Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

It is helpful to know that. However, time is pressing, so I shall move on to amendment 76. The Minister spent a fair amount of time discussing the amendment and the issues that he considered arose from it. It would exempt all proceedings of the ISC from civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings¸ which would protect members of the Committee, staff of the Committee, and evidence held by the Committee. In that respect, it extends the protections that the Government inserted in the Bill in Committee, which have now been refined in their amendments 61 and 62.

Before I go into the details of the difference between amendment 76 and the Government amendments, I should establish why these protections are important. They are important because we want witnesses to be able to give full and frank evidence to the Committee, and we want the Committee to be able to receive evidence in confidence. It may be helpful to compare the provisions governing the ISC to the provisions governing Select Committees. Evidence given to Select Committees, whether written or oral, is subject to parliamentary privilege, which means that the evidence cannot be used in any court proceedings against the witness or anyone else.

This is a central tenet of our democracy and allows witnesses to give the frankest possible answers without fear of reprisals. Witnesses giving evidence to the ISC are likely to be particularly mindful of the legal obligations on them. Evidence is likely to be covered by the Official Secrets Act and, technically, an offence would be committed every time a witness exceeded the explicit permission they had been given, which could be frequent.

This may not be the only restriction on a witness’s ability to give evidence. Restrictions are likely to be contained within the witness’s employment contract and the civil service code. Such restrictions have the potential to pose two problems to the ISC. First, they could slow down or prohibit witnesses where there is no genuine need for them not to be able to divulge evidence but it is not clear they have the legal authority. Secondly, they could prevent the Committee from taking evidence from whistleblowers. In recognition of these difficulties, in Committee the Government tabled amendments introducing statutory protection for witnesses, exempting evidence they provided to the Committee from civil, disciplinary or criminal proceedings. Amendments 61 and 62 refine that. They maintain the complete exemption from civil or disciplinary proceedings, but limit the exemption in criminal proceedings to action taken against the witness.

The Opposition welcomed the introduction of these protections and accept the refinements made today, but it is important that the House realises that these protections fall far short of those enjoyed by Select Committees and leave many unanswered questions. It is also important to realise that because these are statutory protections and not privilege, it would be possible for the Government or an agency to obtain an injunction preventing a witness from appearing before the Committee.

As I have stated, parliamentary privilege covers all the proceedings of a Select Committee, and it is important to realise what that means in practice. It means the evidence presented to a Select Committee is covered by privilege. That is not any document submitted to the Committee, but documents accepted by the Committee as evidence. Privilege also covers all proceedings of the Committee, including advice given by the Clerks to members of the Committee and actions of members while serving on the Committee.

I highlight these areas because it is not at all clear to me what alternative protections are given to the ISC in such situations. I would like to ask the Minister about a hypothetical situation where the ISC receives classified information relating to serious wrongdoing on the part of an element of the security agencies. Let us say, for example, the ISC were anonymously to receive Secret Intelligence Service transcripts indicating an agent had committed torture. I am not saying this has ever happened; I just want the Minister to say what would happen if it were the case.

It is questionable whether the ISC would be able to act on the evidence it received. That would depend on the provisions in clause 2. These documents may be directly related to an investigation the ISC was already undertaking, but that is not the question I want to focus on here: I am asking whether the ISC is even in a position to accept these documents.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Would the effect of amendment 76 be that if, for example, the ISC uncovered evidence of collusion in torture, that evidence could not be used in a court case?

[Diana Johnson]

I have tabled this amendment because I am not satisfied that the provisions the Government have proposed so far offer the type of protection that this Committee needs. I heard what the Minister said, and his response seemed to be that the amendment was drafted too broadly. I do not have the back-up of learned counsel in drafting amendments, and I want the Minister to explain what kind of protections are available and what their effect would be in the circumstances I have described.

It is questionable whether the ISC would be able to act on evidence it received. I hope the Minister will address that point and explain the impact of the clause 2 provisions. The documents might relate to an ISC investigation, which might be relevant to whether it would be possible to put the documents forward and examine them.

ISC staff members will be signatories to the Official Secrets Act. It is my understanding that parliamentary Clerks would be protected as soon as the document was taken into evidence, but no such protection is available to the ISC Clerk. Is that correct? If a staff member who received documents decided to pass them on to the Chair of the ISC, will the Minister confirm that they would be doing that without lawful authority and would therefore be in breach of the Official Secrets Act?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I shall be brief. On amendment 73, in the light of the undertaking given by the Minister to my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) that the publication issues will be addressed in the memorandum of understanding, I am say on behalf of colleagues that we do not propose to press that amendment.

On the question of taking evidence on oath, I think I speak for colleagues on the Committee in saying that we are entirely happy with what the Government propose. On the use of the word “voluntary”, I can only re-emphasise what has been said by many other colleagues. The Minister endeavoured to explain to the House why this applies only to that part of our duties that relate to operational matters. All I can say to him and to the Government is that we will be spending an awful lot of our time trying to fend off critics who, wilfully or otherwise, choose to interpret the presence of the word “voluntarily” on the face of the Bill as implying that we do not have the ability to force the agencies to comply with our requests, when in most cases we do. There must be a simpler and less emotive term that can be used to express the same purpose, without leaving us open to such unjustified criticism.

On the question of privilege, I am still concerned, as are the Opposition, that sufficient measures have not been taken to empower the Committee and protect the Committee to anything like the same extent. For example, when the Committee discusses people’s possible involvement in serious criminal activity, could we end up in a situation in which some of our proceedings that involve statements —not from witnesses, but from Committee members—that in the ordinary course of events might be regarded as defamatory may result in court proceedings being taken against members in a way that would not be possible with members of a Select Committee in analogous circumstances? If we could end up in such a situation, the Government need to consider that problem very seriously indeed and do something about it at a later stage. I hope that the Minister will refer to that in his closing remarks.

On the question of pre-appointment hearings, I do not believe that the Committee has taken a corporate view as such, but one point must be made, and made strongly: this would add to the work load of the Committee’s staff. The Committee, as has been made crystal clear today, is already grotesquely understaffed by comparison with comparable committees and organisations in this country and in Europe. Therefore, were we to take on that further burden, we would definitely need better proposals for resourcing it than those that are currently ready.

The Opposition are quite right to resist amendment 71, because individual complaints against the agencies, such as that involving Binyam Mohamed, are not the responsibility of the ISC; they fall within the statutory remit of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is the correct body to deal with such matters.

Finally, on the question of the Osmotherly rules, I am glad that the matter will be dealt with one way or another. We would prefer it to be set out in the Bill, but otherwise in the memorandum of understanding, because the ISC frequently needs access to the papers of a previous Administration, for example, or has to deal with matters that are sub judice, and we cannot row backwards from that situation. Subject to those comments, we are very pleased with the progress the Bill has made thus far.

[Caroline Lucas]

Amendment 71 seeks to provide some form of recourse for people who have been defamed by the UK security services and to ensure that part of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit is to investigate such claims and, where necessary, ensure that they are corrected. I listened with interest to what the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said about this not necessarily being the right forum. I am happy to be advised on that, but right now it feels that there is no appropriate forum. The situation of Shaker Aamer, for example, which I will set out in more detail shortly, demonstrates that. If the hon. Gentleman can enlighten me on how we can make existing forums work more effectively, for example in this case, I would be very interested to hear what he has to say.

The ability of the security services effectively to say what they like about anyone, often resulting in serious consequences for the individual concerned, is at present largely unchecked. As John Cooper QC said in a legal opinion on precisely that issue, the security services are “presently allowed to literally say what they will to achieve their own ends, whether or not those ends are legal, democratic or in accordance with the rule of law. In addition to this, those who indulge in these activities are completely unaccountable to the citizen, to the Government, and even to a quasi-regulator or body charged with their oversight, such as the ISC. What is more, the victims of such defamation are likely to be the most vulnerable individuals, most likely detained under the most restrictive of circumstances. In essence, they are prisoners defamed by their controllers and captors. That is neither right, nor acceptable.”

I want to give a real-life example to help illustrate why I believe that this is so important. British resident Shaker Aamer, whose wife and children are British citizens and live in south London, has been held in Guantanamo for more than 11 years, despite having been cleared for release by both the Bush and Obama Administrations. The Foreign Secretary has raised the case with the US on several occasions, and the Foreign Office has made it clear that

“The government remains committed to securing Mr Aamer’s release and return to the UK.”

Given that the US has cleared him for release, a complicated process including multiple federal agencies, and the UK Government have made it clear that they want him to come home, one cannot help asking why Mr Aamer remains detained in Guantanamo, never having been charged or tried for any crimes. The conclusion that his US lawyer has reached is that Britain’s intelligence agencies have been defaming Mr Aamer to the US, passing on false information and accusing him of extremism, and that is what is holding up his release.

Mr Aamer is being deprived of his liberty on the basis of lies being told about him that he is unable to challenge. He has therefore begun defamation action against the security services—action that could be pushed into a secret court under part 2 of the Bill, leaving him once again unable to confront his accusers or to challenge the evidence used by the Government against him. I would argue that, at the very least, it is important that a duty be placed on the Intelligence and Security Committee fully to investigate such claims. That would not be a solution in itself, but it could provide some small measure of recourse for those such as Mr Aamer who find themselves in the gravest of positions as a result of information passed behind their back.

I will be very happy to hear if there are other ways of addressing this problem, but right now the advice that I am receiving from some of the legal people involved in the case is that they are not aware of any measure that would do so.

[Mr George Howarth]

Perhaps some of my right hon. Friends will explain to the hon. Lady the powers that exist to deal with such cases, and deal with them shortly, one hopes. Does she think it would be right for a Committee of Parliament to act in a quasi-judicial or even wholly judicial role, which would be the effect of her amendment?

[Caroline Lucas]

I am not convinced that the Committee would be acting in a quasi-judicial role; I would share the right hon. Gentleman’s reservations were that to be so. I am honestly searching for a solution to the problem, and perhaps this is not the right one. However, I want to put on record the real concern that exists about the situation that Shaker Aamer finds himself in. If nothing else, I hope that if this is not the right route to take, Government Members will direct me towards the appropriate measures, because this case has been going on for very many years.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I wish to be helpful to the hon. Lady, and I think that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is the body that she has in mind. All these tribunals, including those for communications issues and for complaints such as this one, are headed up by senior judges. I think she would find that they are a much more appropriate route. However, it is obviously very interesting to hear what she has to say about these worrying cases.

[Caroline Lucas]

In the interests of time, I will leave the matter there and pursue it via other avenues. I am grateful for the opportunity to have aired this really important case.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I am entirely sympathetic to what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has said about that case. However, a statutory avenue is already available under the Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which set up the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Further to the intervention by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a fellow member of the Committee, one might not be able to describe the proposed power that she wishes to provide as quasi-judicial, but it might possess a hybrid relationship in being both investigative and judicial, or in a position of seeking to create redress.

Apart from that, there is a fundamental statutory point. The hon. Lady’s proposed subsection (4A) refers to a situation in which

“a plausible claim has been made by or on behalf of an individual to the ISC that the Security Service…has disseminated any information to any recipient concerning any person that appears to be…materially false; and…harmful to the person defamed.”

The breadth of that goes far beyond even the jurisdiction of any court in the United Kingdom of which I am aware. Proposed subsection (4B) says that

“the ISC shall fully and expeditiously investigate the claim”—

so it does involve an investigative function—

“and, where the claim appears to be well founded, shall ensure that the misinformation is expeditiously corrected.”

But by what means? The ISC is not in a position to implement any such action. The amendment is not legally well-founded. In any event, as has been pointed out, its scope goes far beyond anything that the Committee’s staff and resources would permit. Moreover, there is no indication of how the powers would be exercised or how they could ever be implemented.

[James Brokenshire]

This has been a useful debate underlining the importance the House attaches to the scrutiny provided by the ISC and how it is being enhanced by the steps contemplated as a consequence of the Bill. The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), the Chairman of the Justice Committee, made the point about the scrutiny so far seen in the House and how we are seeking to strengthen it further.

I shall respond first to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and her amendment 71. As others have said, the essentially judicial function she seeks does not sit well within the ISC, which is intended to be a Committee of Parliament. It is not for the ISC to consider, much less determine, individual complaints about the intelligence services, especially given that there is already a body that can consider these matters and which we believe is well equipped to do so. Right hon. and hon. Members have highlighted the work of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which is the appropriate route through which complaints should be made.

The hon. Lady referred to the case of Shaker Aamer. I assure her that his case remains a high priority for the UK Government and we continue to make it clear to the US that we want him released and returned to the UK as a matter of priority. We continue to work with US counterparts to consider the implications for Mr Aamer’s case of the 2013 National Defence Authorisation Act. Discussions continue with senior officials within the US Administration. The Foreign Secretary raised Mr Aamer’s case numerous times with former Secretary of State Clinton and will continue to do so with Secretary of State Kerry. As the Foreign Secretary told Parliament last October, he and the Defence Secretary also made representations to the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta last June.

[Caroline Lucas]

I appreciate the Minister’s rehearsing the Government’s commitment to getting Shaker Aamer back from Guantanamo. I have no doubt about that, but does he understand what the obstacle is? The US says he can come back here and the UK Government say we want him back. What, then, is the obstacle? Does he have any idea?

[James Brokenshire]

I can only say that decisions about the release of Mr Aamer rest entirely with the US Government. I underline that the British Government remain committed to engaging with the US with the aim of securing Mr Aamer’s release and return to the UK as soon as possible. To conclude my remarks on the hon. Lady’s amendment, let me say that we believe there is an appropriate mechanism by which she or others can bring complaints to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

On amendment 74 and pre-appointment hearings, I do not wish to go back over the lengthy debate we had in Committee on this issue. I can only restate several points I made then: pre-appointment hearings are a relatively new phenomenon in the UK; the Cabinet Office has published guidance on the process to be followed for such hearings; and at the moment the list of posts subject to those hearings relates to public bodies, such as the chair of Ofcom or the Social Security Advisory Committee. The pre-appointment process has never been used for the appointment of civil servants. The heads of the intelligence and security agencies are permanent secretary-level civil servants, so the recruitment process is expected to follow the process for the appointment of civil servants of such seniority. We judge that this continues to be the appropriate mechanism.

On the Osmotherly rules, I made the point in Committee that the powers to withhold information from the ISC have been used sparingly and that we expect them to continue to be used only in exceptional circumstances. The Osmotherly rules set out categories of information, including information on officials’ personal views, as distinct from the views of Ministers, on policy options; information that could be supplied only after carrying out substantial research or at excessive cost; information about matters that are sub judice; and the papers of a previous Administration. The provisions in the Bill are necessary to safeguard the long-standing conventions that are reflected in the Osmotherly rules. We judge that the provisions, although they have been used only sparingly, remain appropriate.