Keir Starmer
Main Page: Keir Starmer (Labour - Holborn and St Pancras)Department Debates - View all Keir Starmer's debates with the Home Office
(9 years ago)
Commons ChamberI shall speak to the amendments in my name. I hope it will be helpful to the House if I indicate as I go through them which of those amendments I currently intend to press to a Division, so that the Minister will know.
I start with the labour market provisions and say at the outset that we on the Labour Benches support the establishment of a director of labour market enforcement. This will provide strategic leadership, which is much needed and very welcome. The real issues in relation to the director are resources and focus. In Committee we heard evidence from Professor Metcalf, who is chair of the Migration Advisory Committee. He said that he understood the issues of public finances, but he did not think the enforcement bodies had enough resources. He pointed to the fact that on the evidence in the report on low-skilled work, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs could be expected to visit any given premises once every 250 years and that there was the prospect of a prosecution every 1 million years.
I accept that any investigation would be intelligence-led and targeted, but those figures are stark and point to the problem of resourcing. As another example, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority investigations dropped from 134 in 2011 to 68 in 2014. Clearly, we cannot deal with resources here in this debate, but amendment 18 is intended to give a focus to the director, to ensure that the functions of the director are exercised for the purpose of protecting the victims of labour market exploitation and to make this explicit on the face of the Bill. This mirrors the way in which the Modern Slavery Act 2015 dealt with the functions of the Anti-Slavery Commissioner established by that Act.
There is therefore a good precedent for the amendment. It provides clarity and it avoids any misconception or temptation about this role, which is being introduced in an immigration Bill—namely, that it should be about labour market enforcement, not immigration control. The experience of other countries suggests that this is the right focus for this important role.
Amendment 19 would omit the proposed illegal working offence and maintain the status quo. Time and again in the House and elsewhere the point has been made about the exploitation of the vulnerable. The Migration Advisory Committee reported in 2014 that
“the combination of non-compliance and insufficient enforcement can lead to instances of severe exploitation, particularly of vulnerable groups such as migrants.”
The Committee said in the same report:
“We were struck on our visits around the country by the amount of concern that was expressed by virtually everyone we spoke to about the exploitation of migrants in low-skilled jobs.”
There is a great deal of other evidence to the same effect. What is desperately needed is more resources for inspections, a focus on exploitative employers and a mechanism to encourage employees to have the confidence to come forward. The new provision cuts across that.
Clause 8 is likely to ensure that the most exploited and vulnerable will become even more so; in effect, it will simply strengthen the hand of gangmasters over exploited workers. It also fails the test of necessity. There are already criminal provisions relating to those who have breached immigration rules and there is no need to introduce a new criminal offence for employees. We are talking about the most vulnerable and exploited people, who need the confidence to come forward if the director is to achieve the functions set out in the Bill. My current intention is to push amendment 19 to a vote, although obviously I will listen to what the Minister has to say.
I turn to amendment 20, which also relates to the offence of illegal working. It is a strict or stark offence: an employee who simply does not have the right immigration status commits an offence and has no defence at all. I shall give an example of the injustice likely to be caused. If an employee in good faith relies on his or her employer to sponsor him or her, but something wrong in the process means that as a matter of law, and unbeknown to them, they do not have the right immigration status, they automatically commit an offence and have no “reasonable excuse” defence. That cannot be right for a new criminal offence in this field. With all due respect to the Director of Public Prosecutions, it is not good enough to say that the prosecution must weed out those cases. There needs to be a defence in statute to cover cases of mistake and error that are not the employee’s fault.
I turn to the provisions on landlords and the right to rent. The background is important during this Report debate. The Immigration Act 2014 introduced a civil penalty scheme in relation to the right to rent. That was discussed in the House; there were concerns about the impact it would have in practice and in particular about whether there would be any discriminatory effects. Assurances were given about piloting and properly evaluating the civil penalty scheme before it was rolled out. This Bill, in 2015, proposes to extend the civil penalty scheme by introducing a criminal penalty before there has been a full and meaningful evaluation.
As was mentioned on Second Reading, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants carried out an evaluation showing, alarmingly, that 42% of landlords said that the right to rent provisions made them less likely to consider accommodating someone who did not have a British passport. At that stage, we did not have the advantage of the Home Office evaluation, which was made available in Committee, as the Minister said it would be. That evaluation, however, was small and narrow. The Home Office itself said that it was not sure about the statistical significance of part of the evaluation and that the sample sizes were too small to draw any robust conclusions. We say that the assurance in relation to the civil penalty scheme has not been fulfilled and there is no warrant for extending the scheme to include a criminal sanction.
Amendment 22 deals with the position of landlords who, under the current provisions, would automatically commit a criminal offence the moment they were served notice that they had a tenant without the right to rent. They would be criminalised notwithstanding the period between receipt of that knowledge, normally by a notice, and their best prospect of getting anybody evicted. A reasonable, objective landlord who received a notice and acted on it immediately would still be criminalised during the process. There cannot be any sensible or compelling case for that state of affairs, which causes great concern to landlords and puts them in an impossible position. I understand that the Government may be considering the issue and obviously I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says. On the face of it, however, it is difficult to see that there could ever be a case for such a measure.
Amendments 23 to 26 all relate to the important issue of summary eviction. The Bill introduces a fast-track process—innovative in this field—in which a notice from a landlord stands as a court order, leading to provision for summary eviction. Some 30 or 40 years ago, the House set its face against summary evictions for a very good reason: there were too many examples of locks being changed and families literally being put out on to the street to sleep on the pavements. Everybody agreed that there should be due process before individuals and families, particularly families with children, were evicted. The Bill cuts through that protection for no good reason. In this country in the 21st century no group of individuals should—for whatever reason, and whether renting lawfully or not—be subject to summary eviction proceedings that, as I said, we turned our back on a long time ago.
I move on to immigration detention, which has already been touched on and is a matter of increasing concern to many in this House and beyond. The fact of immigration detention causes real distress and anxiety, particularly among vulnerable groups, and its indefinite nature adds to that. There is strong evidence of the impact on varying groups, particularly women. I think I am right in saying that the UK is the only country in Europe that does not have a time limit of any sort on immigration detention. That has been the subject of inquiry by the all-party groups on refugees and on migration. They concluded:
“We believe that the United Kingdom has a proud tradition of upholding justice and the right to liberty. However, the continued use of indefinite detention puts this proud tradition at risk.”
The reforms suggested by the cross-party joint APPG group were backed by the House of Commons when they were debated in September this year, and a motion supporting them was passed. The issue is one of increasing concern and justifying indefinite immigration detention is increasingly difficult. Amendment 32 is intended to deal with that by introducing a 28-day limit, which many people feel is the right one.
New clause 13 is intended to allow a review by an independently chaired panel to consider the issues and report to Parliament within three months; it is not premised on a fixed period. It is important that there is progress on these issues. Immigration detention is a real cause for concern and this is an opportunity to do something necessary.
The hon. Gentleman just said that new clause 13 does not prescribe a particular length of time, yet paragraph (a) specifies a 28-day time limit. Will he confirm that that is his position?
I apologise. I meant that it proposes a review of the time limit rather than a time limit itself, and that therefore, given the nature of the review, it would be open to it to look at other options. There are shared concerns across the House about immigration detention and its indefinite nature. There will be disagreements as to the precise time limit, if there is to be one, and that can be discussed, but at this stage sitting back and simply accepting the status quo is not an acceptable way of proceeding. However, I will obviously listen to what the Minister has to say on this.
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that one of the values of a time limit is that it provides the detained person with some certainty about what is happening while they are being detained? We heard evidence, and we know from our constituents, that the difficulty is that people are put in detention and do not know what is going to happen to them, with consequential mental health, and other, impacts.
I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. There is the fact of detention in the first place, covering a wide range of individuals detained for different reasons, and then there is its indefinite nature, which adds to the anxiety, because most terms of detention are for a fixed period that allows the individual to know when they may regain their liberty.
As I say, there will be debates about what the precise time limit should be, but sustaining a position of indefinite detention is no longer acceptable in the 21st century. It is not the position in almost all other countries in Europe, and it should not be so in this country.
As somebody who served with the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and others on the Bill Committee, there is a terrible sense of déjà vu, to put it politely, or “Groundhog Day”, not so politely, about this debate. We had a lot of these debates and discussions in Committee. I hope that those who did not join me in voting as I did in Committee would at least recognise that it was a very thoughtful process in which we went through the whole Bill in great depth and a great raft of amendments were tabled and debated. However, even the Opposition parties managed to run out of steam, allowing the usual channels to pull stumps some little time before the Committee stage was scheduled to finish. I hope that that in no way suggests that we cantered with unseemly haste through the important issues that the Bill seeks to address.
My hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Rebecca Harris), who is no longer in her place, hit the nail on the head, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich North (Chloe Smith) in Committee. This is probably one of the most important issues that this House and this Parliament will deal with. If we get it right, we will engender a sense of an understanding of fair play and that this place “gets it”. If we get it wrong, we will seem to be even more disengaged from the communities that we seek to serve.
I am lucky to represent a predominantly rural constituency where even a casual glance at the census returns would suggest that immigration was not an issue that would be raised on the doorstep or in meetings. However, even in rural North Dorset, it has been, and continues to be, such an issue.
It is a pleasure to take part in this debate, and I will speak to the new clauses to which my name has been added. New clauses 8, 9, 13 and 32 are unique in that they have a cross-party feel, which should not go unnoticed. I have not had the pleasure of being involved in all stages of the Bill, but I think that cross-party support for these new clauses is a unique aspect to our deliberations; I do not think it has happened until now. As the Minister has noticed, there is cross-party concern about the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) about fair play. We are concerned to ensure that our immigration system stands up to scrutiny from beginning to end, and that fair play is imbued within it.
Fair play matters for those who shout loudest and campaign loudly—whether before elections or in other campaigns throughout the year—just as much as it matters for those who are relatively voiceless, or perhaps do not even have a vote. Fair play should be about “the other” and those who are not as loud, and we want to uphold the fundamental British values of fairness and due process. Indeed, one could refer back to Magna Carta when considering issues of detention, and the right and duty to detain people only after fair and due process, and not for administrative purposes alone. Although I concede that immigration detention is not the main purpose of the Bill, it will not surprise the Minister that these new clauses have been tabled.
When dealing with detention, it is important that we uphold principles that have stood this country well for many years. The rest of the world looks at how we handle detention and whether we do so with fairness, and when dealing with those who are detained for administrative reasons, the bar is set that much higher. We must be proportionate, reasonable, and do things in a limited way, so that a limited number of people are in detention for as short a time as possible. Regardless of whether the new clauses are accepted, we must ensure that that principle is applied.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that what unites the parties is the principle that there should be some measure to limit and reduce the time spent in immigration detention?
I agree, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about that abiding principle. Home Office guidance states that detention should be used sparingly and as a last resort, and such guidance must be available for all to use and apply throughout the system. However people come to this country, and whether by fair means or foul, we must treat everyone fairly and with dignity when they are with us, all the way through to their possible removal. They may be with us voluntarily or by force, but at every stage we must show that we respect their human dignity.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions on a range of issues, which have highlighted the concerns, passion and interest that so many people have shown throughout the consideration of this Bill. The debate we have had over the last hour and 50 minutes has again underlined that interest and focus, and it is important that the House has been able to debate in this way.
I want to start with the issue of immigration detention, which is one of the key elements of the debate. I want to underline at the outset the fact that the Home Office has a policy to safeguard against unnecessary or arbitrary detention. The presumption is in favour of liberty. Cases must be considered on their individual circumstances. Detention must be used sparingly and for the shortest period necessary. That goes to the heart of some of the elements in new clause 13, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes). This is about having a system that is efficient and effective, but that also treats those within it with dignity and respect.
If I may, I would like to finish this point and then take interventions. I want to set out the fact that the Home Office is conducting detailed analysis of the purposes behind that—in other words, moving towards the policy that I have underlined, including looking at the checks and balances in the systems to ensure that we have a more efficient and more effective process so that people are removed more swiftly and speedily. We also need to reflect on how that sits within an overall framework of removal.
I believe that it is accepted here that detention plays an important role in managing immigration and managing people towards removal, but it has to have removal as its focus. Yes, of course, for certain groups such as foreign national offenders or in certain national security cases, detention might be needed for a slightly longer period, but always with the focus on the realistic prospect of removal taking place. We will come back to this House in the new year—and we intend this to be before the Bill has passed through both Houses—setting out the much broader piece of work that we are undertaking.
Other amendments relate to the issues of vulnerability raised by Steven Shaw. As I have indicated, we intend to respond to it before the Bill has started its Committee in the House of Lords, and we shall also set out proposals for a new detained fast-track, which I suspended because I was not satisfied that the necessary safeguards were in place. It is the sense of how we construct an efficient and effective detention policy that goes to the heart of the issues I have highlighted—of considering cases on their merits, but using detention sparingly and for the shortest period necessary that is consistent with our policy, which must be upheld.
Does the Minister agree that the reviews he has summarised deal with the issues raised in paragraphs (b) through to (e) in new clause 13? Having set out the policy carefully, does he agree that it is consistent with the principle that we should seek to limit and reduce the time spent in immigration detention?
As I have said, the current Home Office policy is to use detention sparingly and for the shortest period necessary, which is why our work on ensuring a more efficient and effective system consistent with our obligation is absolutely consistent with the themes redolent in paragraphs (b) to (e) of new clause 13. The difference is that I believe that having a 28-day time period does not advance the cause. It is a blunt instrument that does not take account of the full range of different circumstances that are redolent here from foreign national offenders to those who might not be compliant with the requirements we put upon them or who abscond, so we need to look at the situation on a case-by-case basis. I repeat, however, that we are conducting our review in the light of our focus on efficiency and effectiveness, and we will revert to the House as I have outlined.
A number of other points, including about the right to rent, have been highlighted in the debate. The right-to-rent scheme restricts the access of illegal migrants to the private rented sector, stopping them setting down roots and building ties. The scheme, which has been rolled out to parts of the west midlands, has not proven difficult or burdensome for landlords, but it has led to illegal migrants being apprehended.
The scheme has been in place for one year and is working as intended. The Government published an extensive evaluation of the right-to-rent scheme’s first six months, and this found no hard evidence of discrimination or any new barriers to lawful residents accessing the private rented sector. Repealing the right-to-rent scheme would remove a significant part of the Government’s measures to deter illegal migration. The Bill’s provisions on residential tenancies are aimed to make it easier for the majority of reputable landlords to evict illegal migrant tenants and to crack down further on those rogue landlords who do so much to damage the sector.
The offences are framed to allow for the prosecution of those who are or who have knowingly rented to illegal migrants or who have or had reasonable cause to believe that they were renting to illegal migrants. We believe that that is the right approach, but a conviction will be possible only where the offence has been proven to the criminal threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. These offences are not designed to catch out a landlord who has made a genuine mistake, and it is difficult to foresee a situation in which it would be in the public interest to pursue a prosecution against a landlord making reasonable efforts to remove illegal migrants from their property.
There are concerns about people being evicted without adequate notice or without sufficient safeguards in place—and points were raised about these in the debate on some of the other amendments. However, safeguards already exist. The Secretary of State will serve notices only where she is satisfied that the migrant is here unlawfully and only after taking the migrant’s circumstances into consideration. Should there be recognised barriers to illegal migrants leaving the UK that are not of their own making, these will be taken into account.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) asked about measures relating to charities. Amendment 46 would create what we regard as a significant loophole in the right-to-rent provisions. It could lead to endless quibbling about what is meant by “significantly exceed the costs” and indeed about what constitutes “costs”. I responded in Committee to give an assurance on a number of different aspects, and said that many of the shelters would fall outside the provisions. Our concern is that rogue landlords would take advantage of the measures that the hon. Lady outlined, and we would not want to create such a loophole.
In the debate in Committee on the director of labour market enforcement, there was strong support on all sides for the creation of such a director, which has been reflected in today’s debate, too. The director’s role is already set out in the Bill. The director will set out the strategy for our enforcement bodies to stop exploitation and non-compliance across the spectrum, but there is a difference between the role of the director and that of the anti-slavery commissioner. If we look at all the different aspects of the labour market enforcement strategy, we judge that the provision is right, but we will obviously continue to reflect to ensure that it is appropriately framed.
On the issue of resources, we have recently announced that we will increase HMRC’s budget for 2015-16 by £4 million around the issue of the national minimum wage. The director will analyse the available funds across all the different aspects for which he or she would have responsibility.
Some have raised concerns about the offence. The Government would not want to prosecute those who have been forced to travel here and exploited for the profit of others, which goes to the heart of the matter. That is why the offence is not aimed at the victims of modern slavery. The statutory defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 will apply.
On some of the issues raised by SNP Members, we maintain that the heart of the issues that matter here are reserved, so it would not be appropriate to accept the proposed amendments. New clause 16 would amend the compensation arrangements for those experiencing financial detriment as a consequence of an illegal working closure notice, but we believe that these provisions are already covered in paragraph 15 of schedule 3 and related safeguards, which are, in our judgment, sufficient. As for James Ewins’s review of overseas domestic workers, it will shortly be published and will no doubt be subject to further consideration at that stage.
I reiterate to right hon. and hon. Members that we have given careful consideration to the Bill and have reflected on a number of the points raised. I hope that, with the assurances I have given, right hon. and hon. Members will be minded not to press their amendments and new clauses to the vote.
I start by confirming that we see the sense in the Government new clauses—I think they are new clauses 3 to 7—intended to help local authorities such as Kent deal with unaccompanied children, and we support them. But that is the extent of the agreement on this group of amendments.
Amendment 29 deals with the removal of support for certain categories of migrants. Such removal is wrong in principle and likely to be counterproductive. All the evidence is one way—support for families facing removal is the best means of ensuring that they leave. By support, I mean not only support in the terms set out in the Bill, but support by way of help with obstacles, documents and advice. It is the families that are supported in that broad way that are most likely to leave, and thus the objective is achieved by having the support in place. By contrast, withdrawing support has the opposite effect.
Let us call a spade a spade. Withdrawing support for this category of migrants is a threat of destitution as a means of enforcing immigration rules. All the evidence suggests that it is counterproductive. The Minister mentioned the 2005 pilot, confident—I think—that I would also mention it. It was a pilot of the proposition that withdrawing support—threatening destitution—was likely to encourage people to leave and to alter behaviour. The results of that pilot were evaluated in 2006, and they were stark. Of the 116 families in the pilot, one family left as a result of the withdrawal of support; 12 sought help with documents; 32 families went underground; and nine were removed from the scheme because on analysis it was found that their claims should not have been refused. The pilot was considered a complete failure.
The evidence is not only a pilot some 10 years ago: it is practice since then, with successive and different Governments accepting that destitution, or the threat of destitution, should not be used as a means of enforcing removal because—among other reasons—it is wholly counterproductive.
The Minister says that the situation now is different, and he put forward two reasons. The first is that, under the proposed arrangements, families would have to prove there was a genuine obstacle to removal. I am not sure how far that advances the argument. The idea seems to be that putting the onus on the family to prove a genuine obstacle will make them less likely to go underground if support is withdrawn, but there is no rational link between the two propositions. Secondly, he says the process will not be by way of correspondence, but carried out in a more engaged manner. It is hard to see how that change, welcome though it is, will make a difference to the stark results of the 2005 pilot. The withdrawal will cause hardship, distress and anxiety and will be wholly counterproductive. That is one the problems with the Bill: it does not meet its own objectives. The only basis on which the Government can advance these provisions is that they will make the UK appear to be a more hostile environment.
Destitution in the 21st century should not be a means of enforcing immigration rules, or any other rules, yet that is what lies behind the provisions. The whole House will accept that children should not be adversely impacted by the decisions of their parents, yet the Bill will visit those adverse impacts on them, because they will fall within the removal of support provisions. That led to great debate in Committee about whether this would simply transfer the burden from one Department to local authorities, which are not going to stand by and leave destitute children unassisted. The provision, therefore, is wrong in principle and counterproductive, and not one that in the 21st century we should have anything to do with.
Turning briefly to appeals, I will start with the narrow issue of appeals on the question of support. Amendments 31, 40 and 30 would reinstate the right of appeal against Home Office decisions on support. This is where the Home Office has made a decision on support but it is thought that the decision is wrong. At the moment, the error rate is very high. Those in the House who were not on the Committee will be astonished to hear that it is as high as 60% in some cases. Under the Bill, those decisions could not be put right on a simple appeal. In Committee, the Minister said that the long route of judicial review would remain as a remedy, but I failed to understand then, and I fail to do so now, how it can be sensible or cost-efficient to remove a simple right of appeal in cases for which there is a high rate of success and to rely on the much more expensive route of judicial review by different principles. With a 60% error rate, it is unacceptable to withdraw the right of appeal.
In relation to that error rate and others I will mention, the argument that some decisions that are changed are changed because an individual provides additional information is no answer. The rate of 60%, and of 40% to 42% for general appeals, is high in any event, and there is no evidence to suggest that in the majority of cases an individual has not provided the necessary information. In any event, whether or not they have been properly advised about what information to provide, they should not be punished by the withdrawal of support where inappropriate.
On the wider point of appeal, amendments 27 and 28 deal with the extension of appeals to the wider category of individuals who will be removed before they can appeal. There is a general point to make about such appeals, which is that although there may be court cases establishing that these provisions or their forerunners do not extinguish the rights of appeal, there is no question but that they materially inhibit the right of appeal. The success rate under the current arrangements, of between 40% and 42%, is instructive—these are the cases where individuals have been removed, only in the end to succeed in their appeals. I accept that some in that group may well have succeeded earlier had different or fuller information been made available to the authorities, but there is a variety of reasons why that may have happened, including the advice that those people had been given. Removing first, before appeal, materially inhibits rights of appeal and it should certainly not be expanded.
Amendments 27 and 28 are intended to ensure that before a decision is made to certify any claim for out-of-country appeal, the best interests of any child affected must be considered. These amendments propose a specific provision to deal with a real problem, rather than the general provision that is already in place, and that is materially important for the children who will be affected by the extension of the rules on appeal.
I want to spend just a few moments on the family reunification issues. Part 11 of the immigration rules are very narrowly drawn, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has given a powerful example of the injustice that they can and do inflict. New clause 1 is intended to remedy that, and I am sympathetic to it, but we have tabled new clause 11, which proposes a wider review of the refugee family reunification rules. New clause 11 has the advantage of covering the failure to implement the Dublin III convention, the advantage of enabling the review to consider an option to allow British citizens to sponsor close family members recognised as refugees or granted humanitarian protection, and the advantage of looking at options for extending the criteria for family reunion in the way envisaged by new clause 1.
I rise to speak to my two new clauses. In so doing, I want to thank the Minister for telling me all the reasons why he does not support them, although he was generous enough to say that he agrees with the principles that lie behind them.
The second of my new clauses, new clause 12, could well be a blueprint for what happens after the country decides to leave the European Union in the forthcoming referendum, because it sets out the way in which people who are already in this country would be able to obtain the right of residence here, as well as some of the associated rules to ensure that those without the right of residence would be the subject of criminal sanctions.
Before coming to that in more detail, I want to refer to new clause 10 and some of the background to it. New clause 10 is modelled very much on a private Member’s Bill that I have brought forward on a couple of occasions for debate in the House, the Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill. The Bill had the privilege of being the subject of an opinion poll, which was conducted by the noble Lord Ashcroft in June 2013. The findings were that some 86% of those polled supported the provisions of the Bill and only 9% were against them, so this is a new clause that strikes a chord with the British people.
The reason I have brought those provisions forward again is that, despite previous debates, it seems that the statistics on how many people are being prosecuted and/or convicted for offences under section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971 are going in the wrong direction. In 2009, the number of people proceeded against and convicted both in the magistrates courts and the Crown courts for offences against that section was a giddy 158. For every year after 2009 the number had fallen, and by 2013—the last year for which figures are available—the number found guilty in the magistrates courts had fallen to six and the number convicted in the Crown courts had fallen to 66, making a total of 72 convictions for a widespread range of criminal offences against our immigration laws.