UN Syrian Refugees Programme

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 20th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

Listening to the shadow Secretary of State’s response, I do not think that she could have listened to a word that I said. On the scale of help and support the United Kingdom is giving to the region, our level of aid support dwarfs that of most other European countries. Some countries are willing to take very small numbers—sometimes just two figures, by which I mean 10 or 20—and they are not providing financial support. We are the second largest donor: we are helping not hundreds but hundreds of thousands of people in the region by providing water, food and medical supplies. That has to be the right way. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has been one of the leading players working with UNICEF on a programme to help about 15,000 vulnerable children in Syria and the neighbouring countries. That has to be the right solution, rather than offering to take token numbers of people compared with the millions of people in need and the hundreds of thousands of people we are helping in the region.

We are stepping up and doing our part, not just on aid but in the work we are doing on the diplomatic front to help to bring the Geneva II talks, which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has been leading, to a successful conclusion. That has to be the long-term solution. It has to be in the region, making sure that those people can return home when the country is safe for them to do so. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) did not acknowledge the work that we are doing, with our European partners, to lead that approach.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

There is no dispute that the Government have led the way in the provision of financial aid; nor is there any dispute that the Government have helped to lead the way in relation to a political settlement, but the children of Syria have suffered grievously. Are we really saying that we cannot take a few hundred of those who have suffered most, or are we now so intimidated by UKIP that we have abandoned our humanity?

[Mr Harper]

I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that children are among those most at risk. One example of what we are doing for children in particular is our work with UNICEF in Syria and the region to provide help not to a few hundred children, but to 15,000. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has been leading this initiative with UNICEF. In terms of the numbers we can help, it is better to help tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of people in the region than the frankly relatively small numbers that some European countries are talking about. They are taking very small numbers of people and they are not providing aid. This country is playing a leading role and we can be proud of that.

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Steve Baker]

I recognise that my right hon. and learned Friend is advancing that argument with the best possible intention, but we live in a time when, because of terrorism and the fear of terrorism in particular—to pre-empt my concluding remarks—there has been an encroachment on our fundamental principles of liberty and justice, which we see elsewhere in the Bill. It is in that context that we must make sure that the security services are held properly to account in a transparent and credible way.

Here is the crucial point: in other Select Committees, transparency can do the heavy lifting, but as has been mentioned, transparency is not available in relation to the ISC. Precisely because of that, we need an elected Chair. I appreciate that the Prime Minister might find himself in a position where he had to reject a candidate in advance of their election, but that is surely a better option than going forward with a Committee whose independence from prime ministerial patronage can be questioned. I appreciate that the Prime Minister might have to engage in some politics on this issue, but that is after all his job.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

Like others, I do not take offence at the argument, but I think the hon. Gentleman’s representation of the nature of those who serve on the Committee is a long way short of my experience, if I may put it that way. Am I to understand that no matter how well qualified a Member of the House of Lords might be to chair the Committee, the hon. Gentleman’s amendment would preclude that from ever happening?

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[Paul Murphy]

Had I been inclined to support amendments 8 to 14, my inclination would have dropped dramatically over the past half hour as a consequence of hearing the speech made by the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker). I do not think for one second that the Committee’s significance depends on the Chair. The Chair is an important member of the Committee—the first among equals. During the two years I chaired the Committee, including the period when we considered extraordinary rendition, there was certainly unanimity among the members, as the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has just mentioned, as there is now, so the Committee had to come to a consensus.

It is preposterous to argue that whether or not the Chair had been elected would have made the slightest difference to the report on rendition or to the Committee’s eventually recommendations. That issue can be dealt with in another place and at another time, although the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), who was supposed to move the amendment—we have had an explanation of why he cannot be here—had a particular interest in rendition, but Members of the House will know that the Committee dealt with a host of other important issues affecting this country’s intelligence services.

Twenty years ago, the Committee started on a journey. Before the law was changed, there was no Committee of this House—in the Commons or the Lords—to deal with the intelligence services. Indeed, just before the inauguration of the Committee, the very existence of MI6 was denied publicly by the Government. In those 20 years there has been a dramatic shift in how the intelligence services have been made more accountable. The latest of those shifts is proposed in this Bill, which is a very good Bill in that regard. The accountability and transparency that it requires—there is obviously a limit to how much transparency one can have when dealing with the intelligence services—is something that I am sure we all welcome and support.

I support the proposal that the members of the Committee—who, by the way, are themselves subject to approval by the House of Commons and the House of Lords—will decide on who the Chairman of the Committee is to be. The Prime Minister does not do that. The Prime Minister could have a say in who the members are, but ultimately the House of Commons makes that decision. Those members will know among themselves who they feel to be the best person for the job. We have to bear it in mind that this is not a Select Committee. If it were, it could be argued that its Chair should be elected in the same way as for a Select Committee, but it is not—it is a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament. The Chair of the Committee, who is usually, and should be, a Member of this House, reports to the House annually, and a debate is also held in the other place. Having the members themselves choose the Chair of the Committee is a very significant development.

The Committee can never be the same as a Select Committee, because if it were, it would not be doing its job. It has to command the trust and the confidence of the intelligence services because of the nature of the business they deal with. The only way to do that is to have people on the Committee who are trusted not only by their colleagues here and in the House of Lords but by the three agencies, so that they can ensure that there is the fullest flow of information of highly sensitive and secret detail that the Committee can deal with. That is why it is different from other Committees. I think that the proposals in the Bill, which have been refined over the past couple of years, are such that everybody will be able to support them today.

Another matter covered in this group of amendments is the way in which the ISC is financed. Under the Bill, the Committee is no longer a statutory Committee—it becomes a Committee of Parliament. As a consequence, the Government will pay Parliament for the workings and expenses of the Committee. I fully support the Government amendment. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) is going to discuss the remuneration of the members of the ISC—more particularly, that of its Chair. Of course, all of us who have held these positions over the years have had no remuneration. I welcome and support this development and only wish that it were retrospective so that I could claim two years’ back pay, but that is not going to happen. My hon. Friend’s amendment refers to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which I hope will support this measure. I also hope that the Chair of the ISC will get the same remuneration as is paid to the equivalent Chairs of Select Committees: in this case, I imagine, the Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence Committees. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) is extremely hard working in his position, and I believe that this is a right and proper thing to do.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I have the good fortune, in the interests of brevity, to be able to acknowledge all that has been said on both sides of the House, but I would like to add a thought or two of my own.

This Committee is sui generis; there is nothing else like it. To seek to bring it within a certain structure runs the risk of ignoring the fact that it has particular characteristics. The Chair of the Committee has particular characteristics, too, because by convention the Committee does not talk to the press. When any request is made for information from the print or electronic media, the proper course of action, which, if I may say so, I have studiously followed since my election, is to refer the matter to the Chair of the Committee. The Chair then finds himself in a very difficult and sensitive position regarding the extent to which he is able to respond to possibly legitimate inquiries about the work of the Committee, in so far as that is consistent with the fact that he, like all of us, signs the Official Secrets Act. No member of any other Select Committee in the House of Commons does that. Particular skills are therefore essential for the chairmanship of this Committee that are not necessarily required in the chairmanship of other Committees. I respectfully suggest that those who are best able to assess those skills are the members of the Committee themselves. Of course, they must have confidence in their Chair.

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[Steve Baker]

rose—

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I will finish this point, if I may.

The amendment contains a contradiction in saying that we must elect the Chair in accordance with general circumstances while adding an extra requirement. That would make it a little difficult to maintain the unqualified democratic support that the mover of the amendment sought to persuade us to accept would be part of the process.

[Steve Baker]

I admire the way in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman is attacking my amendment and seeking to show a contradiction. We all agree that this Committee is different because of its need to access classified information, and that is the reason for having a different provision that does not exist in the case of other Select Committee Chairs.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

First, I had a concession on the peers and now I have a concession on what appears to be an inherent contradiction.

It seems to me that these provisions meet the necessary requirements of a Committee that is sui generis and that they are entirely in accord with the extension of scrutiny and responsibility that the rest of the Bill provides.

[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

Let it be stated from the beginning—this should be made absolutely clear—that this is not about the integrity of any member, past or present, of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am certain that the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker), who moved the amendment, is under no illusions, because it would be defeated in a vote. I hope there will be a vote, but am not sure that there will be.

I think that this has been a useful debate, however brief, because we rarely have the opportunity to debate how ISC members are appointed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) has reminded us that until about 25 years ago there were no statutory regulations on the security agencies. I remember clearly my attempts to have debates on M15 and so on in the 1980s, but they were not welcomed, to say the least. In so far as M15 and M16 are accountable to Parliament, I thought it only right and proper that we should have the opportunity now and again to discuss their role.

As I stated many years ago, let me make it clear—in case anyone thinks otherwise—that I am not against the security agencies. Even when there was no acute terrorist threat such as that which we face now, I made the point time and again that every democracy has a right to protect itself and should have some sort of agency against those who want to do harm to it.

What we are discussing today is not, as I have said, a matter of integrity, but whether the House should have an opportunity to elect those who serve on the ISC. I see no reason why we should not do that. I do not like the view that has been expressed, more or less, that the security agencies could veto people whom they do not particularly like.

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[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

I plan to speak to amendments 8 to 14, which deal with the election of the ISC Chairman, and then Government amendment 58, which deals with the broad proposals for the financing and resources required by the ISC. After that, I shall speak to amendment 58(a), which stands in my name and that of my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary and would make provision for payment to members of the ISC.

It has been helpful having this debate and hearing the experiences of past and serving members of the ISC and other hon. Members who have taken an interest in the area for many years. It was important to hear the historical context and the explanation of why we are in this position. My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) explained that when the ISC was set up in 1994 it represented a huge change in the relationship between Parliament and the security services and that we have been on a journey ever since—this is part of that journey. It was also interesting to hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) said about the fight to get the ISC set up. It is important that we understand the history and why we are in this position, but we must also recognise the important work that the ISC does, and I pay tribute to all its members, who put an enormous amount of time and effort into their roles. It is vital that the public have confidence in the security services, and that demands confidence in their oversight.

In our debates in the other place and here in Committee, there were extensive exchanges between the Government and the Opposition about how to strengthen the role of the ISC. Since inception, the ISC has been composed of Members of Parliament, yet because of its unique nature, it has often been portrayed more like a component of the Executive, not least because its secretariat is provided by the Cabinet Office. The Government have now finally decided, however, formally to constitute the ISC as a Committee of Parliament. Changing its name to the “Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament” emphasises not only that the ISC is composed of parliamentarians, but that they are doing the work of Parliament while serving on the ISC.

In Committee, we debated whether to move to a full Select Committee status for the ISC, and there was lengthy debate about what it would mean and how it would operate. I think there was clear recognition from both sides of the House that the special nature of the role of the ISC and the sensitive and secret information it routinely dealt with made its constitution worthy of separate and special consideration. Many parliamentarians are calling for reform to be hastened. I would like to set out the Opposition’s view. My right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary has called for the ISC to become a Select Committee. We recognise that, were that to happen and because of the special nature of its work, we would have to consider the most appropriate way of appointing a Chair.

We think that amendment 8 gets the matter the wrong way around: it would deal with the election or appointment of the Chair, whereas we need to deal first with the fundamental issue about the status of the Committee. The Bill provides for a Committee of Parliament, with the rules for its operation and procedure laid down in statute. Hon. Members will know that Select Committees are not created by statute, but formed by a resolution of the House and governed through Standing Orders. I recently reread the chapter in the book by the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) about the ISC and what reforms were needed. Of course, he referenced the Wright Committee recommendations about the ISC’s becoming a Select Committee and having an elected Chair, just like other Select Committees.

The problem is, however, that in the Bill the Government are establishing the ISC as a Committee of Parliament, not a Select Committee. We are, then, in a very different place from the established Select Committee structures. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker), but amendment 8 would give the ISC the partial look of a Select Committee, when it actually is not a Select Committee. I also note that setting out in a Bill how the Commons should elect a Chair is problematical, because the House is governed by Standing Orders. Will the Minister say whether it is in order to put in a Bill a mechanism for how the House should operate?

My second problem with the amendment, which has been touched on by right hon. and hon. Members, is that it would require the Prime Minister to give written consent to any Member wishing to stand as Chair. As has been recognised, that does not happen with any other candidate for a Select Committee position, although it goes some way to recognising the special nature of the Committee. It would present lots of problems, however, as it would mean that the Prime Minister could decide not to endorse a candidate—an elected MP—as not suitable for a role, which would put the Prime Minister in a difficult position. I am not sure it is one we want to move to.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

Let us imagine that, say, half a dozen people wanted to apply. Has the hon. Lady considered what would happen if the Prime Minister took the view that only one of them was suitable? What would happen to the element of choice lying behind the views expressed today?

[Diana Johnson]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman highlights yet another problem with supporting amendment 9 at this stage. He is right that it would take away the element of choice if only one candidate was endorsed.

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[James Brokenshire]

I hear the point that the right hon. Lady makes. The intent of the changes in the Bill is to underline the greater scrutiny and the import of the ISC as a Committee of Parliament in fulfilling its work, and therefore ensuring that it has an appropriate mechanism for the publication of information relating to its deliberations. As we have already discussed, sometimes there are challenges on evidence given, perhaps in private, and we had some useful debates in Committee on public hearings. We hope that we will be able to work with the newly formed ISC to have public evidence hearings for some evidence that has previously always been held in private. I acknowledge that most evidence would probably still continue to be heard in private because of the very nature of the materials provided, but we want to look at ways to make hearings more public to show the important scrutiny that is provided by the ISC, and thus to enhance visibility, transparency and confidence in the scrutiny role.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

Perhaps I might endorse the Minister’s enthusiasm for the public hearings, which would constitute a complete departure from what has previously been the case and provide an interesting opportunity for that greater degree of public interest and public understanding. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) has had to leave because of another commitment, but it is my understanding that he has been in informal discussions with the Minister about the issues raised by amendment 73. Am I right in understanding that it is possible for those discussions to continue and that consideration may be given in another place to an amendment that would satisfy both the Government and the Committee?

[James Brokenshire]

Informal discussions have taken place to work through the detailed and technical issues that need proper consideration and ensure we strike the right balance. I welcome that dialogue. Before I return to the substance of my right hon. and learned Friend’s point and respond formally, I will take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field).

[James Brokenshire]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. There is scope to deal with this further in the memorandum of understanding. I reiterate that it is not the Government’s intention to try and stop the ISC from continuing to do things in the way that it does at the moment as a consequence of the changes contemplated in the Bill, and I am content to reflect on providing further clarity in the memorandum of understanding to address some of those technical points. We have a framework in the legislation. While we may have found it challenging to get the precise legal wording right for an amendment because of those technical areas, I am willing to reflect on how we can seek to encapsulate the existing arrangements, under which the ISC conducts its affairs, in the memorandum of understanding.

These exchanges highlight some of the difficulties in putting changes in the Bill in a rigid way. In some ways, because of the nature of the evidence, they probably lend themselves to being addressed more effectively in the memorandum of understanding. If it will help the House, I am happy to give that commitment on how we may best address those challenges in greater detail in the memorandum of understanding. I hope right hon. and hon. Members will accept the spirit in which that commitment is given.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

In the absence of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, may I say how grateful the Committee is for the attitude displayed by the Minister? We await the resolution with interest. We have a common intention; it is just a question of making sure we frame it in a way that satisfies all other criteria.

[James Brokenshire]

I understand. I look forward to continuing informal discussions, and hope that agreement on the memorandum of understanding on the operations of the ISC in Parliament will be resolved quickly.

Government amendment 59 is a technical, clarificatory amendment that makes clear how paragraph 5(2) of schedule 1 will operate. The insertion of the word “otherwise” puts beyond doubt certain technical issues that have been highlighted, so I will not take up the House’s time and go through it in detail.

On Government amendments 61, 62 and amendment 76, in Committee, a Government amendment was agreed to provide protection to witnesses before the ISC. It will prevent evidence given by a witness before the ISC from being used against them in any criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings, unless it was given in bad faith. The provision, now in paragraph 6 of schedule 1, replicates an important part of the protection that witnesses before a Select Committee would have, by virtue of a Select Committee’s proceedings being subject to parliamentary privilege. In doing so, that will encourage witnesses appearing before the ISC to be full and frank in the evidence that they provide. It is perhaps worth stressing that witnesses before the ISC currently enjoy no special protections with regard to the subsequent use of their evidence.

The amendment made in Committee was therefore an important change to ensure that the ISC is able to perform its oversight function even more effectively, because the fuller and more candid the evidence the ISC receives, the more effective it is likely to be in supervising the security and intelligence community. During the debate in Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) questioned whether the protection went far enough. In response, I made a commitment to reflect carefully on the points that were made. I have considered whether further protection could be given to witnesses’ evidence, preventing its disclosure for the purposes of any legal proceedings; in other words, not merely legal proceedings where the evidence would be used against the particular witness. I am happy to confirm to the House that, while we concluded that such a protection would be problematic in terms of compatibility with the European convention on human rights in relation to criminal proceedings, we are satisfied that it will be compatible for civil and disciplinary proceedings.

Government amendment 61 therefore introduces a statutory protection for evidence given by witnesses to the ISC, preventing its disclosure for the purposes of any civil or disciplinary proceedings. That protection applies not merely to civil and disciplinary proceedings where the evidence would be used against the particular witness, but to all such proceedings. As a result, the existing prohibition on the use of evidence against the witness needs only to deal with use of evidence in criminal proceedings, since the wider protection given by the provision introduced by Government amendment 61 will cover use of evidence against a witness in civil or disciplinary proceedings. Government amendment 62 makes the necessary consequential changes.

As amended, paragraph 6 of schedule 1 will therefore provide a statutory protection for evidence given by witnesses to the ISC, preventing its disclosure for the purposes of any civil or disciplinary proceedings. In addition, evidence given by a witness before the ISC will not be able to be used against that witness in criminal proceedings. Of course, evidence that is deliberately misleading is of no assistance to the ISC. Accordingly, the protections do not apply to evidence given in bad faith. It is important to explain the context in which the drafting has been framed.

It may be that others will argue that this further protection, while welcome, does not go far enough. Indeed, I note that the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has tabled an amendment that would extend the protection even further, and no doubt the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North will wish to speak to that. All I will say at this stage—obviously, I will listen to what the hon. Lady says in her speech—is that we believe there is a significant issue of compatibility with the European convention on human rights. For example, it is possible that criminal proceedings against an individual could hinge on the testimony of a particular witness who has given inconsistent evidence to the ISC about broadly the same matters. If approved, this protection in the proposed amendment would prevent the inconsistent evidence given before the ISC from being used by the defence in the criminal proceedings to discredit the witness.

That would lead to obvious unfairness for the defendant in criminal proceedings. We do not believe that our preferred protection on this issue runs into that problem, because of the nature of its framing and the protections against self-incrimination. The ECHR has recognised that the privilege against self-incrimination lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial. By providing the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities and thereby avoiding miscarriages of justice, the existing protection secures the aims of article 6, whereas we judge that amendment 76 would run into challenges and issues in that way.

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[James Brokenshire]

I fully respect what my hon. Friend has said. We have given careful consideration, at length, to the statutory protections afforded to the ISC through this Bill. He will remember the debates we had in Committee about issues under the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act, along with a number of other statutory provisions, which we believed needed to be addressed to afford the ISC a number of additional protections. Although I very much hear what he says, the Government believe that we have taken this as far as we can through our amendments—and within the remit of article 6 of the ECHR, for example—to afford those protections and frame the provisions. I note the concern he has raised; all I would say is that the Government have taken some additional steps—on things that the existing Committee does not currently have—in how the Bill is framed to move the Committee as close as we can, within the framework of law, to provide the relevant protections.

As members of the ISC who are here today will recognise, consideration was given to how one might approach the issue of parliamentary privilege. Indeed, there was a lengthy debate in the other place on that issue. There is a broad recognition that trying to define parliamentary privilege in statute would open a whole new array of issues. Indeed, I do not think this House would welcome an attempt to frame the privileges that reside in this place by way of an Act of Parliament, which might be subject to further litigation and challenge, which not only might have an effect simply on the ISC but could have a limiting effect on parliamentary privilege for broader issues in this House. When considering this issue, everyone involved in the examination of the Bill thought that that would be a very unfortunate step to take. Therefore, the Government have thereafter sought to approach the issue by framing matters within existing legislative frameworks.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I just want to advise the Minister—who might not need advising—and the House that there is a Joint Committee of both Houses wrestling with precisely the problem he has just outlined, and it would not have made a great deal of sense for this Bill to proceed in a way that pre-empted any conclusions reached by the Committee.

[James Brokenshire]

I entirely agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman; hence the reason the Government have taken the approach they have.

Let me turn briefly to amendment 55, which concerns the ISC’s ability to oversee operational matters. With the amendments, the Bill now provides for three routes by which the ISC may consider particular operational matters. The first is where the Prime Minister and the ISC are agreed that the matter is of significant national interest and not part of any ongoing intelligence and security operations. The second route is where the Government request the ISC to consider a matter notwithstanding the fact that those criteria are not met. The third is where the ISC’s consideration of an operational matter is limited to considering information provided to it voluntarily by the agencies or another Department.

That additional route was provided to meet a further concern of the ISC—that the requirement that both the ISC and the Prime Minister should be satisfied that the criteria for oversight of operational matters had been met risked slowing the provision of information to the ISC on routine operational matters. Obviously that already happens now; the concern was that not framing the third limb might hinder it. We therefore made an amendment in Committee to address that third point. The key issue is that, as has been highlighted, for the first two categories there is the ability to require further information to be given, whereas for the third limb—because, in essence, information is provided without being compelled—those further requirements did not operate. That is why the structure has been framed in this way.

My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East expressed some concern about the term “voluntarily”. I think his point was that this was in some way a presentational issue—that we understood what we were talking about when it came to information that would ordinarily be provided to the Committee. We have reflected on that point; hence the reason for a further amendment to try to clarify rights of access.

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[Caroline Lucas]

In the interests of time, I will leave the matter there and pursue it via other avenues. I am grateful for the opportunity to have aired this really important case.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I am entirely sympathetic to what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has said about that case. However, a statutory avenue is already available under the Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which set up the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Further to the intervention by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a fellow member of the Committee, one might not be able to describe the proposed power that she wishes to provide as quasi-judicial, but it might possess a hybrid relationship in being both investigative and judicial, or in a position of seeking to create redress.

Apart from that, there is a fundamental statutory point. The hon. Lady’s proposed subsection (4A) refers to a situation in which

“a plausible claim has been made by or on behalf of an individual to the ISC that the Security Service…has disseminated any information to any recipient concerning any person that appears to be…materially false; and…harmful to the person defamed.”

The breadth of that goes far beyond even the jurisdiction of any court in the United Kingdom of which I am aware. Proposed subsection (4B) says that

“the ISC shall fully and expeditiously investigate the claim”—

so it does involve an investigative function—

“and, where the claim appears to be well founded, shall ensure that the misinformation is expeditiously corrected.”

But by what means? The ISC is not in a position to implement any such action. The amendment is not legally well-founded. In any event, as has been pointed out, its scope goes far beyond anything that the Committee’s staff and resources would permit. Moreover, there is no indication of how the powers would be exercised or how they could ever be implemented.

[Sir Alan Beith]

I want to consider briefly the restrictive wording of parts of clause 2 and the voluntary issue that has been raised by a number of Members.

I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for about 11 years from its very beginning. It was a slow and painful task to get the first generation of heads of agencies and civil servants from Departments to understand the Committee’s need for a deep understanding of the relevant matters in order for us to do our job effectively. Subsequent generations of heads of agencies were ready to involve the Committee more closely and to bring up operational matters, whatever the statute said. It did not take me long to realise that it was not possible for members of the Committee to do their job properly unless they understood how various kinds of operations were conducted and the constraints and problems faced by the agencies. In particular, it was not possible to discharge an important responsibility without an understanding of operational matters.

One of the purposes of the ISC, where Members of both Houses of Parliament look closely at the work of agencies, is to give people on the outside—both in this place and in the community at large—a sense that Members who are there by democratic means are observing the agencies sufficiently closely to give confidence that their work is within the framework not only of the law, but of the ethics and principles by which we try to run our country. The background is that agencies were often accused of doing precisely the opposite in years gone by. Unless we can give people that confidence and say, “Yes, I have looked very closely at this matter and I do not think you need to be concerned about it,” the Committee will not be discharging properly one of its most important roles. We found that we had to look very closely at operational matters and that became easier as time went on.

The work sometimes involves what are, in effect, ongoing intelligence operations. In some fields, the work never stops and an operation to do with a particular recurrent problem does not have a simple end, so the provision in clause 2(3)(a)(i) is restrictive.

I fully understand how the Government have arrived at the word “voluntarily”. It would have been absurd if the wording had prevented the Committee from continuing to work closely with the agencies in the way it has done in recent years. That would have been ridiculous, so the word is there for a perfectly respectable reason. Indeed, things have been improved by the insistence that, if the Committee requests something, that does not by definition make it involuntary. However, I still think, as the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, that that is not the kind of language we want to see in the Bill. Nor does it give people outside the confidence that this Committee will be able to find out whether something is going wrong when it needs to do so, or that it can be relied on when it seeks to give assurance that all is reasonably well.

The task of getting this right is by no means over. The memorandum of understanding may be able to deal with those issues better, but, even then, words are being put on paper and when that happens, as we have discovered, simple, practical and sensible ways of doing things may appear to be precluded. Moreover, when there is friction or tension, it becomes easier for the head of an agency or, at least as often—indeed, perhaps more often—a Minister or civil servant to say, “This goes beyond the memorandum of understanding. It is outwith the terms of the statute.” We have heard such language and the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), who is a previous Chairman of the Committee, will remember how rigid some people in the relevant Departments could be from time to time.

Ministers need to make it clear, as they have done to some extent in these discussions, that it is in the interests of the democratic accountability of these extremely important and valuable agencies that the public have confidence, not only in the agencies, but in that process of democratic accountability, circumscribed as it is by the need to protect the work of those agencies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

Part 1 of this Bill is a logical extension of a process that began approximately 20 years ago. The development of the relationship between the Intelligence and Security Committee and the services, based on respect but also on a clear understanding of their respective responsibilities, has been a substantial and important constitutional development, and nothing should take away from that.

The Minister without Portfolio described me as a heavyweight. It is a description I have been trying to avoid as I get older, for reasons he will readily understand, but there is no doubt that the matter we are discussing causes considerable controversy, and let me begin by saying I do not like part 2 of the Bill. Quite often we have to pass legislation that we do not like, however, because in our judgment it is necessary to do so, as the balance favours having the legislation. That is the principle on which I base my conclusion in this case, for which I will not be the darling of the Liberal Democrat conference in Brighton, not least because I am going back to my constituency—not to prepare for government, but to explain the consequences of the Government’s decision to close the Royal Air Force base there, which has been a source of great pride and has made an enormous contribution to the life of the community. What I will say and do is contrary to the expressed—and potential—views of the Liberal Democrat conference. I respect those views, but I think I am entitled to expect in return that my party colleagues will respect mine.

I base my views on this difficult matter on three influences: first, the fact that I have been a member of the ISC for some years; secondly, my experience as a Member of this House; and, thirdly, the fact that the law has been my trade since 1968 and I believe I know and understand it as well as any other Member of this House. I also believe that I have done as much as anyone to pursue the objectives of ensuring the protection of the citizen and the preservation of human rights.

The implication that those of us who support this legislation do so out of a slavish willingness to advance the interests of the United States has caused me some resentment, as has the suggestion that we are a cat’s-paw of the intelligence services. Not only are these claims insulting, but in my case they are palpably wrong. In recent years, for example, I have argued very strongly for an alteration in the extradition arrangements between our two countries, and 10 years ago almost to the day I and the then leader of my party were leading the opposition to the too-close association with George W. Bush and the United States in the unhappy venture into Iraq.

However, when senior officials in the current American Administration look us in the eye and tell us that their apprehension about the confidentiality of their sources is influencing the quality of the intelligence they are willing to share with the United Kingdom, should we ignore or dismiss that? If that position is then supported by American agencies themselves, should we ignore or dismiss it? When the UK’s agencies confirm under cross-examination their impression that the quality of shared intelligence with the United States has diminished, should we ignore or dismiss that? When the Americans say they are concerned about the risk to the lives of their agents or the revealing of techniques and procedures, should we ignore or dismiss that?

Do I like closed material proceedings? I do not. But do I think public interest immunity certificates are the answer? I most certainly do not. I have re-read chapter 13 of the Scott inquiry into arms to Iraq. It is heavyweight reading, but if any Members wish to become advocates for the value and validity of PII, I recommend they read it and find out the true implications.

If one wants to avoid embarrassment, a PII certificate is one of the most effective ways of doing so. If one wants to prevent a litigant from accessing evidence that might assist that person in establishing a case, PII is a very convenient way of doing so. One thing that has interested me more than anything else in this rather controversial debate has been the fact that many of the interested parties that now express confidence in public interest immunity certificates have previously been the first to criticise them.

The Bill has improved. Has it improved as much as I would prefer? Of course not, but how many times can any one of us put our hand on our heart and say that the piece of legislation for which we have voted is precisely and exactly as we would have wished? We are at a crossroads between principle and necessity, and we have to ask whether the balance that has now been struck is acceptable. That, essentially, is a question of individual judgement and it is that individual judgement that our constituents send us to this place to exercise every time we are faced with a dilemma of the kind the Bill obviously creates. Why do I say that? The balance struck is sufficient because of the developed and controlling role of the judiciary or the judge in any case and because of the palpable independence of the judiciary in these matters. We need only consider the Binyam Mohamed case, the observations of the Master of the Rolls and the extent to which the Government of the day were unable to escape the consequences of the action raised against them.

As is often the case, distinguished lawyers of sound judgment take different views of these matters. Sometimes, it seems to me that it is like a game of political contract bridge: “If you play your 700 lawyers and my good friend Baroness Kennedy, I will play my Ken Clarke and my Lord Woolf in an attempt to outbid you.” Such decisions are often as much a matter of instinct as logic.

Closed material proceedings have been described as Kafkaesque, but I doubt that those who say so have read Kafka. Others have said that they illustrate a form of Soviet-style justice, but a many litigants and accused persons in the Soviet system would be perfectly happy to swap their arrangements for those in this country, both north and south of the border. I would prefer not to have closed material proceedings, but I am satisfied that in this case the protections are such that they are justified.

[Mr Leigh]

I very much respect the views of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but is he satisfied, as a Liberal, with the notion that from now on a litigant will not be allowed to look at the evidence in their case and cross-examine it on the basis that it will be made available to them? After all, is that not quite a serious procedure that is quite different from the defence withdrawing a piece of evidence or not adducing it at all?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

It is a procedure that already exists in our law. If my hon. Friend is concerned about the universal application of the principle, that argument was lost some time ago.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Yes, that argument was lost a long time ago, but is that a reason to pass the Bill into law when it makes the situation worse? Once again, it suggests that the view of Parliament is that somehow it is okay to go through a judicial process in which the defendant is not fully aware of the case against them and in which the public is totally unaware of the issue. It sets a dangerous precedent to have any avoidable secrecy in the judicial system.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

Since the hon. Gentleman puts the point that way, let us turn it around and ask what he would do. Would he have elements of the conduct and the sources of the security services—sensitive, and perhaps at great risk to those who provide human intelligence—exposed in our courts? That seems to me the only possible alternative, or else, as has been suggested, we simply say there is a financial cost to be borne and we will settle any case that may have the consequence of causing such sensitive information to be revealed. That is not justice, as I understand it. That is the failure of the judicial system to reflect the reality of the proceedings which are brought before us.

[Mr Leigh]

It is always open to the defendant to choose not to adduce evidence to support his case. If the state does not want to adduce the evidence, nobody is suggesting that it has to reveal the sources of agents or information. The state simply does not produce it.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

But if the case raises the kind of issues that were raised in the case of Binyam Mohamed, what does my hon. Friend think the response would be if the state said, “We’re not producing any evidence at all”? What inference does he think people would draw if no defence was mounted? Of course the inference drawn would inevitably be one of guilt.

I finish by saying this: a lot has happened since the twin towers in New York were bombed and thousands of people died. Not all of it could be described as something of which we are proud, but the one thing that certainly happened then and which was reflected in many of the speeches that were made here on the special occasion when Parliament was summoned, and much of what has happened since then, has demonstrated that things were irretrievably and irrevocably changed as a result of that. We have only to look at the incidence of proceedings being taken in this country in relation to acts of terrorism or proposed acts of terrorism to realise the extent of that change. That is why, although I have no love for this legislation, I believe it is appropriate.

Points of Order

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I raise this point of order with you in respect of your duty of defending the interests and rights of Back Benchers and Committees in this House. This morning in an interview in The Sun newspaper, the Home Secretary, who I see is on the Treasury Bench, said the following about the Communications Data Bill:

“Criminals, terrorists and paedophiles will want MPs to vote against this bill. Victims of crime, police and the public will want them to vote for it. It’s a question of whose side you’re on.”

She also said:

“Anybody who is against this bill is putting politics before people’s lives.”

A Joint Committee of this House and the other House is meeting at present to pass comment on this Bill. Therefore, apart from traducing a large number of Members of this House, the Home Secretary is undermining the work of that Committee. Has she asked to come to the House to explain herself, and if not, what can you do to protect us, Mr Speaker?

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

Is it on the same theme?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Speaker]

We shall come to it, therefore. I am saving the right hon. and learned Member up. He is worth waiting for, I am sure.

Let me respond first to the point of order of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). Ministers and other Members must take responsibility for their own words. I have not received any requests from the Home Secretary to come to the House. The right hon. Lady is reported as having expressed herself in strong terms, as the right hon. Gentleman alluded, and others, notably including the right hon. Gentleman, may disagree with her analysis. The two Houses agreed that a Joint Committee would be an appropriate way of examining the Government’s proposals in detail, but that does not put the proposals beyond comment by others. I am sure that, as with all Joint and Select Committees, this Joint Committee’s report will be founded on a careful and sober weighing of the evidence. I hope that is helpful to the right hon. Gentleman and the House.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Have you received any requests from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to make a statement about the nature of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Israel? Following last week’s events in New York at the United Nations, a number of actions have been taken and/or promised that are admittedly retaliatory in purpose. Would it not be right for the House to be brought up to date as soon as possible about the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government towards those actions and any future conduct which may be of the same nature?

Extradition

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Tuesday 16th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

The hon. Gentleman is also assiduous in standing up for his constituent and I recognise the campaign that has been fought over the years by many people. As I said earlier, however, my decision was based on the material that was available to me.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I understand the difficult nature of the decision that my right hon. Friend has had to take. Extracts of some of the medical reports have been circulating in the House of Commons today and it seems to me that under the terms of the medical advice she received there was no other conclusion to reach that was consistent with Mr McKinnon’s human rights but that she should bring an end to the extradition process. As we have already heard, that is subject to universal acceptance.

I also agree with what my right hon. Friend said about a forum bar and the need, even with such a procedure embodied in our law, to ensure that it does not become the source of undue delay. Regrettably, however, I must disagree with her on the question of standard of proof. Once again, I respectfully disagree with the conclusions reached in the Baker report. In that, I am supported by a large body of credible legal opinion, not to mention many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House. Does she understand that sooner or later it will not be the perception that will be challenged but the substance of the distinction? Would not the protocol to which she referred as being necessary between the United Kingdom and the United States be an exact and appropriate vehicle in which to state that no one will be extradited from Great Britain to the United States unless there is probable cause for doing so?

[Mrs May]

I am grateful for my right hon. and learned Friend’s remarks on a number of my announcements today. I fully recognise the concern expressed in this House and elsewhere about the perception that there is a difference. Sir Scott Baker considered the issue very carefully and came to the conclusion that there was no significant difference between the requirements on either side of the Atlantic and that in effect there was no practical difference between the two. I recognise, however, the opinion expressed by my right hon. and learned Friend today.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 19th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman look at the recent comment made by the chief constable of Greater Manchester. Referring to the police authority’s decision on the council tax grant, he thanked the authority for

“agreeing the budget which will allow us to start recruiting again and to continue to reduce crime and disorder.”

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

In the light of the discussions last week—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I apologise for interrupting the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but he deserves to be heard in an atmosphere of quietude.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

In the light of the discussions last week between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States about extradition, is the Home Secretary now in a position to tell the House when she expects to respond to the Baker report?

[Mrs May]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his question. As he will have seen from the Prime Minister’s comments following his discussions with the President, discussions are taking place between this Government and the American Government about the extradition treaty, and I will report shortly.

Extradition

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2011 Westminster Hall

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak in this debate. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) on securing it. Like others, I believe that this debate should be held in the main Chamber. We are discussing fundamental constitutional rights. There is only one forum where those rights should be discussed, and that is the Floor of the House of Commons. The Leader of the House was with us a little while ago, and I have no doubt that he heard what many Members said, but I shall make a point of going to see him after this debate to reinforce the view that the Chamber is the place for such issues.

I first took an interest in these matters in July 2006, when at Prime Minister’s questions in two consecutive weeks, I sought to interrogate Tony Blair. I said then what I say now: the extradition treaty with the United States puts United Kingdom citizens in a position of disadvantage compared with their US counterparts. It is implied that the United States embraced the treaty, but that is not true. The Senate waited until autumn 2006 before ratifying it. The purported reason was that the strength of the Irish lobby in the United States was such that senators were concerned that the treaty, if ratified, might cause alleged terrorists from Ireland in the United States to be extradited to the United Kingdom. The treaty did not have an immaculate conception.

The treaty is wrong in principle. Extradition is based on the principle of reciprocity. For a state to give up one of its citizens to another jurisdiction can be justified only by the confident knowledge that citizens of both states have equal rights. I know that, here in the United Kingdom, the representatives of the United States have some reservations about what I and others are saying today. They need have no anxieties. I wish not for a levelling down but a levelling up. I seek equivalence, not exceptionalism.

I have sought to test the integrity of my position by asking myself what a United States member of Congress would do if the positions were reversed. We all know that such is the strength of feeling on Capitol hill about such issues that, if United Kingdom citizens were in a better constitutional position than Americans, there is no member of Congress who would not seek, as we do, to protect their own citizens. One thinks, for example, of Robert Byrd, the longest serving senator in the history of the United States and a constitutional expert to his fingertips. Faced with the situation that we face, I have absolutely no doubt how vehement and articulate his opposition would be.

[Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is precisely because of the traditions of jurisprudence and respect for habeas corpus in both the United Kingdom and the United States that it is extremely important that we work together to level up the rules on extradition, as he says, so that we can send a message to other countries that are trying to achieve the same level of justice to which we have aspired and that we are achieving?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I agree entirely. I can say this as a Scots lawyer, because we have a civil law rather than a common law system: one important export, even as long ago as our colonisation of the United States, was the common law. Habeas corpus is a fundamental principle of the law in the United States. Not only in federal law but in the laws of each state, habeas corpus occupies exactly the same important position, as my hon. Friend suggests.

I fancy that there is not much patience in the Chamber for an analytical exercise in the interpretation of the Baker report, but in order to provide some further reading to Members who have not yet had the opportunity to do so, I refer them to part 7, pages 231 to 243, paragraphs 728, 729, 735, 739 and 742, the burden of which is that the Baker report concluded that there was no significant difference between “reasonable suspicion,” which is the standard applicable in the United Kingdom under the treaty, and “probable cause,” which is the standard necessary in the United States and which is enshrined in the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.

I have the misfortune to disagree with the conclusions of the Baker report. I believe that probable cause is a requirement that has to be met before any United Kingdom citizen should be extradited to the United States. Why do I believe that? Because before surrendering a British citizen to a foreign jurisdiction, the state—our state—should reasonably require to ensure that there is a case requiring to be answered, not a suspicion. To borrow an illustration from my own experience as a prosecutor and from domestic law on both sides of the border, suspicion justifies arrest, but suspicion does not justify charge or prosecution. Probable cause, in my view, is necessary before prosecution can be justified.

I think that my argument is underpinned by the conclusions of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to which reference has already been made. It concluded, rather as I have suggested, that it is necessary that the standard of proof on both sides of the Atlantic should be the same. Those arguments are properly set out on page 4 of the report. That the issue might require adjustment of the treaty was recognised by the Committee, whose Chair, the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis), is present, and by Baroness Neville-Jones, who gave evidence on behalf of the Government and who appeared to be optimistic that adjustment could be achieved.

I am persuaded by one other element of the consideration of these matters. There is a considerable predisposition on the part of the courts of the United States to invoke extraterritorial jurisdiction to an extent that we simply do not apply in this country. We have, therefore, in practice, no reciprocity in the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is my view, however, that if the significant difference in the approach in the United States is, as we know, common, that is all the more reason that the standards of proof should be equivalent.

Let me deal quickly with three further issues. First, on the matter of forum, it is surely correct in principle that there should be an effective statutory presumption that a case be tried in the country where the crime is committed, and that only in the most special circumstances should there be a departure from that principle. Secondly, on legal representation—this is also recognised by the JCHR—someone who is being sought to be extradited needs good representation not just in this country, but in the country to which they are extradited. We know that the availability of public funds, or indeed of public defenders, is to different standards in different states of the United States.

Finally, on the application of the Human Rights Act 1998, which is, of course, a statutory requirement for the Home Secretary, I do not believe that there is any justification for the Baker committee’s recommendation that the Home Secretary’s authority on that should be transferred to the legal system. Baker says that there should be a removal because of delay being caused if it is invoked and because determination of extradition should be exclusively a judicial process. That, I think, fails to understand the nature of extradition, notwithstanding the detailed historical analysis that the Baker report contains. Extradition is diplomatic in the first instance. It becomes judicial and ultimately it is political.

In exercising that power, the Home Secretary is not acting ultra vires; she is exercising the power conferred on her by Parliament—the same sovereign Parliament that resolved that other parts of the procedure should be exercised by the courts. I see nothing wrong in principle with the Home Secretary exercising a power conferred on her by Parliament additional to the powers of the court. Parliament has chosen not to grant exclusive jurisdiction in matters of extradition to the courts, as Parliament is entitled to do. The truth is that the Home Secretary is exercising an administrative function in furtherance of the duties incumbent on her by the Human Rights Act.

It has been suggested that it would perhaps be helpful if the considerations that the Home Secretary is obliged to take into account were more fully described in legislation, such as the health of the person being considered for extradition, which is relevant to the speech we heard a moment ago by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes), the impact on family life, the quality of treatment that a person might receive in the penal system, and, of course, the proportionality of the likely sentence that might be imposed.

[Charlotte Leslie (Bristol North West) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way and my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) for securing this debate. We have talked a lot about extradition treaties between the USA and the UK, and the European arrest warrant. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is a case for looking at extradition treaties with countries in category 2 territories, such as South Africa, where my constituent, Shrien Dewani, may face trial, and at considerations such as the health of the person and whether they will face a fair trial, given, in the case of my constituent, the high media coverage that his case has received in the country to which he may be extradited?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

My hon. Friend underlines the need for the Home Secretary to have the jurisdiction and the discretion that the law presently allows. It is a powerful argument in support of the view that that discretion should remain.

I have not sought to deal with any particular case or set of circumstances, but my interest in this matter was first aroused by the case of the NatWest three, one of whom, Mr Gary Mulgrew, was a constituent of mine. I think that one has to be careful about changing the law in response to particular cases—there is an old legal dictum that hard cases make hard law—but today this is an opportunity to define principle, and I for one am delighted that so many Members have chosen to be present for that purpose. I look forward to the occasion when we have a resolution on the Floor of the House to which we can give effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. My right hon. and learned Friend may want to intervene to provide clarity on when the panel will report.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

As soon as possible.

[Tom Brake]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend, who has responded in true ministerial mode. The panel will respond as soon as possible.

Sir Scott Baker’s conclusions do not take into account the emotional strain that is put on individuals and families involved in extradition cases. His findings draw conclusions about, for example, whether a forum bar would have been used in historic cases, which are difficult to substantiate. He also suggests a periodic review of arrangements with certain countries, such as Russia or Azerbaijan, with which I feel very uncomfortable. I welcome the fact that my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, has asked my right hon. and learned Friend to set up a panel, which will report as soon as possible.

I will not refer to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, because many other hon. Members have done so. I shall simply conclude by thanking Sir Scott Baker for his review, although I do not accept his findings. I therefore welcome and endorse the panel that is being established under the leadership of my right hon. and learned Friend. I hope that that panel will make recommendations to address the imbalances that we identified in opposition and which, because we have taken no action so far, remain and must be rectified.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Leigh, to follow the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) on this important subject. I join others in congratulating the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) on securing this debate. I agree that it would have been better to have this debate on the Floor of the House. These important matters have been of concern to many Members, hence the large number of right hon. and hon. Members who have attended the debate.

I want to re-emphasise the decisions taken so far by the Home Affairs Committee. Before I do so, I want to commend the excellent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It was fair and balanced. It provided Members with an insight into the struggles faced not only by individuals, but by members of families who support those individuals not only in the normal legal process, but against Governments of other countries. It certainly will help my Committee in the work that we do.

I have an apology to make. We started our inquiry into extradition a year ago, but unfortunately events in the Home Affairs Committee tend to gather pace and different issues occupy us. We were therefore not able to conclude our report, partly because of the Committee’s heavy workload, but also because we were waiting for the outcome of Sir Scott Baker’s review. I am pleased to tell the House that Sir Scott Baker will be appearing before the Committee on 20 December. We have been trying to get him before us for a while, but we thought it best that he should report first before we questioned him on his conclusions. This debate will provide us with a great deal of information about individual cases, which I hope will assist the Committee and Parliament once we publish our report in February.

I am delighted that the Liberal Democrats will be having their own review. Judging by what the chairman of the panel has told the House today, I have a fair idea what the conclusions will be even before the review has begun. It would be very odd if we had conclusions from a review chaired by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) that were different from what he has said today and different from the principled stand that he took on the Gary McKinnon case. It would certainly be a shock to us all if they were different from the words of the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, and the words of the Deputy Prime Minister when in opposition, when he was clear that in his view Gary McKinnon should not be allowed to go to America to face trial.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I am loth to cause a shock to the right hon. Gentleman. He can assume that my views have been formed for a long time and are unlikely to be changed. However, there is an important element, to which I made reference earlier, about how one would effect the changes in the treaty arrangements between this country and the United States to ensure that a system that we find acceptable was put in place.

[Keith Vaz]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right. That is the fundamental basis for what should happen next. There is consensus across the House about what is wrong with the treaty. I have spoken to previous Home Secretaries under the previous Government, one of whom expressed regret about the way in which the original treaty was negotiated. The next step, therefore, must be to look again at the treaty and see what changes can be made.

We have heard some extraordinary stories—I should say case histories, not stories—from the hon. Members for South Dorset (Richard Drax) and for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith). We have heard about the excellent work by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan). The Home Affairs Committee listened carefully to the evidence given by the father of Babar Ahmad when he appeared. He spoke with great dignity. If someone’s son has been in custody for as long as Babar Ahmad, I would expect anger and outrage, but the way in which he gave evidence to the Committee was absolutely commendable.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes), who is not in his place at the moment, has done an outstanding job in protecting his constituent and in advancing the cause of Gary McKinnon. I do not think that we would have been discussing these issues had it not been for the case studies that we have had in Tooting and Southgate.

The Home Affairs Committee has unanimously written to the Minister. We wrote to the previous Minister with responsibility for immigration and the previous Home Secretary under the previous Government to urge them to write to the United States to express a view and conclude this matter. That is my plea to the Minister. We are told that politics is not included in such matters because of their legal nature, but we know that the Prime Minister spoke to President Obama about these matters when the President came to the United Kingdom, so there is politics in this. I cannot see why it has taken 18 months for the Home Secretary to make a decision about this case. I have written to her regularly on behalf of the Committee. Each time she has replied to tell me that the medical evidence cannot be agreed, but the medical evidence, as we have heard from the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, has not changed over the past 18 months. I hope that we can reach a conclusion on this. Once we conclude on Gary McKinnon, and then when we hear the views of the Deputy Prime Minister, we will know the coalition Government’s position on the Act and the treaty. That is why the McKinnon case is so important.

I hope that we will have closure on this matter. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members who have other cases will be able to get satisfaction. I do not know whether our report will be as brilliant as the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but I hope that, when we report in February, after we have taken evidence from Sir Scott Baker, we will be able to assist the House in deciding what the next steps will be.

Intelligence and Security Committee

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I should begin with an apology because it has been my misfortune to miss a large part of the debate owing to a prior commitment, which was on behalf of Parliament but outside the House. However, I have had the opportunity to listen to the debate and hear some very fine and perceptive speeches. I hope that I may be excused for singling out the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), who made a very wise contribution. I was also pleased to hear the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), with whom I serve on the Committee, because his four years in the Northern Ireland Office undoubtedly qualify him to speak with common sense and great knowledge of the problems Northern Ireland presents, not least in recent times. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Chair. I think that the Chair should be the best person for the job because any kind of preference, however well intentioned, could stand in the way of the Committee’s efficient working.

As for what the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) said, or at least implied, anyone who doubts the independence of the Committee over the years should come to the office and look at the photographs on the wall of the people who have constituted the Committee over 20 odd years. He will not find one of them, man or woman, who could be described in any way as less than fully independent. My experience as a relatively new member led me to believe from the very beginning that the quality I had to demonstrate most of all was independence.

Despite the independence of those who have served on the Committee, it is interesting to note the extent to which its role has been misunderstood, and often in circles where one would have hoped that its role would be much better appreciated. That is one of the most compelling arguments for the changes in the Committee that the Committee itself has recommended and that now form part of the Green Paper.

[Mr Winnick]

When I made my criticism of the Committee, I cited what the Joint Committee on Human Rights reported last year—that the Committee had not been sufficiently robust in dealing with the allegations of complicity in torture.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

That is a matter of judgment. Members of the Committee sign the Official Secrets Act and are subject to constraints when it comes to any criticism directed at them either collectively or individually. Based on my experience, however, I have never seen any action—or lack of action—on the part of the Committee which suggested a lack of independence of thought.

[Paul Murphy]

indicated assent.

[Mr George Howarth]

indicated assent.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I see members of the Committee, both past and present, nodding in agreement.

I talked about independence a moment or two ago, but two other elements are important to the Committee’s membership: experience and judgment. The assessment of these is of enormous significance and importance, and, given that the ultimate responsibility for security in this country rests with the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister ought to play a significant part in the formation of the Committee. We can argue about whether he should play a part after or in advance of an election, but that is a detail for another day. I am in no doubt about the principle, however, that as the Prime Minister answers to the nation—to the country—for the security of the country, in this matter at least he ought to have a determining role.

One other thing that has been brought rather remarkably to my attention is that the success of the three agencies depends on their co-operation. Those with longer—or perhaps not that much longer—memories than I will remember that there have been occasions in the not-so-distant past when the agencies have to some extent seemed at odds, when there has been a certain amount of competition and when they have found it difficult to share common objectives and, indeed, common information.

The greater effectiveness of the services collectively has come about because of increasing co-operation. In the four years or so that I have been a member of the Committee, I have seen that co-operation grow and blossom. Co-operation is necessary because no one agency can hope to be the fount of all intelligence wisdom any more than one country can. That is why our relations with our allies are of very considerable significance, and why the debate and, indeed, controversy about the control principle have become so salient.

I echo what others have said. When we last went to the United States, there was strong anecdotal evidence from people in positions of authority and responsibility that their anxiety about the control principle, or the lack of its application, might—if it had not already—inhibit the volume and quality of intelligence that they were willing to share.

If someone has that anxiety and concern, they have a simple way of dealing with it: they just stop giving significant information. The problem is that if ours is the country expecting to receive information of that quality, we have no way of knowing that they have stopped. The supplier can simply turn off the tap, and we have no way of knowing whether what we still receive is of quality or, indeed, the sort of worth that the arrangements between our closest allies have often provided.

It has been said—it is an entirely logical position to take—that if there is to be protection of information provided to us under the control principle, that enhances the argument for scrutiny at the instance of the Committee of the services. I certainly agree with that principle. That is why I hope that I am in the vanguard of those who support the proposal that the Committee become a Committee of Parliament, perhaps selected using the same method as that used by the Standards and Privileges Committee. However, as I have said, an important role and responsibility should rest with the Prime Minister.

Like some more long-standing Members, I remember the debates that surrounded the creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee and the atmosphere in which it was launched, which was very different from that now surrounding the Committee’s activities. Although I was not a member of the Committee at the time of its inception, I imagine that the atmosphere was also very different then between the Committee and the services. I do not doubt for a moment that the services were perhaps suspicious but certainly apprehensive about the extent to which the Committee might inhibit or create some kind of obstacle to their activities.

For that reason, we are entitled not only to change the form of the Committee but certainly to increase its powers. That is why the recommendation that we be able to “require” information rather than request it seems an essential part of the change that the Green Paper envisages. However, as others have said, the Committee staff is very modest in number. If the Committee is to fulfil this wider remit, it must have many more resources; otherwise it will have greater responsibility but less capability. That would be bound to reduce not only the quantity but the quality of scrutiny.

I am amused by the suggestion that rogue elements of Parliament might be keeping tabs on rogue members of the security services. It occurred to me that perhaps the best way to keep tabs on rogue elements of Parliament would be to employ the services of rogue elements of the security services. The latter proposition may prove more powerful than the first.

This is an annual debate of great importance. It is true that the quality of the Committee’s work depends to a large extent on the quality of the work done by its staff. That in turn depends on the quality of the activities carried out by those who work for the agencies. My experience of these people is that they are professional, unassuming and that they essentially live in the shade. There is no glory attached to what they do and there is hardly ever any public recognition. It is not the most generously remunerated occupation and it necessarily imposes considerable restrictions on personal life, on the ability to live in a normal way and even sometimes on someone being able to say what their occupation is. These are people of enormous quality. If one were looking for a fictional comparison, which is always dangerous, it is rather less like Ian Fleming and rather more like John le Carré.

The right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East very properly paid tribute to the quality of the members of the agencies, and I would most certainly like to do so too. I also pay tribute to the leadership in the agencies, because that has not been expressly referred to. Daily challenges have to be faced. One substantial challenge coming down the track is the Olympic games. I am not an entirely impartial observer of that because I attend the Olympic Board under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and, indeed, the Mayor. The Olympics will be a very formidable challenge.

Let me say, in parenthesis, that everyone with any interest in sport remembers the horrific outrage of Munich. If anything of that kind were to happen in any other games, it would inevitably be definitive. Therefore, in the next 12 months or so these unassuming professional people will, perhaps from a domestic point of view, face a more severe challenge than they have ever faced before. I am confident that they will meet that challenge.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who has demonstrated the qualities that we have all come to respect in him: first, he has good judgment; and secondly, he is unerringly fair in the judgments that he exercises. It is a pleasure to serve with him. I think we are now the two old lags of the Committee.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

But look how young we look!

[Mr Howarth]

In my case, yes. [Interruption.] We are both certainly young in our outlook.

I should like to echo the praise that the right hon. and learned Gentleman gave to the agencies and to the staff of the ISC, who are very open with us, very helpful, and enable us to do the job that we have been appointed to do. When we go to visit the agencies—sometimes we do have to make visits, like other Committees—or when they come to give evidence, those events are invariably well organised and well informed. Our most recent visit, which was to GCHQ, was no exception, and I learned a lot from it. It was well structured and well organised, and it is important to acknowledge that.

Before I move on to the three key issues that I want to cover, it is important to recognise that the impartiality, or independence, of the Committee is paramount and, in my experience, can be relied on. Michael Mates, a former member of the Committee who, until he retired at the last election, served on it from the outset, used to say that when the Committee meets, our political affiliations are left at the door. In my experience, that is the exactly the case. We are seeking not to score party political points, but to get at the truth and carry out the job of scrutinising the work of the agencies concerned.

That leads me on to my first point, which is about the reform of the Committee. A great deal has been said about that already, and I will not repeat it all, but I want to make two observations. First, I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife and my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) in that I am unconcerned about whether the Chairman of the Committee is a member of the governing party or of the Opposition party. I have served under four Chairmen—their downfall, in three cases, had nothing whatsoever to do with me—and I have found them all to be extremely capable and experienced. Whatever their political affiliation was, it never influenced how the Committee was conducted. The most important thing is that we get the right man or woman in the job. I hope, like the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), that we might have some continuity with the current Chairman during the course of this Parliament, because that is helpful.

Secondly, I support the reforms of the Committee set out in the Green Paper and covered in our report. Let us be brutally frank: there are now two Prime Ministers who have wanted reforms in this direction, and it would be a very foolish Committee that did not notice that they were both from different parties and that perhaps the time for change had arrived. I therefore have no problem with the reforms.

However, we need to be careful about one thing. We should not set up the expectation that these reforms will make the whole operation of the services and everything that they do a matter of public knowledge. As the Chairman of the Committee said at the outset, there is information that we are party to that we can never make public because we sign the Official Secrets Act and, by and large, retain the trust of the agencies. That is why we sometimes, reluctantly, have to put redactions in our annual reports. Principled critics of the Committee criticise it because we have access to privileged and secret information. States will always have secrets, and necessarily so. We should not lead anybody to believe that everything that we know will be made public as a result of the reforms of the Committee. I know that nobody is claiming that and I do not mean this as a criticism of the Government or other Committee members. However, it is important, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) made clear at the outset, that there will not be a free-for-all in relation to the information that the state has and what can be made public. The brutal truth is that a state secret that becomes public is no longer a state secret and is therefore useless.

My second point is about cyber-security. That issue has been covered extensively, but I want to cover it in a slightly different way. It is not a new issue. In June 2009, the Cabinet Office produced the “Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom”, which rightly stated that it was an urgent, high-level issue that could not be ignored. More recently, in October 2010, the national security strategy cited

“Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime”

as a tier-one risk, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington has said. For several years, the importance of this issue has been acknowledged. However, for national security and diplomatic reasons, the UK has been coy about naming those responsible, at least until recently. I will say a little more about the recent developments where those responsible have been named in a moment.

First, I want to use this opportunity to emphasise how important this issue is for our country. Our annual report makes it clear that we generally approve of the cross-cutting approach that the Government are taking on cyber-security. It states rightly that the Government’s decision to move ministerial responsibility for the issue to the Cabinet Office, which is better placed to deal with such issues across Departments, is appropriate. That was a good move on the part of the Government.

It is also important that we seek better international cyber-security controls against cyber-attacks. I do not underestimate the difficulties that that presents. I am well aware that the Foreign Secretary is on the case and is raising this issue in international forums, no doubt discretely. I believe that we need to develop international protocols and controls over the coming years to make it easier to get control over what is going on across the world. I do not make that point in a spirit of criticism, I merely say that the matter has to be given some prominence. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), might be able to support that point of view when he winds up the debate. It is in the interests of our national security, and of businesses in the UK, that we take such an approach.

I wish to make one further point on cyber-security that is perhaps less driven by consensus than those that I have already made. It concerns the role and status of the Prime Minister’s official representative to business on cyber-security, Baroness Neville-Jones, who was of course Security Minister until May. Over recent years, our Committee has struggled with both the current and previous Government on whether those primarily responsible for attacks could be named in our reports. I am sure the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife would bear me out on that. Up until this year, we were losing that struggle. However, there has been movement. In his recent signed article in The Times, the head of GCHQ, Mr Iain Lobban, flagged up the importance of the issue, but sensibly declined to say which countries were responsible.

In our report, published in July, we went further, stating:

“The greatest threat of electronic attack continues to be posed by State actors and, of those, Russia and China are”

suspected of carrying out “the majority of attacks.” That form of words, carefully nuanced and the product of thorough negotiations between the services, the Government and our Committee, was the best way of putting it. Certainly the Government and the agencies concerned seemed to believe that that was the right way to describe the situation. However, when Baroness Neville-Jones was pressed in an interview on Radio 4’s “The World at One” about whether China and Russia were involved in such attacks, she responded, “They certainly are”. That is rather further than anybody else has gone.

The reason for highlighting that is straightforward. Either it is right to be circumspect about naming the states concerned, or it is not. It is not clear to me whether Baroness Neville-Jones speaks for the Government or whether she is, as it were, a free spirit in these matters. We need to know with what authority she speaks, and to what extent anything she says can be attributed to the Government or to the agencies concerned. Perhaps the Minister might be able to say a little about the noble Lady’s position, and what her status and authority is.

I turn to the use of intelligence material as evidence. The issue has arisen principally from the Binyam Mohamed case, and the Government have brought forward a way of dealing with it that may or may not work. I agree with the points made in our annual report about the matter, but what concerns me is that, no matter how Parliament may express itself on the issue, what guidance is given to the judiciary or what clauses are put in Bills, at the end of the day judges who will handle such cases will have to make a choice between, on the one hand, what is in the national interest and important for national security, and on the other hand the conduct of the court and the particular trial that is taking place. My fear is that the conduct of the trial and the proceedings of the court will, in some cases, as in the Binyam Mohamed case, take precedence over what Parliament intended, anything in any particular Act of Parliament, and the national interest. This is not an attack on judges. I have tried to think of this by asking myself, “What if I were sitting in that chair and had to make that choice,” but they might ask, “What am I responsible for?” The answer is that they are responsible for the good conduct of that trial.

Why is that important? Several hon. Members, including the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, who chairs the Committee, have made the point that it is hugely important that the co-operation we have with foreign Governments on intelligence remains something on which we can rely. In turn, it is vital that those Governments feel that intelligence that is passed to the UK will not be made public in court proceedings. I would go slightly further than the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife. I believe that the amount and quality of intelligence that we have received from the US since the Binyam Mohamed case has declined. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, that is a difficult case to prove, and I cannot within the confines of this debate give chapter and verse on it—certain issues of which I am aware cannot be discussed in public—but most well informed people who have made a judgment on the matter believe that co-operation between the US and the UK has declined.

That is important not from the point of view of the volume of information that we receive, but because incidents have been prevented on the basis of intelligence co-operation not only with the US, but with other close allies. The reputation of the UK could become such that foreign agencies and Governments feel they cannot share information with us because it will end up being broadcast all over the place in a court case. As has already been said, there is evidence that fishing trips are being made in the British courts to support cases elsewhere.

I am not necessarily saying that the Government have got it wrong. My point is that we need to think long and hard about how we will handle this, not because of any political matter that might attach itself to the problem, and not even because of day-to-day political relationships with other Governments, but because getting as much information as we can is in our national interest and the interests of the security of our people. I hope that will be addressed fully and sustainably as things develop and in legislation. It should be addressed in a way that does not leave the courts feeling that they can do what they like regardless.

As other hon. Members have said, it is an enormous privilege to be a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee—it is now six years since I was fortunate to be appointed to it. The Committee is sometimes criticised not for what we do, but for what we cannot say. We should be careful in how we deal with that. Hopefully, we are all big enough and experienced enough to know that we sometimes have to take a hit as a Committee and as individuals because some sections of the press and the media want to know what we know and we cannot tell them, but at the end of the day, being able properly to oversee the activities of the agencies and knowing why the public need to be protected overrides our concerns about any criticism we might get in the media.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

The Government have opted for legislation rather than for the order-making procedure, but by introducing new clause 13 the Minister demonstrates that the legislative approach is a principle that can be departed from in certain circumstances. The Committee found that an essential way to create a pragmatic response would be to apply the order-making procedure in all circumstances. So far, the Government’s response on the matter has been exiguous to say the least.

The first problem is that if we recalled Parliament for a statement and a debate, we would be doing something quite different from recalling Parliament in order to make primary legislation, remembering that that would have had to pass through not only this House but the other place. But there is a further point, and it seems even more significant as a matter of principle. How could one be assured that, in the course of a debate here about such primary legislation, nothing would take place that did not have the effect of prejudicing the right to a fair trial?

[James Brokenshire]

Parliament has shown itself capable in the past of conducting debates about sensitive issues and of being recalled quickly in exceptional circumstances. The current consideration of issues such as phone hacking illustrates how Parliament can consider and discuss very sensitive issues, and Parliament’s response to the riots over the summer also highlighted the fact that it is possible for the House to be recalled and to return at very short notice.

We return, however, to the principle that maintaining 14 days in primary legislation, rather than having a general order-making power, represents a clear expression of the very exceptional nature of the powers sought, gives Parliament the opportunity to debate the issues and, crucially, avoids 28 days becoming the maximum by default, as it appeared to be under the previous Government.

--- Later in debate ---

The power to dissolve Parliament and, for that matter, the power to hold the Queen’s Speech, is held by the Crown, by Government. It seems bizarre that in that exceptional moment, when the Government have more power than at any other time, we would give them the power to allow an extension to 28 days—corralled around in the various ways that the Minister provided for—but not in other circumstances, when Parliament can hold the Crown to account. The amendment relating to the power of Dissolution is ludicrously over-complicated. It certainly would not pass any “easy English” rule, given the number of sub-clauses and intricacies.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

What’s new?

Counter-terrorism Review

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. This is an extremely important matter and a great many right hon. and hon. Members understandably wish to question the Home Secretary about it. However, there is also important business to follow, and therefore considerable pressure on time. Brevity in questions and answers alike is therefore imperative, a fine example of which can now be provided by Sir Menzies Campbell.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

May I remind the Home Secretary that it was a Labour Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who put through emergency legislation in relation to terrorism in Northern Ireland in the course of one parliamentary day, demonstrating that, if there is consensus, a way can be found to legislate? May I also say to her that, in this finely balanced package—particularly in relation to control orders—she provides a welcome alternative to, and relief from, what often seemed to be the unbridled authoritarianism of the previous Government? Does she further understand that she strikes a particularly welcome note in continuing to pursue the possibility of intercept evidence, and in her emphasis on surveillance, investigation and prosecution?

[Mrs May]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his contribution. I am particularly grateful to him for pointing out, from his experience, that it is perfectly possible to pass legislation in one parliamentary day, as did a Labour Home Secretary. Of course, the crucial factor then was consensus across the House, and I hope that we shall be able to achieve that again, should it be necessary to bring forward the emergency legislation to which I referred in my statement.

My right hon. and learned Friend also reminds us that is has been important for the coalition Government to ensure that we rebalance the needs of our national security with our civil liberties. I was disappointed that the shadow Home Secretary made no attempt to apologise for the way in which the previous Labour Government infringed people’s civil liberties.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 6th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his observations. I reflect, as he does, on the importance of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, but I am also aware, obviously, of comments that have been made outside the House and inside this Chamber about the extradition treaty between the UK and the USA. That is why I think it entirely right for the coalition Government to have agreed that we will not only review that treaty but address the issue more widely and review the operation of European arrest warrants, about which hon. Members—particularly my right hon. and hon. Friends—have also expressed some concerns in this Chamber. I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the review, but, as I said, I will be making more details of the review available to the House shortly.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

Does the Home Secretary understand that, in addition to the lop-sided nature of the legislation, there is a further issue that prejudices British citizens, namely the willingness of American courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction and entertain prosecutions in circumstances where doing so would simply not be permitted in this country? Will that second issue also form part of her review?

[Mrs May]

Let me say to my right hon. and learned Friend that, as I have indicated, I am well aware of the range of concerns that exist in relation to the extradition treaty between the UK and the USA. That is why the coalition Government have agreed that we should have this review of the extradition treaty and take it more widely, looking at all our extradition arrangements to ensure that they operate effectively and in the interests of justice.