Immigration Bill

Christopher Chope Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Commons Chamber

I recognise the intentions behind new clauses 10 and 12, but we do not judge them to be necessary or appropriate. New clause 10 seeks to make provision for criminal sanctions against those who are present or who entered the UK without legal authority, but there are already criminal sanctions and removal and deportation powers in place to deal with illegal migrants. Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 in particular sets out criminal sanctions for various types of unlawful migrant behaviour, including illegal entry and overstaying.

[Mr Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend accept that, in 2013, the latest year for which I have statistics, there were only 72 convictions in magistrates and Crown courts for all the offences mentioned in section 24? Does he think the Government are taking the matter seriously enough?

[James Brokenshire]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for the way in which he has advanced these issues and underlined the need for us to remain focused on the removal of those who have no lawful authority to be here and to address those who have sought to come into the UK by clandestine means. The most effective way of dealing with those matters is to have an effective removal process, and that is why we are legislating in this way in the Bill. I also want to highlight the work that we discussed in our debate on the previous group of amendments. We are working to achieve a speedier and more efficient and effective use of detention and to determine how that plays into a more effective removal process more generally. The measures are already in place, but my hon. Friend’s points relate fundamentally to our achieving more efficient and effective removal, which is an aim I share.

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[Keir Starmer]

I start by confirming that we see the sense in the Government new clauses—I think they are new clauses 3 to 7—intended to help local authorities such as Kent deal with unaccompanied children, and we support them. But that is the extent of the agreement on this group of amendments.

Amendment 29 deals with the removal of support for certain categories of migrants. Such removal is wrong in principle and likely to be counterproductive. All the evidence is one way—support for families facing removal is the best means of ensuring that they leave. By support, I mean not only support in the terms set out in the Bill, but support by way of help with obstacles, documents and advice. It is the families that are supported in that broad way that are most likely to leave, and thus the objective is achieved by having the support in place. By contrast, withdrawing support has the opposite effect.

Let us call a spade a spade. Withdrawing support for this category of migrants is a threat of destitution as a means of enforcing immigration rules. All the evidence suggests that it is counterproductive. The Minister mentioned the 2005 pilot, confident—I think—that I would also mention it. It was a pilot of the proposition that withdrawing support—threatening destitution—was likely to encourage people to leave and to alter behaviour. The results of that pilot were evaluated in 2006, and they were stark. Of the 116 families in the pilot, one family left as a result of the withdrawal of support; 12 sought help with documents; 32 families went underground; and nine were removed from the scheme because on analysis it was found that their claims should not have been refused. The pilot was considered a complete failure.

The evidence is not only a pilot some 10 years ago: it is practice since then, with successive and different Governments accepting that destitution, or the threat of destitution, should not be used as a means of enforcing removal because—among other reasons—it is wholly counterproductive.

The Minister says that the situation now is different, and he put forward two reasons. The first is that, under the proposed arrangements, families would have to prove there was a genuine obstacle to removal. I am not sure how far that advances the argument. The idea seems to be that putting the onus on the family to prove a genuine obstacle will make them less likely to go underground if support is withdrawn, but there is no rational link between the two propositions. Secondly, he says the process will not be by way of correspondence, but carried out in a more engaged manner. It is hard to see how that change, welcome though it is, will make a difference to the stark results of the 2005 pilot. The withdrawal will cause hardship, distress and anxiety and will be wholly counterproductive. That is one the problems with the Bill: it does not meet its own objectives. The only basis on which the Government can advance these provisions is that they will make the UK appear to be a more hostile environment.

Destitution in the 21st century should not be a means of enforcing immigration rules, or any other rules, yet that is what lies behind the provisions. The whole House will accept that children should not be adversely impacted by the decisions of their parents, yet the Bill will visit those adverse impacts on them, because they will fall within the removal of support provisions. That led to great debate in Committee about whether this would simply transfer the burden from one Department to local authorities, which are not going to stand by and leave destitute children unassisted. The provision, therefore, is wrong in principle and counterproductive, and not one that in the 21st century we should have anything to do with.

Turning briefly to appeals, I will start with the narrow issue of appeals on the question of support. Amendments 31, 40 and 30 would reinstate the right of appeal against Home Office decisions on support. This is where the Home Office has made a decision on support but it is thought that the decision is wrong. At the moment, the error rate is very high. Those in the House who were not on the Committee will be astonished to hear that it is as high as 60% in some cases. Under the Bill, those decisions could not be put right on a simple appeal. In Committee, the Minister said that the long route of judicial review would remain as a remedy, but I failed to understand then, and I fail to do so now, how it can be sensible or cost-efficient to remove a simple right of appeal in cases for which there is a high rate of success and to rely on the much more expensive route of judicial review by different principles. With a 60% error rate, it is unacceptable to withdraw the right of appeal.

In relation to that error rate and others I will mention, the argument that some decisions that are changed are changed because an individual provides additional information is no answer. The rate of 60%, and of 40% to 42% for general appeals, is high in any event, and there is no evidence to suggest that in the majority of cases an individual has not provided the necessary information. In any event, whether or not they have been properly advised about what information to provide, they should not be punished by the withdrawal of support where inappropriate.

On the wider point of appeal, amendments 27 and 28 deal with the extension of appeals to the wider category of individuals who will be removed before they can appeal. There is a general point to make about such appeals, which is that although there may be court cases establishing that these provisions or their forerunners do not extinguish the rights of appeal, there is no question but that they materially inhibit the right of appeal. The success rate under the current arrangements, of between 40% and 42%, is instructive—these are the cases where individuals have been removed, only in the end to succeed in their appeals. I accept that some in that group may well have succeeded earlier had different or fuller information been made available to the authorities, but there is a variety of reasons why that may have happened, including the advice that those people had been given. Removing first, before appeal, materially inhibits rights of appeal and it should certainly not be expanded.

Amendments 27 and 28 are intended to ensure that before a decision is made to certify any claim for out-of-country appeal, the best interests of any child affected must be considered. These amendments propose a specific provision to deal with a real problem, rather than the general provision that is already in place, and that is materially important for the children who will be affected by the extension of the rules on appeal.

I want to spend just a few moments on the family reunification issues. Part 11 of the immigration rules are very narrowly drawn, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has given a powerful example of the injustice that they can and do inflict. New clause 1 is intended to remedy that, and I am sympathetic to it, but we have tabled new clause 11, which proposes a wider review of the refugee family reunification rules. New clause 11 has the advantage of covering the failure to implement the Dublin III convention, the advantage of enabling the review to consider an option to allow British citizens to sponsor close family members recognised as refugees or granted humanitarian protection, and the advantage of looking at options for extending the criteria for family reunion in the way envisaged by new clause 1.

[Mr Chope]

I rise to speak to my two new clauses. In so doing, I want to thank the Minister for telling me all the reasons why he does not support them, although he was generous enough to say that he agrees with the principles that lie behind them.

The second of my new clauses, new clause 12, could well be a blueprint for what happens after the country decides to leave the European Union in the forthcoming referendum, because it sets out the way in which people who are already in this country would be able to obtain the right of residence here, as well as some of the associated rules to ensure that those without the right of residence would be the subject of criminal sanctions.

Before coming to that in more detail, I want to refer to new clause 10 and some of the background to it. New clause 10 is modelled very much on a private Member’s Bill that I have brought forward on a couple of occasions for debate in the House, the Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill. The Bill had the privilege of being the subject of an opinion poll, which was conducted by the noble Lord Ashcroft in June 2013. The findings were that some 86% of those polled supported the provisions of the Bill and only 9% were against them, so this is a new clause that strikes a chord with the British people.

The reason I have brought those provisions forward again is that, despite previous debates, it seems that the statistics on how many people are being prosecuted and/or convicted for offences under section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971 are going in the wrong direction. In 2009, the number of people proceeded against and convicted both in the magistrates courts and the Crown courts for offences against that section was a giddy 158. For every year after 2009 the number had fallen, and by 2013—the last year for which figures are available—the number found guilty in the magistrates courts had fallen to six and the number convicted in the Crown courts had fallen to 66, making a total of 72 convictions for a widespread range of criminal offences against our immigration laws.

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[James Brokenshire]

Again, we have touched on several important themes in the Bill that were debated and examined in detail in Committee. We have also had additional items in new clauses that were not addressed in Committee, including those tabled by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). We understand the depth of feeling about the human suffering in Syria and the UK and we are obviously taking several steps to respond to that crisis. I recognise the contribution that she has made to highlight several issues and concerns relating to that. We do not believe, however—I will explain how this fits into what other European countries are doing—that widening the family reunion eligibility criteria is the appropriate response. We are focusing our efforts on humanitarian aid to help the majority of refugees who remain in the region, and working with international partners to find a solution to the conflict, as well as—of course—the issue of resettlement, including of 20,000 of the most vulnerable refugees over the course of this Parliament.

The right hon. Lady asked about Dublin, and it is important to underline that the UK has fully implemented the Dublin III regulation. Those in Calais are the responsibility of the French authorities, and anyone wishing to benefit from the family unity provision of the regulation must first lodge an asylum claim in France and provide details of their family in the UK. A request will then be made to the UK to accept responsibility for that claim based on the presence of close family members—as I think the right hon. Lady recognises. As part of our joint declaration with the French Government, we continue to work with the French authorities on the overall processing of asylum claims and ways in which we can continue to support their activities. Indeed, some of the numbers they are processing and seeing outside the camps are increasing.

It is also worth underlining that our family reunion policy is more generous than our international obligations require. As I hinted at, other EU countries impose additional restrictions in their lawful residence requirements. Countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Austria have recently announced they are amending their family reunion policies, while Germany has indicated it will review its policy.

The right hon. Lady asked me about compelling humanitarian cases, and indeed the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) gave another example. Where a family reunion application fails under the immigration rules, such as in the case of an 18 or 19-year-old applying to join their refugee parents in the UK, the entry clearance officer must consider whether there are exceptional circumstances or compassionate reasons to justify granting a visa outside the rules. I gave another example in relation to elderly parents, so there is that obligation on entry clearance officers. The hon. Gentleman is no longer in his place, but he also highlighted the specific issue of the Belfast harbour police. I am happy to reflect on his point, while recognising that it was established under separate legislation: the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847. Information-sharing powers exist, but I am happy to look at that in further detail.

My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) highlighted deportation. Our primary sanctions for immigration non-compliance are removal and civil penalties, which is why, in many respects, prosecution numbers are relatively low. Our focus is on removal, therefore, rather than prosecution, which can delay removal and is obviously costly. That is why we have taken this approach.

[Mr Chope]

Will my right hon. Friend accept that to remove somebody one first has to apprehend them, and that means to arrest them, which is what my amendment was about?

[James Brokenshire]

Obviously, powers of arrest do reside. Issues of detention came up in the previous debate, and I do not cut across the need to uphold the law and ensure that people are appropriately identified, and I think that removal or a civil penalty for those unlawfully employing them are appropriate measures.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), speaking for the SNP, highlighted an issue to do with the minimum income threshold. A migrant partner with an appropriate job offer in the UK can apply under tier 2 of the points-based system, but overseas employment is no guarantee of finding work in the UK.

In highlighting the issue of destitution, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), who speaks for the official Opposition, said that our arrangements would not work, based on the 2005 pilot. I gave some explanation when I opened the debate, but I would add that there will be focused and targeted engagement with appeal rights-exhausted families together with local authorities. That close engagement with families is in contrast with what happened before. The Local Government Association acknowledges the need for focused efforts to engage with families and adults to promote returns, and that is precisely what we intend to do.

We are working with local authorities to close the gaps that some have suggested might apply, and, in many ways, the LGA welcomes the steps we have taken to ensure that gaps are closed. On the issue of overseas appeals, obviously this matter has been tested by the Court of Appeal, which recently confirmed that the Government were generally entitled to proceed on the basis that an out-of-country appeal is fair and effective remedy. On access to higher education, we want equality of treatment in respect of the relevant student support regulations. We are requiring that the test should be that which is applied to other migrants and British citizens applying for a student loan under the student support regulations.

Again, there was comment about safeguards for children. I want to underline the duty we have under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. That is something we have carefully considered throughout our consideration of these provisions and that we judge provides the necessary support and protection mechanism for children under the Bill.