Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Howarth]

The Minister has provided the reassurance I was looking for, so at this point I can say that I am perfectly happy with the clause as it now stands.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) asked an important question: what will the Government do when a company does not wish to co-operate? I would like to put on the record something that I cannot attribute to a particular individual, other than to say it was a comment made by a very senior member of one of the main communications services providers in modern media. In relation to the question of his medium being abused for serious criminal or terrorist purposes, he said:

“We don’t want to frustrate the access of law enforcement agencies; only, that they should come through the front door and ask us, not sneak in by the back door.”

The companies want something that is clearly laid out in a proper legal format, so that they can fulfil that promise not at the whim of some private or backstairs approach by some unnamed Government official, but through a proper on-the-record procedure.

[Mr Raab]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. There has been a lot of talk about privacy, but if we do not get this right and the providers are not comfortable, the risk is that the Bill will be flouted. If that happens, the use of foreign providers by every paedophile and jihadist group would drive a coach and horses through clause 4 and render it utterly useless.

[Dr Lewis]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, who is a fierce defender of the rights of individuals. I hope he agrees that if we can build on the attitude I have described from one of the most senior providers, then, by consensus, we ought to be able to set an example of an agreed arrangement whereby providers can be satisfied that they are assisting the law enforcement authorities in a proper, open and legitimate way, with no question of their being party to underhand arrangements.

Finally, may I apologise to the House for my late entry to this important debate, and, indeed, for my attire? I spent the entire day at the Farnborough air show, where the screaming of fast jets must have excluded the noise of my telephone ringing repeatedly from Downing street, offering me an alternative way to serve the nation.

[Dr Huppert]

I have two questions and I would be grateful if the Minister provided a written response to them, to ensure we get a clear answer. First, may we have a written confirmation that there would be no power to force foreign companies to install surveillance equipment on their networks if they are able to provide the intercept that is needed? Secondly, will he confirm the impact of subsection (4) and make it clear that, if a foreign company is under an obligation not to provide such data—if it would, in fact, be a criminal offence for them to comply—no such requirement would be made by the Government? That would put people in the invidious position of having to face criminality on one front or the other. If the Minister wrote to me with confirmation on those points, that would be very helpful.

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[John McDonnell]

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) has formally requested a vote on amendment 2. If he has not, I would like to do so. I will deal quickly with some of the points that have been made. I think that the House is open to derision in putting such important legislation through in this time scale. The argument that the time is limited because we are abutting the summer recess and MPs are about to go on holiday opens us up to even more derision, so we will be held in contempt yet again. I say to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), for whom I have a lot of affection, no matter how infuriating he can be at times, that the argument that a piece of legislation that could be undertaken in the next five months is somehow not as good as one that we will put forward in 24 hours simply does not hold water.

The point is that we are appealing to the Government today to give us the opportunity not only to have a thorough debate in this House, but to go back to our constituencies, as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) said, and consult the people who put us here. With such a technical piece of legislation, I want to ensure that I consult my constituents and all those voluntary organisations and experts in the field. That includes taking expert legal advice on its exact meaning, because I no longer accept the argument—it has become confused today—about there being no new powers. I think that there are new powers, but I would like that to be verified by external advice. We have had no chance to do that. We have received, at best, a couple of briefings and a curtailed Select Committee hearing. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis), who chairs the Joint Committee on Human Rights, appealed to the Government and said that all we need is the original judgment from the European Court of Justice and the points it raised, matched with the legislation and with clarification on which points the legislation addressed. We do not even have that.

Furthermore, we have the draft legislation before us, but not the guidance, which is the really meaningful part. It will specify who will be included and how it will be implemented in detail. That is still to come, so we are passing this legislation virtually in the dark. On the argument that there will be review after review, the Government’s new clause 7 simply means that a report of the review will be sent to the Prime Minister, but if it

“appears to the Prime Minister that the publication of any matter in a report under subsection (4) would be contrary to the public interest”—

not just prejudicial to national security—the Prime Minister can ensure that it is not given to this House. The definition of the public interest can be as wide as the Prime Minister determines. That is unacceptable. That is not open or transparent.

We have all been in this House long enough to know that having review after review is almost meaningless unless, at the end of the day, the Government decide to legislate or change legislation. A review process is usually used to put something on the back burner so that we can all ignore it as though it has gone away. The reason for a sunset clause is to give the whole exercise of reviews some bite. Without that bite, I am afraid that Governments do not act. The idea of having some bite at a distant point at the end of the following year means that this country will labour and languor under what I think will be an unjust piece of legislation for a long period, which could result in miscarriages of justice and an imposition on our freedoms. It is too long to wait. That is why the short curtailment of the sunset clause is critical to ensure that we give the matter serious attention; otherwise, it will drift further away.

The next five months give us the opportunity for full consultation, proper advice and full display of information, particularly on the Government’s statutory code. We could then come back after the recess and examine new legislation in detail, which may address some of the points that have been raised about the operation of RIPA. As the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) has said, this is no way to legislate and create laws that could have significant consequences for our constituents.

I have raised the issue of the secrecy of professional advice, which was provided for in the European judgment. That is supposed to be covered by the code of practice, but we have yet to see it. That advice could relate not just to lawyers, but to the operations of journalists who wish to expose matters of public interest and to trade unionists and others. This is a risk to civil liberties that I am not willing to support. That is why I support amendment 2.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Having made a brief intervention earlier that was largely helpful to Members on both Front Benches, I will now rectify the balance by saying that, however one looks at this debate in terms of whether or not enough time has been made available for those who want to speak to have their say, the overall impression that has been given to the public has been unfortunate, to put it mildly. My understanding is that this Bill has been made necessary because of an ECJ judgment that was arrived at in April. It is now mid-July. Why on earth has it taken so long to get from that judgment all those weeks ago to the position now, whereby it appears to the public that we have to make what I believe to be very necessary changes in a terrible rush? They are under the impression—in the context, it must be said, of the paranoia over the Edward Snowden affair—that we are doing this in a desperately swift and ill-considered way.

Personally, I accept that there is some strength in the argument that the time the Government have made available at this very late stage is probably enough for most of the people who are likely to contribute to the debate in the Chamber to do so; but not enough time has been given to those in the country who want to develop the wider public argument. One would not like to give the impression that one was trying to get this Bill through in a rush before a suitable momentum of public concern had the opportunity to build up, but, if that was not the reason for the delay, what was?

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

My hon. Friend says, quite properly, that there is time for those of us who are concerned to make our points, but there is no time for us to research those points. There are significant legal and practical issues involved, and some of the issues are difficult to research because most of them are secret. One weekend is a ridiculous time scale in which to consider something that goes to the heart of the fundamental relationship between the state and the citizen.

[Dr Lewis]

I hope my right hon. Friend accepts that the nub of my short contribution is to say that we should not have found ourselves in this position. When the ECJ judgment was made we should immediately have swung into action so as to give people reasonable warning that this debate was going to take place, and then they could have done the degree of research necessary to avoid the impression that things were being rushed through in unseemly haste.

[Steve McCabe]

If we are all trying to be open and straight with people, why do we not just own up to the fact that this problem is of the coalition Government’s making? They could not get to the point where they agreed on a Bill, so we now have to consider a bit of bounced legislation as an emergency because of the coalition’s problems.

[Dr Lewis]

I always love it when an Opposition Member precisely anticipates my final point. My love, affection and esteem for coalition politics are legendary. I want Ministers to give me the explanation—so far, we have been denied it—that there is indeed a rational alternative to the paranoid belief currently abroad that all this is being rushed through because we wanted to stifle debate, were afraid what the public would say and feared the context of all the revelations of secrets.

Let us get to the heart of it: if the truth is that it took this long for the Conservatives and the Liberals to agree what they wanted to introduce, there is nothing to be ashamed of in saying so; it is a natural downside of coalition politics. I appeal to my hon. Friend the Minister, who does these things with such panache and dependability, to put his head above the parapet and simply say that this was one of the many disadvantages of coalition politics—which Conservative Members and Labour Members look forward to seeing the back of in a few months’ time.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I support amendment 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson), who made his case extremely well.

Surely the issue is simply this: Parliament is here to scrutinise what the Executive do and to try to represent public opinion. We need to take advice from the public, organisations, lobby groups and so on, but all I have managed to find was an interesting and quite useful briefing from Liberty that came in yesterday—all credit to Liberty for getting a reasonable briefing together in a very short time—and a series of articles in The Guardian and one or two other newspapers.

But this Bill has massive implications in relation to the ability of the state to dip in and out of people’s telephone and e-mail accounts. Because it takes on itself a global reach, it has huge implications all around the world. If we are to take the global reach to dip into e-mail accounts all around the world, what are we to do, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) said in an intervention, when an unpalatable regime decides to do the same and pitches up in a British court and says, “Well, you’ve taken these rights unto yourself. Why shouldn’t we do exactly the same?”? The implications of the Bill go a very long way indeed.

I am always suspicious when the House is summoned in an emergency and told, “This is an absolutely overriding, desperate emergency, so we’ve got to get this thing through all its stages in one day,” and Front Benchers from both sides of the House get together and agree that there is a huge national emergency. I am sorry, but what is the emergency?

There was a court decision some months ago, about which the Government have since done very little and made very few statements. There has apparently been an interesting debate between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party in the coalition. In the interests of public scrutiny, we should be given the minutes of the discussion between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister, and of all the sofa discussions that have no doubt taken place. I thought that sofa politics ended with new Labour, but apparently it still goes on in Downing street. We need to know the nature of that debate.

What is the objection to a sunset clause that would bring the—to me—very unpalatable Bill to a conclusion in six months’ time? Such a clause would at least give lawyers an opportunity to make a detailed case, and the Government an opportunity to explain their case a bit better. It would give the Home Affairs Committee a chance to discuss it, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights a chance to examine it, which we as Members of Parliament would also be able to do.

In an age of social media, it is interesting to see the numbers of people following the debate online and live. They are interested in social media, privacy and communication, and they all have views and opinions. I have no idea what all their views and opinions are. All I know is that as an individual Member of Parliament, I, like all colleagues in the Chamber, must vote on this piece of legislation without having had the chance to reflect or consult.

This is not a good day for Parliament. It is not a good advertisement for Parliament. It is not a good advertisement for democracy. The very least that we can do is to agree that this wrong-headed piece of legislation will expire by the end of this year and force the Government to come up with something more palatable, more carefully thought out and more sensible in respect of the protection of privacy and civil rights for all. That is why we were elected to Parliament. We should be given the opportunity to do our job, and should not have to lie down in front of a steamroller and accept something that we know in our hearts to be ill thought out and wrong.

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[Dr Huppert]

These are, I hope, two unobjectionable new clauses, which seek clarity from the Government about what is intended in respect of the transparency reporting. One challenge we have faced for a very long time in this area is the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, very little information is kept by the Home Office or any of the other bodies about what exactly this information is used for, how many pieces of information are collected by different people and what the reasons were. This is a very frustrating state of affairs.

When we looked at the draft Communications Data Bill, we found that there was just a two-week snapshot survey of a few police forces—it was not even all of them—asking about the purposes for which communications data are used. For that reason, I have for a long time wanted proper transparency reporting from the Government and all the organisations—some companies, such as Google, already do this as far as they can—so that we know what is being done and we can make an informed decision about whether it is being done appropriately.

Currently, we have well over 500,000 requests for communications data every year. In order to judge whether that is a large or a small number, we need to know why they were made. We also need to know—we simply do not know this at the moment—how many people it relates to. Do those 500,000 requests relate to more than 500,000 people, or are there, in fact, 20 requests, say, relating to one person? We simply do not have that information.

This is not just a concern that I and various others have raised; it is something that the interception of communications commissioner raised in his 2013 annual report, in which he said:

“In my view the unreliability and inadequacy of the statistical requirements is a significant problem which requires attention.”

We must fix this; it is very important that we know. It was a bit of a shock to find, for example, that only 11.4% of requests were for national security. The vast majority were to prevent or detect crime or to prevent disorder. We should have that information available; we should know. Partly because of the lack of it, the commissioner highlighted the fact that he simply had to estimate various parameters that he was supposed to be investigating. He also said that he was concerned about “significant institutional overuse” and that the figure was “a very large number” that had

“the feel of being too many.”

We need to have the information available and published, so that we can make a proper decision.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I warmly endorse what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Does he agree that if more examples were given of a collated nature—such as those we read about frequently in individual criminal court cases—about the vital role that such data play, that would go a long way to allaying unnecessary public suspicion about the importance of having such data available for the forces of law and order?

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Unfortunately, the approach taken for, I believe, many decades has been not to tell people. We have always been told, “We can’t tell you what’s being done at the moment, but we need more.” If we were told and there were transparency, the public could make a much more sensible judgment about what was needed.

New clause 3 highlights what I would expect to see as part of new transparency reporting. It contains requirements to ensure that information is available about the offence being investigated, so that we can find out if it is about children applying to the wrong school or speeding offences, as opposed to national security matters, how long the data have been requested, so that we can work out how long they should be kept for—is it usually used after a week or a year?—and what sort of data they are, so that we know whether we are talking about reverse directory look-ups or rather more personal information. I hope the Minister will be able to reassure me that that is his intention.

I should say that both my new clauses were inspired by Big Brother Watch, which I have been working with on this whole Bill and which particularly wanted to make these points clear. New clause 4 deals with the problem that a number of organisations feel they cannot publish their transparency reports and say what they have been asked to do for fear of violating the legislation against tipping off. I understand why there is a concern. The Government do not want companies to say, “The following things we are reporting to the Government, but these things are perfectly safe; we will not tell the Government about them.” We want companies to be able to publish that anonymised information, so I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that companies can safely publish it as part of their transparency reports without fear of being prosecuted.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reassurances on both those aspects.

[James Brokenshire]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) for tabling these new clauses to enable a debate about transparency and the information provided in the exercise of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. He will know that the Government—the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister—announced last week that we intend to introduce annual transparency reports relating to the exercise of powers under RIPA. That report will provide as much detail as possible, but without undermining the effectiveness of the agencies or posing a risk to national security.

The point I would make to my hon. Friend is that if we had individual companies giving details, that might give an indication to those who would do us harm, who might ask themselves, “Well, which ones aren’t doing that and which direction should we go in?” This therefore has to be done with care, given the nature of transparency, but I endorse his point about the need for more information to be provided, so that the public and this House can have confidence in the utilisation of the powers set out in the legislation.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will my hon. Friend take on board the point I made in my intervention a few moments ago? Although one fully accepts that one cannot give full statistical data about these sorts of activities as they relate to national security, the point that the hon. Member for Cambridge made—that the majority are about serious crime rather than national security—ought to give us the opportunity to set out many case studies that would improve the public’s understanding of why it is so important that we have these data.

[James Brokenshire]

I know that my hon. Friend understands the importance of communications data in the fight against organised crime, as 95% of the organised crime cases that have been brought before the courts have relied on those data. He will also be aware of some of the surveys that have been run to indicate the proportions of communications data that are used and how they are broken down. For example, a survey in 2012 showed that 51% of communications data used to investigate sexual offences were older than six months. It is that type of information that, if we had further detail, would give that sense of how communications data are used to reassure the public and others in respect of the utility of the powers that are there. That certainly touches on one of my hon. Friend’s points.

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[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend argues for a different approach. He talks about a limited period and then about the need to safeguard that information following an event. I do not agree with him on that, as that is a separate debate. However, I agree that where we can see accurate data being provided, we seek to surface that as much as possible as part of the approach on transparency.

As the commissioner made clear in his report, the Home Office was working with him to improve the statistics collected by public authorities. He identified a number of further elements in his report, including the total number of applications submitted, the total number of items of data requested, the total items of data broken down by statutory purpose for which they were required and the total items of data broken down by crime type or other purpose for which they were required, which is the point that my hon. Friend has just made.

We are working with public authorities to ensure that most of these statistics are already being collected by them, and are progressing work to agree on the relevant practicalities such as agreed nomenclature that would enable those that had not already been collected to be collected. Transparency is important in ensuring continued public trust in the agencies and police forces that have been granted intrusive powers. However, transparency does have limits. We should not commit to such transparency that would publicise police and other sensitive investigative methodology, because explaining exactly how our investigators do their job will naturally lead to terrorists, criminals and others who wish us harm knowing how to avoid detection. We must also be careful not to weigh down investigators with too much bureaucracy such that they cannot perform the important function of preventing and detecting crimes and keeping us safe.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I appreciate that my hon. Friend is mainly talking about the gathering and publication of statistical data, but it would not involve much effort for police forces to collate even half a dozen or a dozen cases per year that are reported in the press to show how these communications data are used in individual cases. A few good examples that have already been published would go a long way to help the public understand how important this methodology is.

[James Brokenshire]

In highlighting case studies, my hon. Friend makes an important point. A number of case studies involving serious murders have already been referenced in the debate this evening. Indeed, the shadow Home Secretary highlighted a case in which a young person who was safeguarded was effectively prevented from killing themselves. Such examples highlight the absolute import and value of communications data and the way in which our emergency services, police and others rely on them, not just to solve crime and to protect the public from those very real threats that we understand from a criminal law and a counter-terrorism perspective, but to protect children and vulnerable adults from harm. The ability to identify where someone may be through tracking the communications data can literally be a matter of life and death. My hon. Friend is therefore right to suggest we can draw on case studies to provide greater explanation. In the appalling Soham murders, for example, communications data were instrumental in bringing those responsible to justice. Such cases highlight the significance of the use of the powers.

I recognise the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge, but I am unable to accept his new clause tonight. I can make it clear, however, that I do not resist increased transparency; indeed, it is the reason we have agreed to bring forward annual transparency reports. Such a level of detail can be considered in different ways, and in amending the code of practice on the acquisition and disclosure of communications data later this year, we can ensure that the appropriate text is included in statutory guidance, for example. Parliament will have a chance to return to the issue soon in that context. There are perhaps other ways in which we can reflect further on getting the balance right.

My hon. Friend made another point that may in fact relate to section 19 of RIPA, rather than to the section he suggested, concerning the illegality of disclosing the existence of a warrant under that section. To do so would risk exposing the existence of an interception capability and, crucially, the potential lack of such a capability, which would indicate to criminals and terrorists, who may wish to exploit such a gap, which communication services they may be able to use to conduct their illicit activities without detection. I believe that my hon. Friend seeks to ensure that where such a disclosure is made as part of an annual transparency report issued by the major service providers, a defence will be available to them in any subsequent legal proceedings.

The Government believe that, as at present, it is for the interception of communications commissioner to publish the total number of interception warrants. The commissioner has expressed his concern about the nature of the transparency reports, particularly with reference to requests for communications data. In his annual report for 2013, the commissioner is clear that statistics from transparency reports should “be treated with caution” as they may “lead to misleading comparisons”. Indeed, it would not be helpful to the public for there to be numerous sources of information on the number of requests or warrants when there is a lack of clarity and consistency as between each source. We are doing everything that we can, working with the independent commissioner, to improve the transparency of how such powers are used, but the additional provision would not help to give the public greater clarity, so I invite my hon. Friend to withdraw new clause 3.

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[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Third time.

We have had a lively and constructive debate today on the urgent need to ensure that communications data continue to be retained, and to clarify the law in respect of interception for communications service providers.

I thank all those who have contributed to the Bill during its various stages so far. I also want to place on record my gratitude to those who have recognised both the need for this legislation and the reason it is so important that we see it enacted quickly.

We discussed the Bill earlier today on Second Reading and it has just been scrutinised in Committee. I thank the Opposition for the support they have given to the Bill and their recognition of the importance of the issues it deals with. I also thank the Clerks of the House and all those involved in supporting us and enabling us to do this business in one day. Particular thanks are due to my hon. Friend the Minister for Security and Immigration for the excellent job he has done in taking the Bill through its Committee stage, and to the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) for his contributions on behalf of the Opposition.

I do not want to rehearse in detail all the arguments that have been made, but I remind Members that the Bill deals with two urgent issues, including the response to the European Court of Justice decision in April, which struck down the European data retention directive. That has created uncertainty among communications service providers about the legal basis for the retention of communications data in the UK, which is a crucial resort for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am sure the Home Secretary knows that I am, in general, supportive of the Bill, but, in the light of the vote we have just taken, what sort of guarantee can she offer the House that the same European Court that struck down the previous situation will not strike down this Bill as well?

[Mrs May]

As I indicated earlier, and as I think others have indicated during the course of the various debates we have had today, the European Court of Justice did not strike down the ability to retain data. It recognised that the ability to retain data was necessary and it recognised purposes for which those data could be retained. What it did in its judgment was say that the data retention directive was drafted too broadly and it challenged its scope.

Of course, it was always the case that regulations here in the United Kingdom had been drawn more tightly and narrowly than the data retention directive. We are able to put through this Bill with confidence because not only were our data retention regulations drafted in a way that met many of the issues that the ECJ raised, but we have made some changes to ensure that we meet the extra requirements that the ECJ made on us. That is what gives us confidence in the future of this legislation.

We have heard a number of examples today of how important it is to have the ability to retain and access communications data. It is vital for piecing together the activities of suspects, victims and vulnerable people, and ensuring that serious criminals and terrorists can be brought to justice. This Bill will clarify the legal basis for us to oblige communications service providers to continue retaining communications data.

At the same time, we need to put beyond doubt the legal obligation on companies that provide services to people in the UK to comply with our laws on interception, regardless of where they are based. As we know, the communications services used by us all are increasingly provided to the UK by companies based outside the country. Interception, which can take place only within strict limits and with a warrant authorised by the Secretary of State, can prove vital when investigating the most dangerous criminals or defending the security of the United Kingdom.

In the absence of explicit provisions in legislation, some overseas companies have started to question whether the law applies to them, so we are clarifying the law. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was always intended to apply to any company providing communications services to the UK, as the provisions in the Bill make absolutely clear. The Bill does not introduce new powers, or extend the reach of law enforcement or security and intelligence agencies in any way. It responds to the European judgment, clarifies the existing provisions of RIPA and ensures that the police and security and intelligence agencies can maintain essential capabilities to fight crime and protect the public.

The Bill does not replicate the draft Communications Data Bill. As I have said several times, I continue to believe that its measures are absolutely necessary, but this Bill is not about what was in the draft Bill; it is about ensuring that we retain the capabilities we have at the moment. It will be for the next Parliament to debate other extensions in relation to communications data, as in the draft Bill. We know that that debate will take place because this Bill has been “sunsetted”. It will therefore be necessary for the Government to look at the issues after the election. Indeed, that will be on the basis of informed debate, following the review undertaken by David Anderson, as agreed.

The Bill will ensure that the job of those who protect us does not get even more difficult; that they can continue to use powers that are part of everyday policing; that they remain able to find vulnerable people at risk or in danger; and that they can maintain the use of vital capabilities to solve crime, save lives and protect the public from harm. It will ensure that our police, law enforcement agencies and security and intelligence agencies have the capabilities to do that. I now invite the House to pass the Bill and send it to the other place, and I commend it to the House.

Asylum Seekers (Support)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 10th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I agree that it is important to take decisions as speedily as possible to ensure that those who are entitled to the full humanitarian protection of this country receive that support and can continue with their lives, and that those who are not entitled can then be removed from this country so that the system is seen to be upheld.

We judge that the levels of support are appropriate, but we keep them under review. We will be reviewing the level of current support in the coming months, as I have committed to do in this House.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Given that one of the most basic needs of any asylum seeker is to have a roof over his or her head, will the Minister explain a little bit more about emergency accommodation, or is it the case that asylum seekers are among those to be found sleeping rough?

[James Brokenshire]

The support that is provided to those seeking asylum includes accommodation. There are provisions relating to temporary support as well as to the section 95 support that has been referenced in this urgent question. The Government have put in place a new contract arrangement, the COMPASS contract, to provide those services. Obviously, we believe that that is now delivering more effective service and more effective value for money. Clearly, we keep such matters under review.

Public Administration Select Committee

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 10th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

There are three steps to take to ensure more accurate crime statistics. One is regular audit. The second is to abandon targets. Many police and crime commissioners have abandoned targets altogether, because they recognise that they have a distorting effect on behaviour and attitudes. The third is that the police themselves need to emphasise the core policing values of accountability, honesty and integrity so that police officers at desks recording crimes recognise that, above everything else, recording the crimes effectively is a microcosm of the honesty, integrity and accountability that they must carry throughout their entire policing profession. It is these values that have been subverted by the target culture. That is the responsibility of both parties over a long period—it is not a partisan point. Our key witness told me that the Metropolitan police is still full of target junkies. It will take a long time to change the culture of leadership throughout our police forces in England and Wales—this also applies to Scotland, although we have not inquired into Scotland—but it has to be done.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is never easy to be a whistleblower, but I cannot imagine a much tougher environment to be a whistleblower in than the police service. What practical measures of protection does the Committee recommend to safeguard the interests of people such as my hon. Friend’s brave constituent PC Patrick in the future?

[Mr Jenkin]

We recommend immunity from disciplinary proceedings while a whistleblowing process is under way. That is standard practice in the financial services industry, nuclear industry, aviation sector, transport sector and many other industries, and it should be so in the police as well. I am pleased to say that, in a letter sent to me by my hon. Friend the Minister, a number of possible options have been included. They are:

“Anonymity for the whistleblower from the point at which the allegation is made…‘sealed’ investigations so that, for a set period, no-one under investigation knows that it is happening …immunity from disciplinary/misconduct proceedings… financial incentives for whistleblowers, for example a share of recovered criminal assets from the case…protection against vexatious or malicious allegations.”

All those options would have made life very different for my constituent.

Syrian Refugees

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. A large number of colleagues wish to participate, but there is also a debate on this very subject to follow. Therefore, my normal practice of calling everybody might not apply today. What is required is brevity, and I think that the textbook on succinctness can be written by Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I was afraid that you would choose me for that, Mr Speaker.

Like hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber, I strongly endorse any help that can be given to vulnerable victims of war, but with regard to the second category that the Home Secretary mentioned—people who have received political asylum—can she assure the House that they are being properly screened so that we do not store up trouble for the future for our security services, as we are already worried about jihadists of our own going out to Syria and coming back?

[Mrs May]

I can assure my hon. Friend that all the appropriate checks are made.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 21st January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I am sure that on a Privy Counsellor basis, the Home Secretary would be happy to brief the right hon. Lady. I am speaking as a Back Bencher, but it seems that when the public are concerned, and when there are people who hold such dangerous views, it is not unreasonable for us as members of the public to ask our two parties of state to work together on this.

The memorandum says that the Home Secretary must reasonably consider

“that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism,”

and with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity,

“for TPIMs to be imposed on an individual.”

That is not unreasonable.

There are two points to consider and I understand the attack from the Labour party. I also understand that the High Court had a problem with relocation, but I would have thought we could find a way through that. If relocation was absolutely necessary from the point of view of protecting the public, I do not think it unreasonable —I have been listening to the shadow Home Secretary—for there to be some requirement for relocation.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I hope my hon. Friend does not mind, but I must finish in a few seconds. I will end with this point, although I would like to be able to give way.

We have a right to know that these six people are now safe to be released on the streets. That is a reasonable question. The Home Secretary’s reasonable point of view is that there must be some new evidence that they continue to be a threat to the public, and we cannot keep someone under a control order for ever on the basis of information that is two years old. I think that is her point of view, and that is how TPIMs differ from control orders. From a rational and objective point of view, that is not an unreasonable stance.

When the Minister sums up the debate, without going into operational details, I would like him to seek, as best he can, to reassure the House that those people have behaved themselves over the past two years, that there is no evidence of new involvement in terrorism, and that in his view, they will not be a threat to society. That would be entirely proper for the Minister to do. Surely all the public want is reassurance that they and their children are safe, and it is the job of us in this Parliament to ensure that those children are safe.

[Alan Johnson (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), who spoke for the public. It was the kind of speech that should have been made by someone on the Treasury Bench.

To join in the debate with the national union of current and former Home Secretaries, it is important to stress that nobody wants control orders or TPIMs. In our free society, no one has ever issued a control order without a heavy heart—and the current Home Secretary issued control orders before the change.

The best solution would be to have the ability to use intercepts as evidence. There is full agreement in the House on that, but Sir John Chilcot’s cross-party Privy Council review could find no practical way of doing it. I briefed the current Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, and we accepted that there was no way forward. Added to that, an authoritative review by senior counsel found that using intercept evidence would not have made a difference in nine cases they examined.

We are therefore stuck in a dilemma. The hon. Member for Gainsborough was right that there is little difference between TPIMs and control orders, apart from the two main measures we are debating. Shami Chakrabarti has described TPIMs as control orders-lite—Shami’s problem is with “control orders”; my problem is with “lite”. She is right in a way. The Home Secretary’s review came to the same conclusion as the previous Government—I was confident that it would. The argument is not about sending people through the courts. There is a small number of people whom we can neither deport nor send through the courts, so we must have a process.

We use control orders or TPIMs with a heavy heart, but there is no alternative. I have the affliction of seeing the other side of the argument, which affects all hon. Members. I can see the civil rights argument for getting rid of control orders, but I cannot see the argument for keeping TPIMs, which apply to a small number of dangerous people who could be free on our streets wreaking havoc and causing harm, and taking away relocation and the ability to renew.

It is important to stress that the people subjected to TPIMs have not simply looked at a few unsavoury websites or made a couple of inflammatory speeches—an awful lot of people would be on TPIMs if they were used in those circumstances. TPIMs, like control orders before them, are issued on the basis not of an extravagant expression of support for terrorism, but of evidence of an intention to carry out threats. As the Government’s independent reviewer puts it, the suspects are at

“the highest end of seriousness”.

There is complete consensus on that among those on the two Front Benches. When control orders were introduced in 2005, it soon became apparent that, if those subjected to them continued to live within that sphere of influence, making it easier for them to fraternise with their old associates, the order was less effective and the ability to abscond was enhanced.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am following the right hon. Gentleman’s argument closely. Although I intend to vote with the Government, I find common ground with him on the question of relocation in one respect. Does he agree that, if terrorists move away from the more spectacular type of attack to the type that involves just a small number of them, and if people are not physically located away from one another, it makes things much harder? There will be nothing to intercept if people plan low-level attacks by meeting face to face.

[Alan Johnson]

Relocation does not have to be part of an order—it would be within the Home Secretary’s box of tools. There would be no argument whatsoever if there was an agreement that that might be counterproductive. I do not think we are over those kinds of threats yet—I take issue with that—but I take the general thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s point.

It would be a different matter if relocation was objected to by the courts, but that is not the case. My right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) quoted David Anderson and others. It would be a different matter if the removal of relocation was required by the Government’s independent advisers, but David Anderson thought we were going backwards on protecting the public. That is what he said in his first review, in so many words. Those on the Liberal Democrat Benches do not like to listen to Lord Carlile, and neither would I if I was in their position, but David Anderson’s predecessor said:

“On the evidence available, I am persuaded firmly—I choose my words carefully—to the view that it would be negligent to remove relocation from the main provisions.”

Both Governments’ reviewers said the same thing.

It was me who placed the control order on Ibrahim Magag, who was relocated away from London. Why was he relocated away from London? Because the ruling of Lord Justice Collins was that

“it is too dangerous to permit him to be in London even for a short period.”

That was the courts, not me. Why on earth did the current Home Secretary allow him back into London, enabling him to hail a taxi and disappear? In times past, media pressure would have meant a taxi being ordered for the Home Secretary.

Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Friday 17th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Chope]

I do not think I can comment on that, particularly because the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) is not in the Chamber.

We then come on to the question of penalties. Let me illustrate the point with an example. I have a constituency case of a person who came here on a visitor’s visa. As they are married to a British citizen, all they needed to do was keep renewing that visa but they did not apply for an extension within the specified time and as a result they have been refused a new visa. I discussed with them whether they should appeal against that refusal, but there is no power of appeal and the advice that is given is that if an in-country application for a visa extension is rejected the person should voluntarily make their own way back to the country from which they came as it is possible they might be subject to a deportation order in due course. Of course, under the law a deportation order is subject to appeal so the authorities do not want to make many such orders as the appeals would clog up the immigration tribunal system. People therefore overstay their visas with impunity as there is effectively no sanction against them. The only sanction arises if they want to visit their country of origin to see a relative or something like that, when they suddenly find that they do not have the right paperwork to get back into the country. They can lie low in this country with impunity for months or years.

I think it would be reasonable to say that somebody guilty of an offence on summary conviction should be subject to a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment or a fine that would be unlimited in England and Wales and would not exceed £5,000 in Scotland or Northern Ireland. A person would be brought before the court and, under the provisions of clause 2(2), would be ordered to be deported.

Unlike the present laws relating to deportation, which are rarely exercised, certainly for relatively minor offences—they are not applied in the cases to which I have referred—the deportation order would be mandatory unless the Secretary of State certified that it was against the public interest. In practice, the person would come before the court and, if found guilty, would be fined and deported or imprisoned, probably not for very long, pending deportation. The deportation would be ordered by the court, rather than the immigration authorities—the Border Agency—which is what happens at present.

An official from the Scotland Office contacted me, wondering what will happen in Scotland when the Bill is on the statute book. She pointed out that in Scotland deportation orders are not made by the courts; they merely make a recommendation to that effect. She agreed that there is nothing to stop the courts being given the power to make specific deportation orders, which I think is fundamental to clause 2. If people are here without legal authority, the most important thing is that they are deported as soon as possible, rather than kept in custody at great expense. Rather than being subject to a recommendation of deportation, they should just be subject to deportation.

While driving to the House this morning, I saw a big, brand-new van on which were the words, “Home Office Immigration Enforcement”. I could not see whether there was anybody inside the van, other than the driver. I suspect that the large lettering was designed to reassure the public that something is being done about all this, but my experience, which I have referred to briefly today, leads me to believe that that is another game of bluff and bluster by the Government and that, in reality, they do not have the will to ensure that our borders are kept secure and that people who enter illegally are found guilty of an offence. [Interruption.]

The hon. Member for Ealing North (Stephen Pound) is chuntering from the Opposition Front Bench. He might think it unusual for me to be concerned about Government policy, but I think that this is another area of Government policy that could be tightened significantly. That would be in accordance not only with public interest, but with the will of the public. In the popular mind, illegality means being against the criminal law, and if someone is guilty of a criminal offence they should be subject to the consequences.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is unusual for my hon. Friend to reach this stage in the presentation of any of his multifarious Bills without making some reference in depth to the European Union. Will he explain what measures other European Union countries take when people overstay or enter illegally?

[Mr Chope]

Without having researched that in detail, and based upon my experience as Chairman of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, my answer is that practice varies significantly from one country to another. Some make being an illegal immigrant a criminal offence, but others do not. There is no uniform practice across the European Union—

[Dr Lewis]

So we cannot blame it for this one.

[Mr Chope]

I think that responsibility for this rests solely with the United Kingdom. While wearing the hat as I have just described, I have come across a lot of evidence of organised criminal networks bringing people into our country illegally. The networks are usually based overseas and take very large sums from often very unfortunate migrants.

Once the migrants get here, they can be assured that they are here with impunity, because they will be able to lie low and will not be subject to any criminal sanctions. That gives them a perverse incentive to come to the United Kingdom rather than go to another European country where the rules are stricter and being there without authority gives rise to criminal penalties and sanctions.

Intelligence and Security Services

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Huppert]

It is absolutely right that we should have that debate. We have to agree it—we cannot just give carte blanche to people. I think that view is shared by everybody here. The hon. Gentleman is right. We must be balanced. None of us wants the details of exact techniques to be publicised. None the less, we do need to have the discussion about what is okay, what is not okay and where the line is drawn.

We know that the National Security Council was not even told of the scale and scope of the surveillance on our own citizens. We have heard that there were concerns about what would happen if the public knew what was happening. It was feared that it could lead to public debate and legal challenge—well, so be it. Public debate and legal challenge are an important part of the rule of law, and to avoid accountability through secrecy is simply not the solution.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is being extremely generous in taking interventions. A few moments ago, he said that he did not want detail to be released. The problem with the mass release of thousands of stolen documents is that nobody knows the detail before they release them and propagate them. Is that not rather different from whistleblowing on an individual error or abuse, when one is putting out there hundreds of thousands of documents that one has not even read oneself?

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that it would be irresponsible to publish hundreds of thousands of documents without having a look at them. That is why I am so glad that that is what The Guardian has explicitly not done. It has taken a responsible approach and managed to prevent that. We can imagine what could have happened if there had been a WikiLeaks-style publication. The hon. Gentleman should be concerned about the fact that a contractor was able to get hold of all the information, and that is a serious failure from the NSA and a great disgrace. If it cannot protect information to that level of security, it should be very worried. There are, I think, 850,000 people who could have had access to that information. Was the NSA certain that none of them would pass it on to a foreign power? Frankly, passing it on to The Guardian is probably about the safest thing that could have happened to it.

One of the functions of Parliament is to pass legislation and scrutinise the work of the Government. However, if we do not know what is happening, how can there be any scrutiny? We see legislation such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 being used beyond the original intentions of the House, and that makes it impossible for Parliament to do its job. People say, “If you have done nothing wrong, you have nothing to fear.” I suggest that they say that to the green activists infiltrated by the police or to members of the Lawrence family. Human behaviour changes when people know that they are being watched. Is that the world in which we want to live?

There is also an economic issue. Our actions are hitting our own economic interests. The internet is a huge factor in business here—some £110 billion of GDP. It is a dynamic market, and it can move. If people are concerned about the privacy of their data here, whether their personal information or important company secrets, they will simply move where they store that information. Germany is already launching schemes to encourage businesses to go there instead, with e-mail systems that guarantee that no data will leave German boundaries while e-mails are being sent, so there is not the problem of information going overseas and coming back again to be looked at. That will hit us financially, regardless of anything else.

We must look at the balance between intelligence gathering and privacy. We need to have oversight. Although I am pleased that we are having the heads of the intelligence and security services coming to a public forum, it has been incredibly hard to get that to happen. Of course national security should not be taken lightly, but the public needs to understand what is being done in their name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

It is extremely welcome that Parliament is at last having a debate about the fact that a state employee can select on a computer any item about an individual—their address, phone number, mobile number, e-mail, passport number, credit card number or any of their log-ins to a web service—and thus access the content of their communications and details of who they communicate with, the full range of their internet use, their location and a great deal else. Of course, GCHQ is proud to insist that none of that is at all likely, because it always acts within the law—if only. Yes, the computer operator must provide a justification for the information that he is seeking, but that is not too hard when he is conveniently offered a drop-down menu to prompt his thoughts.

All such activity is supposed to be firmly controlled by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 but that Act is, I think, more about facilitating such exercises than curtailing them. RIPA is so poorly drafted—one almost wonders whether that was deliberate—and is open to such broad interpretation that it allows Government agencies such as GCHQ to do whatever they like. We are assured by the Home Office that it is concerned only with the metadata—the technical wherewithal of communications systems, rather than the documents—but the Snowden documents, as reported, tell us the truth:

“GCHQ policy is to treat it pretty much all the same whether it’s content or metadata.”

We are repeatedly given assurances that privacy is fully safeguarded, until we discover that the National Security Agency in the United States spends £250 million a year on weakening encryption. No doubt GCHQ is acting similarly on breaking commercially available security products.

The truth is, and has been for a long time, that the NSA in the States, via the Prism programme, and GCHQ in the UK, via Tempora, have acquired the capability to hoover up vast, untold quantities of personal data from the undersea cables that carry internet data on a colossal scale in and out of the UK, and to do that without any check or accountability. Does that matter? I think that it does. Tempora already allows GCHQ the capacity to collect more than 21 petabytes a day. To put that in context, it is the equivalent of sending all the data in all the books in the British Library 192 times every 24 hours. Two years ago, there were already 550 British and American analysts ploughing through the Tempora database. The balance between safeguarding personal safety and tracking down terrorism and serious crimes has unquestionably been drastically breached. The security agencies are operating under outdated law, despite the recent changes that we all know about, without a genuine public mandate.

What should be done? It was decided at the end of the previous Parliament that all Select Committees, except one, should be elected by the House, and not selected by the Whips and beholden to the party leaderships, as hitherto. The one exception was of course the Intelligence and Security Committee, which operates in a totally different way, untouched by the wave of accountability that swept through the Commons in 2009-10, in response to the revelations of the expenses scandal.

[Dr Lewis]

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will—I suspect that he will—enlarge on that point, but will he mention the fact that that one Committee is different from all the others, because it is the only one that has access to highly classified material? Surely, that is the relevant point.

[Mr Meacher]

That is perfectly true. The real issue is whether that justifies its being outside the system of accountability of the Houses of Parliament. In my submission, it does not. Safeguards might be required, but not the construction of a different type of Committee, whose Chair and members are appointed by the Prime Minister, to replace as and when he or she wishes, and which sits in private.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Graham Brady (in the Chair)]

The hon. Gentleman has corrected the record, which is a point of debate and not of order.

[Dr Lewis]

Further to that point of order, Mr Brady. Is there any way in which we can arrange for bogus points of order to be struck from the record, so that Members will be deterred from making them in future?

[Mr Graham Brady (in the Chair)]

No, they remain on the record to embarrass those who make them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I genuinely congratulate my near namesake, the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), not only on securing this debate but on the way in which he presented his case and the exceptionally generous way in which he handled interventions. I hope that it will not damage his credibility on the left too much if I point out how very strongly I agreed with at least one of the points that he made in response to my intervention on him.

There are three questions that I want to address. First, on which the hon. Gentleman responded, why is it so easy for junior personnel to engage in mass leaking? Secondly, is it easier than before, as he suggested, to track or spy on people? Thirdly, who should rightly be regarded as a whistleblower? That is the point that I was touching on when I intervened on him. On the first question, he is absolutely right. If these secrets are so sensitive, there is something terribly wrong with the system that allows an Army private or a junior technician access to them.

[Dr Huppert]

indicated assent.

[Dr Lewis]

I am glad to see the hon. Gentleman endorsing what I am saying. Any system that allows tens of thousands of top secret documents to be downloaded by such junior personnel in such quantity must be at risk.

In an absolutely outstanding contribution to the debate, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood)—I do congratulate him on his measured and exceptionally well-informed contribution—referred to the whole business of Enigma and the ultra secret of world war two.

Colleagues might remember that in 1974 the book, “The Ultra Secret”, perhaps regrettably—historians are grateful—revealed the secret that, as a result of the development of the Enigma machine, we were decrypting codes during the war that people thought were unbreakable. The book was published. Its author was F. W. Winterbotham. If I remember correctly, his role was to be in charge of the signals liaison units, which comprised members of the special services who were involved in the distribution of the Enigma decrypts and who were spread around all parts of the military infrastructure that received that intelligence. In other words, they were crucially aware of the need to keep top secret material secure. As such, they had special security arrangements to prevent anything like the Snowden case and the Bradley Manning case from happening. There is a huge gap in the security arrangements for the handling of such material.

On whether it is easier than before to track and spy on people, as the hon. Member for Cambridge has suggested, in one sense, he is absolutely right. We have electronic devices that offer more ways in. In another sense, though, he is not quite right. The problem is that in the past, when we wanted to track or spy on someone, all we had to do was to get a court order to enable the interception of mail or telephone calls. Now, with so many new systems of communication, it is actually much harder to track and spy on people who ought to be tracked and spied upon, according to the process of law, because there are so many other ways to communicate.

[Dr Huppert]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and for some of his earlier comments. There is an interesting issue. Communications data are increasingly available to the police, but records of the locations where people had phones are now kept for a year. We can join the dots to find out exactly where somebody went. That information is available to the police and is used in many investigations. That would never have been available before. He is right that there are some safeguards; but 20 or 30 years ago, there would have been no way to say, “Three months ago, where was Dr Julian Lewis at any particular moment?”

[Dr Lewis]

I entirely accept that point, which was partly covered by the hon. Member for Cheltenham when he briefly referred to the need to hoover up haystacks to be able to search for the needles in them afterwards. The question is whether we then have access to the irrelevant parts of the haystack, or legally supervised targeted access to those needles in the haystack, which can be detected as a result of modern technology. This is all about the mass collection, mass storage and interrogation of mass data so collected and stored.

I now come back to the third question: who should rightly be regarded as a whistleblower? I would like to reach a point of agreement again with the hon. Member for Cambridge. In his defence of The Guardian newspaper, he said that it is precisely because The Guardian is not simply publishing everything that has fallen into its hands that it is acting responsibly. We can argue the finer points of that; he certainly has an arguable case. Where there can be no argument, however, is in the case of a person who steals the mass database and transmits it to other unauthorised individuals or organisations, or indeed newspapers, when he cannot possibly have read or in any way assessed whether the contents of that database had been properly collected or whether an abuse of the intelligence services’ powers had in fact taken place. That person is not acting responsibly, so the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson), whom I always admire, should be a little more careful before ascribing the term “brave whistleblower” to someone like Snowden.

Snowden is no more a whistleblower than someone like Julian Assange or anyone else who gets a mass of information and feels that it is right to publish it and put it into the public domain for no other reason than it is classified secret or top secret. Basically, their rationale can only be that they do not think anything should ever be classified secret or top secret. Once they admit that there is a purpose in classifying some information, and that some information ought to be kept secret, then we get into the area of who decides what should be kept secret and what should be the result of whistleblowing activities.

When I see somebody who blows the whistle on an identifiable abuse, I say, “Well done”, provided, of course, that they have used and exhausted all the right channels and were left with no alternative. But when I see someone who abuses their access to a massive database and then publishes it widely, I say that that is not whistleblowing; that is irresponsible—

[Mr Graham Brady (in the Chair)]

Order.

National Security (The Guardian)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Julian Smith]

Finally, this debate is not an attack on the campaign to reconsider the extent of intelligence gathering and the concerns raised by the NSA, WikiLeaks and other intelligence revelations. The role of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee has only recently been strengthened.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I leave the Chamber in no doubt whatever that if I had done what The Guardian has done in relation to the classified material that we see, I have no hesitation in saying that I would expect to be charged. My hon. Friend mentioned the D notice system. Does he know whether The Guardian used or was approached under the terms of the D notices?

[Julian Smith]

I will address that point shortly.

I believe we have some of the best oversight in the world of our intelligence services—judicial, ministerial and parliamentary—but we are right to keep testing, keep questioning and keep challenging.

My intention today is to highlight where The Guardian has crossed the line between responsible journalism and seriously risking our national security and the lives of those who seek to protect us. If action is not taken, there will be direct results for our national security, now and in the future.

I pay tribute to our ex-colleague, Louise Mensch, who through her blog, social media and columns has ensured that this major national security issue has been kept alive throughout.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 15th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

There is understanding across government on the challenges and issues involved in protecting the police’s ability to fight crime and on the fact that a gap is emerging in this whole issue of communications data. It is important that we strike an effective balance between keeping the public safe and protecting civil liberties. That is why we are taking this issue seriously and considering it carefully—I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that the previous Labour Government did not do that. We will make proposals in due course to get this right.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Most people on both sides of the House, at least in the major parties, recognise the need for communications data to be preserved so that terrorist needles can be found in a communications haystack. Will the Minister confirm that we should be reassured by the fact that the people who preserve the communications haystack for a limited period are not the Government but the suppliers from the communications industry themselves?

Immigration Rules: Sponsors

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

My understanding is that people are able to do that. I can tell from the way the hon. Lady is looking at me that there is a point behind her question, so if she will do me the courtesy of dropping me a line, I will examine the argument she is making and get back to her, rather than diverting the debate away from its central point.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

At the risk of diverting the debate for just a fraction longer, I worry a bit about this language test. I come from a third-generation immigrant family, and my grandfather to the end of his life spoke English haltingly and with a thick foreign accent. What mattered was that he was able to undertake a productive trade, and that his children and grandchildren were not cosseted by being taught in the language of the country they had left, but were properly educated in the language of the country they had joined. To have too stringent a language test is to look at the problem the wrong way round.

[Mr Harper]

I was listening very carefully to what my hon. Friend said, and I will reflect on it. I thank him for making that point.

Let me say a little more about the financial changes—