Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

George Howarth Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Steve Baker]

Before I deal with amendments 8 to 14, which stand in the name of, among others, my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), I should explain that my hon. Friend has been unavoidably diverted by long-standing and immovable duties in relation to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. He sends his profuse apologies to the House.

I am acutely aware of what is at stake in relation to the Intelligence and Security Committee. In 2009 the Joint Committee on Human Rights published a report entitled “Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture”, which considered the ISC’s ability to work within a circle of secrecy and yet deliver credible scrutiny. It states:

“The missing element, which the ISC has failed to provide, is proper ministerial accountability to Parliament for the activities of the Security Services. In our view, this can be achieved without comprising individual operations if the political will exists to provide more detailed information to Parliament about the policy framework, expenditure and activities of the relevant agencies.”

The provisions in the Bill are therefore welcome on the whole, but amendments 8 to 14 would remedy a crucial deficiency in the struggle to provide that political will to answer to Parliament.

The amendments would have a very simple effect. They provide for the election of a Chair of the ISC from the House of Commons on the same basis as the election of Select Committee Chairs, apart from the fact that candidates would be required to obtain the formal consent of the Prime Minister in writing before standing. Ministers would be ineligible.

There are three reasons why reform of the ISC is needed. First, it tried, but failed, to get to the bottom of British involvement in rendition; its investigation of British complicity in extraordinary rendition was a test that it failed.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

As an ISC member of seven years’ standing, may I say that I take grave offence at what the hon. Gentleman has just said? We looked very thoroughly at the evidence on rendition, and arrived at suitable conclusions. I think that to make a blanket allegation of that kind without providing any evidence to back it up, which I hope he will now do, is unacceptable.

[Steve Baker]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention has slightly pre-empted a quotation that I was about to give. In a recent pamphlet, my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester wrote:

“The ISC found no evidence that the UK agencies were complicit in any extraordinary rendition operations and concluded that, during the critical period (from 2001 to 2003), the agencies had no knowledge of the possible consequences of US custody of detainees generally, or of Binyam Mohamed specifically.”

He went on to say:

“The opposite was the case. Successive court judgments have now made clear that the UK ‘facilitated’ the interrogation of Binyam Mohamed. Furthermore, High Court judgments in February and July 2009 concluded that crucial documents were not made available to the Committee by the Secret Intelligence Service, which led to the Committee’s Report on Rendition being inaccurate”.

I see the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) shaking his head, and I regret that he is offended, but the reality is that allegations have been made about the Committee’s performance, and made credibly, by my hon. Friend. What the amendments seek to do is not to haul the Committee over the coals, but to demonstrate that there is a strong, clear case for the Chair to be elected.

The ISC thought that it had reached the truth, but it had not. MI6 had been complicit in extraordinary rendition, and it was left to the courts to expose the truth.

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[Steve Baker]

Let me take both those points. I do not wish to cast any doubt on particular members, but we are in a position where the Committee’s success can be questioned and we need to deal with that on an institutional basis. Yes, the substance of the amendment would preclude a Member of the other House from being the Chairman of the Committee.

Amendments 8 and 9 provide for the election of the Chair from the House of Commons on the same basis as departmental Select Committee Chairs, with the exception that they would have to have the Prime Minister’s consent to their candidature. The amendments do not make provision for the election of members of the Committee. We think that together these amendments would lead to increased authority and credibility for the Chair, which is not to cast any aspersions on my right hon. and learned Friend. I feel sure that if he stood for election, I would be strongly inclined to vote for him. The point is to set up the institutions so that they are beyond reproach. Amendments 10 to 14 are consequential on amendments 8 and 9.

In conclusion, as I said, the problem is that terrorism and fear of terrorism have led Governments—for honourable reasons, I do not doubt—to erode principles that ordinarily we would regard as sacred principles of our systems of justice and liberty. I refer in particular to closed material procedures, but also to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which have been dealt with on other occasions. In that context, it is vital that the House, the wider public and non-governmental organisations are reassured that the security agencies are answerable to the House, albeit in secret, through a Chair who enjoys the authority conveyed on him by Members. That is why we have tabled the amendments, and I hope that the House will adopt them.

[Mr George Howarth]

I shall try to be brief because I know that a great deal of ground needs to be covered in these debates. The hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker) has served a useful purpose by ventilating the issue through the amendments. I do not want in any way to detract from that. First, however, he bases the argument on an event that he portrays inaccurately, and I will say a word about that in a moment. Secondly, in trying to make the role of the Chair subject to the will of the whole House, he fails to understand the nature of the composition of such a Committee and the responsibilities placed on it, and I will also say a few words about that.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) was the Chair of the Committee when we examined the issue of extraordinary rendition. The way that the hon. Gentleman portrayed what we did grossly misrepresented the process that we went through. First, as my right hon. Friend has just reminded me, there was a break at one point in our consideration of the Bill at the request of the then Government while further information was forthcoming.

Secondly, the hon. Gentleman implied that vital information had not been put before us. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen said in an intervention, the information that we did not have at the time did not change our conclusions at all. We subsequently got that information and, in further annual reports, we pointed out that there was a problem with retrieval of the information that the agencies held. It was never a deliberate attempt on their part to mislead us and the information concerned did not materially affect the conclusions that we drew. So the example that the hon. Gentleman uses to justify his case is, frankly, wrong.

[Steve Baker]

Does the right hon. Gentleman not accept the substance of the court judgments made around the Binyam Mohamed case?

[Mr Howarth]

There is a whole separate debate to be had about that. The hon. Gentleman rightly referred earlier to part 2 of the Bill, which deals with closed material proceedings. There are a number of problems with the Binyam Mohamed case, the main one of which concerned the doctrine known as the control principle. That creates serious problems for our relationships with partner agencies, particularly the United States, but if I were to go too far down that road, Mr Deputy Speaker would pull me up because we have already dealt with amendments to part 2. The process of considering the issues by the Intelligence and Security Committee is not as the hon. Gentleman portrayed it.

On my second point, I shall be brief because in his intervention the Chair of the Committee cleared that up. We have gone a very long way to making the ISC more like a Select Committee, but it never can be identical to a Select Committee, as I think the hon. Gentleman acknowledged, because of the nature of the material that we have to deal with. As a member of the Committee, I am content that the appropriate person to have the final say and to have the recommending powers on who is an appropriate person to chair that Committee should be the Prime Minister of the day—not that I do not trust the House of Commons. As a long-standing Member of the House, I have every confidence in it, but in this one exceptional circumstance I do not think that that is the appropriate way to do it. Although in democratic terms the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is well intentioned, I do not think it is appropriate.

[Steve Baker]

rose—

[Mr Howarth]

I will give way, then I intend to conclude.

[Steve Baker]

Why does the right hon. Gentleman consider it inappropriate to give the Prime Minister of the day the opportunity to approve—or reject—the candidacy of particular Members and then allow them to go forward, with the benefit of that approval, to be elected by the whole House so that they can enjoy the authority of the whole House? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), who is no longer in his place, advanced the argument that the Prime Minister would be in an invidious position, but that does not seem to be what the right hon. Gentleman is concerned about. Why should we not have prime ministerial approval and then an election?

[Mr Howarth]

Because, as I have already said and as the hon. Gentleman acknowledges, the ISC is a different kind of Committee. The people concerned are handling different information—information that they cannot share—and there are occasions when there is an ongoing operation, things are moving at a fast pace, it is impossible to convene a meeting of the full Committee, and the Prime Minister, the heads of agencies and the Foreign Secretary—whoever is relevant—have to be able to talk to somebody. On some occasions the Chair has been the person they speak with, which is entirely appropriate, but in order for them to be able to do so the Chair must have the confidence of senior Ministers and the heads of the agencies. I think that is an important principle. Otherwise, they will feel inhibited about sharing vital information, which often has to be provided at very short notice, with the Chair at least.

[Mr Carswell]

Is not it precisely because the Committee’s work is so vital—in some senses it is more important than almost any other Committee, because it relates to fundamental issues of statecraft and national security—that there should be at least some modicum of democratic accountability, albeit under the system of de facto licence, as identified by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker)? It is precisely because that work is so vital that it should not be left to the grandee system to ensure that the people who are meant to be overseeing what happens are awake and alert to the job.

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention seems to be predicated on the view that the Committee is entirely unaccountable, but that is not the case. We produce an annual report and other reports during the course of the year, and they are debated in both this House and the other place, along with other matters we have dealt with over the year. Therefore, to that extent there is accountability. In that sense the way the Committee operates is already similar to the way Select Committees operate, and it will become more so as a result of the Bill.

However, I still think that whoever chairs the Committee has a special role and that an appropriate veto over an individual’s promotion to it has to be in the hands of the Prime Minister of the day. I have no reason to believe that the current Prime Minister, who is not a member of my party, would not perform that role properly. I also believe that no Prime Minister would promote the candidacy of someone they did not think would have the confidence of the whole House, not just that of the Committee. In that context, I think that the accountability is already there. It might be a little bit opaque in some respects, and in others it might be indirect, but it is there and it is appropriate.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I would like to confine my remarks to an elaboration of a point that was made very effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who sadly is not in his place at the moment. There seems to be a conflation of two separate concepts: whether the election of the Chair directly will aid the Committee’s credibility; and whether it will aid the efficacy of its performance. For the life of me, I cannot see how the method for electing the Chair would make any difference whatsoever if, for example, the Committee was carrying out an investigation and one or other of the security agencies chose not to supply it with certain information that ought to be supplied. I would have thought that the best insurance for an agency supplying the information that should be supplied is the consequences of what would happen if it did not do so and the omission came to public attention, as it inevitably would.

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[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

Let it be stated from the beginning—this should be made absolutely clear—that this is not about the integrity of any member, past or present, of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am certain that the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker), who moved the amendment, is under no illusions, because it would be defeated in a vote. I hope there will be a vote, but am not sure that there will be.

I think that this has been a useful debate, however brief, because we rarely have the opportunity to debate how ISC members are appointed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) has reminded us that until about 25 years ago there were no statutory regulations on the security agencies. I remember clearly my attempts to have debates on M15 and so on in the 1980s, but they were not welcomed, to say the least. In so far as M15 and M16 are accountable to Parliament, I thought it only right and proper that we should have the opportunity now and again to discuss their role.

As I stated many years ago, let me make it clear—in case anyone thinks otherwise—that I am not against the security agencies. Even when there was no acute terrorist threat such as that which we face now, I made the point time and again that every democracy has a right to protect itself and should have some sort of agency against those who want to do harm to it.

What we are discussing today is not, as I have said, a matter of integrity, but whether the House should have an opportunity to elect those who serve on the ISC. I see no reason why we should not do that. I do not like the view that has been expressed, more or less, that the security agencies could veto people whom they do not particularly like.

[Mr George Howarth]

I do not think that anybody is advancing the argument that the heads of agencies or the agencies themselves should have a veto. It is merely that they should be able to feel confident in the person who chairs the Committee. The difference is subtle, but they are two different things.

[Mr Winnick]

When the agencies were put on a statutory basis, however, and appointments duly made, it was argued that if certain people were made members the security agencies would not supply the information requested because they would not have confidence in them. I do not believe that it is possible to divide the House into those Members who can be relied on in that manner and those who cannot. There should be no such division. Are any of us who have the honour to be elected Members of this House fellow travellers of terrorist organisations or willing to betray the trust of our country? I do not accept that Members can be divided accordingly.

If the Chair of the ISC and its members were elected by the whole House—that is not going to happen at this stage, unfortunately—they would have more authority and more credibility. That does not mean that, had the Committee been elected in the past, it would have come to different conclusions. That is not what I am saying; what I am saying is that, instead of appointments, there should be elections, as is the case with Select Committees.

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[Mr George Howarth]

My hon. Friend is making a very good case, so I hesitate to interrupt her further. Does she accept that there is a world of difference between the Prime Minister saying, “I think this is a suitable person to be the Chair of the Committee” before Parliament endorses them, and Parliament electing somebody and the Prime Minister then having to say, “I don’t think this is a suitable person”? Those two positions are entirely different. She is right about that.

[Diana Johnson]

My right hon. Friend makes that point very clearly. I will return to my argument, because I am conscious that other Members wish to speak about later proposals.

The Opposition are of course sympathetic to attempts to widen accountability and open the ISC as much as possible. In Committee, we supported a number of amendments to do just that. We tabled amendments so that we could consider whether an Opposition Member should always chair the Committee, as with the Public Accounts Committee, and whether there should be a majority of MPs—elected representatives—on the ISC.

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[Diana Johnson]

My right hon. Friend raises an important point to which I hope the Minister will respond. Parliament is trying to reduce its costs by 25% over the course of this Parliament. I wonder whether the money that is being transferred to Parliament will be ring-fenced for the work of the ISC and whether it will be expected to make any savings out of that budget.

Will the Minister also deal with the issue of the staff who will be transferred to support the new Committee? Am I right to assume that TUPE will apply? What discussions has he had with the Clerk of the House about this matter? Has he written to the Clerk of the House formally requesting that he starts to make preparations for such an undertaking?

On the accommodation for the Committee, there are clearly security issues that need to be considered. Does the Minister have any further information about where he envisages the Committee being accommodated? Will any separate secure accommodation have to be provided?

Finally, amendment (a) to amendment 58 would provide for the payment of members of the ISC. It follows on from other amendments that the Opposition have tabled to try to strengthen the role of the ISC within Parliament. The role of chairing the ISC will be every bit as important and time-consuming as chairing any other parliamentary Committee. We therefore feel that it should be recognised in the same way.

At present, the ISC is a statutory body funded by the Cabinet Office. When the responsibility for funding the ISC transfers to Parliament, the responsibility for any payment to the Chair will also be a matter for Parliament. Given what I have said about the procedures of the House, I appreciate that that will probably have to be dealt with through Standing Orders rather than statute. In that case, I will be happy not to press amendment (a). I am sure that the Minister will be able to explain the funding situation.

I will just explain why amendment (a) refers to all members of the Committee and not to the Chair. Again, the Minister might be able to help me on this point if there has been any progress. The amendment covers Members of the House of Lords as well because, unlike Members of the House of Commons, they do not get a flat salary, but receive an attendance allowance. As I understand it, they do not receive that allowance for attending the ISC on days when the Lords is not sitting.

[Mr George Howarth]

I am sure that the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but my understanding is that that problem for Members of the House of Lords sitting on the Committee has been resolved within the procedures of the House of Lords.

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful if that is the case. If the Minister could explain that, it would be helpful.

Amendment (a) was also drafted to include all members of the Committee in case it is felt appropriate in the future to make payments to members of Select Committees alongside the payments that are made to Chairs.

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[James Brokenshire]

As the right hon. Lady says, the Committee already receives information on ongoing operational matters, and that would fall short of the requirements in the first two limbs that I have described. She will have seen the Government’s amendment that seeks to reflect the existing work that takes place and the information that is provided. As always with legislation, this is a question of the wording and the way in which matters are interpreted by lawyers, as well as by Members of Parliament. The provision is in no way intended to cut across the Committee’s existing work or the existing flow of information when a request for further clarification has been made. It is intended to provide a distinction between the first two limbs, which will contain an element of further requirement, and the third limb, in which information will be provided because it has been requested rather than required, and in which further investigations will be limited to using the information that has been so provided.

[Mr George Howarth]

I am following the Minister’s argument closely. It would be helpful if he told us how he envisages a situation being resolved where an agency decides voluntarily not to provide information that the Committee feels is important. There might be a mechanism for doing that but, off the top of my head, I am not sure what it is.

[James Brokenshire]

This relates to operational matters and inquiries by the Committee. We have had discussions about the exploration of operational matters—this is a new aspect of the Committee’s work, as the right hon. Gentleman will acknowledge—and about how to frame that. Detailed consideration has been given to the specific matters that an inquiry may cover, and that is supplemented by the memorandum of understanding in respect of the first two limbs. Clause 2(3)(c) is intended to cover the ordinary information that is being provided. I think it was accepted in Committee that that paragraph dealt with the concerns of the ISC about ordinary matters that would be provided in that course. It states that

“the ISC’s consideration of the matter is limited to the consideration of information provided voluntarily to the ISC by”

the agencies, following those kinds of inquiries. These are issues that have customarily been dealt with by the Committee in its ordinary course. A relationship is established between the Committee and the agencies, and information is provided in that ordinary course, and we have sought to reflect the current practice.

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[Mr George Howarth]

Perhaps some of my right hon. Friends will explain to the hon. Lady the powers that exist to deal with such cases, and deal with them shortly, one hopes. Does she think it would be right for a Committee of Parliament to act in a quasi-judicial or even wholly judicial role, which would be the effect of her amendment?

[Caroline Lucas]

I am not convinced that the Committee would be acting in a quasi-judicial role; I would share the right hon. Gentleman’s reservations were that to be so. I am honestly searching for a solution to the problem, and perhaps this is not the right one. However, I want to put on record the real concern that exists about the situation that Shaker Aamer finds himself in. If nothing else, I hope that if this is not the right route to take, Government Members will direct me towards the appropriate measures, because this case has been going on for very many years.

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[Mr George Howarth]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who brought his customary forensic skills to bear in his description of what has happened in relation to the Bill. I entirely accept his point about the resources that we will need to do the job properly.

I have been a member of the Committee since 2005. When we have had the opportunity to discuss oversight with parliamentarians from other parts of the world, they have always expressed envy for our system. I think that our system is now even more enviable. I am proud to be a member of the Committee and think that the changes will result in our being able, resources permitting, to do a better job than we have done so far.

On part 2, as the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) said in a customarily elegant and well-judged speech, in the best of worlds nobody would want to support closed material proceedings. He explained very well the particular circumstances in which many of us think they are necessary. I have been struck in particular by how the views of people such as David Anderson QC have changed. He started out by saying that they were not acceptable and that there was no place for them in our legal system. He then had the opportunity to inspect the files of the cases pending and, as a result, he ended up with the same conclusion—in fact, it was almost identical—as the right hon. and learned Gentleman, namely that there is no ideal solution, so we have to make a choice between bad and worse, which is, in effect, what we have done.

I echo what the hon. Member for New Forest East has said. I have sat through much of the debate on this Bill, although some of us were not allowed on the Bill Committee, so I did not have the opportunity to debate it there. Much of the tone and rhetoric of the debate on the Floor of the House on Report and Third Reading would have been entirely appropriate if we had been discussing criminal proceedings, but we are talking about civil proceedings. The problem that we have to come to terms with is that, because the Government are unable to defend themselves in civil proceedings—some of those involved may be of good character, while others may be of doubtful character—they end up spending millions of pounds in compensation that might not be paid in other cases, but certainly would in others.

In conclusion, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) on the Front Bench talked earlier about his amendment—which I and other right hon. Friends opposed on Monday evening—to, in effect, adopt the Wiley test for fair and open proceedings. He has failed to convince me repeatedly about such a test when the alternative is closed material proceedings. That makes no sense to me whatsoever. The real alternative, as the Minister without Portfolio said in his opening speech, is public interest immunity orders, which would mean that nothing got in front of a court or a judge. That is the choice. This is a better Bill than it was when it came from the other place. If there is no Division, I will support the Bill through my non-vote.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—