I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) for introducing his Committee’s report with his usual eloquence. I thank him and all the ISC’s members, a good number of whom are in the Chamber today, for the work they do throughout the year in overseeing our security and intelligence agencies. They play a very important role. Obviously, I will come on to the proposals to enhance the Committee’s role but, first, I would like to say that it plays an important and largely unseen role in overseeing the agencies. We are grateful to it for that. The quality of the Committee’s annual report underlines the unique and valuable role that it plays in the parliamentary oversight of the security and intelligence agencies.
We continue to face a number of serious threats to our national security. As the Committee’s report rightly sets out, those threats come from a range of sources. Foremost among them are international terrorism, particularly from al-Qaeda and its affiliates. We also face an ongoing threat from residual terrorist groups linked to Northern Ireland, from serious organised crime, and from traditional espionage against British interests. Added to those long-standing threats, we must now address the growing threat to our cyber-security from cybercrime and cyber-espionage.
On international terrorism, it is worth stressing that, despite the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda remains a threat. It is true that the organisation is now weaker than it has been at any point since 9/11. US military and intelligence operations, work by the Pakistani military and, of course, the enormous contribution that UK forces have made to the international effort in Afghanistan have all been key factors. I am sure that the whole House will want to join me in praising the contribution of our armed forces, who are fighting so bravely many thousands of miles away in order to secure our streets back home from terrorism. However, threats from al-Qaeda, and from other groups that subscribe to its global jihad ideology, remain. We continue to arrest very significant numbers of people for terrorist offences—over 650 in the past two years alone.
The right hon. Lady is detailing the nature of the threat that we still face in this country. On that basis, she will recognise that the Olympic games is an area where there is clearly a heightened threat. Will she, even at this late stage, consider delaying the implementation of terrorism prevention and investigation measures, so that people who have been relocated out of London, who are some of the most dangerous people in this country, do not have the possibility of returning to London before the Olympic games?
The right hon. Lady is right to say that the security of the Olympic games is obviously a key concern and a key issue that we will be addressing over the coming months; indeed, it has been addressed by significant work that has been taking place over the past few years, since the bid was won. We all want to ensure that we provide a safe and secure Olympic games where people are able to endure—I am sorry, I mean enjoy; “endure” is probably more like the athletes enduring some pain during the games—the sporting achievements. We have been clear about our reasons for introducing TPIMs. We have been clear, as well, that the introduction of TPIMs, as the right hon. Lady knows, is accompanied by increased funding for the Security Service, and for the police in their counter-terrorism capacity, in order to provide for extra surveillance alongside TPIMs, which ensures that we are able to be reassured about the level of security that we can provide in relation to individuals who will be under those measures.
The leadership of al-Qaeda continues to plan operations in the UK. It attracts people for training, it has sections dedicated to overseas operations, and it radicalises and recruits. Even as its command and control infrastructure has weakened, al-Qaeda now seeks to inspire lone acts of terrorism organised and conducted without its guidance or instruction. We must now also pay more attention to the groups in Yemen and the horn of Africa, in particular, which are affiliated to al-Qaeda or support its ideology. These groups have independent capability. They can radicalise people in this country. Britons, Americans and Europeans are travelling to fight in Somalia with al-Shabaab and to train in Yemen with al-Qaeda.
Is that not why the National Security Council is so important? It brings together Cabinet Ministers and others—those who have domestic responsibility and Ministers such as the Foreign Secretary—in dealing with a country such as Yemen. What happens on the streets of Sana’a today may well affect what happens on the streets of London and other cities tomorrow.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for making that point. It is indeed the case that the National Security Council is able to bring together all the Government Ministers with an interest in matters relating to our national security—not only me and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary but the Secretary of State for Defence and others. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to point out that in looking at our national security we must also look at issues that arise abroad. As I have been saying, we must pay attention to the countries where people from the UK have the opportunity to travel to be trained and then to come back, perhaps to plot attacks here in the UK. What happens elsewhere matters for us on our streets, and he is absolutely right to say so. Indeed, when he intervened I was about to say that, of the people who are abroad in these areas, we know that some aspire to conduct terrorist attacks back at home.
The emergence of such groups is a stark reminder that the threat picture can change rapidly and that the factors that drive the terrorist threat to this country have not gone away. Recent attacks in Nigeria demonstrate the range of places around the globe in which western interests, including British interests, are now under threat. We also face a significant and ongoing threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland. There were 40 such attacks last year. That threat has obviously required increased effort and resources from the security and intelligence agencies.
The tragic events in Oslo this summer have also made us reconsider the threat from the extreme right. That is much less widespread and systematic than terrorism associated with al-Qaeda. However, contrary to some reports, our counter-terrorism strategy—CONTEST—already addresses that threat; that was a major change that we made to the strategy produced by the last Government. After Oslo, we will be allocating further resources to that work.
Traditional espionage continues to pose a threat—to the commercial sector, as well as to our diplomatic and defence interests. The foreign intelligence services operating in this country seek to obtain a wide range of classified and privileged information in the fields of defence, politics, government, energy, and science and technology.
The final threat that I want to mention is cyber-security. The national security strategy assessed cyber-security to be one of the highest-priority risks we now face. It is important to stress that this is not simply a risk for the future. Cybercrime is hitting British people, and cyber-espionage is hitting the British Government and British business, on a daily basis, right now.
All these threats must now be faced at the same time as we prepare for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic games and the challenge of providing security for 10,500 Olympic athletes, 21,000 media and broadcasting personnel—double the number of athletes, I note—and the holders of some 10.8 million Olympic and Paralympic tickets. A question was asked earlier about the responsibility for cyber-security. That rests with the Cabinet Office, although that in no way detracts from the role of the Foreign Secretary in relation to GCHQ. The Cabinet Office is looking at a wide range of issues across Government in relation to cyber-security.
My right hon. Friend is right to say that the Cabinet Office leads on that, and that co-ordination is welcome news. However, do we not all have a responsibility to understand cyber-security? A generation is now growing up that is using Facebook, is yet to own a credit card, and has very different liberal values when it comes to using the internet. Some small and medium-sized businesses are perhaps reluctant to pay for the addition of cyber-security because it is a little costly and times are difficult. We all have a responsibility for this, not just the Cabinet Office and Government.
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. There is an onus on all of us who are using the internet to ensure that we are aware of the responsibility that we have for our own security. One problem is that many people are unaware of what is available to help them to increase their own personal security in relation to these matters. That is a challenge that we all need to face and to rise up to.
All these threats require active and highly competent security and intelligence agencies to tackle them—and fortunately, in this country, that is exactly what we have. We should be proud of the agencies and of the work they do alongside their police colleagues. They work tirelessly, day in and day out, often at great personal risk to themselves, to keep the British public safe. They do this work without public thanks or public recognition, and we owe them an enormous debt of gratitude. As the Committee’s report notes, those working in this field continue to excel at a very challenging task. I am sure that the whole House will join me in sending them our thanks and our praise.
As the Foreign Secretary set out last week, those agencies not only defend us from threats to our national security and to the lives of British citizens but provide vital support to British military operations and diplomatic intelligence, which gives us a key national advantage in foreign and security policy. But it is precisely because of the importance of the agencies’ role, and because much of it must be kept away from the public gaze, that their work should be properly scrutinised. It is also important that, where there are any allegations of misconduct by the agencies, public confidence can be assured and retained by rigorous independent parliamentary oversight. That is why the oversight provided by the ISC is so crucial.
We sought in our Green Paper on justice and security to strengthen, clarify and modernise those oversight arrangements. For many years, successive Chairmen of the ISC have called for reform. We will answer that call. We therefore propose to formalise the role of the ISC, making it a statutory Committee of Parliament and allowing it to report to Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. It will also be given a formal remit for oversight of the wider intelligence community. Crucially, our proposals will for the first time give the ISC the power to require information from the agencies.
I want to stress that, although the Green Paper proposes that we should consider the extent to which the ISC should oversee the operational activity of the agencies, no decisions in that area have yet been made. We need to consider carefully the consequences of creating such a broad power, including the impact on the operational effectiveness of the agencies and the additional resource burden that would be placed on them.
We are also looking at wider changes. We propose to consult on giving the intelligence services commissioner an expanded remit to monitor compliance with agency operational policies. We will also consult on more far-reaching proposals such as the introduction of an inspector- general to provide oversight of all agency business.
Separately, we have strengthened decision making on national security issues by creating a proper National Security Council, as was referred to by the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, and appointing a National Security Adviser. Those are important and profound changes to the national security and intelligence machinery at the heart of Government and I am grateful that the Committee has welcomed them.
Robust oversight and accountability are not the sole requirements of effective intelligence agencies. They also need to be able to keep the public safe, without the risk of vital intelligence or essential international intelligence-sharing relationships being compromised. For that, they need a proper legal framework that allows them to present their case in the courts and to defend themselves properly. It cannot be right that at the moment sensitive material is excluded altogether, meaning judgment is not reached on the basis of the full facts. That is why the Green Paper proposes reforms to allow the right balance to be struck between protecting sensitive material and giving the courts the access to the material that they need to allow justice to be done.
The Green Paper makes proposals, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington referred, to allow closed material procedures to be more widely available to the courts, to enhance the special advocate system, and to ensure that sensitive material, sources and techniques are protected. The overall aim is to allow cases involving national security to be heard fairly, fully and safely in our courts. I am pleased that the Committee welcomed those proposals and that there was cross-party support for them. I note that the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw)—not always one to praise this Government’s decisions—called them “elegant solutions”.
I stress that those are just proposals at this stage. I note the encouragement of my right hon. and learned Friend to strengthen that aspect of the Green Paper. We will consider other ideas if they come forward. However, our aim is and must be to strike the right balance between protecting sensitive material and protecting the fundamentals of British justice.
As well as robust oversight and the right legal framework, the other thing that the security and intelligence agencies need to do their job is, of course, resources. I am pleased with the Committee’s conclusion that the agencies have been given a fair funding settlement in the spending review. Like the rest of the public sector, the agencies will seek to make savings in their support functions and corporate services. Collaborative working across the three agencies is the key to that. What is clear is that the agencies have the funding that they need to maintain their current range of operational capabilities and to invest for the future. For example, much of the £650 million of funding for our transformative national cyber-security programme will fund activity by the agencies. There is no question of allowing our national security to be diminished to make savings. Although the agencies face pressures, as they always do, like the ISC, the Government remain confident in their ability to meet those challenges.
It is important to note, with the Olympics approaching, that the agencies’ plans for meeting the significant additional challenge of securing the games remain on track and that the Olympics security budget is protected.
The first duty and the overriding priority of any Government is the protection of the British public. Although great progress has been made in counter-terrorism and other areas in recent years, serious threats to our national security remain. That is why it is so vital that we have security and intelligence agencies that can continue to reduce those threats and help keep us all safe. Their work is among the most important carried out by anyone. It is right that there should be robust oversight, which is why we are modernising and strengthening the oversight arrangements. I warmly welcome the Committee’s latest annual report. Its recommendations are informing change as we speak. I look forward to future annual reports being even more useful in helping our world-class intelligence and security agencies to get even better at the valuable work that they do to protect the public.
We have had an important and wide-ranging debate that has illustrated how important it is that the public should be confident that the Government’s national security work is being robustly scrutinised. Last week the Foreign Secretary said:
“I believe it is vital that the British public and Parliament have confidence in the Agencies’ ability to keep us safe and to do so within the framework of the law; and that they also have confidence in government using this capability wisely, and in accordance with our democratic values and principles of domestic and international law.”
That comment sums up well the Committee’s challenges and the themes that ran through this evening’s debate. I am grateful to hon. Members on both sides of the House for raising a number of pertinent points. We heard 16 speeches, and the debate has been considered and well informed. I fear that in the eight or so minutes available to me I will not be able to do justice to the contributions we have heard.
Before I address those points, let me first thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Committee’s Chair, for the work he and his Committee have undertaken over the past year. The Committee and its staff continue to adopt a constructive and professional approach, for which the Government are grateful. It is vital that we have a strong framework for overseeing the work of the security and intelligence agencies. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has said, the quality of the ISC’s annual report underlines the unique and valuable role it plays in this framework.
Several of the contributions we have heard this evening have focused on the justice and security Green Paper and the proposals it outlines to ensure that justice can be done in the full range of civil proceedings by allowing the courts to take full and fair account of all the relevant information, even when some of it is too sensitive to be disclosed publicly. The overall aim is to allow cases involving national security to be heard fairly, fully and safely in our courts, and I think that that sense of safety underpinned a number of the contributions we heard this evening. This will allow sensitive material to be considered in court proceedings without the risk of vital intelligence or essential international intelligence-sharing relationships being compromised.
Sensitive material is essential for UK national security. It is used to prevent terrorist attacks, disrupt serious crime networks and make the case for executive actions such as deportation and asset freezing. Closed material procedures are the central provision in the Green Paper. Extending their availability across all civil judicial proceedings will provide a framework that enables the courts to consider material that is too sensitive to be disclosed in open court but that protects the fundamental elements that make up a fair trial and UK national security. We welcome the Committee’s support for the proposals.
The other aspect of the Green Paper that has been the focus of much of today’s debate is the proposal to strengthen, clarify and modernise the arrangements for overseeing the work of the security and intelligence agencies and the wider intelligence community. The proposals are designed to ensure that oversight arrangements are as effective and credible as possible and to provide reassurance to Parliament and the public that the agencies operate in a proper and legal manner.
I am grateful to the ISC for the very active and constructive role that it has played in developing proposals for its reform. The Government and the Committee agree on the right approach to the vast majority of those proposals, including formalising the role of the ISC with regard to oversight of the wider intelligence community, making it a statutory Committee of Parliament and allowing it to report to Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. The ISC would also be given the power to require information from the agencies.
As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has said, however, although the Green Paper proposes that we consider the extent to which the ISC might in future oversee the operational activity of the agencies, no decisions have yet been made in that regard. Before making any decisions, we would need to understand the consequences of creating such a broad power, including the impact on the operational effectiveness of the agencies and on the Foreign and Home Secretaries’ own responsibilities for them.
A number of points have been made about the agencies’ resources and the ability to respond to threats. In addition to the real and serious threat from international terrorism, particularly from al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we continue to face threats from residual terrorist groups linked to Northern Ireland, as well as from cyber-attack and from traditional espionage—a point very effectively made by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis).
I welcome the ISC’s conclusion that the agencies have been given a fair settlement in the most recent spending review, which will allow them to continue their essential work of keeping us all safe, but of course they are not immune from the pressures of the wider economic climate, and delivering more support or back-office functions together will ensure that the agencies can play their part in making savings while prioritising resources to support the front line.
I am afraid that I will not, because I have three minutes left in which to get through a range of other points. I do apologise to my hon. Friend.
Let me make it clear: there is no question of allowing our national security to be diminished in order to make savings. The agencies have always prioritised their resources to meet the highest threats to our national security, and they will continue to do so. There is no clearer example of that than the Olympics, which throw up a number of security challenges, but agility and flexibility are core and established strengths of the British intelligence community. The agencies continue to enhance their capacity in preparation for the games, and their plans for meeting the additional challenges of London 2012 are mature and remain on track, including in relation to the recruitment of additional personnel.
A number of points have been made about cyber-security, and the Government welcome the ISC’s acknowledgement of the real and increasing risk to the UK’s national security from cyber-attack. It is one of the highest priority risks that we face, and the Government have allocated—I know that many Members recognise this—an additional £650 million of funding over four years to enhance the response to threats from cyberspace through a transformative national cyber-security programme. Much of that money will fund activity by the agencies, but we have sought to provide clear accountability on cyber-security through the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance and the role that my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General plays in providing such oversight, while recognising the role that other Ministers and Departments have to play in that important agenda.
As well as providing resources, we are committed to providing the agencies with the powers that they need. That is why the Government have introduced the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, combined with new resources for the police and security services to replace the current control orders regime, which is neither perfect nor entirely effective. TPIMs will provide robust and effective powers for dealing with the risks posed by suspected terrorists whom we can neither prosecute nor deport, and they are part of a wider package of work to ensure that we have the most appropriate and effective powers to address the terrorist threats. Arrangements will be in place to manage the transition from control orders to TPIMs effectively.
In conclusion, I pay tribute to the security and intelligence agencies for the enormous contribution that they make in ensuring that the British public are kept safe and properly protected. We all owe them a debt of gratitude for the fundamental and indispensable role that they play in keeping our nation safe.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the matter of the 2010-11 Annual Report from the Intelligence and Security Committee (Cm 8114).