Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brady]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a valuable point. We are engaged in a process here. There has been a considerable amount of reform. The hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) alluded to the history: 25 years ago there was no oversight, then we got an oversight Committee and now we have a proposal to allow a parliamentary veto of its membership. Like him, I find it hard to believe that this is the last stage in that journey, and I suspect that 25 years from now we might have different arrangements in the other place and be looking at a completely different constitutional arrangement, which Joint Committees will have to reflect.

For me—I cannot speak for the other members of the then Committee on Reform of the House of Commons—the fundamental point is not about the ISC, which I suspect would have much the same membership, would behave in much the same way and, like now, would have a high status and be held in high regard by the House. Fundamentally, this is an argument about the House of Commons and whether we have the self-confidence to believe that we should be taken seriously as a Parliament and a representative Chamber and whether we are prepared to take on this enormous responsibility. Just as the election of Select Committee Chairmen and members has enhanced the House, I believe that eventually this next step will also enhance it. It will prove us capable of making that responsible judgment and ensuring we have a Committee overseeing these vital and sensitive matters that is chosen democratically, but which is capable of enjoying the respect of the Government, the security services and the whole country. That could be done in a slightly more open and democratic way.

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

I plan to speak to amendments 8 to 14, which deal with the election of the ISC Chairman, and then Government amendment 58, which deals with the broad proposals for the financing and resources required by the ISC. After that, I shall speak to amendment 58(a), which stands in my name and that of my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary and would make provision for payment to members of the ISC.

It has been helpful having this debate and hearing the experiences of past and serving members of the ISC and other hon. Members who have taken an interest in the area for many years. It was important to hear the historical context and the explanation of why we are in this position. My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) explained that when the ISC was set up in 1994 it represented a huge change in the relationship between Parliament and the security services and that we have been on a journey ever since—this is part of that journey. It was also interesting to hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) said about the fight to get the ISC set up. It is important that we understand the history and why we are in this position, but we must also recognise the important work that the ISC does, and I pay tribute to all its members, who put an enormous amount of time and effort into their roles. It is vital that the public have confidence in the security services, and that demands confidence in their oversight.

In our debates in the other place and here in Committee, there were extensive exchanges between the Government and the Opposition about how to strengthen the role of the ISC. Since inception, the ISC has been composed of Members of Parliament, yet because of its unique nature, it has often been portrayed more like a component of the Executive, not least because its secretariat is provided by the Cabinet Office. The Government have now finally decided, however, formally to constitute the ISC as a Committee of Parliament. Changing its name to the “Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament” emphasises not only that the ISC is composed of parliamentarians, but that they are doing the work of Parliament while serving on the ISC.

In Committee, we debated whether to move to a full Select Committee status for the ISC, and there was lengthy debate about what it would mean and how it would operate. I think there was clear recognition from both sides of the House that the special nature of the role of the ISC and the sensitive and secret information it routinely dealt with made its constitution worthy of separate and special consideration. Many parliamentarians are calling for reform to be hastened. I would like to set out the Opposition’s view. My right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary has called for the ISC to become a Select Committee. We recognise that, were that to happen and because of the special nature of its work, we would have to consider the most appropriate way of appointing a Chair.

We think that amendment 8 gets the matter the wrong way around: it would deal with the election or appointment of the Chair, whereas we need to deal first with the fundamental issue about the status of the Committee. The Bill provides for a Committee of Parliament, with the rules for its operation and procedure laid down in statute. Hon. Members will know that Select Committees are not created by statute, but formed by a resolution of the House and governed through Standing Orders. I recently reread the chapter in the book by the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) about the ISC and what reforms were needed. Of course, he referenced the Wright Committee recommendations about the ISC’s becoming a Select Committee and having an elected Chair, just like other Select Committees.

The problem is, however, that in the Bill the Government are establishing the ISC as a Committee of Parliament, not a Select Committee. We are, then, in a very different place from the established Select Committee structures. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker), but amendment 8 would give the ISC the partial look of a Select Committee, when it actually is not a Select Committee. I also note that setting out in a Bill how the Commons should elect a Chair is problematical, because the House is governed by Standing Orders. Will the Minister say whether it is in order to put in a Bill a mechanism for how the House should operate?

My second problem with the amendment, which has been touched on by right hon. and hon. Members, is that it would require the Prime Minister to give written consent to any Member wishing to stand as Chair. As has been recognised, that does not happen with any other candidate for a Select Committee position, although it goes some way to recognising the special nature of the Committee. It would present lots of problems, however, as it would mean that the Prime Minister could decide not to endorse a candidate—an elected MP—as not suitable for a role, which would put the Prime Minister in a difficult position. I am not sure it is one we want to move to.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

Let us imagine that, say, half a dozen people wanted to apply. Has the hon. Lady considered what would happen if the Prime Minister took the view that only one of them was suitable? What would happen to the element of choice lying behind the views expressed today?

[Diana Johnson]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman highlights yet another problem with supporting amendment 9 at this stage. He is right that it would take away the element of choice if only one candidate was endorsed.

[Steve Baker]

That is one of the more ingenious arguments for not having an election. It seems to me more than likely that the vast majority of Members of this House would meet the Prime Minister’s basic requirements for being suitable to keep state secrets. I cannot accept that argument. It seems to be an ingenious way of saying that democracy is not appropriate.

[Diana Johnson]

Nobody is saying that democracy is not appropriate. We are just highlighting some of the issues with the amendments that have been tabled.

The basic problem that the Opposition have with the hon. Gentleman’s amendments is that they put the cart before the horse. The first issue that needs to be addressed is the status of the Committee. We should then decide how to elect or appoint a Chair to that Committee.

[Mr George Howarth]

My hon. Friend is making a very good case, so I hesitate to interrupt her further. Does she accept that there is a world of difference between the Prime Minister saying, “I think this is a suitable person to be the Chair of the Committee” before Parliament endorses them, and Parliament electing somebody and the Prime Minister then having to say, “I don’t think this is a suitable person”? Those two positions are entirely different. She is right about that.

[Diana Johnson]

My right hon. Friend makes that point very clearly. I will return to my argument, because I am conscious that other Members wish to speak about later proposals.

The Opposition are of course sympathetic to attempts to widen accountability and open the ISC as much as possible. In Committee, we supported a number of amendments to do just that. We tabled amendments so that we could consider whether an Opposition Member should always chair the Committee, as with the Public Accounts Committee, and whether there should be a majority of MPs—elected representatives—on the ISC.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I have some experience of that point. I was Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee for nine years. The Chair of that Committee is the sole auditor of the accounts of the security services, so he sees in great detail all the accounts of the security services. He is not vetted by anybody, including the Prime Minister. He is elected by all Members of the House. Nobody has ever suggested that an elected or appointed Chair of the Public Accounts Committee is a threat to national security, so this is a fuss about nothing.

[Diana Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman speaks with great experience as the former Chair of the Public Accounts Committee. However, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee deals with far more than just the finances of the security agencies, so it is not quite the same.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

On that point, the hon. Lady’s response is correct. The people who advise the Intelligence and Security Committee on the finances of the security and intelligence services leave the meetings when other matters—namely, classified information—are under discussion.

[Diana Johnson]

That information is very helpful.

I have explained why the Opposition will not support amendment 8. Government amendment 58 relates to the money, staff, accommodation and other resources that will be made available to Parliament for the new Committee. I wonder whether the Minister can help me, because I am slightly confused about the intention of the Government with respect to the support that will be provided to the ISC. In his response, will he set out how he expects the secretariat to the ISC to be provided? In Committee, we discussed a proposal suggested by the membership of the ISC for a non-departmental public body to be established to provide secretarial support. That does not appear to be what the Government are doing. Will he therefore explain what will happen?

[Hazel Blears]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is consensus across the House that the Bill will strengthen the scrutiny of our secret intelligence services and that that is welcomed by everyone? In Committee, the Opposition were forceful in saying that if we are to have increased scrutiny, we need the necessary resources to do the job. The Opposition talked about a figure of £2 million. The Government’s impact assessment has a figure of £1.3 million. There is no agreement on resourcing, and without resourcing, it will be impossible to do the job that the Government want us to do.

[Diana Johnson]

My right hon. Friend raises an important point to which I hope the Minister will respond. Parliament is trying to reduce its costs by 25% over the course of this Parliament. I wonder whether the money that is being transferred to Parliament will be ring-fenced for the work of the ISC and whether it will be expected to make any savings out of that budget.

Will the Minister also deal with the issue of the staff who will be transferred to support the new Committee? Am I right to assume that TUPE will apply? What discussions has he had with the Clerk of the House about this matter? Has he written to the Clerk of the House formally requesting that he starts to make preparations for such an undertaking?

On the accommodation for the Committee, there are clearly security issues that need to be considered. Does the Minister have any further information about where he envisages the Committee being accommodated? Will any separate secure accommodation have to be provided?

Finally, amendment (a) to amendment 58 would provide for the payment of members of the ISC. It follows on from other amendments that the Opposition have tabled to try to strengthen the role of the ISC within Parliament. The role of chairing the ISC will be every bit as important and time-consuming as chairing any other parliamentary Committee. We therefore feel that it should be recognised in the same way.

At present, the ISC is a statutory body funded by the Cabinet Office. When the responsibility for funding the ISC transfers to Parliament, the responsibility for any payment to the Chair will also be a matter for Parliament. Given what I have said about the procedures of the House, I appreciate that that will probably have to be dealt with through Standing Orders rather than statute. In that case, I will be happy not to press amendment (a). I am sure that the Minister will be able to explain the funding situation.

I will just explain why amendment (a) refers to all members of the Committee and not to the Chair. Again, the Minister might be able to help me on this point if there has been any progress. The amendment covers Members of the House of Lords as well because, unlike Members of the House of Commons, they do not get a flat salary, but receive an attendance allowance. As I understand it, they do not receive that allowance for attending the ISC on days when the Lords is not sitting.

[Mr George Howarth]

I am sure that the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but my understanding is that that problem for Members of the House of Lords sitting on the Committee has been resolved within the procedures of the House of Lords.

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful if that is the case. If the Minister could explain that, it would be helpful.

Amendment (a) was also drafted to include all members of the Committee in case it is felt appropriate in the future to make payments to members of Select Committees alongside the payments that are made to Chairs.

[Minister without Portfolio (Mr Kenneth Clarke)]

Before dealing with Government amendment 58, which provides the Government with the necessary powers to make a financial contribution to the Committee, I will add a few words to the interesting and lively debate that we have had on the election of the Chair. I will not repeat every argument. My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker) put the case robustly and had some pretty strong support. However, every member of the ISC who is here has responded and he has had to take on some of the more formidable Members on both sides of the House. He is also facing the opposition of all three of the major parties.

I assure him that this is not an establishment stitch-up—quite the reverse. Perhaps the best way of illustrating that is by putting everything in the context of what we are trying to do in this part of the Bill. We are making a remarkable advance in strengthening the powers of this Committee to hold our security and intelligence services to account. For 20 years the Committee has steadily contributed on that front, and we are marching forward considerably in the Bill. This part of it is just as important as the part we debated on Monday, as we are stepping towards making our security services more accountable to Parliament. We are enabling judges, in exceptional cases, to take all the evidence into account and make an adjudication when allegations are made by individuals; and we are committing to holding judicial inquiries when worrying circumstances occur—subject, of course, to those inquiries being able to get under way once police investigations have been properly completed.

These amendments are important, and they are being proposed in the context of a situation where all parties agree that they want this Committee to be a parliamentary Committee and no longer a creature of the Government. We therefore wish to give it more resources and the structure that enables it to do an even better job. The only thing that distinguishes the Committee from a Joint Committee or Select Committee of this House is this problem of the extremely sensitive nature of some of the information that it sees. Only where it is unavoidable are we departing from the normal process of allowing the House of Commons to have a powerful Committee of its own choosing and to exhort it to do its job and report back properly on what is and is not happening in this area.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

I hear the clear statements, but I have sought to respond in an equally clear fashion on why we judge that the need for that word still remains. Right hon. and hon. Members have argued loudly and clearly across the House in what I believe has been a good public demonstration of the clear and robust challenge that the ISC provides to Ministers and to members of the security agencies. I welcome the exchange we have had to underline the clear and focused challenge that will no doubt be given and enhanced as a result of the provisions.

I note that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has tabled amendment 71. Rather than delay her presentation further, I will if I may respond to the points she raises in my summing up, although I have already taken up a great deal of the House’s time. With those comments, I support Government amendment 56.

[Diana Johnson]

I want to discuss amendment 75, which deals with the Osmotherly rules, amendment 76, which deals with the protection of ISC proceedings, and amendment 74, which deals with pre-appointment hearings.

Amendment 75, tabled by me and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), would remove the Government’s ability to refuse to disclose information to the ISC when it is information “not proper” to be disclosed to a Select Committee under the Osmotherly rules. The Bill currently allows a Minister to withhold information if

“it is information of such a nature that, if the Secretary of State were requested to produce it before a Departmental Select Committee of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State would consider (on grounds which were not limited to national security) it proper not to do so.”

What Ministers are able to disclose to Select Committees is governed by those famous Osmotherly rules, which we discussed in Committee. There are three reasons for withholding information: disproportionate cost, the fact that the information is sub judice, and the fact that it relates to a previous Administration. Our amendment would rule out the use of the Osmotherly rules altogether, although we would be happy for an agreement on cost to be included in the memorandum of understanding, which would achieve the same result.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

The so-called Osmotherly rules were devised by the Executive but were never accepted in any form by Parliament, and were not considered by Parliament’s Committees to have any binding force.

[Diana Johnson]

That is an interesting point, but because of the way in which the Bill is drafted and because of the references that have been made to the use of the Osmotherly rules, we think that there is a case for excluding them completely from the Minister’s decision making.

We do not think that sub judice information should be excluded from the ISC’s hearings, because that might may prevent it from seeing particularly important information. As significant procedures exist to ensure that information will be protected, we should not worry about the ISC seeing the information if it would assist it. We also feel that the ISC should have access to information held by previous Administrations, for two main reasons. First, the matters that the ISC investigates are rarely politically sensitive, although they will be sensitive in other ways. Secondly, the ISC will often be able to investigate an issue only after a change of Administration. Its role is usually retrospective, which means that there will often be a long delay before it can begin an investigation.

[Sir Alan Beith]

The ISC has, on occasion, sought permission from Ministers in a previous Administration to obtain access to material, and indeed has been given it, only to find that current Ministers decline to give permission on other grounds.

[Diana Johnson]

It is helpful to know that. However, time is pressing, so I shall move on to amendment 76. The Minister spent a fair amount of time discussing the amendment and the issues that he considered arose from it. It would exempt all proceedings of the ISC from civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings¸ which would protect members of the Committee, staff of the Committee, and evidence held by the Committee. In that respect, it extends the protections that the Government inserted in the Bill in Committee, which have now been refined in their amendments 61 and 62.

Before I go into the details of the difference between amendment 76 and the Government amendments, I should establish why these protections are important. They are important because we want witnesses to be able to give full and frank evidence to the Committee, and we want the Committee to be able to receive evidence in confidence. It may be helpful to compare the provisions governing the ISC to the provisions governing Select Committees. Evidence given to Select Committees, whether written or oral, is subject to parliamentary privilege, which means that the evidence cannot be used in any court proceedings against the witness or anyone else.

This is a central tenet of our democracy and allows witnesses to give the frankest possible answers without fear of reprisals. Witnesses giving evidence to the ISC are likely to be particularly mindful of the legal obligations on them. Evidence is likely to be covered by the Official Secrets Act and, technically, an offence would be committed every time a witness exceeded the explicit permission they had been given, which could be frequent.

This may not be the only restriction on a witness’s ability to give evidence. Restrictions are likely to be contained within the witness’s employment contract and the civil service code. Such restrictions have the potential to pose two problems to the ISC. First, they could slow down or prohibit witnesses where there is no genuine need for them not to be able to divulge evidence but it is not clear they have the legal authority. Secondly, they could prevent the Committee from taking evidence from whistleblowers. In recognition of these difficulties, in Committee the Government tabled amendments introducing statutory protection for witnesses, exempting evidence they provided to the Committee from civil, disciplinary or criminal proceedings. Amendments 61 and 62 refine that. They maintain the complete exemption from civil or disciplinary proceedings, but limit the exemption in criminal proceedings to action taken against the witness.

The Opposition welcomed the introduction of these protections and accept the refinements made today, but it is important that the House realises that these protections fall far short of those enjoyed by Select Committees and leave many unanswered questions. It is also important to realise that because these are statutory protections and not privilege, it would be possible for the Government or an agency to obtain an injunction preventing a witness from appearing before the Committee.

As I have stated, parliamentary privilege covers all the proceedings of a Select Committee, and it is important to realise what that means in practice. It means the evidence presented to a Select Committee is covered by privilege. That is not any document submitted to the Committee, but documents accepted by the Committee as evidence. Privilege also covers all proceedings of the Committee, including advice given by the Clerks to members of the Committee and actions of members while serving on the Committee.

I highlight these areas because it is not at all clear to me what alternative protections are given to the ISC in such situations. I would like to ask the Minister about a hypothetical situation where the ISC receives classified information relating to serious wrongdoing on the part of an element of the security agencies. Let us say, for example, the ISC were anonymously to receive Secret Intelligence Service transcripts indicating an agent had committed torture. I am not saying this has ever happened; I just want the Minister to say what would happen if it were the case.

It is questionable whether the ISC would be able to act on the evidence it received. That would depend on the provisions in clause 2. These documents may be directly related to an investigation the ISC was already undertaking, but that is not the question I want to focus on here: I am asking whether the ISC is even in a position to accept these documents.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Would the effect of amendment 76 be that if, for example, the ISC uncovered evidence of collusion in torture, that evidence could not be used in a court case?

[Diana Johnson]

I have tabled this amendment because I am not satisfied that the provisions the Government have proposed so far offer the type of protection that this Committee needs. I heard what the Minister said, and his response seemed to be that the amendment was drafted too broadly. I do not have the back-up of learned counsel in drafting amendments, and I want the Minister to explain what kind of protections are available and what their effect would be in the circumstances I have described.

It is questionable whether the ISC would be able to act on evidence it received. I hope the Minister will address that point and explain the impact of the clause 2 provisions. The documents might relate to an ISC investigation, which might be relevant to whether it would be possible to put the documents forward and examine them.

ISC staff members will be signatories to the Official Secrets Act. It is my understanding that parliamentary Clerks would be protected as soon as the document was taken into evidence, but no such protection is available to the ISC Clerk. Is that correct? If a staff member who received documents decided to pass them on to the Chair of the ISC, will the Minister confirm that they would be doing that without lawful authority and would therefore be in breach of the Official Secrets Act?