear, precise guidance to avoid unintended consequences and ensure fairness. Proper statutory guidance is the mechanism by which the principles established in the Bill should be translated into proportionate and actionable requirements for online service providers.

In short, in our view these amendments seek to guarantee that the architecture of this new regime is built on technical expertise and clarity, both those pillars being essential in ensuring that our online crime-fighting tools are fit for purpose. As such, we support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55C, I will speak also to my Amendments 55D and 55E. My three amendments here are all similar, as I argue that a value-based penalty is more effective than a maximum fixed fine. The issue of illegal knife sales on the internet is a matter of serious public concern. It is big business with big consequences when those knives—machetes and zombie knives—are used to kill and maim, as is increasingly the case.

The proposals in the Bill to fine individuals and businesses up to £60,000 for selling illegal knives online seem hefty at first glance. However, the effectiveness and fairness of such a fixed penalty are questionable. A more effective approach would be to impose a fine equal to 500% of the total value of all the illegal goods advertised. I want to convince the Minister that a proportional penalty is, in some cases, superior to a subjective fixed maximum fine.

First, there is the subjectivity of the fixed maximum fine. Setting a maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives leaves the final penalty to the discretion of the court. This introduces subjectivity into the process, as judges must determine what amount is appropriate in each case. The outcome may vary significantly depending on the judge’s interpretation of the offence’s severity, the defendant’s circumstances and other factors. Consequently, similar offenders could face vastly different penalties, undermining the consistency and predictability of the law. Then, of course, I come back to my favourite organisation, the Sentencing Council, advising that the £60,000 fine should never be imposed—but let us leave that aside for the moment.

Moreover, a fixed cap may not reflect the true scale of the illegal activity. For example, a small-scale individual seller and a large business operation could both face the same maximum penalty, despite the latter potentially profiting far more from illegal sales. This lack of proportionality can result in fines that are either too lenient or excessively harsh, depending on the specifics of the case.

In contrast, my suggestion of a fine set at 500% of the value of all illegal knives advertised is directly linked to the scale of the offence and the profits. This proportional penalty approach ensures that the penalty increases in line with the seriousness of the crime. Large-scale operations, which are likely to profit more and cause greater harm, would face correspondingly larger fines. This not only achieves greater fairness but strengthens the deterrent effect. As we have said on many occasions, criminals are primarily motivated by profit. If the financial penalty reliably exceeds any potential gains—by a factor of five in this case—the risk heavily outweighs the reward. I suggest that that creates a strong disincentive for individuals and businesses to engage in illegal knife sales.

The proportional system also ensures that penalties remain meaningful, even as the market or profitability of legal knives fluctuates over time. The proportional penalty system is more likely to deter criminal behaviour, because it removes ambiguity and subjectivity from sentencing. Offenders know in advance that any profits from illegal activity will be entirely wiped out and replaced by a substantial loss. That clarity and certainty are crucial in discouraging would-be offenders. Furthermore, tying the fine to the value of the legal goods ensures fairness across all cases. Small-time offenders are punished proportionately for their actions, while major players face penalties commensurate with the harm they cause and the profits they make. That upholds the principle that the punishment should fit the crime.

In summary, I submit that a fixed maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives online introduces subjectivity and inconsistency—whereas a penalty of 500% of the value of all illegal goods advertised is fair, more predictable and far more likely to deter criminal activity.

I do not need to speak to my Amendment 55E; it is the same concept but suggests a mere 100% proportional penalty for a lesser offence. I urge the Minister to consider adopting a proportional penalty system to effectively combat the sale of illegal knives over the internet. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has so concisely described—he gets more concise as the evening goes on—this group deals with the sanctions applied under the online weapon advertising regime.

We very much welcome the Government’s commitment to ensuring accountability for businesses and sellers who facilitate the online sale of knives. However, if the penalties imposed are too small, they merely become a tolerable cost of doing business for large, wealthy online service providers. As the noble Lord explained, the Bill proposes maximum civil penalties for service providers of up to £60,000 for failing to comply with content manager requirements or for failing to comply with a content removal notice. His Amendments 55C and 55D directly challenge that maximum limit by proposing that the penalty for a service provider’s non-compliance should instead be a minimum of 500% of the value of the illegal goods advertised.

In our view, that proposal shifts the focus decisively towards financial deterrence—although I hate to agree with the noble Lord twice in one evening. The argument embedded within these amendments is sound: fines should reflect the scale and profitability of the illegal advertising business they enable. By linking the minimum fine directly to five times the value of the illegal goods advertised, we ensure that the penalty scales proportionally with the volume of the illicit trade facilitated by the platform, making it financially unsustainable to turn a blind eye to illegal weapon content.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 55E applies this same principle to the penalties imposed on the service provider’s content manager. Clause 23 currently sets the maximum penalty for the content manager at £10,000. Amendment 55E seeks to replace that cap with a minimum penalty of 100% of the value of the illegal goods advertised. That would ensure that the individual responsible for overseeing compliance within the organisation also faces a penalty that reflects the seriousness of the content they failed to manage or remove, particularly where that content is tied directly to the advertisement of unlawful weapons.

These amendments force us to consider how we can make our laws genuinely tough on organised online crime. In our view, legislation must be proportionate; and proportionality, in the face of corporate digital crime, means that penalties should meaningfully exceed the profits derived from facilitating criminal activity. The amendments rightly push us to consider the financial consequences that would truly deter platforms from risking public safety for private gain.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for these amendments and offer support from the Front Bench for them.

The three amendments by my noble friend all have the same aim: to tie the level of financial penalty directly to the value of the illegal knives being advertised and the profits generated from their sale. The logic behind them is obvious—and they also raise an important point. Fines that merely represent a modest operational cost to criminals will do little to deter those who deliberately trade in dangerous and illegal weapons. If the economic reward remains greater than the economic risk, the deterrent effect is minimal. Therefore, it seems prudent to put into statute appropriate provisions to ensure that that never is the case. The purpose of penalties must be both to punish wrongdoing and to disrupt the business model that makes it worth pursuing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his explanation of the amendments in this group. As he said, Amendment 55C would set minimum fines for companies that fail to comply with an appointment notice that requires them to designate an executive to be held liable for failing to take down illegal knife and weapons content. Amendments 55D and 55E would set minimum fines for companies and liable executives that fail to take down illegal content when requested to do so. As he explains, his proposed minimum fines are proportionate for companies; they are set at 500% of the value of the knife or the weapon for companies, and 100% of the value for individuals.

I hate to disappoint the Committee or to ruin the spirit of accord that has broken out across the Benches opposite, but while the logic of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is good, I am afraid it does not reflect the actual behaviour and experience of the marketplace. If I can, I will try to explain why it would not be as effective or as impactful as he no doubt intends.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I hate to interrupt the Minister—well, I do not really—but can he explain what he means by that about the market? I did not grasp what he meant by that.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Well, that is a very good segue into the words that are just following—I was about to get there.

Many knives and weapons that are sold illegally are sold relatively cheaply, in the order of tens of pounds. Some sellers who sell knives and weapons over social media tend to hold and advertise small stock numbers. Therefore, we contend that the suggested minimum penalties are simply too low to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content. The independent review of online safety of knives shows a case study as an example where an individual bought 30 knives to sell illegally over social media for under £50 each. Should the social media company not take the illegal content down, the proposed minimum fine under these amendments would be £1,500 for the executive and £7,500 for the companies. Those penalties, as I am sure noble Lords would agree, would be too low for large tech companies and executives to be worried about at all. Not having a minimum penalty will leave full discretion to the police, who specialise in investigating illegal knife sales online. This will allow them to use their judgment to issue fines that are commensurate in each case.

The penalties for failing to comply with these are, as already noted, issued in the form of civil penalty notices by the police. They can be up to £60,000 for companies and £10,000 for individuals. I remind noble Lords that these penalties are for single violations and will add up if companies and executives repeatedly fail to comply with removal notices. The measure is intended not just to punish companies but to facilitate behaviour change. I trust that the police administering these measures will issue fines of an appropriate level to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content.

I note the experience, which I found instructive, of the independent review of the online sale of knives, that a lot of the activity is undertaken through very small stocks that are cheaply sold. If we used the regime of a proportionate measure, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we simply would not generate enough. Noble Lords may not think that £60,000 is worth much, but we certainly would not generate anywhere near £60,000 in those examples.

It is worth bearing in mind that a lot of the grey market sellers do so over social media websites. The recipient of the fine is the tech company that does not take down the illegal material, rather than the person selling the knives or the weapons. We understand the intended recipient of the punishment—the fines—which is why we think that having the £60,000 or £10,000 level is appropriate, because that is for single offences. Any time a company fails to remove the content for which they have received a notice, the fines will add up and accumulate, which will make an impact—and we would all agree that that needs to be done.

In response to another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we feel that the Sentencing Council is unlikely to comment on the level of a civil penalty. That may be a little speculative from my perspective, but I think that it is probably what the experience bears out.

Given this explanation and the clarification of our view of how the environment—I should not have used the word “market” earlier—in which these sales take place, I hope that the noble Lord is sufficiently assured that these penalties will have an impact in the way they are set out in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I can say yes to both those points. If I cannot, I shall revert to her shortly.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches, we support the intent behind this blizzard of government amendments. Of course, as the Minister says, the effect of these amendments and other consequential changes is to apply tougher maximum penalties and provisions relating to offensive weapons in Scotland and, in certain cases, Northern Ireland.

It would be extremely useful if the Minister could say whether the law in each of the home nations is the same. I assume that is the effect of all these different amendments—that the UK should be on exactly the same footing, however and wherever you commit that offence. Even though I understand that it was at the request, in the first instance, of the Scottish Government.

We very much support the way in which the amendments reflect the gravity of the kinds of violence that plague our communities from these offensive weapons and that the manufacture, supply and possession of these articles will be met with the full force of the law. We welcome not only the amendments but the original provisions of the Bill, but we need to think of not just penalties but prevention. I hope some of those provisions will make individuals accountable with the digital identity, which we also support.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, I would like an answer to the question of whether the analogue identity provision will continue. Otherwise, that could lead to forms of digital exclusion, which I do not think that we or the Minister would welcome.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.

As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.

As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.

I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.

There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century—I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.

I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.

I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I thank him for what he said. I am slightly baffled. There is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrat Benches, so I find the Minister’s assurance that the analogue form of identity will continue—and digital ID in this instance, whatever is prescribed by the Secretary of State, is an alternative form of identification—wholly convincing, but if we must come back on Report and debate this at length, so be it.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Will the noble Lord respond on the mandatory conditions on the digital proof-of-age pass, which he confirmed would be published before December?

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

122: After Clause 32, insert the following new Clause—
“Sale and delivery of knives: review(1) The Secretary of State must review the impact of sections 31 and 32 of this Act within two years of these sections coming into force.(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—(a) the effect of sections 31 and 32 in preventing the online sale of knives to those under the age of 18,(b) whether safety design regulation would limit the availability of knives that may be used in violent offences, and(c) what mechanisms could be used to improve data collection by the police of bladed articles used in all knife-related crimes.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of sections 31 and 32 in preventing the online sale of knives to under 18s, and requires the review to look at other measures that might limit the availability of knives that could be used in violent offences.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, while we welcome the effort to strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales, we must ensure that these new powers are effective, enforceable and subject to continuous review.

In moving Amendment 122, I also speak to Amendment 194. Both aim to enhance the long-term effectiveness and impact of this legislation. Amendment 122 would insert a new clause immediately after Clause 32. It would mandate that the Secretary of State conducts a review of the impact of Sections 31 and 32 of what will be the Act within two years of these provisions coming into force.

New powers addressing the remote sale of knives are crucial, yet legislative intervention alone is rarely sufficient to address a complex societal challenge such as knife crime. I recall some years ago running a project in the London Borough of Lambeth on precisely this issue, and it was extremely complex dealing with young people in this particular area. We must ensure that the mechanisms we are implementing, such as the requirement for physical ID on delivery and the provisions for age verification, and indeed those mentioned by the Minister, moving towards digital verification, are actually achieving the desired result and preventing the online sale of knives to under-18s. The review must go beyond merely confirming compliance. Crucially, it must also look at other measures that might limit the availability of knives that could be used in violent offences, such as the design of knives—for instance, by changing kitchen knives available online to rounded ends.

Home Office statistics indicate that two-thirds of the identified knives used to kill people in a single year are kitchen knives. We are very much on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, with his Amendment 123. We must not stand still but use real-world evidence of what works in tackling and preventing violent crime. We need to continuously monitor and assess the effectiveness of the solutions we put in place. Amendment 194 relates to Clause 36:

“Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk”.


Clause 36 introduces the requirement for sellers to report bulk sales, an essential provision for tackling the grey market and ensuring accountability. However, for this provision to be an effective law enforcement tool, the information reported must be timely.

My amendment would require regulations made under Clause 36(1) to include a clear provision that any reportable sale must be notified to the specified person in real time or as soon as is reasonably practicable. Furthermore, to eliminate any ambiguity, the amendment would set a hard stop specifying that notification must occur, in any event, no later than the delivery of the bladed articles or the end of the day on which the seller became aware that the sale constituted a reportable sale. If we expect law enforcement agencies to use this reporting data to intervene and prevent crimes, giving them advance warning is paramount. A delay in reporting a suspicious bulk purchase renders the power largely reactive rather than preventive, and this amendment would simply ensure that the regulations implement the duty to report as soon as possible, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable intelligence. I hope the Government will support Amendment 122 to ensure accountability and scrutiny over time and Amendment 194 to ensure that the immediate operational impact of the new bulk reporting duties is maximised. I beg to move.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 123 says:

“Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must launch a consultation”—


as a teacher, marking my own homework, I realise that the drafting is then wrong and it should say “on a ban on sharp-tipped knives”. In this, I associate myself with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I am a teacher, and two years ago my school lost a student to knife crime. With respect to my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool, who is not in his place but who at Second Reading warned that there must not be too much law, I will use the analogy that amendments are like cars: everybody agrees that there are too many but nobody wants to give up their own. According to the ONS, last year 46% of homicides in the UK were with a sharp instrument, and 50% of those were with a kitchen knife. It was 52% the year before. Combat knives account for 6% and zombie knives 2%. Are we looking in the wrong direction here? Should we be looking within the home?

I am very grateful to Graham Farrell, professor of crime science at the University of Leeds, the Youth Endowment Fund and the Ben Kinsella Trust for their help. If anybody has not watched Idris Elba’s brilliantly thought-provoking film “Our Knife Crime Crisis”, I heartily recommend it. It is still available on BBC iPlayer.

Pointed-tipped knives are significantly more lethal than round-tipped knives, as shown by forensic studies on penetrative damage. A rounded knife will not penetrate clothing, let alone kill. Domestic settings are high-risk environments—especially for women—in which kitchen knives are readily available and often used in fatal attacks. Blade magazine disagrees. It says:

“The harsh truth is this: no amount of blunted blades, banned kitchen knives, or bureaucratic licensing schemes will stop individuals hell-bent on violence. You can’t legislate evil out of existence by targeting inanimate objects. England doesn’t have a knife problem—it has a people problem. A system problem. A failure-to-act-when-it-matters problem”.


But it is not the situation in which a perpetrator has planned their attack and carefully obtained or adapted a weapon to kill that this would prevent. It is the impulse homicide, particularly within a home environment, that we are trying to reduce here.

Situational crime prevention theory supports reducing crime opportunities by altering environments and tools, such as replacing lethal knives with safer ones. Rounded-tipped knives reduce temptation and harm, making impulsive violence less deadly without affecting culinary function. Small paring knives that do not penetrate far enough could be used in kitchens where a sharp point is really needed. Evidence also shows that crime rarely displaces to other weapons when access to one is restricted. Alternative weapons, such as scissors or screwdrivers, are less effective and less available and carry a lower status, thereby reducing their appeal. Dining knives are already rounded, showing a public tolerance for safer designs in everyday life. There are also policy parallels, with phase-outs such as incandescent light bulbs, diesel cars and the smoking ban.

The expected outcomes from this include a halving of knife-related homicides, reducing other knife crimes and preventing thousands of injuries. Can we please just have a consultation on this?

--- Later in debate ---

These issues in relation to knives are extremely important. I say finally to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, that we are actively exploring options to strengthen enforcement and prevention measures, particularly in relation to the pointed ends of knives. That will form part of the discussions that we have. I say to both noble Lords that this is a work in progress. We will consult still further. I hope that with those assurances the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, before I come to the Minister’s very constructive response, I want to thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. It has been a very valuable debate, and we have had a huge degree of consensus on the way forward. I very much welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, had to say about there being no easy answers. I would say that he is lethal not just at the checkout but elsewhere in this House.

On a serious note, we have a common cause here to prevent knife crime in any way we possibly can. I very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, had to say with his experience as a headteacher. He quite rightly gave Idris Elba a namecheck, as he has done so much towards the cause of knife crime prevention. I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, had to say in caveating this kind of review. It could be as specific as the Minister has said, in looking in particular at design. He certainly indicated that in his response.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst—and I very much appreciate the support from the Opposition Front Bench. As he says, it is legitimate to seek adjustments in response to the evidence; that is a very important point that was made. When he says that this is a moderate measure, I will take that; I think moderate is good in this context.

I come to what the Minister had to say. He said that the current provisions were an honest attempt to tackle these issues. I entirely take that, but I also took a lot of comfort from what he said about what the Government are doing to explore further preventive measures, including perhaps licensing schemes, or whatever. I very much hope that, between Committee and Report, we can discover a bit more about the shape of that. I also took comfort in what he had to say about the content of the regulations: that appropriate timescales would be included in those regulations.

On the basis of those two assurances—I think the Minister has responded—we can take some comfort in the fact that we are not only seeking answers but continuing to question whether we have all the answers.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can I correct a quick note of fact? It is very kind of him to promote me massively, but I am a simple design technology teacher. I have a very good headteacher way above me.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 122 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)]

My Lords, I also support the amendments put forward by my friend and colleague, my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. I will address the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for a short period. He was a Minister, as was one other person in this Committee, when I was a senior police officer. I do not remember the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, once instigating or taking through legislation that did not have an effect. That is a fact.

The other thing I am going to disclose—I was going to keep it secret, but I know I can trust all of you and that you are all positively vetted—is that when the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, left he was given a helmet, as was the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. She was also an extremely effective Minister in my time. The noble Lord was offered a truncheon, but he decided that his shepherd’s stick was far more effective than a truncheon, so we did not give it to him. As a matter of record, I used my truncheon once. I was chasing someone down Tottenham Court Road. I hit him three times and it had absolutely no effect. From then on, I never used it. However, on the flying squad, when we were going to violent robberies where we had intelligence that weapons were being used, we used pickaxe handles. They are far more effective.

This is a move in the right direction. I think the noble Lord described it as a practical approach. We need a common-sense approach to things such as straight truncheons and all the other issues that have been raised this afternoon. It has been a great debate as far as I am concerned, but we will make a difference. Following the approach of my dear friend the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and his historical delivery in terms of what he delivered with the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, in the time they were Ministers, we will make a difference.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, far be it from me to disagree with two former commissioners; that would be extremely inadvisable. We have heard the word “liberal” used twice in this debate, which shows that interpretations can vary.

In this House, we learn something new every day. I had no idea that we can trace pre-1945 steel in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, described. I thank him for his clear and expert introduction to his amendments, which seek to refine the definitions and provide necessary defences within the existing offensive weapons legislation.

His amendments that seek exemption for agricultural tools and historical and cultural items seem entirely sensible to us on these Benches. They would protect legitimate interests in the film, theatre and television industries, as well as non-public museums, and seek to prevent the law from becoming obsolete or unnecessarily broad. We are entirely comfortable with ensuring that while we crack down on those who equip themselves for violence, we do not punish collectors, farmers or those engaged in artistic production. To us, these are common sense amendments that safeguard the legitimate possession and use of articles that could otherwise be caught by broad definitions, and we support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.

Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.

Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.

We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.