Donald Trump

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

Like many others here, I welcome this debate. It is a good thing that 600,000 or so members of the public, one way or the other, have brought this subject to the House’s attention. There is clearly a wide range of views among the public, across all political parties and on both sides of the House. There have been powerful speeches and powerful interventions but in one important aspect, in all the speeches this afternoon, we are united in condemning the comments of Donald Trump on issues such as Mexican immigrants, Muslims and women. We should celebrate that, whatever our view of the proposals in these petitions. I add my name to the list of those condemning Donald Trump’s comments.

Before addressing the specific question of whether Donald Trump should be banned from entering the UK, I will spend a few moments on the wider context. Donald Trump made his comments about Muslims largely in the aftermath of the San Bernardino shootings on 2 December—that is when he was at his height with these comments. He is not the first, and he will not be the last, to make comments about a community in the wake of a terrorist atrocity, and we should make it clear that responsibility for terrorist acts lies with terrorists, not with the communities that they purport to come from. We must be clear in what we say about that, even when Donald Trump is not clear about what he says.

I am concerned about the rise in hate crime in the UK. Hate crime has been increasing, as has been mentioned in the debate. It went up 18% in 2015, and the number of offences involving religious hatred has more than doubled over the past three years. That rise is a concern, but it is not uniform—it always spikes after an atrocity. There is always a reaction in terms of hate crime.

Just last month, in my constituency of Holborn and St Pancras, I convened a meeting with Bengali and Somali women, from whom I was particularly concerned to hear. We spent the afternoon discussing their concerns—this was in December, after the Paris atrocities—and the one thing they raised with me repeatedly was that they, the Muslim women in my constituency, were very concerned that they were being insulted that day and that week as a result of what had happened in Paris. They perceived it and felt it, and they said that it was happening in Euston on the buses, on the trains and when they were shopping, for example. That is happening in our communities, and it spikes after atrocities. We have to unite around our values and our concern that that should be addressed.

The Government are now tracking Muslim hate crime as an independent category, which is welcome, and a number of steps are being taken to address hate crime. Anything the Minister can say on what is being done in addition to address such hate crime would be welcome. I join other Members in saying that I, too, and many others here, want to send a message to the Muslim community about how much we value them and what they bring to our society.

[Ms Ahmed-Sheikh]

I am extremely grateful for the hon. and learned Gentleman’s sentiments about the Muslim community. It is important to put on the record that the Muslim community condemns all types of bigotry and racism, regardless who is spouting that. There seems to be a misconception, not least throughout this debate—I am referring to comments that I have received during the debate—that, for some reason, we think it is acceptable for Muslims to speak in derogatory terms about people of other religions. It is important that we put on record that that is absolutely not the case. Wherever the bigotry, racism or hate speech is coming from, it is not acceptable, regardless who might be delivering the message.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention because I have a few comments on the approach that says, “Well, because he wants to ban Muslims, we should ban him.” That is far too simplistic. What lies at the heart of his belief that Muslims should be banned is that he thinks they are all dangerous. That is not buffoonery. That is absolutely repugnant. That is not what leads anybody in this debate, or anybody who signed the petition, to suggest that Donald Trump should not come here; it is a very different situation. His comments are so offensive to that whole community, and of course to women and to Mexicans, too—because of the assumptions and the belief that lie behind those comments.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

In no way do I condone what Donald Trump said, but it is not right in fair dealing to say, “If you ban all of x, that means you think that all of x are dangerous,” whatever group it might be. Forgive me, but what Donald Trump is saying is that a very few from a certain group might be dangerous—that is where the proposed ban comes from. I do not condone the logic or the policy, but in this House of Commons we have to give fair dealing to the views that have been expressed.

[Keir Starmer]

We have to be very careful about equating the views of Members of this House who call for a ban with the views of Donald Trump. For me, his views edge towards treating a whole community as a suspect community. Of course, it may be that he does not think that of each and every member of the Muslim community, but this has happened before in many other contexts where a whole community has been treated as a suspect community. We stood against it in the past, and we should stand against it now.

[Chris Stephens]

The hon. and learned Gentleman comes to this debate with considerable and learned legal experience. This debate can be tied up on whether Mr Trump’s comments were, as has been described, outrageous or simply hate speech, as some of us believe. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) said, others have been banned from this country for saying exactly the same things.

[Keir Starmer]

I will address that specific issue in a moment. Obviously, one of the measures available to the Government is to ban any individual from entering the UK. That power has been used by successive Home Secretaries on a number of occasions, and many examples have been put before the House this afternoon. It is a power that should be applied equally to everybody, whatever their wealth or power. That is important. I do not hold the view that presidential candidates fall within a special category; they should be judged in the same way as everybody else, on the basis of what they have said or done.

[Dr Wollaston]

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the consequences of such hate speech are greater when it comes from high-profile individuals? At the heart of this debate is whether Donald Trump’s presence in the UK is conducive to the public good. We have heard repeatedly about the harm, and the hon. and learned Gentleman himself has elucidated the kinds of hate crimes about which we are talking.

[Keir Starmer]

I accept the substance of the hon. Lady’s intervention that certain words in the mouths of certain individuals are more likely to provoke a reaction. The question is what the test for a ban is and whether the words have to be linked to public disorder and violence rather than simply being offensive. I will come to that, but I accept the premise that different people will provoke different reactions, sometimes according to who they are. The narrower point is that simply because he has particular wealth, power or position should not affect the application of the same rules to him as would be applied to anybody else.

The threshold for banning is relatively high, and the power is relatively rarely used. The test is whether an individual’s exclusion from the UK would be conducive to the public good. In 2005, as has been mentioned, that was extended to include unacceptable behaviours. It is worth going through the list of indicative factors spelling out such behaviours. Four examples are given: fomenting, justifying or glorifying terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs; seeking to provoke others to terrorist acts; fomenting other serious criminal activity; and fostering hatred that might lead to inter-community violence in the UK. The touchstone has always been words provoking a response that includes elements of disorder or violence, so the threshold is quite high. Examples of some cases that have fallen under those provisions were given at the outset of this debate.

There is no doubt that some of Donald Trump’s comments have been offensive, shocking and disturbing, and I join those who say that they are not funny but repugnant, but they are just that—offensive, shocking and disturbing—and I do not think that that, in and of itself, is enough to provoke a ban at this stage, on the basis of what has been said so far. I return to a principle set out by the European Court of Human Rights almost a quarter of a century ago, in relation to a case in which The Sunday Times and our Government were slugging it out over “Spycatcher”. The ECHR said:

“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society…it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb”.

The point that the Court was making is important. Freedom of speech is not needed for welcome speech. The protection is not needed for speech that people treat with indifference; it is only relevant, and it only bites, in the sphere of offensive, shocking or disturbing speech. That is the whole point of the protection of free speech. Therefore, the speech that we are debating, however offensive, shocking or disturbing, is in fact protected speech under what we conceive to be freedom of expression.

How does that translate? Of course I would not want to have Donald Trump round for dinner to express his views, but I agree with others that we should invite him to join us in our various constituencies to meet our constituents and members of various religious orders, faiths and communities. Having listened to this debate, I realise that if he came here, he would be very busy, as he is already going to visit several constituencies. I would invite him to mine—at the end of a long list—to meet my constituents, because mine is an incredibly diverse and multicultural community. Donald Trump would see a UK very different from the picture that he painted. But should he be banned from entering the country on the basis of what he said? No; in my view, he should not. He should be met with words far more powerful than his.

I accept that this is a judgment call, and I respect those who have expressed, in this debate and on other occasions, the contrary view that the matter is so close to the line that action should be taken against Donald Trump. In the end, we should be guided by our own values, not his. Our own values include a deep belief in freedom of speech and in multi-faith and diverse societies in which everyone feels secure and respected.

Oral Answers to Questions

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Monday 11th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Karen Bradley]

My hon. Friend has great expertise in this area, particularly given his time as a Minister. He knows that I take the welfare of children extremely seriously, as does the Home Secretary. We make sure that we have the information we need to protect those children.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I spent Friday in the camps in Calais and Dunkirk. I have seen some pretty appalling conditions in my time, including in prisons in Africa and the Caribbean, but nothing could prepare anyone for the squalor of those camps, particularly in Dunkirk. What was obvious, among other things, was that there is simply no process in place on the ground for anyone—particularly children—who is entitled to join their family in the UK. What steps are the Government taking to address that issue and to ensure that children in Calais and Dunkirk who have the right to join their families are able to do so?

[Karen Bradley]

The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that we work very closely with the French authorities. We are working with them to make sure that their processing is done as swiftly and efficiently as possible. I must repeat that these are camps in France. It is a sovereign country and we cannot interfere in French matters.

draft Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: code of practice) order 2015 Draft Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Thursday 7th January 2016 General Committees

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

The Opposition welcome the codes and the tone and manner in which the debate has been opened by the Minister. I will start with some general propositions, the most obvious of which is this: the ability to intercept the communication of those who mean us harm is a vital tool in the fight against terrorism and serious crime that is available to the police and security services. I saw that for myself when I was Director of Public Prosecutions for five years. I worked closely with the police and security services, relying on the sort of intercept and data that the codes refer to on a daily basis in the fight against both terrorism and serious crime.

On the framework, the powers set out in the draft codes—the interception of communications and equipment interference, which is being put into a code for the first time—are among the most intrusive and therefore the most sensitive available. The need for strict adherence to the safeguards in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act is vital; it is those safeguards that allow the powers to be used. Whether the safeguards in the existing legislative framework are robust enough is a debate for yesterday, because the draft Investigatory Powers Bill is going through its various processes currently with the Joint Committee, and no doubt many of the issues discussed today will be equally if not more relevant in those debates. Given the legislation that we have and that we are existing under at the moment, it is welcome to have codes that give guidance to those who need to exercise such powers, and to ensure that, as far as possible, the safeguards are properly applied.

The Minister mentioned necessity and proportionality, which are key to the exercise of any of the powers referred to in the codes; they are, as the Minister says, at the heart. In that respect, I welcome the guidance in paragraph 3.6 of the interception of communications draft code and in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of the equipment interference draft code, which spell out in practical terms how proportionality is to be applied. Having worked, before I was Director of Public Prosecutions, with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, I know that practical guidance to those on the ground as to how they assess necessity and proportionality is critical. It is well set out in those parts of the code, and that is welcome guidance not only for all of us and for the public to see, but for those charged with implementing the codes. In those paragraphs are the key principles that privacy must be balanced against the need for activity in operational terms, and the reminder, if it is needed for those exercising the powers, that actions should not be deemed proportionate simply because there is a potential threat to security. If that were the case, the proportionality test would be redundant.

Paragraphs 3.22 and 3.23 of the interception of communications draft code are welcome, because they make clear for the first time in a code that a

“communication remains in the course of its transmission regardless of whether the communication has previously been read, viewed or listened to.”

That central issue emerged in the investigations and prosecutions relating to allegations of hacking across various news bodies. At one stage, there was a lack of clarity about whether a communication that had already been listened to remained in the course of its transmission. That gave rise to a huge debate before and after the Leveson inquiry. It is welcome that the new code aligns the position in guidance with the approach suggested by Lord Justice Leveson, which in my opinion is the right approach.

[Mr Hayes]

So that I can reduce my closing remarks to the necessary length, which is short, I should say that the hon. and learned Gentleman is right that this is the first time that that has been put into the code.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that.

Regarding the remaining tricky or more complicated areas, I shall focus on legal professional privilege and the protection of communications involving confidential journalistic material and other confidential information. Before I do so, though, I highlight the point made by a number of respondents to the consultation on the equipment interference code. The Government’s response to the consultation summarises their point as saying that

“a code of practice was not a suitable vehicle for setting out the power to conduct equipment interference and that it should be provided for in primary legislation. This would offer an opportunity to have an open and transparent debate about the use of equipment interference by the Security and Intelligence agencies.”

That is a point well made in the consultation, although the Government’s response is inevitably constrained by the legislation that is currently in place. Nevertheless, it emphasises the need for a real debate on this issue as the draft Investigatory Powers Bill goes through its various stages.

I will not take up time by reminding the Committee of the importance of legal professional privilege, but the need for reform and further guidance under the code is absolutely clear. In that respect, probably the only quarrel I have with the Minister is that I am not sure that the new codes are simply about the Government doing their job properly. They were necessary as a result of the ruling in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which declared in February last year that the previous approach was not in accordance with article 8 of the European convention on human rights. That position was rightly conceded by the Government, because in that case the IPT ruled that

“the regime for the interception/obtaining, analysis, use, disclosure and destruction of legally privileged material has contravened Article 8 ECHR and was accordingly unlawful.”

It was therefore necessary, for the period that the current regime remains intact, to have further guidance to bring the approach into accordance with the IPT.

I remind the Committee that the previous code simply said that caseworkers

“should be alert to any intercept material which may be subject to legal privilege.”

It did not go on to state what steps should be taken if legally privileged material was identified. There was a deficiency there that the new code is intended to deal with.

Although they do not ring-fence legally privileged material, the new codes do provide much more detailed guidance, which, again, is welcome, particularly in paragraphs 4.5 to 4.25 of the interception of communications draft code and chapter 3 of the equipment interference draft code. I highlight the fact that the latter provides that, prior to any warrant being granted where interception of privileged information is likely, there must be an assessment of how likely it is that such information will be intercepted. So, first, there must be an assessment before the event. Secondly, when the interception of legally privileged information is intended, the threshold, as the Minister said, is that there must be

“exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary.”

Thirdly, the code makes it clear that the threshold will be met when there is an

“imminent threat of death or serious injury or serious threat to national security”

but it is anticipated that such situations will be rare. In addition, the code states that any communication between lawyer and client or any third party for the purpose of actual or contemplated litigation

“must be presumed to be privileged unless the contrary is established”.

Those are three or four aspects in which the guidance is much sharper and clearer. Time will tell—in the limited life of such codes—whether the regime is robust enough. Over the coming weeks and months, we will obviously keep a beady eye on how matters progress. To some extent, however, such matters will be considered in greater detail as the Bill proceeds.

My only point at this stage is that there is a question mark over whether the protection in relation to dissemination is strong enough under the code. The code simply states that privileged information cannot be disseminated unless a legal adviser has been consulted on the lawfulness of such action and that “all reasonable steps” must be taken to ensure that “as far as practicable” authorities involved in legal proceedings are prevented from seeing privileged information relating to those proceedings. Why does the code not expressly prevent dissemination where legal advice has been received as to its unlawfulness? I accept, however, that that question is probably equally well suited to the forthcoming debate on the Bill.

Moving on, it is noticeable that the protection for journalistic material and other confidential information is a lot weaker than the protection for legally privileged material. In his report, “A Question of Trust”, David Anderson, the Government’s reviewer, points out:

“The Draft Interception Code sets out similar provisions in respect of journalistic or other confidential material but the threshold for access is not as high as that in respect of legal privilege.”

It is obviously a matter of some concern that there are two different regimes for protected information. This matter was raised in the consultation, and I remind the Committee that the News Media Association took the view that the current regulatory framework

“poses a threat to journalism, journalists and their sources”.

The new provisions in the code of course have a chequered history. The National Union of Journalists, in a joint statement with the Bar Council, said that

“access to professional data should be protected in law and should be subject to independent, judicial oversight. Using codes of practice—such as the draft code under RIPA—undermines the rule of law.”

To some extent, their plea is for a change in the law, which is hopefully now forthcoming. The general secretary of the NUJ said:

“The proposals contained in the existing RIPA code of practice simply do not offer the protection to journalists and to sources, and are in fact dangerously inadequate. New legislation is urgently needed—it is vital that judicial oversight is introduced to force police officers and other snoopers to apply to judges in a transparent process before surveillance powers against media and legal professionals can be considered.”

Finally, the Press Gazette and the Society of Editors said that the draft code provides

“wholly inadequate protection for journalists’ sources”

and demanded that communication between journalists and public officials be treated the same as privileged information.

I recognise that the target of some of those comments was new legislation rather than a different code and that the code can only go so far, but not to have aligned in the interim the protection for journalistic material and other confidential material with the protection now given in the code to legally privileged material is a missed opportunity.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

How would the hon. and learned Gentleman define “journalist” in this context given the plethora of people out there, from the occasional blogger to the editor of a mainstream broadsheet newspaper, who would self-describe as journalists?

[Keir Starmer]

That is a good question, and a difficult one to answer. I confronted it when I was Director of Public Prosecutions, because I had to issue guidance on how we would approach the prosecution of journalists. We took a broad view, on the basis that if the protection of journalists’ sources is to have any meaning, one cannot distinguish between different forms of journalism. It is simply not good enough to say that because the definition is difficult, the protection should not be afforded to any.

I acknowledge that it is difficult to define journalism. I gave it my best shot in the guidance that I published and took a broad approach, but I resist the notion that because it is difficult to delineate clearly the limits of what a journalist is, the long-standing and hard-won protection for journalists’ sources and other confidential information must yield to that difficulty. That is a dangerous path for us to go down. It is obvious and inevitable that the regime in this legislation will not involve the sort of judicial oversight that comes with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which is a live issue in the public domain among journalists and others. As I said, I think that it is a missed opportunity, albeit for a relatively short period, not to have aligned the protections in the different sorts of protected category in the codes to give better protection to journalists, their sources and the confidential material with which they deal routinely.

There is, of course, much to focus on in the upcoming debate on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill. We welcome the codes and the tone and manner in which they have been put before the Committee. I have outlined the concerns, but we support the codes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

rose—

[Mr Hayes]

It may be that the hon. and learned Gentleman has anticipated what I am going to say, but I happily give way to him.

[Keir Starmer]

The point I was making was limited to dissemination where it has been established that material has been unlawfully obtained, as will happen in certain situations. My point is about the safeguard where, whatever the prior assessment, it transpires that legally privileged material has been captured and should not have been. The question was why in those circumstances there is not a prohibition on dissemination, rather than the assessment before the event.

[Mr Hayes]

I was going on to that point, but that would have deprived the hon. and learned Gentleman of his place in the sun, so I am glad that I did not. I was going to add that there are further safeguards on the retention and dissemination of confidential material that must apply when seeking and granting a warrant. In any case where confidential information is retained, there is a requirement for notification to the interception of communications commissioner.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that, although they are related, the acquisition, dissemination and retention are different issues, and each requires appropriate safeguards. He made a good, more general point, as did the former Secretary of State for Scotland, the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, about the need to look at things again in light of the new legislation, and it is absolutely right that we do. I confirm, as they asked me to, that that will happen, but it would be inappropriate for the Government to say, “We will not do anything until then.” Unless the important cross-House Committee considering these things makes alarmingly radical recommendations or the Bill Committee in its proper scrutiny of these things forces the Minister to make radical changes, I do not anticipate extraordinary changes between what we see today and what we end up with. However, the hon. and learned Gentleman and the former Secretary of State for Scotland are both absolutely right that proper reconsideration is necessary in the context of that new legislation. It would be inappropriate not to do that. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that we will look at such things in that way.

The hon. and learned Gentleman also raised the issue of journalists. There is a difference between journalists and lawyers in these terms, because commissioned lawyers retain for all kinds of purposes, many of which he was intimately familiar with in his previous life. My hon. Friend the Member for Fareham is right that these days defining a journalist is more complicated than defining a lawyer, but there is a good argument for applying the provisions I have just described around privacy and particularly sensitive or confidential information to those areas.

I met representatives of the National Union of Journalists in that context, and they put directly to me the case that the hon. and learned Gentleman described. It was right to hear that case. I am not insensitive to the argument, but equally we have probably got the balance about right in emphasising the need for confidentiality and the higher bar, without treating journalists in quite the same way as we treat lawyers.

I think I have covered most of the points that the hon. and learned Gentleman raised. I will sit down unless he wants to intervene on me to raise additional points.

[Keir Starmer]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Hayes]

Brevity, as you know, Ms Buck, is my middle name.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: Code of Practice) Order 2015.

DRAFT EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE (CODE OF PRACTICE) ORDER 2015

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015.—(Mr John Hayes.)

Healthcare: Yarl’s Wood

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I, too, pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) for securing this debate and for her powerful and insightful comments. I am grateful for all the powerful and insightful comments that have been made this afternoon. It is a shame there are not more men in the room. This is a question not of women’s issues but of human rights, and it is notable that there are not as many male Members present as there should be—this is not a party political point—both to contribute and to hear the contributions that have been made.

Of course, immigration rules have to be enforced and, in exceptional circumstances, detention is necessary, but it must always be humane and done to the highest standards, and there must always be safeguards. The point has already been made that, in relation to this particular type of detention, where there has been no conviction—no wrongdoing—it is particularly important that the detention service’s operating standards are kept to, and that the same range and quality of healthcare services is provided in detention centres as is available on the NHS. That point was made early in the debate, and it is central to this issue, because it is manifestly not the case in Yarl’s Wood.

There is clear evidence of repeated failures in relation to the rule 35 reports, in relation to the treatment and detention of pregnant women and the mentally ill, and in the provision of adequate healthcare more generally. Such repeated failings, and the reports on them, bring into question whether Yarl’s Wood is still fit for purpose. That is the central question. But, instead of taking action, the Government repeatedly refer us back to reports that are due out, such as the Shaw review into the welfare of vulnerable people in detention. That review is important, but it has been with the Minister for some time now—I think it was completed in the autumn—so, in the light of the concerns that have been raised on many occasions and again in this debate, will he tell us when it will be published so that we can see its findings?

The rule 35 reports are central to the provision of care, welfare and healthcare in Yarl’s Wood. They are intended to be a report of any case where continued detention is likely to injure the detainee’s health, so they are central. They are sent, or are supposed to be sent, to the Home Secretary, who must consider and respond to them. As has already been mentioned, the quality of the rule 35 reports in Yarl’s Wood, these central reports that are supposed to flag up cases so that something can be done about them, is appalling.

Although part of it has already been read out, it is worth giving in full the quote from the 2015 report by the chief inspector of prisons, which said that the rule 35 reports

“were among the worst we have seen. All were handwritten and many were difficult to read, lacked detail and were perfunctory. Some responses were dismissive.”

That shows a manifest failing of a flagging system that is supposed to start the process and alert the Home Office to concerns so that something can be done. How can the rule 35 reports examined in the 2015 report be among the worst that have ever been seen?

It is clear that the Home Office’s response to these reports has also been inadequate on occasion. A recent example is the case of a Sudanese refugee that went to the High Court. In that case, the medical practitioner at Yarl’s Wood had filed a rule 35 report, which gave details of previous injuries caused by beatings with metal rods, knife wounds and even a gunshot. Despite the evidence of torture, the Home Secretary said that there were exceptional circumstances justifying detention. The High Court disagreed, finding that the woman had been wrongfully detained and calling the case “truly disgraceful”. What is the point of the rule 35 procedure if adequate responses are not made in every case?

A further problem that has already been touched on is the detention of pregnant women and the mentally ill. It may be that the number is coming down, but it is a very serious issue. There have been far too many in the past, and any detention of anyone who is pregnant requires exceptional justification. There is no evidence that those exceptional circumstances are made out in so many of these cases. As the director of midwifery at the Royal College of Midwives, Louise Silverton, has said:

“Some pregnant women have reported receiving inadequate healthcare, which clearly puts their unborn baby at risk as well.”

The law is designed to protect pregnant women and those with other vulnerabilities from being detained. It is not being applied properly, it has not been applied properly in the past, and that now raises the question of whether, if it cannot be applied properly, it should be applied at all. There are other provisions in relation to vulnerable individuals.

I am aware of the time, but I want to mention one other issue, which I think has already been raised: the investigations into the deaths in custody that have occurred in the past few years. In particular, there have been reports of the death of a 40-year-old female detainee in March last year in which it has been said that the detainee was denied medical assistance. I know that there has been an investigation, so could the Minister give us an update on that and tell us when we can see its findings? That might tell us so much more about the provision of healthcare in Yarl’s Wood.

To conclude, it is not acceptable to wait for yet more evidence and yet more reports before something is done about the appalling situation in Yarl’s Wood. Now is the time for action. Frankly, if the rules cannot be applied properly in Yarl’s Wood and adequate medical provision cannot be made to safeguard the health and welfare of some of the most vulnerable people in our society, the question is whether Yarl’s Wood is fit for purpose.

Relocation of Migrants in need of International Protection (Opt-in Decision)

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I am glad we have the opportunity to debate this vitally important issue today. Political unrest and widespread violations of human rights have led to millions of people being displaced. The UNHCR says that there are 4.3 million Syrian refugees alone. This is, as the Minister said, the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since the second world war, and it is clearly the most important issue now facing the EU.

Over the past nine months, the EU has seen unprecedented levels of migration, with more than 812,000 asylum seekers registered in the EU up till the end of September. The UNHCR says that more than 3,000 people are tragically dead or missing as a result of attempted crossings of the Mediterranean. The vast majority of the pressures of those incoming migrants has fallen on Italy and Greece, with 99.5% of migrants who cross the Mediterranean arriving in these two countries. That is the background to the EU-proposed programme of relocation in the UK. Britain rightly has an opt-out in relation to migration matters and has decided not to opt back into these measures.

Although we support that decision, it is disappointing that it has taken over six months and repeated prompting by the European Scrutiny Committee to secure this debate on the Floor of the House. We recognise, of course, that situations are often fast-moving and that the Government should not be constrained, but we think the Government should reflect on the approach they have taken so far in relation to the procedure.

On the substance of the matter, although we do not want to see Britain opt into mandatory quotas, we believe that we should take an active role in tackling the migration crisis across the EU, as well as on our doorstep. In this respect we take issue with the Government’s response. Just as we have joined military operations to play our part in tackling ISIS, so we have a moral responsibility to work with other EU states to help to deal with the large numbers of refugees who are fleeing the barbaric conditions in Syria and elsewhere. The Government have pledged to accept 20,000 refugees over this Parliament—4,000 a year. After more than two years of Labour calling on the Government to take action, this is undoubtedly a welcome step and was welcomed by the House, but the Government still refuse to accept people in desperate need who need relocation from other EU states.

Four thousand refugees represents less than 0.5% of the refugees entering the EU this year. That is not good enough. The UK has a proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need of refuge and should not shrink from its responsibilities because it has the fortune not to be on the frontline of the crisis.

[John Redwood]

Can the hon. Gentleman explain how many refugees he thinks we ought to take and what the criteria would be?

[Keir Starmer]

Our position is that mandatory quotas are not the way forward. Any numbers taken in this country should be on only a voluntary basis. In view of what we see as the current failure of relocation policy, the Government should rethink whether we should take some numbers from Europe on a voluntary basis. It would be for the Government to decide what number, on a voluntary basis, would be the right number. It has been suggested that if every city or county in Britain took just 10 refugee families, we would be able to help perhaps 10,000 individuals. As I say, in the first instance we call on the Government to reconsider their approach in the light of the prevailing situation.

It goes without saying that under any scheme, and under a voluntary scheme in particular, there should be robust and effective vetting and safeguarding procedures, wherever those procedures take place. We therefore call on the Government to reconsider the refusal to take people relocated from other member states on a voluntary basis, without opting into a mandatory system. Even if we are not part of the mandatory relocation scheme, we should do everything in our power to ensure that it works effectively. The EU relocation scheme has so far relocated just 130 individuals from Italy and 30 from Greece of its intended 160,000 people, which seems to indicate that it may be incapable of dealing successfully with the pressures being faced in Italy and Greece. In addition, only six of the 22 member states have notified the EU that they have the capacity to host relocated individuals.

What steps, if any, are the Government taking to support the relocation programme and to help to cope with this volume? On a point that has been raised on more than one occasion by the European Scrutiny Committee, in the absence of voluntary relocation how do the Government interpret the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the EU?

Let me turn to the questions that we have on the motion, which we support. Can the Minister update the House on the number of Syrian refugees who have arrived in Britain since the Prime Minister announced that we would take 20,000 over the course of this Parliament? In addition, the Home Office has stated that 55 local authorities will welcome Syrian refugees into their communities before Christmas. How many of those authorities have so far welcomed refugees? The Government say they are reluctant to take migrants relocated from within the EU for fear of creating new pull factors, but they have consistently produced little evidence that this would be the result of allowing internal relocation. As the European Scrutiny Committee has observed, the Government have been thin on substance on this issue. Can the Minister now give some substance on the pull factor argument? Surely we must recognise the level of desperation that forces people to leave their homes and attempt the journey to the EU in the knowledge that they or their loved ones might not make it. That will be a significant factor whatever relocation programme is put in place.

[Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Can the shadow Minister assist us by explaining how many people leave Syria, how many come into Greece and why there is a large difference between the two numbers?

[Keir Starmer]

I am not sure that I am in a position to deal with that intervention; it is probably better put to the Minister.

The Government have rightly said that they will take refugees from outside Europe, and we support that, but what about those who have made it into Europe? Of course the Government do not want to get drawn into a mandatory relocation programme within Europe, but why cannot there be a voluntary arrangement that we could enter into in order to play our full part in solidarity and fair responsibility for refugees across Europe? Just as we have joined with our European and other international allies in trying to defeat ISIS and other causes of refugees and migration, so we should play our full part in dealing with the crisis here in Europe, with huge numbers already desperately needing relocation. On the basis of the figures, at least at first blush, it looks as though the relocation programme is not working as was anticipated. As I say, only 160 or so individuals have been relocated. In those circumstances, we ask whether the Government could and should do more.

I finish where I started and return to the way in which this matter now comes before the House. Recognising that the situation is moving fast, will the Minister give an assurance that the House will be properly updated and that time will be allowed for proper scrutiny and debate as the relocation policy rolls out over the coming weeks and months?

European Agenda on Migration

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

The motion covers a number of important documents, including the “European Agenda on Migration” and, of course, the “EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling”. The scope of the documents is broad, and their ambition is commendable. The “European Agenda on Migration”, for example, aims to set out an agenda for a fair, robust and realistic migration policy, and the action plan includes wider steps on issues such as people smuggling, recovering criminal assets, data gathering and the sharing of information, and the use of military assets.

We support those aims, and the motion’s call for

“a coherent and sustainable approach to addressing…migratory pressures”.

We also praise and support the efforts of our Royal Navy and other armed forces, who have rescued more than 5,577 migrants from the Mediterranean so far. It would be appreciated if the Minister could update us on the figure. The key question, however, is the extent to which the Government are helping to deliver that approach, and whether the European Union as a whole is achieving it. It is clear from the concerns that have been highlighted by the European Scrutiny Committee, and from the painful reality on the ground that we have seen in many parts of the EU, that a

“coherent and sustainable approach”

has not yet been adopted. These documents attempt to identify an approach that will ensure that Europe remains a safe haven for those who are fleeing atrocities and persecution, while also securing its borders and creating the conditions for economic prosperity.

If there is to be a coherent and sustainable solution to the migrant crisis, we must crack down on those who seek to take advantage of people in their time of need. Ruthless criminal networks organise the journeys of large numbers of migrants who are desperate to reach the European Union. They make substantial gains while putting migrants’ lives at risk, often squeezing hundreds on to unseaworthy boats, including small inflatable ones. Scores of migrants drown at sea, suffocate in containers, or perish in deserts. Smugglers treat migrants as goods, just like the drugs and firearms which they often traffic along the same routes. That is why we support the current operations which are aimed at preventing the smuggling of people into the European Union, and agree that undertaking such operations provides an opportunity to have an immediate impact on the crisis.

However, as the motion acknowledges, action must also be taken to address the root causes of migration. Many of those root causes lie deep in global issues that the international community has been trying to address for many years. Civil war, persecution, poverty and climate change all feed into migration, which is why the United Kingdom must be involved in reinvigorated diplomatic efforts to bring peace and stability to countries such as Syria, from which most of the refugees originate. There is also an important role for targeted aid and assisting the development of the countries in question.

Against that background, there are a number of issues that I would like the Minister to clarify. It is important for there to be ongoing parliamentary scrutiny of UK involvement in anti-trafficking operations. Will the Minister commit himself to informing the House before any further developments are agreed, and, in particular, to informing us of any decision to move from phase 2 to phase 3 of Operation Sophia?

There are some contradictions relating to the current state of operations. The initial EU plan stated that phase 3 involved the disposing of vehicles and vessels used for trafficking, but the Government have said that 40 migrant boats have already been disposed of as part of phase 2. Can the Minister explain that, and can he tell us whether the phases have now changed?

As well as ensuring that the vessels used for trafficking are disrupted and disposed of, we must ensure that the people smugglers who take advantage of vulnerable people are brought to justice. Can the Minister provide details of what the UK is doing on that front, along with any details relating to the investigation and prosecution of those who have already been apprehended?

Immigration Bill

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I shall speak to the amendments in my name. I hope it will be helpful to the House if I indicate as I go through them which of those amendments I currently intend to press to a Division, so that the Minister will know.

I start with the labour market provisions and say at the outset that we on the Labour Benches support the establishment of a director of labour market enforcement. This will provide strategic leadership, which is much needed and very welcome. The real issues in relation to the director are resources and focus. In Committee we heard evidence from Professor Metcalf, who is chair of the Migration Advisory Committee. He said that he understood the issues of public finances, but he did not think the enforcement bodies had enough resources. He pointed to the fact that on the evidence in the report on low-skilled work, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs could be expected to visit any given premises once every 250 years and that there was the prospect of a prosecution every 1 million years.

I accept that any investigation would be intelligence-led and targeted, but those figures are stark and point to the problem of resourcing. As another example, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority investigations dropped from 134 in 2011 to 68 in 2014. Clearly, we cannot deal with resources here in this debate, but amendment 18 is intended to give a focus to the director, to ensure that the functions of the director are exercised for the purpose of protecting the victims of labour market exploitation and to make this explicit on the face of the Bill. This mirrors the way in which the Modern Slavery Act 2015 dealt with the functions of the Anti-Slavery Commissioner established by that Act.

There is therefore a good precedent for the amendment. It provides clarity and it avoids any misconception or temptation about this role, which is being introduced in an immigration Bill—namely, that it should be about labour market enforcement, not immigration control. The experience of other countries suggests that this is the right focus for this important role.

Amendment 19 would omit the proposed illegal working offence and maintain the status quo. Time and again in the House and elsewhere the point has been made about the exploitation of the vulnerable. The Migration Advisory Committee reported in 2014 that

“the combination of non-compliance and insufficient enforcement can lead to instances of severe exploitation, particularly of vulnerable groups such as migrants.”

The Committee said in the same report:

“We were struck on our visits around the country by the amount of concern that was expressed by virtually everyone we spoke to about the exploitation of migrants in low-skilled jobs.”

There is a great deal of other evidence to the same effect. What is desperately needed is more resources for inspections, a focus on exploitative employers and a mechanism to encourage employees to have the confidence to come forward. The new provision cuts across that.

Clause 8 is likely to ensure that the most exploited and vulnerable will become even more so; in effect, it will simply strengthen the hand of gangmasters over exploited workers. It also fails the test of necessity. There are already criminal provisions relating to those who have breached immigration rules and there is no need to introduce a new criminal offence for employees. We are talking about the most vulnerable and exploited people, who need the confidence to come forward if the director is to achieve the functions set out in the Bill. My current intention is to push amendment 19 to a vote, although obviously I will listen to what the Minister has to say.

I turn to amendment 20, which also relates to the offence of illegal working. It is a strict or stark offence: an employee who simply does not have the right immigration status commits an offence and has no defence at all. I shall give an example of the injustice likely to be caused. If an employee in good faith relies on his or her employer to sponsor him or her, but something wrong in the process means that as a matter of law, and unbeknown to them, they do not have the right immigration status, they automatically commit an offence and have no “reasonable excuse” defence. That cannot be right for a new criminal offence in this field. With all due respect to the Director of Public Prosecutions, it is not good enough to say that the prosecution must weed out those cases. There needs to be a defence in statute to cover cases of mistake and error that are not the employee’s fault.

I turn to the provisions on landlords and the right to rent. The background is important during this Report debate. The Immigration Act 2014 introduced a civil penalty scheme in relation to the right to rent. That was discussed in the House; there were concerns about the impact it would have in practice and in particular about whether there would be any discriminatory effects. Assurances were given about piloting and properly evaluating the civil penalty scheme before it was rolled out. This Bill, in 2015, proposes to extend the civil penalty scheme by introducing a criminal penalty before there has been a full and meaningful evaluation.

As was mentioned on Second Reading, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants carried out an evaluation showing, alarmingly, that 42% of landlords said that the right to rent provisions made them less likely to consider accommodating someone who did not have a British passport. At that stage, we did not have the advantage of the Home Office evaluation, which was made available in Committee, as the Minister said it would be. That evaluation, however, was small and narrow. The Home Office itself said that it was not sure about the statistical significance of part of the evaluation and that the sample sizes were too small to draw any robust conclusions. We say that the assurance in relation to the civil penalty scheme has not been fulfilled and there is no warrant for extending the scheme to include a criminal sanction.

Amendment 22 deals with the position of landlords who, under the current provisions, would automatically commit a criminal offence the moment they were served notice that they had a tenant without the right to rent. They would be criminalised notwithstanding the period between receipt of that knowledge, normally by a notice, and their best prospect of getting anybody evicted. A reasonable, objective landlord who received a notice and acted on it immediately would still be criminalised during the process. There cannot be any sensible or compelling case for that state of affairs, which causes great concern to landlords and puts them in an impossible position. I understand that the Government may be considering the issue and obviously I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says. On the face of it, however, it is difficult to see that there could ever be a case for such a measure.

Amendments 23 to 26 all relate to the important issue of summary eviction. The Bill introduces a fast-track process—innovative in this field—in which a notice from a landlord stands as a court order, leading to provision for summary eviction. Some 30 or 40 years ago, the House set its face against summary evictions for a very good reason: there were too many examples of locks being changed and families literally being put out on to the street to sleep on the pavements. Everybody agreed that there should be due process before individuals and families, particularly families with children, were evicted. The Bill cuts through that protection for no good reason. In this country in the 21st century no group of individuals should—for whatever reason, and whether renting lawfully or not—be subject to summary eviction proceedings that, as I said, we turned our back on a long time ago.

I move on to immigration detention, which has already been touched on and is a matter of increasing concern to many in this House and beyond. The fact of immigration detention causes real distress and anxiety, particularly among vulnerable groups, and its indefinite nature adds to that. There is strong evidence of the impact on varying groups, particularly women. I think I am right in saying that the UK is the only country in Europe that does not have a time limit of any sort on immigration detention. That has been the subject of inquiry by the all-party groups on refugees and on migration. They concluded:

“We believe that the United Kingdom has a proud tradition of upholding justice and the right to liberty. However, the continued use of indefinite detention puts this proud tradition at risk.”

The reforms suggested by the cross-party joint APPG group were backed by the House of Commons when they were debated in September this year, and a motion supporting them was passed. The issue is one of increasing concern and justifying indefinite immigration detention is increasingly difficult. Amendment 32 is intended to deal with that by introducing a 28-day limit, which many people feel is the right one.

New clause 13 is intended to allow a review by an independently chaired panel to consider the issues and report to Parliament within three months; it is not premised on a fixed period. It is important that there is progress on these issues. Immigration detention is a real cause for concern and this is an opportunity to do something necessary.

[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

The hon. Gentleman just said that new clause 13 does not prescribe a particular length of time, yet paragraph (a) specifies a 28-day time limit. Will he confirm that that is his position?

[Keir Starmer]

I apologise. I meant that it proposes a review of the time limit rather than a time limit itself, and that therefore, given the nature of the review, it would be open to it to look at other options. There are shared concerns across the House about immigration detention and its indefinite nature. There will be disagreements as to the precise time limit, if there is to be one, and that can be discussed, but at this stage sitting back and simply accepting the status quo is not an acceptable way of proceeding. However, I will obviously listen to what the Minister has to say on this.

[Richard Fuller]

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that one of the values of a time limit is that it provides the detained person with some certainty about what is happening while they are being detained? We heard evidence, and we know from our constituents, that the difficulty is that people are put in detention and do not know what is going to happen to them, with consequential mental health, and other, impacts.

[Keir Starmer]

I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. There is the fact of detention in the first place, covering a wide range of individuals detained for different reasons, and then there is its indefinite nature, which adds to the anxiety, because most terms of detention are for a fixed period that allows the individual to know when they may regain their liberty.

As I say, there will be debates about what the precise time limit should be, but sustaining a position of indefinite detention is no longer acceptable in the 21st century. It is not the position in almost all other countries in Europe, and it should not be so in this country.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

As somebody who served with the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and others on the Bill Committee, there is a terrible sense of déjà vu, to put it politely, or “Groundhog Day”, not so politely, about this debate. We had a lot of these debates and discussions in Committee. I hope that those who did not join me in voting as I did in Committee would at least recognise that it was a very thoughtful process in which we went through the whole Bill in great depth and a great raft of amendments were tabled and debated. However, even the Opposition parties managed to run out of steam, allowing the usual channels to pull stumps some little time before the Committee stage was scheduled to finish. I hope that that in no way suggests that we cantered with unseemly haste through the important issues that the Bill seeks to address.

My hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Rebecca Harris), who is no longer in her place, hit the nail on the head, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich North (Chloe Smith) in Committee. This is probably one of the most important issues that this House and this Parliament will deal with. If we get it right, we will engender a sense of an understanding of fair play and that this place “gets it”. If we get it wrong, we will seem to be even more disengaged from the communities that we seek to serve.

I am lucky to represent a predominantly rural constituency where even a casual glance at the census returns would suggest that immigration was not an issue that would be raised on the doorstep or in meetings. However, even in rural North Dorset, it has been, and continues to be, such an issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Burrowes]

It is a pleasure to take part in this debate, and I will speak to the new clauses to which my name has been added. New clauses 8, 9, 13 and 32 are unique in that they have a cross-party feel, which should not go unnoticed. I have not had the pleasure of being involved in all stages of the Bill, but I think that cross-party support for these new clauses is a unique aspect to our deliberations; I do not think it has happened until now. As the Minister has noticed, there is cross-party concern about the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) about fair play. We are concerned to ensure that our immigration system stands up to scrutiny from beginning to end, and that fair play is imbued within it.

Fair play matters for those who shout loudest and campaign loudly—whether before elections or in other campaigns throughout the year—just as much as it matters for those who are relatively voiceless, or perhaps do not even have a vote. Fair play should be about “the other” and those who are not as loud, and we want to uphold the fundamental British values of fairness and due process. Indeed, one could refer back to Magna Carta when considering issues of detention, and the right and duty to detain people only after fair and due process, and not for administrative purposes alone. Although I concede that immigration detention is not the main purpose of the Bill, it will not surprise the Minister that these new clauses have been tabled.

When dealing with detention, it is important that we uphold principles that have stood this country well for many years. The rest of the world looks at how we handle detention and whether we do so with fairness, and when dealing with those who are detained for administrative reasons, the bar is set that much higher. We must be proportionate, reasonable, and do things in a limited way, so that a limited number of people are in detention for as short a time as possible. Regardless of whether the new clauses are accepted, we must ensure that that principle is applied.

[Keir Starmer]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that what unites the parties is the principle that there should be some measure to limit and reduce the time spent in immigration detention?

[Mr Burrowes]

I agree, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about that abiding principle. Home Office guidance states that detention should be used sparingly and as a last resort, and such guidance must be available for all to use and apply throughout the system. However people come to this country, and whether by fair means or foul, we must treat everyone fairly and with dignity when they are with us, all the way through to their possible removal. They may be with us voluntarily or by force, but at every stage we must show that we respect their human dignity.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions on a range of issues, which have highlighted the concerns, passion and interest that so many people have shown throughout the consideration of this Bill. The debate we have had over the last hour and 50 minutes has again underlined that interest and focus, and it is important that the House has been able to debate in this way.

I want to start with the issue of immigration detention, which is one of the key elements of the debate. I want to underline at the outset the fact that the Home Office has a policy to safeguard against unnecessary or arbitrary detention. The presumption is in favour of liberty. Cases must be considered on their individual circumstances. Detention must be used sparingly and for the shortest period necessary. That goes to the heart of some of the elements in new clause 13, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes). This is about having a system that is efficient and effective, but that also treats those within it with dignity and respect.

[Keir Starmer]

rose—

[James Brokenshire]

If I may, I would like to finish this point and then take interventions. I want to set out the fact that the Home Office is conducting detailed analysis of the purposes behind that—in other words, moving towards the policy that I have underlined, including looking at the checks and balances in the systems to ensure that we have a more efficient and more effective process so that people are removed more swiftly and speedily. We also need to reflect on how that sits within an overall framework of removal.

I believe that it is accepted here that detention plays an important role in managing immigration and managing people towards removal, but it has to have removal as its focus. Yes, of course, for certain groups such as foreign national offenders or in certain national security cases, detention might be needed for a slightly longer period, but always with the focus on the realistic prospect of removal taking place. We will come back to this House in the new year—and we intend this to be before the Bill has passed through both Houses—setting out the much broader piece of work that we are undertaking.

Other amendments relate to the issues of vulnerability raised by Steven Shaw. As I have indicated, we intend to respond to it before the Bill has started its Committee in the House of Lords, and we shall also set out proposals for a new detained fast-track, which I suspended because I was not satisfied that the necessary safeguards were in place. It is the sense of how we construct an efficient and effective detention policy that goes to the heart of the issues I have highlighted—of considering cases on their merits, but using detention sparingly and for the shortest period necessary that is consistent with our policy, which must be upheld.

[Keir Starmer]

Does the Minister agree that the reviews he has summarised deal with the issues raised in paragraphs (b) through to (e) in new clause 13? Having set out the policy carefully, does he agree that it is consistent with the principle that we should seek to limit and reduce the time spent in immigration detention?

[James Brokenshire]

As I have said, the current Home Office policy is to use detention sparingly and for the shortest period necessary, which is why our work on ensuring a more efficient and effective system consistent with our obligation is absolutely consistent with the themes redolent in paragraphs (b) to (e) of new clause 13. The difference is that I believe that having a 28-day time period does not advance the cause. It is a blunt instrument that does not take account of the full range of different circumstances that are redolent here from foreign national offenders to those who might not be compliant with the requirements we put upon them or who abscond, so we need to look at the situation on a case-by-case basis. I repeat, however, that we are conducting our review in the light of our focus on efficiency and effectiveness, and we will revert to the House as I have outlined.

A number of other points, including about the right to rent, have been highlighted in the debate. The right-to-rent scheme restricts the access of illegal migrants to the private rented sector, stopping them setting down roots and building ties. The scheme, which has been rolled out to parts of the west midlands, has not proven difficult or burdensome for landlords, but it has led to illegal migrants being apprehended.

The scheme has been in place for one year and is working as intended. The Government published an extensive evaluation of the right-to-rent scheme’s first six months, and this found no hard evidence of discrimination or any new barriers to lawful residents accessing the private rented sector. Repealing the right-to-rent scheme would remove a significant part of the Government’s measures to deter illegal migration. The Bill’s provisions on residential tenancies are aimed to make it easier for the majority of reputable landlords to evict illegal migrant tenants and to crack down further on those rogue landlords who do so much to damage the sector.

The offences are framed to allow for the prosecution of those who are or who have knowingly rented to illegal migrants or who have or had reasonable cause to believe that they were renting to illegal migrants. We believe that that is the right approach, but a conviction will be possible only where the offence has been proven to the criminal threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. These offences are not designed to catch out a landlord who has made a genuine mistake, and it is difficult to foresee a situation in which it would be in the public interest to pursue a prosecution against a landlord making reasonable efforts to remove illegal migrants from their property.

There are concerns about people being evicted without adequate notice or without sufficient safeguards in place—and points were raised about these in the debate on some of the other amendments. However, safeguards already exist. The Secretary of State will serve notices only where she is satisfied that the migrant is here unlawfully and only after taking the migrant’s circumstances into consideration. Should there be recognised barriers to illegal migrants leaving the UK that are not of their own making, these will be taken into account.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) asked about measures relating to charities. Amendment 46 would create what we regard as a significant loophole in the right-to-rent provisions. It could lead to endless quibbling about what is meant by “significantly exceed the costs” and indeed about what constitutes “costs”. I responded in Committee to give an assurance on a number of different aspects, and said that many of the shelters would fall outside the provisions. Our concern is that rogue landlords would take advantage of the measures that the hon. Lady outlined, and we would not want to create such a loophole.

In the debate in Committee on the director of labour market enforcement, there was strong support on all sides for the creation of such a director, which has been reflected in today’s debate, too. The director’s role is already set out in the Bill. The director will set out the strategy for our enforcement bodies to stop exploitation and non-compliance across the spectrum, but there is a difference between the role of the director and that of the anti-slavery commissioner. If we look at all the different aspects of the labour market enforcement strategy, we judge that the provision is right, but we will obviously continue to reflect to ensure that it is appropriately framed.

On the issue of resources, we have recently announced that we will increase HMRC’s budget for 2015-16 by £4 million around the issue of the national minimum wage. The director will analyse the available funds across all the different aspects for which he or she would have responsibility.

Some have raised concerns about the offence. The Government would not want to prosecute those who have been forced to travel here and exploited for the profit of others, which goes to the heart of the matter. That is why the offence is not aimed at the victims of modern slavery. The statutory defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 will apply.

On some of the issues raised by SNP Members, we maintain that the heart of the issues that matter here are reserved, so it would not be appropriate to accept the proposed amendments. New clause 16 would amend the compensation arrangements for those experiencing financial detriment as a consequence of an illegal working closure notice, but we believe that these provisions are already covered in paragraph 15 of schedule 3 and related safeguards, which are, in our judgment, sufficient. As for James Ewins’s review of overseas domestic workers, it will shortly be published and will no doubt be subject to further consideration at that stage.

I reiterate to right hon. and hon. Members that we have given careful consideration to the Bill and have reflected on a number of the points raised. I hope that, with the assurances I have given, right hon. and hon. Members will be minded not to press their amendments and new clauses to the vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I start by confirming that we see the sense in the Government new clauses—I think they are new clauses 3 to 7—intended to help local authorities such as Kent deal with unaccompanied children, and we support them. But that is the extent of the agreement on this group of amendments.

Amendment 29 deals with the removal of support for certain categories of migrants. Such removal is wrong in principle and likely to be counterproductive. All the evidence is one way—support for families facing removal is the best means of ensuring that they leave. By support, I mean not only support in the terms set out in the Bill, but support by way of help with obstacles, documents and advice. It is the families that are supported in that broad way that are most likely to leave, and thus the objective is achieved by having the support in place. By contrast, withdrawing support has the opposite effect.

Let us call a spade a spade. Withdrawing support for this category of migrants is a threat of destitution as a means of enforcing immigration rules. All the evidence suggests that it is counterproductive. The Minister mentioned the 2005 pilot, confident—I think—that I would also mention it. It was a pilot of the proposition that withdrawing support—threatening destitution—was likely to encourage people to leave and to alter behaviour. The results of that pilot were evaluated in 2006, and they were stark. Of the 116 families in the pilot, one family left as a result of the withdrawal of support; 12 sought help with documents; 32 families went underground; and nine were removed from the scheme because on analysis it was found that their claims should not have been refused. The pilot was considered a complete failure.

The evidence is not only a pilot some 10 years ago: it is practice since then, with successive and different Governments accepting that destitution, or the threat of destitution, should not be used as a means of enforcing removal because—among other reasons—it is wholly counterproductive.

The Minister says that the situation now is different, and he put forward two reasons. The first is that, under the proposed arrangements, families would have to prove there was a genuine obstacle to removal. I am not sure how far that advances the argument. The idea seems to be that putting the onus on the family to prove a genuine obstacle will make them less likely to go underground if support is withdrawn, but there is no rational link between the two propositions. Secondly, he says the process will not be by way of correspondence, but carried out in a more engaged manner. It is hard to see how that change, welcome though it is, will make a difference to the stark results of the 2005 pilot. The withdrawal will cause hardship, distress and anxiety and will be wholly counterproductive. That is one the problems with the Bill: it does not meet its own objectives. The only basis on which the Government can advance these provisions is that they will make the UK appear to be a more hostile environment.

Destitution in the 21st century should not be a means of enforcing immigration rules, or any other rules, yet that is what lies behind the provisions. The whole House will accept that children should not be adversely impacted by the decisions of their parents, yet the Bill will visit those adverse impacts on them, because they will fall within the removal of support provisions. That led to great debate in Committee about whether this would simply transfer the burden from one Department to local authorities, which are not going to stand by and leave destitute children unassisted. The provision, therefore, is wrong in principle and counterproductive, and not one that in the 21st century we should have anything to do with.

Turning briefly to appeals, I will start with the narrow issue of appeals on the question of support. Amendments 31, 40 and 30 would reinstate the right of appeal against Home Office decisions on support. This is where the Home Office has made a decision on support but it is thought that the decision is wrong. At the moment, the error rate is very high. Those in the House who were not on the Committee will be astonished to hear that it is as high as 60% in some cases. Under the Bill, those decisions could not be put right on a simple appeal. In Committee, the Minister said that the long route of judicial review would remain as a remedy, but I failed to understand then, and I fail to do so now, how it can be sensible or cost-efficient to remove a simple right of appeal in cases for which there is a high rate of success and to rely on the much more expensive route of judicial review by different principles. With a 60% error rate, it is unacceptable to withdraw the right of appeal.

In relation to that error rate and others I will mention, the argument that some decisions that are changed are changed because an individual provides additional information is no answer. The rate of 60%, and of 40% to 42% for general appeals, is high in any event, and there is no evidence to suggest that in the majority of cases an individual has not provided the necessary information. In any event, whether or not they have been properly advised about what information to provide, they should not be punished by the withdrawal of support where inappropriate.

On the wider point of appeal, amendments 27 and 28 deal with the extension of appeals to the wider category of individuals who will be removed before they can appeal. There is a general point to make about such appeals, which is that although there may be court cases establishing that these provisions or their forerunners do not extinguish the rights of appeal, there is no question but that they materially inhibit the right of appeal. The success rate under the current arrangements, of between 40% and 42%, is instructive—these are the cases where individuals have been removed, only in the end to succeed in their appeals. I accept that some in that group may well have succeeded earlier had different or fuller information been made available to the authorities, but there is a variety of reasons why that may have happened, including the advice that those people had been given. Removing first, before appeal, materially inhibits rights of appeal and it should certainly not be expanded.

Amendments 27 and 28 are intended to ensure that before a decision is made to certify any claim for out-of-country appeal, the best interests of any child affected must be considered. These amendments propose a specific provision to deal with a real problem, rather than the general provision that is already in place, and that is materially important for the children who will be affected by the extension of the rules on appeal.

I want to spend just a few moments on the family reunification issues. Part 11 of the immigration rules are very narrowly drawn, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has given a powerful example of the injustice that they can and do inflict. New clause 1 is intended to remedy that, and I am sympathetic to it, but we have tabled new clause 11, which proposes a wider review of the refugee family reunification rules. New clause 11 has the advantage of covering the failure to implement the Dublin III convention, the advantage of enabling the review to consider an option to allow British citizens to sponsor close family members recognised as refugees or granted humanitarian protection, and the advantage of looking at options for extending the criteria for family reunion in the way envisaged by new clause 1.

[Mr Chope]

I rise to speak to my two new clauses. In so doing, I want to thank the Minister for telling me all the reasons why he does not support them, although he was generous enough to say that he agrees with the principles that lie behind them.

The second of my new clauses, new clause 12, could well be a blueprint for what happens after the country decides to leave the European Union in the forthcoming referendum, because it sets out the way in which people who are already in this country would be able to obtain the right of residence here, as well as some of the associated rules to ensure that those without the right of residence would be the subject of criminal sanctions.

Before coming to that in more detail, I want to refer to new clause 10 and some of the background to it. New clause 10 is modelled very much on a private Member’s Bill that I have brought forward on a couple of occasions for debate in the House, the Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill. The Bill had the privilege of being the subject of an opinion poll, which was conducted by the noble Lord Ashcroft in June 2013. The findings were that some 86% of those polled supported the provisions of the Bill and only 9% were against them, so this is a new clause that strikes a chord with the British people.

The reason I have brought those provisions forward again is that, despite previous debates, it seems that the statistics on how many people are being prosecuted and/or convicted for offences under section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971 are going in the wrong direction. In 2009, the number of people proceeded against and convicted both in the magistrates courts and the Crown courts for offences against that section was a giddy 158. For every year after 2009 the number had fallen, and by 2013—the last year for which figures are available—the number found guilty in the magistrates courts had fallen to six and the number convicted in the Crown courts had fallen to 66, making a total of 72 convictions for a widespread range of criminal offences against our immigration laws.

Immigration Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

May I first echo the Minister’s comments by joining him and everybody in the House in abhorring the attacks that took place this weekend in Paris, as well as all the other attacks that have taken place elsewhere. They are attacks on our values, and we must stand together in our response. Those responsible seek to divide us; we must not be divided. As was said in the House yesterday, they are attacks on our values, our principles and our approach to issues such as refugees. It is important, if we mean what we say about our values and about standing together, that we do not diminish our stand on refugees, human rights and the sort of democratic accountability that this Committee brings to how we pass laws in this country.

Those are important principles, and it is right that this Bill should go through such a process to ensure that there is no diminution of protection for asylum seekers and refugees or of human rights for anybody who finds themselves in this jurisdiction, whether they be an adult, a child, a refugee or anybody else. As human beings, they have human rights, and it is our business to ensure that those rights are fully upheld. I make those comments in response to the comments just made, but nothing that happened this weekend should lead any of us to think that weakening in any way our resolve to deal properly with refugees and human rights issues should be any part of the answer to the atrocities, which we are all united in abhorring.

I will take the new clause and schedule in the order that the Minister did. Paragraph 7 of new schedule 3 is intended to provide a new, simplified definition of a person without immigration status who will generally be ineligible for local authority support. Can he assure us that only those currently excluded from support will continue to be excluded—in other words, that this is a simplification of the process, and that paragraph 7 does not broaden the category of individuals ineligible for support listed in schedule 3(1) of the 2002 Act?

Paragraph 8 of new schedule 3 will provide for the accommodation and subsistence needs of destitute families without immigration status in certain circumstances. Our concern about the provision involves those who are seeking judicial review or have judicial review proceedings pending. Again, can the Minister set out the position on such individuals? It will be a change from the current position, and it excludes that group of individuals from protection. If that is not the case, an assurance to that effect would be helpful, and would go on the record.

Paragraph 4 inserts a new paragraph 3A into schedule 3 of the 2002 Act and relates to how we deal with destitute families. Again, there are two issues for the Minister. First, without knowing the meaning of a “genuine obstacle” to return, how can the Committee assess the impact of the provision? We are considering it against a definition that is not before the Committee. Secondly—he might have dealt with this, but perhaps he can assure me if he did not—can he confirm that the needs provided for under the section appear to be narrower than those provided for under the Children Act 1989? In other words, they appear to omit disability or education needs. Given what he just said, I might be wrong about that, and a simple assurance might deal with that point.

[James Brokenshire]

If I may intervene to save time, I explained that the provision applies to housing and what are effectively direct support needs, but that the provisions of section 17 of the Children Act 1989, which relate to other needs such as medical or care needs, will still remain in force.



[Albert Owen in the Chair]

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful. I did think that that was what the Minister had said, and I just wanted that assurance.

Turning in a little more detail to the provisions in paragraph 2 dealing with those leaving care, former looked-after children who require leave to enter or remain when they turn 18, but do not have it or are not asylum seekers, will be excluded from receiving accommodation, financial support, a personal adviser, a pathway plan, funds for education or training and any other assistance under various provisions of the Children Act 1989 and from staying put with foster carers or maintaining contact. The Minister says that that is because the needs of those who have no right to be here are different from those of people who have their future in this country. Such individuals are former looked-after children who have just turned 18, and care leavers in such circumstances include those with no immigration status, those who arrived as children and sought asylum and were granted UASC leave, and those who came to the UK at a young age but were never helped to regularise their status.

Such people can only claim access to accommodation and other assistance in limited circumstances. The first is if they are destitute, have been refused asylum and are eligible for support and there is a genuine obstacle to them leaving the UK. The second is if they are destitute and have a pending non-asylum immigration application or appeal. The third is if their rights are exhausted, and regulations will set out the limited circumstances in which they can receive support.

The concern here is that specific provision was made in the Children Act for all children leaving care in recognition of their additional vulnerabilities and the need for additional support in order for them to have the same chances as other young people entering adulthood. The new clause and new schedule fundamentally change that position. There is a real concern that someone who has just turned 18 and who, as a matter of fact and possibly because of vulnerabilities, has simply not regularised their immigration status will be denied support under this provision, which cuts across the thrust of the 1989 Act.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

I want to speak against new clause 17 and new schedule 3. I want to start by asking the Minister whether he has the approval of the Minister for Children and Families, because the provisions seem to challenge much of the core principles for which he has been arguing. The changes have far-reaching impacts on the core definitions and duties of the Children Act, and it is strange that such dramatic changes are being housed within an immigration Bill.

Section 23(4)(c) of the Children Act places a duty on local authorities to give care leavers assistance to the extent that their welfare requires it. While the young person was a looked-after child, the local authority was their corporate parent. That duty recognises the legacy of the parental role and allows the local authority to step in and protect a care leaver in crisis. The Government’s Staying Put initiative explicitly recognises the need for care leavers to have “stable and secure homes” and to

“be given sufficient time to prepare for life after care.”

The Department for Education care leavers’ charter outlines key principles that will

“remain constant through any changes in Legislation, Regulation and Guidance”,

including the provision of advice and practical, financial and emotional support. Such initiatives are entirely undermined by the proposals.

Migrant children in care often face additional difficulties to British children. They are particularly likely to have faced trauma. They may experience language and cultural barriers. They are less likely to have any contact with biological family members. Care leavers often need their personal adviser or advocate to help to identify and even instruct an immigration lawyer. Barnardo’s conducted a child advocacy pilot for the Home Office that by all accounts seemed to be very beneficial. It helped the young person enormously to make informed choices and it helped the state to provide the level of support that was needed, so it seems odd that the new clause will undermine the Government’s pilot.

Not only is it discriminatory to remove support from young people leaving care on the basis of their immigration status, but in order for migrant care leavers to enter adulthood successfully it is vital that they can access a care plan under the 1989 Act. They are very young adults who often have no one else to turn to. The Government’s changes will remove all possible support usually provided to care leavers—including a personal adviser, a pathway plan and funding for education or training—other than, as the Minister confirmed, basic accommodation and financial assistance for certain groups.

It is not clear from the new clause whether it is envisaged that local authorities or the Home Office will be responsible for providing the support set out in proposed new paragraph 10B. Although I oppose the changes as a whole, at the very least local authorities should be responsible for providing support if the Government are not, and that should be stated in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

I shall respond to the points that have been flagged in the order in which they were made. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras asked a number of questions. I underline that paragraph 7B is principally a matter of clarification. Those failed asylum seekers who claim asylum at port rather than in country are covered by the definition in paragraph 7B; we argue that that provides greater clarity. He made a point about judicial review cases. If someone has been granted permission to seek judicial review in respect of an asylum or article 3 European convention on human rights claim they will now be eligible for section 95 support under schedule 6 to the Bill.

The hon. and learned Gentleman also asked what was meant by a “genuine obstacle to return”. We debated that previously in this Committee and as I previously stated, the principal reasons will be a lack of documentation, including travel documentation, to facilitate return, or medical issues. He commented on the needs of children leaving care—a point further developed by the hon. Member for Rotherham and the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. It is important to underline that the provisions relate to adults rather than children. That is important in the context of the UN convention on the rights of the child, as it defines a child as under the age of 18. Obviously, we are talking about adults who do not have that right to remain in the UK.

It may also be worth highlighting some context here. For example, in 2014 63% of asylum claims made by unaccompanied children were made by young people who arrived aged 16 or 17; therefore they had spent most of their lives outside the UK. When their claims fail and their appeal rights are exhausted, adult migrants are expected to leave this country. Any accommodation, subsistence or other support they require prior to their departure is, in our judgment, better provided under provisions intended for that purpose, not under the Children Act care leaver provisions intended to support the development of young people whose long-term future is in the UK. That is the distinction we draw.

[Keir Starmer]

What does the Minister say to the concern that those coming out of care may very well be vulnerable and traumatised, whatever age they went into care? They might not have regularised their status and will need access, for example, to an adviser even to get as far as an immigration lawyer to start the process. I appreciate what he says about age, but these are children who have just turned 18. What does he say to that group?

[James Brokenshire]

Obviously, if someone comes to this country as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child, their case will be considered in that context and whether they become appeal rights exhausted up to the point at which they turn 18. It is not simply about how we approach this when someone gets to 18; for example, when they are 17 and a half they are reminded that they do not have status and that they should be regularising their position if they have not already done so. At that stage, obviously, the provisions that would continue to exist for a child, with the potential for a local authority to provide a personal adviser, will have been put in place.

[Keir Starmer]

That answer is inadequate. The Minister makes a distinction between those who are 18 and under 18. What he is saying is that we tell children that they must undertake whatever proceedings they need to regularise their status, and if they do not do so, when they get to 18, when they may still be very vulnerable and in need, they have missed the opportunity, perhaps because, as children, they did not understand what they were supposed to do. How is this supposed to work in practice for that vulnerable group?

[James Brokenshire]

As the hon. and learned Gentleman has already highlighted, support is provided to a child within the meaning of the Children Act. The point we are making is that when someone becomes an adult who is appeal rights exhausted, it is appropriate for the state to seek the removal of that adult from the UK in those circumstances. We are making an in-principle point about facilitating the removal of those with no rights to be here. The hon. and learned Gentleman seems to be suggesting that because someone came to this country as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child, they have an enhanced right to remain in this country. We are saying that that is not correct. We should of course work with the Home Office to see that someone returns in those circumstances and that they are assisted to do so. Fundamentally, the provisions in the Children Act are designed for those who are likely to stay in the UK. Therefore it is our judgment that they should not apply and that is why we are bringing forward these provisions.

To the hon. Member for Rotherham I would add that we have consulted the Department for Education closely in the preparation of these provisions. The schedule therefore reflects a whole of Government view, rather than just a Home Office view.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Gangmasters Licensing Authority—GLA—is the foremost labour inspection agency in the UK and it works to protect workers within the sectors it oversees, namely agriculture, forestry, horticulture, shellfish gathering, and food processing and packaging. It was set up in the aftermath of the 2004 Morecambe bay cockling disaster, in which 23 Chinese cockle pickers drowned when trapped by sweeping tides. In the past two years, the authority has prevented the exploitation of probably more than 5,000 workers.

During debates on the Modern Slavery Act 2015, a number of colleagues called for the Gangmasters Licensing Authority’s remit to be extended to cover sectors beyond those it currently regulates to include other sectors known to be high risk, among them construction, hospitality and social care. We then have the provisions in the Bill, which are not an extension of the GLA’s powers but the creation of a different body—the director of labour market enforcement. We welcome and support that, but there are two major implications. First, by increasing the focus on criminal investigations by the GLA, the provisions extend investigations within the existing remit but not the remit itself. The first issue that raises is one of resources, which has already been touched on in previous discussions in the Committee. Without the resources to go with the additional number of criminal investigations there is, in fact, a thinning down of the GLA’s ability to carry out its important work, rather than a reinforcing of it.

At this stage in particular, I draw to the Committee’s attention the fact that the GLA already sustained 20% savings—or cuts—in the previous spending review. There is a new spending review pending, and I ask the Minister: what further cuts are expected to the GLA in that review?

Secondly, on a separate point, the consultation exercise that accompanies the Bill seems to suggest going down the route of voluntary rather than statutory licensing. It would be helpful for the Committee if the Minister clarified whether this is the intended direction of travel for the GLA, particularly since, in our opinion, the statutory licencing approach has worked very well in the past.

[James Brokenshire]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for proposing the new clause, which seeks to introduce a power to extend the licensing regime contained in the Gangmasters Licensing Act 2004 to new sectors of the economy. It rightly facilitates a debate and I join him in underlining the important work that the GLA has undertaken and how it remains an important agency in seeking to respond to labour market abuses.

The hon. and learned Gentleman will recollect our debates on the director of labour market enforcement and the new strategy that we intend to adopt. He will also remember that I made it clear that it would be for the director of labour market enforcement effectively to make recommendations as to how resources should be applied within the overall spending envelope.

The hon. and learned Gentleman asked about the spending review. Sadly, that is a matter for others, and he will have to wait for the Chancellor’s statement next week. I am not going to tread on the Chancellor’s toes. I think that is the right and proper way. However, I want to touch on the current consultation on the role and remit of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. Hon. Members have already voiced opinions of the work undertaken by the GLA and I hope they will welcome the consultation and the questions it asks about the GLA’s role in tackling labour market exploitation.

As demonstrated by the amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which require a review of the role of the GLA, we have taken very seriously the issues raised during debates during the passage of that Act about whether the GLA should have a wider role. Section 55 of the Modern Slavery Act already requires the Government to publish a paper on the role of the GLA and to consult on it. Our current consultation on the GLA and wider labour market exploitation fulfils that requirement.

We are unclear what the new clause seeks to achieve, given that we are in the midst of consulting on the GLA’s remit and role. In fact, our consultation goes further than the new clause proposes. We are seeking views on extending the role of the GLA beyond its current role in licensing gangmasters in certain sectors. The new clause appears to restrict the GLA’s role solely to licensing. We have a broader ambition for the GLA’s contribution to tackling exploitation, which is why we are proposing a new, wider remit for the GLA with new investigatory and enforcement powers to tackle serious cases of labour market exploitation, wherever they occur in the economy. We also want to ensure that the licensing regime can be adapted to fit the latest intelligence and the changing threat of worker exploitation in different sectors. We have set out several proposals in our consultation that we believe would achieve that.

We are looking to the role of the director of labour market enforcement to recommend any changes to the current statutory licensing regime and also to work closely with businesses to identify areas of possible self-regulation. It is the director’s role in considering the use of licensing to tackle labour market exploitation. The consultation proposes that the director should recommend extensions or reductions to the licensing remit. That may identify new sectors beyond those in the remit of the licensing regime where licensing can play a part in tackling worker exploitation.

At paragraph 137 of the consultation document, we suggest:

“a flexible and evidence-based approach to using licensing as a tool to prevent exploitation in the very highest risk sectors. Any changes to the licensed sectors would be agreed by Parliament, after Ministers had considered an evidence based proposal from the Director. This would be based on a risk based intelligence analysis of labour sectors.”

So we are envisaging a regulation-making power that would allow Ministers to change the licensing regime or the sectors covered by licensing through regulations that would be agreed by Parliament, after Ministers had considered the director’s evidence-based proposal. We believe that that would give an appropriate level of scrutiny to the evidence presented for any changes to the licensing regime.

We are consulting on the changes because we recognise the broad support to build on the effectiveness and good work of the GLA by providing the authority with further powers to increase its already strong performance. Once the consultation has closed, we will consider our response, including the funding necessary for the GLA to operate effectively in the context of the spending review, the results of which will be announced shortly. We fully expect that process to conclude during the passage of the Bill.

In the light of the proposals made in the consultation, which would extend the GLA’s enforcement function across the economy and set the framework for evidence-based decisions on licensing, we believe that the new clause is unnecessary, but we look forward to the results of the consultation and a clear, evidence-based analysis, which I hope will strengthen the GLA and our response to illegal working and to those who are abusing the vulnerable. We are adding to the GLA’s functions and to the progress in enhancing our response to bad, inappropriate and at times illegal practices in the labour market. The new enforcement measures contemplated in the Bill will strengthen the GLA.

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister resists the temptation to anticipate the Chancellor, but I wager that the resources for the GLA will go down, not up. All that will be discussed between now and what will be announced is by how much the resources will go down. I hope I am wrong, but I doubt it.

I fear what the Minister and other Ministers have said about savings and cuts. Of course I accept that efficiencies can always be made, but I have deep concerns that, in the area we are discussing, as well as in others, we will look back on the spending review and recognise that we did long-standing damage to the ability of our various agencies and authorities to carry out their necessary work, in particular with those who are most exploited in our society. However, we can return to the subject after the Chancellor’s announcement and see what the position is.

The Minister asked what the purpose of the new clause was. It was to build in a review. I listened carefully to what he said about the consultation and what might follow, and I welcome that. Given what he said about the exercise to be followed, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Additional measures in relation to victims of domestic violence or human trafficking

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In Section 21 after sub-section (4) insert—

“(4A) P is to be treated as having a right to rent in relation to premises (in spite of subsection (2)) if they are in the process of applying for leave to remain under Paragraph 289 of the Immigration Rules as a victim of domestic violence.

(4B) P is to be treated as having a right to rent in relation to premises (in spite of subsection (2)) if they have received a reasonable grounds decision from UK Visas and Immigration that they are a victim of human trafficking.”’—(Keir Starmer.)

This new clause would enable suspected victims of human trafficking or domestic violence, who do not have a final visa giving them leave to remain, the right to enter into a tenancy.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 10—Persons disqualified by immigration status or with limited right to rent—

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (3).

(2) Omit section 21(3) and insert—

“(3) But P is to be treated as having a right to rent in relation to premises (in spite of subsection (2)) if:

(a) the Secretary of State has granted P permission for the purposes of this Chapter to occupy premises under a residential tenancy agreement; or

(b) P has been granted immigration bail; or

(c) P is to be treated as having been granted immigration bail.”’

To ensure that persons seeking asylum who can afford to rent privately, persons with outstanding applications and persons with outstanding appeals or judicial reviews are able to rent.

[Keir Starmer]

I will do my best to be as persuasive as my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham had she spoken on the proposed provisions. It is convenient to take the two new clauses together.

New clause 6 is in essence an attempt to carve out an exemption to the restrictions on right to rent in relation to two particularly vulnerable groups—suspected victims of domestic violence or human trafficking—and gives them the right to enter into a tenancy. Our concern is the unintended consequence of those two groups not being able to be properly accommodated.

New clause 10 is different. It is intended to provide a right to rent to anyone known to and in touch with the authorities, whom the authorities have chosen not to detain, where they are in a financial position to rent privately. If they are not in a position to rent privately, they would be catered for differently through support, so this is a sub-group within the group that is known to be in touch with the authorities, but not detained. It has been suggested that the Secretary of State will exercise discretionary power in relation to that group. The new clause is intended to put that on a proper statutory basis so that that group is properly protected.

[James Brokenshire]

The Government completely agree that victims of domestic violence and human trafficking should not be disadvantaged as a result of this legislation or the previous Immigration Act. We accept that individuals in such a vulnerable position should have access to the private rented sector. The aims and objectives in new clause 6 are laudable, but we do not believe they are necessary.

When the 2014 Act was before Parliament, we were concerned that the Secretary of State should have sufficient latitude to be able to exempt specific persons from the disqualification on renting premises if need be. Subsection (3) of section 21 of that Act provides that a person is to be treated as having a right to rent if the Secretary of State has granted that person permission to occupy premises under a residential tenancy agreement. That can be exercised on behalf of vulnerable people. In addition, the Act provides exemptions whereby the provisions do not apply to certain excluded tenancy agreements. Schedule 3 specifically excludes hostels and refuges. Paragraph 6(5) to schedule 3 defines refuges as accommodation used for persons who have been subject to violence, threats and other coercive and abusive behaviour, so persons in refuges will not be disadvantaged.

Where a potential victim of human trafficking has received a positive reasonable grounds decision through the national referral mechanism, the Government fund specialist accommodation and support, as do the devolved Administrations, which is provided until a conclusive grounds decision is reached on their status as a victim and on any discretionary leave resulting from that status.

New clause 10 is also unnecessary. Persons seeking asylum who can afford to rent privately, and persons who have a genuine barrier preventing their departure from the UK, can already obtain permission to rent from the Home Office. That permission to rent mechanism already exists in section 21(3) of the Immigration Act 2014. Landlords of prospective migrant tenants who believe that they may qualify for permission to rent can contact the Home Office to conduct a right to rent check.

There is also no need for a statutory provision for permission to rent for persons granted immigration bail. Such persons are always given permission, and Home Office presenting officers have been instructed to assure immigration judges that, should they choose to release an immigrant on bail, the Home Office will provide permission to rent. That is our very clear policy. The tribunal has found this approach acceptable. It is also the case that there may be other instances where permission to rent is appropriate, such as where an illegal immigrant faces a recognised barrier to returning home.

On the national referral mechanism, we aim to make a reasonable grounds decision within five days. Once a positive reasonable grounds decision is made, potential victims of modern slavery can access accommodation and support through the Government-funded contract run by the Salvation Army, which many hon. Members will be well aware of. It is therefore normally through that mechanism that support is provided. The hon. and learned Gentleman highlights the issue of discretion. I think that I have explained that we seek to apply discretion if there is continued consideration moving towards a conclusive decision. However, in all practical circumstances, support would normally be provided through the Salvation Army-run contracts and through the arrangements of the devolved Administrations. We judge that, practically, these amendments are not needed because support is given.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I think we share concerns about the particular groups that are dealt with under the new clauses. The gap between us is between a statutory scheme under the new clause and a discretionary scheme exercised by the Secretary of State. The Minister has, however, set out in some detail what the policy approach is and has given a clear steer as to how measures are being and will be operated. In those circumstances, the gap is in fact smaller than it might otherwise have been and I will not press the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 7

Residential tenancies: repeal of provisions of the Immigration Act 2014

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.

(2) Omit sections 20-37, 74(2)(a) and Schedule 3.—(Keir Starmer.)

Together with amendment 84, this amendment removes the residential tenancies provisions from both the Immigration Act 2014 and the current Bill.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I can deal with new clause 7 very briefly because, as hon. Members will see, it is associated with, and is I think the flipside of, amendment 84, which we discussed the week before last. It aims to remove the residential tenancies right to move provisions from the Immigration Act, but the Committee has already had a substantive debate on this, including discussion of the west midlands pilot, and we voted on amendment 84. In those circumstances, whatever our respective views on these provisions, I am not sure they will become any more influential or powerful by being repeated at length. I therefore do not propose to press new clause 7.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. and learned Gentleman has clearly reaffirmed the Opposition’s position and I do not think, in the interests of time, that there is any merit in my going over some of the detailed debates that we have already had on amendment 84. We have had extensive debate on the right to rent and I know that there is a difference of opinion across the Committee. Equally I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman recognises that a vote has already been taken and that this new clause repeats some of that ground. I welcome his comment that he does not intend to push new clause 7 to a vote.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

Persons with a right to rent

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 21(2)(a) after “have it,” insert “subject to subsection (2A)”.

(3) After section 21(2) insert—

“(2A) P retains a right to rent under this section:

(a) for 90 days after P’s leave to enter or remain comes to an end; or

(b) until the end of the one year beginning with the date on which P’s landlord last complied with the prescribed requirements in respect of P, whichever is longer.”

(4) After section 21(4) (b) insert—

“(c) a person who has retained a right to rent under subsection (2A).”—(Keir Starmer.)

To amend the Immigration Act 2014 to provide protection for landlords and landladies from prosecution when their tenant’s leave comes to an end.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 9—Immigration Act 2014: Premises shared with the landlord or a member of his family—

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In Clause 20 (Residential tenancy agreement), omit the “and” at the end of subparagraph (b), and insert—

“(ba) is not an agreement granting a right of occupation of premises shared with the landlord, licensor or a member of his family, and””

To exclude from the definition of a residential tenancy agreement those agreements relating to accommodation shared with a landlord or a member of his family, so that individuals who rent out rooms or take lodgers into their homes, as opposed to renting out a whole flat or house, are not part of the right to rent provisions.

[Keir Starmer]

I intend to take a similar approach to new clause 8 as I took to new clause 7. It goes, again, to an issue that we have already discussed: the element of protection given to landlords who find themselves in a situation where they are immediately criminalised under the new provisions, about which we expressed considerable concern in the debate that we had the week before last. This provision deals with what we see as the injustice of that situation by providing for a 90-day grace period to protect landlords. It is, in essence, a version of the argument, or the submission, that we made two weeks ago, which was dealt with by a vote on protection for landlords. Again, I doubt that in the intervening two weeks the arguments on either side have either changed or strengthened, so I will not press the new clause.

New clause 9 has one foot in the camp of having already been discussed and one foot in the camp of being new. The last time we touched on similar provisions was in relation to a concern about those in a household who may find themselves advertising for co-tenants. The example discussed in Committee was that of students in a flat who might advertise when one of their number leaves. The Minister gave various assurances and made it clear that in those circumstances they would not come within the definition of an agent and therefore there was no need for concern. I accept that and, from memory, we withdrew the amendment on that basis.

New clause 9 is concerned with a not dissimilar situation, of a landlord renting accommodation that is shared by the landlord or a member of his or her family. It draws a distinction between, on the one hand, professional landlords, and on the other, those who simply let out a room in their house or flat. There is no real evidence on the likely impact of the new provisions on that group, but they will be impactful. New clause 9 drives at that group of individuals.

[James Brokenshire]

As the Government have explained, the new offences relating to landlords and agents will be targeted at cases where there has been repeated or particularly serious behaviour as regards renting to illegal migrants or failing to evict them. As I made clear and as we have debated previously, it is not intended to target landlords who are unaware that someone is disqualified from renting, nor will such landlords meet the

“knows or has reasonable cause to believe”

threshold required for commission of the offence. It is not intended to take steps to prosecute landlords who are taking reasonable steps to remove someone they know to be disqualified from their property. I recognise that, in part, new clause 8 goes over ground that we have debated at length in Committee, therefore I do not see a need to rerehearse some of the issues debated previously.

New clause 9 touches on some different points and seeks to place lodgers and instances where a person is renting to a family member outside the scope of the right to rent scheme. That was debated at some length at the time of the Immigration Act 2014 and was considered by the House in the context of its application to lodgers. There is already guidance about the position of those renting to close family. For example, undertaking a right to rent check provides a landlord with an excuse as regards the civil penalty. Where someone is confident that their family member is lawfully in the UK, there will be no need for them to undertake the checks to establish that excuse.

Our concern is that taking lodgers out of the scheme will mean that a significant number of illegal migrants and those who exploit them are left untouched, in essence creating a gap in the legislation. That would provide an easy means by which rogue landlords could avoid any sanctions, for instance by arguing that the property was their family home or by arranging for one tenant to take in another occupant as a lodger. Sadly, we know that there is exploitation, there are rogue landlords and that that is a risk. We believe that the checks are straightforward and should be no more difficult for someone letting out a spare room than for any other person who might be within the ambit of the Bill, for example through a formal tenancy. Anyone who accepts remuneration for renting property should accept the responsibilities involved in doing so, such as carrying out the basic checks previously debated and discussed in Committee. The concern about the gap that would be created and the risk that it might lead to further exploitation, with people being taken advantage of, means that we judge that this provision is not appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

It is obviously difficult, nor would it be right, for me to comment on specific arrangements. I have already talked about refuges and the separate exemptions that apply regarding the support provided for victims of trafficking, and in other circumstances within the definitions that were set out. I have spoken about the issue of nothing of monetary value changing hands, but ultimately we are looking at those with no right to be in the country. That is, I suppose, the basis of the question, and therefore some charitable support might be provided in other circumstances. That is why I must be careful in understanding the specifics, but I think that existing exemptions apply, and these were considered in detail when the right to rent scheme was original considered by the House. There are specific exemptions that we judge to be appropriate, and which cover, in particular, issues of vulnerability and abuse. Refuges play an incredible and essential role in providing appropriate support, and they are normally run by charities and other non-governmental organisations. It was right to put in those exemptions and we judge that they remain appropriate.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, in particular on new clause 8. I think he said that it was not the intention to prosecute landlords who took reasonable steps to take adequate action. As he well knows, in the end that is a matter for those who prosecute, but what he has said will now be on the record. It gives some assurance, certainly to Labour members of the Committee and also to landlords who have raised the issue with us, as well as with other members of the Committee, on a number of occasions. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 11

Eligibility for housing and homelessness assistance

“The Secretary of State shall make provision by regulations to ensure that a person granted leave to enter or remain under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971, whether under rules made under that section or otherwise, who is eligible for public funds shall also be eligible for housing and homelessness services.”—(Keir Starmer.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is my final appearance on an amendment or new clause, and it is fitting that the new clause is a probing one. Concerns have been raised about eligibility for housing and homelessness assistance. As a result of changes to immigration law and practice, some young people in households with children given leave to remain in the UK that allows them to claim all relevant benefits have un- intentionally been made ineligible for local authority housing and homelessness services, leaving them disadvantaged and creating a problem for social services, which must house them in emergencies if housing departments cannot do so.

The intention behind the new clause is to avoid what is hopefully an unintended consequence. If a level of assurance can be given that that will not be a consequence, the new clause has no purpose.

[James Brokenshire]

Migrants granted leave to enter or remain in the UK are generally expected to be able to maintain and accommodate themselves without recourse to public funds in the form of mainstream welfare benefits or local authority housing support. There is legislation in place to ensure that the majority of migrants cannot access those public funds. The Government are aware that in some cases a person granted immigration leave with no bar to accessing public funds might require local authority housing or homelessness support but would currently be ineligible as they are not settled here.

The Home Office is working with other Departments—the Department for Communities and Local Government in particular—to remedy the situation as swiftly as possible. It does not follow, however, that everyone who has been granted leave should have an immediate and enforceable claim to access local authority support and services, even where there is no bar to them accessing other public funds.

The No Recourse to Public Funds Network has highlighted the issue of the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Eligibility) (England) Regulations 2006, which control access to homelessness assistance and still refer to the discretionary leave category. That is quite a technical but important point. I assure the Committee that we are working closely with the Department for Communities and Local Government to examine amendments to the 2006 regulations, which is the relevant point.

There is an issue here, but I hope, with that assurance, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras will be minded to withdraw the new clause, while noting that this is something we are aware of and will take steps to remedy.

[Keir Starmer]

The purpose of a probing amendment is to identify a particular concern and seek assurance on it. The Minister gave that assurance and says all are working on a remedy. In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1

Private hire vehicles etc

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c. 115)

1 The Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 is amended as follows.

2 In section 8(7) (driver’s licence to be in force for three years unless suspended or revoked) for “A” substitute “Subject to section 8A, a”.

3 After section 8 insert—

“8A Drivers’ licences for persons subject to immigration control

(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a licence under section 8 is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period (“the leave period”),

(b) the person’s leave has not been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision), and

(c) apart from subsection (2), the period for which the licence would have been in force would have ended after the end of the leave period.

(2) Transport for London must grant the licence for a period which ends at or before the end of the leave period.

(3) Subsection (4) applies if—

(a) a licence under section 8 is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period, and

(b) the person’s leave has been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision).

(4) Transport for London must grant the licence for a period that does not exceed six months.

(5) A licence under section 8 ceases to be in force if the person to whom it was granted becomes disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from driving a hackney carriage.

(6) If subsection (5) applies to a licence, the person to whom it was granted must, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person first became disqualified, return to Transport for London—

(a) the licence,

(b) the person’s copy of the licence (if any), and

(c) the person’s driver’s badge.

(7) A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection (6) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction—

(a) to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, and

(b) in the case of a continuing offence, to a fine not exceeding ten pounds for each day during which an offence continues after conviction.

(8) For the purposes of this section a person is disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from driving a hackney carriage if the person is subject to immigration control and —

(a) the person has not been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or

(b) the person’s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom—

(i) is invalid,

(ii) has ceased to have effect (whether by reason of curtailment, revocation, cancellation, passage of time or otherwise), or

(iii) is subject to a condition preventing the individual from driving a hackney carriage.

(9) Where a person is on immigration bail within the meaning of Part 1 of Schedule 5 to the Immigration Act 2016—

(a) the person is to be treated for the purposes of this section as if the person had been granted leave to enter the United Kingdom, but

(b) any condition as to the person’s work in the United Kingdom to which the person’s immigration bail is subject is to be treated for those purposes as a condition of leave.

(10) For the purposes of this section a person is subject to immigration control if under the Immigration Act 1971 the person requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.”

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c. 57)

4 The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 is amended as follows.

5 (1) Section 51 (licensing of drivers of private hire vehicles) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) in paragraph (a) after “satisfied” insert “—(i)”, and

(b) for the “or” at the end of paragraph (a) substitute “and

(ii) that the applicant is not disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from driving a private hire vehicle; or”.

(3) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether an applicant is disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from driving a private hire vehicle, a district council must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”

6 In section 53(1) (drivers’ licences for hackney carriages and private hire vehicles)—

(a) in paragraph (a) for “Every” substitute “Subject to section 53A, every”, and

(b) in paragraph (b) after “1889,” insert “but subject to section 53A,”.

7 After section 53 insert—

“53A Drivers’ licences for persons subject to immigration control

(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a licence within section 53(1)(a) or (b) is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period (“the leave period”);

(b) the person’s leave has not been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision); and

(c) apart from subsection (2), the period for which the licence would have been in force would have ended after the end of the leave period.

(2) The district council which grants the licence must specify a period in the licence as the period for which it remains in force; and that period must end at or before the end of the leave period.

(3) Subsection (4) applies if—

(a) a licence within section 53(1)(a) or (b) is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period; and

(b) the person’s leave has been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision).

(4) The district council which grants the licence must specify a period in the licence as the period for which it remains in force; and that period must not exceed six months.

(5) A licence within section 53(1)(a) ceases to be in force if the person to whom it was granted becomes disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from driving a private hire vehicle.

(6) A licence within section 53(1)(b) ceases to be in force if the person to whom it was granted becomes disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from driving a hackney carriage.

(7) If subsection (5) or (6) applies to a licence, the person to whom it was granted must, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person first became disqualified, return the licence and the person’s driver’s badge to the district council which granted the licence.

(8) A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection (7) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction—

(a) to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale; and

(b) in the case of a continuing offence, to a fine not exceeding ten pounds for each day during which an offence continues after conviction.”

8 (1) Section 55 (licensing of operators of private hire vehicles) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) after “satisfied” insert “—(a)”, and

(b) at the end of paragraph (a) insert “; and

(b) if the applicant is an individual, that the applicant is not disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from operating a private hire vehicle.”

(3) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether an applicant is disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from operating a private hire vehicle, a district council must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”

(4) In subsection (2) for “Every” substitute “Subject to section 55ZA, every”.

9 After section 55 insert—

“55ZA Operators’ licences for persons subject to immigration control

(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a licence under section 55 is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period (“the leave period”);

(b) the person’s leave has not been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision); and

(c) apart from subsection (2), the period for which the licence would have been in force would have ended after the end of the leave period.

(2) The district council which grants the licence must specify a period in the licence as the period for which it remains in force; and that period must end at or before the end of the leave period.

(3) Subsection (4) applies if—

(a) a licence under section 55 is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period; and

(b) the person’s leave has been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision).

(4) The district council which grants the licence must specify a period in the licence as the period for which it remains in force; and that period must not exceed six months.

(5) A licence under section 55 ceases to be in force if the person to whom it was granted becomes disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from operating a private hire vehicle.

(6) If subsection (5) applies to a licence, the person to whom it was granted must, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person first became disqualified, return it to the district council which granted the licence.

(7) A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection (6) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction—

(a) to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale; and

(b) in the case of a continuing offence, to a fine not exceeding ten pounds for each day during which an offence continues after conviction.”

10 (1) Section 59 (qualification for drivers of hackney carriages) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) in paragraph (a) after “satisfied” insert “—(i)”, and

(b) for the “or” at the end of paragraph (a) substitute “and

(ii) that the applicant is not disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from driving a hackney carriage; or”.

(3) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether an applicant is disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from driving a hackney carriage, a district council must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”

11 In section 61(1) (suspension and revocation of drivers’ licences) before the “or” at the end of paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) that he has since the grant of the licence been convicted of an immigration offence or required to pay an immigration penalty;”.

12 In section 62(1) (suspension and revocation of operators’ licences) before the “or” at the end of paragraph (c) insert—

“(ca) that the operator has since the grant of the licence been convicted of an immigration offence or required to pay an immigration penalty;”.

13 In section 77 (appeals) after subsection (3) insert—

“(4) On an appeal under this Part of this Act or an appeal under section 302 of the Act of 1936 as applied by this section, the court is not entitled to entertain any question as to whether—

(a) a person should be, or should have been, granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; or

(b) a person has, after the date of the decision being appealed against, been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.”

14 After section 79 insert—

“79A Persons disqualified by reason of immigration status

(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person is disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from carrying on a licensable activity if the person is subject to immigration control and —

(a) the person has not been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; or

(b) the person’s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom—

(i) is invalid;

(ii) has ceased to have effect (whether by reason of curtailment, revocation, cancellation, passage of time or otherwise); or

(iii) is subject to a condition preventing the individual from carrying on the licensable activity.

(2) Where a person is on immigration bail within the meaning of Part 1 of Schedule 5 to the Immigration Act 2016—

(a) the person is to be treated for the purposes of this Part of this Act as if the person had been granted leave to enter the United Kingdom; but

(b) any condition as to the person’s work in the United Kingdom to which the person’s immigration bail is subject is to be treated for those purposes as a condition of leave.

(3) For the purposes of this section a person is subject to immigration control if under the Immigration Act 1971 the person requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.

(4) For the purposes of this section a person carries on a licensable activity if the person—

(a) drives a private hire vehicle;

(b) operates a private hire vehicle; or

(c) drives a hackney carriage.

79B Immigration offences and immigration penalties

(1) In this Part of this Act “immigration offence” means—

(a) an offence under any of the Immigration Acts;

(b) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence within paragraph (a); or

(c) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 of conspiracy to commit an offence within paragraph (a).

(2) In this Part of this Act “immigration penalty” means a penalty under—

(a) section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (“the 2006 Act”); or

(b) section 23 of the Immigration Act 2014 (“the 2014 Act”).

(3) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 15 of the 2006 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty if—

(a) the person is excused payment by virtue of section 15(3) of that Act; or

(b) the penalty is cancelled by virtue of section 16 or 17 of that Act.

(4) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 15 of the 2006 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty until such time as—

(a) the period for giving a notice of objection under section 16 of that Act has expired and the Secretary of State has considered any notice given within that period; and

(b) if a notice of objection was given within that period, the period for appealing under section 17 of that Act has expired and any appeal brought within that period has been finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.

(5) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 23 of the 2014 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty if—

(a) the person is excused payment by virtue of section 24 of that Act; or

(b) the penalty is cancelled by virtue of section 29 or 30 of that Act.

(6) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 23 of the 2014 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty until such time as—

(a) the period for giving a notice of objection under section 29 of that Act has expired and the Secretary of State has considered any notice given within that period; and

(b) if a notice of objection was given within that period, the period for appealing under section 30 of that Act has expired and any appeal brought within that period has been finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.”

Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 (c. 34)

15 The Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 is amended as follows.

16 In section 1(1) (meaning of “private hire vehicle” etc)—

(a) omit the “and” at the end of paragraph (a), and

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert “; and

(c) “operate”, in relation to a private hire vehicle, means to make provision for the invitation or acceptance of, or to accept, private hire bookings in relation to the vehicle.”

17 (1) Section 3 (London operator’s licences) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (3) for the “and” at the end of paragraph (a) substitute—

“(aa) if the applicant is an individual, the applicant is not disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from operating a private hire vehicle; and”

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

“(3A) In determining for the purposes of subsection (3) whether an applicant is disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from operating a private hire vehicle, the licensing authority must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”

(4) In subsection (5) for “A” substitute “Subject to section 3A, a”.

18 After section 3 insert—

“3A London PHV operator’s licences for persons subject to immigration control

(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a London PHV operator’s licence is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period (“the leave period”);

(b) the person’s leave has not been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision); and

(c) apart from subsection (2), the period for which the licence would have been granted would have ended after the end of the leave period.

(2) The licence must be granted for a period which ends at or before the end of the leave period.

(3) Subsection (4) applies if—

(a) a London PHV operator’s licence is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period; and

(b) the person’s leave has been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision).

(4) The licence must be granted for a period which does not exceed six months.

(5) A London PHV operator’s licence ceases to be in force if the person to whom it was granted becomes disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from operating a private hire vehicle.

(6) If subsection (5) applies to a licence, the person to whom it was granted must, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person first became disqualified, return it the licensing authority.

(7) A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection (6) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction—

(a) to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale; and

(b) in the case of a continuing offence, to a fine not exceeding ten pounds for each day during which an offence continues after conviction.”

19 (1) Section 13 (London PHV driver’s licences) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2) for the “and” at the end of paragraph (a) substitute—

“(aa) the applicant is not disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from driving a private hire vehicle; and”

(3) After subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) In determining for the purposes of subsection (2) whether an applicant is disqualified by reason of the applicant’s immigration status from driving a private hire vehicle, the licensing authority must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”

(4) In subsection (5) at the beginning of paragraph (c) insert “subject to section 13A,”.

20 After section 13 insert—

“13A London PHV driver’s licences for persons subject to immigration control

(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a London PHV driver’s licence is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period (“the leave period”);

(b) the person’s leave has not been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision); and

(c) apart from subsection (2), the period for which the licence would have been granted would have ended after the end of the leave period.

(2) The licence must be granted for a period which ends at or before the end of the leave period.

(3) Subsection (4) applies if—

(a) a London PHV driver’s licence is to be granted to a person who has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period; and

(b) the person’s leave has been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (continuation of leave pending variation decision).

(4) The licence must be granted for a period which does not exceed six months.

(5) A London PHV driver’s licence ceases to be in force if the person to whom it was granted becomes disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from driving a private hire vehicle.

(6) If subsection (5) applies to a licence, the person to whom it was granted must, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person first became disqualified, return the licence and the person’s driver’s badge to the licensing authority.

(7) A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection (6) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction—

(a) to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale; and

(b) in the case of a continuing offence, to a fine not exceeding ten pounds for each day during which an offence continues after conviction.”

21 (1) Section 16 (power to suspend or revoke licences) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2) before the “or” at the end of paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) the licence holder has, since the grant of the licence, been convicted of an immigration offence or required to pay an immigration penalty;”.

(3) In subsection (4) at the end of paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) the licence holder has, since the grant of the licence, been convicted of an immigration offence or required to pay an immigration penalty;”.

22 In section 25 (appeals) after subsection (7) insert—

“(8) On an appeal under this Act to the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court, the court is not entitled to entertain any question as to whether—

(a) a person should be, or should have been, granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; or

(b) a person has, after the date of the decision being appealed against, been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.”

23 After section 35 insert—

“35A Persons disqualified by reason of immigration status

(1) For the purposes of this Act a person is disqualified by reason of the person’s immigration status from carrying on a licensable activity if the person is subject to immigration control and —

(a) the person has not been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; or

(b) the person’s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom—

(i) is invalid;

(ii) has ceased to have effect (whether by reason of curtailment, revocation, cancellation, passage of time or otherwise); or

(iii) is subject to a condition preventing the individual from carrying on the licensable activity.

(2) Where a person is on immigration bail within the meaning of Part 1 of Schedule 5 to the Immigration Act 2016—

(a) the person is to be treated for the purposes of this Part as if the person had been granted leave to enter the United Kingdom; but

(b) any condition as to the person’s work in the United Kingdom to which the person’s immigration bail is subject is to be treated for those purposes as a condition of leave.

(3) For the purposes of this section a person is subject to immigration control if under the Immigration Act 1971 the person requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.

(4) For the purposes of this section a person carries on a licensable activity if the person—

(a) operates a private hire vehicle; or

(b) drives a private hire vehicle.

35B Immigration offences and immigration penalties

(1) In this Act “immigration offence” means—

(a) an offence under any of the Immigration Acts;

(b) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence within paragraph (a); or

(c) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 of conspiracy to commit an offence within paragraph (a).

(2) In this Act “immigration penalty” means a penalty under—

(a) section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (“the 2006 Act”), or

(b) section 23 of the Immigration Act 2014 (“the 2014 Act”).

(3) For the purposes of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 15 of the 2006 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty if—

(a) the person is excused payment by virtue of section 15(3) of that Act; or

(b) the penalty is cancelled by virtue of section 16 or 17 of that Act.

(4) For the purposes of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 15 of the 2006 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty until such time as—

(a) the period for giving a notice of objection under section 16 of that Act has expired and the Secretary of State has considered any notice given within that period; and

(b) if a notice of objection was given within that period, the period for appealing under section 17 of that Act has expired and any appeal brought within that period has been finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.

(5) For the purposes of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 23 of the 2014 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty if—

(a) the person is excused payment by virtue of section 24 of that Act; or

(b) the penalty is cancelled by virtue of section 29 or 30 of that Act.

(6) For the purposes of this Act a person to whom a penalty notice under section 23 of the 2014 Act has been given is not to be treated as having been required to pay an immigration penalty until such time as—

(a) the period for giving a notice of objection under section 29 of that Act has expired and the Secretary of State has considered any notice given within that period; and

(b) if a notice of objection was given within that period, the period for appealing under section 30 of that Act has expired and any appeal brought within that period has been finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.”

24 In section 36 (interpretation) at the appropriate place insert—

““operate” has the meaning given in section 1(1);”.” —(James Brokenshire.)

This amendment amends the licensing regimes for taxis and private hire vehicles in England and Wales to prevent illegal working in these sectors. It includes the addition of requirements for licence grant to be conditional on leave and for licence length to be limited by a person’s leave duration.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 2

Duty to supply nationality documents to Secretary of State: persons to whom duty applies Persons to whom section 20A applies

1 This is the new Schedule A1 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 referred to in section (Supply of information to Secretary of State)—

“Schedule A1

Persons to whom section 20A applies

Law enforcement

1 The chief officer of police for a police area in England and Wales.

2 The chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland.

3 The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

4 The Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force.

5 A Port Police Force established under an order made under section 14 of the Harbours Act 1964.

6 The Port Police Force established under Part 10 of the Port of London Act 1968.

7 A Port Police Force established under section 79 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847.

8 The National Crime Agency.

Local government

9 A county council or district council in England.

10 A London borough council.

11 The Greater London Authority.

12 The Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority.

13 The Council of the Isles of Scilly.

14 A county council or a county borough council in Wales.

15 A council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994.

16 A district council in Northern Ireland.

Regulatory bodies

17 The Gangmasters Licensing Authority.

18 The Security Industry Authority.

Health bodies

19 An NHS trust established under section 25 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or under section 18 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006.

20 An NHS foundation trust within the meaning given by section 30 of the National Health Service Act 2006.

21 A Local Health Board established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006.

22 A National Health Service Trust established under section 12A of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978.

23 A Health and Social Care trust established under Article 10 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1991 (SI 1991/194 (NI 1)).

Registration officials

24 The Registrar General for England and Wales.

25 A superintendent registrar of births, deaths and marriages.

26 A registrar of births, deaths and marriages.

27 A civil partnership registrar within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (see section 29 of that Act).

28 The Registrar General for Scotland.

29 A district registrar within the meaning of section 7 of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965.

30 A senior registrar within the meaning of that section.

31 An assistant registrar within the meaning of that section.

32 The Registrar General for Northern Ireland.

33 A person appointed under Article 31(1) or (3) of the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (SI 2003/413 (NI 3)).

34 A person appointed under section 152(1) or (3) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.

Other bodies: Northern Ireland

35 The Northern Ireland Housing Executive.” —(James Brokenshire.)

This amendment inserts a new Schedule A1 into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 listing the bodies which are subject to the duty to provide nationality documents to the Secretary of State under the new section 20A for that Act (see NC15).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 3

Availability of local authority support

1 Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (withholding and withdrawal of support) is amended as follows.

2 (1) Paragraph 1 (ineligibility for support) is amended as follows.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1) (excluded support or assistance) after paragraph (g) insert—

(ga) in relation only to a person to whom this paragraph applies by virtue of paragraph 7B—

(i) section 23CZA of that Act (arrangements for certain former relevant children to continue to live with former foster parents), or

(ii) regulations under section 23D of that Act (personal advisers),”.

(3) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—

“(2A) In the case of the provisions referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(ga), sub-paragraph (2) applies only in relation to a person to whom this paragraph applies by virtue of paragraph 7B.”

3 (1) Paragraph 2(1) (exceptions) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph (c) for “or 10” substitute “, 10, 10A or 10B”.

(3) After the “or” at the end of paragraph (c) insert—

(ca) under section 95A or 98A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (support for failed asylum seekers etc), or”.

4 After paragraph 3 insert—

3A Notwithstanding paragraph 3, paragraph 1(1)(g) prevents a local authority in England from providing support or assistance under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 to a person in respect of a child if —

(a) the support or assistance is of a type that could be provided to the person by virtue of paragraph 10A (see paragraph 10A(7)), and

(b) support is being provided to the person by virtue of paragraph 10A or there are reasonable grounds for believing that support will be provided to the person by virtue of that paragraph.

3B Notwithstanding paragraph 3, paragraph 1(1)(g) prevents a local authority in England from providing support or assistance under section 23C, 23CA, 24A or 24B of the Children Act 1989 to a person if—

(a) support is being provided to the person by virtue of paragraph 10B or section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that support will be provided to the person by virtue of that paragraph or section.

3C Notwithstanding paragraph 3, paragraph 1(1)(ga) prevents a local authority in England from providing support or assistance under a provision mentioned in paragraph (ga) to a person if—

(a) support is being provided to the person by virtue of paragraph 10B or section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that support will be provided to the person by virtue of that paragraph or section.”

5 In paragraph 6 (third class of ineligible person: failed asylum-seeker), in sub-paragraph (1), in the words before sub-paragraph (a), after “person” insert “in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland”.

6 In paragraph 7 (fourth class of ineligible person: person unlawfully in United Kingdom), in the words before sub-paragraph (a), after “person” insert “in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland”.

7 Before paragraph 8 insert—

“Sixth class of ineligible person: person in England without leave to enter or remain

7B (1) Paragraph 1 applies to a person in England if—

(a) under the Immigration Act 1971, he requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it, and

(b) he is not an asylum-seeker.

(2) Paragraph 1 also applies to a dependant of a person to whom that paragraph applies by virtue of sub-paragraph (1).”

8 After paragraph 10 insert—

“Accommodation and subsistence etc: England

10A (1) The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for arrangements to be made for support to be provided to a person to whom paragraph 1 applies by virtue of paragraph 7B(1) and—

(a) who is destitute,

(b) who has with him a dependent child,

(c) to whom section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 does not apply, and

(d) in relation to whom condition A, B, C or D is satisfied.

(2) Condition A is that—

(a) the person has made an application for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom and has not withdrawn the application,

(b) where regulations under this paragraph require that the application must be of a kind specified in the regulations for this condition to be satisfied, the application is of that kind, and

(c) the application has not been determined.

(3) Condition B is that—

(a) the person has appealed under section 82(1), and

(b) the appeal is pending within the meaning of section 104.

(4) Condition C is that—

(a) the person’s appeal rights are exhausted, and

(b) he has not failed to cooperate with arrangements that would enable him to leave the United Kingdom.

(5) Condition D is that the provision of support is necessary to safeguard and promote the welfare of a dependent child.

(6) Arrangements for a person by virtue of this paragraph may include arrangements for a dependant.

(7) The support that may be provided under arrangements by virtue of this paragraph may take the form of —

(a) accommodation;

(b) subsistence in kind, or cash or vouchers to pay for subsistence.

(8) Subsections (3) to (8) of section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (meaning of “destitute”) apply for the purposes of this paragraph as they apply for the purposes of that section.

(9) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) regulations under this paragraph may provide for circumstances in which—

(a) a person is to be treated as having made an application for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom (despite not having made one);

(b) a person is to be treated as not having made such an application where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the application made is vexatious or wholly without merit.

(10) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) a person’s appeal rights are exhausted at the time when—

(a) he could not bring an appeal under section 82 (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission), and

(b) no appeal brought by him is pending within the meaning of section 104.

10B (1) The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for arrangements to be made for support to be provided to a person to whom paragraph 1 applies by virtue of paragraph 7B(1) and—

(a) who is a former relevant child within the meaning of section 23C of the Children Act 1989,

(b) to whom section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 does not apply, and

(c) in relation to whom condition A, B or C is satisfied.

(2) Condition A is that—

(a) the person is destitute,

(b) the person has made an application for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom and has not withdrawn the application,

(c) where regulations under this paragraph require that the application must be of a kind specified in the regulations for this condition to be satisfied, the application is of that kind, and

(d) the application has not been determined.

(3) Condition B is that—

(a) the person is destitute,

(b) the person has appealed under section 82(1), and

(c) the appeal is pending within the meaning of section 104.

(4) Condition C is that—

(a) the person’s appeal rights are exhausted, and

(b) a person specified in regulations under this paragraph is satisfied that support needs to be provided to the person.

(5) The support that may be provided under arrangements by virtue of this paragraph may, in particular, take the form of —

(a) accommodation;

(b) subsistence in kind, or cash or vouchers to pay for subsistence.

(6) Subsections (3) to (8) of section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (meaning of “destitute”) apply for the purposes of this paragraph as they apply for the purposes of that section.

(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3) regulations under this paragraph may provide for circumstances in which—

(a) a person is to be treated as having made an application for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom (despite not having made one);

(b) a person is to be treated as not having made such an application where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the application made is vexatious or wholly without merit.

(8) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5) a person’s appeal rights are exhausted at the time when—

(a) he could not bring an appeal under section 82 (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission), and

(b) no appeal brought by him is pending within the meaning of section 104.”

9 In paragraph 11 (assistance and accommodation: general), in the words before sub-paragraph (a), for “or 10” substitute “, 10, 10A or 10B”.

10 In paragraph 13 (offences), in sub-paragraphs (1)(b) and (2)(a), for “or 10” substitute “, 10, 10A or 10B”.

11 In paragraph 14 (information), in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), for “or 7” (as substituted by paragraph 25(8)(b) of Schedule 6) substitute “, 7 or 7B”.” —(James Brokenshire.)

This new Schedule simplifies the basis on which local authorities in England assess and provide accommodation and subsistence for destitute families without immigration status. It prevents adult migrant care leavers who have exhausted their appeal rights accessing Children Act support and provides for their pre-departure support.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the schedule be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Amendment 221 is to be moved formally.

[Keir Starmer]

To clarify, Mr Owen, I will not move amendments 221 and 77, but I will move amendment 70.

Amendment proposed: 70, in clause 54, page 45, line 11, at end insert

‘(4A) Section 12 shall not come into force before 1 January 2018.’. —(Keir Starmer.)

This amendment would defer the implementation of Clause 12 until January 2018.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee proceeded to a Division.

[The Chair]

The ayes were six and the noes were eight, so the ayes have it—I beg your pardon, the noes have it.

--- Later in debate ---

We have had a good debate. At times it has been quite passionate, but it has been conducted in a measured way which does credit to this Committee. Yes, we have had differences at times, but the process has added to the scrutiny of this legislation. Therefore, in conclusion, I thank all members of the Committee for their questions, for their debates and for the manner in which they have conducted our proceedings. This has been a very positive and helpful Committee and one that we can all look back on as adding to parliamentary scrutiny and consideration of the Bill as it moves to its next stage.

[Keir Starmer]

On a point of order, Mr Owen, I join the Minister in thanking so many members of the teams. In particular, I thank you and Mr Bone, for chairing these proceedings. It has been invaluable to me, in particular, going through such a process for the first time, and has ensured that we have got through quite difficult, technical business in an efficient way which has provided the safeguards that this process is intended to provide. We are all very grateful for that.

I extend my gratitude to the Clerks, who have helped not only in the proceedings themselves but in the preparation as well, and have ensured that we have gone through this process in the best possible way, and to all the support staff, in whatever capacity, both in this Room and sitting behind both teams. The support may be different and perhaps more luxurious on the other side, but that support is vital for both sides, to enable issues to be untangled where they can be untangled quickly and to allow probing, testing and challenge. The process has been useful.

I have had some difficult briefs in my time. In terms of the likelihood of ever winning a single vote, this goes down as one of the most difficult. I thought for one brief moment that we might just have sealed one vote a moment ago, but that was not to be. That is a reflection on the process, but I thank the Minister and the Solicitor General for the way they have dealt with our questions, the information they have provided and the assurances they have given on issues that are of real concern, not only in the Committee but to many people outside who will be affected by the Bill. They have willingly written or put on the record their position where they have agreed to meet our concerns, and we are grateful for that.

Perhaps we should add our thanks to the witnesses who came and gave their time and their evidence to the Committee, both orally and in writing.

[Anne McLaughlin]

On a point of order, Mr Owen, I am beginning to feel a bit sorry for Mr Bone, because this is twice you have had this. Perhaps you have engineered it this way. I add my thanks, on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and myself, to everyone involved. This is obviously our first time on a Public Bill Committee. I was a Member of the Scottish Parliament for two years, but I never served on a Bill Committee. I was on the Audit Committee and the Petitions Committee, so this is completely new to me. As well as the Clerks, colleagues in the Labour party have been so helpful and generous. Our own researchers have been really good.

I will always remember my first experience on a Bill Committee as being a little like ceilidh dancing in that you work out exactly what you are doing just as the music stops. I am desperate for my next Bill Committee, because it has all now clicked into place.

It is not often that I have anything positive to say about Members on the Government Benches. [Hon. Members: “Oh!] They bring it on themselves. While the entire Bill is wrong and everything they said is wrong, the way in which it was said was respectful and the responses were comprehensive. While I completely disagree with everything that is being done, I thank Government Members, particularly the two Ministers. It was helpful and useful to have them here, and everything was done respectfully. However, I was worried when the Minister for Immigration said that it had been a measured debate, because I feel like I have not done my job properly.

Finally, I thank all the stakeholders and witnesses, who were incredible. I have read some of the really interesting evidence again, and they advised us and suggested amendments and taught me so much. I am looking forward to my next Bill Committee because of my experience here. I just want to thank everyone again and to thank my mum. I will sit down now.

Oral Answers to Questions

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Monday 16th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am happy to tell the hon. and learned Lady that a considerable amount of work is being done by the Home Office, primarily with the local authorities that are receiving the Syrian refugees, to discuss the sort of support that is available to them. That links in to the last question I answered from my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston): it will often be possible for charities and other organisations to provide support and help for refugees in settling into life in whichever part of the United Kingdom they come to.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

May I, too, join the Home Secretary in the comments she made at the beginning of Question Time? In the light of the terrible events in Paris this weekend, which we in this House are united in condemning, it is vital that the first refugees to arrive in the UK from Syria are properly supported and welcomed. As the Prime Minister has said, those who will be brought here are among the most vulnerable men, women and children in the refugee camps. What steps have been taken to ensure that adequate resources are allocated to provide not only the necessary accommodation, but the care and support that will be needed? What messages are planned to ensure that they are welcomed when they arrive here?

[Mrs May]

The considerable amount of work that the Under-Secretary of State for Refugees has been doing with teams from the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department for International Development is about ensuring that those refugees who are referred to the UK and accepted for resettlement here are given the right package of support. It is not simply a case of allocation; there is careful consideration of what is available in any particular local authority in terms of accommodation or to meet the medical needs that individuals have. A considerable amount of work goes into ensuring that people are given the right support when they come to whichever area they come to. It is also important to recognise that individuals and families should be given a degree of privacy. They are making a huge move in coming to the UK, so it is right to give them not just the right support, but the time and space to settle into the UK.

Immigration Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 224, , in schedule 6, page 91, line 37, leave out—

“before the end of such period as may be prescribed.”

To remove provision for a period to be prescribed in regulations, made under section 94(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, during which an individual may be left destitute before qualifying for section 95 support on the basis of having lodged “further qualifying submissions”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 225, in schedule 6, page 92, line 6, leave out from “, or” to end of line 8.

To prevent section 95 support from terminating immediately on notification of a decision on further qualifying submissions if no period for support terminating is prescribed in regulations made under section 94(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

[Keir Starmer]

The two amendments are rather technical but none the less important. They deal with the period between a decision being made and support being made available.

The background to amendment 224 is that, under proposed new subsection (2B) under paragraph 3(3) of the schedule, people who have lodged “further qualifying submissions” to the Home Office are defined as asylum seekers and will therefore qualify for full support under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 in the same way as those making an initial claim for asylum. That enables support to be provided to that group of people, who at the moment are accommodated under section 4 of the 1999 Act. That section is being repealed.

The drafting of proposed new subsection (2B)(b) and (2B)(c)(ii) enables the Secretary of State to prescribe in regulation a period during which he may consider the further qualifying submissions without being under a duty to provide support. During that period, the individual would remain destitute. Such a situation was subject to litigation in the case of MK and AH, with Refugee Action, which was reported in 2012. The Home Office policy of delaying 15 working days before making a decision on section 4 applications was found to be unlawful. The case led to a policy change, so that decisions under section 4 now have to be made within two days for individuals in vulnerable categories and five days for other people. The amendment would ensure that the principles in the MK case are upheld and that the resulting policy remains broadly in place.

Amendment 226 is also technical and is intended to prevent section 95 support from terminating immediately upon notification of a decision on—

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry to interrupt the shadow Minister, but I think he might have said amendment 226 just then, but that is in the next group. We are discussing amendments 224 and 225 at this stage.

[Keir Starmer]

Sorry. We are discussing amendment 225—

[The Chair]

Yes, but I think you said 226.

[Keir Starmer]

Maybe I did. I apologise.

Amendment 225 is intended to prevent individuals and families from being made immediately homeless and destitute on receipt of a decision from the Home Office on their further qualifying submissions. The existing policy allows for 14 days of support if further qualifying submissions are rejected and 21 days if they are accepted. Under proposed new subsection (3A)(b) in paragraph 3(5) of the schedule, however, if no regulations are brought in prescribing the period after which support is terminated, or the individual is not covered by the scenario envisaged in the regulations, support can be terminated immediately.

Essentially, there are three scenarios that are a cause of concern. The first is applicants whose further submissions are accepted and who are granted leave. They would have no time to obtain the documentation they need to apply for mainstream benefits and/or work. Lest anyone thinks that that is a theoretical example, there was the tragic case that a number of Committee members will know of—the case of EG—where support was withdrawn and there was a serious case review, which touched upon the transitional periods when support was not provided under the existing regime. To be fair, I do not think that that was the sole cause of the issue, but it was certainly one of the issues that was flagged up in the serious case review, and obviously everyone wants to ensure that everything is done to ensure that that type of thing does not happen again. EG was a little boy who starved to death in that period. So that is applicants whose further submissions are accepted and are granted leave.

The second group is applicants whose further submissions are treated as a fresh protection claim with a right of appeal. As I understand it, they would have to reapply for support on receiving a decision about their further qualifying submissions, because the Bill provides for the support they were receiving to terminate on the day that the decision is taken. So, as far as they are concerned, there is an interim period.

The third group is applicants whose further submissions are rejected. Until now, they would have had 14 days of support. There is a provision in the Bill—new subsection (3D) under paragraph 3(5) of schedule 6—that provides for support to be continued when

“permission to apply for judicial review is granted”.

Clearly, however, there will be a gap between the decision and any application being made for judicial review, and any permission being granted.

As I say, to some extent, these are technical amendments, but they are important because they deal with periods that until now have been dealt with under policy and guidance, whereby support is not removed during the possible gap period. However, it may be that the Minister can give some assurances that will remove the need for the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

It is also important that people on section 95 support have time to secure DWP benefits if they are granted refugee status. In those cases, people receive a grace period of 28 days of further support to enable them to obtain mainstream benefits, and we have been working with the DWP to ensure that that process works as smoothly as possible, for example by updating the documentation a person receives when they are given notice that the grace period has started. We also ensure that the person is assigned a national insurance number, as I have described, and therefore it is an ongoing process. I hope that with that reassurance, the hon. and learned Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister has dealt in some detail with the situation if the claim is rejected. As I understand it, if it is accepted, the grace period of 28 days will apply, which covers the first category of people. If that is what the Minister is saying, I am reassured by that and will not push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 97, in schedule 6, page 92, line 41, leave out “VI” and insert “VI and section 141”.—(James Brokenshire).

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 226, in schedule 6, page 93, line 37, leave out sub-paragraph (5),

To allow destitute refused asylum seeking families to continue receiving basic support (just over £5 a day for their essential living needs with housing provided for those with nowhere to live) until their case is finally concluded, as is currently the case. This aims to protect vulnerable children from being left destitute; ensure immigration controls are not undermined because the Home Office has lost contact with families who are appeal rights exhausted; and to avoid a substantial transfer of costs to local authorities.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 227, in schedule 6, page 93, line 38, leave out from “provided)” to end of line 39, and insert—

‘(a) the heading becomes “Support for asylum-seekers, etc”, and

(b) insert after subsection (8)—

“(8A) The weekly cash payment set out in Regulation 2(2) of the Asylum Support (Amendment No.3) Regulations 2015 No. 1501 for each individual is increased to no less than 60% of the rate of Income Support payable to single adults aged 25 or over.”’

To ensure asylum seekers have the support they need to pay for food, clothing, toiletries, travel and other necessities and thereby try to help ensure that they can properly meet their essential living needs and pursue their asylum applications. The amendment works by amending section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 which is the overarching section under which support for persons seeking asylum is provided.

[Keir Starmer]

In earlier debates on clause 34 and schedule 6, we have touched at great length on the subject of amendment 226, which is intended to reverse the removal of support altogether. A number of Committee Members quoted from the available evidence. In those circumstances, I do not propose to dwell heavily on amendment 226, but amendment 227 has not been dealt with.

The rates for asylum seekers supported under section 95 of the 1999 Act were originally set at 70% of income support, on the basis that their accommodation and utility bills would be paid for separately. As of August this year, asylum seekers, including children, on section 95 support who would otherwise be destitute now receive the same flat rate of support, as opposed to varying amounts for single adults, lone parents, families with children and so on. That rate set at just £36.95 a week, or just over £5 a day. A number of groups have looked at that rate of support, which is manifestly very low. In 2013, a cross-party parliamentary inquiry into asylum support for children and young people, which took evidence from 150 local authorities, found that

“the levels of support for asylum seeking families are meeting neither children’s essential living needs, nor their wider need to learn and develop. The levels are too low and given that they were not increased in 2012 they should be raised as a matter of urgency and increased annually at the very least in line with income support.”

The inquiry further recommended:

“The rates of support should never fall below 70% of income support.”

The Home Affairs Committee picked up the theme in October 2013, highlighting

“concerns about the level of support available to those who seek asylum in the UK.”

It concluded:

“This relative poverty of those on section 95 support is compounded by the fact that the vast majority of asylum applicants have not legally been allowed to work since 2002.”

We will come to that issue later. Amendment 227 would ensure that any asylum seeker who would otherwise be destitute received no less than 60% of income support, which is currently equal to £43.86 a week.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

I am going to speak to amendments 226 and 227, because they are both fundamental and speak to the humanity that I believe we have in this country.

I shall speak to amendment 226 first. Our immigration system has long recognised the need to afford special protection to families with children. It is heartening to hear the Minister reaffirm that position. However, the Bill will remove those protections by withdrawing support for refused asylum-seeking families with children. Irrespective of whether families should or should not return to their country of origin, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the wellbeing of children is at the forefront of our asylum policy. The Government, by contrast, are seeking to withdraw all support for children when their parent’s application is refused, and to prevent statutory services from assisting children who become destitute.

The consequences of the complete withdrawal of support are severe. We have heard from witnesses that when refused asylum seekers have their support cut off, it both causes illness and complicates existing health problems. Those effects are even more pronounced given that asylum seekers will have been living below the poverty line, on just over £5 a day, for many months or even years while awaiting a decision. The pilot of section 9 of the Immigration Act 2004, which introduced similar measures, clearly demonstrated their negative impact on the health and wellbeing of refused asylum seekers. Refugee Action and the Refugee Council’s study of the pilot revealed that the majority of families with whom they worked had mental or physical health problems that were exacerbated by section 9. Some 80% of parents were found to have mental health problems and some 36% had significant physical health problems.

The risks to children are worsened still further by the potential to force families into exploitative situations in order to survive. Provisions in the Bill would see the criminalisation of illegal workers, the loss of the right to rent, the closure of bank accounts and the freezing of assets. In such an environment I am gravely concerned that exploitation will increase dramatically and that many of the positive steps made by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 may be fatally undermined.

The Bill will inevitably mean the cost of supporting families being passed to local authorities. The costs will be huge. As asylum seekers are overwhelmingly located in deprived areas, those with the least ability to absorb those costs will be faced with the highest bill. The north of England, for example, has about a third of the UK’s population, but Migration Yorkshire estimates that it will face half the cost. It has also highlighted that the societal impacts of such deprivation will be disproportionately felt in the north of England.

The Government’s view is that the changes are necessary to encourage refused migrants to leave, but a huge weight of evidence, including from the Home Office itself, suggests that that will simply not work. Indeed, the Bill is likely to make effective immigration control still harder. When parents think that their children’s life may be at risk if they return home, whether that fear is justified or not, they will generally opt for destitution in the UK as the lesser of two evils. The impact of the removal of support will be the removal of any incentive for failed migrants to maintain contact with the Home Office. The Bill will not only force migrants from the address at which they were known to the Home Office but ensure that migrants do not contact the Home Office again. How is immigration control to operate under those conditions? How is the Home Office expected to track and ultimately remove migrants with whom it has no contact and for whom it has no address? The Bill fails to address those serious questions.

The findings of the section 9 pilot clearly demonstrate the effect on immigration control of removing support. The Home Office’s own report stated that 39% of migrants from whom support was withdrawn absconded, compared with 21% of those who remained supported. Only one family was successfully removed, compared with nine in the control group, and there was no significant increase in voluntary returns. Section 9 almost doubled the rate of absconding, greatly decreased the chances of successful removal and had no impact whatever on families choosing to leave the UK. How can that possibly achieve the Government’s objectives?

We are facing, then, changes that will place families in poverty, cost local authorities and have a disproportionate impact on poor areas. The changes will make it more difficult to remove failed asylum seekers and will do nothing to encourage them to return of their own accord. The Government should reconsider this ill thought out step and support amendment 226.

In the Bill the Government have sought to withdraw the pitifully low level of support currently provided to asylum seekers. The question of if and when the support should be withdrawn has been widely discussed in Committee. Amendment 227 would instead address the support itself, to ensure that it provides the most basic needs for asylum seekers. As currently calculated, section 95 support unquestionably does not do so. Over recent years, Government cuts and a four-year freeze in the rate of the support have seen its value fall well below the level of 75% of income support at which it was originally set. That level in itself was determined as the absolute bare minimum necessary to stave off poverty.

Section 95 support is currently £36.95 a week, or a little over £5 a day. With that money, asylum seekers must pay for food, clothing, toiletries, transport and all necessities. Asylum seekers’ situation is made even more precarious by the fact that they often arrive in Britain with nothing at all and in many cases are already malnourished and in poor health.

Repeated studies have found that section 95 support fails to meet basic needs. Research in 2013 by Refugee Action found that 70% of those surveyed were unable to buy either enough food to feed themselves, or fresh fruit and vegetables, or food that met their religious or cultural needs. Similarly, all respondents to a research survey by Freedom from Torture stated that their income was insufficient to meet their basic needs. Both surveys indicated that asylum seekers usually had to sacrifice one essential need to meet another.

A 2013 cross-party inquiry found that support was not meeting children’s basic needs. Children seeking refugee protection are some of the hardest hit by the lowest levels of support. Children under 19 recently saw their weekly payment under section 95 slashed from £52.96 a week to £36.95. That will leave a single parent with one child struggling to survive on an amount that is less than 50% of income support, despite the fact that children require extra support, especially to fully meet their social, educational and health needs. Even prior to the cuts, all lone parent respondents to Refugee Action’s research survey reported that they could not buy items for their children’s education and wellbeing, such as toys, books or stationery. No children should be forced to live in poverty as a result of Government policy, especially not those seeking protection from persecution.

One of the stated justifications for keeping asylum support rates low was that both section 95 support and section 4 support were only temporary. However, in the second quarter of this year, roughly 60% of the 29,586 pending asylum cases had either been waiting over six months for an initial decision or were awaiting further review. The Home Affairs Committee has already raised concerns about the impact of living off asylum support for extended periods of time.

In complying with a 2014 High Court judgment, the Government calculated the level of support necessary to meet asylum seekers’ most basic needs, based upon expenditure data from the Office for National Statistics for the lowest 10% income group in the UK. However, the Home Office saw fit to revise those figures downwards. In doing so, it introduced a subjective element to the calculation and ensured that support levels are vulnerable to political or budgetary pressures. Amendment 227 would introduce a level of support based on ONS data for the current financial year and ensure that it was adjusted according to the consumer prices index each year. Without those adjustments, support will continue to be eroded and asylum seekers will be pushed deeper into poverty.

Uprating asylum support levels would ensure that those seeking protection were able to meet their most basic needs. The level proposed in amendment 227 can hardly be described as profligate, amounting to only the absolute minimum necessary to stave off poverty. It is vital that we act now to address what amounts to state-enforced poverty. Failure to do so will inevitably lead to more and more vulnerable people being driven into increasingly desperate circumstances.

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[James Brokenshire]

I think the hon. Lady is confusing certain issues. As I have already indicated, certain obligations exist under schedule 3 and also under section 17 of the Children Act 1989. We are discussing in detail with local authorities the interrelationship between such backstop support powers and how the different regimes fit together. That needs to be done in the joined-up fashion of understanding that if families are here unlawfully, they could and should leave and there needs to be encouragement through the returns process to ensure that they do. It is in that considered way that we propose the provisions, although hon. Members may disagree with our approach. That is, however, the stance that we seek to take, given the factors I identified and the interrelationship with local authorities I indicated.

Let me turn to amendment 227, which seeks to set the level of the cash allowances given to asylum seekers at 60% of the income support rate for people aged over 25. That would raise the amount provided from £36.95 to £43.86 a week.

The cash allowance is only one element of the support package provided to ensure that asylum seekers are not left destitute. That package needs to be seen as a whole. Accommodation is provided free and comes fully furnished and equipped with bed linen, towels and kitchen utensils. Utilities such as gas, electricity and water are also provided free. Recipients receive free healthcare and schooling for their children. The cost of travel to appointments to pursue an asylum claim—to attend asylum interviews, appeal hearings and meet legal advisers, for example—is also provided separately.

[Keir Starmer]

Will the Minister confirm to members of the Committee who seek comfort from the fact that we have just discussed provisions that apply to asylum seekers who have exhausted their process, that we are now discussing something that applies to all asylum seekers, including, for example, a Syrian who has got to this country in the last few months by whatever means? I take into account what he said about accommodation, but in relation to the comments of the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, the rates in the package are £1.23 a week for toiletries and 69p for healthcare. Given the particular examples that she gave, which made people feel uncomfortable, perhaps Members would like to go to Boots this afternoon and see what they could get for that.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. and learned Gentleman wrapped up two points. He said that the package would apply to Syrians applying for resettlement here, but that is a separate regime. [Interruption.] He used the pejorative term of Syrians, so it is important to understand the support provided through resettlement when refugee status is accepted, because then there would be entitlement to mainstream benefits. We are talking about the mechanism for those of all nationalities who have claimed asylum in the country but whose claims have not yet been determined.

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister will know that I deliberately did not give that example. I said a Syrian who had arrived in this country from Europe or somewhere—not on the package. Any Syrian who is now in Europe and arrives in this country not under the resettlement regime will come on to this regime. That is the example I was giving.

[James Brokenshire]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for that clarification, because he had not given that clarity initially and it is important to understand the different regimes that operate for those with refugee status and for someone who has come here and claimed asylum. It is helpful that he explained his intent. That is why I said what I did about how asylum support rates are intended to operate for all nationalities of people claiming asylum in this country.

I come on to the second point about the amount of cash, having already indicated to the Committee all the other support mechanisms provided to those seeking asylum fairly and appropriately. The cash amount is provided with reference to a specific legal test set out in section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The allowance is there to cover what is described as “essential living needs”.

The Home Office reviews the level of the cash allowance each year but the way that review is conducted changed in 2014. Following a judicial review, the Home Office put in place a new assessment methodology designed to give full effect to the findings of and the valuable guidance given by the court. It is important to understand how the rates are set in the context of what the court said and the guidance that it provided. First, a careful assessment is made to identify all needs that are essential and not covered through some other part of the package.

The needs identified in this way are: sufficient food to eat healthily, adequate clothing, provision to cover toiletries, household cleaning items and non-prescription medicines, sufficient provision for travel and communications for everyday purposes and to maintain interpersonal relationships and a minimum level of participation in social, cultural and interpersonal relationships. That is a term of art and an essential need identified by the court. Having identified all these particular needs, an assessment is made of how much money is required to meet each of them. This is done through a mixture of market research into the cost of the particular items and analysis of Office for National Statistics data about expenditure on the items by people in the lowest 10% income group of the UK population. This approach resulted in the allowance for a single asylum seeker being set at £36.62 per week in 2014, rising to £36.95 per week from April 2015. In 2015 we also decided that providing £36.95 for every person in the household—in other words for the asylum seeker and each dependant—would be sufficient to cover the essential living needs of all family groups. This is because of the economies of scale available to large households and is an approach taken by other European countries as well.

I recognise that many organisations representing asylum seekers and children disagree with the changes, but none of these groups has provided detailed evidence to show that the findings of the review are wrong.

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[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman was seeking to impute that there was a preordained mindset to adjust everything down. I have already given him an example where there has been an adjustment up. It is that fair assessment, subject to reasonable adjustment, based on the twin tests of ONS data and market research data on costs, which produces the figure. I say to him again that concerns have been expressed by various groups representing asylum seekers and children, but none has provided detailed evidence to show that the findings of the review are wrong. We will continue to assess, we will hold a further review of the allowance levels for 2016 and we would welcome detailed evidence and submissions about the level of the allowance. That is the right forum to address any perception that the allowances are not adequate.

We also do not consider that seeking to apply this to a level under income support is appropriate. It is not referencing the essential living needs test. This was debated by the other place on 27 October, when a motion to annul the regulations that implemented the findings of the most recent review was rejected. I recognise that there are differences of view on this but, on this detailed analysis, on some of these specific items, I would welcome further submissions to show whether the evidence that has been presented to us needs further reflection. Obviously we would consider that in setting the levels for 2016, but I urge that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Keir Starmer]

The two amendments go to the heart of one of the most important provisions. On the withdrawal of support from certain categories, I will not rehearse the powerful argument showing that all the evidence says that this will not achieve the desired objective and in all likelihood will push people into destitution and exploitation. That is why it is such a fundamental issue.

A lot has been said already about the daily rates. It is true that the food and non-alcoholic drink rate is up from the ONS data to £24.96. That is just over £3.50 per day for the very many weeks and months that it takes for a decision to be made about someone who is seeking asylum and may have come from any number of countries, fleeing persecution. All the other rates that have been adjusted, have been adjusted down.

[James Brokenshire]

Not true.

[Keir Starmer]

All the others that have been adjusted have been adjusted down. Some have not been adjusted. I will happily take an intervention if I am wrong about that. Clothing and footwear has gone down from £4.62 to £2.51, and travel from £3.62 to £3. That is 45p or so a day for travel. I do not know in which city people are expected to live for these weeks or months, but travelling for 45p a day is not an easy task. There are not many bus fares that can be bought for that even in one direction. On those adjustments down, the question that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central put was not whether this was a preordained decision but whether that downward trend could be justified. That question was not answered.

The amendments go to the heart of this part of the Bill and I will press them to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 228, in schedule 6, page 100, line 16, at end insert—

‘(43A) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

(43B) After section 3(9) (general provisions for regulation and control) insert—

“(10) In making rules under subsection (2), the Secretary of State must have regard to the following.

(11) Rules must provide for persons seeking asylum, within the meaning of the rules, to apply to the Secretary of State for permission to take up employment and that permission must be granted if—

(a) a decision has not been taken on the applicant’s asylum application within six months of the date on which it was recorded, or

(b) an individual makes further submissions which raise asylum grounds and a decision on that fresh claim or to refuse to treat such further submissions as a fresh claim has not been taken within six months of the date on which they were recorded.

(12) Permission for a person seeking asylum to take up employment shall be on terms no less favourable than those upon which permission is granted to a person recognised as a refugee to take up employment.””

This proposed amendment would provide for asylum seekers to be able to work if their claim is not determined within the Home Office target time of six months.

The amendment follows amendment 227 in that it would provide for asylum seekers to be able to work if their claim was not determined within the Home Office target time of six months. One of the injustices here is that those who have to exist on the low rates that the Committee has just discussed must do so under a system that prohibits them from working.

More than 3,600 asylum seekers currently wait more than six months for an initial decision on their cases. They are the individuals surviving on just over £5 a day, as we have just discussed. As things stand, they can apply for permission to work only if they have been waiting for more than a year for an initial decision. If that permission is granted, they are allowed to seek employment only in an occupation listed on the shortage occupation list.

This system has changed over the years as a result of a number of challenges and different policy decisions. The evidence that not allowing people to work deters them from coming to the UK is extremely hard to maintain when the position in other EU countries is taken into account. Some 11 EU countries grant permission to work after six months or less, if a decision has not been made on the asylum application. All those countries have had policies in place for many years. The recast EU reception conditions directive reduces the period an asylum seeker can be excluded from the labour market in an initial decision to nine months. Some 27 EU states have more generous policies than the UK as a combined result of those provisions.

This simple amendment would put people who have had to wait more than six months for their decision in a position where they can work, which is what many of them want to do. The net result for the taxpayer is likely to be a saving rather than a cost.

[Sarah Champion]

I would like to build on my hon. and learned Friend’s well made argument. I thank the Regional Asylum Activism Project for Yorkshire and Humberside for their help.

Despite often arriving in the UK with a host of skills and experiences gained in their country of origin, hardly any asylum seekers are allowed to work while their claim is being assessed by the Home Office. Only asylum seekers who have waited over 12 months for an initial decision on their case are eligible to apply for permission to work, but even those granted permission to work are not allowed to work in a self-employed capacity, set up a business, or take up a job that is not included on the highly specialised shortage occupation list. The current restrictions on accessing employment for people seeking refugee protection stops many highly skilled, experienced and educated individuals from contributing to the UK’s economy and society. For example, refugees started Marks & Spencer and brought us fish and chips and the Mini. People seeking refugee protection today will include, among many others, entrepreneurs, doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, scientists and solicitors. Fundamentally, allowing asylum seekers to work will make economic, social and political sense.

First, on economics, if asylum seekers were granted permission to work, they would be able to contribute to the UK economy immediately through income tax, adding directly to the UK’s coffers. Equally, amounts spent on asylum support would decline, resulting in a net benefit to the economy. That has been recognised by the European Commission, which states:

“Mandatory unemployment… imposes costs on the State through the payment of additional social welfare payments.”

Government research has also recognised that delayed entry to the labour market, loss of skills and confidence, and difficulty getting qualifications recognised in this country can cause problems even when status is granted, leading to high levels of unemployment and underemployment. Allowing people to work while waiting for their asylum claim decision will not only allow them to start rebuilding their lives free from persecution, but allow them to start the journey towards meaningful employment as soon as possible.

Secondly, the indirect costs of enforced poverty are significant. Without the right to work, people in the asylum system are forced to rely on Government support to survive, but with asylum support rates set at £5.28 a day—barely 50% of the income support equivalent—many in the asylum system are forced into institutionalised poverty. As I and other hon. Members have said, extended periods living in poverty have huge impacts on physical and mental health and self-esteem. For some, a reliance on Government support is considered shameful, as they are unable to support themselves and their families; that concern has been raised by the cross-party parliamentary inquiry into asylum support for children and young people. Research from the University of Leeds and the University of Salford found that the experience of poverty was a key factor in pushing many individuals in the asylum process into exploitative and precarious working conditions. I suggest that providing those in the asylum process with the legal permission to work is in line with the Government’s commitment to ending modern day slavery.

Thirdly, the rationale for the current policy does not hold up. The reasons for restricting permission to work for asylum seekers hinge on the idea that it will act as pull factor, but it is important to remember the conclusions of research the Home Office commissioned in 2002:

“There was very little evidence that the sample respondents had a detailed knowledge of: UK immigration or asylum procedures; entitlements to benefits in the UK; or the availability of work in the UK.”

That was confirmed by a review of the 19 main recipient countries for asylum applications in the OECD in 2011, which concluded that policies that relate to the welfare of asylum seekers did not impact on the number of applications made in destination countries. All but one of the countries that granted permission to work to people seeking asylum received fewer asylum applications than the UK in 2012 and 2013.

A change of policy to allow asylum seekers the permission to work is long overdue. In 2007, the Joint Committee on Human Rights described the denial of the right to work for asylum seekers as part of a “deliberate policy of destitution”, which was breaching human rights. In 2013, the cross-party parliamentary inquiry into asylum support for children and young people called for parents and young people to be given permission to work while their claims were being decided. Thirteen local authorities have passed motions condemning the destitution of people seeking asylum. To date, 71 current Members of this House, of all political persuasions, have signed Still Human Still Here’s declaration on permission to work. They join the Trades Union Congress and a broad coalition of organisations, from Refugee Council to Crisis, Doctors of the World to The Children’s Society, in their call for people seeking refugee protection to be allowed to live in dignity, not destitution.

Allowing asylum seekers permission to work will enable many to support themselves through the asylum process. We should grant permission to work to all asylum seekers if they have been waiting more than six months for an initial decision, up until their protection needs are recognised or a safe route back to their country of origin has been negotiated. For this reason, I urge the Minister to support the amendment.

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[James Brokenshire]

I can tell the hon. Lady that 85% of cases are straightforward and we have a service standard of dealing with those within six months. We dealt with a big backlog earlier this year—that is why I make the point about the effort that has gone in. Many people in the asylum processing system will say that asylum processing is probably in as good a place now as it has been in for many years, but of course I look for further improvements; we do not sit back. Equally, it depends on some of the pressures in terms of changes or increases in the numbers of those who are claiming asylum. We are very vigilant in monitoring how we are dealing with this. I can say to the hon. Lady that 85% of cases are straightforward and that our service standard is to deal with those within six months. Obviously, it is difficult to know what proportion of the people in her constituency may be in the situation she describes; it is difficult to draw that parallel. However, I hope that it is helpful at least to set out the approach that we are taking and that balance in terms of how asylum claims are dealt with.

We judge that the current policy strikes the right balance. Asylum seekers are provided with support and accommodation, but if their asylum claims are undetermined for 12 months for reasons outside their control, they can apply for permission to work. We believe that that is a fair and reasonable policy that we should keep. For the reasons that I have outlined, we ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister puts forward a number of good reasons for the decisions to be made within six months and prays in aid the service standard, which is to be supported, but the real question is: how many cases are actually decided within the service standard? We all have examples of where they are not. We know that the number is roughly 3,600. I am sure that the Minister did not welcome the ombudsman’s report published this morning, or at least reported on this morning, about the very high level of complaints upheld by the ombudsman, particularly in relation to immigration decision making. That does not mean that things are not moving in the right direction, but it does mean that very many cases are not decided within the six-month period.

[James Brokenshire]

The point that I was making about the service standard for dealing with the 85% of cases that are straightforward was that that has been met. I do not know whether that is helpful to the hon. and learned Gentleman in relation to his point.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister for that, but it still leaves outstanding the 3,600 cases in which people have not had their decision made within the six-month period. The Minister says that there is a concern that if there is a change in the current regime to a six-month regime, that may lead to adverse consequences, but as I understand it, that is simply unevidenced. Whatever research has been carried out in this area, it is unevidenced. It is a fear, but it is an unevidenced fear. The reason why I cited the EU provisions was not so much to argue that we should necessarily align ourselves with the EU position and should not take our own position as it was to say that it is much more difficult to make the argument that a six-month regime would operate as a pull factor if other countries are operating that regime at the moment.

[James Brokenshire]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman accept that the evidence that has been cited is from prior to the current migration crisis and that many EU countries are reflecting on their support and other mechanisms for providing asylum, precisely because of a number of these factors?

[Keir Starmer]

I do accept that, although I think that anyone in this Committee would be hard-pressed to say that the migration crisis of this summer was linked in any way, shape or form to whether someone could work after six months or after 12 months.

[James Brokenshire]

The reason why I intervened on the hon. and learned Gentleman was that his hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham, I think, had alluded to the timing of the reports. The point that I was trying to get across—I will make it briefly in this intervention—was that, sadly, we do see people traffickers, through social media and other means, seeking to set out the position of certain member states and what people are entitled to and, in a very deliberate way, encouraging people to try to come to other European countries.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Will the Minister take an intervention?

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister was intervening on me. I take that intervention; I have no quarrel with it in any way, shape or form. This is an important point, because there is a real fairness and justice in allowing people to work if they want to work, rather than surviving on £5 a day. Most people would agree on that. The concern expressed by the Minister is that if the period is too short, it can have adverse consequences, which is a serious point that needs to be debated.

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. and learned Friend will note the enthusiasm with which the Minister is intervening on him. Does he share my hope that the Minister might intervene to provide some more evidence regarding the pull factor? In his earlier comments, the Minister said he would outline exactly why the Government thought that was not the case, but he has conspicuously failed to do so. Now would be a good opportunity for him to do that.

[Keir Starmer]

In fairness, knowing the Minister, I think that if there was a sound evidence base, he would have referred to it already and the fact that he has not speaks volumes. There has obviously been a discussion about the migration crisis this summer and the impact—

[The Chair]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt, but I thought it might be useful to the Committee—I did say this right at the beginning—and particularly for new Members to say that Members are not restricted to one speech. As this debate has developed, if more Members want to catch my eye, that is quite appropriate.

[Keir Starmer]

Thank you, Mr Bone.

Clearly, as a result of what has happened this summer, there will be discussions about all aspects of the framework across the EU in relation to migration, but at this point, I was only praying in aid the EU provisions to counter any suggestion that the change proposed in the amendment would act as a pull factor when so many other countries in Europe have operated a different system for some time. In the crisis this summer, although there may be individual examples of traffickers exploiting pretty well every provision that they are capable of exploiting, I would have thought that the vast majority of cases had absolutely nothing to do with whether people can work after six or 12 months.

[The Chair]

I am not entirely sure whether the shadow Minister is pressing the amendment to a Division.

[Keir Starmer]

I do apologise, Mr Bone. That is because I did not say one way or another, but I will press the amendment. I am grateful for the steer.

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[James Brokenshire]

Amendments 105 to 112 are technical corrections to the drafting of the Bill. I will provide a brief explanation.

The lead amendment makes minor drafting changes by omitting the unnecessary alterations to the conjunctions in section 25B(3) of the Immigration Act 1971. Amendment 106 makes a minor amendment to correct the reference to which paragraph requires amending. Amendment 107 ensures that immigration officers must seek authorisation from the Secretary of State before exercising the maritime powers in relation to a foreign ship, or a ship registered under the law of a relevant territory, within UK territorial waters adjacent to Northern Ireland. That aligns the provision with the equivalent provisions applicable to UK territorial waters adjacent to England, Wales and Scotland. Amendment 108 removes the superfluous definition of “home state” and has no substantive effect. Amendments 109, 110, 111 and 112 are all minor drafting changes to ensure consistency of language throughout the schedule.

Amendment 105 agreed to.

Amendments made: 106, in schedule 8, page 108, line 9, leave out “28A” and insert “28A(3)”.

This minor amendment substitutes “28A” for “28A(3)” to correct the reference to which paragraph requires amending.

Amendment 107, in schedule 8, page 109, line 26, after “before” insert “an immigration officer,”.—(James Brokenshire.)

This amendment ensures that immigration officers must seek authorisation from the Secretary of State prior to exercising the maritime powers in relation to a foreign ship or a ship registered under the law of a relevant territory, within UK territorial waters adjacent to Northern Ireland. This aligns the provision with the equivalent provisions applicable to UK territorial waters adjacent to England, Wales and Scotland.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 229, page 109, line 35, in schedule 8, at beginning insert—

‘( ) Hot pursuit can only be commenced when a ship is in United Kingdom waters.”

Probing amendment to provide the Minister with an opportunity to confirm that hot pursuit will only start when the ship is in territorial waters, as required by Article 111 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The amendment is a probing one and, following our debate, we might not have to press it to a Division. There are provisions on hot pursuit in article 111 of the UN convention on the law of the sea. We tabled the amendment to seek assurance that the schedule, which is on maritime enforcement, is aligned with that international obligation, providing the Minister with the opportunity to confirm that hot pursuit will start only when a ship is in UK territorial waters. If that is the case, the provisions in the schedule will align with article 111 of the UN convention and the amendment is unnecessary.

[James Brokenshire]

The right of hot pursuit from territorial waters into international waters has long formed part of UK common law and reflects the provisions in article 111 of the UN convention. The Bill preserves the common law position by virtue of new section 28P(10) of the Immigration Act 1971, inserted by schedule 8. I can therefore confirm that under the maritime powers in the Bill, hot pursuit will commence only when a ship is in territorial or internal waters, as permitted by article 111 of the UN convention. In the light of that assurance, I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman is minded to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am, and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 108, in schedule 8, page 111, leave out lines 21 to 24.—(James Brokenshire.)

This amendment removes the superfluous definition of “home state” and has no substantive effect.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 236, in schedule 8, page 113, line 29, at end insert—

“(3A) If in the course of questioning or otherwise a person expresses to or in the presence of an immigration officer, a fear of return that may be a claim for asylum then the person shall be taken to the UK for that case to be considered.”

Probing amendment to seek assurances the powers granted in the Bill will not be used to push back asylum seekers at sea.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 237, in schedule 8, page 118, line 7, at end insert—

“(3A) If in the course of questioning or otherwise a person expresses to or in the presence of an immigration officer, a fear of return that may be a claim for asylum then the person shall be taken to the UK for that case to be considered.”

See explanatory note for Amendment 236.

Amendment 238, in schedule 8, page 122, line 29, at end insert—

“(3A) If in the course of questioning or otherwise a person expresses to or in the presence of an immigration officer, a fear of return that may be a claim for asylum then the person shall be taken to the UK for that case to be considered.”

See explanatory note for Amendment 236.

[Keir Starmer]

I will deal with the amendments in the group together, as amendments 237 and 238 would simply apply the provisions of amendment 236 to Scotland and to Northern Ireland. Again, it may be that the Minister’s remarks mean that there is no need to press the amendment.

Our concern is that the powers in the schedule for immigration officers to detain or search those found on boats in UK territorial waters should not be used to push back asylum seekers arriving by boat. As things stand, claims for asylum can be made in UK territorial waters, and if made are dealt with in accordance with the appropriate procedures. There is a wealth of support for that remaining the position. The amendment is probing, and if the Committee is given an assurance on the issue I have raised, I may not need to cite that great wealth of support.

[James Brokenshire]

I will give a brief response to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s probing amendment. The powers in the Bill do not permit officers to turn vessels back. Under the power, vessels may be diverted only to a port in the UK. Upon arrival in the UK an individual wishing to claim asylum may do so and will be processed in the ordinary way. As is the case for all persons arriving in the UK, they will be subject to an immigration examination under the Immigration Act once they have arrived on land, and may also be detained under relevant provisions pending an immigration decision. If they are assessed as being an illegal entrant or attempted illegal entrant, they will be processed under paragraph 9 of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, and removed accordingly.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister for that assurance. What he has just said will appear on the record of the proceedings in Committee. In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.