Intelligence and Security Committee

Keith Vaz Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I am privileged, as Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to introduce this debate on not only the Committee’s annual report but the work of our intelligence agencies over the past year. It has been a particularly interesting year, in which we have seen a sea change in our intelligence agencies and the role that they play in the public debate of the nation: not only has the Justice and Security Green Paper been published by the Government, but only last week the Foreign Secretary, for the first time in our history, gave a lecture on the record—a public lecture—on the role of intelligence in foreign policy; over the past few months, the heads of the various intelligence agencies—the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service and GCHQ—have either given lectures or been interviewed on television or in the press about the work of their agencies and the role of intelligence; and the Intelligence and Security Committee has said in its annual report that we look forward to having, at least on one or two occasions, public sittings, for the first time in the history of the Committee, and we know that the Government see that to be appropriate. The fundamental reforms that we will be discussing today on the nature of the Intelligence and Security Committee and on the wider question of intelligence oversight mark a fundamental departure from the practices of the past.

Some might be entitled to ask, “Does this mean that secrecy is not as important as it used to be?” They might suggest that our secret services do not have to be as secret and that the secrets themselves do not require the same protection. Anyone who had that view would need correcting quickly and comprehensively. Of course there are secrets, and the basic role of these agencies is to carry out secret activities on behalf the nation as a whole.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

I welcome what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said about this important matter. When the Select Committee on Home Affairs has sought evidence from the head of MI5 in the past, we have had to travel to its headquarters for a private briefing, sometimes with darkened windows. I welcome what he said about the fact that the heads of those agencies will be giving evidence to his Committee in public so that they can be cross-examined. Does he know when the first such sitting might be?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The heads of the agencies have been travelling to the Intelligence and Security Committee to give evidence—albeit in secret, not in public—for a good number of years, so precedent is not being broken. Some thought is being given to holding public sessions, and I certainly hope that will prove possible over the next few months. I cannot give an absolute commitment to that effect, but it is certainly what I would expect.

The nature of secret operations remains as crucial as ever. A much more mature approach is being taken to what Britain needs to remain secret and what is a legitimate question of public debate, even if the intelligence agencies are involved. When I first entered this House, and right up until the 1990s, the very existence of the intelligence agencies was never officially declared or admitted and those who led the agencies were very private figures whose identities were never revealed. Much has changed since enactment of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, but to this day some aspects of that approach remain very much in our eye. The question that must be asked is whether that is acceptable in a modern society. We have three intelligence agencies that collectively receive some £2 billion of taxpayers’ money each year. That is serious money that inevitably needs not only private scrutiny but a degree of public scrutiny, too.

Secondly, the very fact that they are secret agencies in an open society means that there is a need for Parliament and the public to take a serious interest not only in the private but, where possible, in the public way in which the agencies operate. Of course, there is a third consideration, which is that as the very activities of the agencies involve the power to intercept communications or carry out operations that, without the authority of a Secretary of State, would be unlawful, they have a privilege that is not available to the rest of the community. If one thinks that this debate is taking place in the middle of a hacking inquiry when exactly that kind of interception was carried out by those who did not have lawful authority, one can see a clear illustration of why the needs of the agencies should be subject to a degree of transparency.

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[Mrs May]

The right hon. Lady is right to say that the security of the Olympic games is obviously a key concern and a key issue that we will be addressing over the coming months; indeed, it has been addressed by significant work that has been taking place over the past few years, since the bid was won. We all want to ensure that we provide a safe and secure Olympic games where people are able to endure—I am sorry, I mean enjoy; “endure” is probably more like the athletes enduring some pain during the games—the sporting achievements. We have been clear about our reasons for introducing TPIMs. We have been clear, as well, that the introduction of TPIMs, as the right hon. Lady knows, is accompanied by increased funding for the Security Service, and for the police in their counter-terrorism capacity, in order to provide for extra surveillance alongside TPIMs, which ensures that we are able to be reassured about the level of security that we can provide in relation to individuals who will be under those measures.

The leadership of al-Qaeda continues to plan operations in the UK. It attracts people for training, it has sections dedicated to overseas operations, and it radicalises and recruits. Even as its command and control infrastructure has weakened, al-Qaeda now seeks to inspire lone acts of terrorism organised and conducted without its guidance or instruction. We must now also pay more attention to the groups in Yemen and the horn of Africa, in particular, which are affiliated to al-Qaeda or support its ideology. These groups have independent capability. They can radicalise people in this country. Britons, Americans and Europeans are travelling to fight in Somalia with al-Shabaab and to train in Yemen with al-Qaeda.

[Keith Vaz]

Is that not why the National Security Council is so important? It brings together Cabinet Ministers and others—those who have domestic responsibility and Ministers such as the Foreign Secretary—in dealing with a country such as Yemen. What happens on the streets of Sana’a today may well affect what happens on the streets of London and other cities tomorrow.

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for making that point. It is indeed the case that the National Security Council is able to bring together all the Government Ministers with an interest in matters relating to our national security—not only me and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary but the Secretary of State for Defence and others. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to point out that in looking at our national security we must also look at issues that arise abroad. As I have been saying, we must pay attention to the countries where people from the UK have the opportunity to travel to be trained and then to come back, perhaps to plot attacks here in the UK. What happens elsewhere matters for us on our streets, and he is absolutely right to say so. Indeed, when he intervened I was about to say that, of the people who are abroad in these areas, we know that some aspire to conduct terrorist attacks back at home.

The emergence of such groups is a stark reminder that the threat picture can change rapidly and that the factors that drive the terrorist threat to this country have not gone away. Recent attacks in Nigeria demonstrate the range of places around the globe in which western interests, including British interests, are now under threat. We also face a significant and ongoing threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland. There were 40 such attacks last year. That threat has obviously required increased effort and resources from the security and intelligence agencies.

The tragic events in Oslo this summer have also made us reconsider the threat from the extreme right. That is much less widespread and systematic than terrorism associated with al-Qaeda. However, contrary to some reports, our counter-terrorism strategy—CONTEST—already addresses that threat; that was a major change that we made to the strategy produced by the last Government. After Oslo, we will be allocating further resources to that work.

Traditional espionage continues to pose a threat—to the commercial sector, as well as to our diplomatic and defence interests. The foreign intelligence services operating in this country seek to obtain a wide range of classified and privileged information in the fields of defence, politics, government, energy, and science and technology.

The final threat that I want to mention is cyber-security. The national security strategy assessed cyber-security to be one of the highest-priority risks we now face. It is important to stress that this is not simply a risk for the future. Cybercrime is hitting British people, and cyber-espionage is hitting the British Government and British business, on a daily basis, right now.

All these threats must now be faced at the same time as we prepare for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic games and the challenge of providing security for 10,500 Olympic athletes, 21,000 media and broadcasting personnel—double the number of athletes, I note—and the holders of some 10.8 million Olympic and Paralympic tickets. A question was asked earlier about the responsibility for cyber-security. That rests with the Cabinet Office, although that in no way detracts from the role of the Foreign Secretary in relation to GCHQ. The Cabinet Office is looking at a wide range of issues across Government in relation to cyber-security.

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[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), who, with his usual ingenuity, managed to give a number of written parliamentary questions an oral flavour. Some might well have served as essay titles. I noted that the Minister was writing furiously in preparation for his winding-up speech, and I hope that we shall all be able to obtain copies of his answers.

I shall speak briefly. First, let me join Front Benchers and others in congratulating the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) on the excellent work that he and his fellow Committee members have done in respect of the annual report. It was a change to be able to hear such a long and thoughtful speech from the Chairman of the ISC, rather than the limited contribution that my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) used to have to make when he chaired the Committee. Things are certainly changing.

I also welcome the commitment that the right hon. and learned Gentleman made in saying that the Committee intended to take oral evidence from the heads of the security services at some time in the future. I always think it odd that, although we hear about magnificent speeches made by the heads of MI5 and MI6 containing important statistics about the security threat, no one in Parliament is able to question them. We used to be told that their jobs were so secret that no one knew what they looked like, but nowadays it is quite easy to find out what Jonathan Evans and John Sawyers look like by means of the internet. There is no secrecy about their identities any more.

In an intervention on the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, I described the annual pilgrimage of the Home Affairs Committee, in a people-carrier with blacked-out windows, to a building somewhere on Millbank whose address we were not allowed to know. On arrival, we would be taken up through the back of the building into a room that was not the office of the head of the agency, but a meeting room where we were able to ask questions. We were not allowed to make notes or include what was said in our reports, although inevitably some of it had leaked out into a Sunday newspaper by the time the Committee was able to consider matters a week later. The fact is that it is much better for the heads of those agencies—both of whom I have met, and both of whom are highly intelligent individuals—to appear before the ISC, and for members of the ISC to put questions to them and receive answers. That is the basis of parliamentary scrutiny, and it is a very important step forward.

I welcome the way in which the National Security Council has developed over the past 18 months. Its establishment was recommended by the Home Affairs Committee in the last Parliament. I tried hard to persuade the last Prime Minister to accept the recommendation. I told him that the NSC would be good for the country, because for the first time we should be able to co-ordinate all the various Government Departments. There would be a national security adviser who, hopefully, would give evidence to Parliament, and it would be a good way of dealing with issues relating to countries such as Yemen—foreign policy issues that also had a domestic resonance. I was pleased that, when the Prime Minister appeared before the Liaison Committee, he talked about the operation of the National Security Council. I welcome that co-ordination, and I think it important for us to hear more about what the council is doing.

Obviously, in terms of its composition, the NSC differs from its counterpart in the United States, which is the model that we used when we considered the report two years ago. I do not think that Peter Ricketts or his successor, Kim Darroch, will ever quite become Condoleezza Rice—a great figure who can be brought before Parliament and make important statements about national security. That will never happen, because we will always have a career civil servant in the job. It is a pity, because I think that Prime Ministers ought to be able to choose more widely when selecting their national security advisers, but we never know: in the future, a Prime Minister may decide to do that.

I want to refer to the excellent contribution of the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). He is entirely right to consider the threat that is facing our country. We must deal with those who are behind that threat, which is why I am so pleased that the Security Minister—the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire)—has agreed to speak at the Select Committee’s conference in Leicester in December, when we will consider the roots of radicalism. As the hon. Member for New Forest East pointed out, unless we confront the threat with a budget larger than that which currently exists in the units in the Home Office, we will never deal with it. The only way in which to deal with home-grown terrorism is to engage the communities involved. The previous strategy was about preventing: “Let’s try to stop them doing what they’re doing.” That cannot be successful, however. Instead, we have to engage; we have to get right down into the communities and work with them—with different mosques and organisations. We heard from a fair few of them in the Home Affairs Committee evidence sessions, and I think that, by engaging, we can deal with this threat.

This annual report is excellent, and we look forward to the next one, but we also look forward to its being even more transparent in respect of the issues it addresses, as the Committee and Parliament expect.